\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ortega v. Lujan Grisham\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 22, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n SAMUEL ORTEGA; REBECCA SCOTT,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\n\n v. No. 24-2121\n (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00471-JB-SCY)\n MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, in her (D. N.M.)\n official capacity as Governor of the State of\n New Mexico; RAUL TORREZ, in his\n official capacity as Attorney General of the\n State of New Mexico,\n\n Defendants - Appellees.\n\n ------------------------------\n\n BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN\n VIOLENCE; GIFFORDS LAW CENTER\n TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE; STATE\n OF COLORADO; EVERYTOWN FOR\n GUN SAFETY,\n\n Amici Curiae.\n _________________________________\n\n ORDER\n _________________________________\n\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, MATHESON,\nBACHARACH, PHILLIPS, McHUGH, MORITZ, EID, CARSON, ROSSMAN, and\nFEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\n This matter is before the court on Defendants/Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing\n\nEn Banc, and Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing En\n\n Appellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\nBanc. The petition and the response were circulated to all judges of the court who are in\n\nregular active service, and a poll was called. The poll did not carry. Consequently, the\n\npetition is DENIED.\n\n Judges Moritz and Federico would grant the petition. Judge Federico has filed a\n\nseparate dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing, which is joined by Judge Moritz.\n\n\n Entered for the Court,\n\n\n PER CURIAM\n\n\n\n\n 2\n\n Appellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\nNo. 24-2121, Ortega v. Grisham\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ortega v. Lujan Grisham\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 22, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n SAMUEL ORTEGA; REBECCA SCOTT,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\\n\\n v. No. 24-2121\\n (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00471-JB-SCY)\\n MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, in her (D. N.M.)\\n official capacity as Governor of the State of\\n New Mexico; RAUL TORREZ, in his\\n official capacity as Attorney General of the\\n State of New Mexico,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees.\\n\\n ------------------------------\\n\\n BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN\\n VIOLENCE; GIFFORDS LAW CENTER\\n TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE; STATE\\n OF COLORADO; EVERYTOWN FOR\\n GUN SAFETY,\\n\\n Amici Curiae.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n ORDER\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, MATHESON,\\nBACHARACH, PHILLIPS, McHUGH, MORITZ, EID, CARSON, ROSSMAN, and\\nFEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n This matter is before the court on Defendants/Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing\\n\\nEn Banc, and Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Response in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing En\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nBanc. The petition and the response were circulated to all judges of the court who are in\\n\\nregular active service, and a poll was called. The poll did not carry. Consequently, the\\n\\npetition is DENIED.\\n\\n Judges Moritz and Federico would grant the petition. Judge Federico has filed a\\n\\nseparate dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing, which is joined by Judge Moritz.\\n\\n\\n Entered for the Court,\\n\\n\\n PER CURIAM\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 24-2121, Ortega v. Grisham\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30950,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10764062,"string":"10,764,062"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Lancaster v. Cartmell"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-6000"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 23, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n MAX LANCASTER, by and through Jan\\n Green, next of friend and attorney-in-fact;\\n PEGGY LANCASTER, by and through\\n Jan Green, next of friend and attorney-in-\\n fact,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\\n\\n v. No. 25-6000\\n\\n JEFFREY CARTMELL, Director of\\n Oklahoma Department of Human Services,\\n in his official capacity; ELLEN\\n BUETTNER, CEO/Director of Oklahoma\\n Health Care Authority, in her official\\n capacity,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Oklahoma\\n (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00842-J)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nMichael Craig Riffel (Katresa J. Riffel, Jonathan F. Benham, and Matthew C. Russell,\\nRiffel, Riffel & Benham, P.L.L.C., Enid, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) for\\nPlaintiffs-Appellants.\\n\\nRyan Gillett (Michael Williams, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for\\nDefendant-Appellee Ellen Buettner.\\n\\nSusan L. Eads, Assistant General Counsel (Josh Holloway, Assistant General Counsel,\\nOklahoma City, Oklahoma, with her on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee Jeffrey\\nCartmell.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nTYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Max and Peggy Lancaster applied for Medicaid benefits. After their\\n\\napplications were denied, the Lancasters sued the directors of the Oklahoma\\n\\nDepartment of Human Services and Oklahoma Health Care Authority (the Agencies)\\n\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the Agencies violated the Medicaid Act—\\n\\nspecifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)—by unlawfully denying the Lancasters’\\n\\nMedicaid applications. The Agencies jointly moved to dismiss the lawsuit. The\\n\\ndistrict court granted the motion, finding that the Lancasters were not eligible for\\n\\nMedicaid benefits because their financial resources exceeded the asset limitation for\\n\\nMedicaid eligibility. The Lancasters appealed.\\n\\n During the course of the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Medina v.\\n\\nPlanned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025). The Agencies argue that\\n\\nunder Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right enforceable though\\n\\n§ 1983.\\n\\n We agree and thus AFFIRM. The Supreme Court in Medina explained that a\\n\\nstatute confers a personally enforceable right only if the law “clearly and\\n\\nunambiguously uses rights-creating terms” with an “unmistakable focus on\\n\\nindividuals like the plaintiff.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 368 (citations modified). It then\\n\\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A)—a provision materially similar to § 1396a(a)(8)—did\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nnot satisfy that standard and rejected plaintiffs’ private right of action. Medina\\n\\napplies with equal force to the Lancasters’ claims here.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n The Lancasters 1 transferred approximately $3.8 million worth of their real and\\n\\npersonal property to The Lancaster Family LLC, a limited liability company owned\\n\\nby their three adult children. In return, the Family LLC executed a loan agreement,\\n\\nreal estate mortgages, personal guarantees, and a promissory note. The Lancasters\\n\\nthen applied for Medicaid benefits but were found ineligible.\\n\\n The Lancasters sued the Agencies in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\n\\nclaiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). According to the complaint, the\\n\\nAgencies erred in finding the Lancasters ineligible based on their asset\\n\\ndetermination; the Lancasters argue this determination violated § 1396a(a)(8), which\\n\\nrequires the Agencies to promptly provide Medicaid benefits to eligible individuals.\\n\\n The Agencies moved to dismiss and argued, in part, that the Family LLC’s\\n\\npromissory note to the Lancasters was not bona fide—that is, the loan was not\\n\\n“legally valid under the applicable State’s law and made in good faith.” See POMS\\n\\nSI § 1120.220(B)(3). The promissory note was therefore a countable resource for\\n\\npurposes of determining the Lancasters’ Medicaid eligibility. And because the\\n\\nLancasters’ resources exceeded the applicable threshold, the Agencies determined\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Mrs. Lancaster passed away during this litigation, and thus the Agencies\\nrequest that her claims be dismissed. But because we dispose of the case on\\nindependent grounds, we need not address whether Mrs. Lancaster must be\\nindividually dismissed from this appeal.\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nthat the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits. The district court agreed\\n\\nand granted the Agencies’ motion.\\n\\n While the appeal was pending oral argument, the Agencies jointly moved for\\n\\nsummary disposition under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tenth Circuit\\n\\nRule 27.3(A)(1)(b). 2 The Agencies cited Medina v. Planned Parenthood South\\n\\nAtlantic, which held that the any-qualified-provider provision of the Medicaid Act,\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), did not clearly and unambiguously confer an\\n\\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983. 606 U.S. 357. They argued that\\n\\nMedina’s reasoning also applies to § 1396a(a)(8), the provision at issue in this case.\\n\\nThe Agencies asserted that summary disposition was appropriate because Medina\\n\\nintroduced a supervening change in law: legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s\\n\\nspending power, like Medicaid, does not create privately enforceable rights under\\n\\n§ 1983 unless Congress uses clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable\\n\\nindividual-focused and rights-creating language.\\n\\n The Lancasters opposed summary disposition, arguing that Medina merely\\n\\nclarifies existing law as to when a statute creates individual rights. On the merits,\\n\\nthey argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) is distinguishable from the provision\\n\\naddressed in Medina. And in contending that § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private right of\\n\\naction under § 1983, the Lancasters cited and heavily relied on a Third Circuit case,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Tenth Circuit Rule 27.3(A)(1)(b) allows parties to file “a motion for\\n 2\\n\\nsummary disposition because of a supervening change of law or mootness.”\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nSabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), which made that exact holding. We\\n\\ndenied summary disposition.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n As we explain, Medina requires us to conclude that § 1396a(a)(8) does not\\n\\nclearly and unambiguously confer a private right of action enforceable under § 1983.\\n\\n A. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\n In 1965, Congress enacted the Medicaid Act pursuant to its spending power\\n\\n“to subsidize state efforts to provide healthcare to families and individuals whose\\n\\nincome and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical\\n\\nservices.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 363 (citation modified). To receive those federal\\n\\nfunds, States must submit a State plan for providing medical assistance and\\n\\nsubstantially comply with a series of conditions imposed by the Medicaid Act. 42\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), 1396c. One such condition is that “[a] State plan for medical\\n\\nassistance must . . . provide that all individuals wishing to make application for\\n\\nmedical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such\\n\\nassistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\\n\\n This is the provision that the Lancasters argue the Agencies violated by\\n\\ndenying them Medicaid benefits despite their alleged eligibility.\\n\\n B. Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025)\\n\\n In Medina, the Supreme Court considered whether an adjacent provision of the\\n\\nMedicaid Act, § 1396a(a)(23)(A), also known as the any-qualified-provider\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nprovision, conferred an individually enforceable right under § 1983. It determined\\n\\nthat it did not.\\n\\n 1. Private Enforceable Rights under § 1983\\n\\n The Court began by explaining that while “§ 1983 allows private parties to sue\\n\\nstate actors who violate their ‘rights’ under ‘the Constitution and laws’ of the United\\n\\nStates,” not all federal statutes confer enforceable rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 365–\\n\\n66 (citing Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 183\\n\\n(2023)).\\n\\n The Court proceeded to clarify “how to determine whether a statute confers an\\n\\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983.” Id. at 367. “To prove that a statute\\n\\nsecures an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity, and does not just provide a\\n\\nbenefit or protect an interest, a plaintiff must show that the law in question ‘clearly\\n\\nand unambiguously’ uses ‘rights-creating terms.’” Id. at 368 (citation modified). In\\n\\npart, the statute must “display an unmistakable focus on individuals like the\\n\\nplaintiff.” Id. (citation modified). The Court described the test as “stringent” and\\n\\n“demanding” because federal statutes do not automatically confer rights enforceable\\n\\nunder § 1983. Id. Rather, rights-creating provisions are rare exceptions. Id. at 368,\\n\\n380. It noted that even after satisfying such requirements, “a § 1983 action still may\\n\\nnot be available if Congress has displaced § 1983’s general cause of action with a\\n\\nmore specific remedy.” Id. at 368 (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S.\\n\\n113, 120 (2005)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n With this background, the Court explained why it is especially unlikely that\\n\\nspending-power statutes like the Medicaid Act would confer an enforceable right\\n\\nunder § 1983. Id. at 365, 369. The Court reasoned that Congress’s spending power\\n\\nallows it to “offer funds to States that agree to certain conditions.” Id. at 365.\\n\\nAccordingly, the “typical remedy” for violation of the conditions is for the federal\\n\\ngovernment to terminate funds to the State; it is not a private enforcement suit. Id. at\\n\\n365–66. That is because the statutes “address a State’s obligations to the federal\\n\\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Id. at 379 (citation modified)\\n\\n(quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002)); see also Talevski, 599\\n\\nU.S. at 183 (“For Spending Clause legislation in particular . . . the typical remedy for\\n\\nstate noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of\\n\\naction for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate\\n\\nfunds to the State.” (citation modified)).\\n\\n The Court thus held that “whether a private party may sue to enforce the terms\\n\\nof a federal grant depends on ‘whether the State voluntarily and knowingly’\\n\\nconsented to answer private claims as part of its bargain with the federal\\n\\ngovernment.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 373 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.\\n\\nHalderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). In other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate, at\\n\\nminimum, that Congress provided States with clear and unambiguous notice that the\\n\\nState may be subject to private enforcement suits should it fail to comply with federal\\n\\nfunding conditions. Id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); see also id. at 376\\n\\n(“Because spending-power legislation is ‘in the nature of a contract,’ a grantee must\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n‘voluntarily and knowingly’ consent to answer private § 1983 enforcement suits\\n\\nbefore they may proceed.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n “[T]he Court [previously] restated these principles and explored how they\\n\\ninteract with § 1983” in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Id. at 374.\\n\\nThe Court acknowledged, however, that it had briefly “experimented with a different\\n\\napproach” by taking “an expansive view of its power . . . . to confer new rights under\\n\\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them,” which has since “given\\n\\nrise to some confusion in the lower courts.” Id. at 375. But the Court explicitly\\n\\nclarified that lower courts should no longer consult cases from the pre-Gonzaga era—\\n\\nspecifically it called out three cases: Wilder, Wright, and Blessing. Id. at 375–76; see\\n\\nWright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987)\\n\\n(granting a statutory right under § 1983 for Public Housing Act 3); Wilder v. Va.\\n\\nHosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (granting a statutory right under § 1983\\n\\nfor a reimbursement provision of Title XIX of the Social Security Act because the\\n\\nlegislation was “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff” and the plaintiff’s interest\\n\\nin the statute was not “too vague and amorphous”); Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, 343–45\\n\\n(denying individuals a general statutory right under § 1983 to enforce substantial\\n\\ncompliance with Title IV–D of the Social Security Act).\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Supreme Court in Blessing acknowledged that in Wright, it “did not ask\\nwhether the federal housing legislation generally gave rise to rights; rather, [it]\\nfocused [its] analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting ‘rent’ to 30 percent of\\na tenant’s income.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997) (quoting\\nWright, 479 U.S. at 430).\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\n 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A): No Private Enforceable Right\\n\\n Applying those principles to the statute at issue, the Court concluded that\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not confer an individually enforceable right because the\\n\\nstatute’s “language speaks to what a State must do to participate in Medicaid.”\\n\\nMedina, 606 U.S. at 377. Although the statute surely “seeks to benefit both providers\\n\\nand patients,” the Court held that it does not clearly and unambiguously confer on\\n\\nindividuals a federal right. Id. at 377–78 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Under the any-qualified-provider provision, States participating in Medicaid\\n\\nmust provide that\\n\\n any individual eligible for medical assistance (including\\n drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution,\\n agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to\\n perform the service or services required (including an\\n organization which provides such services, or arranges for\\n their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes\\n to provide him such services . . . .\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).\\n\\n The Court pointed to the surrounding statutory context, which requires that a\\n\\nState “comply substantially” with the requirements in § 1396a to receive federal\\n\\nfunding. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. It recognized that the statute’s “focus on aggregate\\n\\ncompliance suggests that the statute addresses a State’s obligations to the federal\\n\\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 379\\n\\n(citation modified). Moreover, the Court noted that the any-qualified-provider\\n\\nprovision was nested under a subsection titled “Contents,” which outlines conditions\\n\\nthat “a state plan must include to qualify for federal funding.” Id. And notably,\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nthose conditions “are directed to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who\\n\\nmust ‘approve any plan’ that meets them.” Id. (quoting § 1396a(b)). Finally, the\\n\\nCourt indicated the “mandatory terms” in the provisions—such as “must,” “provide,”\\n\\nor “shall”—do not necessarily create individual rights. Id. at 380.\\n\\n In conclusion, the Court reemphasized that rights-creating provisions in\\n\\nspending-power statutes are “atypical” exceptions and not the rule. Id. at 380, 385–\\n\\n86. So because the language in § 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not clearly and unambiguously\\n\\nconfer individual rights, the Court held that the Medina plaintiffs lacked an\\n\\nindividual right enforceable through § 1983.\\n\\n C. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\n We turn to the Lancasters’ claim that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private\\n\\nright enforceable via § 1983. We find that Medina squarely controls and reject that\\n\\nargument. 4\\n\\n To begin, much of Medina’s analysis regarding § 1396a(a)(23)(A) applies to\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8). Both are Medicaid Act provisions that are nested within the same\\n\\nsubsection, titled “Contents,” that lists requirements States must substantially comply\\n\\nwith to receive Medicaid funding. § 1396c(2). Both are requirements directed to the\\n\\nSecretary of Health and Human Services for plan approvals. And although\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8) arguably has more “mandatory terms” and directives (such as that a\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The Lancasters’ argument that Medina clarified existing law and was not a\\nsupervening change in law was relevant only in relation to the Agencies’ motion for\\nsummary disposition and is not relevant to considering the appeal on the merits.\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nState “must . . . provide” certain obligations) than § 1396a(a)(23)(A), Medina teaches\\n\\nthat mandatory language alone does not create individually enforceable rights.\\n\\n Like the adjacent provision at issue in Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) is a Medicaid\\n\\nprovision enacted under Congress’s spending power. That fact requires an\\n\\nassessment of whether this provision is the atypical, rare exception that confers\\n\\nindividual rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 380. For the same reasons the Medina Court\\n\\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not confer a private enforceable right, neither does\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\\n\\n Resisting this conclusion, the Lancasters urge us to follow Sabree v. Richman,\\n\\na Third Circuit case from 20 years ago that held 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does in fact\\n\\nconfer an individual right enforceable through § 1983. 5 367 F.3d 180. They argue\\n\\nthat Sabree applied the Supreme Court’s instructions in Gonzaga University, which\\n\\nexplained how to determine whether Congress provided such clear and unambiguous\\n\\nlanguage that States may be subject to answer private suits under § 1983. And\\n\\nbecause Medina reaffirmed Gonzaga University, they argue Sabree’s analysis stands.\\n\\nWe disagree.\\n\\n While Sabree does rely on Gonzaga University, it did so by heavily leaning on\\n\\nthe three Supreme Court cases disclaimed in Medina: Wright, Wilder, and Blessing.\\n\\nSabree, 367 F.3d at 184–87; see id. at 184 (“[T]he Court relied on [Wright and\\n\\nWilder] in crafting Gonzaga University. Accordingly, we will assess the rights\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The Supreme Court did not cite Sabree in Medina.\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nclaimed by plaintiffs in light of Wright, Wilder, Suter, and Blessing, as construed by\\n\\nGonzaga University.”). In fact, the Third Circuit explicitly applied the Blessing test,\\n\\nwhich finds a plaintiff to be within a statute’s zone of interest and have\\n\\nunambiguously conferred rights if: (1) Congress intended plaintiff to be the intended\\n\\nbeneficiaries of the law; (2) the rights to be enforced are specific and enumerated,\\n\\nand not “vague or amorphous”; and (3) the statute imposes an unambiguous “binding\\n\\nobligation on the States.” See id. at 186, 189. As acknowledged by the Third\\n\\nCircuit, the three-prong Blessing test was established by drawing upon Wright and\\n\\nWilder, as well as Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). Id. at 186.\\n\\n After concluding that the Sabree plaintiffs satisfied the Blessing test, the Third\\n\\nCircuit then addressed whether there were any rights-creating terms in § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\nfor that zone of interest under Gonzaga University. Id. at 189–90. It observed that\\n\\nthe provision uses mandatory language such as “[a] State plan must provide.” Id. at\\n\\n190 (emphases added). And it noted that the provision focuses on individuals by\\n\\nmaking the entitlement available to “all eligible individuals.” Id. The Third Circuit\\n\\nthus determined that the plain language of § 1396a(a)(8) clearly and unambiguously\\n\\nconferred a privately enforceable right.\\n\\n But given the Court’s directives in Medina, the analysis in Sabree cannot\\n\\nwithstand scrutiny. The Third Circuit determined that the provision had\\n\\nrights-creating language and was “confiden[t] in this conclusion [because it] rests\\n\\nsecurely on the fact that the Court has refrained from overruling Wright and Wilder,\\n\\nwhich upheld the exercise of individual rights under statutes that contain similar (or,\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\nin the case of Wilder, identical) provisions to 42 U.S.C. § 1396.” Id. at 192. The\\n\\nreason for its confidence no longer holds—the Medina Court explicitly stated that its\\n\\n“longstanding repudiation of Wright and Wilder’s reasoning” meant that those cases\\n\\nwere unreliable in determining “whether spending-power legislation confers a\\n\\nprivately enforceable right.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 377. And although Medina did not\\n\\nexpressly overturn the Blessing test, it stated that the Blessing test was rooted in the\\n\\npreviously, and now rejected, “expansive view of [the Court’s] power to imply\\n\\nprivate causes of action to enforce federal laws” and “confer new rights under\\n\\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them.” Id. at 375–76\\n\\n(“Building on those same ideas in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court outlined a\\n\\nthree-factor test for recognizing new privately enforceable rights. . . . To the extent\\n\\nlower courts feel obliged, or permitted, to consider the contrary reasoning of Wilder,\\n\\nWright, or Blessing, they should resist the impulse.”).\\n\\n Moreover, Sabree relied on mandatory language in § 1396a(a)(8) to conclude\\n\\nthat the provision confers individual rights—but that reasoning alone is not enough.\\n\\nSee id. at 380 (finding that mandatory terms like “must” or “shall” do not necessarily\\n\\ncreate individual rights). Finally, Sabree held that because the provision focused on\\n\\nindividuals rather than entities, § 1396a(a)(8) confers a privately enforceable right.\\n\\nBut Medina repeatedly emphasized that provisions may benefit or even protect\\n\\nindividual interests without conferring an enforceable right. Id. at 376–78.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm because § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right\\n\\nenforceable by the Lancasters through § 1983.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11230647/\", \"author_raw\": \"TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"TYMKOVICH"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"PHILLIPS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MCHUGH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"TYMKOVICH\": \", Circuit\", \"PHILLIPS\": \", Circuit\", \"McHUGH\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764062/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Lancaster v. Cartmell\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 23, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n MAX LANCASTER, by and through Jan\n Green, next of friend and attorney-in-fact;\n PEGGY LANCASTER, by and through\n Jan Green, next of friend and attorney-in-\n fact,\n\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\n\n v. No. 25-6000\n\n JEFFREY CARTMELL, Director of\n Oklahoma Department of Human Services,\n in his official capacity; ELLEN\n BUETTNER, CEO/Director of Oklahoma\n Health Care Authority, in her official\n capacity,\n\n Defendants - Appellees.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Western District of Oklahoma\n (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00842-J)\n _________________________________\n\nMichael Craig Riffel (Katresa J. Riffel, Jonathan F. Benham, and Matthew C. Russell,\nRiffel, Riffel & Benham, P.L.L.C., Enid, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) for\nPlaintiffs-Appellants.\n\nRyan Gillett (Michael Williams, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for\nDefendant-Appellee Ellen Buettner.\n\nSusan L. Eads, Assistant General Counsel (Josh Holloway, Assistant General Counsel,\nOklahoma City, Oklahoma, with her on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee Jeffrey\nCartmell.\n _________________________________\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\nBefore TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\nTYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\n Max and Peggy Lancaster applied for Medicaid benefits. After their\n\napplications were denied, the Lancasters sued the directors of the Oklahoma\n\nDepartment of Human Services and Oklahoma Health Care Authority (the Agencies)\n\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the Agencies violated the Medicaid Act—\n\nspecifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)—by unlawfully denying the Lancasters’\n\nMedicaid applications. The Agencies jointly moved to dismiss the lawsuit. The\n\ndistrict court granted the motion, finding that the Lancasters were not eligible for\n\nMedicaid benefits because their financial resources exceeded the asset limitation for\n\nMedicaid eligibility. The Lancasters appealed.\n\n During the course of the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Medina v.\n\nPlanned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025). The Agencies argue that\n\nunder Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right enforceable though\n\n§ 1983.\n\n We agree and thus AFFIRM. The Supreme Court in Medina explained that a\n\nstatute confers a personally enforceable right only if the law “clearly and\n\nunambiguously uses rights-creating terms” with an “unmistakable focus on\n\nindividuals like the plaintiff.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 368 (citations modified). It then\n\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A)—a provision materially similar to § 1396a(a)(8)—did\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\nnot satisfy that standard and rejected plaintiffs’ private right of action. Medina\n\napplies with equal force to the Lancasters’ claims here.\n\n I. Background\n\n The Lancasters 1 transferred approximately $3.8 million worth of their real and\n\npersonal property to The Lancaster Family LLC, a limited liability company owned\n\nby their three adult children. In return, the Family LLC executed a loan agreement,\n\nreal estate mortgages, personal guarantees, and a promissory note. The Lancasters\n\nthen applied for Medicaid benefits but were found ineligible.\n\n The Lancasters sued the Agencies in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\n\nclaiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). According to the complaint, the\n\nAgencies erred in finding the Lancasters ineligible based on their asset\n\ndetermination; the Lancasters argue this determination violated § 1396a(a)(8), which\n\nrequires the Agencies to promptly provide Medicaid benefits to eligible individuals.\n\n The Agencies moved to dismiss and argued, in part, that the Family LLC’s\n\npromissory note to the Lancasters was not bona fide—that is, the loan was not\n\n“legally valid under the applicable State’s law and made in good faith.” See POMS\n\nSI § 1120.220(B)(3). The promissory note was therefore a countable resource for\n\npurposes of determining the Lancasters’ Medicaid eligibility. And because the\n\nLancasters’ resources exceeded the applicable threshold, the Agencies determined\n\n\n 1\n Mrs. Lancaster passed away during this litigation, and thus the Agencies\nrequest that her claims be dismissed. But because we dispose of the case on\nindependent grounds, we need not address whether Mrs. Lancaster must be\nindividually dismissed from this appeal.\n 3\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\nthat the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits. The district court agreed\n\nand granted the Agencies’ motion.\n\n While the appeal was pending oral argument, the Agencies jointly moved for\n\nsummary disposition under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tenth Circuit\n\nRule 27.3(A)(1)(b). 2 The Agencies cited Medina v. Planned Parenthood South\n\nAtlantic, which held that the any-qualified-provider provision of the Medicaid Act,\n\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), did not clearly and unambiguously confer an\n\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983. 606 U.S. 357. They argued that\n\nMedina’s reasoning also applies to § 1396a(a)(8), the provision at issue in this case.\n\nThe Agencies asserted that summary disposition was appropriate because Medina\n\nintroduced a supervening change in law: legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s\n\nspending power, like Medicaid, does not create privately enforceable rights under\n\n§ 1983 unless Congress uses clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable\n\nindividual-focused and rights-creating language.\n\n The Lancasters opposed summary disposition, arguing that Medina merely\n\nclarifies existing law as to when a statute creates individual rights. On the merits,\n\nthey argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) is distinguishable from the provision\n\naddressed in Medina. And in contending that § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private right of\n\naction under § 1983, the Lancasters cited and heavily relied on a Third Circuit case,\n\n\n\n\n Tenth Circuit Rule 27.3(A)(1)(b) allows parties to file “a motion for\n 2\n\nsummary disposition because of a supervening change of law or mootness.”\n 4\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\nSabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), which made that exact holding. We\n\ndenied summary disposition.\n\n II. Discussion\n\n As we explain, Medina requires us to conclude that § 1396a(a)(8) does not\n\nclearly and unambiguously confer a private right of action enforceable under § 1983.\n\n A. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\n\n In 1965, Congress enacted the Medicaid Act pursuant to its spending power\n\n“to subsidize state efforts to provide healthcare to families and individuals whose\n\nincome and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical\n\nservices.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 363 (citation modified). To receive those federal\n\nfunds, States must submit a State plan for providing medical assistance and\n\nsubstantially comply with a series of conditions imposed by the Medicaid Act. 42\n\nU.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), 1396c. One such condition is that “[a] State plan for medical\n\nassistance must . . . provide that all individuals wishing to make application for\n\nmedical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such\n\nassistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”\n\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\n\n This is the provision that the Lancasters argue the Agencies violated by\n\ndenying them Medicaid benefits despite their alleged eligibility.\n\n B. Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025)\n\n In Medina, the Supreme Court considered whether an adjacent provision of the\n\nMedicaid Act, § 1396a(a)(23)(A), also known as the any-qualified-provider\n 5\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\nprovision, conferred an individually enforceable right under § 1983. It determined\n\nthat it did not.\n\n 1. Private Enforceable Rights under § 1983\n\n The Court began by explaining that while “§ 1983 allows private parties to sue\n\nstate actors who violate their ‘rights’ under ‘the Constitution and laws’ of the United\n\nStates,” not all federal statutes confer enforceable rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 365–\n\n66 (citing Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 183\n\n(2023)).\n\n The Court proceeded to clarify “how to determine whether a statute confers an\n\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983.” Id. at 367. “To prove that a statute\n\nsecures an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity, and does not just provide a\n\nbenefit or protect an interest, a plaintiff must show that the law in question ‘clearly\n\nand unambiguously’ uses ‘rights-creating terms.’” Id. at 368 (citation modified). In\n\npart, the statute must “display an unmistakable focus on individuals like the\n\nplaintiff.” Id. (citation modified). The Court described the test as “stringent” and\n\n“demanding” because federal statutes do not automatically confer rights enforceable\n\nunder § 1983. Id. Rather, rights-creating provisions are rare exceptions. Id. at 368,\n\n380. It noted that even after satisfying such requirements, “a § 1983 action still may\n\nnot be available if Congress has displaced § 1983’s general cause of action with a\n\nmore specific remedy.” Id. at 368 (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S.\n\n113, 120 (2005)).\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\n With this background, the Court explained why it is especially unlikely that\n\nspending-power statutes like the Medicaid Act would confer an enforceable right\n\nunder § 1983. Id. at 365, 369. The Court reasoned that Congress’s spending power\n\nallows it to “offer funds to States that agree to certain conditions.” Id. at 365.\n\nAccordingly, the “typical remedy” for violation of the conditions is for the federal\n\ngovernment to terminate funds to the State; it is not a private enforcement suit. Id. at\n\n365–66. That is because the statutes “address a State’s obligations to the federal\n\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Id. at 379 (citation modified)\n\n(quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002)); see also Talevski, 599\n\nU.S. at 183 (“For Spending Clause legislation in particular . . . the typical remedy for\n\nstate noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of\n\naction for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate\n\nfunds to the State.” (citation modified)).\n\n The Court thus held that “whether a private party may sue to enforce the terms\n\nof a federal grant depends on ‘whether the State voluntarily and knowingly’\n\nconsented to answer private claims as part of its bargain with the federal\n\ngovernment.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 373 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.\n\nHalderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). In other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate, at\n\nminimum, that Congress provided States with clear and unambiguous notice that the\n\nState may be subject to private enforcement suits should it fail to comply with federal\n\nfunding conditions. Id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); see also id. at 376\n\n(“Because spending-power legislation is ‘in the nature of a contract,’ a grantee must\n\n 7\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\n‘voluntarily and knowingly’ consent to answer private § 1983 enforcement suits\n\nbefore they may proceed.” (citation omitted)).\n\n “[T]he Court [previously] restated these principles and explored how they\n\ninteract with § 1983” in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Id. at 374.\n\nThe Court acknowledged, however, that it had briefly “experimented with a different\n\napproach” by taking “an expansive view of its power . . . . to confer new rights under\n\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them,” which has since “given\n\nrise to some confusion in the lower courts.” Id. at 375. But the Court explicitly\n\nclarified that lower courts should no longer consult cases from the pre-Gonzaga era—\n\nspecifically it called out three cases: Wilder, Wright, and Blessing. Id. at 375–76; see\n\nWright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987)\n\n(granting a statutory right under § 1983 for Public Housing Act 3); Wilder v. Va.\n\nHosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (granting a statutory right under § 1983\n\nfor a reimbursement provision of Title XIX of the Social Security Act because the\n\nlegislation was “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff” and the plaintiff’s interest\n\nin the statute was not “too vague and amorphous”); Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, 343–45\n\n(denying individuals a general statutory right under § 1983 to enforce substantial\n\ncompliance with Title IV–D of the Social Security Act).\n\n\n\n 3\n The Supreme Court in Blessing acknowledged that in Wright, it “did not ask\nwhether the federal housing legislation generally gave rise to rights; rather, [it]\nfocused [its] analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting ‘rent’ to 30 percent of\na tenant’s income.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997) (quoting\nWright, 479 U.S. at 430).\n 8\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\n 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A): No Private Enforceable Right\n\n Applying those principles to the statute at issue, the Court concluded that\n\n§ 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not confer an individually enforceable right because the\n\nstatute’s “language speaks to what a State must do to participate in Medicaid.”\n\nMedina, 606 U.S. at 377. Although the statute surely “seeks to benefit both providers\n\nand patients,” the Court held that it does not clearly and unambiguously confer on\n\nindividuals a federal right. Id. at 377–78 (emphasis added).\n\n Under the any-qualified-provider provision, States participating in Medicaid\n\nmust provide that\n\n any individual eligible for medical assistance (including\n drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution,\n agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to\n perform the service or services required (including an\n organization which provides such services, or arranges for\n their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes\n to provide him such services . . . .\n\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).\n\n The Court pointed to the surrounding statutory context, which requires that a\n\nState “comply substantially” with the requirements in § 1396a to receive federal\n\nfunding. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. It recognized that the statute’s “focus on aggregate\n\ncompliance suggests that the statute addresses a State’s obligations to the federal\n\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 379\n\n(citation modified). Moreover, the Court noted that the any-qualified-provider\n\nprovision was nested under a subsection titled “Contents,” which outlines conditions\n\nthat “a state plan must include to qualify for federal funding.” Id. And notably,\n\n 9\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\nthose conditions “are directed to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who\n\nmust ‘approve any plan’ that meets them.” Id. (quoting § 1396a(b)). Finally, the\n\nCourt indicated the “mandatory terms” in the provisions—such as “must,” “provide,”\n\nor “shall”—do not necessarily create individual rights. Id. at 380.\n\n In conclusion, the Court reemphasized that rights-creating provisions in\n\nspending-power statutes are “atypical” exceptions and not the rule. Id. at 380, 385–\n\n86. So because the language in § 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not clearly and unambiguously\n\nconfer individual rights, the Court held that the Medina plaintiffs lacked an\n\nindividual right enforceable through § 1983.\n\n C. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\n\n We turn to the Lancasters’ claim that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private\n\nright enforceable via § 1983. We find that Medina squarely controls and reject that\n\nargument. 4\n\n To begin, much of Medina’s analysis regarding § 1396a(a)(23)(A) applies to\n\n§ 1396a(a)(8). Both are Medicaid Act provisions that are nested within the same\n\nsubsection, titled “Contents,” that lists requirements States must substantially comply\n\nwith to receive Medicaid funding. § 1396c(2). Both are requirements directed to the\n\nSecretary of Health and Human Services for plan approvals. And although\n\n§ 1396a(a)(8) arguably has more “mandatory terms” and directives (such as that a\n\n\n\n 4\n The Lancasters’ argument that Medina clarified existing law and was not a\nsupervening change in law was relevant only in relation to the Agencies’ motion for\nsummary disposition and is not relevant to considering the appeal on the merits.\n 10\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\nState “must . . . provide” certain obligations) than § 1396a(a)(23)(A), Medina teaches\n\nthat mandatory language alone does not create individually enforceable rights.\n\n Like the adjacent provision at issue in Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) is a Medicaid\n\nprovision enacted under Congress’s spending power. That fact requires an\n\nassessment of whether this provision is the atypical, rare exception that confers\n\nindividual rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 380. For the same reasons the Medina Court\n\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not confer a private enforceable right, neither does\n\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\n\n Resisting this conclusion, the Lancasters urge us to follow Sabree v. Richman,\n\na Third Circuit case from 20 years ago that held 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does in fact\n\nconfer an individual right enforceable through § 1983. 5 367 F.3d 180. They argue\n\nthat Sabree applied the Supreme Court’s instructions in Gonzaga University, which\n\nexplained how to determine whether Congress provided such clear and unambiguous\n\nlanguage that States may be subject to answer private suits under § 1983. And\n\nbecause Medina reaffirmed Gonzaga University, they argue Sabree’s analysis stands.\n\nWe disagree.\n\n While Sabree does rely on Gonzaga University, it did so by heavily leaning on\n\nthe three Supreme Court cases disclaimed in Medina: Wright, Wilder, and Blessing.\n\nSabree, 367 F.3d at 184–87; see id. at 184 (“[T]he Court relied on [Wright and\n\nWilder] in crafting Gonzaga University. Accordingly, we will assess the rights\n\n\n\n 5\n The Supreme Court did not cite Sabree in Medina.\n 11\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nclaimed by plaintiffs in light of Wright, Wilder, Suter, and Blessing, as construed by\n\nGonzaga University.”). In fact, the Third Circuit explicitly applied the Blessing test,\n\nwhich finds a plaintiff to be within a statute’s zone of interest and have\n\nunambiguously conferred rights if: (1) Congress intended plaintiff to be the intended\n\nbeneficiaries of the law; (2) the rights to be enforced are specific and enumerated,\n\nand not “vague or amorphous”; and (3) the statute imposes an unambiguous “binding\n\nobligation on the States.” See id. at 186, 189. As acknowledged by the Third\n\nCircuit, the three-prong Blessing test was established by drawing upon Wright and\n\nWilder, as well as Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). Id. at 186.\n\n After concluding that the Sabree plaintiffs satisfied the Blessing test, the Third\n\nCircuit then addressed whether there were any rights-creating terms in § 1396a(a)(8)\n\nfor that zone of interest under Gonzaga University. Id. at 189–90. It observed that\n\nthe provision uses mandatory language such as “[a] State plan must provide.” Id. at\n\n190 (emphases added). And it noted that the provision focuses on individuals by\n\nmaking the entitlement available to “all eligible individuals.” Id. The Third Circuit\n\nthus determined that the plain language of § 1396a(a)(8) clearly and unambiguously\n\nconferred a privately enforceable right.\n\n But given the Court’s directives in Medina, the analysis in Sabree cannot\n\nwithstand scrutiny. The Third Circuit determined that the provision had\n\nrights-creating language and was “confiden[t] in this conclusion [because it] rests\n\nsecurely on the fact that the Court has refrained from overruling Wright and Wilder,\n\nwhich upheld the exercise of individual rights under statutes that contain similar (or,\n\n 12\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\nin the case of Wilder, identical) provisions to 42 U.S.C. § 1396.” Id. at 192. The\n\nreason for its confidence no longer holds—the Medina Court explicitly stated that its\n\n“longstanding repudiation of Wright and Wilder’s reasoning” meant that those cases\n\nwere unreliable in determining “whether spending-power legislation confers a\n\nprivately enforceable right.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 377. And although Medina did not\n\nexpressly overturn the Blessing test, it stated that the Blessing test was rooted in the\n\npreviously, and now rejected, “expansive view of [the Court’s] power to imply\n\nprivate causes of action to enforce federal laws” and “confer new rights under\n\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them.” Id. at 375–76\n\n(“Building on those same ideas in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court outlined a\n\nthree-factor test for recognizing new privately enforceable rights. . . . To the extent\n\nlower courts feel obliged, or permitted, to consider the contrary reasoning of Wilder,\n\nWright, or Blessing, they should resist the impulse.”).\n\n Moreover, Sabree relied on mandatory language in § 1396a(a)(8) to conclude\n\nthat the provision confers individual rights—but that reasoning alone is not enough.\n\nSee id. at 380 (finding that mandatory terms like “must” or “shall” do not necessarily\n\ncreate individual rights). Finally, Sabree held that because the provision focused on\n\nindividuals rather than entities, § 1396a(a)(8) confers a privately enforceable right.\n\nBut Medina repeatedly emphasized that provisions may benefit or even protect\n\nindividual interests without conferring an enforceable right. Id. at 376–78.\n\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\n III. Conclusion\n\n We affirm because § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right\n\nenforceable by the Lancasters through § 1983.\n\n\n\n\n 14\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Lancaster v. Cartmell\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 23, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n MAX LANCASTER, by and through Jan\\n Green, next of friend and attorney-in-fact;\\n PEGGY LANCASTER, by and through\\n Jan Green, next of friend and attorney-in-\\n fact,\\n\\n Plaintiffs - Appellants,\\n\\n v. No. 25-6000\\n\\n JEFFREY CARTMELL, Director of\\n Oklahoma Department of Human Services,\\n in his official capacity; ELLEN\\n BUETTNER, CEO/Director of Oklahoma\\n Health Care Authority, in her official\\n capacity,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Western District of Oklahoma\\n (D.C. No. 5:24-CV-00842-J)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nMichael Craig Riffel (Katresa J. Riffel, Jonathan F. Benham, and Matthew C. Russell,\\nRiffel, Riffel & Benham, P.L.L.C., Enid, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs) for\\nPlaintiffs-Appellants.\\n\\nRyan Gillett (Michael Williams, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for\\nDefendant-Appellee Ellen Buettner.\\n\\nSusan L. Eads, Assistant General Counsel (Josh Holloway, Assistant General Counsel,\\nOklahoma City, Oklahoma, with her on the brief) for Defendant-Appellee Jeffrey\\nCartmell.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nBefore TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nTYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Max and Peggy Lancaster applied for Medicaid benefits. After their\\n\\napplications were denied, the Lancasters sued the directors of the Oklahoma\\n\\nDepartment of Human Services and Oklahoma Health Care Authority (the Agencies)\\n\\nunder 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the Agencies violated the Medicaid Act—\\n\\nspecifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)—by unlawfully denying the Lancasters’\\n\\nMedicaid applications. The Agencies jointly moved to dismiss the lawsuit. The\\n\\ndistrict court granted the motion, finding that the Lancasters were not eligible for\\n\\nMedicaid benefits because their financial resources exceeded the asset limitation for\\n\\nMedicaid eligibility. The Lancasters appealed.\\n\\n During the course of the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Medina v.\\n\\nPlanned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025). The Agencies argue that\\n\\nunder Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right enforceable though\\n\\n§ 1983.\\n\\n We agree and thus AFFIRM. The Supreme Court in Medina explained that a\\n\\nstatute confers a personally enforceable right only if the law “clearly and\\n\\nunambiguously uses rights-creating terms” with an “unmistakable focus on\\n\\nindividuals like the plaintiff.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 368 (citations modified). It then\\n\\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A)—a provision materially similar to § 1396a(a)(8)—did\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nnot satisfy that standard and rejected plaintiffs’ private right of action. Medina\\n\\napplies with equal force to the Lancasters’ claims here.\\n\\n I. Background\\n\\n The Lancasters 1 transferred approximately $3.8 million worth of their real and\\n\\npersonal property to The Lancaster Family LLC, a limited liability company owned\\n\\nby their three adult children. In return, the Family LLC executed a loan agreement,\\n\\nreal estate mortgages, personal guarantees, and a promissory note. The Lancasters\\n\\nthen applied for Medicaid benefits but were found ineligible.\\n\\n The Lancasters sued the Agencies in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,\\n\\nclaiming a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). According to the complaint, the\\n\\nAgencies erred in finding the Lancasters ineligible based on their asset\\n\\ndetermination; the Lancasters argue this determination violated § 1396a(a)(8), which\\n\\nrequires the Agencies to promptly provide Medicaid benefits to eligible individuals.\\n\\n The Agencies moved to dismiss and argued, in part, that the Family LLC’s\\n\\npromissory note to the Lancasters was not bona fide—that is, the loan was not\\n\\n“legally valid under the applicable State’s law and made in good faith.” See POMS\\n\\nSI § 1120.220(B)(3). The promissory note was therefore a countable resource for\\n\\npurposes of determining the Lancasters’ Medicaid eligibility. And because the\\n\\nLancasters’ resources exceeded the applicable threshold, the Agencies determined\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Mrs. Lancaster passed away during this litigation, and thus the Agencies\\nrequest that her claims be dismissed. But because we dispose of the case on\\nindependent grounds, we need not address whether Mrs. Lancaster must be\\nindividually dismissed from this appeal.\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nthat the Lancasters were not eligible for Medicaid benefits. The district court agreed\\n\\nand granted the Agencies’ motion.\\n\\n While the appeal was pending oral argument, the Agencies jointly moved for\\n\\nsummary disposition under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tenth Circuit\\n\\nRule 27.3(A)(1)(b). 2 The Agencies cited Medina v. Planned Parenthood South\\n\\nAtlantic, which held that the any-qualified-provider provision of the Medicaid Act,\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), did not clearly and unambiguously confer an\\n\\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983. 606 U.S. 357. They argued that\\n\\nMedina’s reasoning also applies to § 1396a(a)(8), the provision at issue in this case.\\n\\nThe Agencies asserted that summary disposition was appropriate because Medina\\n\\nintroduced a supervening change in law: legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s\\n\\nspending power, like Medicaid, does not create privately enforceable rights under\\n\\n§ 1983 unless Congress uses clear, unambiguous, and unmistakable\\n\\nindividual-focused and rights-creating language.\\n\\n The Lancasters opposed summary disposition, arguing that Medina merely\\n\\nclarifies existing law as to when a statute creates individual rights. On the merits,\\n\\nthey argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) is distinguishable from the provision\\n\\naddressed in Medina. And in contending that § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private right of\\n\\naction under § 1983, the Lancasters cited and heavily relied on a Third Circuit case,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Tenth Circuit Rule 27.3(A)(1)(b) allows parties to file “a motion for\\n 2\\n\\nsummary disposition because of a supervening change of law or mootness.”\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nSabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004), which made that exact holding. We\\n\\ndenied summary disposition.\\n\\n II. Discussion\\n\\n As we explain, Medina requires us to conclude that § 1396a(a)(8) does not\\n\\nclearly and unambiguously confer a private right of action enforceable under § 1983.\\n\\n A. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\n In 1965, Congress enacted the Medicaid Act pursuant to its spending power\\n\\n“to subsidize state efforts to provide healthcare to families and individuals whose\\n\\nincome and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical\\n\\nservices.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 363 (citation modified). To receive those federal\\n\\nfunds, States must submit a State plan for providing medical assistance and\\n\\nsubstantially comply with a series of conditions imposed by the Medicaid Act. 42\\n\\nU.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), 1396c. One such condition is that “[a] State plan for medical\\n\\nassistance must . . . provide that all individuals wishing to make application for\\n\\nmedical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such\\n\\nassistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\\n\\n This is the provision that the Lancasters argue the Agencies violated by\\n\\ndenying them Medicaid benefits despite their alleged eligibility.\\n\\n B. Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, 606 U.S. 357 (2025)\\n\\n In Medina, the Supreme Court considered whether an adjacent provision of the\\n\\nMedicaid Act, § 1396a(a)(23)(A), also known as the any-qualified-provider\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nprovision, conferred an individually enforceable right under § 1983. It determined\\n\\nthat it did not.\\n\\n 1. Private Enforceable Rights under § 1983\\n\\n The Court began by explaining that while “§ 1983 allows private parties to sue\\n\\nstate actors who violate their ‘rights’ under ‘the Constitution and laws’ of the United\\n\\nStates,” not all federal statutes confer enforceable rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 365–\\n\\n66 (citing Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 183\\n\\n(2023)).\\n\\n The Court proceeded to clarify “how to determine whether a statute confers an\\n\\nindividually enforceable right under § 1983.” Id. at 367. “To prove that a statute\\n\\nsecures an enforceable right, privilege, or immunity, and does not just provide a\\n\\nbenefit or protect an interest, a plaintiff must show that the law in question ‘clearly\\n\\nand unambiguously’ uses ‘rights-creating terms.’” Id. at 368 (citation modified). In\\n\\npart, the statute must “display an unmistakable focus on individuals like the\\n\\nplaintiff.” Id. (citation modified). The Court described the test as “stringent” and\\n\\n“demanding” because federal statutes do not automatically confer rights enforceable\\n\\nunder § 1983. Id. Rather, rights-creating provisions are rare exceptions. Id. at 368,\\n\\n380. It noted that even after satisfying such requirements, “a § 1983 action still may\\n\\nnot be available if Congress has displaced § 1983’s general cause of action with a\\n\\nmore specific remedy.” Id. at 368 (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S.\\n\\n113, 120 (2005)).\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n With this background, the Court explained why it is especially unlikely that\\n\\nspending-power statutes like the Medicaid Act would confer an enforceable right\\n\\nunder § 1983. Id. at 365, 369. The Court reasoned that Congress’s spending power\\n\\nallows it to “offer funds to States that agree to certain conditions.” Id. at 365.\\n\\nAccordingly, the “typical remedy” for violation of the conditions is for the federal\\n\\ngovernment to terminate funds to the State; it is not a private enforcement suit. Id. at\\n\\n365–66. That is because the statutes “address a State’s obligations to the federal\\n\\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Id. at 379 (citation modified)\\n\\n(quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 288 (2002)); see also Talevski, 599\\n\\nU.S. at 183 (“For Spending Clause legislation in particular . . . the typical remedy for\\n\\nstate noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of\\n\\naction for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate\\n\\nfunds to the State.” (citation modified)).\\n\\n The Court thus held that “whether a private party may sue to enforce the terms\\n\\nof a federal grant depends on ‘whether the State voluntarily and knowingly’\\n\\nconsented to answer private claims as part of its bargain with the federal\\n\\ngovernment.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 373 (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.\\n\\nHalderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). In other words, a plaintiff must demonstrate, at\\n\\nminimum, that Congress provided States with clear and unambiguous notice that the\\n\\nState may be subject to private enforcement suits should it fail to comply with federal\\n\\nfunding conditions. Id. (citing Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); see also id. at 376\\n\\n(“Because spending-power legislation is ‘in the nature of a contract,’ a grantee must\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n‘voluntarily and knowingly’ consent to answer private § 1983 enforcement suits\\n\\nbefore they may proceed.” (citation omitted)).\\n\\n “[T]he Court [previously] restated these principles and explored how they\\n\\ninteract with § 1983” in Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). Id. at 374.\\n\\nThe Court acknowledged, however, that it had briefly “experimented with a different\\n\\napproach” by taking “an expansive view of its power . . . . to confer new rights under\\n\\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them,” which has since “given\\n\\nrise to some confusion in the lower courts.” Id. at 375. But the Court explicitly\\n\\nclarified that lower courts should no longer consult cases from the pre-Gonzaga era—\\n\\nspecifically it called out three cases: Wilder, Wright, and Blessing. Id. at 375–76; see\\n\\nWright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987)\\n\\n(granting a statutory right under § 1983 for Public Housing Act 3); Wilder v. Va.\\n\\nHosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (granting a statutory right under § 1983\\n\\nfor a reimbursement provision of Title XIX of the Social Security Act because the\\n\\nlegislation was “intended to benefit the putative plaintiff” and the plaintiff’s interest\\n\\nin the statute was not “too vague and amorphous”); Blessing, 520 U.S. 329, 343–45\\n\\n(denying individuals a general statutory right under § 1983 to enforce substantial\\n\\ncompliance with Title IV–D of the Social Security Act).\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Supreme Court in Blessing acknowledged that in Wright, it “did not ask\\nwhether the federal housing legislation generally gave rise to rights; rather, [it]\\nfocused [its] analysis on a specific statutory provision limiting ‘rent’ to 30 percent of\\na tenant’s income.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997) (quoting\\nWright, 479 U.S. at 430).\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\n 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A): No Private Enforceable Right\\n\\n Applying those principles to the statute at issue, the Court concluded that\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not confer an individually enforceable right because the\\n\\nstatute’s “language speaks to what a State must do to participate in Medicaid.”\\n\\nMedina, 606 U.S. at 377. Although the statute surely “seeks to benefit both providers\\n\\nand patients,” the Court held that it does not clearly and unambiguously confer on\\n\\nindividuals a federal right. Id. at 377–78 (emphasis added).\\n\\n Under the any-qualified-provider provision, States participating in Medicaid\\n\\nmust provide that\\n\\n any individual eligible for medical assistance (including\\n drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution,\\n agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to\\n perform the service or services required (including an\\n organization which provides such services, or arranges for\\n their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes\\n to provide him such services . . . .\\n\\n42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A).\\n\\n The Court pointed to the surrounding statutory context, which requires that a\\n\\nState “comply substantially” with the requirements in § 1396a to receive federal\\n\\nfunding. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. It recognized that the statute’s “focus on aggregate\\n\\ncompliance suggests that the statute addresses a State’s obligations to the federal\\n\\ngovernment, not the rights of any particular person.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 379\\n\\n(citation modified). Moreover, the Court noted that the any-qualified-provider\\n\\nprovision was nested under a subsection titled “Contents,” which outlines conditions\\n\\nthat “a state plan must include to qualify for federal funding.” Id. And notably,\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nthose conditions “are directed to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who\\n\\nmust ‘approve any plan’ that meets them.” Id. (quoting § 1396a(b)). Finally, the\\n\\nCourt indicated the “mandatory terms” in the provisions—such as “must,” “provide,”\\n\\nor “shall”—do not necessarily create individual rights. Id. at 380.\\n\\n In conclusion, the Court reemphasized that rights-creating provisions in\\n\\nspending-power statutes are “atypical” exceptions and not the rule. Id. at 380, 385–\\n\\n86. So because the language in § 1396a(a)(23)(A) did not clearly and unambiguously\\n\\nconfer individual rights, the Court held that the Medina plaintiffs lacked an\\n\\nindividual right enforceable through § 1983.\\n\\n C. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\n We turn to the Lancasters’ claim that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) confers a private\\n\\nright enforceable via § 1983. We find that Medina squarely controls and reject that\\n\\nargument. 4\\n\\n To begin, much of Medina’s analysis regarding § 1396a(a)(23)(A) applies to\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8). Both are Medicaid Act provisions that are nested within the same\\n\\nsubsection, titled “Contents,” that lists requirements States must substantially comply\\n\\nwith to receive Medicaid funding. § 1396c(2). Both are requirements directed to the\\n\\nSecretary of Health and Human Services for plan approvals. And although\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8) arguably has more “mandatory terms” and directives (such as that a\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The Lancasters’ argument that Medina clarified existing law and was not a\\nsupervening change in law was relevant only in relation to the Agencies’ motion for\\nsummary disposition and is not relevant to considering the appeal on the merits.\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nState “must . . . provide” certain obligations) than § 1396a(a)(23)(A), Medina teaches\\n\\nthat mandatory language alone does not create individually enforceable rights.\\n\\n Like the adjacent provision at issue in Medina, § 1396a(a)(8) is a Medicaid\\n\\nprovision enacted under Congress’s spending power. That fact requires an\\n\\nassessment of whether this provision is the atypical, rare exception that confers\\n\\nindividual rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 380. For the same reasons the Medina Court\\n\\nfound that § 1396a(a)(23)(A) does not confer a private enforceable right, neither does\\n\\n§ 1396a(a)(8).\\n\\n Resisting this conclusion, the Lancasters urge us to follow Sabree v. Richman,\\n\\na Third Circuit case from 20 years ago that held 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) does in fact\\n\\nconfer an individual right enforceable through § 1983. 5 367 F.3d 180. They argue\\n\\nthat Sabree applied the Supreme Court’s instructions in Gonzaga University, which\\n\\nexplained how to determine whether Congress provided such clear and unambiguous\\n\\nlanguage that States may be subject to answer private suits under § 1983. And\\n\\nbecause Medina reaffirmed Gonzaga University, they argue Sabree’s analysis stands.\\n\\nWe disagree.\\n\\n While Sabree does rely on Gonzaga University, it did so by heavily leaning on\\n\\nthe three Supreme Court cases disclaimed in Medina: Wright, Wilder, and Blessing.\\n\\nSabree, 367 F.3d at 184–87; see id. at 184 (“[T]he Court relied on [Wright and\\n\\nWilder] in crafting Gonzaga University. Accordingly, we will assess the rights\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n The Supreme Court did not cite Sabree in Medina.\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nclaimed by plaintiffs in light of Wright, Wilder, Suter, and Blessing, as construed by\\n\\nGonzaga University.”). In fact, the Third Circuit explicitly applied the Blessing test,\\n\\nwhich finds a plaintiff to be within a statute’s zone of interest and have\\n\\nunambiguously conferred rights if: (1) Congress intended plaintiff to be the intended\\n\\nbeneficiaries of the law; (2) the rights to be enforced are specific and enumerated,\\n\\nand not “vague or amorphous”; and (3) the statute imposes an unambiguous “binding\\n\\nobligation on the States.” See id. at 186, 189. As acknowledged by the Third\\n\\nCircuit, the three-prong Blessing test was established by drawing upon Wright and\\n\\nWilder, as well as Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992). Id. at 186.\\n\\n After concluding that the Sabree plaintiffs satisfied the Blessing test, the Third\\n\\nCircuit then addressed whether there were any rights-creating terms in § 1396a(a)(8)\\n\\nfor that zone of interest under Gonzaga University. Id. at 189–90. It observed that\\n\\nthe provision uses mandatory language such as “[a] State plan must provide.” Id. at\\n\\n190 (emphases added). And it noted that the provision focuses on individuals by\\n\\nmaking the entitlement available to “all eligible individuals.” Id. The Third Circuit\\n\\nthus determined that the plain language of § 1396a(a)(8) clearly and unambiguously\\n\\nconferred a privately enforceable right.\\n\\n But given the Court’s directives in Medina, the analysis in Sabree cannot\\n\\nwithstand scrutiny. The Third Circuit determined that the provision had\\n\\nrights-creating language and was “confiden[t] in this conclusion [because it] rests\\n\\nsecurely on the fact that the Court has refrained from overruling Wright and Wilder,\\n\\nwhich upheld the exercise of individual rights under statutes that contain similar (or,\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\nin the case of Wilder, identical) provisions to 42 U.S.C. § 1396.” Id. at 192. The\\n\\nreason for its confidence no longer holds—the Medina Court explicitly stated that its\\n\\n“longstanding repudiation of Wright and Wilder’s reasoning” meant that those cases\\n\\nwere unreliable in determining “whether spending-power legislation confers a\\n\\nprivately enforceable right.” Medina, 606 U.S. at 377. And although Medina did not\\n\\nexpressly overturn the Blessing test, it stated that the Blessing test was rooted in the\\n\\npreviously, and now rejected, “expansive view of [the Court’s] power to imply\\n\\nprivate causes of action to enforce federal laws” and “confer new rights under\\n\\nspending-power statutes that did not expressly provide them.” Id. at 375–76\\n\\n(“Building on those same ideas in Blessing v. Freestone, the Court outlined a\\n\\nthree-factor test for recognizing new privately enforceable rights. . . . To the extent\\n\\nlower courts feel obliged, or permitted, to consider the contrary reasoning of Wilder,\\n\\nWright, or Blessing, they should resist the impulse.”).\\n\\n Moreover, Sabree relied on mandatory language in § 1396a(a)(8) to conclude\\n\\nthat the provision confers individual rights—but that reasoning alone is not enough.\\n\\nSee id. at 380 (finding that mandatory terms like “must” or “shall” do not necessarily\\n\\ncreate individual rights). Finally, Sabree held that because the provision focused on\\n\\nindividuals rather than entities, § 1396a(a)(8) confers a privately enforceable right.\\n\\nBut Medina repeatedly emphasized that provisions may benefit or even protect\\n\\nindividual interests without conferring an enforceable right. Id. at 376–78.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\n III. Conclusion\\n\\n We affirm because § 1396a(a)(8) does not confer an individual right\\n\\nenforceable by the Lancasters through § 1983.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30951,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10764814,"string":"10,764,814"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Cole"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-24"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-7077"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"EBEL, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 24, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 24-7077\\n\\n BRETT DEWAYNE COLE,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Oklahoma\\n (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-00098-JFH-1)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBlain Myhre of Blaine Myhre LLC, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\nLisa C. Williams, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher J. Wilson,\\nUnited States Attorney, with her on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-\\nAppellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n In this direct criminal appeal, defendant Brett Dewayne Cole challenges his\\n\\nconviction for aggravated sexual abuse, aggravated abuse, and abusive sexual contact\\n\\nin Indian Country on the grounds that evidence of prior acts of child molestation was\\n\\nwrongly admitted at trial. Specifically, Cole argues both that because the prior acts\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\noccurred when he was a juvenile they are not “crimes” as required by Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 414, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect significantly outweighed its\\n\\nprobative value. To the contrary, we conclude that acts of child molestation are still\\n\\n“crimes” for the purposes of Rule 414 when committed by a juvenile, and the district\\n\\ncourt properly balanced the evidence’s probative value and prejudicial effect.\\n\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n In May 2019, K.Z., Cole’s stepdaughter, reported that Cole had molested her.\\n\\nAt the time, K.Z. was aged 10 and in the third grade. K.Z. is a member of the\\n\\nChoctaw tribe.\\n\\n K.Z. reported that on the evening of May 8, she joined Cole and a friend of\\n\\nCole’s in the “shop” at their home where Cole was working on a four-wheeler\\n\\nvehicle, known as a “Banshee.” Over dinner, Cole told K.Z. that if she learned to\\n\\nride the Banshee, she could have it. Cole’s wife went to bed around 10:30 to 11:00\\n\\np.m., while Cole went back to the shop. At some point later, Cole came to bed.\\n\\nAfter a short time lying in bed, Cole went to the kitchen and his wife fell back asleep.\\n\\nThen, Cole went to K.Z.’s bedroom and woke her up. Cole put his fingers in K.Z.’s\\n\\nvagina, telling her that he would give her the Banshee if she allowed him to do so.\\n\\nCole returned to the bedroom with his wife afterwards, who woke up and noticed that\\n\\nCole’s penis was wet.\\n\\n On the morning of May 9, school personnel noticed that K.Z. “seemed very\\n\\ndistracted and upset.” (Aple. Br. at 12.) When asked if she was okay, K.Z. said she\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nwas not and needed to talk about something. K.Z. told school personnel that Cole\\n\\nhad “stuck his fingers in [her] private parts” the night before. Id. at 14. K.Z. said\\n\\nCole told her not to tell anyone because he or she would go to jail. When asked if\\n\\nsimilar incidents had happened before, K.Z. said yes. K.Z. said that Cole had put his\\n\\nfinger in her vagina once before. The school then contacted Cole’s wife, who came\\n\\nto take K.Z. for an examination.\\n\\n A sexual assault nurse examiner conducted an examination, and K.Z. told the\\n\\nnurse what had happened. She also told the nurse that there had been two prior\\n\\noccasions of sexual misconduct. On one, Cole put his mouth on K.Z.’s vagina, put\\n\\nhis penis in K.Z.’s mouth, and put his penis in K.Z.’s anus. Later, when speaking to\\n\\na child forensic interviewer, K.Z. described the second prior incident: K.Z. said that\\n\\nCole had put her hand on his penis and made her move her hand up and down. Cole\\n\\nalso pushed K.Z.’s head down, putting his penis in her mouth.\\n\\n Cole was charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian\\n\\nCountry, one count of Aggravated Abuse in Indian Country, and one count of\\n\\nAbusive Sexual Contact in Indian Country, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5),\\n\\n2246(2)(B-C) & (3), 1151, and 1152, stemming from the three assaults K.Z.\\n\\ndescribed. Cole denied ever inappropriately touching K.Z.\\n\\n At trial, the government also sought to introduce three different witnesses’\\n\\ntestimony of prior uncharged instances of child molestation committed by Cole.\\n\\nFirst, the government presented the testimony of Cole’s half-sister, who is\\n\\napproximately seven years younger than Cole. She testified that when she was\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nbetween five and ten—placing Cole between twelve and seventeen—Cole began\\n\\nsexually assaulting her. She said this happened so frequently that “it would take\\n\\n[her] forever to [talk] about everything that has happened.” (Aple. Br. at 18.) The\\n\\nthree incidents she specifically described included Cole putting his penis in her\\n\\nmouth, Cole kissing her, Cole placing his mouth on her vagina, and Cole putting his\\n\\nfingers inside her vagina. Second, her brother testified that he remembered walking\\n\\ninto a shed and seeing them together, with Cole zipping up his pants. Third, Cole’s\\n\\nstepcousin who is approximately five years younger than Cole testified that when she\\n\\nwas around eight, Cole sexually assaulted her on two occasions. On one occasion,\\n\\nCole put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina; Cole told her not to tell\\n\\nanyone because nobody would believe her. On another, when she was asleep, Cole\\n\\nstarted undoing her pants and put his finger in her vagina. At this point, she avoided\\n\\nseeing Cole. Cole denied inappropriately touching his cousin without her consent.\\n\\n The first trial took place in January 2023. Over Cole’s out-of-time objection,\\n\\ntestimony regarding the other acts of child molestation was presented. When the jury\\n\\nwas unable to reach a verdict after seven hours of deliberation, the court declared a\\n\\nmistrial. The second trial took place in March 2023. Again, the jury heard testimony\\n\\nregarding the other acts evidence. After two hours of deliberation, the jury found\\n\\nCole guilty on all three counts.\\n\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n\\n Cole objected below to the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 414 both\\n\\nbecause he said his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations meant they\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nwere not “crimes” as incorporated into Rule 414 and because the evidence’s\\n\\nprejudicial effect significantly outweighed its probative value. Preserved objections\\n\\nto decisions to admit evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.\\n\\nBenally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Cole argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the\\n\\nevidence of prior acts of child molestation pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 414\\n\\nbecause he suggests that his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations made\\n\\nthem not “crimes” and, thus, inadmissible under Rule 414. We disagree. Though\\n\\njuvenile delinquency proceedings differ from criminal proceedings, the underlying acts\\n\\nremain criminal. Additionally, Cole argues that the evidence’s prejudicial effect\\n\\nsignificantly outweighed its probative value. Not so. The evidence was highly probative\\n\\nbecause of its frequency and its similarity to the charged acts, and the risk of prejudice\\n\\nwas no greater than any case involving Rule 414 evidence.\\n\\nA. Criminal acts committed by juveniles remain “crimes”\\n\\n When a criminal defendant is accused of child molestation, Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 414 permits the admission of evidence that the defendant “committed any other\\n\\nchild molestation.” FED. R. EVID. 414(a). Rule 414 then states that “‘child molestation’\\n\\nmeans a crime under federal law or under state law,” involving any of a variety of\\n\\nsexually motivated acts. FED. R. EVID. 414(d)(2). Cole argues that prior child\\n\\nmolestations committed by a juvenile are not “crimes.” Therefore, he suggests that\\n\\nevidence of child molestations committed by the defendant when the defendant was a\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\njuvenile cannot come in under Rule 414. Given the law regarding juvenile delinquency,\\n\\nthe plain terms of Rule 414, and Congress’ intention that courts admit this evidence\\n\\nliberally, we find that evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation while he was a\\n\\nminor was admissible under Rule 414.\\n\\n To support his argument that child molestations committed when the defendant\\n\\nwas a minor are not crimes, Cole relies on the definition of “juvenile delinquency” in the\\n\\nFederal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“FJDA”). 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–\\n\\n42 (2006). Specifically, Cole says that the language stating “‘juvenile delinquency’ is the\\n\\nviolation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth\\n\\nbirthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult” necessarily means\\n\\nthat the act is not a crime if committed by a juvenile. See id. § 5031 (emphasis added).\\n\\nCole takes this to mean that those who have not reached their eighteenth birthday are\\n\\nincapable of committing “crimes,” only “acts of juvenile delinquency.”\\n\\n To the contrary, it is well-established that juveniles are capable of committing\\n\\ncrimes. For example, we find it instructive that juveniles can be charged as adults, in\\n\\nwhich case they are tried in a traditional criminal proceeding rather than a juvenile\\n\\ndelinquency proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1990). The FJDA itself instructs when this is appropriate, allowing for\\n\\ncriminal proceedings in federal courts when (1) the juvenile court “does not have\\n\\njurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction” for the misconduct, (2) “the State does\\n\\nnot have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles,” or\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n(3) the juvenile is charged with a felonious crime of violence. 1 18 U.S.C. § 5032.\\n\\nIf the FJDA decriminalized otherwise criminal conduct when committed by juveniles,\\n\\nthere would be no basis for a criminal conviction in any of these circumstances.\\n\\n This also follows from the purpose of the FJDA, which is to provide separate\\n\\nproceedings for juveniles outside of the court system and to avoid criminal\\n\\nconvictions that would appear on juveniles’ records. Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220. It is\\n\\nclear, therefore, that Congress intended to alter the consequences of a crime\\n\\ncommitted by a juvenile, not to reclassify the act itself as non-criminal. In fact, we\\n\\ndiscussed in Brian N. the FJDA’s applicability to “persons who are juveniles at the\\n\\ntime a federal crime is committed.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United\\n\\nStates v. Mechem, we noted that “Congress recognized that juvenile crimes are\\n\\n‘essentially a State and local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local\\n\\ngovernments.’” 509 F.2d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (citing\\n\\nS. Rep. No. 93–1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Criminal actions engaged in by\\n\\njuveniles are still crimes, simply with different proceedings and consequences.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Even if Cole prevailed on the proposition that acts of juvenile delinquency\\ncovered by the FJDA are not crimes in general, this exception in the FJDA for\\nfelonious acts of violence would still defeat Cole’s argument here. Cole’s\\nnonconsensual sexual acts would likely fall under this exception for felonious acts of\\nviolence. See e.g., U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.2a, 2L1.2 app. note 2\\n(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023) (categorizing forcible sex offenses—sexual acts where\\nconsent was not given nor valid—as crimes of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)\\n(Bail Reform Act). Therefore, even under Cole’s preferred definition, these prior\\nacts of child molestation were “crimes.”\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n We have previously considered crimes committed by juveniles in an analogous\\n\\ncontext in United States v. Willis and reached the same conclusion. 826 F.3d 1265\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2016). In Willis, acts of sexual assault committed by the defendant as a\\n\\njuvenile were presented via Rule 413, id. at 1270, which mirrors the language of\\n\\nRule 414 by defining “sexual assault” as “a crime under federal law or under state\\n\\nlaw.” FED. R. EVID. 413(d). In Willis, we concluded that evidence of sexual assaults\\n\\ncommitted as a juvenile was admissible. 826 F.3d at 1274. Cole asserts that, despite\\n\\nthe near-identical statutory language and factual background at play in Willis, its\\n\\nholding is irrelevant because the defendant in Willis did not raise his exact argument\\n\\nas to the definition of “crime” drawn from the FJDA; rather, the defendant in Willis\\n\\nargued that his juvenile status at the time rendered the prior sexual assaults irrelevant.\\n\\nBut our analysis in Willis was not limited to a Rule 403 balancing. In fact, we\\n\\nrecognized the lack of “any authority for the proposition that juvenile misconduct is\\n\\nper se inadmissible under Rule 413.” Willis, 826 F.3d at 1274. We went on to say\\n\\nthat “the mere fact that Mr. Willis was a minor at the time of his alleged sexual\\n\\nassaults . . . does not render evidence of those events inadmissible, and we cannot say\\n\\nhis status as a juvenile conclusively outweighs the other factors showing the\\n\\nprobative value of the evidence.” Id. We not only answered the balancing question,\\n\\nbut also whether crimes committed as a juvenile are admissible as a category in the\\n\\nfirst place. We answered that question in the affirmative then, and we see no reason\\n\\nto deviate now.\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\n Both parties point our attention to In re Sweeney, suggesting it supports each\\n\\nof their positions. 492 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2007). In Sweeney, a debtor in his\\n\\nbankruptcy action sought to discharge a restitution order from a juvenile delinquency\\n\\nproceeding. Id. at 1190. Typically, restitution ordered via criminal proceedings is\\n\\nnot dischargeable. Id. at 1191. Holding in that case that the restitution order was\\n\\ndischargeable, however, we said, “an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not\\n\\nequivalent to a conviction.” Id. Cole extrapolates that his acts committed as a\\n\\njuvenile are not criminal and, consequently, inadmissible here. Though Sweeney did\\n\\nhighlight the same language from the FJDA that Cole seizes on, id., the crux of its\\n\\nholding was that Sweeney had not been convicted of a crime, which was necessary\\n\\nfor the bankruptcy discharge exception. We reiterated that the purpose of juvenile\\n\\ndelinquency proceedings is “to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction,” id.\\n\\n(quoting Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220), and having thus concluded adjudications of\\n\\nstatus differ from convictions, we did not need to determine if Sweeney’s offense—\\n\\narson—was still a crime. By contrast, Rule 414 does not require a prior criminal\\n\\nconviction, only an underlying criminal offense. As a result, while undoubtedly\\n\\nrelated, Sweeney does not change our understanding that criminal acts committed by\\n\\njuveniles are “crimes.”\\n\\n This conclusion is also consistent with “Congress’ legislative judgment that\\n\\n[Rule 414] evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.” United States v. Enjady, 134\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nF.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998). 2 Congress itself added Rules 413 and 414 to the\\n\\nFederal Rules of Evidence in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103–322, Tit. XXXII § 320935;\\n\\nUnited States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting Rule 414\\n\\n“was not developed through the usual Judicial Conference rulemaking process, but by\\n\\nCongress itself”). Had Congress intended to exclude all evidence of child\\n\\nmolestations committed by juveniles, it would have said so.\\n\\n Cole’s analogous argument with relation to state law is similarly mistaken.\\n\\nThe law in question says that fifteen to seventeen-year-olds charged with rape “shall\\n\\nbe held accountable as youthful offenders.” OKLA. STAT. 10A § 2-5-205(C) (2024).\\n\\nReasoning that those under fifteen are not guilty of any crime, Cole says the\\n\\ngovernment has not sufficiently proven he was at least fifteen at the time of the other\\n\\nacts. Again, however, this speaks to the status and punishment of juveniles who\\n\\ncommit the crime of rape; it does nothing to change the substantive criminality of the\\n\\nunderlying offense. Oklahoma law puts forth three categories of offenders: adults,\\n\\nyouthful offenders, and juveniles. Id. § 2-5-204(A). And “[a] child who is arrested\\n\\n. . . may, depending on the child’s age and alleged crime,” be placed in each of these\\n\\ncategories. Id. Not only does this demonstrate that Oklahoma still considers child\\n\\noffenses crimes, it also gives discretion to try juveniles as adults for the underlying\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Because Congress wanted courts rarely to exclude evidence of other child\\nmolestations, Rule 414 provides that this evidence “may be considered on any matter\\nto which it is relevant,” FED. R. EVID. 414(a), including showing the defendant’s\\npropensity to engage in child molestation, Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (10th Cir.\\n1997), as opposed to typical “other acts” evidence that cannot go to propensity. See\\nFED. R. EVID. 404(b).\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\ncriminal offense. Id. § 2-5-205(D). Therefore, we conclude that Oklahoma similarly\\n\\ndid not decriminalize offenses committed by juveniles.\\n\\n Finally, Cole argues that if the language of Rule 414 does not clearly support\\n\\nhis position, it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to make the rule of lenity applicable.\\n\\nEven if we were to conclude that Rule 414 is ambiguous, Cole’s argument is\\n\\ninapposite. The rule of lenity is the legal principle that requires courts to interpret\\n\\nvague language in substantive criminal laws and sentencing statutes in favor of\\n\\ncriminal defendants. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); United\\n\\nStates v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993). The rationale for the rule of\\n\\nlenity is that individuals must be put on notice of what actions constitute a crime and\\n\\nhow harshly they can be punished, so that they have a fair opportunity to conform\\n\\ntheir conduct to the law. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949–50; cf. United States v. Trout,\\n\\n68 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming sentence when defendant “clearly\\n\\nknew that such conduct was illegal and punishable by at least five years of\\n\\nimprisonment”); Olivera-Beritan v. Asuncion, 2017 WL 3131829, at *9 (S.D. Cal.\\n\\nJuly 24, 2017) (unreported) (discussing defendant’s practice of “avoiding dealing in\\n\\nother drugs [besides marijuana] due to the long prison sentences”). 3 Rule 414,\\n\\nhowever, is not a substantive criminal statute nor a sentencing provision. It is an\\n\\nevidentiary rule. There is no precedent to support applying the rule of lenity to\\n\\nevidentiary rules, nor should there be. As opposed to the undoubted importance of an\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We cite all unpublished decisions only for their persuasive value. See 10th\\nCir. R. 32.1(A).\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nindividual knowing substantively whether their conduct is criminal and knowing how\\n\\nharshly they could be punished for that conduct, it is simply too remote to require\\n\\nunambiguous advance notice of what evidence could ultimately be deemed\\n\\nadmissible at a subsequent trial, especially for an entirely unrelated crime as is the\\n\\ncase here. It is too remote a stretch to assume that Cole would have conformed his\\n\\nconduct and avoided committing the earlier child molestations in order to avoid\\n\\nevidence of such crimes being admitted at a trial several years later for a separate\\n\\nchild molestation. Cole asks us to take the rule of lenity one step too far.\\n\\n We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Cole’s prior acts of child\\n\\nmolestation committed when he was a juvenile were “crimes” as referred to in\\n\\nRule 414, and thus evidence of such crimes was admissible.\\n\\nB. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice\\n\\n Once a court has determined that other acts of child molestation meet the\\n\\nbaseline criteria for Rule 414, the court must then carry out Rule 403 balancing to\\n\\ndetermine if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s\\n\\nprobative value. See United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748, 765 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\nWe employ four factors to determine the evidence’s probative value and three factors\\n\\nto determine the danger of unfair prejudice. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. Addressing\\n\\neach, we conclude that the district court’s balancing was not an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n 1. The Enjady factors suggest the other acts evidence was probative\\n\\n The four factors considered at the probative stage of the analysis are: (1) how\\n\\nclearly the other act has been proven, (2) how probative the evidence is to a material\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\nfact, (3) how seriously disputed the material fact to be proven is, and (4) whether less\\n\\nprejudicial evidence is available. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. All four factors weigh\\n\\nin favor of the evidence’s probative value.\\n\\n a. The other acts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence\\n\\n Cole argues the other acts were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence\\n\\nbecause the alleged acts occurred as much as twenty-one years prior to the trial, and\\n\\nthey were not reported until 2019 and 2020, respectively. Also, Cole argues that his\\n\\nhalf-brother provided only weak corroboration of his half-sister’s allegations because\\n\\nhe did not see any sexual act occur.\\n\\n Cole’s half-sister did, however, disclose her abuse at age eleven. Additionally,\\n\\nthough the time since the alleged acts took place may go to the credibility of the\\n\\nwitnesses, it does not overcome the witnesses’ testimony on a preponderance\\n\\nstandard, which only requires that it be more likely than not that the acts took place.\\n\\nUltimately, “witness credibility is a jury question.” United States v. Harjo, 122 F.4th\\n\\n1240, 1252 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he key to [Rule 414] admission is relevance, not\\n\\ncorroboration.”).\\n\\n b. The other acts were probative of a material fact\\n\\n Cole argues that the other acts were not probative of a material fact: whether\\n\\nhe abused K.Z. This factor itself contains five considerations: (1) the similarity of\\n\\nthe other acts and charged acts, (2) the time lapse between the acts, (3) the frequency\\n\\nof the other acts, (4) intervening events, and (5) the need for evidence beyond the\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\ndefendant’s and victim’s testimony. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n Cole argues that significant differences exist between the other acts and\\n\\ncharged acts, in that his half-sister alleged Cole put his mouth on her vagina, which\\n\\nK.Z. “didn’t say in her trial testimony and [was] something that was not a basis for\\n\\nthe three charges,” (Aplt. Br. 23), and that Cole was a juvenile at the time of the\\n\\nprevious alleged molestations. These differences are hardly persuasive. Not only\\n\\nhad K.Z. actually told the nurse examiner that Cole did put his mouth on her vagina,\\n\\nbut the other aspects of the assaults are essentially identical, and all suggest an\\n\\naffinity to molest girls in his family who are significantly younger than him—and\\n\\napproximately the same age of this victim at the time of her molestation. Likewise,\\n\\nthe difference in his own age does not render the acts themselves any different.\\n\\n Cole’s strongest argument is the lapse in time between these acts, which is\\n\\nbetween twelve and seventeen years. In advising that Rule 413 and 414 evidence\\n\\nmost often should be admitted as probative, however, Congress noted that “evidence\\n\\nof other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly admitted,\\n\\nnotwithstanding substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or\\n\\noffenses.” Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 413 Historical Notes).\\n\\nTherefore, though the time lapse may reduce the probative value of the other acts\\n\\nevidence, it does not negate their probative nature.\\n\\n Cole argues that the frequency factor cuts against the probative value of the\\n\\nevidence because “only five specific acts” were detailed in the record, which Cole\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\ncategorizes as “not substantial.” (Aplt. Br. 24.) Yet, Cole points to no authority to\\n\\nsupport his conclusion that five acts of child molestation are “not substantial.” One\\n\\nof our sister circuits considered three examples sufficiently frequent. See United\\n\\nStates v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Cole’s half-sister\\n\\nstated that there were many more than the three instances of molestation of which she\\n\\nprovided details—enough that “it would take [] forever” to recount them. Lastly,\\n\\nCole’s argument that the frequency pales in comparison to “daily abuse,” (Reply\\n\\nBr. 13), weakens because he did not see his victims daily, but only on specific\\n\\noccasions. Further, his cousin deliberately stopped visiting to avoid additional\\n\\nmolestations. The record indicates that when he had the opportunity to assault his\\n\\nyoung female relatives, Cole often took that opportunity.\\n\\n As for intervening events, Cole states that his work, marriage, fatherhood, and\\n\\n“full neurological development” all occurred between the prior acts and charged acts.\\n\\n(Aplt. Br. 24.) Similar to the time lapse, these events may reduce the probative value\\n\\nof the other acts, but they do not negate their probative nature.\\n\\n Finally, Cole argues that there was no need for the other acts evidence because\\n\\nthe testimony of K.Z. and the examiners, as well as the physical evidence, was\\n\\nsufficient. We have, however, recognized the importance of corroborating evidence\\n\\nin cases of child molestation. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th\\n\\nCir. 1999) (en banc). When the credibility of the child-victim has been questioned,\\n\\nas here, “there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant evidence\\n\\nthat will illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial by the defense.” Id.\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\n c. The material fact, whether Cole abused K.Z., is seriously disputed\\n\\n The parties agree that the material fact was seriously disputed: Cole claims he\\n\\nnever inappropriately touched K.Z., while the government claims that he did so on\\n\\nmultiple occasions. This dispute counsels in favor of admitting the other acts\\n\\nevidence. United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1286 (10th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n d. There was no less prejudicial evidence for this purpose\\n\\n The last factor is whether the government can avail itself of less prejudicial\\n\\nevidence. Cole argues the government had less prejudicial evidence at its disposal,\\n\\nwhich it used, including the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the\\n\\nexaminers. The existence of victim testimony alone, however, can hardly mean this\\n\\nfactor weighs against admission; if that were the case, there would practically never\\n\\nbe good reason to admit Rule 414 evidence in this context. Cf. United States v. Clay,\\n\\n148 F.4th 1181, 1200 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding district court did not abuse discretion\\n\\nwhen admitting other acts evidence despite victim testimony, which the government\\n\\n“nearly always has”). Cole’s argument would not accord with our understanding that\\n\\nexcluding evidence under the Enjady test should be “infrequent[ ], reflecting\\n\\nCongress’ legislative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.”\\n\\n134 F.3d at 1433.\\n\\n Additionally, the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the examiners\\n\\nall helped clarify for the jury what had happened to K.Z. and support her version of\\n\\nevents. Evidence of other child molestations Cole committed is a different type of\\n\\nevidence, and it is probative for different reasons. The other acts evidence served\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\ntwo distinct purposes: to shed light on Cole’s own credibility and his propensity to\\n\\nmolest children, purposes uniquely authorized under Rule 414.\\n\\n As stated above, Rule 414 evidence differs from traditional other acts evidence\\n\\naddressed under Rule 404(b) in that Rule 414 evidence can be used for propensity\\n\\nreasoning. See supra note 2. There is good reason for this unique feature of\\n\\nRule 414. Congress recognized that it is inherently difficult to prove sexual offenses\\n\\ncommitted against children because “sex offense prosecutions frequently involves\\n\\n[sic] victim-witnesses who are traumatized and unable to effectively testify.”\\n\\nEnjady, 134 F.3d at 1434. Additionally, the offenses “rarely occur in the presence of\\n\\nother witnesses and a child victim’s credibility can readily be attacked in the absence\\n\\nof substantial corroboration.” Harjo, 122 F.4th at 1249 (internal quotation omitted).\\n\\nTherefore, Congress “determined it would be appropriate to permit the jury to\\n\\nconsider a defendant’s past conduct as corroborating evidence” in order to give juries\\n\\na complete picture of the offense and the defendant’s background. 4 See id. None of\\n\\nthe “less prejudicial” evidence Cole points to helped establish his propensity to\\n\\nmolest children, which is the very reason Rule 414 evidence is often necessary and\\n\\n“liberally” admitted. See Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1433. And, as Cole stated, “[t]he\\n\\ncase rested largely on K.Z.’s testimony versus Cole’s testimony.” (Aplt. Br. 28.)\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The difficulties of child molestation prosecutions also justify the Enjady\\nfactors’ “specialized version of the standard Rule 403 balancing analysis,” Harjo,\\n122 F.4th at 1249, to enact Congress’ instruction “that the evidence ‘normally’\\nshould be admitted” in these cases. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (quoting 140 Cong.\\nRec. H8992 (S. Molinari, Aug. 21, 1994)).\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nAs such, other evidence that would undermine Cole’s credibility when denying the\\n\\nalleged molestations was probative and admissible under Rule 414. Charley, 189\\n\\nF.3d at 1260.\\n\\n 2. The Enjady factors suggest little danger of unfair prejudice\\n\\n The three factors considered in the unfair prejudice analysis are (1) the\\n\\nlikelihood of contributing to an improper verdict, (2) whether the other acts will\\n\\ndistract from the central issues, and (3) how time consuming it will be to prove the\\n\\nother acts. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.\\n\\n Cole argues that the danger of the jury improperly convicting him due to these\\n\\nother acts was increased because the other acts involved different victims, and they\\n\\noccurred long before. On these grounds, he seeks to distinguish United States v.\\n\\nRiggs, in which the other acts involved the same victim and were more recent.\\n\\n2024 WL 2873897, at *8–9 (10th Cir. June 7, 2024) (unreported). But it is not\\n\\nobvious to us, nor has Cole sufficiently established, that these differences increased\\n\\nthe likelihood that the jury “would have overlooked [the] testimony about these\\n\\ncharged acts and instead punished” Cole for the uncharged acts. See id. at 8. In the\\n\\nabsence of any cases compelling the conclusion that the other acts evidence here\\n\\nwould lead to an improper verdict, and given the district court’s proper instruction to\\n\\nthe jury that the other acts evidence could not alone prove guilt, we cannot conclude\\n\\nthat the district court abused its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence.\\n\\n Cole argues that the other acts evidence was very time consuming, taking up\\n\\n16% of the trial transcript and involving three of the government’s twelve witnesses.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nIn Perrault, we recognized that no specific number of Rule 414 witnesses was or was\\n\\nnot appropriate, but we pointed to several cases in which three or more witnesses was\\n\\nconsidered not unduly prejudicial. 995 F.3d at 768. This is particularly true when\\n\\nmultiple witnesses are each testifying as to their own molestation. See id. at 769.\\n\\n Cole also argues that the evidence distracted the jury from the central issues.\\n\\nHe suggests that the amount of time spent on the other acts evidence and the fact that\\n\\nhe was never charged for the other acts likely distracted the jury. Again, Cole says\\n\\nthis risk was heightened by the temporal remoteness of the events and his juvenile\\n\\nstatus at the time. The district court could have found, however, that the likelihood\\n\\nof distraction was reduced by the remoteness in time and his juvenile status, since the\\n\\nevents were less likely to be confused with the charged acts.\\n\\n Because the evidence was highly probative and did not present significant\\n\\ndanger of unfair prejudice, and because the district court provided detailed reasoning\\n\\nfor its conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this\\n\\nevidence. The mere possibility that this evidence would cause the jury to have\\n\\nnegative feelings towards Cole does not make it “unfair” prejudice, as this is likely\\n\\ntrue for all Rule 414 evidence. See Perrault, 995 F.3d at 770 (citing United States v.\\n\\nMercer, 653 F. App’x 622, 629 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)).\\n\\n We need not reach the question of harmless error because the district court was\\n\\ncorrect to admit the evidence. Additionally, to the extent Cole argues that his first\\n\\ntrial ending with a mistrial necessarily demonstrates this was a close case and the\\n\\nalleged error was harmful, he is mistaken. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n659, 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The fact that [defendant’s] first trial ended in a hung jury\\n\\ndoes not alter our harmless error conclusion. A jury may hang for any number of\\n\\nreasons, including the idiosyncratic views of a single juror.”). This is particularly\\n\\ntrue given that both juries heard the challenged evidence. See Barker v. Fleming,\\n\\n423 F.3d 1085, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t must be acknowledged that different juries\\n\\nmay view the same facts and testimony differently.”).\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n The evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation was admissible under\\n\\nRule 414, and the probative value of this evidence outweighed any danger of unfair\\n\\nprejudice. Therefore, we need not reach the district court’s alternative ground for\\n\\nadmission via Rule 404(b). We AFFIRM Cole’s conviction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11231399/\", \"author_raw\": \"EBEL, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HOLMES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EBEL"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CARSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HOLMES\": \", Chief\", \"EBEL\": \", Circuit\", \"CARSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764814/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Cole\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-24\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 24, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v. No. 24-7077\n\n BRETT DEWAYNE COLE,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Eastern District of Oklahoma\n (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-00098-JFH-1)\n _________________________________\n\nBlain Myhre of Blaine Myhre LLC, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.\n\nLisa C. Williams, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher J. Wilson,\nUnited States Attorney, with her on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-\nAppellee.\n _________________________________\n\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\n In this direct criminal appeal, defendant Brett Dewayne Cole challenges his\n\nconviction for aggravated sexual abuse, aggravated abuse, and abusive sexual contact\n\nin Indian Country on the grounds that evidence of prior acts of child molestation was\n\nwrongly admitted at trial. Specifically, Cole argues both that because the prior acts\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\noccurred when he was a juvenile they are not “crimes” as required by Federal Rule of\n\nEvidence 414, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect significantly outweighed its\n\nprobative value. To the contrary, we conclude that acts of child molestation are still\n\n“crimes” for the purposes of Rule 414 when committed by a juvenile, and the district\n\ncourt properly balanced the evidence’s probative value and prejudicial effect.\n\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n In May 2019, K.Z., Cole’s stepdaughter, reported that Cole had molested her.\n\nAt the time, K.Z. was aged 10 and in the third grade. K.Z. is a member of the\n\nChoctaw tribe.\n\n K.Z. reported that on the evening of May 8, she joined Cole and a friend of\n\nCole’s in the “shop” at their home where Cole was working on a four-wheeler\n\nvehicle, known as a “Banshee.” Over dinner, Cole told K.Z. that if she learned to\n\nride the Banshee, she could have it. Cole’s wife went to bed around 10:30 to 11:00\n\np.m., while Cole went back to the shop. At some point later, Cole came to bed.\n\nAfter a short time lying in bed, Cole went to the kitchen and his wife fell back asleep.\n\nThen, Cole went to K.Z.’s bedroom and woke her up. Cole put his fingers in K.Z.’s\n\nvagina, telling her that he would give her the Banshee if she allowed him to do so.\n\nCole returned to the bedroom with his wife afterwards, who woke up and noticed that\n\nCole’s penis was wet.\n\n On the morning of May 9, school personnel noticed that K.Z. “seemed very\n\ndistracted and upset.” (Aple. Br. at 12.) When asked if she was okay, K.Z. said she\n\n 2\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\nwas not and needed to talk about something. K.Z. told school personnel that Cole\n\nhad “stuck his fingers in [her] private parts” the night before. Id. at 14. K.Z. said\n\nCole told her not to tell anyone because he or she would go to jail. When asked if\n\nsimilar incidents had happened before, K.Z. said yes. K.Z. said that Cole had put his\n\nfinger in her vagina once before. The school then contacted Cole’s wife, who came\n\nto take K.Z. for an examination.\n\n A sexual assault nurse examiner conducted an examination, and K.Z. told the\n\nnurse what had happened. She also told the nurse that there had been two prior\n\noccasions of sexual misconduct. On one, Cole put his mouth on K.Z.’s vagina, put\n\nhis penis in K.Z.’s mouth, and put his penis in K.Z.’s anus. Later, when speaking to\n\na child forensic interviewer, K.Z. described the second prior incident: K.Z. said that\n\nCole had put her hand on his penis and made her move her hand up and down. Cole\n\nalso pushed K.Z.’s head down, putting his penis in her mouth.\n\n Cole was charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian\n\nCountry, one count of Aggravated Abuse in Indian Country, and one count of\n\nAbusive Sexual Contact in Indian Country, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5),\n\n2246(2)(B-C) & (3), 1151, and 1152, stemming from the three assaults K.Z.\n\ndescribed. Cole denied ever inappropriately touching K.Z.\n\n At trial, the government also sought to introduce three different witnesses’\n\ntestimony of prior uncharged instances of child molestation committed by Cole.\n\nFirst, the government presented the testimony of Cole’s half-sister, who is\n\napproximately seven years younger than Cole. She testified that when she was\n\n 3\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\nbetween five and ten—placing Cole between twelve and seventeen—Cole began\n\nsexually assaulting her. She said this happened so frequently that “it would take\n\n[her] forever to [talk] about everything that has happened.” (Aple. Br. at 18.) The\n\nthree incidents she specifically described included Cole putting his penis in her\n\nmouth, Cole kissing her, Cole placing his mouth on her vagina, and Cole putting his\n\nfingers inside her vagina. Second, her brother testified that he remembered walking\n\ninto a shed and seeing them together, with Cole zipping up his pants. Third, Cole’s\n\nstepcousin who is approximately five years younger than Cole testified that when she\n\nwas around eight, Cole sexually assaulted her on two occasions. On one occasion,\n\nCole put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina; Cole told her not to tell\n\nanyone because nobody would believe her. On another, when she was asleep, Cole\n\nstarted undoing her pants and put his finger in her vagina. At this point, she avoided\n\nseeing Cole. Cole denied inappropriately touching his cousin without her consent.\n\n The first trial took place in January 2023. Over Cole’s out-of-time objection,\n\ntestimony regarding the other acts of child molestation was presented. When the jury\n\nwas unable to reach a verdict after seven hours of deliberation, the court declared a\n\nmistrial. The second trial took place in March 2023. Again, the jury heard testimony\n\nregarding the other acts evidence. After two hours of deliberation, the jury found\n\nCole guilty on all three counts.\n\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n\n Cole objected below to the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 414 both\n\nbecause he said his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations meant they\n\n 4\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\nwere not “crimes” as incorporated into Rule 414 and because the evidence’s\n\nprejudicial effect significantly outweighed its probative value. Preserved objections\n\nto decisions to admit evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.\n\nBenally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 2007).\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n\n Cole argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the\n\nevidence of prior acts of child molestation pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 414\n\nbecause he suggests that his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations made\n\nthem not “crimes” and, thus, inadmissible under Rule 414. We disagree. Though\n\njuvenile delinquency proceedings differ from criminal proceedings, the underlying acts\n\nremain criminal. Additionally, Cole argues that the evidence’s prejudicial effect\n\nsignificantly outweighed its probative value. Not so. The evidence was highly probative\n\nbecause of its frequency and its similarity to the charged acts, and the risk of prejudice\n\nwas no greater than any case involving Rule 414 evidence.\n\nA. Criminal acts committed by juveniles remain “crimes”\n\n When a criminal defendant is accused of child molestation, Federal Rule of\n\nEvidence 414 permits the admission of evidence that the defendant “committed any other\n\nchild molestation.” FED. R. EVID. 414(a). Rule 414 then states that “‘child molestation’\n\nmeans a crime under federal law or under state law,” involving any of a variety of\n\nsexually motivated acts. FED. R. EVID. 414(d)(2). Cole argues that prior child\n\nmolestations committed by a juvenile are not “crimes.” Therefore, he suggests that\n\nevidence of child molestations committed by the defendant when the defendant was a\n 5\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\njuvenile cannot come in under Rule 414. Given the law regarding juvenile delinquency,\n\nthe plain terms of Rule 414, and Congress’ intention that courts admit this evidence\n\nliberally, we find that evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation while he was a\n\nminor was admissible under Rule 414.\n\n To support his argument that child molestations committed when the defendant\n\nwas a minor are not crimes, Cole relies on the definition of “juvenile delinquency” in the\n\nFederal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“FJDA”). 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–\n\n42 (2006). Specifically, Cole says that the language stating “‘juvenile delinquency’ is the\n\nviolation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth\n\nbirthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult” necessarily means\n\nthat the act is not a crime if committed by a juvenile. See id. § 5031 (emphasis added).\n\nCole takes this to mean that those who have not reached their eighteenth birthday are\n\nincapable of committing “crimes,” only “acts of juvenile delinquency.”\n\n To the contrary, it is well-established that juveniles are capable of committing\n\ncrimes. For example, we find it instructive that juveniles can be charged as adults, in\n\nwhich case they are tried in a traditional criminal proceeding rather than a juvenile\n\ndelinquency proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220\n\n(10th Cir. 1990). The FJDA itself instructs when this is appropriate, allowing for\n\ncriminal proceedings in federal courts when (1) the juvenile court “does not have\n\njurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction” for the misconduct, (2) “the State does\n\nnot have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles,” or\n\n\n\n 6\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\n(3) the juvenile is charged with a felonious crime of violence. 1 18 U.S.C. § 5032.\n\nIf the FJDA decriminalized otherwise criminal conduct when committed by juveniles,\n\nthere would be no basis for a criminal conviction in any of these circumstances.\n\n This also follows from the purpose of the FJDA, which is to provide separate\n\nproceedings for juveniles outside of the court system and to avoid criminal\n\nconvictions that would appear on juveniles’ records. Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220. It is\n\nclear, therefore, that Congress intended to alter the consequences of a crime\n\ncommitted by a juvenile, not to reclassify the act itself as non-criminal. In fact, we\n\ndiscussed in Brian N. the FJDA’s applicability to “persons who are juveniles at the\n\ntime a federal crime is committed.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United\n\nStates v. Mechem, we noted that “Congress recognized that juvenile crimes are\n\n‘essentially a State and local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local\n\ngovernments.’” 509 F.2d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (citing\n\nS. Rep. No. 93–1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Criminal actions engaged in by\n\njuveniles are still crimes, simply with different proceedings and consequences.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Even if Cole prevailed on the proposition that acts of juvenile delinquency\ncovered by the FJDA are not crimes in general, this exception in the FJDA for\nfelonious acts of violence would still defeat Cole’s argument here. Cole’s\nnonconsensual sexual acts would likely fall under this exception for felonious acts of\nviolence. See e.g., U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.2a, 2L1.2 app. note 2\n(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023) (categorizing forcible sex offenses—sexual acts where\nconsent was not given nor valid—as crimes of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)\n(Bail Reform Act). Therefore, even under Cole’s preferred definition, these prior\nacts of child molestation were “crimes.”\n 7\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\n We have previously considered crimes committed by juveniles in an analogous\n\ncontext in United States v. Willis and reached the same conclusion. 826 F.3d 1265\n\n(10th Cir. 2016). In Willis, acts of sexual assault committed by the defendant as a\n\njuvenile were presented via Rule 413, id. at 1270, which mirrors the language of\n\nRule 414 by defining “sexual assault” as “a crime under federal law or under state\n\nlaw.” FED. R. EVID. 413(d). In Willis, we concluded that evidence of sexual assaults\n\ncommitted as a juvenile was admissible. 826 F.3d at 1274. Cole asserts that, despite\n\nthe near-identical statutory language and factual background at play in Willis, its\n\nholding is irrelevant because the defendant in Willis did not raise his exact argument\n\nas to the definition of “crime” drawn from the FJDA; rather, the defendant in Willis\n\nargued that his juvenile status at the time rendered the prior sexual assaults irrelevant.\n\nBut our analysis in Willis was not limited to a Rule 403 balancing. In fact, we\n\nrecognized the lack of “any authority for the proposition that juvenile misconduct is\n\nper se inadmissible under Rule 413.” Willis, 826 F.3d at 1274. We went on to say\n\nthat “the mere fact that Mr. Willis was a minor at the time of his alleged sexual\n\nassaults . . . does not render evidence of those events inadmissible, and we cannot say\n\nhis status as a juvenile conclusively outweighs the other factors showing the\n\nprobative value of the evidence.” Id. We not only answered the balancing question,\n\nbut also whether crimes committed as a juvenile are admissible as a category in the\n\nfirst place. We answered that question in the affirmative then, and we see no reason\n\nto deviate now.\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\n Both parties point our attention to In re Sweeney, suggesting it supports each\n\nof their positions. 492 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2007). In Sweeney, a debtor in his\n\nbankruptcy action sought to discharge a restitution order from a juvenile delinquency\n\nproceeding. Id. at 1190. Typically, restitution ordered via criminal proceedings is\n\nnot dischargeable. Id. at 1191. Holding in that case that the restitution order was\n\ndischargeable, however, we said, “an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not\n\nequivalent to a conviction.” Id. Cole extrapolates that his acts committed as a\n\njuvenile are not criminal and, consequently, inadmissible here. Though Sweeney did\n\nhighlight the same language from the FJDA that Cole seizes on, id., the crux of its\n\nholding was that Sweeney had not been convicted of a crime, which was necessary\n\nfor the bankruptcy discharge exception. We reiterated that the purpose of juvenile\n\ndelinquency proceedings is “to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction,” id.\n\n(quoting Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220), and having thus concluded adjudications of\n\nstatus differ from convictions, we did not need to determine if Sweeney’s offense—\n\narson—was still a crime. By contrast, Rule 414 does not require a prior criminal\n\nconviction, only an underlying criminal offense. As a result, while undoubtedly\n\nrelated, Sweeney does not change our understanding that criminal acts committed by\n\njuveniles are “crimes.”\n\n This conclusion is also consistent with “Congress’ legislative judgment that\n\n[Rule 414] evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.” United States v. Enjady, 134\n\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\nF.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998). 2 Congress itself added Rules 413 and 414 to the\n\nFederal Rules of Evidence in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103–322, Tit. XXXII § 320935;\n\nUnited States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting Rule 414\n\n“was not developed through the usual Judicial Conference rulemaking process, but by\n\nCongress itself”). Had Congress intended to exclude all evidence of child\n\nmolestations committed by juveniles, it would have said so.\n\n Cole’s analogous argument with relation to state law is similarly mistaken.\n\nThe law in question says that fifteen to seventeen-year-olds charged with rape “shall\n\nbe held accountable as youthful offenders.” OKLA. STAT. 10A § 2-5-205(C) (2024).\n\nReasoning that those under fifteen are not guilty of any crime, Cole says the\n\ngovernment has not sufficiently proven he was at least fifteen at the time of the other\n\nacts. Again, however, this speaks to the status and punishment of juveniles who\n\ncommit the crime of rape; it does nothing to change the substantive criminality of the\n\nunderlying offense. Oklahoma law puts forth three categories of offenders: adults,\n\nyouthful offenders, and juveniles. Id. § 2-5-204(A). And “[a] child who is arrested\n\n. . . may, depending on the child’s age and alleged crime,” be placed in each of these\n\ncategories. Id. Not only does this demonstrate that Oklahoma still considers child\n\noffenses crimes, it also gives discretion to try juveniles as adults for the underlying\n\n\n 2\n Because Congress wanted courts rarely to exclude evidence of other child\nmolestations, Rule 414 provides that this evidence “may be considered on any matter\nto which it is relevant,” FED. R. EVID. 414(a), including showing the defendant’s\npropensity to engage in child molestation, Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (10th Cir.\n1997), as opposed to typical “other acts” evidence that cannot go to propensity. See\nFED. R. EVID. 404(b).\n 10\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\ncriminal offense. Id. § 2-5-205(D). Therefore, we conclude that Oklahoma similarly\n\ndid not decriminalize offenses committed by juveniles.\n\n Finally, Cole argues that if the language of Rule 414 does not clearly support\n\nhis position, it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to make the rule of lenity applicable.\n\nEven if we were to conclude that Rule 414 is ambiguous, Cole’s argument is\n\ninapposite. The rule of lenity is the legal principle that requires courts to interpret\n\nvague language in substantive criminal laws and sentencing statutes in favor of\n\ncriminal defendants. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); United\n\nStates v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993). The rationale for the rule of\n\nlenity is that individuals must be put on notice of what actions constitute a crime and\n\nhow harshly they can be punished, so that they have a fair opportunity to conform\n\ntheir conduct to the law. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949–50; cf. United States v. Trout,\n\n68 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming sentence when defendant “clearly\n\nknew that such conduct was illegal and punishable by at least five years of\n\nimprisonment”); Olivera-Beritan v. Asuncion, 2017 WL 3131829, at *9 (S.D. Cal.\n\nJuly 24, 2017) (unreported) (discussing defendant’s practice of “avoiding dealing in\n\nother drugs [besides marijuana] due to the long prison sentences”). 3 Rule 414,\n\nhowever, is not a substantive criminal statute nor a sentencing provision. It is an\n\nevidentiary rule. There is no precedent to support applying the rule of lenity to\n\nevidentiary rules, nor should there be. As opposed to the undoubted importance of an\n\n\n 3\n We cite all unpublished decisions only for their persuasive value. See 10th\nCir. R. 32.1(A).\n 11\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nindividual knowing substantively whether their conduct is criminal and knowing how\n\nharshly they could be punished for that conduct, it is simply too remote to require\n\nunambiguous advance notice of what evidence could ultimately be deemed\n\nadmissible at a subsequent trial, especially for an entirely unrelated crime as is the\n\ncase here. It is too remote a stretch to assume that Cole would have conformed his\n\nconduct and avoided committing the earlier child molestations in order to avoid\n\nevidence of such crimes being admitted at a trial several years later for a separate\n\nchild molestation. Cole asks us to take the rule of lenity one step too far.\n\n We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Cole’s prior acts of child\n\nmolestation committed when he was a juvenile were “crimes” as referred to in\n\nRule 414, and thus evidence of such crimes was admissible.\n\nB. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice\n\n Once a court has determined that other acts of child molestation meet the\n\nbaseline criteria for Rule 414, the court must then carry out Rule 403 balancing to\n\ndetermine if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s\n\nprobative value. See United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748, 765 (10th Cir. 2021).\n\nWe employ four factors to determine the evidence’s probative value and three factors\n\nto determine the danger of unfair prejudice. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. Addressing\n\neach, we conclude that the district court’s balancing was not an abuse of discretion.\n\n 1. The Enjady factors suggest the other acts evidence was probative\n\n The four factors considered at the probative stage of the analysis are: (1) how\n\nclearly the other act has been proven, (2) how probative the evidence is to a material\n\n 12\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\nfact, (3) how seriously disputed the material fact to be proven is, and (4) whether less\n\nprejudicial evidence is available. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. All four factors weigh\n\nin favor of the evidence’s probative value.\n\n a. The other acts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence\n\n Cole argues the other acts were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence\n\nbecause the alleged acts occurred as much as twenty-one years prior to the trial, and\n\nthey were not reported until 2019 and 2020, respectively. Also, Cole argues that his\n\nhalf-brother provided only weak corroboration of his half-sister’s allegations because\n\nhe did not see any sexual act occur.\n\n Cole’s half-sister did, however, disclose her abuse at age eleven. Additionally,\n\nthough the time since the alleged acts took place may go to the credibility of the\n\nwitnesses, it does not overcome the witnesses’ testimony on a preponderance\n\nstandard, which only requires that it be more likely than not that the acts took place.\n\nUltimately, “witness credibility is a jury question.” United States v. Harjo, 122 F.4th\n\n1240, 1252 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he key to [Rule 414] admission is relevance, not\n\ncorroboration.”).\n\n b. The other acts were probative of a material fact\n\n Cole argues that the other acts were not probative of a material fact: whether\n\nhe abused K.Z. This factor itself contains five considerations: (1) the similarity of\n\nthe other acts and charged acts, (2) the time lapse between the acts, (3) the frequency\n\nof the other acts, (4) intervening events, and (5) the need for evidence beyond the\n\n\n\n 13\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\ndefendant’s and victim’s testimony. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331\n\n(10th Cir. 1998).\n\n Cole argues that significant differences exist between the other acts and\n\ncharged acts, in that his half-sister alleged Cole put his mouth on her vagina, which\n\nK.Z. “didn’t say in her trial testimony and [was] something that was not a basis for\n\nthe three charges,” (Aplt. Br. 23), and that Cole was a juvenile at the time of the\n\nprevious alleged molestations. These differences are hardly persuasive. Not only\n\nhad K.Z. actually told the nurse examiner that Cole did put his mouth on her vagina,\n\nbut the other aspects of the assaults are essentially identical, and all suggest an\n\naffinity to molest girls in his family who are significantly younger than him—and\n\napproximately the same age of this victim at the time of her molestation. Likewise,\n\nthe difference in his own age does not render the acts themselves any different.\n\n Cole’s strongest argument is the lapse in time between these acts, which is\n\nbetween twelve and seventeen years. In advising that Rule 413 and 414 evidence\n\nmost often should be admitted as probative, however, Congress noted that “evidence\n\nof other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly admitted,\n\nnotwithstanding substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or\n\noffenses.” Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 413 Historical Notes).\n\nTherefore, though the time lapse may reduce the probative value of the other acts\n\nevidence, it does not negate their probative nature.\n\n Cole argues that the frequency factor cuts against the probative value of the\n\nevidence because “only five specific acts” were detailed in the record, which Cole\n\n 14\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 15\n\n\n\ncategorizes as “not substantial.” (Aplt. Br. 24.) Yet, Cole points to no authority to\n\nsupport his conclusion that five acts of child molestation are “not substantial.” One\n\nof our sister circuits considered three examples sufficiently frequent. See United\n\nStates v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Cole’s half-sister\n\nstated that there were many more than the three instances of molestation of which she\n\nprovided details—enough that “it would take [] forever” to recount them. Lastly,\n\nCole’s argument that the frequency pales in comparison to “daily abuse,” (Reply\n\nBr. 13), weakens because he did not see his victims daily, but only on specific\n\noccasions. Further, his cousin deliberately stopped visiting to avoid additional\n\nmolestations. The record indicates that when he had the opportunity to assault his\n\nyoung female relatives, Cole often took that opportunity.\n\n As for intervening events, Cole states that his work, marriage, fatherhood, and\n\n“full neurological development” all occurred between the prior acts and charged acts.\n\n(Aplt. Br. 24.) Similar to the time lapse, these events may reduce the probative value\n\nof the other acts, but they do not negate their probative nature.\n\n Finally, Cole argues that there was no need for the other acts evidence because\n\nthe testimony of K.Z. and the examiners, as well as the physical evidence, was\n\nsufficient. We have, however, recognized the importance of corroborating evidence\n\nin cases of child molestation. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th\n\nCir. 1999) (en banc). When the credibility of the child-victim has been questioned,\n\nas here, “there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant evidence\n\nthat will illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial by the defense.” Id.\n\n 15\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 16\n\n\n\n c. The material fact, whether Cole abused K.Z., is seriously disputed\n\n The parties agree that the material fact was seriously disputed: Cole claims he\n\nnever inappropriately touched K.Z., while the government claims that he did so on\n\nmultiple occasions. This dispute counsels in favor of admitting the other acts\n\nevidence. United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1286 (10th Cir. 2012).\n\n d. There was no less prejudicial evidence for this purpose\n\n The last factor is whether the government can avail itself of less prejudicial\n\nevidence. Cole argues the government had less prejudicial evidence at its disposal,\n\nwhich it used, including the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the\n\nexaminers. The existence of victim testimony alone, however, can hardly mean this\n\nfactor weighs against admission; if that were the case, there would practically never\n\nbe good reason to admit Rule 414 evidence in this context. Cf. United States v. Clay,\n\n148 F.4th 1181, 1200 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding district court did not abuse discretion\n\nwhen admitting other acts evidence despite victim testimony, which the government\n\n“nearly always has”). Cole’s argument would not accord with our understanding that\n\nexcluding evidence under the Enjady test should be “infrequent[ ], reflecting\n\nCongress’ legislative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.”\n\n134 F.3d at 1433.\n\n Additionally, the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the examiners\n\nall helped clarify for the jury what had happened to K.Z. and support her version of\n\nevents. Evidence of other child molestations Cole committed is a different type of\n\nevidence, and it is probative for different reasons. The other acts evidence served\n\n 16\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 17\n\n\n\ntwo distinct purposes: to shed light on Cole’s own credibility and his propensity to\n\nmolest children, purposes uniquely authorized under Rule 414.\n\n As stated above, Rule 414 evidence differs from traditional other acts evidence\n\naddressed under Rule 404(b) in that Rule 414 evidence can be used for propensity\n\nreasoning. See supra note 2. There is good reason for this unique feature of\n\nRule 414. Congress recognized that it is inherently difficult to prove sexual offenses\n\ncommitted against children because “sex offense prosecutions frequently involves\n\n[sic] victim-witnesses who are traumatized and unable to effectively testify.”\n\nEnjady, 134 F.3d at 1434. Additionally, the offenses “rarely occur in the presence of\n\nother witnesses and a child victim’s credibility can readily be attacked in the absence\n\nof substantial corroboration.” Harjo, 122 F.4th at 1249 (internal quotation omitted).\n\nTherefore, Congress “determined it would be appropriate to permit the jury to\n\nconsider a defendant’s past conduct as corroborating evidence” in order to give juries\n\na complete picture of the offense and the defendant’s background. 4 See id. None of\n\nthe “less prejudicial” evidence Cole points to helped establish his propensity to\n\nmolest children, which is the very reason Rule 414 evidence is often necessary and\n\n“liberally” admitted. See Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1433. And, as Cole stated, “[t]he\n\ncase rested largely on K.Z.’s testimony versus Cole’s testimony.” (Aplt. Br. 28.)\n\n\n\n 4\n The difficulties of child molestation prosecutions also justify the Enjady\nfactors’ “specialized version of the standard Rule 403 balancing analysis,” Harjo,\n122 F.4th at 1249, to enact Congress’ instruction “that the evidence ‘normally’\nshould be admitted” in these cases. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (quoting 140 Cong.\nRec. H8992 (S. Molinari, Aug. 21, 1994)).\n 17\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 18\n\n\n\nAs such, other evidence that would undermine Cole’s credibility when denying the\n\nalleged molestations was probative and admissible under Rule 414. Charley, 189\n\nF.3d at 1260.\n\n 2. The Enjady factors suggest little danger of unfair prejudice\n\n The three factors considered in the unfair prejudice analysis are (1) the\n\nlikelihood of contributing to an improper verdict, (2) whether the other acts will\n\ndistract from the central issues, and (3) how time consuming it will be to prove the\n\nother acts. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.\n\n Cole argues that the danger of the jury improperly convicting him due to these\n\nother acts was increased because the other acts involved different victims, and they\n\noccurred long before. On these grounds, he seeks to distinguish United States v.\n\nRiggs, in which the other acts involved the same victim and were more recent.\n\n2024 WL 2873897, at *8–9 (10th Cir. June 7, 2024) (unreported). But it is not\n\nobvious to us, nor has Cole sufficiently established, that these differences increased\n\nthe likelihood that the jury “would have overlooked [the] testimony about these\n\ncharged acts and instead punished” Cole for the uncharged acts. See id. at 8. In the\n\nabsence of any cases compelling the conclusion that the other acts evidence here\n\nwould lead to an improper verdict, and given the district court’s proper instruction to\n\nthe jury that the other acts evidence could not alone prove guilt, we cannot conclude\n\nthat the district court abused its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence.\n\n Cole argues that the other acts evidence was very time consuming, taking up\n\n16% of the trial transcript and involving three of the government’s twelve witnesses.\n\n 18\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 19\n\n\n\nIn Perrault, we recognized that no specific number of Rule 414 witnesses was or was\n\nnot appropriate, but we pointed to several cases in which three or more witnesses was\n\nconsidered not unduly prejudicial. 995 F.3d at 768. This is particularly true when\n\nmultiple witnesses are each testifying as to their own molestation. See id. at 769.\n\n Cole also argues that the evidence distracted the jury from the central issues.\n\nHe suggests that the amount of time spent on the other acts evidence and the fact that\n\nhe was never charged for the other acts likely distracted the jury. Again, Cole says\n\nthis risk was heightened by the temporal remoteness of the events and his juvenile\n\nstatus at the time. The district court could have found, however, that the likelihood\n\nof distraction was reduced by the remoteness in time and his juvenile status, since the\n\nevents were less likely to be confused with the charged acts.\n\n Because the evidence was highly probative and did not present significant\n\ndanger of unfair prejudice, and because the district court provided detailed reasoning\n\nfor its conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this\n\nevidence. The mere possibility that this evidence would cause the jury to have\n\nnegative feelings towards Cole does not make it “unfair” prejudice, as this is likely\n\ntrue for all Rule 414 evidence. See Perrault, 995 F.3d at 770 (citing United States v.\n\nMercer, 653 F. App’x 622, 629 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)).\n\n We need not reach the question of harmless error because the district court was\n\ncorrect to admit the evidence. Additionally, to the extent Cole argues that his first\n\ntrial ending with a mistrial necessarily demonstrates this was a close case and the\n\nalleged error was harmful, he is mistaken. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d\n\n 19\n\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 20\n\n\n\n659, 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The fact that [defendant’s] first trial ended in a hung jury\n\ndoes not alter our harmless error conclusion. A jury may hang for any number of\n\nreasons, including the idiosyncratic views of a single juror.”). This is particularly\n\ntrue given that both juries heard the challenged evidence. See Barker v. Fleming,\n\n423 F.3d 1085, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t must be acknowledged that different juries\n\nmay view the same facts and testimony differently.”).\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n\n The evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation was admissible under\n\nRule 414, and the probative value of this evidence outweighed any danger of unfair\n\nprejudice. Therefore, we need not reach the district court’s alternative ground for\n\nadmission via Rule 404(b). We AFFIRM Cole’s conviction.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Cole\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-24\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 24, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 24-7077\\n\\n BRETT DEWAYNE COLE,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Eastern District of Oklahoma\\n (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-00098-JFH-1)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBlain Myhre of Blaine Myhre LLC, Englewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\nLisa C. Williams, Special Assistant United States Attorney (Christopher J. Wilson,\\nUnited States Attorney, with her on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-\\nAppellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n In this direct criminal appeal, defendant Brett Dewayne Cole challenges his\\n\\nconviction for aggravated sexual abuse, aggravated abuse, and abusive sexual contact\\n\\nin Indian Country on the grounds that evidence of prior acts of child molestation was\\n\\nwrongly admitted at trial. Specifically, Cole argues both that because the prior acts\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\noccurred when he was a juvenile they are not “crimes” as required by Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 414, and that the evidence’s prejudicial effect significantly outweighed its\\n\\nprobative value. To the contrary, we conclude that acts of child molestation are still\\n\\n“crimes” for the purposes of Rule 414 when committed by a juvenile, and the district\\n\\ncourt properly balanced the evidence’s probative value and prejudicial effect.\\n\\nHaving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we AFFIRM.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n In May 2019, K.Z., Cole’s stepdaughter, reported that Cole had molested her.\\n\\nAt the time, K.Z. was aged 10 and in the third grade. K.Z. is a member of the\\n\\nChoctaw tribe.\\n\\n K.Z. reported that on the evening of May 8, she joined Cole and a friend of\\n\\nCole’s in the “shop” at their home where Cole was working on a four-wheeler\\n\\nvehicle, known as a “Banshee.” Over dinner, Cole told K.Z. that if she learned to\\n\\nride the Banshee, she could have it. Cole’s wife went to bed around 10:30 to 11:00\\n\\np.m., while Cole went back to the shop. At some point later, Cole came to bed.\\n\\nAfter a short time lying in bed, Cole went to the kitchen and his wife fell back asleep.\\n\\nThen, Cole went to K.Z.’s bedroom and woke her up. Cole put his fingers in K.Z.’s\\n\\nvagina, telling her that he would give her the Banshee if she allowed him to do so.\\n\\nCole returned to the bedroom with his wife afterwards, who woke up and noticed that\\n\\nCole’s penis was wet.\\n\\n On the morning of May 9, school personnel noticed that K.Z. “seemed very\\n\\ndistracted and upset.” (Aple. Br. at 12.) When asked if she was okay, K.Z. said she\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nwas not and needed to talk about something. K.Z. told school personnel that Cole\\n\\nhad “stuck his fingers in [her] private parts” the night before. Id. at 14. K.Z. said\\n\\nCole told her not to tell anyone because he or she would go to jail. When asked if\\n\\nsimilar incidents had happened before, K.Z. said yes. K.Z. said that Cole had put his\\n\\nfinger in her vagina once before. The school then contacted Cole’s wife, who came\\n\\nto take K.Z. for an examination.\\n\\n A sexual assault nurse examiner conducted an examination, and K.Z. told the\\n\\nnurse what had happened. She also told the nurse that there had been two prior\\n\\noccasions of sexual misconduct. On one, Cole put his mouth on K.Z.’s vagina, put\\n\\nhis penis in K.Z.’s mouth, and put his penis in K.Z.’s anus. Later, when speaking to\\n\\na child forensic interviewer, K.Z. described the second prior incident: K.Z. said that\\n\\nCole had put her hand on his penis and made her move her hand up and down. Cole\\n\\nalso pushed K.Z.’s head down, putting his penis in her mouth.\\n\\n Cole was charged with one count of Aggravated Sexual Abuse in Indian\\n\\nCountry, one count of Aggravated Abuse in Indian Country, and one count of\\n\\nAbusive Sexual Contact in Indian Country, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2244(a)(5),\\n\\n2246(2)(B-C) & (3), 1151, and 1152, stemming from the three assaults K.Z.\\n\\ndescribed. Cole denied ever inappropriately touching K.Z.\\n\\n At trial, the government also sought to introduce three different witnesses’\\n\\ntestimony of prior uncharged instances of child molestation committed by Cole.\\n\\nFirst, the government presented the testimony of Cole’s half-sister, who is\\n\\napproximately seven years younger than Cole. She testified that when she was\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nbetween five and ten—placing Cole between twelve and seventeen—Cole began\\n\\nsexually assaulting her. She said this happened so frequently that “it would take\\n\\n[her] forever to [talk] about everything that has happened.” (Aple. Br. at 18.) The\\n\\nthree incidents she specifically described included Cole putting his penis in her\\n\\nmouth, Cole kissing her, Cole placing his mouth on her vagina, and Cole putting his\\n\\nfingers inside her vagina. Second, her brother testified that he remembered walking\\n\\ninto a shed and seeing them together, with Cole zipping up his pants. Third, Cole’s\\n\\nstepcousin who is approximately five years younger than Cole testified that when she\\n\\nwas around eight, Cole sexually assaulted her on two occasions. On one occasion,\\n\\nCole put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina; Cole told her not to tell\\n\\nanyone because nobody would believe her. On another, when she was asleep, Cole\\n\\nstarted undoing her pants and put his finger in her vagina. At this point, she avoided\\n\\nseeing Cole. Cole denied inappropriately touching his cousin without her consent.\\n\\n The first trial took place in January 2023. Over Cole’s out-of-time objection,\\n\\ntestimony regarding the other acts of child molestation was presented. When the jury\\n\\nwas unable to reach a verdict after seven hours of deliberation, the court declared a\\n\\nmistrial. The second trial took place in March 2023. Again, the jury heard testimony\\n\\nregarding the other acts evidence. After two hours of deliberation, the jury found\\n\\nCole guilty on all three counts.\\n\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n\\n Cole objected below to the admissibility of this evidence under Rule 414 both\\n\\nbecause he said his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations meant they\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nwere not “crimes” as incorporated into Rule 414 and because the evidence’s\\n\\nprejudicial effect significantly outweighed its probative value. Preserved objections\\n\\nto decisions to admit evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.\\n\\nBenally, 500 F.3d 1085, 1089 (10th Cir. 2007).\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Cole argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the\\n\\nevidence of prior acts of child molestation pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 414\\n\\nbecause he suggests that his juvenile status at the time of the prior molestations made\\n\\nthem not “crimes” and, thus, inadmissible under Rule 414. We disagree. Though\\n\\njuvenile delinquency proceedings differ from criminal proceedings, the underlying acts\\n\\nremain criminal. Additionally, Cole argues that the evidence’s prejudicial effect\\n\\nsignificantly outweighed its probative value. Not so. The evidence was highly probative\\n\\nbecause of its frequency and its similarity to the charged acts, and the risk of prejudice\\n\\nwas no greater than any case involving Rule 414 evidence.\\n\\nA. Criminal acts committed by juveniles remain “crimes”\\n\\n When a criminal defendant is accused of child molestation, Federal Rule of\\n\\nEvidence 414 permits the admission of evidence that the defendant “committed any other\\n\\nchild molestation.” FED. R. EVID. 414(a). Rule 414 then states that “‘child molestation’\\n\\nmeans a crime under federal law or under state law,” involving any of a variety of\\n\\nsexually motivated acts. FED. R. EVID. 414(d)(2). Cole argues that prior child\\n\\nmolestations committed by a juvenile are not “crimes.” Therefore, he suggests that\\n\\nevidence of child molestations committed by the defendant when the defendant was a\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\njuvenile cannot come in under Rule 414. Given the law regarding juvenile delinquency,\\n\\nthe plain terms of Rule 414, and Congress’ intention that courts admit this evidence\\n\\nliberally, we find that evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation while he was a\\n\\nminor was admissible under Rule 414.\\n\\n To support his argument that child molestations committed when the defendant\\n\\nwas a minor are not crimes, Cole relies on the definition of “juvenile delinquency” in the\\n\\nFederal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“FJDA”). 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–\\n\\n42 (2006). Specifically, Cole says that the language stating “‘juvenile delinquency’ is the\\n\\nviolation of a law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth\\n\\nbirthday which would have been a crime if committed by an adult” necessarily means\\n\\nthat the act is not a crime if committed by a juvenile. See id. § 5031 (emphasis added).\\n\\nCole takes this to mean that those who have not reached their eighteenth birthday are\\n\\nincapable of committing “crimes,” only “acts of juvenile delinquency.”\\n\\n To the contrary, it is well-established that juveniles are capable of committing\\n\\ncrimes. For example, we find it instructive that juveniles can be charged as adults, in\\n\\nwhich case they are tried in a traditional criminal proceeding rather than a juvenile\\n\\ndelinquency proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1990). The FJDA itself instructs when this is appropriate, allowing for\\n\\ncriminal proceedings in federal courts when (1) the juvenile court “does not have\\n\\njurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction” for the misconduct, (2) “the State does\\n\\nnot have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles,” or\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n(3) the juvenile is charged with a felonious crime of violence. 1 18 U.S.C. § 5032.\\n\\nIf the FJDA decriminalized otherwise criminal conduct when committed by juveniles,\\n\\nthere would be no basis for a criminal conviction in any of these circumstances.\\n\\n This also follows from the purpose of the FJDA, which is to provide separate\\n\\nproceedings for juveniles outside of the court system and to avoid criminal\\n\\nconvictions that would appear on juveniles’ records. Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220. It is\\n\\nclear, therefore, that Congress intended to alter the consequences of a crime\\n\\ncommitted by a juvenile, not to reclassify the act itself as non-criminal. In fact, we\\n\\ndiscussed in Brian N. the FJDA’s applicability to “persons who are juveniles at the\\n\\ntime a federal crime is committed.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United\\n\\nStates v. Mechem, we noted that “Congress recognized that juvenile crimes are\\n\\n‘essentially a State and local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local\\n\\ngovernments.’” 509 F.2d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 1975) (emphasis added) (citing\\n\\nS. Rep. No. 93–1011, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)). Criminal actions engaged in by\\n\\njuveniles are still crimes, simply with different proceedings and consequences.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Even if Cole prevailed on the proposition that acts of juvenile delinquency\\ncovered by the FJDA are not crimes in general, this exception in the FJDA for\\nfelonious acts of violence would still defeat Cole’s argument here. Cole’s\\nnonconsensual sexual acts would likely fall under this exception for felonious acts of\\nviolence. See e.g., U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual §§ 4B1.2a, 2L1.2 app. note 2\\n(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2023) (categorizing forcible sex offenses—sexual acts where\\nconsent was not given nor valid—as crimes of violence); 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)\\n(Bail Reform Act). Therefore, even under Cole’s preferred definition, these prior\\nacts of child molestation were “crimes.”\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n We have previously considered crimes committed by juveniles in an analogous\\n\\ncontext in United States v. Willis and reached the same conclusion. 826 F.3d 1265\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2016). In Willis, acts of sexual assault committed by the defendant as a\\n\\njuvenile were presented via Rule 413, id. at 1270, which mirrors the language of\\n\\nRule 414 by defining “sexual assault” as “a crime under federal law or under state\\n\\nlaw.” FED. R. EVID. 413(d). In Willis, we concluded that evidence of sexual assaults\\n\\ncommitted as a juvenile was admissible. 826 F.3d at 1274. Cole asserts that, despite\\n\\nthe near-identical statutory language and factual background at play in Willis, its\\n\\nholding is irrelevant because the defendant in Willis did not raise his exact argument\\n\\nas to the definition of “crime” drawn from the FJDA; rather, the defendant in Willis\\n\\nargued that his juvenile status at the time rendered the prior sexual assaults irrelevant.\\n\\nBut our analysis in Willis was not limited to a Rule 403 balancing. In fact, we\\n\\nrecognized the lack of “any authority for the proposition that juvenile misconduct is\\n\\nper se inadmissible under Rule 413.” Willis, 826 F.3d at 1274. We went on to say\\n\\nthat “the mere fact that Mr. Willis was a minor at the time of his alleged sexual\\n\\nassaults . . . does not render evidence of those events inadmissible, and we cannot say\\n\\nhis status as a juvenile conclusively outweighs the other factors showing the\\n\\nprobative value of the evidence.” Id. We not only answered the balancing question,\\n\\nbut also whether crimes committed as a juvenile are admissible as a category in the\\n\\nfirst place. We answered that question in the affirmative then, and we see no reason\\n\\nto deviate now.\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\n Both parties point our attention to In re Sweeney, suggesting it supports each\\n\\nof their positions. 492 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2007). In Sweeney, a debtor in his\\n\\nbankruptcy action sought to discharge a restitution order from a juvenile delinquency\\n\\nproceeding. Id. at 1190. Typically, restitution ordered via criminal proceedings is\\n\\nnot dischargeable. Id. at 1191. Holding in that case that the restitution order was\\n\\ndischargeable, however, we said, “an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not\\n\\nequivalent to a conviction.” Id. Cole extrapolates that his acts committed as a\\n\\njuvenile are not criminal and, consequently, inadmissible here. Though Sweeney did\\n\\nhighlight the same language from the FJDA that Cole seizes on, id., the crux of its\\n\\nholding was that Sweeney had not been convicted of a crime, which was necessary\\n\\nfor the bankruptcy discharge exception. We reiterated that the purpose of juvenile\\n\\ndelinquency proceedings is “to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction,” id.\\n\\n(quoting Brian N., 900 F.2d at 220), and having thus concluded adjudications of\\n\\nstatus differ from convictions, we did not need to determine if Sweeney’s offense—\\n\\narson—was still a crime. By contrast, Rule 414 does not require a prior criminal\\n\\nconviction, only an underlying criminal offense. As a result, while undoubtedly\\n\\nrelated, Sweeney does not change our understanding that criminal acts committed by\\n\\njuveniles are “crimes.”\\n\\n This conclusion is also consistent with “Congress’ legislative judgment that\\n\\n[Rule 414] evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.” United States v. Enjady, 134\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nF.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998). 2 Congress itself added Rules 413 and 414 to the\\n\\nFederal Rules of Evidence in 1994. Pub. L. No. 103–322, Tit. XXXII § 320935;\\n\\nUnited States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting Rule 414\\n\\n“was not developed through the usual Judicial Conference rulemaking process, but by\\n\\nCongress itself”). Had Congress intended to exclude all evidence of child\\n\\nmolestations committed by juveniles, it would have said so.\\n\\n Cole’s analogous argument with relation to state law is similarly mistaken.\\n\\nThe law in question says that fifteen to seventeen-year-olds charged with rape “shall\\n\\nbe held accountable as youthful offenders.” OKLA. STAT. 10A § 2-5-205(C) (2024).\\n\\nReasoning that those under fifteen are not guilty of any crime, Cole says the\\n\\ngovernment has not sufficiently proven he was at least fifteen at the time of the other\\n\\nacts. Again, however, this speaks to the status and punishment of juveniles who\\n\\ncommit the crime of rape; it does nothing to change the substantive criminality of the\\n\\nunderlying offense. Oklahoma law puts forth three categories of offenders: adults,\\n\\nyouthful offenders, and juveniles. Id. § 2-5-204(A). And “[a] child who is arrested\\n\\n. . . may, depending on the child’s age and alleged crime,” be placed in each of these\\n\\ncategories. Id. Not only does this demonstrate that Oklahoma still considers child\\n\\noffenses crimes, it also gives discretion to try juveniles as adults for the underlying\\n\\n\\n 2\\n Because Congress wanted courts rarely to exclude evidence of other child\\nmolestations, Rule 414 provides that this evidence “may be considered on any matter\\nto which it is relevant,” FED. R. EVID. 414(a), including showing the defendant’s\\npropensity to engage in child molestation, Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (10th Cir.\\n1997), as opposed to typical “other acts” evidence that cannot go to propensity. See\\nFED. R. EVID. 404(b).\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\ncriminal offense. Id. § 2-5-205(D). Therefore, we conclude that Oklahoma similarly\\n\\ndid not decriminalize offenses committed by juveniles.\\n\\n Finally, Cole argues that if the language of Rule 414 does not clearly support\\n\\nhis position, it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to make the rule of lenity applicable.\\n\\nEven if we were to conclude that Rule 414 is ambiguous, Cole’s argument is\\n\\ninapposite. The rule of lenity is the legal principle that requires courts to interpret\\n\\nvague language in substantive criminal laws and sentencing statutes in favor of\\n\\ncriminal defendants. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988); United\\n\\nStates v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir. 1993). The rationale for the rule of\\n\\nlenity is that individuals must be put on notice of what actions constitute a crime and\\n\\nhow harshly they can be punished, so that they have a fair opportunity to conform\\n\\ntheir conduct to the law. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 949–50; cf. United States v. Trout,\\n\\n68 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1995) (affirming sentence when defendant “clearly\\n\\nknew that such conduct was illegal and punishable by at least five years of\\n\\nimprisonment”); Olivera-Beritan v. Asuncion, 2017 WL 3131829, at *9 (S.D. Cal.\\n\\nJuly 24, 2017) (unreported) (discussing defendant’s practice of “avoiding dealing in\\n\\nother drugs [besides marijuana] due to the long prison sentences”). 3 Rule 414,\\n\\nhowever, is not a substantive criminal statute nor a sentencing provision. It is an\\n\\nevidentiary rule. There is no precedent to support applying the rule of lenity to\\n\\nevidentiary rules, nor should there be. As opposed to the undoubted importance of an\\n\\n\\n 3\\n We cite all unpublished decisions only for their persuasive value. See 10th\\nCir. R. 32.1(A).\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nindividual knowing substantively whether their conduct is criminal and knowing how\\n\\nharshly they could be punished for that conduct, it is simply too remote to require\\n\\nunambiguous advance notice of what evidence could ultimately be deemed\\n\\nadmissible at a subsequent trial, especially for an entirely unrelated crime as is the\\n\\ncase here. It is too remote a stretch to assume that Cole would have conformed his\\n\\nconduct and avoided committing the earlier child molestations in order to avoid\\n\\nevidence of such crimes being admitted at a trial several years later for a separate\\n\\nchild molestation. Cole asks us to take the rule of lenity one step too far.\\n\\n We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Cole’s prior acts of child\\n\\nmolestation committed when he was a juvenile were “crimes” as referred to in\\n\\nRule 414, and thus evidence of such crimes was admissible.\\n\\nB. The probative value of the evidence outweighed any unfair prejudice\\n\\n Once a court has determined that other acts of child molestation meet the\\n\\nbaseline criteria for Rule 414, the court must then carry out Rule 403 balancing to\\n\\ndetermine if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence’s\\n\\nprobative value. See United States v. Perrault, 995 F.3d 748, 765 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\nWe employ four factors to determine the evidence’s probative value and three factors\\n\\nto determine the danger of unfair prejudice. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. Addressing\\n\\neach, we conclude that the district court’s balancing was not an abuse of discretion.\\n\\n 1. The Enjady factors suggest the other acts evidence was probative\\n\\n The four factors considered at the probative stage of the analysis are: (1) how\\n\\nclearly the other act has been proven, (2) how probative the evidence is to a material\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\nfact, (3) how seriously disputed the material fact to be proven is, and (4) whether less\\n\\nprejudicial evidence is available. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. All four factors weigh\\n\\nin favor of the evidence’s probative value.\\n\\n a. The other acts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence\\n\\n Cole argues the other acts were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence\\n\\nbecause the alleged acts occurred as much as twenty-one years prior to the trial, and\\n\\nthey were not reported until 2019 and 2020, respectively. Also, Cole argues that his\\n\\nhalf-brother provided only weak corroboration of his half-sister’s allegations because\\n\\nhe did not see any sexual act occur.\\n\\n Cole’s half-sister did, however, disclose her abuse at age eleven. Additionally,\\n\\nthough the time since the alleged acts took place may go to the credibility of the\\n\\nwitnesses, it does not overcome the witnesses’ testimony on a preponderance\\n\\nstandard, which only requires that it be more likely than not that the acts took place.\\n\\nUltimately, “witness credibility is a jury question.” United States v. Harjo, 122 F.4th\\n\\n1240, 1252 (10th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he key to [Rule 414] admission is relevance, not\\n\\ncorroboration.”).\\n\\n b. The other acts were probative of a material fact\\n\\n Cole argues that the other acts were not probative of a material fact: whether\\n\\nhe abused K.Z. This factor itself contains five considerations: (1) the similarity of\\n\\nthe other acts and charged acts, (2) the time lapse between the acts, (3) the frequency\\n\\nof the other acts, (4) intervening events, and (5) the need for evidence beyond the\\n\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\ndefendant’s and victim’s testimony. United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1331\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1998).\\n\\n Cole argues that significant differences exist between the other acts and\\n\\ncharged acts, in that his half-sister alleged Cole put his mouth on her vagina, which\\n\\nK.Z. “didn’t say in her trial testimony and [was] something that was not a basis for\\n\\nthe three charges,” (Aplt. Br. 23), and that Cole was a juvenile at the time of the\\n\\nprevious alleged molestations. These differences are hardly persuasive. Not only\\n\\nhad K.Z. actually told the nurse examiner that Cole did put his mouth on her vagina,\\n\\nbut the other aspects of the assaults are essentially identical, and all suggest an\\n\\naffinity to molest girls in his family who are significantly younger than him—and\\n\\napproximately the same age of this victim at the time of her molestation. Likewise,\\n\\nthe difference in his own age does not render the acts themselves any different.\\n\\n Cole’s strongest argument is the lapse in time between these acts, which is\\n\\nbetween twelve and seventeen years. In advising that Rule 413 and 414 evidence\\n\\nmost often should be admitted as probative, however, Congress noted that “evidence\\n\\nof other sex offenses by the defendant is often probative and properly admitted,\\n\\nnotwithstanding substantial lapses of time in relation to the charged offense or\\n\\noffenses.” Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1492 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 413 Historical Notes).\\n\\nTherefore, though the time lapse may reduce the probative value of the other acts\\n\\nevidence, it does not negate their probative nature.\\n\\n Cole argues that the frequency factor cuts against the probative value of the\\n\\nevidence because “only five specific acts” were detailed in the record, which Cole\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\ncategorizes as “not substantial.” (Aplt. Br. 24.) Yet, Cole points to no authority to\\n\\nsupport his conclusion that five acts of child molestation are “not substantial.” One\\n\\nof our sister circuits considered three examples sufficiently frequent. See United\\n\\nStates v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Cole’s half-sister\\n\\nstated that there were many more than the three instances of molestation of which she\\n\\nprovided details—enough that “it would take [] forever” to recount them. Lastly,\\n\\nCole’s argument that the frequency pales in comparison to “daily abuse,” (Reply\\n\\nBr. 13), weakens because he did not see his victims daily, but only on specific\\n\\noccasions. Further, his cousin deliberately stopped visiting to avoid additional\\n\\nmolestations. The record indicates that when he had the opportunity to assault his\\n\\nyoung female relatives, Cole often took that opportunity.\\n\\n As for intervening events, Cole states that his work, marriage, fatherhood, and\\n\\n“full neurological development” all occurred between the prior acts and charged acts.\\n\\n(Aplt. Br. 24.) Similar to the time lapse, these events may reduce the probative value\\n\\nof the other acts, but they do not negate their probative nature.\\n\\n Finally, Cole argues that there was no need for the other acts evidence because\\n\\nthe testimony of K.Z. and the examiners, as well as the physical evidence, was\\n\\nsufficient. We have, however, recognized the importance of corroborating evidence\\n\\nin cases of child molestation. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1260 (10th\\n\\nCir. 1999) (en banc). When the credibility of the child-victim has been questioned,\\n\\nas here, “there is a compelling public interest in admitting all significant evidence\\n\\nthat will illumine the credibility of the charge and any denial by the defense.” Id.\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\n c. The material fact, whether Cole abused K.Z., is seriously disputed\\n\\n The parties agree that the material fact was seriously disputed: Cole claims he\\n\\nnever inappropriately touched K.Z., while the government claims that he did so on\\n\\nmultiple occasions. This dispute counsels in favor of admitting the other acts\\n\\nevidence. United States v. Sturm, 673 F.3d 1274, 1286 (10th Cir. 2012).\\n\\n d. There was no less prejudicial evidence for this purpose\\n\\n The last factor is whether the government can avail itself of less prejudicial\\n\\nevidence. Cole argues the government had less prejudicial evidence at its disposal,\\n\\nwhich it used, including the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the\\n\\nexaminers. The existence of victim testimony alone, however, can hardly mean this\\n\\nfactor weighs against admission; if that were the case, there would practically never\\n\\nbe good reason to admit Rule 414 evidence in this context. Cf. United States v. Clay,\\n\\n148 F.4th 1181, 1200 (10th Cir. 2025) (holding district court did not abuse discretion\\n\\nwhen admitting other acts evidence despite victim testimony, which the government\\n\\n“nearly always has”). Cole’s argument would not accord with our understanding that\\n\\nexcluding evidence under the Enjady test should be “infrequent[ ], reflecting\\n\\nCongress’ legislative judgment that the evidence ‘normally’ should be admitted.”\\n\\n134 F.3d at 1433.\\n\\n Additionally, the testimony of K.Z., the school personnel, and the examiners\\n\\nall helped clarify for the jury what had happened to K.Z. and support her version of\\n\\nevents. Evidence of other child molestations Cole committed is a different type of\\n\\nevidence, and it is probative for different reasons. The other acts evidence served\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\ntwo distinct purposes: to shed light on Cole’s own credibility and his propensity to\\n\\nmolest children, purposes uniquely authorized under Rule 414.\\n\\n As stated above, Rule 414 evidence differs from traditional other acts evidence\\n\\naddressed under Rule 404(b) in that Rule 414 evidence can be used for propensity\\n\\nreasoning. See supra note 2. There is good reason for this unique feature of\\n\\nRule 414. Congress recognized that it is inherently difficult to prove sexual offenses\\n\\ncommitted against children because “sex offense prosecutions frequently involves\\n\\n[sic] victim-witnesses who are traumatized and unable to effectively testify.”\\n\\nEnjady, 134 F.3d at 1434. Additionally, the offenses “rarely occur in the presence of\\n\\nother witnesses and a child victim’s credibility can readily be attacked in the absence\\n\\nof substantial corroboration.” Harjo, 122 F.4th at 1249 (internal quotation omitted).\\n\\nTherefore, Congress “determined it would be appropriate to permit the jury to\\n\\nconsider a defendant’s past conduct as corroborating evidence” in order to give juries\\n\\na complete picture of the offense and the defendant’s background. 4 See id. None of\\n\\nthe “less prejudicial” evidence Cole points to helped establish his propensity to\\n\\nmolest children, which is the very reason Rule 414 evidence is often necessary and\\n\\n“liberally” admitted. See Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1433. And, as Cole stated, “[t]he\\n\\ncase rested largely on K.Z.’s testimony versus Cole’s testimony.” (Aplt. Br. 28.)\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n The difficulties of child molestation prosecutions also justify the Enjady\\nfactors’ “specialized version of the standard Rule 403 balancing analysis,” Harjo,\\n122 F.4th at 1249, to enact Congress’ instruction “that the evidence ‘normally’\\nshould be admitted” in these cases. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433 (quoting 140 Cong.\\nRec. H8992 (S. Molinari, Aug. 21, 1994)).\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nAs such, other evidence that would undermine Cole’s credibility when denying the\\n\\nalleged molestations was probative and admissible under Rule 414. Charley, 189\\n\\nF.3d at 1260.\\n\\n 2. The Enjady factors suggest little danger of unfair prejudice\\n\\n The three factors considered in the unfair prejudice analysis are (1) the\\n\\nlikelihood of contributing to an improper verdict, (2) whether the other acts will\\n\\ndistract from the central issues, and (3) how time consuming it will be to prove the\\n\\nother acts. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433.\\n\\n Cole argues that the danger of the jury improperly convicting him due to these\\n\\nother acts was increased because the other acts involved different victims, and they\\n\\noccurred long before. On these grounds, he seeks to distinguish United States v.\\n\\nRiggs, in which the other acts involved the same victim and were more recent.\\n\\n2024 WL 2873897, at *8–9 (10th Cir. June 7, 2024) (unreported). But it is not\\n\\nobvious to us, nor has Cole sufficiently established, that these differences increased\\n\\nthe likelihood that the jury “would have overlooked [the] testimony about these\\n\\ncharged acts and instead punished” Cole for the uncharged acts. See id. at 8. In the\\n\\nabsence of any cases compelling the conclusion that the other acts evidence here\\n\\nwould lead to an improper verdict, and given the district court’s proper instruction to\\n\\nthe jury that the other acts evidence could not alone prove guilt, we cannot conclude\\n\\nthat the district court abused its discretion by admitting the other acts evidence.\\n\\n Cole argues that the other acts evidence was very time consuming, taking up\\n\\n16% of the trial transcript and involving three of the government’s twelve witnesses.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nIn Perrault, we recognized that no specific number of Rule 414 witnesses was or was\\n\\nnot appropriate, but we pointed to several cases in which three or more witnesses was\\n\\nconsidered not unduly prejudicial. 995 F.3d at 768. This is particularly true when\\n\\nmultiple witnesses are each testifying as to their own molestation. See id. at 769.\\n\\n Cole also argues that the evidence distracted the jury from the central issues.\\n\\nHe suggests that the amount of time spent on the other acts evidence and the fact that\\n\\nhe was never charged for the other acts likely distracted the jury. Again, Cole says\\n\\nthis risk was heightened by the temporal remoteness of the events and his juvenile\\n\\nstatus at the time. The district court could have found, however, that the likelihood\\n\\nof distraction was reduced by the remoteness in time and his juvenile status, since the\\n\\nevents were less likely to be confused with the charged acts.\\n\\n Because the evidence was highly probative and did not present significant\\n\\ndanger of unfair prejudice, and because the district court provided detailed reasoning\\n\\nfor its conclusion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this\\n\\nevidence. The mere possibility that this evidence would cause the jury to have\\n\\nnegative feelings towards Cole does not make it “unfair” prejudice, as this is likely\\n\\ntrue for all Rule 414 evidence. See Perrault, 995 F.3d at 770 (citing United States v.\\n\\nMercer, 653 F. App’x 622, 629 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)).\\n\\n We need not reach the question of harmless error because the district court was\\n\\ncorrect to admit the evidence. Additionally, to the extent Cole argues that his first\\n\\ntrial ending with a mistrial necessarily demonstrates this was a close case and the\\n\\nalleged error was harmful, he is mistaken. See United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n659, 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The fact that [defendant’s] first trial ended in a hung jury\\n\\ndoes not alter our harmless error conclusion. A jury may hang for any number of\\n\\nreasons, including the idiosyncratic views of a single juror.”). This is particularly\\n\\ntrue given that both juries heard the challenged evidence. See Barker v. Fleming,\\n\\n423 F.3d 1085, 1101 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t must be acknowledged that different juries\\n\\nmay view the same facts and testimony differently.”).\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n The evidence of Cole’s prior acts of child molestation was admissible under\\n\\nRule 414, and the probative value of this evidence outweighed any danger of unfair\\n\\nprejudice. Therefore, we need not reach the district court’s alternative ground for\\n\\nadmission via Rule 404(b). We AFFIRM Cole’s conviction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30952,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10766595,"string":"10,766,595"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Raban"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-30"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-1359"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 24-1359\\n\\n ANTOAN RABAN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Colorado\\n (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00329-RMR-1)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nJohn C. Arceci, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal\\nPublic Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-\\nAppellant.\\n\\nKyle W. Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney (Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant\\nUnited States Attorney, and Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, on the\\nbrief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nPHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Two officers stopped a motorist for two violations: driving without a\\n\\nfront license plate and failing to use a turn signal. During the traffic stop, the\\n\\nofficers learned that the driver, who identified himself as Antoan Raban, was a\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\ncriminal gang member. The stop occurred in a high-crime area and a rival\\n\\ngang’s territory. And just seconds after the officers stopped Raban, another\\n\\nman, whom the police knew to be a fellow gang member, drove past, turned\\n\\naround, parked across the street from the stop, and called Raban’s phone.\\n\\n The officers called for backup and four more officers soon arrived.\\n\\nBecause Raban lacked identification, the officers decided to fingerprint him to\\n\\nverify his identity. They removed Raban from the car and frisked him, finding\\n\\nno weapons. While one officer walked Raban to the curb and prepared the\\n\\nfingerprint reader, a second officer did a protective sweep of the car. That\\n\\nofficer found a loaded pistol under the driver’s seat and ammunition in the\\n\\ncenter console.\\n\\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\\n\\nammunition as a felon. Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search,\\n\\narguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a protective sweep of\\n\\nthe car. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the officers\\n\\nreasonably suspected that Raban was dangerous and might access a weapon\\n\\nfrom inside the car.\\n\\n Raban pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s\\n\\nsuppression decision. Now he does just that. He argues that the officers lacked\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous and might access a weapon, so the\\n\\ncourt erred by denying his suppression motion.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\n Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. First, several\\n\\ncircumstances, taken together, provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\npresently dangerous. And second, when the officer conducted the protective\\n\\nsweep, he reasonably believed that Raban would receive a civil citation and be\\n\\nallowed to return to the car, where he might have had access to a weapon. The\\n\\nofficer therefore had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep.\\n\\n BACKGROUND\\n\\nI. Factual Background\\n\\n In May 2023, two gang-unit police officers—Tyler Danielson and\\n\\nZachary Moldenhauer—were patrolling a high-crime area in northeast Denver.\\n\\nSoon after 4 p.m., they noticed a car without its front license plate at a gas\\n\\nstation. That gas station “saw a lot of crime,” including “motor vehicle theft,\\n\\nnarcotics sale and distribution, [and] weapons-related offenses.” R. vol. I at\\n\\n123.\\n\\n When the driver left the gas station, he didn’t use a turn signal. So the\\n\\nofficers followed and pulled over the car.\\n\\n Officer Danielson approached the driver-side window, and Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer approached the passenger side. Because the car had tinted\\n\\nwindows, the officers asked the driver—Antoan Raban—to roll down the\\n\\nwindows. Raban complied, and the officers saw that he was alone in the car.\\n\\n The officers soon spotted an open beer can on the backseat floor. They\\n\\nalso noticed Raban’s face tattoos: the number “3” under each eye, which\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nconnected him to the Tre Tre Crips gang. Officer Danielson found Raban’s\\n\\nCrips affiliation “odd” because Raban was driving through the territory of a\\n\\nrival-gang, the Bloods. Id. at 79. In fact, later during the stop, Raban told\\n\\nOfficer Danielson: “If this is your area, I see why y’all would have scoped me\\n\\nout.”\\n\\n After Raban rolled down all four windows, Officer Danielson asked him\\n\\nabout the missing license plate. Raban said that the car belonged to his\\n\\ngirlfriend and explained that the car’s front had been recently damaged in an\\n\\naccident. Raban then looked for, but could not find, the car’s registration. He\\n\\nalso lacked any identification. So he gave the officers his name, address, and\\n\\nbirthday instead.\\n\\n Meanwhile, seconds after the officers stopped Raban, a white SUV drove\\n\\npast, completed a three-point turn, and parked across the street from the stop.\\n\\nBoth officers recognized the SUV’s driver: Deshay Armstrong, 1 “a well-known\\n\\nCrip gang member” with a violent criminal history. Id. at 79–80, 127. Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer acknowledged Armstrong by saying “sup, brother.” Id. at 101,\\n\\n143. Then the officers noticed Armstrong placing a telephone call. They could\\n\\nsee inside Raban’s car that the call was to Raban’s phone. Raban, ignoring the\\n\\ncall, told the officers that Armstrong was his girlfriend’s brother.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n At times, the record reflects Armstrong’s first name as “Dashae.”\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\n After getting Raban’s information, Officer Moldenhauer returned to the\\n\\npolice car to run a records check. Officer Danielson stayed with Raban, partly\\n\\nbecause Armstrong was parked nearby.\\n\\n Officer Danielson and Raban chatted calmly. Raban explained that the\\n\\nopen beer can was from the night before. He also admitted that he didn’t have a\\n\\ndriver’s license. And he said that Armstrong “just so happened to be here.”\\n\\n Around this time, the officers called for backup, largely because of\\n\\nArmstrong. Four more officers soon arrived.\\n\\n Officer Moldenhauer finished the records check, which revealed that\\n\\nRaban had several violent and weapons-related convictions. It also showed that\\n\\nRaban lacked a valid driver’s license. And though the check returned a photo\\n\\nresembling Raban, the photographed individual lacked face tattoos. So to\\n\\nconfirm Raban’s identity, Officer Moldenhauer decided to fingerprint him.\\n\\n Without telling Officer Danielson the records-check results, including\\n\\nRaban’s criminal history, Officer Moldenhauer asked Danielson to remove\\n\\nRaban from the car for fingerprinting. At the same time, Moldenhauer also told\\n\\nDanielson: “I think he’s good.” Id. at 147.\\n\\n Officer Danielson asked Raban to exit the car, frisked him, and noticed\\n\\nhe was wearing an ankle monitor. Finding no weapons, Danielson passed Raban\\n\\nto Officer Moldenhauer, who walked Raban closer to the police car. Surrounded\\n\\nby several officers, Raban sat on the curb with his legs crossed while Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer prepared the fingerprint reader.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\n Officer Danielson then did a protective sweep of the car. He soon found a\\n\\nloaded handgun under the driver’s seat. At that point, officers handcuffed\\n\\nRaban. Officers later found a baggie of ammunition in the center console.\\n\\nII. Procedural History\\n\\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\\n\\nammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).\\n\\n A. Motion to Suppress & Evidentiary Hearing\\n\\n Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search, arguing that the\\n\\nprotective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. To justify a protective\\n\\nsweep, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect (1) “is\\n\\ndangerous” and (2) “may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v.\\n\\nLong, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Raban argued that the officers lacked\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. In response, the government\\n\\nargued that Officer Danielson had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep\\n\\nbased on the area, Raban’s gang affiliation and criminal history, Armstrong’s\\n\\npresence and conduct during the stop, and Raban’s ankle monitor.\\n\\n The court held an evidentiary hearing. Officers Danielson and\\n\\nMoldenhauer testified about the stop and the circumstances they relied on to\\n\\njustify the protective sweep.\\n\\n To begin, Officer Danielson testified that the stop occurred in a high-\\n\\ncrime area—one with several recent shootings. He also noted that he had “been\\n\\nshot at . . . by a gang member” in that area before. R. vol. I at 109.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n Officer Danielson then explained the significance of Raban’s being in a\\n\\nrival gang’s territory. He testified that the Crips did not usually enter the\\n\\nBloods’ “turf.” Id. at 79. Indeed, Danielson found Raban’s presence in Bloods\\n\\nterritory especially “odd” “because of recent violence in that neighborhood.”\\n\\nId. Officer Moldenhauer similarly attested that the area experienced violent\\n\\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” Id. at 122–\\n\\n23, 131.\\n\\n Next, the officers testified about Armstrong. Officer Danielson stated\\n\\nthat Armstrong’s presence concerned him for a few reasons: both Armstrong\\n\\nand Raban were members of the Crips, Armstrong had a violent criminal\\n\\nhistory, and Armstrong “ha[d] been armed in the past.” Id. at 80. Danielson\\n\\nexplained that sometimes “others . . . attempt to interfere with a traffic stop or\\n\\ntry to overwhelm officers to try to distract attention or even use violence\\n\\nagainst officers.” Id. at 81. And he testified that “[Raban’s] being accompanied\\n\\nby another Crip gang member set off red flags to me that there was a possibility\\n\\nthat . . . either he was armed or there were multiple firearms that could\\n\\npotentially be used against us within immediate reach.” Id. at 87.\\n\\n Likewise, Officer Moldenhauer testified that Armstrong’s presence\\n\\nincreased his safety concerns. He explained, “I didn’t know what Deshay\\n\\nArmstrong’s intentions were being over there . . . . We don’t know if Deshay\\n\\nwants us to basically leave the defendant alone and what he’s going to do.” Id.\\n\\nat 129. According to Officer Moldenhauer, this “created a fairly large officer\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nsafety issue.” Id. Moldenhauer’s concerns only increased after learning about\\n\\nArmstrong’s personal relationship with Raban.\\n\\n Finally, Officer Danielson discussed the protective sweep. He testified\\n\\nthat he searched the car because he anticipated releasing Raban with only a\\n\\ncitation. Though Raban lacked a license, Danielson explained that they would\\n\\nrelease him to the car with a warning not to drive. But he also added that at\\n\\nsome point “it was a consideration that we were going to either park and lock\\n\\nor tow his vehicle from that scene” too. Id. at 117–18. Both officers testified\\n\\nthat Danielson did not know Raban’s criminal history when Danielson searched\\n\\nthe car.\\n\\n B. Suppression Rulings\\n\\n Though deeming it “a close call,” the district court orally denied Raban’s\\n\\nsuppression motion. Id. at 176. The court concluded that four considerations\\n\\ntogether satisfied Long’s first prong: (1) the high-crime neighborhood,\\n\\n(2) Raban’s gang affiliation, (3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle\\n\\nmonitor. The court ruled that, under the totality of the circumstances, these\\n\\nfactors supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n As for Long’s second prong, Raban’s access to weapons, the court was\\n\\nsilent. But at the end of the hearing, the court stated that it “did not find the\\n\\nofficers’ testimony” about intending to return Raban to the car to be “credible,\\n\\nplausible or otherwise.” Id. at 176–77. The court found “it hard to imagine that\\n\\nthese officers, given what they knew, were going to release this man with a\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\ncitation.” Id. at 177. With that in mind, the court emphasized that releasing\\n\\nRaban to the car was “not one of the factors that [it] found to support the\\n\\nreasonable suspicion for the sweep.” Id.\\n\\n Hearing this, Raban argued that the court must grant his suppression\\n\\nmotion. He reasoned that if officers were not going to release him to the car (as\\n\\nthe court had just found), the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he may\\n\\naccess a weapon under Long’s second prong. But the court stuck with its\\n\\noriginal ruling.\\n\\n Two days later, the court sua sponte invited the parties to move for\\n\\nreconsideration. Raban argued that the court’s credibility finding about the\\n\\nofficers’ intent to return Raban to the car required suppression. Perhaps\\n\\nacknowledging that, the government asked the court to reconsider its credibility\\n\\nfinding and rule in the government’s favor.\\n\\n On reconsideration, the district court again denied Raban’s suppression\\n\\nmotion. United States v. Raban, No. 23-cr-00329, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1\\n\\n(D. Colo. May 1, 2024). Addressing Long’s first prong, the court reiterated the\\n\\nfacts supporting its earlier finding of reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\ndangerous—his gang tattoos, the high-crime and rival-gang area, Armstrong’s\\n\\npresence, and Raban’s ankle monitor. Id. at *1, 3.\\n\\n Then the court addressed Long’s second prong. This time, the court ruled\\n\\nthat it was “reasonable to believe[] . . . that Mr. Raban may have been allowed\\n\\nto leave the scene with a citation and return to his car.” Id. at *6. Retreating\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nfrom its earlier credibility finding, the court remarked that “what [it] did not\\n\\nfind credible” was “[t]he Government’s assertion . . . that Officer Danielson\\n\\nknew of Mr. Raban’s criminal history, but that he nevertheless would have\\n\\nreturned an individual with Mr. Raban’s criminal history to his vehicle without\\n\\nan arrest.” 2 Id. at *5. As for Raban’s access to weapons, the court noted that the\\n\\nhearing testimony and bodycam footage established that Officer Danielson in\\n\\nfact knew nothing about Raban’s criminal history before the protective sweep.\\n\\nId. The court also noted that right before the sweep, Officer Moldenhauer had\\n\\ntold Danielson that Raban was “good.” Id.\\n\\n With all this in mind, the court held that when Officer Danielson\\n\\n“conducted the protective sweep, it was objectively reasonable for [him] to\\n\\nconclude that Mr. Raban could have been permitted to return to his vehicle\\n\\nafter receiving a traffic citation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). So the court again\\n\\nheld the protective sweep lawful. Id. at *6.\\n\\n C. Guilty Plea, Sentencing & Appeal\\n\\n After the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Raban entered\\n\\na conditional guilty plea. He reserved his right to appeal the suppression\\n\\ndecision. The court sentenced Raban to seventy-one months’ imprisonment.\\n\\n Raban timely appealed, challenging the court’s holding on both Long\\n\\nprongs.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The court never explained why Raban’s criminal history would have\\nsupported an arrest. See generally Raban, 2024 WL 1911223.\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\n STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the\\n\\ntotality of the circumstances. United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304, 1307\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2023). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n\\ngovernment, accept the district court’s finding of fact unless clearly erroneous,\\n\\nand review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the\\n\\nFourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n Raban does not challenge the court’s factual determinations, only its\\n\\nlegal conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the protective\\n\\nsweep. We review that question de novo. See id.\\n\\n DISCUSSION\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in\\n\\ntheir persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\\n\\nseizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to cars. Canada, 76\\n\\nF.4th at 1307 (“A vehicle is an effect protected by the Fourth Amendment.”\\n\\n(citation modified)).\\n\\n Typically, a search or seizure is reasonable only if “supported by a\\n\\nwarrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234,\\n\\n1240 (10th Cir. 2021). But protective sweeps do not require warrants. See Long,\\n\\n463 U.S. at 1051. Protective sweeps “exist for officer safety; we do not require\\n\\nofficers to take unnecessary risks.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1309. Rather, we allow\\n\\nofficers to “take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” Id.\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nat 1307 (citation modified). Even so, we limit these warrantless protective\\n\\nsearches to areas where a suspect may keep or hide weapons. See Long, 463\\n\\nU.S. at 1049.\\n\\n To conduct a protective sweep under Long, “an officer must have\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that a suspect” (1) “poses a danger” and (2) “may gain\\n\\nimmediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307. “Reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion demands less than probable cause,” but “requires the officer to act on\\n\\nsomething more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id.\\n\\n(citation modified). The government bears the burden of proving reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022).\\n\\n Below, we examine whether the government satisfied that burden for\\n\\neach Long prong.\\n\\nI. Presently Dangerous\\n\\n To satisfy Long’s first prong, “the government must show that a\\n\\nreasonable officer would believe the suspect to be presently dangerous.” United\\n\\nStates v. McGregor, 158 F.4th 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).\\n\\nIn reviewing the district court’s holding on that point, “we first individually\\n\\nanalyze the probative value of each of the relevant factors that the district court\\n\\nrelied upon.” Id. at 1091. Then viewing those factors “collectively and in the\\n\\ncontext of the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether those factors\\n\\nsupport a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1091–92.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson had only a “hunch” that Raban was\\n\\narmed and dangerous. But under the totality of the circumstances, several\\n\\nfactors support that Officer Danielson reasonably suspected that Raban was\\n\\npresently dangerous.\\n\\n A. Individual Factors\\n\\n The district court’s dangerousness analysis relied on four factors:\\n\\n(1) Raban’s gang affiliation, (2) the high-crime and rival-gang neighborhood,\\n\\n(3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle monitor. See Raban, 2024 WL\\n\\n1911223, at *1, 3. We discuss each factor in turn.\\n\\n 1. Gang Membership\\n\\n To begin, the court found that Raban’s gang membership supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion of his dangerousness. Id. We agree.\\n\\n We recently held that “[g]ang affiliation can support a finding of\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.” McGregor,\\n\\n158 F.4th at 1097–98; see also United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 907–\\n\\n08 (10th Cir. 2018) (determining that defendant’s status as a “known gang\\n\\nmember” supported reasonable suspicion). “Specifically, the presence of gang\\n\\naffiliation can allow officers to reasonably determine that an individual is\\n\\narmed.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\\n\\n But for gang membership to support reasonable suspicion, “officers must\\n\\nhave some objective basis for believing that the suspect is contemporaneously\\n\\nor recently associated with a criminal gang.” Id. What’s more, “a defendant’s\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\ngang affiliation must be accompanied by other factors to ultimately support a\\n\\nreasonable suspicion finding.” Id. at 1099.\\n\\n Here, officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that\\n\\nRaban was presently affiliated with a gang. Namely, Raban’s face tattoos\\n\\nsignaled his association with the Tre Tre Crips gang. Highlighting the officers’\\n\\ntraining and experience with “the significance of such tattoos” and gang\\n\\naffiliations, the district court concluded that Raban’s tattoos “represent[ed]\\n\\nsome level of commitment” to the Crips. R. vol. I at 174. Indeed, because both\\n\\nOfficers Danielson and Moldenhauer were gang-unit officers, we too “credit\\n\\ntheir expertise and ability to discern” Raban’s status as a Crips member. See\\n\\nMcGregor, 158 F.4th at 1100.\\n\\n Another factor supporting Raban’s current Crips affiliation was\\n\\nArmstrong and his actions at the stop. Armstrong—who arrived just seconds\\n\\nafter officers stopped Raban—parked across the street and stared at the\\n\\nofficers. Then he called Raban’s phone. Raban also told officers that Armstrong\\n\\nwas his girlfriend’s brother.\\n\\n Both officers knew Armstrong as “a violent gang member in the\\n\\ncommunity that’s been active for a long time.” R. vol. I at 127; see also id. at\\n\\n80. And both identified him as another Crips member. Thus, based on Raban’s\\n\\ntattoos and his connection to Armstrong, the officers had “some objective basis\\n\\nfor believing” that Raban was “contemporaneously or recently associated with a\\n\\ncriminal gang.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\n And so, Raban’s gang affiliation supported reasonable suspicion that he\\n\\nwas dangerous.\\n\\n 2. Characteristics of the Area\\n\\n The district court also concluded that the neighborhood’s characteristics\\n\\nsupported reasonable suspicion. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The\\n\\ndefendant’s “presence in a high-crime area . . . may be a relevant contextual\\n\\nconsideration” for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d\\n\\n1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified); see also Illinois v. Wardlow,\\n\\n528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that “officers are not required to ignore the\\n\\nrelevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances\\n\\nare sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation”).\\n\\n Raban is correct that location alone cannot provide reasonable suspicion\\n\\nthat a defendant is dangerous. See United States v. Huerta, --- F.4th ----, 2025\\n\\nWL 3018105, at *7 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). Even so, the area’s characteristics\\n\\nremain relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. E.g., United States v.\\n\\nDaniels, 101 F.4th 770, 781–82 (10th Cir. 2024). In fact, location impacts that\\n\\nanalysis here in two ways.\\n\\n First, the officers testified that they stopped Raban in a high-crime area\\n\\nthat had experienced an uptick in violence, including multiple shootings. And\\n\\nOfficer Danielson testified based on his experience that the people he\\n\\nencountered in this area were more likely to be armed and confrontational. So\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nRaban’s “presence in a high-crime area” supported reasonable suspicion that he\\n\\nwas presently dangerous. See Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208.\\n\\n Second, and more importantly, officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s\\n\\nterritory. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The officers explained that gang\\n\\nmembers were often armed, that the area belonged to the Bloods gang, and that\\n\\nthe Bloods were the Crips’ rivals. Officer Danielson also testified that Raban’s\\n\\npresence in a rival gang’s territory increased his suspicion that Raban was\\n\\narmed. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that the area experienced violent\\n\\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” R. vol. I at\\n\\n122–23, 131. So the stop’s location provided significant “relevant context[]”\\n\\nfor the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208 (citation\\n\\nomitted).\\n\\n Raban’s contrary argument misses the mark. He argues that driving\\n\\n“through a ‘high crime’ area in the heart of a city, or travers[ing] through an\\n\\nenormous area ostensibly controlled by a rival gang, does not mean the person\\n\\nis likely a violent criminal who would use a weapon against a police officer.”\\n\\nReply Br. at 5. We agree. But again, though “insufficient alone,” location\\n\\n“c[an] be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Daniels, 101\\n\\nF.4th at 781. And here, Raban’s presence in a high-crime area—and rival\\n\\ngang’s territory—supported reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\n 3. Armstrong’s Presence\\n\\n Next, we consider whether Armstrong’s presence supported reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion that Raban was dangerous. We agree with the district court that it\\n\\ndid. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1.\\n\\n Others’ behavior during a stop can add to the reasonable-suspicion\\n\\nanalysis. See, e.g., Daniels, 101 F.4th at 781, 783 (considering actions of\\n\\nnearby SUV in totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v.\\n\\nMcHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “suspicious\\n\\nbehavior” by defendant “along with that of his compatriot” “only adds to the\\n\\n‘reasonable suspicion’ calculus”); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1290\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant’s and his companion’s suspicious\\n\\nbehavior “would have heightened a reasonable officer’s suspicion of criminal\\n\\nactivity”). In fact, in Terry v. Ohio—the foundational reasonable-suspicion\\n\\ncase—the Supreme Court considered both the defendant’s and his companions’\\n\\nbehavior in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. 392 U.S. 1, 22–23, 27–28 (1968).\\n\\n Here, too, Armstrong’s presence and conduct during the stop supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Take Armstrong’s conduct.\\n\\nArmstrong drove past the officers just seconds after they stopped Raban. Then\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nArmstrong parked right across the street, called Raban, and watched the\\n\\nencounter. 3\\n\\n As discussed, the officers testified that they knew Armstrong was “a\\n\\nwell-known Crip gang member” with “a violent criminal history,” and that he\\n\\nhad been “armed in the past.” R. vol. I at 80, 127. The officers’ bodycam\\n\\nfootage shows that his presence put the officers on edge. In fact, the officers\\n\\neven called for backup because of Armstrong’s presence.\\n\\n Officer Danielson also testified that the two Crips gang members\\n\\ntraveling close together through rival-gang territory “set off red flags” that\\n\\nRaban was armed or that “there were multiple firearms that could potentially be\\n\\nused against” the officers. Id. at 87. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that\\n\\nArmstrong’s presence heightened his safety concerns.\\n\\n Courts “must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and\\n\\ninferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81\\n\\n(2020) (citation modified). So we conclude that the on-scene presence of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Raban suggests that Armstrong was simply “freely observ[ing] the\\npolice” during the stop. Reply Br. at 6. But we credit officers’ “ability to\\ndistinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v.\\nHernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). And here,\\nofficers used their common sense and experience to conclude that Armstrong’s\\nconduct—arriving seconds after Raban was stopped, turning around, parking\\nacross the street, calling Raban, and staring at the officers—was not “so\\ninnocent . . . as to be innocuous.” See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,\\n1147 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nanother Crips gang member with a violent criminal history, and a personal\\n\\nrelationship to the defendant, supported reasonable suspicion.\\n\\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson could not “imput[e]” his “general\\n\\nsuspicion” of Armstrong to Raban. Op. Br. at 16. But Officer Danielson did no\\n\\nsuch thing. Instead, Armstrong’s presence heightened officers’ concerns about\\n\\nRaban. In fact, Danielson stayed with Raban during the records check partly\\n\\nbecause Armstrong’s presence heightened his concerns that Raban might\\n\\n“attempt to retrieve [a] type of weapon.” R. vol. I at 78–79.\\n\\n The district court also credited the officers’ testimony about Armstrong,\\n\\nconcluding that Armstrong’s presence “raise[d] more credibility with regard to\\n\\n[the officers’] concern about Mr. Raban’s gang affiliation and his propensity\\n\\nfor having weapons and the reasonableness of the belief that he may be armed\\n\\nand dangerous.” Id. at 175–76. And we must “keep in mind that it is the\\n\\nprovince of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses at the\\n\\nsuppression hearing and to determine the weight to be given to the evidence\\n\\npresented, and we must give such determinations due deference.” United States\\n\\nv. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). So we\\n\\naccept the district court’s determination that Officer Danielson’s reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion for the protective sweep centered on Raban—not Armstrong. See id.\\n\\n All in all, we conclude that Armstrong’s presence and conduct supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n 4. Ankle Monitor\\n\\n Lastly, the district court concluded that Raban’s ankle monitor supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. Raban argues that\\n\\nhaving an ankle monitor carries little weight here; in his view, it shows nothing\\n\\nmore than “some sort of legal monitoring.” Op. Br. at 16.\\n\\n We agree that the ankle monitor adds little to the reasonable-suspicion\\n\\nanalysis in this case. “Standing alone, a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to\\n\\ncreate reasonable suspicion of anything.” Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (citation\\n\\nmodified). And though criminal history can be “critically relevant” to\\n\\nreasonable suspicion, “the circumstances of the stop itself [must] interact with\\n\\nan individual’s criminal history to trigger an officer’s suspicions.” Id. at 907.\\n\\n Here, Officer Danielson knew only that Raban had an ankle monitor. He\\n\\nnever asked why or what for. In fact, he knew nothing about Raban’s criminal\\n\\nhistory. What’s more, Officer Danielson never testified that the ankle monitor\\n\\nincreased his suspicions that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n All told, because Danielson did not know why Raban had an ankle\\n\\nmonitor—and because he never asserted that it impacted his safety concerns—\\n\\nthe ankle monitor does not weigh heavily in our analysis.\\n\\n B. Totality of the Circumstances\\n\\n Raban argues that none of the factors discussed above can independently\\n\\nsupport reasonable suspicion. That’s true. Even so, we must consider “the\\n\\ntotality of the circumstances,” or in other words, the “whole picture,” when\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\nconsidering reasonableness. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).\\n\\nAnd here, the “whole picture” supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\ndangerous.\\n\\n Consider McGregor. There, we held that the defendant’s gang affiliation,\\n\\nfurtive movements, and prior robbery conviction, when “viewed collectively\\n\\nand in the light of the totality of the circumstances, provided a solid foundation\\n\\nfor the district court’s ruling.” 158 F.4th at 1105.\\n\\n Though different factors are at play here, we reach the same conclusion.\\n\\nOfficers stopped Raban in a high-crime area known for gang violence. Raban\\n\\nhad face tattoos associating him with the Crips. Officer Danielson testified that\\n\\n“gang members are often armed,” R. vol. I at 72, tying Raban’s gang\\n\\nmembership to the likelihood “that weapons may be found” in the car, see\\n\\nDennison, 410 F.3d at 1212; see also Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (noting in the\\n\\nreasonable-suspicion analysis that officers “knew” gang membership “often\\n\\nsuggested the presence of guns”). And right after officers stopped Raban, a\\n\\nwell-known Crips member with a violent history—and a personal connection to\\n\\nRaban—parked nearby, called Raban, and stared at the officers. This, too,\\n\\nheightened Officer Danielson’s concerns that Raban was dangerous. Not to\\n\\nmention that officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s territory.\\n\\n These factors taken together gave the officers “more than an inchoate and\\n\\nunparticularized suspicion or hunch” that Raban was “presently dangerous.”\\n\\nCanada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (citation omitted).\\n\\n 21\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\n Raban argues that other facts cut against reasonable suspicion. For one,\\n\\nRaban was calm and cooperative throughout the stop. He also compares the\\n\\nfacts here to Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906–07, noting several factors from that\\n\\ncase that are missing here. Along those lines, he emphasizes that it was not\\n\\nnighttime, he did not drive dangerously, he was not in a remote area, he did not\\n\\nmove furtively, and officers did not suspect him of another crime.\\n\\n But these facts do not sway our reasonable-suspicion analysis in Raban’s\\n\\nfavor. When the McGregor defendant raised similar arguments, we rejected\\n\\nthem. See 158 F.4th at 1105. We explained that “we have previously found\\n\\nreasonable suspicion even when a stop occurred during daytime hours in a\\n\\nresidential neighborhood” and that “a defendant’s compliance and cooperation\\n\\nwith officers do not undercut the probative weight of other factors.” Id. at\\n\\n1105–06. Similarly, we have found reasonable suspicion without relying on\\n\\nfurtive movements, see Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212–1214, and when officers\\n\\nnever suspected the defendant of another crime, see McGregor, 158 F.4th at\\n\\n1087–88.\\n\\n As the McGregor court put it, “these additional factors . . . may weigh in\\n\\n[Raban’s] favor on the question of whether there was a reasonable basis to\\n\\nsuspect that he was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 1106. Even so, “they do not\\n\\nalter our ultimate conclusion that the officers had such reasonable suspicion—\\n\\nwhen the three factors that the district court relied on are viewed collectively\\n\\nand in the context of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see also Canada,\\n\\n 22\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\n76 F.4th at 1309 (concluding that mitigating factors did not dissipate\\n\\nreasonable suspicion).\\n\\n Viewed collectively—and in the light most favorable to the\\n\\ngovernment—the area’s characteristics, Raban’s gang affiliation, and\\n\\nArmstrong’s presence provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\nII. Immediate Access to Weapons\\n\\n Under Long’s second prong, “an officer must have reasonable suspicion\\n\\nthat a suspect . . . may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\nat 1307. This means officers must have “reason to believe that weapons may be\\n\\nfound” in the car and that the suspect may access those weapons. Id. at 1307–\\n\\n08. This can happen in three scenarios:\\n\\n (1) the suspect could break away from police control and retrieve a\\n weapon from his automobile; (2) the suspect is not placed under\\n arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will\\n then have access to any weapons inside; and (3) the suspect may be\\n permitted to reenter the vehicle before the investigation is over, and\\n again, may have access to weapons.\\n\\nId. at 1309 (citation modified).\\n\\n Here, the officers “had reason to believe that weapons may be found” in\\n\\nthe car based on the same factors supporting Raban’s dangerousness. See id. at\\n\\n1307–08. As for Raban’s weapons access, the district court ruled that the\\n\\nsecond scenario applied because Officer Danielson reasonably believed the\\n\\nofficers would return Raban to the car with a citation. Raban, 2024 WL\\n\\n1911223, at *3, 5.\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 24\\n\\n\\n\\n We think the district court got it right. The second scenario applies if\\n\\n“officers—at the time of the search—had reason to believe they would not\\n\\ndetain a suspect further.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. And here, the court\\n\\nultimately ruled that Officer Danielson credibly testified that the officers\\n\\nintended to release Raban with a citation.\\n\\n The district court knew that Raban lacked a driver’s license. Yet Officer\\n\\nDanielson explained that, even without a license, the officers would not\\n\\nnecessarily prevent Raban from getting in the car; instead, they might advise\\n\\nhim not to drive. Crediting this testimony, the court reasoned that the officers\\n\\ncould have reasonably expected to release Raban to the car to grab his\\n\\nbelongings or wait for a ride. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *5. We give\\n\\n“due deference” to this finding. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted).\\n\\n But Raban argues that it was unreasonable for Officer Danielson to\\n\\nbelieve that officers would release him to the car. In support, he emphasizes\\n\\nthat Raban “lacked a driver’s license, that there was an open container of beer\\n\\nin the car, and there were six officers on the scene.” 4 Op. Br. at 9.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Raban suggests—with no supporting argument—that he also lacked\\n“demonstrated ownership or authority” over the car. Op. Br. at 22. Raban\\nwaived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See United States v.\\nBurke, 633 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2011). Also, if he lacked authority over the\\ncar, he might lack Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See\\nUnited States v. Guzman, 149 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2025). So we find\\nthis argument unpersuasive.\\n 24\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 25\\n\\n\\n\\n Yet these facts do not establish that the officers planned to “detain\\n\\n[Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. For one, driving without a\\n\\nlicense is not a criminal offense in Colorado. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-2-\\n\\n101(1), (10), 42-2-138(1). Nor is driving with an open container. See id. § 42-\\n\\n4-1305(2)(c). Rather, these violations are “civil matter[s].” Id. § 42-4-1701(1).\\n\\nSo the officers could not arrest Raban for those violations. See People v.\\n\\nBarrientos, 956 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. App. 1997). And Raban points to no\\n\\nevidence or law suggesting otherwise.\\n\\n Instead, Raban contrasts the facts here with those in Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\n1304. He argues that we “determined [in Canada] that officers had reason to\\n\\nbelieve they would not arrest the defendant when, at the time of the protective\\n\\nsweep, they had not yet learned he had a revoked license.” Op. Br. at 23. Raban\\n\\nsuggests that if the Canada officers had known about the defendant’s revoked\\n\\nlicense beforehand, then the officers would have lacked reasonable suspicion\\n\\nfor the search.\\n\\n True enough, unlike the officers in Canada, Officer Danielson knew that\\n\\nRaban lacked a license before he searched the car. But importantly, the offenses\\n\\nhere and in Canada carry different weight. The Canada defendant “was a\\n\\nprohibited possessor with a revoked license,” 76 F.4th at 1310—a criminal\\n\\noffense under Kansas law, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-235(e), 21-6602. Not so\\n\\nhere. Before the protective sweep, Raban had allegedly committed only civil\\n\\ntraffic offenses. Thus, “[u]ntil the gun was found, there was no reason to doubt\\n\\n 25\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 26\\n\\n\\n\\nthat [Raban] (though he did not have a driver’s license) would soon be allowed\\n\\nto return to the car.” United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 814 (5th Cir.\\n\\n2022).\\n\\n Consider the facts in Rodriguez. There, officers stopped a car after\\n\\nobserving a traffic violation. Id. at 809–10. Officers ultimately performed a\\n\\nprotective sweep. Id. at 810. The defendant—a passenger—had a gun in his\\n\\njacket, which he had left on the backseat. Id.\\n\\n The defendant challenged the protective sweep, arguing that it was\\n\\nunreasonable to believe that officers would return him to the car. Id. at 814.\\n\\nThe Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that even though he did not own the car or\\n\\nhave a license, the defendant “could easily have returned to the car” as a\\n\\npassenger. Id. The court highlighted that the defendant “had only been\\n\\ndetained, not arrested,” when the search occurred. Id.\\n\\n Here, too, when Officer Danielson searched the car, Raban “had only\\n\\nbeen detained, not arrested.” See id. And Danielson had no reason to think the\\n\\nofficers would arrest Raban. In fact, when Officer Moldenhauer asked\\n\\nDanielson to remove Raban from the car, Moldenhauer said: “I think he’s\\n\\ngood.” R. vol. I at 147. So “at the time of the search,” Officer Danielson “had\\n\\nreason to believe they would not detain [Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\nat 1310.\\n\\n Raban argues that even if officers returned him to the car, six officers\\n\\nwere present. So in his view, “there is no reason to believe that the officers on\\n\\n 26\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 27\\n\\n\\n\\nscene . . . could not have effectuated such a return in a safe and controlled\\n\\nmanner.” Op. Br. at 23.\\n\\n Though the number of on-scene officers might matter for gun access in\\n\\nthe breaking-free scenario, 5 we are unsure how that might impact Raban’s gun\\n\\naccess if officers released him to the car with a citation. Cf. McGregor, 158\\n\\nF.4th at 1106 (“[A]n increased number of police officers does not necessarily\\n\\nundermine officers’ reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous.”).\\n\\nPlus, Raban wasn’t alone. Armstrong waited nearby—possibly there to help\\n\\nRaban if he chose to resist the officers. As a result, the number of on-scene\\n\\nofficers did not dispel Officer Danielson’s reasonable suspicion that Raban may\\n\\naccess a weapon once returned to the car.\\n\\n We conclude that when he conducted the protective sweep, Officer\\n\\nDanielson reasonably believed officers may release Raban to the car.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n In the end, officers reasonably suspected both that Raban was dangerous\\n\\nand that he may access a weapon upon release to the car. Because “the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment permits protective sweeps under such conditions,” Canada, 76\\n\\nF.4th at 1310, the district court did not err in denying Raban’s motion to\\n\\nsuppress.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Though the government argues that the breaking-free scenario also\\njustified the search, we need not address this argument because we find the\\nsweep lawful under a different scenario.\\n 27\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 28\\n\\n\\n\\n CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s suppression decision and\\n\\nRaban’s conviction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11233180/\", \"author_raw\": \"PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"PHILLIPS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EBEL"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"EID"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"PHILLIPS\": \", Circuit\", \"EBEL\": \", Circuit\", \"EID\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766595/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Raban\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v. No. 24-1359\n\n ANTOAN RABAN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Colorado\n (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00329-RMR-1)\n _________________________________\n\nJohn C. Arceci, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal\nPublic Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-\nAppellant.\n\nKyle W. Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney (Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant\nUnited States Attorney, and Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, on the\nbrief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\n _________________________________\n\nBefore PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\nPHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\n Two officers stopped a motorist for two violations: driving without a\n\nfront license plate and failing to use a turn signal. During the traffic stop, the\n\nofficers learned that the driver, who identified himself as Antoan Raban, was a\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\ncriminal gang member. The stop occurred in a high-crime area and a rival\n\ngang’s territory. And just seconds after the officers stopped Raban, another\n\nman, whom the police knew to be a fellow gang member, drove past, turned\n\naround, parked across the street from the stop, and called Raban’s phone.\n\n The officers called for backup and four more officers soon arrived.\n\nBecause Raban lacked identification, the officers decided to fingerprint him to\n\nverify his identity. They removed Raban from the car and frisked him, finding\n\nno weapons. While one officer walked Raban to the curb and prepared the\n\nfingerprint reader, a second officer did a protective sweep of the car. That\n\nofficer found a loaded pistol under the driver’s seat and ammunition in the\n\ncenter console.\n\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\n\nammunition as a felon. Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search,\n\narguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a protective sweep of\n\nthe car. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the officers\n\nreasonably suspected that Raban was dangerous and might access a weapon\n\nfrom inside the car.\n\n Raban pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s\n\nsuppression decision. Now he does just that. He argues that the officers lacked\n\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous and might access a weapon, so the\n\ncourt erred by denying his suppression motion.\n\n\n\n 2\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\n Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. First, several\n\ncircumstances, taken together, provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was\n\npresently dangerous. And second, when the officer conducted the protective\n\nsweep, he reasonably believed that Raban would receive a civil citation and be\n\nallowed to return to the car, where he might have had access to a weapon. The\n\nofficer therefore had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep.\n\n BACKGROUND\n\nI. Factual Background\n\n In May 2023, two gang-unit police officers—Tyler Danielson and\n\nZachary Moldenhauer—were patrolling a high-crime area in northeast Denver.\n\nSoon after 4 p.m., they noticed a car without its front license plate at a gas\n\nstation. That gas station “saw a lot of crime,” including “motor vehicle theft,\n\nnarcotics sale and distribution, [and] weapons-related offenses.” R. vol. I at\n\n123.\n\n When the driver left the gas station, he didn’t use a turn signal. So the\n\nofficers followed and pulled over the car.\n\n Officer Danielson approached the driver-side window, and Officer\n\nMoldenhauer approached the passenger side. Because the car had tinted\n\nwindows, the officers asked the driver—Antoan Raban—to roll down the\n\nwindows. Raban complied, and the officers saw that he was alone in the car.\n\n The officers soon spotted an open beer can on the backseat floor. They\n\nalso noticed Raban’s face tattoos: the number “3” under each eye, which\n\n 3\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\nconnected him to the Tre Tre Crips gang. Officer Danielson found Raban’s\n\nCrips affiliation “odd” because Raban was driving through the territory of a\n\nrival-gang, the Bloods. Id. at 79. In fact, later during the stop, Raban told\n\nOfficer Danielson: “If this is your area, I see why y’all would have scoped me\n\nout.”\n\n After Raban rolled down all four windows, Officer Danielson asked him\n\nabout the missing license plate. Raban said that the car belonged to his\n\ngirlfriend and explained that the car’s front had been recently damaged in an\n\naccident. Raban then looked for, but could not find, the car’s registration. He\n\nalso lacked any identification. So he gave the officers his name, address, and\n\nbirthday instead.\n\n Meanwhile, seconds after the officers stopped Raban, a white SUV drove\n\npast, completed a three-point turn, and parked across the street from the stop.\n\nBoth officers recognized the SUV’s driver: Deshay Armstrong, 1 “a well-known\n\nCrip gang member” with a violent criminal history. Id. at 79–80, 127. Officer\n\nMoldenhauer acknowledged Armstrong by saying “sup, brother.” Id. at 101,\n\n143. Then the officers noticed Armstrong placing a telephone call. They could\n\nsee inside Raban’s car that the call was to Raban’s phone. Raban, ignoring the\n\ncall, told the officers that Armstrong was his girlfriend’s brother.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n At times, the record reflects Armstrong’s first name as “Dashae.”\n 4\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\n After getting Raban’s information, Officer Moldenhauer returned to the\n\npolice car to run a records check. Officer Danielson stayed with Raban, partly\n\nbecause Armstrong was parked nearby.\n\n Officer Danielson and Raban chatted calmly. Raban explained that the\n\nopen beer can was from the night before. He also admitted that he didn’t have a\n\ndriver’s license. And he said that Armstrong “just so happened to be here.”\n\n Around this time, the officers called for backup, largely because of\n\nArmstrong. Four more officers soon arrived.\n\n Officer Moldenhauer finished the records check, which revealed that\n\nRaban had several violent and weapons-related convictions. It also showed that\n\nRaban lacked a valid driver’s license. And though the check returned a photo\n\nresembling Raban, the photographed individual lacked face tattoos. So to\n\nconfirm Raban’s identity, Officer Moldenhauer decided to fingerprint him.\n\n Without telling Officer Danielson the records-check results, including\n\nRaban’s criminal history, Officer Moldenhauer asked Danielson to remove\n\nRaban from the car for fingerprinting. At the same time, Moldenhauer also told\n\nDanielson: “I think he’s good.” Id. at 147.\n\n Officer Danielson asked Raban to exit the car, frisked him, and noticed\n\nhe was wearing an ankle monitor. Finding no weapons, Danielson passed Raban\n\nto Officer Moldenhauer, who walked Raban closer to the police car. Surrounded\n\nby several officers, Raban sat on the curb with his legs crossed while Officer\n\nMoldenhauer prepared the fingerprint reader.\n\n 5\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\n Officer Danielson then did a protective sweep of the car. He soon found a\n\nloaded handgun under the driver’s seat. At that point, officers handcuffed\n\nRaban. Officers later found a baggie of ammunition in the center console.\n\nII. Procedural History\n\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\n\nammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).\n\n A. Motion to Suppress & Evidentiary Hearing\n\n Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search, arguing that the\n\nprotective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. To justify a protective\n\nsweep, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect (1) “is\n\ndangerous” and (2) “may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v.\n\nLong, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Raban argued that the officers lacked\n\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. In response, the government\n\nargued that Officer Danielson had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep\n\nbased on the area, Raban’s gang affiliation and criminal history, Armstrong’s\n\npresence and conduct during the stop, and Raban’s ankle monitor.\n\n The court held an evidentiary hearing. Officers Danielson and\n\nMoldenhauer testified about the stop and the circumstances they relied on to\n\njustify the protective sweep.\n\n To begin, Officer Danielson testified that the stop occurred in a high-\n\ncrime area—one with several recent shootings. He also noted that he had “been\n\nshot at . . . by a gang member” in that area before. R. vol. I at 109.\n\n 6\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\n Officer Danielson then explained the significance of Raban’s being in a\n\nrival gang’s territory. He testified that the Crips did not usually enter the\n\nBloods’ “turf.” Id. at 79. Indeed, Danielson found Raban’s presence in Bloods\n\nterritory especially “odd” “because of recent violence in that neighborhood.”\n\nId. Officer Moldenhauer similarly attested that the area experienced violent\n\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” Id. at 122–\n\n23, 131.\n\n Next, the officers testified about Armstrong. Officer Danielson stated\n\nthat Armstrong’s presence concerned him for a few reasons: both Armstrong\n\nand Raban were members of the Crips, Armstrong had a violent criminal\n\nhistory, and Armstrong “ha[d] been armed in the past.” Id. at 80. Danielson\n\nexplained that sometimes “others . . . attempt to interfere with a traffic stop or\n\ntry to overwhelm officers to try to distract attention or even use violence\n\nagainst officers.” Id. at 81. And he testified that “[Raban’s] being accompanied\n\nby another Crip gang member set off red flags to me that there was a possibility\n\nthat . . . either he was armed or there were multiple firearms that could\n\npotentially be used against us within immediate reach.” Id. at 87.\n\n Likewise, Officer Moldenhauer testified that Armstrong’s presence\n\nincreased his safety concerns. He explained, “I didn’t know what Deshay\n\nArmstrong’s intentions were being over there . . . . We don’t know if Deshay\n\nwants us to basically leave the defendant alone and what he’s going to do.” Id.\n\nat 129. According to Officer Moldenhauer, this “created a fairly large officer\n\n 7\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\nsafety issue.” Id. Moldenhauer’s concerns only increased after learning about\n\nArmstrong’s personal relationship with Raban.\n\n Finally, Officer Danielson discussed the protective sweep. He testified\n\nthat he searched the car because he anticipated releasing Raban with only a\n\ncitation. Though Raban lacked a license, Danielson explained that they would\n\nrelease him to the car with a warning not to drive. But he also added that at\n\nsome point “it was a consideration that we were going to either park and lock\n\nor tow his vehicle from that scene” too. Id. at 117–18. Both officers testified\n\nthat Danielson did not know Raban’s criminal history when Danielson searched\n\nthe car.\n\n B. Suppression Rulings\n\n Though deeming it “a close call,” the district court orally denied Raban’s\n\nsuppression motion. Id. at 176. The court concluded that four considerations\n\ntogether satisfied Long’s first prong: (1) the high-crime neighborhood,\n\n(2) Raban’s gang affiliation, (3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle\n\nmonitor. The court ruled that, under the totality of the circumstances, these\n\nfactors supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\n\n As for Long’s second prong, Raban’s access to weapons, the court was\n\nsilent. But at the end of the hearing, the court stated that it “did not find the\n\nofficers’ testimony” about intending to return Raban to the car to be “credible,\n\nplausible or otherwise.” Id. at 176–77. The court found “it hard to imagine that\n\nthese officers, given what they knew, were going to release this man with a\n\n 8\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\ncitation.” Id. at 177. With that in mind, the court emphasized that releasing\n\nRaban to the car was “not one of the factors that [it] found to support the\n\nreasonable suspicion for the sweep.” Id.\n\n Hearing this, Raban argued that the court must grant his suppression\n\nmotion. He reasoned that if officers were not going to release him to the car (as\n\nthe court had just found), the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he may\n\naccess a weapon under Long’s second prong. But the court stuck with its\n\noriginal ruling.\n\n Two days later, the court sua sponte invited the parties to move for\n\nreconsideration. Raban argued that the court’s credibility finding about the\n\nofficers’ intent to return Raban to the car required suppression. Perhaps\n\nacknowledging that, the government asked the court to reconsider its credibility\n\nfinding and rule in the government’s favor.\n\n On reconsideration, the district court again denied Raban’s suppression\n\nmotion. United States v. Raban, No. 23-cr-00329, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1\n\n(D. Colo. May 1, 2024). Addressing Long’s first prong, the court reiterated the\n\nfacts supporting its earlier finding of reasonable suspicion that Raban was\n\ndangerous—his gang tattoos, the high-crime and rival-gang area, Armstrong’s\n\npresence, and Raban’s ankle monitor. Id. at *1, 3.\n\n Then the court addressed Long’s second prong. This time, the court ruled\n\nthat it was “reasonable to believe[] . . . that Mr. Raban may have been allowed\n\nto leave the scene with a citation and return to his car.” Id. at *6. Retreating\n\n 9\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\nfrom its earlier credibility finding, the court remarked that “what [it] did not\n\nfind credible” was “[t]he Government’s assertion . . . that Officer Danielson\n\nknew of Mr. Raban’s criminal history, but that he nevertheless would have\n\nreturned an individual with Mr. Raban’s criminal history to his vehicle without\n\nan arrest.” 2 Id. at *5. As for Raban’s access to weapons, the court noted that the\n\nhearing testimony and bodycam footage established that Officer Danielson in\n\nfact knew nothing about Raban’s criminal history before the protective sweep.\n\nId. The court also noted that right before the sweep, Officer Moldenhauer had\n\ntold Danielson that Raban was “good.” Id.\n\n With all this in mind, the court held that when Officer Danielson\n\n“conducted the protective sweep, it was objectively reasonable for [him] to\n\nconclude that Mr. Raban could have been permitted to return to his vehicle\n\nafter receiving a traffic citation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). So the court again\n\nheld the protective sweep lawful. Id. at *6.\n\n C. Guilty Plea, Sentencing & Appeal\n\n After the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Raban entered\n\na conditional guilty plea. He reserved his right to appeal the suppression\n\ndecision. The court sentenced Raban to seventy-one months’ imprisonment.\n\n Raban timely appealed, challenging the court’s holding on both Long\n\nprongs.\n\n\n 2\n The court never explained why Raban’s criminal history would have\nsupported an arrest. See generally Raban, 2024 WL 1911223.\n 10\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\n STANDARD OF REVIEW\n\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the\n\ntotality of the circumstances. United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304, 1307\n\n(10th Cir. 2023). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the\n\ngovernment, accept the district court’s finding of fact unless clearly erroneous,\n\nand review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the\n\nFourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).\n\n Raban does not challenge the court’s factual determinations, only its\n\nlegal conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the protective\n\nsweep. We review that question de novo. See id.\n\n DISCUSSION\n\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in\n\ntheir persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\n\nseizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to cars. Canada, 76\n\nF.4th at 1307 (“A vehicle is an effect protected by the Fourth Amendment.”\n\n(citation modified)).\n\n Typically, a search or seizure is reasonable only if “supported by a\n\nwarrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234,\n\n1240 (10th Cir. 2021). But protective sweeps do not require warrants. See Long,\n\n463 U.S. at 1051. Protective sweeps “exist for officer safety; we do not require\n\nofficers to take unnecessary risks.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1309. Rather, we allow\n\nofficers to “take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” Id.\n\n 11\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nat 1307 (citation modified). Even so, we limit these warrantless protective\n\nsearches to areas where a suspect may keep or hide weapons. See Long, 463\n\nU.S. at 1049.\n\n To conduct a protective sweep under Long, “an officer must have\n\nreasonable suspicion that a suspect” (1) “poses a danger” and (2) “may gain\n\nimmediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307. “Reasonable\n\nsuspicion demands less than probable cause,” but “requires the officer to act on\n\nsomething more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id.\n\n(citation modified). The government bears the burden of proving reasonable\n\nsuspicion. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022).\n\n Below, we examine whether the government satisfied that burden for\n\neach Long prong.\n\nI. Presently Dangerous\n\n To satisfy Long’s first prong, “the government must show that a\n\nreasonable officer would believe the suspect to be presently dangerous.” United\n\nStates v. McGregor, 158 F.4th 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).\n\nIn reviewing the district court’s holding on that point, “we first individually\n\nanalyze the probative value of each of the relevant factors that the district court\n\nrelied upon.” Id. at 1091. Then viewing those factors “collectively and in the\n\ncontext of the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether those factors\n\nsupport a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1091–92.\n\n\n\n 12\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson had only a “hunch” that Raban was\n\narmed and dangerous. But under the totality of the circumstances, several\n\nfactors support that Officer Danielson reasonably suspected that Raban was\n\npresently dangerous.\n\n A. Individual Factors\n\n The district court’s dangerousness analysis relied on four factors:\n\n(1) Raban’s gang affiliation, (2) the high-crime and rival-gang neighborhood,\n\n(3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle monitor. See Raban, 2024 WL\n\n1911223, at *1, 3. We discuss each factor in turn.\n\n 1. Gang Membership\n\n To begin, the court found that Raban’s gang membership supported\n\nreasonable suspicion of his dangerousness. Id. We agree.\n\n We recently held that “[g]ang affiliation can support a finding of\n\nreasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.” McGregor,\n\n158 F.4th at 1097–98; see also United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 907–\n\n08 (10th Cir. 2018) (determining that defendant’s status as a “known gang\n\nmember” supported reasonable suspicion). “Specifically, the presence of gang\n\naffiliation can allow officers to reasonably determine that an individual is\n\narmed.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\n\n But for gang membership to support reasonable suspicion, “officers must\n\nhave some objective basis for believing that the suspect is contemporaneously\n\nor recently associated with a criminal gang.” Id. What’s more, “a defendant’s\n\n 13\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\ngang affiliation must be accompanied by other factors to ultimately support a\n\nreasonable suspicion finding.” Id. at 1099.\n\n Here, officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that\n\nRaban was presently affiliated with a gang. Namely, Raban’s face tattoos\n\nsignaled his association with the Tre Tre Crips gang. Highlighting the officers’\n\ntraining and experience with “the significance of such tattoos” and gang\n\naffiliations, the district court concluded that Raban’s tattoos “represent[ed]\n\nsome level of commitment” to the Crips. R. vol. I at 174. Indeed, because both\n\nOfficers Danielson and Moldenhauer were gang-unit officers, we too “credit\n\ntheir expertise and ability to discern” Raban’s status as a Crips member. See\n\nMcGregor, 158 F.4th at 1100.\n\n Another factor supporting Raban’s current Crips affiliation was\n\nArmstrong and his actions at the stop. Armstrong—who arrived just seconds\n\nafter officers stopped Raban—parked across the street and stared at the\n\nofficers. Then he called Raban’s phone. Raban also told officers that Armstrong\n\nwas his girlfriend’s brother.\n\n Both officers knew Armstrong as “a violent gang member in the\n\ncommunity that’s been active for a long time.” R. vol. I at 127; see also id. at\n\n80. And both identified him as another Crips member. Thus, based on Raban’s\n\ntattoos and his connection to Armstrong, the officers had “some objective basis\n\nfor believing” that Raban was “contemporaneously or recently associated with a\n\ncriminal gang.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\n\n 14\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\n\n\n\n And so, Raban’s gang affiliation supported reasonable suspicion that he\n\nwas dangerous.\n\n 2. Characteristics of the Area\n\n The district court also concluded that the neighborhood’s characteristics\n\nsupported reasonable suspicion. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The\n\ndefendant’s “presence in a high-crime area . . . may be a relevant contextual\n\nconsideration” for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d\n\n1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified); see also Illinois v. Wardlow,\n\n528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that “officers are not required to ignore the\n\nrelevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances\n\nare sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation”).\n\n Raban is correct that location alone cannot provide reasonable suspicion\n\nthat a defendant is dangerous. See United States v. Huerta, --- F.4th ----, 2025\n\nWL 3018105, at *7 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). Even so, the area’s characteristics\n\nremain relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. E.g., United States v.\n\nDaniels, 101 F.4th 770, 781–82 (10th Cir. 2024). In fact, location impacts that\n\nanalysis here in two ways.\n\n First, the officers testified that they stopped Raban in a high-crime area\n\nthat had experienced an uptick in violence, including multiple shootings. And\n\nOfficer Danielson testified based on his experience that the people he\n\nencountered in this area were more likely to be armed and confrontational. So\n\n\n\n 15\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\n\n\n\nRaban’s “presence in a high-crime area” supported reasonable suspicion that he\n\nwas presently dangerous. See Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208.\n\n Second, and more importantly, officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s\n\nterritory. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The officers explained that gang\n\nmembers were often armed, that the area belonged to the Bloods gang, and that\n\nthe Bloods were the Crips’ rivals. Officer Danielson also testified that Raban’s\n\npresence in a rival gang’s territory increased his suspicion that Raban was\n\narmed. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that the area experienced violent\n\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” R. vol. I at\n\n122–23, 131. So the stop’s location provided significant “relevant context[]”\n\nfor the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208 (citation\n\nomitted).\n\n Raban’s contrary argument misses the mark. He argues that driving\n\n“through a ‘high crime’ area in the heart of a city, or travers[ing] through an\n\nenormous area ostensibly controlled by a rival gang, does not mean the person\n\nis likely a violent criminal who would use a weapon against a police officer.”\n\nReply Br. at 5. We agree. But again, though “insufficient alone,” location\n\n“c[an] be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Daniels, 101\n\nF.4th at 781. And here, Raban’s presence in a high-crime area—and rival\n\ngang’s territory—supported reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.\n\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\n\n\n\n 3. Armstrong’s Presence\n\n Next, we consider whether Armstrong’s presence supported reasonable\n\nsuspicion that Raban was dangerous. We agree with the district court that it\n\ndid. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1.\n\n Others’ behavior during a stop can add to the reasonable-suspicion\n\nanalysis. See, e.g., Daniels, 101 F.4th at 781, 783 (considering actions of\n\nnearby SUV in totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v.\n\nMcHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “suspicious\n\nbehavior” by defendant “along with that of his compatriot” “only adds to the\n\n‘reasonable suspicion’ calculus”); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1290\n\n(10th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant’s and his companion’s suspicious\n\nbehavior “would have heightened a reasonable officer’s suspicion of criminal\n\nactivity”). In fact, in Terry v. Ohio—the foundational reasonable-suspicion\n\ncase—the Supreme Court considered both the defendant’s and his companions’\n\nbehavior in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. 392 U.S. 1, 22–23, 27–28 (1968).\n\n Here, too, Armstrong’s presence and conduct during the stop supported\n\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Take Armstrong’s conduct.\n\nArmstrong drove past the officers just seconds after they stopped Raban. Then\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\n\n\n\nArmstrong parked right across the street, called Raban, and watched the\n\nencounter. 3\n\n As discussed, the officers testified that they knew Armstrong was “a\n\nwell-known Crip gang member” with “a violent criminal history,” and that he\n\nhad been “armed in the past.” R. vol. I at 80, 127. The officers’ bodycam\n\nfootage shows that his presence put the officers on edge. In fact, the officers\n\neven called for backup because of Armstrong’s presence.\n\n Officer Danielson also testified that the two Crips gang members\n\ntraveling close together through rival-gang territory “set off red flags” that\n\nRaban was armed or that “there were multiple firearms that could potentially be\n\nused against” the officers. Id. at 87. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that\n\nArmstrong’s presence heightened his safety concerns.\n\n Courts “must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and\n\ninferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81\n\n(2020) (citation modified). So we conclude that the on-scene presence of\n\n\n\n\n 3\n Raban suggests that Armstrong was simply “freely observ[ing] the\npolice” during the stop. Reply Br. at 6. But we credit officers’ “ability to\ndistinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v.\nHernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). And here,\nofficers used their common sense and experience to conclude that Armstrong’s\nconduct—arriving seconds after Raban was stopped, turning around, parking\nacross the street, calling Raban, and staring at the officers—was not “so\ninnocent . . . as to be innocuous.” See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,\n1147 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\n 18\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\n\n\n\nanother Crips gang member with a violent criminal history, and a personal\n\nrelationship to the defendant, supported reasonable suspicion.\n\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson could not “imput[e]” his “general\n\nsuspicion” of Armstrong to Raban. Op. Br. at 16. But Officer Danielson did no\n\nsuch thing. Instead, Armstrong’s presence heightened officers’ concerns about\n\nRaban. In fact, Danielson stayed with Raban during the records check partly\n\nbecause Armstrong’s presence heightened his concerns that Raban might\n\n“attempt to retrieve [a] type of weapon.” R. vol. I at 78–79.\n\n The district court also credited the officers’ testimony about Armstrong,\n\nconcluding that Armstrong’s presence “raise[d] more credibility with regard to\n\n[the officers’] concern about Mr. Raban’s gang affiliation and his propensity\n\nfor having weapons and the reasonableness of the belief that he may be armed\n\nand dangerous.” Id. at 175–76. And we must “keep in mind that it is the\n\nprovince of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses at the\n\nsuppression hearing and to determine the weight to be given to the evidence\n\npresented, and we must give such determinations due deference.” United States\n\nv. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). So we\n\naccept the district court’s determination that Officer Danielson’s reasonable\n\nsuspicion for the protective sweep centered on Raban—not Armstrong. See id.\n\n All in all, we conclude that Armstrong’s presence and conduct supported\n\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\n\n\n\n 19\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\n\n\n\n 4. Ankle Monitor\n\n Lastly, the district court concluded that Raban’s ankle monitor supported\n\nreasonable suspicion. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. Raban argues that\n\nhaving an ankle monitor carries little weight here; in his view, it shows nothing\n\nmore than “some sort of legal monitoring.” Op. Br. at 16.\n\n We agree that the ankle monitor adds little to the reasonable-suspicion\n\nanalysis in this case. “Standing alone, a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to\n\ncreate reasonable suspicion of anything.” Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (citation\n\nmodified). And though criminal history can be “critically relevant” to\n\nreasonable suspicion, “the circumstances of the stop itself [must] interact with\n\nan individual’s criminal history to trigger an officer’s suspicions.” Id. at 907.\n\n Here, Officer Danielson knew only that Raban had an ankle monitor. He\n\nnever asked why or what for. In fact, he knew nothing about Raban’s criminal\n\nhistory. What’s more, Officer Danielson never testified that the ankle monitor\n\nincreased his suspicions that Raban was dangerous.\n\n All told, because Danielson did not know why Raban had an ankle\n\nmonitor—and because he never asserted that it impacted his safety concerns—\n\nthe ankle monitor does not weigh heavily in our analysis.\n\n B. Totality of the Circumstances\n\n Raban argues that none of the factors discussed above can independently\n\nsupport reasonable suspicion. That’s true. Even so, we must consider “the\n\ntotality of the circumstances,” or in other words, the “whole picture,” when\n\n 20\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\n\n\n\nconsidering reasonableness. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).\n\nAnd here, the “whole picture” supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was\n\ndangerous.\n\n Consider McGregor. There, we held that the defendant’s gang affiliation,\n\nfurtive movements, and prior robbery conviction, when “viewed collectively\n\nand in the light of the totality of the circumstances, provided a solid foundation\n\nfor the district court’s ruling.” 158 F.4th at 1105.\n\n Though different factors are at play here, we reach the same conclusion.\n\nOfficers stopped Raban in a high-crime area known for gang violence. Raban\n\nhad face tattoos associating him with the Crips. Officer Danielson testified that\n\n“gang members are often armed,” R. vol. I at 72, tying Raban’s gang\n\nmembership to the likelihood “that weapons may be found” in the car, see\n\nDennison, 410 F.3d at 1212; see also Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (noting in the\n\nreasonable-suspicion analysis that officers “knew” gang membership “often\n\nsuggested the presence of guns”). And right after officers stopped Raban, a\n\nwell-known Crips member with a violent history—and a personal connection to\n\nRaban—parked nearby, called Raban, and stared at the officers. This, too,\n\nheightened Officer Danielson’s concerns that Raban was dangerous. Not to\n\nmention that officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s territory.\n\n These factors taken together gave the officers “more than an inchoate and\n\nunparticularized suspicion or hunch” that Raban was “presently dangerous.”\n\nCanada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (citation omitted).\n\n 21\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\n\n\n\n Raban argues that other facts cut against reasonable suspicion. For one,\n\nRaban was calm and cooperative throughout the stop. He also compares the\n\nfacts here to Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906–07, noting several factors from that\n\ncase that are missing here. Along those lines, he emphasizes that it was not\n\nnighttime, he did not drive dangerously, he was not in a remote area, he did not\n\nmove furtively, and officers did not suspect him of another crime.\n\n But these facts do not sway our reasonable-suspicion analysis in Raban’s\n\nfavor. When the McGregor defendant raised similar arguments, we rejected\n\nthem. See 158 F.4th at 1105. We explained that “we have previously found\n\nreasonable suspicion even when a stop occurred during daytime hours in a\n\nresidential neighborhood” and that “a defendant’s compliance and cooperation\n\nwith officers do not undercut the probative weight of other factors.” Id. at\n\n1105–06. Similarly, we have found reasonable suspicion without relying on\n\nfurtive movements, see Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212–1214, and when officers\n\nnever suspected the defendant of another crime, see McGregor, 158 F.4th at\n\n1087–88.\n\n As the McGregor court put it, “these additional factors . . . may weigh in\n\n[Raban’s] favor on the question of whether there was a reasonable basis to\n\nsuspect that he was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 1106. Even so, “they do not\n\nalter our ultimate conclusion that the officers had such reasonable suspicion—\n\nwhen the three factors that the district court relied on are viewed collectively\n\nand in the context of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see also Canada,\n\n 22\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\n\n\n\n76 F.4th at 1309 (concluding that mitigating factors did not dissipate\n\nreasonable suspicion).\n\n Viewed collectively—and in the light most favorable to the\n\ngovernment—the area’s characteristics, Raban’s gang affiliation, and\n\nArmstrong’s presence provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\n\nII. Immediate Access to Weapons\n\n Under Long’s second prong, “an officer must have reasonable suspicion\n\nthat a suspect . . . may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th\n\nat 1307. This means officers must have “reason to believe that weapons may be\n\nfound” in the car and that the suspect may access those weapons. Id. at 1307–\n\n08. This can happen in three scenarios:\n\n (1) the suspect could break away from police control and retrieve a\n weapon from his automobile; (2) the suspect is not placed under\n arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will\n then have access to any weapons inside; and (3) the suspect may be\n permitted to reenter the vehicle before the investigation is over, and\n again, may have access to weapons.\n\nId. at 1309 (citation modified).\n\n Here, the officers “had reason to believe that weapons may be found” in\n\nthe car based on the same factors supporting Raban’s dangerousness. See id. at\n\n1307–08. As for Raban’s weapons access, the district court ruled that the\n\nsecond scenario applied because Officer Danielson reasonably believed the\n\nofficers would return Raban to the car with a citation. Raban, 2024 WL\n\n1911223, at *3, 5.\n\n\n 23\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 24\n\n\n\n We think the district court got it right. The second scenario applies if\n\n“officers—at the time of the search—had reason to believe they would not\n\ndetain a suspect further.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. And here, the court\n\nultimately ruled that Officer Danielson credibly testified that the officers\n\nintended to release Raban with a citation.\n\n The district court knew that Raban lacked a driver’s license. Yet Officer\n\nDanielson explained that, even without a license, the officers would not\n\nnecessarily prevent Raban from getting in the car; instead, they might advise\n\nhim not to drive. Crediting this testimony, the court reasoned that the officers\n\ncould have reasonably expected to release Raban to the car to grab his\n\nbelongings or wait for a ride. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *5. We give\n\n“due deference” to this finding. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted).\n\n But Raban argues that it was unreasonable for Officer Danielson to\n\nbelieve that officers would release him to the car. In support, he emphasizes\n\nthat Raban “lacked a driver’s license, that there was an open container of beer\n\nin the car, and there were six officers on the scene.” 4 Op. Br. at 9.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n Raban suggests—with no supporting argument—that he also lacked\n“demonstrated ownership or authority” over the car. Op. Br. at 22. Raban\nwaived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See United States v.\nBurke, 633 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2011). Also, if he lacked authority over the\ncar, he might lack Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See\nUnited States v. Guzman, 149 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2025). So we find\nthis argument unpersuasive.\n 24\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 25\n\n\n\n Yet these facts do not establish that the officers planned to “detain\n\n[Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. For one, driving without a\n\nlicense is not a criminal offense in Colorado. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-2-\n\n101(1), (10), 42-2-138(1). Nor is driving with an open container. See id. § 42-\n\n4-1305(2)(c). Rather, these violations are “civil matter[s].” Id. § 42-4-1701(1).\n\nSo the officers could not arrest Raban for those violations. See People v.\n\nBarrientos, 956 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. App. 1997). And Raban points to no\n\nevidence or law suggesting otherwise.\n\n Instead, Raban contrasts the facts here with those in Canada, 76 F.4th\n\n1304. He argues that we “determined [in Canada] that officers had reason to\n\nbelieve they would not arrest the defendant when, at the time of the protective\n\nsweep, they had not yet learned he had a revoked license.” Op. Br. at 23. Raban\n\nsuggests that if the Canada officers had known about the defendant’s revoked\n\nlicense beforehand, then the officers would have lacked reasonable suspicion\n\nfor the search.\n\n True enough, unlike the officers in Canada, Officer Danielson knew that\n\nRaban lacked a license before he searched the car. But importantly, the offenses\n\nhere and in Canada carry different weight. The Canada defendant “was a\n\nprohibited possessor with a revoked license,” 76 F.4th at 1310—a criminal\n\noffense under Kansas law, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-235(e), 21-6602. Not so\n\nhere. Before the protective sweep, Raban had allegedly committed only civil\n\ntraffic offenses. Thus, “[u]ntil the gun was found, there was no reason to doubt\n\n 25\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 26\n\n\n\nthat [Raban] (though he did not have a driver’s license) would soon be allowed\n\nto return to the car.” United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 814 (5th Cir.\n\n2022).\n\n Consider the facts in Rodriguez. There, officers stopped a car after\n\nobserving a traffic violation. Id. at 809–10. Officers ultimately performed a\n\nprotective sweep. Id. at 810. The defendant—a passenger—had a gun in his\n\njacket, which he had left on the backseat. Id.\n\n The defendant challenged the protective sweep, arguing that it was\n\nunreasonable to believe that officers would return him to the car. Id. at 814.\n\nThe Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that even though he did not own the car or\n\nhave a license, the defendant “could easily have returned to the car” as a\n\npassenger. Id. The court highlighted that the defendant “had only been\n\ndetained, not arrested,” when the search occurred. Id.\n\n Here, too, when Officer Danielson searched the car, Raban “had only\n\nbeen detained, not arrested.” See id. And Danielson had no reason to think the\n\nofficers would arrest Raban. In fact, when Officer Moldenhauer asked\n\nDanielson to remove Raban from the car, Moldenhauer said: “I think he’s\n\ngood.” R. vol. I at 147. So “at the time of the search,” Officer Danielson “had\n\nreason to believe they would not detain [Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th\n\nat 1310.\n\n Raban argues that even if officers returned him to the car, six officers\n\nwere present. So in his view, “there is no reason to believe that the officers on\n\n 26\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 27\n\n\n\nscene . . . could not have effectuated such a return in a safe and controlled\n\nmanner.” Op. Br. at 23.\n\n Though the number of on-scene officers might matter for gun access in\n\nthe breaking-free scenario, 5 we are unsure how that might impact Raban’s gun\n\naccess if officers released him to the car with a citation. Cf. McGregor, 158\n\nF.4th at 1106 (“[A]n increased number of police officers does not necessarily\n\nundermine officers’ reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous.”).\n\nPlus, Raban wasn’t alone. Armstrong waited nearby—possibly there to help\n\nRaban if he chose to resist the officers. As a result, the number of on-scene\n\nofficers did not dispel Officer Danielson’s reasonable suspicion that Raban may\n\naccess a weapon once returned to the car.\n\n We conclude that when he conducted the protective sweep, Officer\n\nDanielson reasonably believed officers may release Raban to the car.\n\n * * *\n\n In the end, officers reasonably suspected both that Raban was dangerous\n\nand that he may access a weapon upon release to the car. Because “the Fourth\n\nAmendment permits protective sweeps under such conditions,” Canada, 76\n\nF.4th at 1310, the district court did not err in denying Raban’s motion to\n\nsuppress.\n\n\n\n 5\n Though the government argues that the breaking-free scenario also\njustified the search, we need not address this argument because we find the\nsweep lawful under a different scenario.\n 27\n\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 28\n\n\n\n CONCLUSION\n\n For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s suppression decision and\n\nRaban’s conviction.\n\n\n\n\n 28\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Raban\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 24-1359\\n\\n ANTOAN RABAN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Colorado\\n (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00329-RMR-1)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nJohn C. Arceci, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal\\nPublic Defender, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-\\nAppellant.\\n\\nKyle W. Brenton, Assistant United States Attorney (Jess D. Mekeel, Assistant\\nUnited States Attorney, and Peter McNeilly, United States Attorney, on the\\nbrief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nPHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Two officers stopped a motorist for two violations: driving without a\\n\\nfront license plate and failing to use a turn signal. During the traffic stop, the\\n\\nofficers learned that the driver, who identified himself as Antoan Raban, was a\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\ncriminal gang member. The stop occurred in a high-crime area and a rival\\n\\ngang’s territory. And just seconds after the officers stopped Raban, another\\n\\nman, whom the police knew to be a fellow gang member, drove past, turned\\n\\naround, parked across the street from the stop, and called Raban’s phone.\\n\\n The officers called for backup and four more officers soon arrived.\\n\\nBecause Raban lacked identification, the officers decided to fingerprint him to\\n\\nverify his identity. They removed Raban from the car and frisked him, finding\\n\\nno weapons. While one officer walked Raban to the curb and prepared the\\n\\nfingerprint reader, a second officer did a protective sweep of the car. That\\n\\nofficer found a loaded pistol under the driver’s seat and ammunition in the\\n\\ncenter console.\\n\\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\\n\\nammunition as a felon. Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search,\\n\\narguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a protective sweep of\\n\\nthe car. The district court denied his motion, concluding that the officers\\n\\nreasonably suspected that Raban was dangerous and might access a weapon\\n\\nfrom inside the car.\\n\\n Raban pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s\\n\\nsuppression decision. Now he does just that. He argues that the officers lacked\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous and might access a weapon, so the\\n\\ncourt erred by denying his suppression motion.\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\n Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. First, several\\n\\ncircumstances, taken together, provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\npresently dangerous. And second, when the officer conducted the protective\\n\\nsweep, he reasonably believed that Raban would receive a civil citation and be\\n\\nallowed to return to the car, where he might have had access to a weapon. The\\n\\nofficer therefore had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep.\\n\\n BACKGROUND\\n\\nI. Factual Background\\n\\n In May 2023, two gang-unit police officers—Tyler Danielson and\\n\\nZachary Moldenhauer—were patrolling a high-crime area in northeast Denver.\\n\\nSoon after 4 p.m., they noticed a car without its front license plate at a gas\\n\\nstation. That gas station “saw a lot of crime,” including “motor vehicle theft,\\n\\nnarcotics sale and distribution, [and] weapons-related offenses.” R. vol. I at\\n\\n123.\\n\\n When the driver left the gas station, he didn’t use a turn signal. So the\\n\\nofficers followed and pulled over the car.\\n\\n Officer Danielson approached the driver-side window, and Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer approached the passenger side. Because the car had tinted\\n\\nwindows, the officers asked the driver—Antoan Raban—to roll down the\\n\\nwindows. Raban complied, and the officers saw that he was alone in the car.\\n\\n The officers soon spotted an open beer can on the backseat floor. They\\n\\nalso noticed Raban’s face tattoos: the number “3” under each eye, which\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nconnected him to the Tre Tre Crips gang. Officer Danielson found Raban’s\\n\\nCrips affiliation “odd” because Raban was driving through the territory of a\\n\\nrival-gang, the Bloods. Id. at 79. In fact, later during the stop, Raban told\\n\\nOfficer Danielson: “If this is your area, I see why y’all would have scoped me\\n\\nout.”\\n\\n After Raban rolled down all four windows, Officer Danielson asked him\\n\\nabout the missing license plate. Raban said that the car belonged to his\\n\\ngirlfriend and explained that the car’s front had been recently damaged in an\\n\\naccident. Raban then looked for, but could not find, the car’s registration. He\\n\\nalso lacked any identification. So he gave the officers his name, address, and\\n\\nbirthday instead.\\n\\n Meanwhile, seconds after the officers stopped Raban, a white SUV drove\\n\\npast, completed a three-point turn, and parked across the street from the stop.\\n\\nBoth officers recognized the SUV’s driver: Deshay Armstrong, 1 “a well-known\\n\\nCrip gang member” with a violent criminal history. Id. at 79–80, 127. Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer acknowledged Armstrong by saying “sup, brother.” Id. at 101,\\n\\n143. Then the officers noticed Armstrong placing a telephone call. They could\\n\\nsee inside Raban’s car that the call was to Raban’s phone. Raban, ignoring the\\n\\ncall, told the officers that Armstrong was his girlfriend’s brother.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n At times, the record reflects Armstrong’s first name as “Dashae.”\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\n After getting Raban’s information, Officer Moldenhauer returned to the\\n\\npolice car to run a records check. Officer Danielson stayed with Raban, partly\\n\\nbecause Armstrong was parked nearby.\\n\\n Officer Danielson and Raban chatted calmly. Raban explained that the\\n\\nopen beer can was from the night before. He also admitted that he didn’t have a\\n\\ndriver’s license. And he said that Armstrong “just so happened to be here.”\\n\\n Around this time, the officers called for backup, largely because of\\n\\nArmstrong. Four more officers soon arrived.\\n\\n Officer Moldenhauer finished the records check, which revealed that\\n\\nRaban had several violent and weapons-related convictions. It also showed that\\n\\nRaban lacked a valid driver’s license. And though the check returned a photo\\n\\nresembling Raban, the photographed individual lacked face tattoos. So to\\n\\nconfirm Raban’s identity, Officer Moldenhauer decided to fingerprint him.\\n\\n Without telling Officer Danielson the records-check results, including\\n\\nRaban’s criminal history, Officer Moldenhauer asked Danielson to remove\\n\\nRaban from the car for fingerprinting. At the same time, Moldenhauer also told\\n\\nDanielson: “I think he’s good.” Id. at 147.\\n\\n Officer Danielson asked Raban to exit the car, frisked him, and noticed\\n\\nhe was wearing an ankle monitor. Finding no weapons, Danielson passed Raban\\n\\nto Officer Moldenhauer, who walked Raban closer to the police car. Surrounded\\n\\nby several officers, Raban sat on the curb with his legs crossed while Officer\\n\\nMoldenhauer prepared the fingerprint reader.\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\n Officer Danielson then did a protective sweep of the car. He soon found a\\n\\nloaded handgun under the driver’s seat. At that point, officers handcuffed\\n\\nRaban. Officers later found a baggie of ammunition in the center console.\\n\\nII. Procedural History\\n\\n A federal grand jury charged Raban with possessing a firearm and\\n\\nammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).\\n\\n A. Motion to Suppress & Evidentiary Hearing\\n\\n Raban moved to suppress evidence from the search, arguing that the\\n\\nprotective sweep violated the Fourth Amendment. To justify a protective\\n\\nsweep, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the suspect (1) “is\\n\\ndangerous” and (2) “may gain immediate control of weapons.” Michigan v.\\n\\nLong, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). Raban argued that the officers lacked\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that he was dangerous. In response, the government\\n\\nargued that Officer Danielson had reasonable suspicion for the protective sweep\\n\\nbased on the area, Raban’s gang affiliation and criminal history, Armstrong’s\\n\\npresence and conduct during the stop, and Raban’s ankle monitor.\\n\\n The court held an evidentiary hearing. Officers Danielson and\\n\\nMoldenhauer testified about the stop and the circumstances they relied on to\\n\\njustify the protective sweep.\\n\\n To begin, Officer Danielson testified that the stop occurred in a high-\\n\\ncrime area—one with several recent shootings. He also noted that he had “been\\n\\nshot at . . . by a gang member” in that area before. R. vol. I at 109.\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n Officer Danielson then explained the significance of Raban’s being in a\\n\\nrival gang’s territory. He testified that the Crips did not usually enter the\\n\\nBloods’ “turf.” Id. at 79. Indeed, Danielson found Raban’s presence in Bloods\\n\\nterritory especially “odd” “because of recent violence in that neighborhood.”\\n\\nId. Officer Moldenhauer similarly attested that the area experienced violent\\n\\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” Id. at 122–\\n\\n23, 131.\\n\\n Next, the officers testified about Armstrong. Officer Danielson stated\\n\\nthat Armstrong’s presence concerned him for a few reasons: both Armstrong\\n\\nand Raban were members of the Crips, Armstrong had a violent criminal\\n\\nhistory, and Armstrong “ha[d] been armed in the past.” Id. at 80. Danielson\\n\\nexplained that sometimes “others . . . attempt to interfere with a traffic stop or\\n\\ntry to overwhelm officers to try to distract attention or even use violence\\n\\nagainst officers.” Id. at 81. And he testified that “[Raban’s] being accompanied\\n\\nby another Crip gang member set off red flags to me that there was a possibility\\n\\nthat . . . either he was armed or there were multiple firearms that could\\n\\npotentially be used against us within immediate reach.” Id. at 87.\\n\\n Likewise, Officer Moldenhauer testified that Armstrong’s presence\\n\\nincreased his safety concerns. He explained, “I didn’t know what Deshay\\n\\nArmstrong’s intentions were being over there . . . . We don’t know if Deshay\\n\\nwants us to basically leave the defendant alone and what he’s going to do.” Id.\\n\\nat 129. According to Officer Moldenhauer, this “created a fairly large officer\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nsafety issue.” Id. Moldenhauer’s concerns only increased after learning about\\n\\nArmstrong’s personal relationship with Raban.\\n\\n Finally, Officer Danielson discussed the protective sweep. He testified\\n\\nthat he searched the car because he anticipated releasing Raban with only a\\n\\ncitation. Though Raban lacked a license, Danielson explained that they would\\n\\nrelease him to the car with a warning not to drive. But he also added that at\\n\\nsome point “it was a consideration that we were going to either park and lock\\n\\nor tow his vehicle from that scene” too. Id. at 117–18. Both officers testified\\n\\nthat Danielson did not know Raban’s criminal history when Danielson searched\\n\\nthe car.\\n\\n B. Suppression Rulings\\n\\n Though deeming it “a close call,” the district court orally denied Raban’s\\n\\nsuppression motion. Id. at 176. The court concluded that four considerations\\n\\ntogether satisfied Long’s first prong: (1) the high-crime neighborhood,\\n\\n(2) Raban’s gang affiliation, (3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle\\n\\nmonitor. The court ruled that, under the totality of the circumstances, these\\n\\nfactors supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n As for Long’s second prong, Raban’s access to weapons, the court was\\n\\nsilent. But at the end of the hearing, the court stated that it “did not find the\\n\\nofficers’ testimony” about intending to return Raban to the car to be “credible,\\n\\nplausible or otherwise.” Id. at 176–77. The court found “it hard to imagine that\\n\\nthese officers, given what they knew, were going to release this man with a\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\ncitation.” Id. at 177. With that in mind, the court emphasized that releasing\\n\\nRaban to the car was “not one of the factors that [it] found to support the\\n\\nreasonable suspicion for the sweep.” Id.\\n\\n Hearing this, Raban argued that the court must grant his suppression\\n\\nmotion. He reasoned that if officers were not going to release him to the car (as\\n\\nthe court had just found), the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that he may\\n\\naccess a weapon under Long’s second prong. But the court stuck with its\\n\\noriginal ruling.\\n\\n Two days later, the court sua sponte invited the parties to move for\\n\\nreconsideration. Raban argued that the court’s credibility finding about the\\n\\nofficers’ intent to return Raban to the car required suppression. Perhaps\\n\\nacknowledging that, the government asked the court to reconsider its credibility\\n\\nfinding and rule in the government’s favor.\\n\\n On reconsideration, the district court again denied Raban’s suppression\\n\\nmotion. United States v. Raban, No. 23-cr-00329, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1\\n\\n(D. Colo. May 1, 2024). Addressing Long’s first prong, the court reiterated the\\n\\nfacts supporting its earlier finding of reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\ndangerous—his gang tattoos, the high-crime and rival-gang area, Armstrong’s\\n\\npresence, and Raban’s ankle monitor. Id. at *1, 3.\\n\\n Then the court addressed Long’s second prong. This time, the court ruled\\n\\nthat it was “reasonable to believe[] . . . that Mr. Raban may have been allowed\\n\\nto leave the scene with a citation and return to his car.” Id. at *6. Retreating\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\nfrom its earlier credibility finding, the court remarked that “what [it] did not\\n\\nfind credible” was “[t]he Government’s assertion . . . that Officer Danielson\\n\\nknew of Mr. Raban’s criminal history, but that he nevertheless would have\\n\\nreturned an individual with Mr. Raban’s criminal history to his vehicle without\\n\\nan arrest.” 2 Id. at *5. As for Raban’s access to weapons, the court noted that the\\n\\nhearing testimony and bodycam footage established that Officer Danielson in\\n\\nfact knew nothing about Raban’s criminal history before the protective sweep.\\n\\nId. The court also noted that right before the sweep, Officer Moldenhauer had\\n\\ntold Danielson that Raban was “good.” Id.\\n\\n With all this in mind, the court held that when Officer Danielson\\n\\n“conducted the protective sweep, it was objectively reasonable for [him] to\\n\\nconclude that Mr. Raban could have been permitted to return to his vehicle\\n\\nafter receiving a traffic citation.” Id. (emphasis omitted). So the court again\\n\\nheld the protective sweep lawful. Id. at *6.\\n\\n C. Guilty Plea, Sentencing & Appeal\\n\\n After the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Raban entered\\n\\na conditional guilty plea. He reserved his right to appeal the suppression\\n\\ndecision. The court sentenced Raban to seventy-one months’ imprisonment.\\n\\n Raban timely appealed, challenging the court’s holding on both Long\\n\\nprongs.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The court never explained why Raban’s criminal history would have\\nsupported an arrest. See generally Raban, 2024 WL 1911223.\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\n STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we consider the\\n\\ntotality of the circumstances. United States v. Canada, 76 F.4th 1304, 1307\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2023). “[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n\\ngovernment, accept the district court’s finding of fact unless clearly erroneous,\\n\\nand review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the\\n\\nFourth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).\\n\\n Raban does not challenge the court’s factual determinations, only its\\n\\nlegal conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the protective\\n\\nsweep. We review that question de novo. See id.\\n\\n DISCUSSION\\n\\n The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in\\n\\ntheir persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\\n\\nseizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to cars. Canada, 76\\n\\nF.4th at 1307 (“A vehicle is an effect protected by the Fourth Amendment.”\\n\\n(citation modified)).\\n\\n Typically, a search or seizure is reasonable only if “supported by a\\n\\nwarrant based on probable cause.” United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234,\\n\\n1240 (10th Cir. 2021). But protective sweeps do not require warrants. See Long,\\n\\n463 U.S. at 1051. Protective sweeps “exist for officer safety; we do not require\\n\\nofficers to take unnecessary risks.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1309. Rather, we allow\\n\\nofficers to “take steps reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.” Id.\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nat 1307 (citation modified). Even so, we limit these warrantless protective\\n\\nsearches to areas where a suspect may keep or hide weapons. See Long, 463\\n\\nU.S. at 1049.\\n\\n To conduct a protective sweep under Long, “an officer must have\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that a suspect” (1) “poses a danger” and (2) “may gain\\n\\nimmediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1307. “Reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion demands less than probable cause,” but “requires the officer to act on\\n\\nsomething more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id.\\n\\n(citation modified). The government bears the burden of proving reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion. United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022).\\n\\n Below, we examine whether the government satisfied that burden for\\n\\neach Long prong.\\n\\nI. Presently Dangerous\\n\\n To satisfy Long’s first prong, “the government must show that a\\n\\nreasonable officer would believe the suspect to be presently dangerous.” United\\n\\nStates v. McGregor, 158 F.4th 1082, 1092 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).\\n\\nIn reviewing the district court’s holding on that point, “we first individually\\n\\nanalyze the probative value of each of the relevant factors that the district court\\n\\nrelied upon.” Id. at 1091. Then viewing those factors “collectively and in the\\n\\ncontext of the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether those factors\\n\\nsupport a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1091–92.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson had only a “hunch” that Raban was\\n\\narmed and dangerous. But under the totality of the circumstances, several\\n\\nfactors support that Officer Danielson reasonably suspected that Raban was\\n\\npresently dangerous.\\n\\n A. Individual Factors\\n\\n The district court’s dangerousness analysis relied on four factors:\\n\\n(1) Raban’s gang affiliation, (2) the high-crime and rival-gang neighborhood,\\n\\n(3) Armstrong’s presence, and (4) Raban’s ankle monitor. See Raban, 2024 WL\\n\\n1911223, at *1, 3. We discuss each factor in turn.\\n\\n 1. Gang Membership\\n\\n To begin, the court found that Raban’s gang membership supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion of his dangerousness. Id. We agree.\\n\\n We recently held that “[g]ang affiliation can support a finding of\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous.” McGregor,\\n\\n158 F.4th at 1097–98; see also United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 907–\\n\\n08 (10th Cir. 2018) (determining that defendant’s status as a “known gang\\n\\nmember” supported reasonable suspicion). “Specifically, the presence of gang\\n\\naffiliation can allow officers to reasonably determine that an individual is\\n\\narmed.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\\n\\n But for gang membership to support reasonable suspicion, “officers must\\n\\nhave some objective basis for believing that the suspect is contemporaneously\\n\\nor recently associated with a criminal gang.” Id. What’s more, “a defendant’s\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\ngang affiliation must be accompanied by other factors to ultimately support a\\n\\nreasonable suspicion finding.” Id. at 1099.\\n\\n Here, officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that\\n\\nRaban was presently affiliated with a gang. Namely, Raban’s face tattoos\\n\\nsignaled his association with the Tre Tre Crips gang. Highlighting the officers’\\n\\ntraining and experience with “the significance of such tattoos” and gang\\n\\naffiliations, the district court concluded that Raban’s tattoos “represent[ed]\\n\\nsome level of commitment” to the Crips. R. vol. I at 174. Indeed, because both\\n\\nOfficers Danielson and Moldenhauer were gang-unit officers, we too “credit\\n\\ntheir expertise and ability to discern” Raban’s status as a Crips member. See\\n\\nMcGregor, 158 F.4th at 1100.\\n\\n Another factor supporting Raban’s current Crips affiliation was\\n\\nArmstrong and his actions at the stop. Armstrong—who arrived just seconds\\n\\nafter officers stopped Raban—parked across the street and stared at the\\n\\nofficers. Then he called Raban’s phone. Raban also told officers that Armstrong\\n\\nwas his girlfriend’s brother.\\n\\n Both officers knew Armstrong as “a violent gang member in the\\n\\ncommunity that’s been active for a long time.” R. vol. I at 127; see also id. at\\n\\n80. And both identified him as another Crips member. Thus, based on Raban’s\\n\\ntattoos and his connection to Armstrong, the officers had “some objective basis\\n\\nfor believing” that Raban was “contemporaneously or recently associated with a\\n\\ncriminal gang.” McGregor, 158 F.4th at 1098.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\n And so, Raban’s gang affiliation supported reasonable suspicion that he\\n\\nwas dangerous.\\n\\n 2. Characteristics of the Area\\n\\n The district court also concluded that the neighborhood’s characteristics\\n\\nsupported reasonable suspicion. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The\\n\\ndefendant’s “presence in a high-crime area . . . may be a relevant contextual\\n\\nconsideration” for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d\\n\\n1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation modified); see also Illinois v. Wardlow,\\n\\n528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (holding that “officers are not required to ignore the\\n\\nrelevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances\\n\\nare sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation”).\\n\\n Raban is correct that location alone cannot provide reasonable suspicion\\n\\nthat a defendant is dangerous. See United States v. Huerta, --- F.4th ----, 2025\\n\\nWL 3018105, at *7 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). Even so, the area’s characteristics\\n\\nremain relevant to the reasonable-suspicion analysis. E.g., United States v.\\n\\nDaniels, 101 F.4th 770, 781–82 (10th Cir. 2024). In fact, location impacts that\\n\\nanalysis here in two ways.\\n\\n First, the officers testified that they stopped Raban in a high-crime area\\n\\nthat had experienced an uptick in violence, including multiple shootings. And\\n\\nOfficer Danielson testified based on his experience that the people he\\n\\nencountered in this area were more likely to be armed and confrontational. So\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nRaban’s “presence in a high-crime area” supported reasonable suspicion that he\\n\\nwas presently dangerous. See Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208.\\n\\n Second, and more importantly, officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s\\n\\nterritory. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. The officers explained that gang\\n\\nmembers were often armed, that the area belonged to the Bloods gang, and that\\n\\nthe Bloods were the Crips’ rivals. Officer Danielson also testified that Raban’s\\n\\npresence in a rival gang’s territory increased his suspicion that Raban was\\n\\narmed. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that the area experienced violent\\n\\ngang activity “specifically” related to “Bloods and Crips relations.” R. vol. I at\\n\\n122–23, 131. So the stop’s location provided significant “relevant context[]”\\n\\nfor the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1208 (citation\\n\\nomitted).\\n\\n Raban’s contrary argument misses the mark. He argues that driving\\n\\n“through a ‘high crime’ area in the heart of a city, or travers[ing] through an\\n\\nenormous area ostensibly controlled by a rival gang, does not mean the person\\n\\nis likely a violent criminal who would use a weapon against a police officer.”\\n\\nReply Br. at 5. We agree. But again, though “insufficient alone,” location\\n\\n“c[an] be considered in the totality of the circumstances analysis.” Daniels, 101\\n\\nF.4th at 781. And here, Raban’s presence in a high-crime area—and rival\\n\\ngang’s territory—supported reasonable suspicion that he was dangerous.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\n 3. Armstrong’s Presence\\n\\n Next, we consider whether Armstrong’s presence supported reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion that Raban was dangerous. We agree with the district court that it\\n\\ndid. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1.\\n\\n Others’ behavior during a stop can add to the reasonable-suspicion\\n\\nanalysis. See, e.g., Daniels, 101 F.4th at 781, 783 (considering actions of\\n\\nnearby SUV in totality-of-the-circumstances analysis); United States v.\\n\\nMcHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “suspicious\\n\\nbehavior” by defendant “along with that of his compatriot” “only adds to the\\n\\n‘reasonable suspicion’ calculus”); United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1290\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2013) (noting that defendant’s and his companion’s suspicious\\n\\nbehavior “would have heightened a reasonable officer’s suspicion of criminal\\n\\nactivity”). In fact, in Terry v. Ohio—the foundational reasonable-suspicion\\n\\ncase—the Supreme Court considered both the defendant’s and his companions’\\n\\nbehavior in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. 392 U.S. 1, 22–23, 27–28 (1968).\\n\\n Here, too, Armstrong’s presence and conduct during the stop supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous. Take Armstrong’s conduct.\\n\\nArmstrong drove past the officers just seconds after they stopped Raban. Then\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nArmstrong parked right across the street, called Raban, and watched the\\n\\nencounter. 3\\n\\n As discussed, the officers testified that they knew Armstrong was “a\\n\\nwell-known Crip gang member” with “a violent criminal history,” and that he\\n\\nhad been “armed in the past.” R. vol. I at 80, 127. The officers’ bodycam\\n\\nfootage shows that his presence put the officers on edge. In fact, the officers\\n\\neven called for backup because of Armstrong’s presence.\\n\\n Officer Danielson also testified that the two Crips gang members\\n\\ntraveling close together through rival-gang territory “set off red flags” that\\n\\nRaban was armed or that “there were multiple firearms that could potentially be\\n\\nused against” the officers. Id. at 87. Officer Moldenhauer, too, testified that\\n\\nArmstrong’s presence heightened his safety concerns.\\n\\n Courts “must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and\\n\\ninferences about human behavior.” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380–81\\n\\n(2020) (citation modified). So we conclude that the on-scene presence of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n Raban suggests that Armstrong was simply “freely observ[ing] the\\npolice” during the stop. Reply Br. at 6. But we credit officers’ “ability to\\ndistinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.” United States v.\\nHernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). And here,\\nofficers used their common sense and experience to conclude that Armstrong’s\\nconduct—arriving seconds after Raban was stopped, turning around, parking\\nacross the street, calling Raban, and staring at the officers—was not “so\\ninnocent . . . as to be innocuous.” See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140,\\n1147 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nanother Crips gang member with a violent criminal history, and a personal\\n\\nrelationship to the defendant, supported reasonable suspicion.\\n\\n Raban argues that Officer Danielson could not “imput[e]” his “general\\n\\nsuspicion” of Armstrong to Raban. Op. Br. at 16. But Officer Danielson did no\\n\\nsuch thing. Instead, Armstrong’s presence heightened officers’ concerns about\\n\\nRaban. In fact, Danielson stayed with Raban during the records check partly\\n\\nbecause Armstrong’s presence heightened his concerns that Raban might\\n\\n“attempt to retrieve [a] type of weapon.” R. vol. I at 78–79.\\n\\n The district court also credited the officers’ testimony about Armstrong,\\n\\nconcluding that Armstrong’s presence “raise[d] more credibility with regard to\\n\\n[the officers’] concern about Mr. Raban’s gang affiliation and his propensity\\n\\nfor having weapons and the reasonableness of the belief that he may be armed\\n\\nand dangerous.” Id. at 175–76. And we must “keep in mind that it is the\\n\\nprovince of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses at the\\n\\nsuppression hearing and to determine the weight to be given to the evidence\\n\\npresented, and we must give such determinations due deference.” United States\\n\\nv. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). So we\\n\\naccept the district court’s determination that Officer Danielson’s reasonable\\n\\nsuspicion for the protective sweep centered on Raban—not Armstrong. See id.\\n\\n All in all, we conclude that Armstrong’s presence and conduct supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n 4. Ankle Monitor\\n\\n Lastly, the district court concluded that Raban’s ankle monitor supported\\n\\nreasonable suspicion. Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *1. Raban argues that\\n\\nhaving an ankle monitor carries little weight here; in his view, it shows nothing\\n\\nmore than “some sort of legal monitoring.” Op. Br. at 16.\\n\\n We agree that the ankle monitor adds little to the reasonable-suspicion\\n\\nanalysis in this case. “Standing alone, a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to\\n\\ncreate reasonable suspicion of anything.” Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (citation\\n\\nmodified). And though criminal history can be “critically relevant” to\\n\\nreasonable suspicion, “the circumstances of the stop itself [must] interact with\\n\\nan individual’s criminal history to trigger an officer’s suspicions.” Id. at 907.\\n\\n Here, Officer Danielson knew only that Raban had an ankle monitor. He\\n\\nnever asked why or what for. In fact, he knew nothing about Raban’s criminal\\n\\nhistory. What’s more, Officer Danielson never testified that the ankle monitor\\n\\nincreased his suspicions that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\n All told, because Danielson did not know why Raban had an ankle\\n\\nmonitor—and because he never asserted that it impacted his safety concerns—\\n\\nthe ankle monitor does not weigh heavily in our analysis.\\n\\n B. Totality of the Circumstances\\n\\n Raban argues that none of the factors discussed above can independently\\n\\nsupport reasonable suspicion. That’s true. Even so, we must consider “the\\n\\ntotality of the circumstances,” or in other words, the “whole picture,” when\\n\\n 20\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\nconsidering reasonableness. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).\\n\\nAnd here, the “whole picture” supported reasonable suspicion that Raban was\\n\\ndangerous.\\n\\n Consider McGregor. There, we held that the defendant’s gang affiliation,\\n\\nfurtive movements, and prior robbery conviction, when “viewed collectively\\n\\nand in the light of the totality of the circumstances, provided a solid foundation\\n\\nfor the district court’s ruling.” 158 F.4th at 1105.\\n\\n Though different factors are at play here, we reach the same conclusion.\\n\\nOfficers stopped Raban in a high-crime area known for gang violence. Raban\\n\\nhad face tattoos associating him with the Crips. Officer Danielson testified that\\n\\n“gang members are often armed,” R. vol. I at 72, tying Raban’s gang\\n\\nmembership to the likelihood “that weapons may be found” in the car, see\\n\\nDennison, 410 F.3d at 1212; see also Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906 (noting in the\\n\\nreasonable-suspicion analysis that officers “knew” gang membership “often\\n\\nsuggested the presence of guns”). And right after officers stopped Raban, a\\n\\nwell-known Crips member with a violent history—and a personal connection to\\n\\nRaban—parked nearby, called Raban, and stared at the officers. This, too,\\n\\nheightened Officer Danielson’s concerns that Raban was dangerous. Not to\\n\\nmention that officers stopped Raban in a rival gang’s territory.\\n\\n These factors taken together gave the officers “more than an inchoate and\\n\\nunparticularized suspicion or hunch” that Raban was “presently dangerous.”\\n\\nCanada, 76 F.4th at 1307 (citation omitted).\\n\\n 21\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\n Raban argues that other facts cut against reasonable suspicion. For one,\\n\\nRaban was calm and cooperative throughout the stop. He also compares the\\n\\nfacts here to Hammond, 890 F.3d at 906–07, noting several factors from that\\n\\ncase that are missing here. Along those lines, he emphasizes that it was not\\n\\nnighttime, he did not drive dangerously, he was not in a remote area, he did not\\n\\nmove furtively, and officers did not suspect him of another crime.\\n\\n But these facts do not sway our reasonable-suspicion analysis in Raban’s\\n\\nfavor. When the McGregor defendant raised similar arguments, we rejected\\n\\nthem. See 158 F.4th at 1105. We explained that “we have previously found\\n\\nreasonable suspicion even when a stop occurred during daytime hours in a\\n\\nresidential neighborhood” and that “a defendant’s compliance and cooperation\\n\\nwith officers do not undercut the probative weight of other factors.” Id. at\\n\\n1105–06. Similarly, we have found reasonable suspicion without relying on\\n\\nfurtive movements, see Dennison, 410 F.3d at 1212–1214, and when officers\\n\\nnever suspected the defendant of another crime, see McGregor, 158 F.4th at\\n\\n1087–88.\\n\\n As the McGregor court put it, “these additional factors . . . may weigh in\\n\\n[Raban’s] favor on the question of whether there was a reasonable basis to\\n\\nsuspect that he was armed and dangerous.” Id. at 1106. Even so, “they do not\\n\\nalter our ultimate conclusion that the officers had such reasonable suspicion—\\n\\nwhen the three factors that the district court relied on are viewed collectively\\n\\nand in the context of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.; see also Canada,\\n\\n 22\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\n76 F.4th at 1309 (concluding that mitigating factors did not dissipate\\n\\nreasonable suspicion).\\n\\n Viewed collectively—and in the light most favorable to the\\n\\ngovernment—the area’s characteristics, Raban’s gang affiliation, and\\n\\nArmstrong’s presence provided reasonable suspicion that Raban was dangerous.\\n\\nII. Immediate Access to Weapons\\n\\n Under Long’s second prong, “an officer must have reasonable suspicion\\n\\nthat a suspect . . . may gain immediate access to a weapon.” Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\nat 1307. This means officers must have “reason to believe that weapons may be\\n\\nfound” in the car and that the suspect may access those weapons. Id. at 1307–\\n\\n08. This can happen in three scenarios:\\n\\n (1) the suspect could break away from police control and retrieve a\\n weapon from his automobile; (2) the suspect is not placed under\\n arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will\\n then have access to any weapons inside; and (3) the suspect may be\\n permitted to reenter the vehicle before the investigation is over, and\\n again, may have access to weapons.\\n\\nId. at 1309 (citation modified).\\n\\n Here, the officers “had reason to believe that weapons may be found” in\\n\\nthe car based on the same factors supporting Raban’s dangerousness. See id. at\\n\\n1307–08. As for Raban’s weapons access, the district court ruled that the\\n\\nsecond scenario applied because Officer Danielson reasonably believed the\\n\\nofficers would return Raban to the car with a citation. Raban, 2024 WL\\n\\n1911223, at *3, 5.\\n\\n\\n 23\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 24\\n\\n\\n\\n We think the district court got it right. The second scenario applies if\\n\\n“officers—at the time of the search—had reason to believe they would not\\n\\ndetain a suspect further.” Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. And here, the court\\n\\nultimately ruled that Officer Danielson credibly testified that the officers\\n\\nintended to release Raban with a citation.\\n\\n The district court knew that Raban lacked a driver’s license. Yet Officer\\n\\nDanielson explained that, even without a license, the officers would not\\n\\nnecessarily prevent Raban from getting in the car; instead, they might advise\\n\\nhim not to drive. Crediting this testimony, the court reasoned that the officers\\n\\ncould have reasonably expected to release Raban to the car to grab his\\n\\nbelongings or wait for a ride. See Raban, 2024 WL 1911223, at *5. We give\\n\\n“due deference” to this finding. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted).\\n\\n But Raban argues that it was unreasonable for Officer Danielson to\\n\\nbelieve that officers would release him to the car. In support, he emphasizes\\n\\nthat Raban “lacked a driver’s license, that there was an open container of beer\\n\\nin the car, and there were six officers on the scene.” 4 Op. Br. at 9.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n Raban suggests—with no supporting argument—that he also lacked\\n“demonstrated ownership or authority” over the car. Op. Br. at 22. Raban\\nwaived this issue by raising it for the first time on appeal. See United States v.\\nBurke, 633 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2011). Also, if he lacked authority over the\\ncar, he might lack Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search. See\\nUnited States v. Guzman, 149 F.4th 1132, 1139–40 (10th Cir. 2025). So we find\\nthis argument unpersuasive.\\n 24\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 25\\n\\n\\n\\n Yet these facts do not establish that the officers planned to “detain\\n\\n[Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th at 1310. For one, driving without a\\n\\nlicense is not a criminal offense in Colorado. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-2-\\n\\n101(1), (10), 42-2-138(1). Nor is driving with an open container. See id. § 42-\\n\\n4-1305(2)(c). Rather, these violations are “civil matter[s].” Id. § 42-4-1701(1).\\n\\nSo the officers could not arrest Raban for those violations. See People v.\\n\\nBarrientos, 956 P.2d 634, 636 (Colo. App. 1997). And Raban points to no\\n\\nevidence or law suggesting otherwise.\\n\\n Instead, Raban contrasts the facts here with those in Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\n1304. He argues that we “determined [in Canada] that officers had reason to\\n\\nbelieve they would not arrest the defendant when, at the time of the protective\\n\\nsweep, they had not yet learned he had a revoked license.” Op. Br. at 23. Raban\\n\\nsuggests that if the Canada officers had known about the defendant’s revoked\\n\\nlicense beforehand, then the officers would have lacked reasonable suspicion\\n\\nfor the search.\\n\\n True enough, unlike the officers in Canada, Officer Danielson knew that\\n\\nRaban lacked a license before he searched the car. But importantly, the offenses\\n\\nhere and in Canada carry different weight. The Canada defendant “was a\\n\\nprohibited possessor with a revoked license,” 76 F.4th at 1310—a criminal\\n\\noffense under Kansas law, see Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-235(e), 21-6602. Not so\\n\\nhere. Before the protective sweep, Raban had allegedly committed only civil\\n\\ntraffic offenses. Thus, “[u]ntil the gun was found, there was no reason to doubt\\n\\n 25\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 26\\n\\n\\n\\nthat [Raban] (though he did not have a driver’s license) would soon be allowed\\n\\nto return to the car.” United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807, 814 (5th Cir.\\n\\n2022).\\n\\n Consider the facts in Rodriguez. There, officers stopped a car after\\n\\nobserving a traffic violation. Id. at 809–10. Officers ultimately performed a\\n\\nprotective sweep. Id. at 810. The defendant—a passenger—had a gun in his\\n\\njacket, which he had left on the backseat. Id.\\n\\n The defendant challenged the protective sweep, arguing that it was\\n\\nunreasonable to believe that officers would return him to the car. Id. at 814.\\n\\nThe Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that even though he did not own the car or\\n\\nhave a license, the defendant “could easily have returned to the car” as a\\n\\npassenger. Id. The court highlighted that the defendant “had only been\\n\\ndetained, not arrested,” when the search occurred. Id.\\n\\n Here, too, when Officer Danielson searched the car, Raban “had only\\n\\nbeen detained, not arrested.” See id. And Danielson had no reason to think the\\n\\nofficers would arrest Raban. In fact, when Officer Moldenhauer asked\\n\\nDanielson to remove Raban from the car, Moldenhauer said: “I think he’s\\n\\ngood.” R. vol. I at 147. So “at the time of the search,” Officer Danielson “had\\n\\nreason to believe they would not detain [Raban] further.” See Canada, 76 F.4th\\n\\nat 1310.\\n\\n Raban argues that even if officers returned him to the car, six officers\\n\\nwere present. So in his view, “there is no reason to believe that the officers on\\n\\n 26\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 27\\n\\n\\n\\nscene . . . could not have effectuated such a return in a safe and controlled\\n\\nmanner.” Op. Br. at 23.\\n\\n Though the number of on-scene officers might matter for gun access in\\n\\nthe breaking-free scenario, 5 we are unsure how that might impact Raban’s gun\\n\\naccess if officers released him to the car with a citation. Cf. McGregor, 158\\n\\nF.4th at 1106 (“[A]n increased number of police officers does not necessarily\\n\\nundermine officers’ reasonable belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous.”).\\n\\nPlus, Raban wasn’t alone. Armstrong waited nearby—possibly there to help\\n\\nRaban if he chose to resist the officers. As a result, the number of on-scene\\n\\nofficers did not dispel Officer Danielson’s reasonable suspicion that Raban may\\n\\naccess a weapon once returned to the car.\\n\\n We conclude that when he conducted the protective sweep, Officer\\n\\nDanielson reasonably believed officers may release Raban to the car.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n In the end, officers reasonably suspected both that Raban was dangerous\\n\\nand that he may access a weapon upon release to the car. Because “the Fourth\\n\\nAmendment permits protective sweeps under such conditions,” Canada, 76\\n\\nF.4th at 1310, the district court did not err in denying Raban’s motion to\\n\\nsuppress.\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Though the government argues that the breaking-free scenario also\\njustified the search, we need not address this argument because we find the\\nsweep lawful under a different scenario.\\n 27\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 28\\n\\n\\n\\n CONCLUSION\\n\\n For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s suppression decision and\\n\\nRaban’s conviction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30953,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10766661,"string":"10,766,661"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. State of Kansas Department of Health & Environment"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-30"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-3041"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"MURPHY, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v. No. 24-3041\\n\\n STATE OF KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF\\n HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Kansas\\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-02250-TC)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nJanea L. Lamar (Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, with her on the briefs), U.S.\\nDepartment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for\\nPlaintiff–Appellant.\\n\\nDavid R. Cooper, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas (Crystal B.\\nMoe, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas, and Anthony J. Powell,\\nSolicitor General, Office of Kansas Attorney General Kris W. Kobach, Topeka, Kansas,\\nwith him on the brief), for Defendant–Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nMURPHY, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nI. INTRODUCTION\\n\\n The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994\\n\\n(“USERRA”) prohibits employers from discriminating against servicemembers\\n\\nbecause of their uniformed service. See Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified\\n\\nas amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33). It defines “employer” as “any person,\\n\\ninstitution, organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages . . . or that has\\n\\ncontrol over employment opportunities.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A).\\n\\n The federal government (or “the government”) brought suit on behalf of Stacy\\n\\nGonzales, a member of the United States Army National Guard, against the State of\\n\\nKansas, claiming a violation of USERRA by the Kansas Department of Health and\\n\\nEnvironment (“KDHE”). 1 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district\\n\\ncourt dismissed the suit, ruling Kansas could not be liable because it was not\\n\\nGonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The government appeals the order and\\n\\njudgment of dismissal, arguing the district court erred by not only adopting an overly\\n\\nnarrow construction of the term “employer,” but also failing to apply the correct\\n\\nsummary judgment standard in reviewing the record evidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The complaint filed in district court named the “State of Kansas (Department\\nof Health and Environment)” as the defendant. Consequently, the district court\\ncharacterized this case as one in which “[t]he United States sued the State of Kansas,\\nalleging the Kansas Department of Health and Environment violated [USERRA].”\\nApp. Vol. III at 709. The district court’s framing of this case is not disputed on\\nappeal. Notwithstanding the defendant-appellee identified in the caption, the court\\nrefers to Kansas as the party raising arguments on appeal.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\n The plain text of USERRA lacks any language to suggest only those who\\n\\nexercise direct or absolute control of employment opportunities may be considered an\\n\\nemployer. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (refusing to\\n\\nadopt a “heightened” statutory requirement for Title VII discrimination claim by\\n\\n“add[ing] words . . . to the statute Congress enacted”). The statutory language further\\n\\nimplies entities that share or co-determine matters constituting employment\\n\\nopportunities can each concurrently be considered employers. See 38 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 4303(4)(A)(i). Whether Kansas, through KDHE, maintained sufficient control over\\n\\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. The\\n\\nrecord evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving\\n\\nparty, allows a reasonable finding that KDHE retained the requisite level of control\\n\\nover Gonzales’s employment opportunities to be a USERRA employer. 2 Therefore,\\n\\nexercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court reverses the district\\n\\ncourt’s order and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this\\n\\ndecision.\\n\\nII. BACKGROUND\\n\\n KDHE is a state agency that provides services related to health and\\n\\nenvironment. The agency has, within its organizational structure, various divisions,\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n In the district court, the parties stipulated KDHE “was a subdivision of the\\ngovernment of the State of Kansas.” App. Vol. I at 24. On appeal, the parties agree\\nthat if KDHE is found to have been Gonzales’s USERRA employer, Kansas would\\nalso have been her USERRA employer.\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nbureaus, and sections. The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section 3\\n\\nfocuses its work on those affected by sexually transmitted infections and the Human\\n\\nImmunodeficiency Virus.\\n\\n During the relevant time period, the Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention\\n\\nSection received federal grants from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention\\n\\n(“CDC”) in the form of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention Award. Under\\n\\nthe supervision of KDHE, the Section used the grant in two primary ways: 1) it hired\\n\\ndisease intervention specialists (“state disease intervention specialists”) and 2) it\\n\\ndistributed a portion of the fund as Aid-to-Local grants 4 to counties within its\\n\\njurisdiction.\\n\\n State disease intervention specialists were each assigned to a clinic. Their\\n\\nprimary task was to interview people who were diagnosed with a communicable\\n\\ndisease. By conducting interviews, state disease intervention specialists were able to\\n\\nidentify others at risk of infection or disease transmission, inform them of their health\\n\\nrisk, and refer them to medical services. Depending on the circumstance, a state\\n\\ndisease intervention specialist may assist individuals who voluntarily walk into a\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section operates within the\\nBureau of Disease Control and Prevention. Through the Bureau of Disease Control\\nand Prevention, a subdivision within the Division of Public Health, KDHE provides\\ndisease intervention and prevention services.\\n 4\\n KDHE distributed Aid-to-Local grants to multiple counties for various\\nservices, not limited to disease prevention services. Relevant to this appeal is only\\nthe Aid-to-Local grants administered through the Sexually Transmitted Disease\\nSection for disease prevention.\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nhealth clinic or be deployed to specified areas based on guidance from KDHE. Each\\n\\nstate disease intervention specialist was provided a copy of the Field Services\\n\\nManual, a document written by KDHE, which identified job expectations, protocols,\\n\\nand metrics by which their performance was evaluated.\\n\\n KDHE also offered Aid-to-Local grants to county-level agencies in exchange\\n\\nfor localized assistance in disease prevention. Accompanying the grant was the\\n\\nNotice of Grant Award Amount & Summary of Program Objectives (“Notice of\\n\\nGrant Award”) which outlined the terms, objectives, and purposes of the grant.\\n\\nAcceptance of the grant fund constituted acceptance of its terms. KDHE decided\\n\\nevery fiscal year whether to renew the grant or reallocate its resources.\\n\\n Finney County Health Department (or “Finney County”) was a recipient of an\\n\\nAid-to-Local grant from 1998 to 2010. The Notice of Grant Award identified\\n\\nobjectives to be satisfied by a disease intervention specialist, which resembled\\n\\nexpectations set out in the Field Services Manual. Finney County dedicated a county-\\n\\nlevel disease intervention specialist (“local disease intervention specialist”) to fulfill\\n\\nthe terms of the Aid-to-Local grant. The position was funded in part by the Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grant, with Finney County making up any shortfall. The technical job\\n\\nresponsibilities of a local disease intervention specialist essentially mirrored that of a\\n\\nstate disease intervention specialist.\\n\\n From 2001 to 2010, Stacy Gonzales served as Finney County’s local disease\\n\\nintervention specialist. During this time, Gonzales was also an active member of the\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nUnited States Army National Guard. She intermittently had military obligations,\\n\\nduring which she was absent from her local disease intervention specialist position.\\n\\n As a local disease intervention specialist, Gonzales interfaced with\\n\\nrepresentatives from both KDHE and Finney County. Her main contacts at KDHE\\n\\nwere Derek Coppedge and Jennifer VandeVelde. Coppedge was the Manager of Field\\n\\nOperations for the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section from 2000 to 2008.\\n\\nVandeVelde succeeded Coppedge in that position from 2008 until 2013, upon\\n\\nCoppedge’s promotion to Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section in\\n\\n2008. The Manager of Field Operations supervised all state and local disease\\n\\nintervention specialists, tracking their deployment and assessing data collected from\\n\\nfield work. The Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section oversaw the\\n\\nAid-to-Local grants by communicating with the federal government, coordinating\\n\\nwith the agency’s legal department, and managing counties’ compliance with the\\n\\ngrant terms. Coppedge and VandeVelde led mandatory quarterly staff meetings for\\n\\nboth state and local disease intervention specialists to review grant objectives and the\\n\\nprogress made in the preceding quarter. Gonzales attended these quarterly meetings.\\n\\n When she did not have military obligations, Gonzales reported daily for work\\n\\nat Finney County. She worked with county employees, including nurses and clinical\\n\\nstaff. Her salary and benefits were determined by Finney County Human Resources\\n\\nDepartment, which issued her paychecks as well.\\n\\n On or around April 1, 2010, a meeting was called to discuss problems with\\n\\nGonzales’s performance. Meeting minutes indicate those in attendance were\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\nCoppedge, VandeVelde, Gonzales, and Ashley Goss. Ashley Goss was the Finney\\n\\nCounty Health Department Administrator at the time. Perceived issues were two-fold.\\n\\nFirst, Gonzales had exhibited inappropriate behavior in the workplace which had\\n\\nstrained relationships with her co-workers. Second, Finney County was failing to\\n\\nmeet Aid-to-Local grant objectives. Goss and Gonzales were warned the Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grant might not be renewed if performance did not improve. On April 9, 2010,\\n\\nGonzales received a deployment order for military service beginning in October and\\n\\nshe informed VandeVelde of her deployment.\\n\\n Coppedge sent a follow-up letter, dated April 23, 2010, to Goss. The letter\\n\\nemphasized the performance deficiency of the disease intervention specialist in\\n\\nFinney County. The letter warned Finney County that if productivity did not\\n\\n“dramatically improve,” the Aid-to-Local grant would be discontinued. App. Vol. II\\n\\nat 385. Coppedge scheduled a reevaluation of Finney County’s performance for July\\n\\n15, 2010.\\n\\n In an internal email dated June 7, 2010, KDHE contemplated reallocating\\n\\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. On July 1, 2010, KDHE decided not to renew\\n\\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. Thereafter, Finney County terminated its local\\n\\ndisease intervention specialist position and Gonzales became unemployed.\\n\\n The government brought suit against the State of Kansas, claiming KDHE had\\n\\nviolated USERRA. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the\\n\\nnarrow issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s employer under\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nUSERRA. 5 The district court granted Kansas’s motion, denied the government’s\\n\\nmotion, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The district court reasoned the language\\n\\nof USERRA confirmed a servicemember might have more than one USERRA\\n\\nemployer in a single job. Nevertheless, it ruled Kansas could not be Gonzales’s\\n\\nUSERRA employer because KDHE did not have any authority to hire, fire, or\\n\\nsupervise Gonzales, or determine her salary. The government timely appealed.\\n\\nIII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n The government raises two issues on appeal. First, it contends the district court\\n\\nadopted an overly narrow construction of the term “employer” as it is defined in\\n\\nUSERRA. The government then asserts the district court’s review of the record\\n\\nevidence was inconsistent with the summary judgment standard.\\n\\n A. Definition of “Employer” under USERRA\\n\\n The interpretation of a federal statute is a question of law which this court\\n\\nreviews de novo. Koch Indus., Inc. v. United States, 603 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2010); see WWC Holding Co. v. Sopkin, 488 F.3d 1262, 1276 n.10 (10th Cir. 2007)\\n\\n(“[W]e are not limited to the parties’ positions on what a statute means, because we\\n\\nreview a question of statutory construction de novo.”). The analysis begins with the\\n\\nstatutory text. Tarango-Delgado v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\nUndefined terms are given their ordinary meaning as understood at the time of\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Although not relevant to this appeal, Kansas’s summary judgment motion\\nalso raised arguments regarding the substantive merits of the USERRA claim, the\\nequitable defense of laches, and the lack of basis for granting any injunctive relief.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\nenactment, considering the specific context in which the word is used. Taniguchi v.\\n\\nKan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566, 569 (2012). “[T]he text of a law controls\\n\\nover purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statutory text.” Corner Post,\\n\\nInc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024) (quotation\\n\\nomitted).\\n\\n Kansas does not provide a valid reason to deviate from the textual analysis. Its\\n\\nargument analogizing USERRA to the Fair Labor Standards Act is unavailing\\n\\nbecause each statute has differing definitions of “employer.” Compare 29 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 203(d) with 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). The Supreme Court’s precedent on the\\n\\ncommon-law definition of control is irrelevant because included within USERRA is a\\n\\nstatute-specific definition of the term “employer.” See Clackamas Gastroenterology\\n\\nAssocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-45, 447 (2003) (explaining courts should\\n\\nlook to common law if Congress is silent on an undefined term and the “undefined\\n\\nterm has a settled meaning at common law”).\\n\\n USERRA provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n A person who is a member of . . . , or has an obligation to perform service\\n in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment,\\n reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of\\n employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, . . . or\\n obligation.\\n\\n38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). The term “employer” is defined in § 4303(4)(A):\\n\\n [T]he term “employer” means any person, institution, organization, or\\n other entity that pays salary or wages for work performed or that has\\n control over employment opportunities including--\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n (i) a person, institution, organization, or other entity to whom the\\n employer has delegated the performance of employment-related\\n responsibilities;\\n (ii) the Federal Government;\\n (iii) a State;\\n (iv) any successor in interest to a person, institution, organization, or\\n other entity referred to in this subparagraph; and\\n (v) a person, institution, organization, or other entity that has denied\\n initial employment in violation of section 4311.\\n\\n The text identifies two avenues of analysis. First, whoever pays an employee’s\\n\\nsalary or wages for the work performed is considered an employer. To pay is to “give\\n\\nto (a person) what is due in discharge of a debt, or as return for services done.” Pay,\\n\\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Under the terms’ plain meanings, “salary”\\n\\nand “wages” both refer to regularly paid compensation. See Helix Energy Sols. Grp.,\\n\\nInc. v. Hewitt, 598 U.S. 39, 51-52 (2023) (defining salary as “fixed compensation\\n\\nregularly paid, as by the year, quarter, month, or week” and wage as “[p]ay given for\\n\\nlabor at short[-]stated intervals” (quotation omitted)). Section 4303(2) identifies\\n\\nsalary or wages as a monetary subcomponent of the benefits of employment. See also\\n\\nAdvocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Kennedy, 605 U.S. 1, 10 (2025) (“The word ‘paid’\\n\\nobviously connotes a cash benefit.”).\\n\\n Second, “control over employment opportunities” is an alternate and sufficient\\n\\nbasis for employer status under USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). This statutory\\n\\nlanguage can be further parsed into two subcomponents: “control over” and\\n\\n“employment opportunities.”\\n\\n To exercise control over is to “exercise power or authority over.” Control,\\n\\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Although the provision does not clarify the\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nnature or degree of control necessary, absent from the text is any language to suggest\\n\\nonly those who exercise direct or absolute control over an employee are considered\\n\\nemployers. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355 (refusing to adopt a “heightened” statutory\\n\\nrequirement by “add[ing] words” to the text); White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d\\n\\n616, 627 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[S]ection 4303(4)(A)(i) does not require that an\\n\\n‘employer’ have direct control over the matters that constitute a USERRA\\n\\nviolation[,] . . . only that the employer must have control over the plaintiff’s\\n\\nemployment opportunities writ large.”).\\n\\n Pursuant to § 4303(4)(A)(i), those who perform employment-related\\n\\nresponsibilities upon delegation by the employer also fall within the ambit of\\n\\nemployer. This provision implies a servicemember may have more than one employer\\n\\nat a time as long as each employer either pays salary or wages or controls\\n\\nemployment opportunities: 1) the employer that delegates the performance of\\n\\nemployment-related responsibilities and 2) those to whom the responsibilities have\\n\\nbeen delegated. “The use of the word ‘delegate[]’ suggests an intent to reach both\\n\\ndirect and indirect employers,” provided each employer satisfies at least one of the\\n\\ntwo conditions identified in § 4303(4)(A). White, 987 F.3d at 627.\\n\\n As a result, the term “control” must be construed to recognize that a\\n\\nservicemember can have more than one employer. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v.\\n\\nCity of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (“[W]ell-established principles of\\n\\nstatutory interpretation . . . require statutes to be construed in a manner that gives\\n\\neffect to all of their provisions.”). Even entities that share or co-determine matters\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nconstituting employment opportunities can concurrently be employers. Cf. Knitter v.\\n\\nCorvias Mil. Living, LLC, 758 F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the joint-\\n\\nemployer test under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Staub v.\\n\\nProctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (observing USERRA “is very similar to\\n\\nTitle VII”). The key determination concerns not the purported employer’s “purely\\n\\nformal” functions, White, 987 F.3d at 627, but whether an entity individually\\n\\nexercises sufficient control over the servicemember’s employment opportunities, cf.\\n\\nKnitter, 758 F.3d at 1226; see Estes v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 658 F. App’x 1029, 1032\\n\\n(Fed. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n Implementing regulations from the Department of Labor support this textual\\n\\nanalysis. 6 See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394, 402 (2024)\\n\\n(recognizing the non-binding but persuasive weight of “interpretations of those\\n\\nresponsible for implementing particular statutes”). The agency confirmed not only\\n\\nthat a servicemember may have more than one employer but also provided an\\n\\nexample of the nature and scope of “control” necessary to be found a USERRA\\n\\nemployer:\\n\\n For example, if the employee is a security guard hired by a security\\n company and he or she is assigned to a work site, the employee may report\\n both to the security company and to the site owner. In such an instance,\\n both employers share responsibility for compliance with USERRA.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “prescribe\\nregulations implementing the provisions of [USERRA] with regard to the application\\nof [the statute] to States, local governments, and private employers.”\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n20 C.F.R. § 1002.37 (2025). 7\\n\\n The phrase “employment opportunities,” on the other hand, refers both to\\n\\nopportunities for obtaining employment and opportunities within the scope of one’s\\n\\nemployment. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(v) (treating as employers those who\\n\\ndeny initial employment), and United States v. Nevada, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238\\n\\n(D. Nev. 2011) (assessing which entity possessed the authority to hire employees),\\n\\nwith Estes, 658 F. App’x at 1032 (discussing retention and termination of\\n\\nemployment), 8 and White, 987 F.3d at 626-27 (suggesting those who determine\\n\\ncertain terms and benefits of employment may be considered employers).\\n\\n Drawing a categorical distinction, Kansas argues no employment relationship\\n\\ncan exist between Kansas and Gonzales because Finney County is the recipient of the\\n\\nAid-to-Local grant, not Gonzales. Kansas theorizes that assessing USERRA liability\\n\\nby looking beyond contractual relationships would have no backstop. For instance,\\n\\n\\n 7\\n This agency interpretation first became effective in 2006 and has remained\\nconsistent since. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)\\n(“[I]nterpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which\\nhave remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the\\nstatute’s meaning.”).\\n 8\\n Estes v. Merit Systems Protection Board provided the following illustration:\\n For example, if an agency knows it is the only entity hiring contractors\\n from a third[-]party company and the agency states that a contractor is no\\n longer welcome on any of its contracts, the agency could be deemed to\\n exercise control over the employee’s continued employment status\\n because the third[-]party company would have nowhere else to place the\\n contractor and would therefore have no choice but to fire him.\\n658 F. App’x 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\nKansas points out there is no reason why the government’s interpretation would not\\n\\napply up the chain of grantor-grantee relationships and expose the CDC to liability as\\n\\nGonzales’s USERRA employer since the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention\\n\\nAward, used to fund the Aid-to-Local grants, originated from the CDC. Because\\n\\nfederal grants constitute a significant portion of state government funding, Kansas\\n\\nwarns, an expansive interpretation of the scope of USERRA employer would\\n\\nimplicate countless grantor-grantee relationships and expose the federal government\\n\\nto potentially significant liability. Kansas concludes Congress could not have\\n\\nintended such an outcome.\\n\\n Kansas’s position is not supported by the statutory language, which identifies\\n\\nno exceptions or alternate framework by which to analyze entities administering\\n\\ngrants. 9 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 669 (2020) (“[W]hen Congress\\n\\nchooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.”).\\n\\nMoreover, USERRA calls for a case-specific analysis to determine not only employer\\n\\nstatus, 10 but also whether the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct. 38 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 4303(4)(A); 4311(b)-(c). As they are based merely on speculation, Kansas’s\\n\\nslippery-slope concerns are unpersuasive. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita\\n\\nBeneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36 (2006) (rejecting a slippery-\\n\\n\\n 9\\n Section 4303(4)(A) identifies two exceptions to the definition of employer:\\n§ 4303(4)(B) and § 4303(4)(C). Neither of these exceptions apply to grantor-grantee\\nrelationships.\\n 10\\n See infra Section III.B.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\nslope argument based on “feasibility of case-by-case consideration”); see also Silva\\n\\nv. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 362, 369 (M.S.P.B. 2009) (explaining that\\n\\njust because the government may be a USERRA employer to one contractor does not\\n\\nmean the government is considered the USERRA employer of all contractors). This\\n\\nleaves two questions, whether there is sufficient evidence that Kansas, through\\n\\nKDHE, 1) paid Gonzales’s wages or salary or 2) exercised some control over\\n\\nemployment opportunities of Gonzales.\\n\\n B. Kansas’s Motion for Summary Judgment\\n\\n The court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,\\n\\napplying the same legal standard used by the district court. Green Country Food\\n\\nMkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). A motion for\\n\\nsummary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine\\n\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment,\\n\\nour review of the record requires that we construe all inferences in favor of the party\\n\\nagainst whom the motion under consideration is made . . . .” Pirkheim v. First Unum\\n\\nLife Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n 1. Payment of Wages or Salary\\n\\n Based on the record facts and the arguments of the parties on appeal, Kansas\\n\\ndoes not satisfy the first condition for being Gonzales’s employer. Although the Aid-\\n\\nto-Local grant funded a portion of Gonzales’s salary, Finney County issued her\\n\\npaychecks. The district court determined Finney County maintained “exclusive\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nauthority over Gonzales’s salary, method of payment, and benefits.” App. Vol. III at\\n\\n721. The government does not dispute this determination on appeal. The record\\n\\ndemonstrates Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined by the Finney County\\n\\nHuman Resources Department according to its pay scale, “based off of [the\\n\\nemployee’s] education and the type of work that [the employee was] going to do.”\\n\\nApp. Vol. II at 417. Because the government concedes only Finney County paid\\n\\nGonzales’s salary, Kansas does not satisfy the first condition identified in\\n\\n§ 4304(4)(A) and is not, therefore, Gonzales’s USERRA employer on that basis.\\n\\n 2. Control over Employment Opportunities\\n\\n The parties agree: whether KDHE exercised a sufficient degree of control over\\n\\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. This\\n\\napproach is consistent with how courts have analyzed the issue arising under other\\n\\nstatutes. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (National\\n\\nLabor Standard Act); Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028-29\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1996) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d\\n\\n802, 805-08 (10th Cir. 1989) (Fair Labor Standards Act).\\n\\n The district court ruled Kansas was not Gonzales’s employer based on three\\n\\nunderlying assessments: KDHE had 1) no authority to hire or fire Gonzales; 2) no\\n\\nauthority to supervise her; and 3) no input regarding her pay or benefits. The\\n\\ngovernment does not challenge the third basis but argues the first two reflect an\\n\\nimproper application of the summary judgment standard. The government contends\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\nthe district court incorrectly resolved genuine disputes of material fact by viewing the\\n\\nevidence and drawing inferences in Kansas’s favor.\\n\\n a. Authority to Hire or Fire\\n\\n Rather than soliciting or receiving applications, KDHE approached counties to\\n\\ngauge their interest in furthering disease intervention efforts in exchange for Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grants. Both VandeVelde and Coppedge understood the Aid-to-Local grants as\\n\\na means of funding the local disease intervention specialist role. Correspondingly,\\n\\nFinney County’s Health Department Administrator, Goss, sought to fulfill the terms\\n\\nof the Notice of Grant Award by hiring a dedicated local disease intervention\\n\\nspecialist. The local disease intervention specialist position for Finney County\\n\\nprovided Gonzales, who was already a county employee, with an employment\\n\\nopportunity.\\n\\n Gonzales recalled being interviewed by Coppedge. Coppedge explained that,\\n\\nwhenever he participated in hiring local disease intervention specialists, he was part\\n\\nof an interviewing team, a panel composed usually of three or four other panelists.\\n\\nOnce the interviews were complete, Coppedge conferred with other panelists,\\n\\nproviding input in ranking the candidates. Thereafter, he participated in deciding who\\n\\nthe county would hire. 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n Coppedge, whose deposition was taken more than twenty years after the\\ninterview, did not think he participated in Gonzales’s interview and could not recall\\nhaving any involvement in her hiring process. Gonzales, on the other hand, could not\\nremember anyone other than Coppedge who interviewed her. The district court stated\\nFinney County staff interviewed Gonzales and noted Coppedge’s presence at the\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\n Aid-to-Local grants were renewed on an annual basis. Although counties were\\n\\nallowed to indicate their willingness to continue receiving the grant by applying for a\\n\\nrenewal, the directors at KDHE had the final say on whether the grant would be\\n\\nrenewed. During at least one fiscal year, the Aid-to-Local grant funded as much as\\n\\napproximately 86% of Gonzales’s salary.\\n\\n When the funding from KDHE stopped, the local disease intervention position\\n\\nfor Finney County was terminated. Shortly before the grant was ended, Goss had a\\n\\ndiscussion with Gonzales about Gonzales’s performance issues. Goss recalled the\\n\\nfollowing about that conversation:\\n\\n Well, then [I told Gonzales] we need to figure this out because [KDHE\\n was] going to take our funding, and at that time we discussed other [job]\\n options. I asked [Gonzales] what she wanted to do because again, I\\n didn’t want to have to figure something else out for her. I wanted her to\\n be able to stay on.\\n\\nApp. Vol. II at 430. Goss testified all of the available positions with the county\\n\\nwould require a reduction in salary and Gonzales’s employment with Finney County\\n\\nended.\\n\\n The evidence indicates KDHE had some influence on the hiring of Gonzales in\\n\\n2001 and the elimination of her position in 2010. Whether that rose to the level of\\n\\nKDHE being a USERRA employer by having sufficient control of Gonzales’s\\n\\nemployment opportunities was something the district court did not adequately\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ninterview. Nevertheless, it did not acknowledge Gonzales’s testimony that she could\\nnot recall any Finney County employee who interviewed her.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\naddress under Rule 56. See United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2016); Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Second Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483\\n\\nF.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Even where parties file cross[-]motions pursuant\\n\\nto Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material\\n\\nfacts.”). In sum, it ruled that “Finney County alone had the authority to hire and fire\\n\\nGonzales.” App. Vol. III at 720. It stated that it was Finney County staff who\\n\\ninterviewed Gonzales although it did acknowledge Coppedge’s presence. The district\\n\\ncourt’s description of the interview as being conducted by Finney County, however,\\n\\ndid not address contrary inferences from Gonzales’s testimony or inferences from\\n\\nCoppedge’s testimony that his usual practice was to be actively involved in the\\n\\nselection process. It treated the grant as a wall between KDHE and Gonzales that\\n\\nrendered the relationship as one solely between KDHE and Finney County without\\n\\nany effect on Gonzales’s employment opportunities under USERRA. Further, the\\n\\ndistrict court did not factor in grant funds as the source of most of Gonzales’s salary\\n\\nin analyzing employment opportunities.\\n\\n b. Supervision\\n\\n The district court addressed supervision of Gonzales in an equally cramped\\n\\nmanner as it did when considering the authority to hire and fire, i.e. viewing the grant\\n\\nas insulating KDHE against any notion it controlled Gonzales’s employment\\n\\nopportunities. Beginning with the training of Gonzales and progressing through her\\n\\ncontinued supervision and evaluation as a local disease intervention specialist, the\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\ndistrict court minimized the involvement of KDHE and emphasized Finney County’s\\n\\nsupervision of Gonzales’s workplace behavior.\\n\\n KDHE established the training requirements for the local disease intervention\\n\\nspecialist position. Coppedge explained he supervised all the state disease\\n\\nintervention specialists and local disease intervention specialists. 12 Gonzales received\\n\\ntraining from KDHE to fulfill her role, including on-the-job training from Coppedge\\n\\non how to conduct field work. Her field work was audited based on standards set in\\n\\nthe Field Services Manual, a document written by KDHE. The district court did note\\n\\nthat Coppedge conducted field audits of Gonzales’s work; that VandeVelde provided\\n\\nGonzales feedback on the quality and quantity of her work; and that “Gonzales\\n\\nchafed under VandeVelde’s supervision.” 13 App. Vol. III at 714.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n During his deposition, Coppedge had the following exchange with counsel\\nfor the government:\\n\\n Q: Who did you supervise when you were the manager of field\\n operations?\\n\\n A: All the state DISs and all the [local] DISs.\\n\\n Q: Was there anyone within that STD program who you supervised other\\n than the DISs?\\n\\n A: My recollection is no. I think Allen had the office personnel.\\n\\n Q: When you say DIS, do you mean disease intervention specialist?\\n\\n A: Yes. It’s the same.\\n\\nApp. Vol. III at 629.\\n 13\\n In an affidavit, Gonzales testified VandeVelde made negative comments\\nabout her military service on three occasions. In one instance, VandeVelde\\n 20\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\n Gonzales appeared for work daily at the Finney County Health Department\\n\\nwhere she shared office space with county employees, including Goss. Interpersonal\\n\\nissues between Gonzales and Finney County staff were reported to and addressed by\\n\\nGoss. The evidence indicates Gonzales reported to both KDHE and Finney County\\n\\nregarding different aspects of her job. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.37. Each entity, in turn,\\n\\nretained supervisory authority over the part of her job that it oversaw.\\n\\n There is evidence Gonzales’s performance evaluations were a joint venture\\n\\ninvolving both Finney County and KDHE. The relevant form, labeled Finney County\\n\\nPerformance Evaluation Form, broke out the evaluation into two general categories:\\n\\nBasic Job Performance and General Work Performance. The form was filled out and\\n\\nsigned by Finney County’s administrator, Goss. KDHE, however, provided the input\\n\\nfor the Basic Job Performance section because Goss lacked knowledge and data of\\n\\nGonzales’s substantive work. As to the Basic Job Performance section, Goss merely\\n\\nperformed the ministerial function of incorporating KDHE’s evaluation. See Nevada,\\n\\n817 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1)(i)).\\n\\n While the district court acknowledged Gonzales could have more than one\\n\\nemployer, its approach looked at only one side of the ledger. That Gonzales may have\\n\\ninteracted more with Goss and that Goss had disciplinary authority over Gonzales’s\\n\\n\\nquestioned Gonzales about an injury sustained during military service and whether it\\nwas interfering with her ability to carry out disease intervention duties. Gonzales\\ntestified she felt VandeVelde was mocking her regarding her military service. Second\\nand third occasions occurred during early 2010, when Gonzales informed\\nVandeVelde of upcoming military obligations. VandeVelde told Gonzales she needed\\nto choose between her military service and her career with KDHE.\\n 21\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\noffice behavior, while relevant, does not negate Gonzales’s interaction with KDHE in\\n\\ntraining, supervision, and evaluation of the substantive duties of a local disease\\n\\nintervention specialist. The district court’s summary judgment ruling was driven by\\n\\nits erroneous view of the grant relationship between KDHE and Finney County. It\\n\\ntreated the grant as a mere funding mechanism. As a consequence, it viewed KDHE’s\\n\\ndealings with Gonzales, not as supervision, but as its oversight of Finney County’s\\n\\ngrant performance. The district court specifically diminished KDHE’s involvement in\\n\\nthe performance evaluation by noting it was Goss that gave the performance review\\n\\nand that KDHE was merely focusing on Gonzales’s performance of Finney County’s\\n\\nduties under the grant. This approach did not properly consider, as was clear to all\\n\\nrelevant persons, that it was Gonzales who was solely tasked with Finney County\\n\\nfulfilling its grant obligations. 14\\n\\n The district court’s summary judgment ruling was not consistent with the\\n\\ncharge of Rule 56 to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Gonzales, the\\n\\nnon-moving party, and to recognize a genuine dispute of material fact. See Sup. Ct. of\\n\\nN.M., 839 F.3d at 906-07.\\n\\nIV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n There is sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the issue of\\n\\nwhether Kansas is Gonzales’s USERRA employer. The district court’s order granting\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n The evidence suggests, during her employment, Gonzales was the only local\\ndisease intervention specialist at Finney County.\\n\\n 22\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\nsummary judgment is therefore reversed. Because Kansas raised other arguments in\\n\\nits summary judgment motion which the district court has not yet addressed, this\\n\\nmatter is remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11233246/\", \"author_raw\": \"MURPHY, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HOLMES"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"MURPHY"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MCHUGH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HOLMES\": \", Chief\", \"MURPHY\": \", Circuit\", \"McHUGH\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766661/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. State of Kansas Department of Health & Environment\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\n v. No. 24-3041\n\n STATE OF KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF\n HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,\n\n Defendant - Appellee.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Kansas\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-02250-TC)\n _________________________________\n\nJanea L. Lamar (Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, with her on the briefs), U.S.\nDepartment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for\nPlaintiff–Appellant.\n\nDavid R. Cooper, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas (Crystal B.\nMoe, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas, and Anthony J. Powell,\nSolicitor General, Office of Kansas Attorney General Kris W. Kobach, Topeka, Kansas,\nwith him on the brief), for Defendant–Appellee.\n _________________________________\n\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\nMURPHY, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\nI. INTRODUCTION\n\n The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994\n\n(“USERRA”) prohibits employers from discriminating against servicemembers\n\nbecause of their uniformed service. See Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified\n\nas amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33). It defines “employer” as “any person,\n\ninstitution, organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages . . . or that has\n\ncontrol over employment opportunities.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A).\n\n The federal government (or “the government”) brought suit on behalf of Stacy\n\nGonzales, a member of the United States Army National Guard, against the State of\n\nKansas, claiming a violation of USERRA by the Kansas Department of Health and\n\nEnvironment (“KDHE”). 1 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district\n\ncourt dismissed the suit, ruling Kansas could not be liable because it was not\n\nGonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The government appeals the order and\n\njudgment of dismissal, arguing the district court erred by not only adopting an overly\n\nnarrow construction of the term “employer,” but also failing to apply the correct\n\nsummary judgment standard in reviewing the record evidence.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n The complaint filed in district court named the “State of Kansas (Department\nof Health and Environment)” as the defendant. Consequently, the district court\ncharacterized this case as one in which “[t]he United States sued the State of Kansas,\nalleging the Kansas Department of Health and Environment violated [USERRA].”\nApp. Vol. III at 709. The district court’s framing of this case is not disputed on\nappeal. Notwithstanding the defendant-appellee identified in the caption, the court\nrefers to Kansas as the party raising arguments on appeal.\n\n 2\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\n The plain text of USERRA lacks any language to suggest only those who\n\nexercise direct or absolute control of employment opportunities may be considered an\n\nemployer. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (refusing to\n\nadopt a “heightened” statutory requirement for Title VII discrimination claim by\n\n“add[ing] words . . . to the statute Congress enacted”). The statutory language further\n\nimplies entities that share or co-determine matters constituting employment\n\nopportunities can each concurrently be considered employers. See 38 U.S.C.\n\n§ 4303(4)(A)(i). Whether Kansas, through KDHE, maintained sufficient control over\n\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. The\n\nrecord evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving\n\nparty, allows a reasonable finding that KDHE retained the requisite level of control\n\nover Gonzales’s employment opportunities to be a USERRA employer. 2 Therefore,\n\nexercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court reverses the district\n\ncourt’s order and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this\n\ndecision.\n\nII. BACKGROUND\n\n KDHE is a state agency that provides services related to health and\n\nenvironment. The agency has, within its organizational structure, various divisions,\n\n\n\n 2\n In the district court, the parties stipulated KDHE “was a subdivision of the\ngovernment of the State of Kansas.” App. Vol. I at 24. On appeal, the parties agree\nthat if KDHE is found to have been Gonzales’s USERRA employer, Kansas would\nalso have been her USERRA employer.\n\n 3\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\nbureaus, and sections. The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section 3\n\nfocuses its work on those affected by sexually transmitted infections and the Human\n\nImmunodeficiency Virus.\n\n During the relevant time period, the Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention\n\nSection received federal grants from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention\n\n(“CDC”) in the form of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention Award. Under\n\nthe supervision of KDHE, the Section used the grant in two primary ways: 1) it hired\n\ndisease intervention specialists (“state disease intervention specialists”) and 2) it\n\ndistributed a portion of the fund as Aid-to-Local grants 4 to counties within its\n\njurisdiction.\n\n State disease intervention specialists were each assigned to a clinic. Their\n\nprimary task was to interview people who were diagnosed with a communicable\n\ndisease. By conducting interviews, state disease intervention specialists were able to\n\nidentify others at risk of infection or disease transmission, inform them of their health\n\nrisk, and refer them to medical services. Depending on the circumstance, a state\n\ndisease intervention specialist may assist individuals who voluntarily walk into a\n\n\n 3\n The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section operates within the\nBureau of Disease Control and Prevention. Through the Bureau of Disease Control\nand Prevention, a subdivision within the Division of Public Health, KDHE provides\ndisease intervention and prevention services.\n 4\n KDHE distributed Aid-to-Local grants to multiple counties for various\nservices, not limited to disease prevention services. Relevant to this appeal is only\nthe Aid-to-Local grants administered through the Sexually Transmitted Disease\nSection for disease prevention.\n\n 4\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\nhealth clinic or be deployed to specified areas based on guidance from KDHE. Each\n\nstate disease intervention specialist was provided a copy of the Field Services\n\nManual, a document written by KDHE, which identified job expectations, protocols,\n\nand metrics by which their performance was evaluated.\n\n KDHE also offered Aid-to-Local grants to county-level agencies in exchange\n\nfor localized assistance in disease prevention. Accompanying the grant was the\n\nNotice of Grant Award Amount & Summary of Program Objectives (“Notice of\n\nGrant Award”) which outlined the terms, objectives, and purposes of the grant.\n\nAcceptance of the grant fund constituted acceptance of its terms. KDHE decided\n\nevery fiscal year whether to renew the grant or reallocate its resources.\n\n Finney County Health Department (or “Finney County”) was a recipient of an\n\nAid-to-Local grant from 1998 to 2010. The Notice of Grant Award identified\n\nobjectives to be satisfied by a disease intervention specialist, which resembled\n\nexpectations set out in the Field Services Manual. Finney County dedicated a county-\n\nlevel disease intervention specialist (“local disease intervention specialist”) to fulfill\n\nthe terms of the Aid-to-Local grant. The position was funded in part by the Aid-to-\n\nLocal grant, with Finney County making up any shortfall. The technical job\n\nresponsibilities of a local disease intervention specialist essentially mirrored that of a\n\nstate disease intervention specialist.\n\n From 2001 to 2010, Stacy Gonzales served as Finney County’s local disease\n\nintervention specialist. During this time, Gonzales was also an active member of the\n\n\n\n 5\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\nUnited States Army National Guard. She intermittently had military obligations,\n\nduring which she was absent from her local disease intervention specialist position.\n\n As a local disease intervention specialist, Gonzales interfaced with\n\nrepresentatives from both KDHE and Finney County. Her main contacts at KDHE\n\nwere Derek Coppedge and Jennifer VandeVelde. Coppedge was the Manager of Field\n\nOperations for the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section from 2000 to 2008.\n\nVandeVelde succeeded Coppedge in that position from 2008 until 2013, upon\n\nCoppedge’s promotion to Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section in\n\n2008. The Manager of Field Operations supervised all state and local disease\n\nintervention specialists, tracking their deployment and assessing data collected from\n\nfield work. The Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section oversaw the\n\nAid-to-Local grants by communicating with the federal government, coordinating\n\nwith the agency’s legal department, and managing counties’ compliance with the\n\ngrant terms. Coppedge and VandeVelde led mandatory quarterly staff meetings for\n\nboth state and local disease intervention specialists to review grant objectives and the\n\nprogress made in the preceding quarter. Gonzales attended these quarterly meetings.\n\n When she did not have military obligations, Gonzales reported daily for work\n\nat Finney County. She worked with county employees, including nurses and clinical\n\nstaff. Her salary and benefits were determined by Finney County Human Resources\n\nDepartment, which issued her paychecks as well.\n\n On or around April 1, 2010, a meeting was called to discuss problems with\n\nGonzales’s performance. Meeting minutes indicate those in attendance were\n\n 6\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\nCoppedge, VandeVelde, Gonzales, and Ashley Goss. Ashley Goss was the Finney\n\nCounty Health Department Administrator at the time. Perceived issues were two-fold.\n\nFirst, Gonzales had exhibited inappropriate behavior in the workplace which had\n\nstrained relationships with her co-workers. Second, Finney County was failing to\n\nmeet Aid-to-Local grant objectives. Goss and Gonzales were warned the Aid-to-\n\nLocal grant might not be renewed if performance did not improve. On April 9, 2010,\n\nGonzales received a deployment order for military service beginning in October and\n\nshe informed VandeVelde of her deployment.\n\n Coppedge sent a follow-up letter, dated April 23, 2010, to Goss. The letter\n\nemphasized the performance deficiency of the disease intervention specialist in\n\nFinney County. The letter warned Finney County that if productivity did not\n\n“dramatically improve,” the Aid-to-Local grant would be discontinued. App. Vol. II\n\nat 385. Coppedge scheduled a reevaluation of Finney County’s performance for July\n\n15, 2010.\n\n In an internal email dated June 7, 2010, KDHE contemplated reallocating\n\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. On July 1, 2010, KDHE decided not to renew\n\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. Thereafter, Finney County terminated its local\n\ndisease intervention specialist position and Gonzales became unemployed.\n\n The government brought suit against the State of Kansas, claiming KDHE had\n\nviolated USERRA. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the\n\nnarrow issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s employer under\n\n\n\n 7\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\nUSERRA. 5 The district court granted Kansas’s motion, denied the government’s\n\nmotion, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The district court reasoned the language\n\nof USERRA confirmed a servicemember might have more than one USERRA\n\nemployer in a single job. Nevertheless, it ruled Kansas could not be Gonzales’s\n\nUSERRA employer because KDHE did not have any authority to hire, fire, or\n\nsupervise Gonzales, or determine her salary. The government timely appealed.\n\nIII. DISCUSSION\n\n The government raises two issues on appeal. First, it contends the district court\n\nadopted an overly narrow construction of the term “employer” as it is defined in\n\nUSERRA. The government then asserts the district court’s review of the record\n\nevidence was inconsistent with the summary judgment standard.\n\n A. Definition of “Employer” under USERRA\n\n The interpretation of a federal statute is a question of law which this court\n\nreviews de novo. Koch Indus., Inc. v. United States, 603 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir.\n\n2010); see WWC Holding Co. v. Sopkin, 488 F.3d 1262, 1276 n.10 (10th Cir. 2007)\n\n(“[W]e are not limited to the parties’ positions on what a statute means, because we\n\nreview a question of statutory construction de novo.”). The analysis begins with the\n\nstatutory text. Tarango-Delgado v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2021).\n\nUndefined terms are given their ordinary meaning as understood at the time of\n\n\n 5\n Although not relevant to this appeal, Kansas’s summary judgment motion\nalso raised arguments regarding the substantive merits of the USERRA claim, the\nequitable defense of laches, and the lack of basis for granting any injunctive relief.\n\n 8\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\nenactment, considering the specific context in which the word is used. Taniguchi v.\n\nKan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566, 569 (2012). “[T]he text of a law controls\n\nover purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statutory text.” Corner Post,\n\nInc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024) (quotation\n\nomitted).\n\n Kansas does not provide a valid reason to deviate from the textual analysis. Its\n\nargument analogizing USERRA to the Fair Labor Standards Act is unavailing\n\nbecause each statute has differing definitions of “employer.” Compare 29 U.S.C.\n\n§ 203(d) with 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). The Supreme Court’s precedent on the\n\ncommon-law definition of control is irrelevant because included within USERRA is a\n\nstatute-specific definition of the term “employer.” See Clackamas Gastroenterology\n\nAssocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-45, 447 (2003) (explaining courts should\n\nlook to common law if Congress is silent on an undefined term and the “undefined\n\nterm has a settled meaning at common law”).\n\n USERRA provides, in relevant part:\n\n A person who is a member of . . . , or has an obligation to perform service\n in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment,\n reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of\n employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, . . . or\n obligation.\n\n38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). The term “employer” is defined in § 4303(4)(A):\n\n [T]he term “employer” means any person, institution, organization, or\n other entity that pays salary or wages for work performed or that has\n control over employment opportunities including--\n\n\n\n 9\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\n (i) a person, institution, organization, or other entity to whom the\n employer has delegated the performance of employment-related\n responsibilities;\n (ii) the Federal Government;\n (iii) a State;\n (iv) any successor in interest to a person, institution, organization, or\n other entity referred to in this subparagraph; and\n (v) a person, institution, organization, or other entity that has denied\n initial employment in violation of section 4311.\n\n The text identifies two avenues of analysis. First, whoever pays an employee’s\n\nsalary or wages for the work performed is considered an employer. To pay is to “give\n\nto (a person) what is due in discharge of a debt, or as return for services done.” Pay,\n\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Under the terms’ plain meanings, “salary”\n\nand “wages” both refer to regularly paid compensation. See Helix Energy Sols. Grp.,\n\nInc. v. Hewitt, 598 U.S. 39, 51-52 (2023) (defining salary as “fixed compensation\n\nregularly paid, as by the year, quarter, month, or week” and wage as “[p]ay given for\n\nlabor at short[-]stated intervals” (quotation omitted)). Section 4303(2) identifies\n\nsalary or wages as a monetary subcomponent of the benefits of employment. See also\n\nAdvocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Kennedy, 605 U.S. 1, 10 (2025) (“The word ‘paid’\n\nobviously connotes a cash benefit.”).\n\n Second, “control over employment opportunities” is an alternate and sufficient\n\nbasis for employer status under USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). This statutory\n\nlanguage can be further parsed into two subcomponents: “control over” and\n\n“employment opportunities.”\n\n To exercise control over is to “exercise power or authority over.” Control,\n\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Although the provision does not clarify the\n\n 10\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\nnature or degree of control necessary, absent from the text is any language to suggest\n\nonly those who exercise direct or absolute control over an employee are considered\n\nemployers. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355 (refusing to adopt a “heightened” statutory\n\nrequirement by “add[ing] words” to the text); White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d\n\n616, 627 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[S]ection 4303(4)(A)(i) does not require that an\n\n‘employer’ have direct control over the matters that constitute a USERRA\n\nviolation[,] . . . only that the employer must have control over the plaintiff’s\n\nemployment opportunities writ large.”).\n\n Pursuant to § 4303(4)(A)(i), those who perform employment-related\n\nresponsibilities upon delegation by the employer also fall within the ambit of\n\nemployer. This provision implies a servicemember may have more than one employer\n\nat a time as long as each employer either pays salary or wages or controls\n\nemployment opportunities: 1) the employer that delegates the performance of\n\nemployment-related responsibilities and 2) those to whom the responsibilities have\n\nbeen delegated. “The use of the word ‘delegate[]’ suggests an intent to reach both\n\ndirect and indirect employers,” provided each employer satisfies at least one of the\n\ntwo conditions identified in § 4303(4)(A). White, 987 F.3d at 627.\n\n As a result, the term “control” must be construed to recognize that a\n\nservicemember can have more than one employer. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v.\n\nCity of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (“[W]ell-established principles of\n\nstatutory interpretation . . . require statutes to be construed in a manner that gives\n\neffect to all of their provisions.”). Even entities that share or co-determine matters\n\n 11\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nconstituting employment opportunities can concurrently be employers. Cf. Knitter v.\n\nCorvias Mil. Living, LLC, 758 F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the joint-\n\nemployer test under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Staub v.\n\nProctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (observing USERRA “is very similar to\n\nTitle VII”). The key determination concerns not the purported employer’s “purely\n\nformal” functions, White, 987 F.3d at 627, but whether an entity individually\n\nexercises sufficient control over the servicemember’s employment opportunities, cf.\n\nKnitter, 758 F.3d at 1226; see Estes v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 658 F. App’x 1029, 1032\n\n(Fed. Cir. 2016).\n\n Implementing regulations from the Department of Labor support this textual\n\nanalysis. 6 See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394, 402 (2024)\n\n(recognizing the non-binding but persuasive weight of “interpretations of those\n\nresponsible for implementing particular statutes”). The agency confirmed not only\n\nthat a servicemember may have more than one employer but also provided an\n\nexample of the nature and scope of “control” necessary to be found a USERRA\n\nemployer:\n\n For example, if the employee is a security guard hired by a security\n company and he or she is assigned to a work site, the employee may report\n both to the security company and to the site owner. In such an instance,\n both employers share responsibility for compliance with USERRA.\n\n\n\n 6\n 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “prescribe\nregulations implementing the provisions of [USERRA] with regard to the application\nof [the statute] to States, local governments, and private employers.”\n\n 12\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\n20 C.F.R. § 1002.37 (2025). 7\n\n The phrase “employment opportunities,” on the other hand, refers both to\n\nopportunities for obtaining employment and opportunities within the scope of one’s\n\nemployment. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(v) (treating as employers those who\n\ndeny initial employment), and United States v. Nevada, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238\n\n(D. Nev. 2011) (assessing which entity possessed the authority to hire employees),\n\nwith Estes, 658 F. App’x at 1032 (discussing retention and termination of\n\nemployment), 8 and White, 987 F.3d at 626-27 (suggesting those who determine\n\ncertain terms and benefits of employment may be considered employers).\n\n Drawing a categorical distinction, Kansas argues no employment relationship\n\ncan exist between Kansas and Gonzales because Finney County is the recipient of the\n\nAid-to-Local grant, not Gonzales. Kansas theorizes that assessing USERRA liability\n\nby looking beyond contractual relationships would have no backstop. For instance,\n\n\n 7\n This agency interpretation first became effective in 2006 and has remained\nconsistent since. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)\n(“[I]nterpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which\nhave remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the\nstatute’s meaning.”).\n 8\n Estes v. Merit Systems Protection Board provided the following illustration:\n For example, if an agency knows it is the only entity hiring contractors\n from a third[-]party company and the agency states that a contractor is no\n longer welcome on any of its contracts, the agency could be deemed to\n exercise control over the employee’s continued employment status\n because the third[-]party company would have nowhere else to place the\n contractor and would therefore have no choice but to fire him.\n658 F. App’x 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\n\n 13\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\nKansas points out there is no reason why the government’s interpretation would not\n\napply up the chain of grantor-grantee relationships and expose the CDC to liability as\n\nGonzales’s USERRA employer since the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention\n\nAward, used to fund the Aid-to-Local grants, originated from the CDC. Because\n\nfederal grants constitute a significant portion of state government funding, Kansas\n\nwarns, an expansive interpretation of the scope of USERRA employer would\n\nimplicate countless grantor-grantee relationships and expose the federal government\n\nto potentially significant liability. Kansas concludes Congress could not have\n\nintended such an outcome.\n\n Kansas’s position is not supported by the statutory language, which identifies\n\nno exceptions or alternate framework by which to analyze entities administering\n\ngrants. 9 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 669 (2020) (“[W]hen Congress\n\nchooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.”).\n\nMoreover, USERRA calls for a case-specific analysis to determine not only employer\n\nstatus, 10 but also whether the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct. 38 U.S.C.\n\n§§ 4303(4)(A); 4311(b)-(c). As they are based merely on speculation, Kansas’s\n\nslippery-slope concerns are unpersuasive. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita\n\nBeneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36 (2006) (rejecting a slippery-\n\n\n 9\n Section 4303(4)(A) identifies two exceptions to the definition of employer:\n§ 4303(4)(B) and § 4303(4)(C). Neither of these exceptions apply to grantor-grantee\nrelationships.\n 10\n See infra Section III.B.\n\n 14\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\n\n\n\nslope argument based on “feasibility of case-by-case consideration”); see also Silva\n\nv. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 362, 369 (M.S.P.B. 2009) (explaining that\n\njust because the government may be a USERRA employer to one contractor does not\n\nmean the government is considered the USERRA employer of all contractors). This\n\nleaves two questions, whether there is sufficient evidence that Kansas, through\n\nKDHE, 1) paid Gonzales’s wages or salary or 2) exercised some control over\n\nemployment opportunities of Gonzales.\n\n B. Kansas’s Motion for Summary Judgment\n\n The court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,\n\napplying the same legal standard used by the district court. Green Country Food\n\nMkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). A motion for\n\nsummary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine\n\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\n\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment,\n\nour review of the record requires that we construe all inferences in favor of the party\n\nagainst whom the motion under consideration is made . . . .” Pirkheim v. First Unum\n\nLife Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).\n\n 1. Payment of Wages or Salary\n\n Based on the record facts and the arguments of the parties on appeal, Kansas\n\ndoes not satisfy the first condition for being Gonzales’s employer. Although the Aid-\n\nto-Local grant funded a portion of Gonzales’s salary, Finney County issued her\n\npaychecks. The district court determined Finney County maintained “exclusive\n 15\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\n\n\n\nauthority over Gonzales’s salary, method of payment, and benefits.” App. Vol. III at\n\n721. The government does not dispute this determination on appeal. The record\n\ndemonstrates Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined by the Finney County\n\nHuman Resources Department according to its pay scale, “based off of [the\n\nemployee’s] education and the type of work that [the employee was] going to do.”\n\nApp. Vol. II at 417. Because the government concedes only Finney County paid\n\nGonzales’s salary, Kansas does not satisfy the first condition identified in\n\n§ 4304(4)(A) and is not, therefore, Gonzales’s USERRA employer on that basis.\n\n 2. Control over Employment Opportunities\n\n The parties agree: whether KDHE exercised a sufficient degree of control over\n\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. This\n\napproach is consistent with how courts have analyzed the issue arising under other\n\nstatutes. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (National\n\nLabor Standard Act); Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028-29\n\n(10th Cir. 1996) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d\n\n802, 805-08 (10th Cir. 1989) (Fair Labor Standards Act).\n\n The district court ruled Kansas was not Gonzales’s employer based on three\n\nunderlying assessments: KDHE had 1) no authority to hire or fire Gonzales; 2) no\n\nauthority to supervise her; and 3) no input regarding her pay or benefits. The\n\ngovernment does not challenge the third basis but argues the first two reflect an\n\nimproper application of the summary judgment standard. The government contends\n\n\n\n 16\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\n\n\n\nthe district court incorrectly resolved genuine disputes of material fact by viewing the\n\nevidence and drawing inferences in Kansas’s favor.\n\n a. Authority to Hire or Fire\n\n Rather than soliciting or receiving applications, KDHE approached counties to\n\ngauge their interest in furthering disease intervention efforts in exchange for Aid-to-\n\nLocal grants. Both VandeVelde and Coppedge understood the Aid-to-Local grants as\n\na means of funding the local disease intervention specialist role. Correspondingly,\n\nFinney County’s Health Department Administrator, Goss, sought to fulfill the terms\n\nof the Notice of Grant Award by hiring a dedicated local disease intervention\n\nspecialist. The local disease intervention specialist position for Finney County\n\nprovided Gonzales, who was already a county employee, with an employment\n\nopportunity.\n\n Gonzales recalled being interviewed by Coppedge. Coppedge explained that,\n\nwhenever he participated in hiring local disease intervention specialists, he was part\n\nof an interviewing team, a panel composed usually of three or four other panelists.\n\nOnce the interviews were complete, Coppedge conferred with other panelists,\n\nproviding input in ranking the candidates. Thereafter, he participated in deciding who\n\nthe county would hire. 11\n\n\n\n 11\n Coppedge, whose deposition was taken more than twenty years after the\ninterview, did not think he participated in Gonzales’s interview and could not recall\nhaving any involvement in her hiring process. Gonzales, on the other hand, could not\nremember anyone other than Coppedge who interviewed her. The district court stated\nFinney County staff interviewed Gonzales and noted Coppedge’s presence at the\n 17\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\n\n\n\n Aid-to-Local grants were renewed on an annual basis. Although counties were\n\nallowed to indicate their willingness to continue receiving the grant by applying for a\n\nrenewal, the directors at KDHE had the final say on whether the grant would be\n\nrenewed. During at least one fiscal year, the Aid-to-Local grant funded as much as\n\napproximately 86% of Gonzales’s salary.\n\n When the funding from KDHE stopped, the local disease intervention position\n\nfor Finney County was terminated. Shortly before the grant was ended, Goss had a\n\ndiscussion with Gonzales about Gonzales’s performance issues. Goss recalled the\n\nfollowing about that conversation:\n\n Well, then [I told Gonzales] we need to figure this out because [KDHE\n was] going to take our funding, and at that time we discussed other [job]\n options. I asked [Gonzales] what she wanted to do because again, I\n didn’t want to have to figure something else out for her. I wanted her to\n be able to stay on.\n\nApp. Vol. II at 430. Goss testified all of the available positions with the county\n\nwould require a reduction in salary and Gonzales’s employment with Finney County\n\nended.\n\n The evidence indicates KDHE had some influence on the hiring of Gonzales in\n\n2001 and the elimination of her position in 2010. Whether that rose to the level of\n\nKDHE being a USERRA employer by having sufficient control of Gonzales’s\n\nemployment opportunities was something the district court did not adequately\n\n\n\n\ninterview. Nevertheless, it did not acknowledge Gonzales’s testimony that she could\nnot recall any Finney County employee who interviewed her.\n\n 18\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\n\n\n\naddress under Rule 56. See United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07\n\n(10th Cir. 2016); Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Second Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483\n\nF.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Even where parties file cross[-]motions pursuant\n\nto Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material\n\nfacts.”). In sum, it ruled that “Finney County alone had the authority to hire and fire\n\nGonzales.” App. Vol. III at 720. It stated that it was Finney County staff who\n\ninterviewed Gonzales although it did acknowledge Coppedge’s presence. The district\n\ncourt’s description of the interview as being conducted by Finney County, however,\n\ndid not address contrary inferences from Gonzales’s testimony or inferences from\n\nCoppedge’s testimony that his usual practice was to be actively involved in the\n\nselection process. It treated the grant as a wall between KDHE and Gonzales that\n\nrendered the relationship as one solely between KDHE and Finney County without\n\nany effect on Gonzales’s employment opportunities under USERRA. Further, the\n\ndistrict court did not factor in grant funds as the source of most of Gonzales’s salary\n\nin analyzing employment opportunities.\n\n b. Supervision\n\n The district court addressed supervision of Gonzales in an equally cramped\n\nmanner as it did when considering the authority to hire and fire, i.e. viewing the grant\n\nas insulating KDHE against any notion it controlled Gonzales’s employment\n\nopportunities. Beginning with the training of Gonzales and progressing through her\n\ncontinued supervision and evaluation as a local disease intervention specialist, the\n\n\n\n 19\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\n\n\n\ndistrict court minimized the involvement of KDHE and emphasized Finney County’s\n\nsupervision of Gonzales’s workplace behavior.\n\n KDHE established the training requirements for the local disease intervention\n\nspecialist position. Coppedge explained he supervised all the state disease\n\nintervention specialists and local disease intervention specialists. 12 Gonzales received\n\ntraining from KDHE to fulfill her role, including on-the-job training from Coppedge\n\non how to conduct field work. Her field work was audited based on standards set in\n\nthe Field Services Manual, a document written by KDHE. The district court did note\n\nthat Coppedge conducted field audits of Gonzales’s work; that VandeVelde provided\n\nGonzales feedback on the quality and quantity of her work; and that “Gonzales\n\nchafed under VandeVelde’s supervision.” 13 App. Vol. III at 714.\n\n\n\n 12\n During his deposition, Coppedge had the following exchange with counsel\nfor the government:\n\n Q: Who did you supervise when you were the manager of field\n operations?\n\n A: All the state DISs and all the [local] DISs.\n\n Q: Was there anyone within that STD program who you supervised other\n than the DISs?\n\n A: My recollection is no. I think Allen had the office personnel.\n\n Q: When you say DIS, do you mean disease intervention specialist?\n\n A: Yes. It’s the same.\n\nApp. Vol. III at 629.\n 13\n In an affidavit, Gonzales testified VandeVelde made negative comments\nabout her military service on three occasions. In one instance, VandeVelde\n 20\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\n\n\n\n Gonzales appeared for work daily at the Finney County Health Department\n\nwhere she shared office space with county employees, including Goss. Interpersonal\n\nissues between Gonzales and Finney County staff were reported to and addressed by\n\nGoss. The evidence indicates Gonzales reported to both KDHE and Finney County\n\nregarding different aspects of her job. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.37. Each entity, in turn,\n\nretained supervisory authority over the part of her job that it oversaw.\n\n There is evidence Gonzales’s performance evaluations were a joint venture\n\ninvolving both Finney County and KDHE. The relevant form, labeled Finney County\n\nPerformance Evaluation Form, broke out the evaluation into two general categories:\n\nBasic Job Performance and General Work Performance. The form was filled out and\n\nsigned by Finney County’s administrator, Goss. KDHE, however, provided the input\n\nfor the Basic Job Performance section because Goss lacked knowledge and data of\n\nGonzales’s substantive work. As to the Basic Job Performance section, Goss merely\n\nperformed the ministerial function of incorporating KDHE’s evaluation. See Nevada,\n\n817 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1)(i)).\n\n While the district court acknowledged Gonzales could have more than one\n\nemployer, its approach looked at only one side of the ledger. That Gonzales may have\n\ninteracted more with Goss and that Goss had disciplinary authority over Gonzales’s\n\n\nquestioned Gonzales about an injury sustained during military service and whether it\nwas interfering with her ability to carry out disease intervention duties. Gonzales\ntestified she felt VandeVelde was mocking her regarding her military service. Second\nand third occasions occurred during early 2010, when Gonzales informed\nVandeVelde of upcoming military obligations. VandeVelde told Gonzales she needed\nto choose between her military service and her career with KDHE.\n 21\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\n\n\n\noffice behavior, while relevant, does not negate Gonzales’s interaction with KDHE in\n\ntraining, supervision, and evaluation of the substantive duties of a local disease\n\nintervention specialist. The district court’s summary judgment ruling was driven by\n\nits erroneous view of the grant relationship between KDHE and Finney County. It\n\ntreated the grant as a mere funding mechanism. As a consequence, it viewed KDHE’s\n\ndealings with Gonzales, not as supervision, but as its oversight of Finney County’s\n\ngrant performance. The district court specifically diminished KDHE’s involvement in\n\nthe performance evaluation by noting it was Goss that gave the performance review\n\nand that KDHE was merely focusing on Gonzales’s performance of Finney County’s\n\nduties under the grant. This approach did not properly consider, as was clear to all\n\nrelevant persons, that it was Gonzales who was solely tasked with Finney County\n\nfulfilling its grant obligations. 14\n\n The district court’s summary judgment ruling was not consistent with the\n\ncharge of Rule 56 to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Gonzales, the\n\nnon-moving party, and to recognize a genuine dispute of material fact. See Sup. Ct. of\n\nN.M., 839 F.3d at 906-07.\n\nIV. CONCLUSION\n\n There is sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the issue of\n\nwhether Kansas is Gonzales’s USERRA employer. The district court’s order granting\n\n\n\n 14\n The evidence suggests, during her employment, Gonzales was the only local\ndisease intervention specialist at Finney County.\n\n 22\n\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\n\n\n\nsummary judgment is therefore reversed. Because Kansas raised other arguments in\n\nits summary judgment motion which the district court has not yet addressed, this\n\nmatter is remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion.\n\n\n\n\n 23\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. State of Kansas Department of Health & Environment\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 30, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\n v. No. 24-3041\\n\\n STATE OF KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF\\n HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Kansas\\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-02250-TC)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nJanea L. Lamar (Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, with her on the briefs), U.S.\\nDepartment of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for\\nPlaintiff–Appellant.\\n\\nDavid R. Cooper, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas (Crystal B.\\nMoe, Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, L.L.P., Topeka, Kansas, and Anthony J. Powell,\\nSolicitor General, Office of Kansas Attorney General Kris W. Kobach, Topeka, Kansas,\\nwith him on the brief), for Defendant–Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nMURPHY, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nI. INTRODUCTION\\n\\n The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994\\n\\n(“USERRA”) prohibits employers from discriminating against servicemembers\\n\\nbecause of their uniformed service. See Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified\\n\\nas amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33). It defines “employer” as “any person,\\n\\ninstitution, organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages . . . or that has\\n\\ncontrol over employment opportunities.” 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A).\\n\\n The federal government (or “the government”) brought suit on behalf of Stacy\\n\\nGonzales, a member of the United States Army National Guard, against the State of\\n\\nKansas, claiming a violation of USERRA by the Kansas Department of Health and\\n\\nEnvironment (“KDHE”). 1 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district\\n\\ncourt dismissed the suit, ruling Kansas could not be liable because it was not\\n\\nGonzales’s “employer” under USERRA. The government appeals the order and\\n\\njudgment of dismissal, arguing the district court erred by not only adopting an overly\\n\\nnarrow construction of the term “employer,” but also failing to apply the correct\\n\\nsummary judgment standard in reviewing the record evidence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The complaint filed in district court named the “State of Kansas (Department\\nof Health and Environment)” as the defendant. Consequently, the district court\\ncharacterized this case as one in which “[t]he United States sued the State of Kansas,\\nalleging the Kansas Department of Health and Environment violated [USERRA].”\\nApp. Vol. III at 709. The district court’s framing of this case is not disputed on\\nappeal. Notwithstanding the defendant-appellee identified in the caption, the court\\nrefers to Kansas as the party raising arguments on appeal.\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\n The plain text of USERRA lacks any language to suggest only those who\\n\\nexercise direct or absolute control of employment opportunities may be considered an\\n\\nemployer. See Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (refusing to\\n\\nadopt a “heightened” statutory requirement for Title VII discrimination claim by\\n\\n“add[ing] words . . . to the statute Congress enacted”). The statutory language further\\n\\nimplies entities that share or co-determine matters constituting employment\\n\\nopportunities can each concurrently be considered employers. See 38 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 4303(4)(A)(i). Whether Kansas, through KDHE, maintained sufficient control over\\n\\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. The\\n\\nrecord evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving\\n\\nparty, allows a reasonable finding that KDHE retained the requisite level of control\\n\\nover Gonzales’s employment opportunities to be a USERRA employer. 2 Therefore,\\n\\nexercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the court reverses the district\\n\\ncourt’s order and remands the case for further proceedings consistent with this\\n\\ndecision.\\n\\nII. BACKGROUND\\n\\n KDHE is a state agency that provides services related to health and\\n\\nenvironment. The agency has, within its organizational structure, various divisions,\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n In the district court, the parties stipulated KDHE “was a subdivision of the\\ngovernment of the State of Kansas.” App. Vol. I at 24. On appeal, the parties agree\\nthat if KDHE is found to have been Gonzales’s USERRA employer, Kansas would\\nalso have been her USERRA employer.\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nbureaus, and sections. The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section 3\\n\\nfocuses its work on those affected by sexually transmitted infections and the Human\\n\\nImmunodeficiency Virus.\\n\\n During the relevant time period, the Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention\\n\\nSection received federal grants from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention\\n\\n(“CDC”) in the form of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention Award. Under\\n\\nthe supervision of KDHE, the Section used the grant in two primary ways: 1) it hired\\n\\ndisease intervention specialists (“state disease intervention specialists”) and 2) it\\n\\ndistributed a portion of the fund as Aid-to-Local grants 4 to counties within its\\n\\njurisdiction.\\n\\n State disease intervention specialists were each assigned to a clinic. Their\\n\\nprimary task was to interview people who were diagnosed with a communicable\\n\\ndisease. By conducting interviews, state disease intervention specialists were able to\\n\\nidentify others at risk of infection or disease transmission, inform them of their health\\n\\nrisk, and refer them to medical services. Depending on the circumstance, a state\\n\\ndisease intervention specialist may assist individuals who voluntarily walk into a\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The Sexually Transmitted Disease Intervention Section operates within the\\nBureau of Disease Control and Prevention. Through the Bureau of Disease Control\\nand Prevention, a subdivision within the Division of Public Health, KDHE provides\\ndisease intervention and prevention services.\\n 4\\n KDHE distributed Aid-to-Local grants to multiple counties for various\\nservices, not limited to disease prevention services. Relevant to this appeal is only\\nthe Aid-to-Local grants administered through the Sexually Transmitted Disease\\nSection for disease prevention.\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\nhealth clinic or be deployed to specified areas based on guidance from KDHE. Each\\n\\nstate disease intervention specialist was provided a copy of the Field Services\\n\\nManual, a document written by KDHE, which identified job expectations, protocols,\\n\\nand metrics by which their performance was evaluated.\\n\\n KDHE also offered Aid-to-Local grants to county-level agencies in exchange\\n\\nfor localized assistance in disease prevention. Accompanying the grant was the\\n\\nNotice of Grant Award Amount & Summary of Program Objectives (“Notice of\\n\\nGrant Award”) which outlined the terms, objectives, and purposes of the grant.\\n\\nAcceptance of the grant fund constituted acceptance of its terms. KDHE decided\\n\\nevery fiscal year whether to renew the grant or reallocate its resources.\\n\\n Finney County Health Department (or “Finney County”) was a recipient of an\\n\\nAid-to-Local grant from 1998 to 2010. The Notice of Grant Award identified\\n\\nobjectives to be satisfied by a disease intervention specialist, which resembled\\n\\nexpectations set out in the Field Services Manual. Finney County dedicated a county-\\n\\nlevel disease intervention specialist (“local disease intervention specialist”) to fulfill\\n\\nthe terms of the Aid-to-Local grant. The position was funded in part by the Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grant, with Finney County making up any shortfall. The technical job\\n\\nresponsibilities of a local disease intervention specialist essentially mirrored that of a\\n\\nstate disease intervention specialist.\\n\\n From 2001 to 2010, Stacy Gonzales served as Finney County’s local disease\\n\\nintervention specialist. During this time, Gonzales was also an active member of the\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nUnited States Army National Guard. She intermittently had military obligations,\\n\\nduring which she was absent from her local disease intervention specialist position.\\n\\n As a local disease intervention specialist, Gonzales interfaced with\\n\\nrepresentatives from both KDHE and Finney County. Her main contacts at KDHE\\n\\nwere Derek Coppedge and Jennifer VandeVelde. Coppedge was the Manager of Field\\n\\nOperations for the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section from 2000 to 2008.\\n\\nVandeVelde succeeded Coppedge in that position from 2008 until 2013, upon\\n\\nCoppedge’s promotion to Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section in\\n\\n2008. The Manager of Field Operations supervised all state and local disease\\n\\nintervention specialists, tracking their deployment and assessing data collected from\\n\\nfield work. The Director of the Sexually Transmitted Disease Section oversaw the\\n\\nAid-to-Local grants by communicating with the federal government, coordinating\\n\\nwith the agency’s legal department, and managing counties’ compliance with the\\n\\ngrant terms. Coppedge and VandeVelde led mandatory quarterly staff meetings for\\n\\nboth state and local disease intervention specialists to review grant objectives and the\\n\\nprogress made in the preceding quarter. Gonzales attended these quarterly meetings.\\n\\n When she did not have military obligations, Gonzales reported daily for work\\n\\nat Finney County. She worked with county employees, including nurses and clinical\\n\\nstaff. Her salary and benefits were determined by Finney County Human Resources\\n\\nDepartment, which issued her paychecks as well.\\n\\n On or around April 1, 2010, a meeting was called to discuss problems with\\n\\nGonzales’s performance. Meeting minutes indicate those in attendance were\\n\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\nCoppedge, VandeVelde, Gonzales, and Ashley Goss. Ashley Goss was the Finney\\n\\nCounty Health Department Administrator at the time. Perceived issues were two-fold.\\n\\nFirst, Gonzales had exhibited inappropriate behavior in the workplace which had\\n\\nstrained relationships with her co-workers. Second, Finney County was failing to\\n\\nmeet Aid-to-Local grant objectives. Goss and Gonzales were warned the Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grant might not be renewed if performance did not improve. On April 9, 2010,\\n\\nGonzales received a deployment order for military service beginning in October and\\n\\nshe informed VandeVelde of her deployment.\\n\\n Coppedge sent a follow-up letter, dated April 23, 2010, to Goss. The letter\\n\\nemphasized the performance deficiency of the disease intervention specialist in\\n\\nFinney County. The letter warned Finney County that if productivity did not\\n\\n“dramatically improve,” the Aid-to-Local grant would be discontinued. App. Vol. II\\n\\nat 385. Coppedge scheduled a reevaluation of Finney County’s performance for July\\n\\n15, 2010.\\n\\n In an internal email dated June 7, 2010, KDHE contemplated reallocating\\n\\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. On July 1, 2010, KDHE decided not to renew\\n\\nFinney County’s Aid-to-Local grant. Thereafter, Finney County terminated its local\\n\\ndisease intervention specialist position and Gonzales became unemployed.\\n\\n The government brought suit against the State of Kansas, claiming KDHE had\\n\\nviolated USERRA. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the\\n\\nnarrow issue of whether Kansas, through KDHE, was Gonzales’s employer under\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nUSERRA. 5 The district court granted Kansas’s motion, denied the government’s\\n\\nmotion, and entered a judgment of dismissal. The district court reasoned the language\\n\\nof USERRA confirmed a servicemember might have more than one USERRA\\n\\nemployer in a single job. Nevertheless, it ruled Kansas could not be Gonzales’s\\n\\nUSERRA employer because KDHE did not have any authority to hire, fire, or\\n\\nsupervise Gonzales, or determine her salary. The government timely appealed.\\n\\nIII. DISCUSSION\\n\\n The government raises two issues on appeal. First, it contends the district court\\n\\nadopted an overly narrow construction of the term “employer” as it is defined in\\n\\nUSERRA. The government then asserts the district court’s review of the record\\n\\nevidence was inconsistent with the summary judgment standard.\\n\\n A. Definition of “Employer” under USERRA\\n\\n The interpretation of a federal statute is a question of law which this court\\n\\nreviews de novo. Koch Indus., Inc. v. United States, 603 F.3d 816, 821 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2010); see WWC Holding Co. v. Sopkin, 488 F.3d 1262, 1276 n.10 (10th Cir. 2007)\\n\\n(“[W]e are not limited to the parties’ positions on what a statute means, because we\\n\\nreview a question of statutory construction de novo.”). The analysis begins with the\\n\\nstatutory text. Tarango-Delgado v. Garland, 19 F.4th 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\nUndefined terms are given their ordinary meaning as understood at the time of\\n\\n\\n 5\\n Although not relevant to this appeal, Kansas’s summary judgment motion\\nalso raised arguments regarding the substantive merits of the USERRA claim, the\\nequitable defense of laches, and the lack of basis for granting any injunctive relief.\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\nenactment, considering the specific context in which the word is used. Taniguchi v.\\n\\nKan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566, 569 (2012). “[T]he text of a law controls\\n\\nover purported legislative intentions unmoored from any statutory text.” Corner Post,\\n\\nInc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024) (quotation\\n\\nomitted).\\n\\n Kansas does not provide a valid reason to deviate from the textual analysis. Its\\n\\nargument analogizing USERRA to the Fair Labor Standards Act is unavailing\\n\\nbecause each statute has differing definitions of “employer.” Compare 29 U.S.C.\\n\\n§ 203(d) with 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). The Supreme Court’s precedent on the\\n\\ncommon-law definition of control is irrelevant because included within USERRA is a\\n\\nstatute-specific definition of the term “employer.” See Clackamas Gastroenterology\\n\\nAssocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-45, 447 (2003) (explaining courts should\\n\\nlook to common law if Congress is silent on an undefined term and the “undefined\\n\\nterm has a settled meaning at common law”).\\n\\n USERRA provides, in relevant part:\\n\\n A person who is a member of . . . , or has an obligation to perform service\\n in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment,\\n reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of\\n employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, . . . or\\n obligation.\\n\\n38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). The term “employer” is defined in § 4303(4)(A):\\n\\n [T]he term “employer” means any person, institution, organization, or\\n other entity that pays salary or wages for work performed or that has\\n control over employment opportunities including--\\n\\n\\n\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n (i) a person, institution, organization, or other entity to whom the\\n employer has delegated the performance of employment-related\\n responsibilities;\\n (ii) the Federal Government;\\n (iii) a State;\\n (iv) any successor in interest to a person, institution, organization, or\\n other entity referred to in this subparagraph; and\\n (v) a person, institution, organization, or other entity that has denied\\n initial employment in violation of section 4311.\\n\\n The text identifies two avenues of analysis. First, whoever pays an employee’s\\n\\nsalary or wages for the work performed is considered an employer. To pay is to “give\\n\\nto (a person) what is due in discharge of a debt, or as return for services done.” Pay,\\n\\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Under the terms’ plain meanings, “salary”\\n\\nand “wages” both refer to regularly paid compensation. See Helix Energy Sols. Grp.,\\n\\nInc. v. Hewitt, 598 U.S. 39, 51-52 (2023) (defining salary as “fixed compensation\\n\\nregularly paid, as by the year, quarter, month, or week” and wage as “[p]ay given for\\n\\nlabor at short[-]stated intervals” (quotation omitted)). Section 4303(2) identifies\\n\\nsalary or wages as a monetary subcomponent of the benefits of employment. See also\\n\\nAdvocate Christ Med. Ctr. v. Kennedy, 605 U.S. 1, 10 (2025) (“The word ‘paid’\\n\\nobviously connotes a cash benefit.”).\\n\\n Second, “control over employment opportunities” is an alternate and sufficient\\n\\nbasis for employer status under USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A). This statutory\\n\\nlanguage can be further parsed into two subcomponents: “control over” and\\n\\n“employment opportunities.”\\n\\n To exercise control over is to “exercise power or authority over.” Control,\\n\\nOxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989). Although the provision does not clarify the\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nnature or degree of control necessary, absent from the text is any language to suggest\\n\\nonly those who exercise direct or absolute control over an employee are considered\\n\\nemployers. See Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355 (refusing to adopt a “heightened” statutory\\n\\nrequirement by “add[ing] words” to the text); White v. United Airlines, Inc., 987 F.3d\\n\\n616, 627 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[S]ection 4303(4)(A)(i) does not require that an\\n\\n‘employer’ have direct control over the matters that constitute a USERRA\\n\\nviolation[,] . . . only that the employer must have control over the plaintiff’s\\n\\nemployment opportunities writ large.”).\\n\\n Pursuant to § 4303(4)(A)(i), those who perform employment-related\\n\\nresponsibilities upon delegation by the employer also fall within the ambit of\\n\\nemployer. This provision implies a servicemember may have more than one employer\\n\\nat a time as long as each employer either pays salary or wages or controls\\n\\nemployment opportunities: 1) the employer that delegates the performance of\\n\\nemployment-related responsibilities and 2) those to whom the responsibilities have\\n\\nbeen delegated. “The use of the word ‘delegate[]’ suggests an intent to reach both\\n\\ndirect and indirect employers,” provided each employer satisfies at least one of the\\n\\ntwo conditions identified in § 4303(4)(A). White, 987 F.3d at 627.\\n\\n As a result, the term “control” must be construed to recognize that a\\n\\nservicemember can have more than one employer. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v.\\n\\nCity of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 933 (2009) (“[W]ell-established principles of\\n\\nstatutory interpretation . . . require statutes to be construed in a manner that gives\\n\\neffect to all of their provisions.”). Even entities that share or co-determine matters\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nconstituting employment opportunities can concurrently be employers. Cf. Knitter v.\\n\\nCorvias Mil. Living, LLC, 758 F.3d 1214, 1226 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the joint-\\n\\nemployer test under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Staub v.\\n\\nProctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (observing USERRA “is very similar to\\n\\nTitle VII”). The key determination concerns not the purported employer’s “purely\\n\\nformal” functions, White, 987 F.3d at 627, but whether an entity individually\\n\\nexercises sufficient control over the servicemember’s employment opportunities, cf.\\n\\nKnitter, 758 F.3d at 1226; see Estes v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 658 F. App’x 1029, 1032\\n\\n(Fed. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n Implementing regulations from the Department of Labor support this textual\\n\\nanalysis. 6 See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394, 402 (2024)\\n\\n(recognizing the non-binding but persuasive weight of “interpretations of those\\n\\nresponsible for implementing particular statutes”). The agency confirmed not only\\n\\nthat a servicemember may have more than one employer but also provided an\\n\\nexample of the nature and scope of “control” necessary to be found a USERRA\\n\\nemployer:\\n\\n For example, if the employee is a security guard hired by a security\\n company and he or she is assigned to a work site, the employee may report\\n both to the security company and to the site owner. In such an instance,\\n both employers share responsibility for compliance with USERRA.\\n\\n\\n\\n 6\\n 38 U.S.C. § 4331(a) authorizes the Secretary of Labor to “prescribe\\nregulations implementing the provisions of [USERRA] with regard to the application\\nof [the statute] to States, local governments, and private employers.”\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n20 C.F.R. § 1002.37 (2025). 7\\n\\n The phrase “employment opportunities,” on the other hand, refers both to\\n\\nopportunities for obtaining employment and opportunities within the scope of one’s\\n\\nemployment. Compare 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A)(v) (treating as employers those who\\n\\ndeny initial employment), and United States v. Nevada, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1238\\n\\n(D. Nev. 2011) (assessing which entity possessed the authority to hire employees),\\n\\nwith Estes, 658 F. App’x at 1032 (discussing retention and termination of\\n\\nemployment), 8 and White, 987 F.3d at 626-27 (suggesting those who determine\\n\\ncertain terms and benefits of employment may be considered employers).\\n\\n Drawing a categorical distinction, Kansas argues no employment relationship\\n\\ncan exist between Kansas and Gonzales because Finney County is the recipient of the\\n\\nAid-to-Local grant, not Gonzales. Kansas theorizes that assessing USERRA liability\\n\\nby looking beyond contractual relationships would have no backstop. For instance,\\n\\n\\n 7\\n This agency interpretation first became effective in 2006 and has remained\\nconsistent since. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)\\n(“[I]nterpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at issue, and which\\nhave remained consistent over time, may be especially useful in determining the\\nstatute’s meaning.”).\\n 8\\n Estes v. Merit Systems Protection Board provided the following illustration:\\n For example, if an agency knows it is the only entity hiring contractors\\n from a third[-]party company and the agency states that a contractor is no\\n longer welcome on any of its contracts, the agency could be deemed to\\n exercise control over the employee’s continued employment status\\n because the third[-]party company would have nowhere else to place the\\n contractor and would therefore have no choice but to fire him.\\n658 F. App’x 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\nKansas points out there is no reason why the government’s interpretation would not\\n\\napply up the chain of grantor-grantee relationships and expose the CDC to liability as\\n\\nGonzales’s USERRA employer since the Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention\\n\\nAward, used to fund the Aid-to-Local grants, originated from the CDC. Because\\n\\nfederal grants constitute a significant portion of state government funding, Kansas\\n\\nwarns, an expansive interpretation of the scope of USERRA employer would\\n\\nimplicate countless grantor-grantee relationships and expose the federal government\\n\\nto potentially significant liability. Kansas concludes Congress could not have\\n\\nintended such an outcome.\\n\\n Kansas’s position is not supported by the statutory language, which identifies\\n\\nno exceptions or alternate framework by which to analyze entities administering\\n\\ngrants. 9 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 669 (2020) (“[W]hen Congress\\n\\nchooses not to include any exceptions to a broad rule, courts apply the broad rule.”).\\n\\nMoreover, USERRA calls for a case-specific analysis to determine not only employer\\n\\nstatus, 10 but also whether the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct. 38 U.S.C.\\n\\n§§ 4303(4)(A); 4311(b)-(c). As they are based merely on speculation, Kansas’s\\n\\nslippery-slope concerns are unpersuasive. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita\\n\\nBeneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36 (2006) (rejecting a slippery-\\n\\n\\n 9\\n Section 4303(4)(A) identifies two exceptions to the definition of employer:\\n§ 4303(4)(B) and § 4303(4)(C). Neither of these exceptions apply to grantor-grantee\\nrelationships.\\n 10\\n See infra Section III.B.\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\nslope argument based on “feasibility of case-by-case consideration”); see also Silva\\n\\nv. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 112 M.S.P.R. 362, 369 (M.S.P.B. 2009) (explaining that\\n\\njust because the government may be a USERRA employer to one contractor does not\\n\\nmean the government is considered the USERRA employer of all contractors). This\\n\\nleaves two questions, whether there is sufficient evidence that Kansas, through\\n\\nKDHE, 1) paid Gonzales’s wages or salary or 2) exercised some control over\\n\\nemployment opportunities of Gonzales.\\n\\n B. Kansas’s Motion for Summary Judgment\\n\\n The court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,\\n\\napplying the same legal standard used by the district court. Green Country Food\\n\\nMkt., Inc. v. Bottling Grp., LLC, 371 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004). A motion for\\n\\nsummary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine\\n\\ndispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n\\nlaw.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment,\\n\\nour review of the record requires that we construe all inferences in favor of the party\\n\\nagainst whom the motion under consideration is made . . . .” Pirkheim v. First Unum\\n\\nLife Ins., 229 F.3d 1008, 1010 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted).\\n\\n 1. Payment of Wages or Salary\\n\\n Based on the record facts and the arguments of the parties on appeal, Kansas\\n\\ndoes not satisfy the first condition for being Gonzales’s employer. Although the Aid-\\n\\nto-Local grant funded a portion of Gonzales’s salary, Finney County issued her\\n\\npaychecks. The district court determined Finney County maintained “exclusive\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nauthority over Gonzales’s salary, method of payment, and benefits.” App. Vol. III at\\n\\n721. The government does not dispute this determination on appeal. The record\\n\\ndemonstrates Gonzales’s salary and benefits were determined by the Finney County\\n\\nHuman Resources Department according to its pay scale, “based off of [the\\n\\nemployee’s] education and the type of work that [the employee was] going to do.”\\n\\nApp. Vol. II at 417. Because the government concedes only Finney County paid\\n\\nGonzales’s salary, Kansas does not satisfy the first condition identified in\\n\\n§ 4304(4)(A) and is not, therefore, Gonzales’s USERRA employer on that basis.\\n\\n 2. Control over Employment Opportunities\\n\\n The parties agree: whether KDHE exercised a sufficient degree of control over\\n\\nGonzales’s employment opportunities is ultimately a factual determination. This\\n\\napproach is consistent with how courts have analyzed the issue arising under other\\n\\nstatutes. See, e.g., Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 481 (1964) (National\\n\\nLabor Standard Act); Lambertsen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028-29\\n\\n(10th Cir. 1996) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d\\n\\n802, 805-08 (10th Cir. 1989) (Fair Labor Standards Act).\\n\\n The district court ruled Kansas was not Gonzales’s employer based on three\\n\\nunderlying assessments: KDHE had 1) no authority to hire or fire Gonzales; 2) no\\n\\nauthority to supervise her; and 3) no input regarding her pay or benefits. The\\n\\ngovernment does not challenge the third basis but argues the first two reflect an\\n\\nimproper application of the summary judgment standard. The government contends\\n\\n\\n\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\nthe district court incorrectly resolved genuine disputes of material fact by viewing the\\n\\nevidence and drawing inferences in Kansas’s favor.\\n\\n a. Authority to Hire or Fire\\n\\n Rather than soliciting or receiving applications, KDHE approached counties to\\n\\ngauge their interest in furthering disease intervention efforts in exchange for Aid-to-\\n\\nLocal grants. Both VandeVelde and Coppedge understood the Aid-to-Local grants as\\n\\na means of funding the local disease intervention specialist role. Correspondingly,\\n\\nFinney County’s Health Department Administrator, Goss, sought to fulfill the terms\\n\\nof the Notice of Grant Award by hiring a dedicated local disease intervention\\n\\nspecialist. The local disease intervention specialist position for Finney County\\n\\nprovided Gonzales, who was already a county employee, with an employment\\n\\nopportunity.\\n\\n Gonzales recalled being interviewed by Coppedge. Coppedge explained that,\\n\\nwhenever he participated in hiring local disease intervention specialists, he was part\\n\\nof an interviewing team, a panel composed usually of three or four other panelists.\\n\\nOnce the interviews were complete, Coppedge conferred with other panelists,\\n\\nproviding input in ranking the candidates. Thereafter, he participated in deciding who\\n\\nthe county would hire. 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n Coppedge, whose deposition was taken more than twenty years after the\\ninterview, did not think he participated in Gonzales’s interview and could not recall\\nhaving any involvement in her hiring process. Gonzales, on the other hand, could not\\nremember anyone other than Coppedge who interviewed her. The district court stated\\nFinney County staff interviewed Gonzales and noted Coppedge’s presence at the\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\n Aid-to-Local grants were renewed on an annual basis. Although counties were\\n\\nallowed to indicate their willingness to continue receiving the grant by applying for a\\n\\nrenewal, the directors at KDHE had the final say on whether the grant would be\\n\\nrenewed. During at least one fiscal year, the Aid-to-Local grant funded as much as\\n\\napproximately 86% of Gonzales’s salary.\\n\\n When the funding from KDHE stopped, the local disease intervention position\\n\\nfor Finney County was terminated. Shortly before the grant was ended, Goss had a\\n\\ndiscussion with Gonzales about Gonzales’s performance issues. Goss recalled the\\n\\nfollowing about that conversation:\\n\\n Well, then [I told Gonzales] we need to figure this out because [KDHE\\n was] going to take our funding, and at that time we discussed other [job]\\n options. I asked [Gonzales] what she wanted to do because again, I\\n didn’t want to have to figure something else out for her. I wanted her to\\n be able to stay on.\\n\\nApp. Vol. II at 430. Goss testified all of the available positions with the county\\n\\nwould require a reduction in salary and Gonzales’s employment with Finney County\\n\\nended.\\n\\n The evidence indicates KDHE had some influence on the hiring of Gonzales in\\n\\n2001 and the elimination of her position in 2010. Whether that rose to the level of\\n\\nKDHE being a USERRA employer by having sufficient control of Gonzales’s\\n\\nemployment opportunities was something the district court did not adequately\\n\\n\\n\\n\\ninterview. Nevertheless, it did not acknowledge Gonzales’s testimony that she could\\nnot recall any Finney County employee who interviewed her.\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\naddress under Rule 56. See United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 906-07\\n\\n(10th Cir. 2016); Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Second Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483\\n\\nF.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Even where parties file cross[-]motions pursuant\\n\\nto Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material\\n\\nfacts.”). In sum, it ruled that “Finney County alone had the authority to hire and fire\\n\\nGonzales.” App. Vol. III at 720. It stated that it was Finney County staff who\\n\\ninterviewed Gonzales although it did acknowledge Coppedge’s presence. The district\\n\\ncourt’s description of the interview as being conducted by Finney County, however,\\n\\ndid not address contrary inferences from Gonzales’s testimony or inferences from\\n\\nCoppedge’s testimony that his usual practice was to be actively involved in the\\n\\nselection process. It treated the grant as a wall between KDHE and Gonzales that\\n\\nrendered the relationship as one solely between KDHE and Finney County without\\n\\nany effect on Gonzales’s employment opportunities under USERRA. Further, the\\n\\ndistrict court did not factor in grant funds as the source of most of Gonzales’s salary\\n\\nin analyzing employment opportunities.\\n\\n b. Supervision\\n\\n The district court addressed supervision of Gonzales in an equally cramped\\n\\nmanner as it did when considering the authority to hire and fire, i.e. viewing the grant\\n\\nas insulating KDHE against any notion it controlled Gonzales’s employment\\n\\nopportunities. Beginning with the training of Gonzales and progressing through her\\n\\ncontinued supervision and evaluation as a local disease intervention specialist, the\\n\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\ndistrict court minimized the involvement of KDHE and emphasized Finney County’s\\n\\nsupervision of Gonzales’s workplace behavior.\\n\\n KDHE established the training requirements for the local disease intervention\\n\\nspecialist position. Coppedge explained he supervised all the state disease\\n\\nintervention specialists and local disease intervention specialists. 12 Gonzales received\\n\\ntraining from KDHE to fulfill her role, including on-the-job training from Coppedge\\n\\non how to conduct field work. Her field work was audited based on standards set in\\n\\nthe Field Services Manual, a document written by KDHE. The district court did note\\n\\nthat Coppedge conducted field audits of Gonzales’s work; that VandeVelde provided\\n\\nGonzales feedback on the quality and quantity of her work; and that “Gonzales\\n\\nchafed under VandeVelde’s supervision.” 13 App. Vol. III at 714.\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n During his deposition, Coppedge had the following exchange with counsel\\nfor the government:\\n\\n Q: Who did you supervise when you were the manager of field\\n operations?\\n\\n A: All the state DISs and all the [local] DISs.\\n\\n Q: Was there anyone within that STD program who you supervised other\\n than the DISs?\\n\\n A: My recollection is no. I think Allen had the office personnel.\\n\\n Q: When you say DIS, do you mean disease intervention specialist?\\n\\n A: Yes. It’s the same.\\n\\nApp. Vol. III at 629.\\n 13\\n In an affidavit, Gonzales testified VandeVelde made negative comments\\nabout her military service on three occasions. In one instance, VandeVelde\\n 20\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\n Gonzales appeared for work daily at the Finney County Health Department\\n\\nwhere she shared office space with county employees, including Goss. Interpersonal\\n\\nissues between Gonzales and Finney County staff were reported to and addressed by\\n\\nGoss. The evidence indicates Gonzales reported to both KDHE and Finney County\\n\\nregarding different aspects of her job. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.37. Each entity, in turn,\\n\\nretained supervisory authority over the part of her job that it oversaw.\\n\\n There is evidence Gonzales’s performance evaluations were a joint venture\\n\\ninvolving both Finney County and KDHE. The relevant form, labeled Finney County\\n\\nPerformance Evaluation Form, broke out the evaluation into two general categories:\\n\\nBasic Job Performance and General Work Performance. The form was filled out and\\n\\nsigned by Finney County’s administrator, Goss. KDHE, however, provided the input\\n\\nfor the Basic Job Performance section because Goss lacked knowledge and data of\\n\\nGonzales’s substantive work. As to the Basic Job Performance section, Goss merely\\n\\nperformed the ministerial function of incorporating KDHE’s evaluation. See Nevada,\\n\\n817 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 1002.5(d)(1)(i)).\\n\\n While the district court acknowledged Gonzales could have more than one\\n\\nemployer, its approach looked at only one side of the ledger. That Gonzales may have\\n\\ninteracted more with Goss and that Goss had disciplinary authority over Gonzales’s\\n\\n\\nquestioned Gonzales about an injury sustained during military service and whether it\\nwas interfering with her ability to carry out disease intervention duties. Gonzales\\ntestified she felt VandeVelde was mocking her regarding her military service. Second\\nand third occasions occurred during early 2010, when Gonzales informed\\nVandeVelde of upcoming military obligations. VandeVelde told Gonzales she needed\\nto choose between her military service and her career with KDHE.\\n 21\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\noffice behavior, while relevant, does not negate Gonzales’s interaction with KDHE in\\n\\ntraining, supervision, and evaluation of the substantive duties of a local disease\\n\\nintervention specialist. The district court’s summary judgment ruling was driven by\\n\\nits erroneous view of the grant relationship between KDHE and Finney County. It\\n\\ntreated the grant as a mere funding mechanism. As a consequence, it viewed KDHE’s\\n\\ndealings with Gonzales, not as supervision, but as its oversight of Finney County’s\\n\\ngrant performance. The district court specifically diminished KDHE’s involvement in\\n\\nthe performance evaluation by noting it was Goss that gave the performance review\\n\\nand that KDHE was merely focusing on Gonzales’s performance of Finney County’s\\n\\nduties under the grant. This approach did not properly consider, as was clear to all\\n\\nrelevant persons, that it was Gonzales who was solely tasked with Finney County\\n\\nfulfilling its grant obligations. 14\\n\\n The district court’s summary judgment ruling was not consistent with the\\n\\ncharge of Rule 56 to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Gonzales, the\\n\\nnon-moving party, and to recognize a genuine dispute of material fact. See Sup. Ct. of\\n\\nN.M., 839 F.3d at 906-07.\\n\\nIV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n There is sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the issue of\\n\\nwhether Kansas is Gonzales’s USERRA employer. The district court’s order granting\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n The evidence suggests, during her employment, Gonzales was the only local\\ndisease intervention specialist at Finney County.\\n\\n 22\\n\\f Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\nsummary judgment is therefore reversed. Because Kansas raised other arguments in\\n\\nits summary judgment motion which the district court has not yet addressed, this\\n\\nmatter is remanded for further proceeding in accordance with this opinion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30954,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10766736,"string":"10,766,736"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Rio Grande Foundation v. 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You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-30\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30955,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10767248,"string":"10,767,248"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Poterbin"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-31"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-3128"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HARTZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"EBEL, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 31, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 23-3128\\n\\n JAMES MICHAEL POTERBIN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Kansas\\n (D.C. No. 2:19-CR-20079-JAR-7)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nKevin Kumar, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Los Angeles, California (Keith Bradley,\\nSquire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\nJames Michael Poterbin, pro se, filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.\\n\\nNatasha K. Harnwell-Davis (Kate E. Brubacher, former United States Attorney, James A.\\nBrown, Appellate Chief, Ryan J. Huschka, and Duston J. Slinkard, former Acting United\\nStates Attorney, Topeka, Kansas; Nicole M. Argentieri, Acting Assistant Attorney\\nGeneral and Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Section,\\nCriminal Division, Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HARTZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\n In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant James Poterbin challenges his\\n\\nconvictions and sentence for 1) conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent\\n\\nto distribute methamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance\\n\\nof a drug-trafficking crime. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\n\\nU.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM his convictions and sentence. We DISMISS without\\n\\nprejudice his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.\\n\\n\\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\\n\\n The evidence at Mr. Poterbin’s trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the\\n\\nverdict, see United States v. Chapman, 839 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016),\\n\\nestablished the following: Brandon West stayed at a house on Ruby Avenue in\\n\\nKansas City, Kansas, where he used and sold illicit drugs—primarily\\n\\nmethamphetamine. Mr. West let his buyers use the drugs at his house. Mr. West’s\\n\\ncousin David Carr supplied Mr. West with methamphetamine. Mr. Carr, in turn,\\n\\nobtained methamphetamine from Mr. Poterbin.\\n\\n On April 18, 2019, Mr. West and a group that included Mariah Vieni and her\\n\\nboyfriend D.B. were using drugs at the house. When the drugs ran out, Mr. West\\n\\nasked if anyone in the group could help him buy more methamphetamine. Ms. Vieni\\n\\noffered to get some from a supplier she knew. After getting Mr. Carr’s approval, Mr.\\n\\nWest gave Ms. Vieni approximately $500 from his earlier drug sales so that Ms.\\n\\nVieni could go buy more methamphetamine. Mr. West got Mr. Carr’s approval\\n\\nbecause some of that money belonged to Mr. Carr and Mr. Poterbin. When Ms.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nVieni did not return to the house after more than an hour, Mr. West concluded that\\n\\nshe had stolen the money. (Ms. Vieni had, instead, been robbed.) Mr. West and\\n\\nothers would not let Ms. Vieni’s boyfriend leave the house. Mr. West then called\\n\\nMessrs. Carr and Poterbin, telling them that Ms. Vieni had stolen their drug proceeds\\n\\nand that her boyfriend was still at the house. Messrs. Carr and Poterbin came over to\\n\\nthe house and beat, tortured, stabbed and shot D.B. twice.\\n\\n\\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n\\n The United States prosecuted several people present at the Ruby Avenue house\\n\\nfrom April 18 through 20, 2019. The United States charged Mr. Poterbin with\\n\\n1) conspiring with Messrs. Carr and West and others, from March 1, 2019, through\\n\\nApril 19, 2019, to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance of the\\n\\ndrug-trafficking offense charged in Count 1. Mr. Poterbin was charged as both a\\n\\nprincipal and as an aider-and-abettor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Poterbin and his\\n\\nco-defendant Carr were tried together. The jury convicted both defendants,\\n\\nspecifically convicting Mr. Poterbin of all three offenses charged against him. The\\n\\ndistrict court sentenced him to a total of 480 months in prison and five years’\\n\\nsupervised release.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n On appeal, Mr. Poterbin, through defense counsel, contends that the district\\n\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting at trial, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence\\n\\nthat after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in this case ended, Mr. Poterbin\\n\\ntwice sold distributable amounts of methamphetamine to an unknown person who\\n\\nwas not involved in the drug trafficking charged in this case. Mr. Poterbin also raises\\n\\nseveral other issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We conclude none of these\\n\\narguments warrant reversing Mr. Poterbin’s convictions or vacating his sentence.\\n\\n\\nA. Any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was harmless\\n\\n To convict Mr. Poterbin of the drug conspiracy charged in Count 1, the\\n\\nGovernment had to prove, among other elements, that 1) two or more people agreed\\n\\n(a) to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and/or (b) to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine; 2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy,\\n\\nand 3) he knowingly and voluntarily involved himself in the conspiracy. See United\\n\\nStates v. Davis, 995 F.3d 1161, 1165‒66 (10th Cir. 2021). Alternatively, to convict\\n\\nhim of aiding and abetting the conspiracy, the Government had to prove that others\\n\\nconspired to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,\\n\\nMr. Poterbin knew about and intentionally associated himself with that conspiracy,\\n\\nand he acted to bring about the conspiracy’s success. See United States v.\\n\\nIbarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 932 (10th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\n In order to help prove Mr. Poterbin’s knowledge of the conspiracy and his\\n\\nintent to participate in methamphetamine distribution, the trial court allowed the\\n\\nGovernment to present evidence of two sales of distributable amounts of\\n\\nmethamphetamine that Mr. Poterbin made to an unknown person after the conspiracy\\n\\ncharged in Count 1 ended. Specifically, the trial court admitted evidence of two\\n\\nseparate text message conversations between Mr. Poterbin and an unknown person,\\n\\nidentified in Mr. Poterbin’s phone as G David; and testimony from the Government’s\\n\\ncase agent interpreting the text messages to indicate that Mr. Poterbin twice sold a\\n\\ndistributable amount of methamphetamine to G David. These text messages occurred\\n\\nseveral months after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1 ended, and\\n\\nthere was no indication that G David was involved in that charged drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy.\\n\\n The trial court admitted this evidence of these two later methamphetamine\\n\\nsales, over Mr. Poterbin’s objection, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which permits\\n\\nevidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove, among other things, intent and\\n\\nknowledge. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part:\\n\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not\\n admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.\\n\\n (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another\\n purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\n There are four requirements for evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b):\\n 1. It must be “offered for a proper purpose”; 2. It must be relevant; 3. Its\\n probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for\\n unfair prejudice; and 4. Upon request, the trial court must “instruct the jury\\n that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose\\n for which it was admitted.”\\n\\nUnited States v. Little, 119 F.4th 750, 777 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Huddleston v.\\n\\nUnited States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824198 (U.S. Oct.\\n\\n6, 2025) (No. 25-5015).\\n\\n The district court admitted the evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s later\\n\\nmethamphetamine sales for two purposes identified in Rule 404(b), to prove his\\n\\nknowledge and intent as to the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. The\\n\\ntrial court gave jurors limiting instructions at the time the court admitted this\\n\\nevidence and again at the conclusion of the trial, telling jurors that they could “not\\n\\nuse this evidence to decide whether or not Mr. Poterbin carried out the acts involved\\n\\nin the . . . crime or crimes charged in the indictment.” (R. 3.1524.) But they could\\n\\nconsider the Rule 404(b) evidence “to the extent you determine that it is relevant to\\n\\nthe issues of intent or knowledge as it relates to the conspiracy, the drug conspiracy\\n\\ncharge that is at issue in this case.” (R. 3.1525‒26.)\\n\\n Focusing on the second and third requirements for the admission of Rule\\n\\n404(b) evidence, Mr. Poterbin contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of\\n\\nhis two later methamphetamine sales. “[T]he admissibility of evidence under Rule\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b).\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n404(b)” is “a ‘case-specific inquiry,’” United States v. Martinez, 122 F.4th 389, 416 (10th\\n\\nCir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2017)),\\n\\nthat we review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Veneno, 107 F.4th\\n\\n1103, 1116 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 3131791 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2025)\\n\\n(No. 24-5191).\\n\\n Even when the trial court abuses it discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence,\\n\\n“[w]e will not reverse a defendant’s conviction on th[at] basis . . . if the error was\\n\\nharmless to the defendant.” United States v. Kupfer, 797 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2015). Such an error is harmless unless it “had a substantial influence on the trial’s\\n\\noutcome or generates grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Id. (citations,\\n\\ninternal quotation marks omitted). “To make this assessment, we review the entire\\n\\nrecord de novo, ‘examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted\\n\\nevidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.’” Id. (quoting\\n\\nUnited States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999)).\\n\\n Here, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in\\n\\nadmitting the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later\\n\\nmethamphetamine sales because any such error would be harmless. The challenged\\n\\nRule 404(b) evidence played only a minor role at trial and the prosecutor did not\\n\\nrefer to it at all in closing arguments. See id.\\n\\n Moreover, there was a significant amount of other evidence presented at trial\\n\\nto support the jury convicting Mr. Poterbin of the charged drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy. See United States v. Summers, 147 F.4th 1135, 1146 n.6 (10th Cir.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n2025) (noting any error in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence would be harmless where\\n\\nthere was other overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt); United States v. Olivo,\\n\\n80 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction where, even if trial court\\n\\nerred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, there was considerable other evidence\\n\\nlinking defendant to charged drug-trafficking conspiracy).\\n\\n That other evidence included testimony that Mr. Poterbin supplied Mr. Carr\\n\\nwith methamphetamine which Mr. Carr, in turn, supplied to Mr. West, who sold it at\\n\\nthe Ruby Avenue house; Mr. West once accompanied Mr. Carr on a trip to Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin’s home to obtain an ounce of methamphetamine; prior to the April 18, 2019\\n\\nincident involving D.B., Mr. Poterbin had been at the Ruby Avenue house where he\\n\\nviolently enforced a drug debt owed to him by an individual nicknamed “Smurf”; Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin called Mr. West on April 18, wanting to know where his money was because\\n\\nMr. Poterbin wanted to buy more methamphetamine; and Mr. Poterbin, along with\\n\\nMr. Carr, came over to the Ruby Avenue house later on April 18 to get their drug\\n\\nmoney back from Ms. Vieni by torturing D.B. In addition, after April 18, Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin told Bryan Spaulding, another person who was at the Ruby Avenue house on\\n\\nthat day, that Mr. Poterbin sold ounce quantities of methamphetamine.\\n\\n Finally, the district court gave thorough instructions limiting the jury’s\\n\\nconsideration of this Rule 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d\\n\\n1105, 1118 (10th Cir. 2020) (“‘When the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming,\\n\\nan erroneous admission of’” Rule 404(b) evidence “‘is harmless—especially when the\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\ntrial court issues a proper limiting instruction.’” (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 589\\n\\nF.3d 1323, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Olivo, 80 F.3d at 1469.\\n\\n For these reasons, even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the\\n\\nRule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later methamphetamine sales, that error was\\n\\nharmless. 2\\n\\n\\nB. Mr. Poterbin’s arguments raised in his pro se supplemental brief\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin raises the following arguments in his pro se supplemental brief,\\n\\nwhich we authorized him to file and which we liberally construe. 3 See Haines v.\\n\\nKerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520‒21 (1972) (per curiam); see also United States v.\\n\\nEdwards, 69 F.3d 419, 427 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995). 4\\n\\n\\n2\\n For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.\\nPoterbin’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial based on admission of the Rule\\n404(b) evidence. See United States v. Orozco, 916 F.3d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 2019)\\n(noting this court reviews for abuse of discretion district court’s decisions on Rule 33\\nmotions for a new trial).\\n3\\n The Government contends that Mr. Poterbin has waived the arguments he raised in\\nhis pro se brief by failing to follow this court’s briefing requirement to identify where\\nin the record he preserved these arguments for review. See 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A).\\nEven so, we exercise our discretion, see United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036,\\n1049 n.15 (10th Cir. 2024), to “review[] the entire appellate record” ourselves,\\nUnited States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1219 n.4 (10th Cir. 2024), and, therefore, we\\nwill overlook those omissions in Mr. Poterbin’s pro se supplemental brief. In doing\\nso, we note that the Government has addressed the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s\\narguments in its supplemental answer brief. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d\\n1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998).\\n4\\n We have already addressed and rejected one of the issues Mr. Poterbin raised in his\\npro se supplemental brief—that the district court abused its discretion in admitting\\nRule 404(b) evidence of the two methamphetamine sales Mr. Poterbin made after the\\ncharged drug-trafficking conspiracy ended.\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n 1. There was sufficient evidence to support each of Mr. Poterbin’s\\n convictions\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues there was insufficient evidence to support each of his\\n\\nthree convictions. His defense attorney raised these arguments in the district court in\\n\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions made during and after trial.\\n\\n We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction de novo to\\n “determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty\\n of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d\\n 1124, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013). In conducting this review, “we consider all of\\n the evidence, direct and circumstantial, along with reasonable inferences, but\\n we do not weigh the evidence or consider the relative credibility of\\n witnesses.” United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 868–69 (10th Cir. 2019)\\n (quotation marks omitted). Thus, our review is limited and deferential; “we\\n may reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential\\n elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 869 (quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n\\nUnited States v. Earls, 129 F.4th 850, 859 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.\\n\\nStepp, 89 F.4th 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 2023)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824364 (U.S. Oct.\\n\\n6, 2025) (No. 52-5276). We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support each of\\n\\nMr. Poterbin’s three convictions.\\n\\n\\n a. Count 1, conspiring to distribute, or to possess with the intent to\\n distribute, methamphetamine\\n\\n For a reasonable jury to convict Mr. Poterbin on Count 1, the Government had\\n\\nto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) two or more persons agreed to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine, or to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it;\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\n2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy; 3) he knowingly and\\n\\nvoluntarily participated in the conspiracy; 4) there was an interdependence among\\n\\nmembers of the conspiracy; and 5) the overall scope of the conspiracy involved a\\n\\nmeasurable amount of methamphetamine. See Davis, 995 F.3d at 1166. We have\\n\\nalready set forth in detail the significant evidence presented at trial from which a\\n\\nrational jury could find each element of this conspiracy. That evidence was more\\n\\nthan sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.\\n\\n\\n b. Count 2, kidnapping\\n\\n Count 2 charged Mr. Poterbin with kidnapping and, alternatively, aiding and\\n\\nabetting kidnapping. The district court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin\\n\\nof kidnapping, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 1) knowingly\\n\\nkidnapped D.B. by seizing, confining, or holding him, 2) kidnapped D.B. for ransom,\\n\\nand 3) willfully used an instrumentality of interstate commerce—a cell phone—to\\n\\ncommit or further the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence for jurors to find\\n\\neither the first or the third element. He specifically contends that there was no\\n\\nevidence that he confined and held D.B. because D.B. was already being confined by\\n\\nMr. West and others before Mr. Poterbin arrived at the Ruby Avenue house. But\\n\\nthere was evidence from which a rational jury could find that, after he and Mr. Carr\\n\\narrived at the house, they continued to confine and hold D.B., blocking his exit,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nbinding his arms, and eventually duct-taping his shirt over his head, in addition to\\n\\nbeating and torturing D.B.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin also argues that there was no evidence that he used a cell phone\\n\\nin connection with the charged kidnapping. Mr. Poterbin asserts that it was instead\\n\\nMr. Carr who used D.B.’s cell phone to call Ms. Vieni twice. During those calls, Mr.\\n\\nCarr engaged the speaker phone in the presence of Mr. Poterbin’s assault on D.B. to\\n\\nadvance Mr. Poterbin’s efforts to collect drug money he believed had been stolen by\\n\\nMs. Vieni. The purpose of the calls was so that Ms. Vieni could hear D.B. screaming\\n\\nand begging Ms. Vieni to bring back the money to Messrs. Carr and Poterbin. Based\\n\\non this evidence, a rational jury could find that Mr. Poterbin used a cell phone to\\n\\nfacilitate his kidnapping D.B. and holding him for ransom.\\n\\n Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could\\n\\nhave found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Poterbin aided and abetted Mr. Carr’s\\n\\nkidnapping D.B. and using a cell phone to facilitate that offense. See Ibarra-Diaz,\\n\\n805 F.3d at 932‒34 (holding, alternatively, that there was sufficient evidence to\\n\\nsupport a jury finding that the defendant aided and abetted the offense of possessing\\n\\ndrugs with the intent to distribute). That is, there was sufficient evidence for a\\n\\nreasonable jury to find that Mr. Carr committed all the elements of kidnapping, and\\n\\nthat Mr. Poterbin both willfully associated himself with the kidnapping and sought to\\n\\nmake that venture succeed through some action of his own. See id. at 932 (setting\\n\\nforth elements of aiding and abetting).\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n c. Count 7, using, brandishing and discharging a firearm during the\\n drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1\\n\\n Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with using, carrying, brandishing and\\n\\ndischarging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\\n\\nCount 1. Alternatively, Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with aiding and abetting that\\n\\noffense. The trial court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin of using,\\n\\nbrandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy charged in Count 1, they first had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n\\nMr. Poterbin committed the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. We\\n\\nhave already explained that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find\\n\\nthat element beyond a reasonable doubt.\\n\\n Second, the trial court instructed jurors they had to find that Mr. Poterbin used,\\n\\nbrandished and/or discharged a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy. (The jury found he possessed, brandished, and discharged a firearm.)\\n\\nMr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support finding this\\n\\nsecond element because his possession and use of a firearm on April 18 was not in\\n\\nproximity to any methamphetamine or proceeds from methamphetamine sales. But\\n\\nthere was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt\\n\\nthat Mr. Poterbin used, brandished and discharged a firearm on April 18 to try to\\n\\ncollect a drug debt resulting from the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1.\\n\\nThat is sufficient. See United States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2009) (citing cases holding that a drug conspiracy conviction can be based solely on\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\nproof the defendant helped collect drug debts). That included evidence that when\\n\\nMessrs. Poterbin and Carr arrived at the Ruby Avenue house to try to get their drug\\n\\nmoney back, they brandished their guns in D.B.’s presence. Then they\\n\\npistol-whipped D.B. before Mr. Carr shot him.\\n\\n In a related argument, Mr. Poterbin asserts that the jury was confused by the\\n\\naiding-and-abetting instruction’s application to Count 7. The Government argued\\n\\nduring its closing that, if jurors found that it was Mr. Carr who shot D.B. in each leg\\n\\nor if they were not sure whether it was Mr. Carr or Mr. Poterbin who shot D.B.,\\n\\njurors could find Mr. Poterbin guilty of aiding and abetting that discharge. During\\n\\ndeliberations, the jury sent the court a question, asking for “further clarification on\\n\\nInstruction no. 18 [the aiding-and-abetting instruction] in relation to counts 6 and 7.\\n\\nSpecifically, if we believe both defendants were present and a weapon was\\n\\nbrandished and discharged, can a guilty verdict be inferred for one or both\\n\\ndefendants.” (R. 1.406.) The court answered: “The government must prove the First\\n\\nand Second elements detailed in Instruction 18, beyond a reasonable doubt. Please\\n\\nread Instruction no. 18 as a whole for further explanation of what the government\\n\\nmust prove.” (Id.) Both defense attorneys and the prosecutor approved the court’s\\n\\nresponse. The jury thereafter convicted Mr. Poterbin on Count 7, using, brandishing,\\n\\nand discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\\n\\nCount 1. To the extent jury confusion resulted in the note to the court, there is no\\n\\nindication that jurors were confused after the court’s response to their question.\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\n d. Credibility of Government witnesses Vieni and D.B.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues that “[t]here was insufficient evidence that any crime ever\\n\\noccurred because” Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. “have both lied to the police before.”\\n\\n(Aplt. S. Br. 3.) We construe this argument to assert that his convictions should be\\n\\noverturned because Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. lack credibility. In reviewing on appeal\\n\\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, however, we may not\\n\\nweigh the credibility of the evidence. See, e.g., Earls, 129 F.4th at 859. Moreover,\\n\\nthere was much more evidence than just Ms. Vieni’s and Mr. D.B.’s testimony that\\n\\nsupported Mr. Poterbin’s convictions.\\n\\n\\n 2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective\\n\\nrepresentation. Specifically, Mr. Poterbin asserts that defense counsel failed to\\n\\nrecognize a flaw in the special verdict form; failed to recognize that the pattern\\n\\ninstruction, apparently on kidnapping, was erroneously amended to change the word\\n\\n“seized” to “seizing”; and gave Mr. Poterbin incompetent advice during the plea\\n\\nnegotiations, leading to Mr. Poterbin proceeding to trial.\\n\\n “We generally do not review an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on\\n\\ndirect appeal.” United States v. Sjodin, 139 F.4th 1188, 1206 (10th Cir. 2025). In fact,\\n\\n“[s]uch claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all\\n\\nwill be dismissed.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en\\n\\nbanc). The reason is that the defendant, in a later collateral 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding,\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nwill be able to develop the factual record often necessary to support his ineffective\\n\\nassistance claim. See id. “Even if evidence is not necessary, at the very least counsel\\n\\naccused of deficient performance can explain their reasoning and actions, and the district\\n\\ncourt can render its opinion on the merits of the claim.” Id. We, therefore, do not\\n\\naddress the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims now on direct appeal\\n\\nbut instead dismiss those claims without prejudice to his raising them in a collateral\\n\\nproceeding.\\n\\n\\n 3. Brady violation/ineffective assistance\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin next argues that his trial attorney committed a Brady 5 violation\\n\\nby failing to provide Mr. Poterbin with discovery that the Government turned over to\\n\\ndefense counsel. Brady and its progeny require the Government to turn over\\n\\nexculpatory evidence to the defense. See United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148,\\n\\n1196 (10th Cir. 2025). Mr. Poterbin’s contention, instead, is that his defense attorney\\n\\nfailed to provide Mr. Poterbin with the discovery that the Government turned over to\\n\\ndefense counsel. We deem that argument to assert defense counsel was ineffective, a\\n\\nclaim which we decline to address now in this direct criminal appeal. See Galloway,\\n\\n56 F.3d at 1240.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\n 4. Procedural reasonableness of sentence\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because\\n\\nthe district court made several errors in calculating his total offense level under the\\n\\nsentencing guidelines and because the jury, rather than the sentencing court, should\\n\\nhave been required to find that these enhancements applied to his case. Because we\\n\\ncould not find where Mr. Poterbin raised these arguments at sentencing, we review\\n\\nthem for plain error. See United States v. Harbin, 56 F.4th 843, 845 (10th Cir. 2022);\\n\\nBrooks, 161 F.3d at 1247. “Under the plain error standard, we will vacate a sentence\\n\\nonly if” Mr. Poterbin can show: “(1) there is error, (2) that is plain; (3) that affects\\n\\nsubstantial rights, or in other words, affects the outcome of the proceeding; and\\n\\n(4) substantially affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial\\n\\nproceedings. . . . An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled\\n\\nlaw.” United States v. Pena, 963 F.3d 1016, 1023 (10th Cir. 2020) (further quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n\\n a. The district court’s application of offense-level enhancements\\n\\n Applying the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin’s total offense level based on his kidnapping conviction. The court began\\n\\nwith a base offense level of 32 for kidnapping, as provided by U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a).\\n\\nThe court then added three enhancements for a total offense level of 42. Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin, on appeal, asserts the district court erred in applying those enhancements.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\n i. Application of six-level enhancement for demanding a\\n ransom\\n\\n The district court added six offense levels under § 2A4.1(b)(1) because a\\n\\nransom was demanded. Mr. Poterbin argues that that was error because it double\\n\\ncounted the ransom, which was also an element of his kidnapping conviction, which\\n\\nthe base offense level already counted.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin does not assert that either the Supreme Court or this court has\\n\\npreviously decided this question and we could not locate any such case. Two cases\\n\\nfrom other circuits have rejected this argument, for different reasons. See United\\n\\nStates v. Acevedo, 824 F.3d 179, 184‒85 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that\\n\\napplication of six-level ransom enhancement is impermissible double counting,\\n\\nnoting U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a)’s base offense level will not always be based on a ransom\\n\\nbecause it also applies to kidnapping convictions where victim is held for “reward or\\n\\notherwise,” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), as well as to convictions for offenses other than\\n\\nkidnapping); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 519‒27 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(holding guidelines’ structure permitted applying six-level enhancement for\\n\\nkidnapping involving ransom demand when ransom was also element of kidnapping\\n\\nconviction).\\n\\n We need not definitively decide the double counting question presented here.\\n\\nInstead, we conclude that Mr. Poterbin has failed to establish that any error the\\n\\ndistrict court may have made in applying § 2A4.1(b)(1)’s six-level enhancement was\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nplain error; that is, he has not shown that the error was “clear or obvious under\\n\\ncurrent, well-established law.” Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\\n\\n\\n ii. Application of a two-level enhancement for causing serious\\n bodily injury and another two-level enhancement for using a\\n dangerous weapon\\n\\n The district court also added two offense levels under U.S.S.G.\\n\\n§ 2A4.1(b)(2)(B) after finding that the victim, D.B., suffered “serious injury.” In\\n\\naddition, the district court added another two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3)\\n\\nbecause a dangerous weapon was used, based on D.B. being shot and stabbed. Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin contended that applying both of these two-level enhancements amounted to\\n\\nimpermissible double-counting. But again he fails to cite, and we have not found,\\n\\nany Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases holding that applying both of these\\n\\nenhancements amounts to impermissible double counting. Cf. United States v.\\n\\nCampus, 147 F.4th 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d\\n\\n1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). We again need not definitively resolve this question in\\n\\norder to hold that Mr. Poterbin has not established that any error the sentencing court\\n\\nmade in applying both of these enhancements in his case was plain error; that is, error\\n\\nthat was clear or obvious. See Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\\n\\n\\n b. The sentencing court, rather than a jury, properly found the\\n sentencing guideline enhancements applied\\n\\n Lastly, Mr. Poterbin is incorrect in asserting that a jury had to find that these\\n\\nsentencing guideline enhancements applied to his case. See United States v. Walker,\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n74 F.4th 1163, 1193‒95 (10th Cir. 2023). The case on which Mr. Poterbin relies,\\n\\nErlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), is distinguishable. In Erlinger, the\\n\\nSupreme Court reiterated that a jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any factor\\n\\nthat increases the statutory maximum or statutory mandatory minimum sentence a\\n\\ndefendant faces. See id. at 833‒35. Here, based on the jury’s convicting Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin of kidnapping, he was subject to a statutory maximum life sentence. See 18\\n\\nU.S.C. § 1201(a). That never changed. The sentencing guideline enhancements only\\n\\nincreased his advisory guideline range within that statutory maximum. See Walker,\\n\\n74 F.4th at 1194‒95.\\n\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n We have determined that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was\\n\\nharmless. We DISMISS Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims without\\n\\nprejudice. The rest of Mr. Poterbin’s challenges to his convictions and sentence also\\n\\ndo not warrant relief. We, therefore, AFFIRM his convictions and sentence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11233833/\", \"author_raw\": \"EBEL, Circuit Judge.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HARTZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EBEL"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSSMAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HARTZ\": \", Circuit\", \"EBEL\": \", Circuit\", \"ROSSMAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10767248/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Poterbin\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-31\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 31, 2025\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\n\n v. No. 23-3128\n\n JAMES MICHAEL POTERBIN,\n\n Defendant - Appellant.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Kansas\n (D.C. No. 2:19-CR-20079-JAR-7)\n _________________________________\n\nKevin Kumar, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Los Angeles, California (Keith Bradley,\nSquire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nJames Michael Poterbin, pro se, filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.\n\nNatasha K. Harnwell-Davis (Kate E. Brubacher, former United States Attorney, James A.\nBrown, Appellate Chief, Ryan J. Huschka, and Duston J. Slinkard, former Acting United\nStates Attorney, Topeka, Kansas; Nicole M. Argentieri, Acting Assistant Attorney\nGeneral and Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Section,\nCriminal Division, Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellee.\n _________________________________\n\nBefore HARTZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\n In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant James Poterbin challenges his\n\nconvictions and sentence for 1) conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent\n\nto distribute methamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance\n\nof a drug-trafficking crime. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\n\nU.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM his convictions and sentence. We DISMISS without\n\nprejudice his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.\n\n\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n\n The evidence at Mr. Poterbin’s trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the\n\nverdict, see United States v. Chapman, 839 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016),\n\nestablished the following: Brandon West stayed at a house on Ruby Avenue in\n\nKansas City, Kansas, where he used and sold illicit drugs—primarily\n\nmethamphetamine. Mr. West let his buyers use the drugs at his house. Mr. West’s\n\ncousin David Carr supplied Mr. West with methamphetamine. Mr. Carr, in turn,\n\nobtained methamphetamine from Mr. Poterbin.\n\n On April 18, 2019, Mr. West and a group that included Mariah Vieni and her\n\nboyfriend D.B. were using drugs at the house. When the drugs ran out, Mr. West\n\nasked if anyone in the group could help him buy more methamphetamine. Ms. Vieni\n\noffered to get some from a supplier she knew. After getting Mr. Carr’s approval, Mr.\n\nWest gave Ms. Vieni approximately $500 from his earlier drug sales so that Ms.\n\nVieni could go buy more methamphetamine. Mr. West got Mr. Carr’s approval\n\nbecause some of that money belonged to Mr. Carr and Mr. Poterbin. When Ms.\n\n\n 2\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\nVieni did not return to the house after more than an hour, Mr. West concluded that\n\nshe had stolen the money. (Ms. Vieni had, instead, been robbed.) Mr. West and\n\nothers would not let Ms. Vieni’s boyfriend leave the house. Mr. West then called\n\nMessrs. Carr and Poterbin, telling them that Ms. Vieni had stolen their drug proceeds\n\nand that her boyfriend was still at the house. Messrs. Carr and Poterbin came over to\n\nthe house and beat, tortured, stabbed and shot D.B. twice.\n\n\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n\n The United States prosecuted several people present at the Ruby Avenue house\n\nfrom April 18 through 20, 2019. The United States charged Mr. Poterbin with\n\n1) conspiring with Messrs. Carr and West and others, from March 1, 2019, through\n\nApril 19, 2019, to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute\n\nmethamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance of the\n\ndrug-trafficking offense charged in Count 1. Mr. Poterbin was charged as both a\n\nprincipal and as an aider-and-abettor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Poterbin and his\n\nco-defendant Carr were tried together. The jury convicted both defendants,\n\nspecifically convicting Mr. Poterbin of all three offenses charged against him. The\n\ndistrict court sentenced him to a total of 480 months in prison and five years’\n\nsupervised release.\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n\n On appeal, Mr. Poterbin, through defense counsel, contends that the district\n\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting at trial, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence\n\nthat after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in this case ended, Mr. Poterbin\n\ntwice sold distributable amounts of methamphetamine to an unknown person who\n\nwas not involved in the drug trafficking charged in this case. Mr. Poterbin also raises\n\nseveral other issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We conclude none of these\n\narguments warrant reversing Mr. Poterbin’s convictions or vacating his sentence.\n\n\nA. Any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was harmless\n\n To convict Mr. Poterbin of the drug conspiracy charged in Count 1, the\n\nGovernment had to prove, among other elements, that 1) two or more people agreed\n\n(a) to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and/or (b) to distribute\n\nmethamphetamine; 2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy,\n\nand 3) he knowingly and voluntarily involved himself in the conspiracy. See United\n\nStates v. Davis, 995 F.3d 1161, 1165‒66 (10th Cir. 2021). Alternatively, to convict\n\nhim of aiding and abetting the conspiracy, the Government had to prove that others\n\nconspired to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,\n\nMr. Poterbin knew about and intentionally associated himself with that conspiracy,\n\nand he acted to bring about the conspiracy’s success. See United States v.\n\nIbarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 932 (10th Cir. 2015).\n\n\n\n\n 4\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\n In order to help prove Mr. Poterbin’s knowledge of the conspiracy and his\n\nintent to participate in methamphetamine distribution, the trial court allowed the\n\nGovernment to present evidence of two sales of distributable amounts of\n\nmethamphetamine that Mr. Poterbin made to an unknown person after the conspiracy\n\ncharged in Count 1 ended. Specifically, the trial court admitted evidence of two\n\nseparate text message conversations between Mr. Poterbin and an unknown person,\n\nidentified in Mr. Poterbin’s phone as G David; and testimony from the Government’s\n\ncase agent interpreting the text messages to indicate that Mr. Poterbin twice sold a\n\ndistributable amount of methamphetamine to G David. These text messages occurred\n\nseveral months after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1 ended, and\n\nthere was no indication that G David was involved in that charged drug-trafficking\n\nconspiracy.\n\n The trial court admitted this evidence of these two later methamphetamine\n\nsales, over Mr. Poterbin’s objection, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which permits\n\nevidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove, among other things, intent and\n\nknowledge. 1\n\n\n\n1\n Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part:\n\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not\n admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a\n particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.\n\n (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another\n purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.\n 5\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\n There are four requirements for evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b):\n 1. It must be “offered for a proper purpose”; 2. It must be relevant; 3. Its\n probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for\n unfair prejudice; and 4. Upon request, the trial court must “instruct the jury\n that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose\n for which it was admitted.”\n\nUnited States v. Little, 119 F.4th 750, 777 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Huddleston v.\n\nUnited States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824198 (U.S. Oct.\n\n6, 2025) (No. 25-5015).\n\n The district court admitted the evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s later\n\nmethamphetamine sales for two purposes identified in Rule 404(b), to prove his\n\nknowledge and intent as to the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. The\n\ntrial court gave jurors limiting instructions at the time the court admitted this\n\nevidence and again at the conclusion of the trial, telling jurors that they could “not\n\nuse this evidence to decide whether or not Mr. Poterbin carried out the acts involved\n\nin the . . . crime or crimes charged in the indictment.” (R. 3.1524.) But they could\n\nconsider the Rule 404(b) evidence “to the extent you determine that it is relevant to\n\nthe issues of intent or knowledge as it relates to the conspiracy, the drug conspiracy\n\ncharge that is at issue in this case.” (R. 3.1525‒26.)\n\n Focusing on the second and third requirements for the admission of Rule\n\n404(b) evidence, Mr. Poterbin contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of\n\nhis two later methamphetamine sales. “[T]he admissibility of evidence under Rule\n\n\n\n\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b).\n 6\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\n404(b)” is “a ‘case-specific inquiry,’” United States v. Martinez, 122 F.4th 389, 416 (10th\n\nCir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2017)),\n\nthat we review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Veneno, 107 F.4th\n\n1103, 1116 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 3131791 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2025)\n\n(No. 24-5191).\n\n Even when the trial court abuses it discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence,\n\n“[w]e will not reverse a defendant’s conviction on th[at] basis . . . if the error was\n\nharmless to the defendant.” United States v. Kupfer, 797 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.\n\n2015). Such an error is harmless unless it “had a substantial influence on the trial’s\n\noutcome or generates grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Id. (citations,\n\ninternal quotation marks omitted). “To make this assessment, we review the entire\n\nrecord de novo, ‘examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted\n\nevidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.’” Id. (quoting\n\nUnited States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999)).\n\n Here, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in\n\nadmitting the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later\n\nmethamphetamine sales because any such error would be harmless. The challenged\n\nRule 404(b) evidence played only a minor role at trial and the prosecutor did not\n\nrefer to it at all in closing arguments. See id.\n\n Moreover, there was a significant amount of other evidence presented at trial\n\nto support the jury convicting Mr. Poterbin of the charged drug-trafficking\n\nconspiracy. See United States v. Summers, 147 F.4th 1135, 1146 n.6 (10th Cir.\n\n 7\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\n2025) (noting any error in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence would be harmless where\n\nthere was other overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt); United States v. Olivo,\n\n80 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction where, even if trial court\n\nerred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, there was considerable other evidence\n\nlinking defendant to charged drug-trafficking conspiracy).\n\n That other evidence included testimony that Mr. Poterbin supplied Mr. Carr\n\nwith methamphetamine which Mr. Carr, in turn, supplied to Mr. West, who sold it at\n\nthe Ruby Avenue house; Mr. West once accompanied Mr. Carr on a trip to Mr.\n\nPoterbin’s home to obtain an ounce of methamphetamine; prior to the April 18, 2019\n\nincident involving D.B., Mr. Poterbin had been at the Ruby Avenue house where he\n\nviolently enforced a drug debt owed to him by an individual nicknamed “Smurf”; Mr.\n\nPoterbin called Mr. West on April 18, wanting to know where his money was because\n\nMr. Poterbin wanted to buy more methamphetamine; and Mr. Poterbin, along with\n\nMr. Carr, came over to the Ruby Avenue house later on April 18 to get their drug\n\nmoney back from Ms. Vieni by torturing D.B. In addition, after April 18, Mr.\n\nPoterbin told Bryan Spaulding, another person who was at the Ruby Avenue house on\n\nthat day, that Mr. Poterbin sold ounce quantities of methamphetamine.\n\n Finally, the district court gave thorough instructions limiting the jury’s\n\nconsideration of this Rule 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d\n\n1105, 1118 (10th Cir. 2020) (“‘When the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming,\n\nan erroneous admission of’” Rule 404(b) evidence “‘is harmless—especially when the\n\n\n\n 8\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\ntrial court issues a proper limiting instruction.’” (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 589\n\nF.3d 1323, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Olivo, 80 F.3d at 1469.\n\n For these reasons, even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the\n\nRule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later methamphetamine sales, that error was\n\nharmless. 2\n\n\nB. Mr. Poterbin’s arguments raised in his pro se supplemental brief\n\n Mr. Poterbin raises the following arguments in his pro se supplemental brief,\n\nwhich we authorized him to file and which we liberally construe. 3 See Haines v.\n\nKerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520‒21 (1972) (per curiam); see also United States v.\n\nEdwards, 69 F.3d 419, 427 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995). 4\n\n\n2\n For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.\nPoterbin’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial based on admission of the Rule\n404(b) evidence. See United States v. Orozco, 916 F.3d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 2019)\n(noting this court reviews for abuse of discretion district court’s decisions on Rule 33\nmotions for a new trial).\n3\n The Government contends that Mr. Poterbin has waived the arguments he raised in\nhis pro se brief by failing to follow this court’s briefing requirement to identify where\nin the record he preserved these arguments for review. See 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A).\nEven so, we exercise our discretion, see United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036,\n1049 n.15 (10th Cir. 2024), to “review[] the entire appellate record” ourselves,\nUnited States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1219 n.4 (10th Cir. 2024), and, therefore, we\nwill overlook those omissions in Mr. Poterbin’s pro se supplemental brief. In doing\nso, we note that the Government has addressed the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s\narguments in its supplemental answer brief. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d\n1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998).\n4\n We have already addressed and rejected one of the issues Mr. Poterbin raised in his\npro se supplemental brief—that the district court abused its discretion in admitting\nRule 404(b) evidence of the two methamphetamine sales Mr. Poterbin made after the\ncharged drug-trafficking conspiracy ended.\n 9\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\n 1. There was sufficient evidence to support each of Mr. Poterbin’s\n convictions\n\n Mr. Poterbin argues there was insufficient evidence to support each of his\n\nthree convictions. His defense attorney raised these arguments in the district court in\n\nFed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions made during and after trial.\n\n We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction de novo to\n “determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\n government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty\n of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d\n 1124, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013). In conducting this review, “we consider all of\n the evidence, direct and circumstantial, along with reasonable inferences, but\n we do not weigh the evidence or consider the relative credibility of\n witnesses.” United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 868–69 (10th Cir. 2019)\n (quotation marks omitted). Thus, our review is limited and deferential; “we\n may reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential\n elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 869 (quotation\n marks omitted).\n\nUnited States v. Earls, 129 F.4th 850, 859 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.\n\nStepp, 89 F.4th 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 2023)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824364 (U.S. Oct.\n\n6, 2025) (No. 52-5276). We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support each of\n\nMr. Poterbin’s three convictions.\n\n\n a. Count 1, conspiring to distribute, or to possess with the intent to\n distribute, methamphetamine\n\n For a reasonable jury to convict Mr. Poterbin on Count 1, the Government had\n\nto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) two or more persons agreed to distribute\n\nmethamphetamine, or to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it;\n\n\n\n\n 10\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\n2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy; 3) he knowingly and\n\nvoluntarily participated in the conspiracy; 4) there was an interdependence among\n\nmembers of the conspiracy; and 5) the overall scope of the conspiracy involved a\n\nmeasurable amount of methamphetamine. See Davis, 995 F.3d at 1166. We have\n\nalready set forth in detail the significant evidence presented at trial from which a\n\nrational jury could find each element of this conspiracy. That evidence was more\n\nthan sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.\n\n\n b. Count 2, kidnapping\n\n Count 2 charged Mr. Poterbin with kidnapping and, alternatively, aiding and\n\nabetting kidnapping. The district court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin\n\nof kidnapping, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 1) knowingly\n\nkidnapped D.B. by seizing, confining, or holding him, 2) kidnapped D.B. for ransom,\n\nand 3) willfully used an instrumentality of interstate commerce—a cell phone—to\n\ncommit or further the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).\n\n Mr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence for jurors to find\n\neither the first or the third element. He specifically contends that there was no\n\nevidence that he confined and held D.B. because D.B. was already being confined by\n\nMr. West and others before Mr. Poterbin arrived at the Ruby Avenue house. But\n\nthere was evidence from which a rational jury could find that, after he and Mr. Carr\n\narrived at the house, they continued to confine and hold D.B., blocking his exit,\n\n\n\n\n 11\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nbinding his arms, and eventually duct-taping his shirt over his head, in addition to\n\nbeating and torturing D.B.\n\n Mr. Poterbin also argues that there was no evidence that he used a cell phone\n\nin connection with the charged kidnapping. Mr. Poterbin asserts that it was instead\n\nMr. Carr who used D.B.’s cell phone to call Ms. Vieni twice. During those calls, Mr.\n\nCarr engaged the speaker phone in the presence of Mr. Poterbin’s assault on D.B. to\n\nadvance Mr. Poterbin’s efforts to collect drug money he believed had been stolen by\n\nMs. Vieni. The purpose of the calls was so that Ms. Vieni could hear D.B. screaming\n\nand begging Ms. Vieni to bring back the money to Messrs. Carr and Poterbin. Based\n\non this evidence, a rational jury could find that Mr. Poterbin used a cell phone to\n\nfacilitate his kidnapping D.B. and holding him for ransom.\n\n Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could\n\nhave found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Poterbin aided and abetted Mr. Carr’s\n\nkidnapping D.B. and using a cell phone to facilitate that offense. See Ibarra-Diaz,\n\n805 F.3d at 932‒34 (holding, alternatively, that there was sufficient evidence to\n\nsupport a jury finding that the defendant aided and abetted the offense of possessing\n\ndrugs with the intent to distribute). That is, there was sufficient evidence for a\n\nreasonable jury to find that Mr. Carr committed all the elements of kidnapping, and\n\nthat Mr. Poterbin both willfully associated himself with the kidnapping and sought to\n\nmake that venture succeed through some action of his own. See id. at 932 (setting\n\nforth elements of aiding and abetting).\n\n\n\n 12\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\n c. Count 7, using, brandishing and discharging a firearm during the\n drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1\n\n Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with using, carrying, brandishing and\n\ndischarging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\n\nCount 1. Alternatively, Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with aiding and abetting that\n\noffense. The trial court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin of using,\n\nbrandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\n\nconspiracy charged in Count 1, they first had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that\n\nMr. Poterbin committed the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. We\n\nhave already explained that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find\n\nthat element beyond a reasonable doubt.\n\n Second, the trial court instructed jurors they had to find that Mr. Poterbin used,\n\nbrandished and/or discharged a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\n\nconspiracy. (The jury found he possessed, brandished, and discharged a firearm.)\n\nMr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support finding this\n\nsecond element because his possession and use of a firearm on April 18 was not in\n\nproximity to any methamphetamine or proceeds from methamphetamine sales. But\n\nthere was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt\n\nthat Mr. Poterbin used, brandished and discharged a firearm on April 18 to try to\n\ncollect a drug debt resulting from the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1.\n\nThat is sufficient. See United States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir.\n\n2009) (citing cases holding that a drug conspiracy conviction can be based solely on\n\n\n 13\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\nproof the defendant helped collect drug debts). That included evidence that when\n\nMessrs. Poterbin and Carr arrived at the Ruby Avenue house to try to get their drug\n\nmoney back, they brandished their guns in D.B.’s presence. Then they\n\npistol-whipped D.B. before Mr. Carr shot him.\n\n In a related argument, Mr. Poterbin asserts that the jury was confused by the\n\naiding-and-abetting instruction’s application to Count 7. The Government argued\n\nduring its closing that, if jurors found that it was Mr. Carr who shot D.B. in each leg\n\nor if they were not sure whether it was Mr. Carr or Mr. Poterbin who shot D.B.,\n\njurors could find Mr. Poterbin guilty of aiding and abetting that discharge. During\n\ndeliberations, the jury sent the court a question, asking for “further clarification on\n\nInstruction no. 18 [the aiding-and-abetting instruction] in relation to counts 6 and 7.\n\nSpecifically, if we believe both defendants were present and a weapon was\n\nbrandished and discharged, can a guilty verdict be inferred for one or both\n\ndefendants.” (R. 1.406.) The court answered: “The government must prove the First\n\nand Second elements detailed in Instruction 18, beyond a reasonable doubt. Please\n\nread Instruction no. 18 as a whole for further explanation of what the government\n\nmust prove.” (Id.) Both defense attorneys and the prosecutor approved the court’s\n\nresponse. The jury thereafter convicted Mr. Poterbin on Count 7, using, brandishing,\n\nand discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\n\nCount 1. To the extent jury confusion resulted in the note to the court, there is no\n\nindication that jurors were confused after the court’s response to their question.\n\n\n\n 14\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\n\n\n\n d. Credibility of Government witnesses Vieni and D.B.\n\n Mr. Poterbin argues that “[t]here was insufficient evidence that any crime ever\n\noccurred because” Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. “have both lied to the police before.”\n\n(Aplt. S. Br. 3.) We construe this argument to assert that his convictions should be\n\noverturned because Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. lack credibility. In reviewing on appeal\n\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, however, we may not\n\nweigh the credibility of the evidence. See, e.g., Earls, 129 F.4th at 859. Moreover,\n\nthere was much more evidence than just Ms. Vieni’s and Mr. D.B.’s testimony that\n\nsupported Mr. Poterbin’s convictions.\n\n\n 2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel\n\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective\n\nrepresentation. Specifically, Mr. Poterbin asserts that defense counsel failed to\n\nrecognize a flaw in the special verdict form; failed to recognize that the pattern\n\ninstruction, apparently on kidnapping, was erroneously amended to change the word\n\n“seized” to “seizing”; and gave Mr. Poterbin incompetent advice during the plea\n\nnegotiations, leading to Mr. Poterbin proceeding to trial.\n\n “We generally do not review an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on\n\ndirect appeal.” United States v. Sjodin, 139 F.4th 1188, 1206 (10th Cir. 2025). In fact,\n\n“[s]uch claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all\n\nwill be dismissed.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en\n\nbanc). The reason is that the defendant, in a later collateral 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding,\n\n\n 15\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\n\n\n\nwill be able to develop the factual record often necessary to support his ineffective\n\nassistance claim. See id. “Even if evidence is not necessary, at the very least counsel\n\naccused of deficient performance can explain their reasoning and actions, and the district\n\ncourt can render its opinion on the merits of the claim.” Id. We, therefore, do not\n\naddress the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims now on direct appeal\n\nbut instead dismiss those claims without prejudice to his raising them in a collateral\n\nproceeding.\n\n\n 3. Brady violation/ineffective assistance\n\n Mr. Poterbin next argues that his trial attorney committed a Brady 5 violation\n\nby failing to provide Mr. Poterbin with discovery that the Government turned over to\n\ndefense counsel. Brady and its progeny require the Government to turn over\n\nexculpatory evidence to the defense. See United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148,\n\n1196 (10th Cir. 2025). Mr. Poterbin’s contention, instead, is that his defense attorney\n\nfailed to provide Mr. Poterbin with the discovery that the Government turned over to\n\ndefense counsel. We deem that argument to assert defense counsel was ineffective, a\n\nclaim which we decline to address now in this direct criminal appeal. See Galloway,\n\n56 F.3d at 1240.\n\n\n\n\n5\n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\n 16\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\n\n\n\n 4. Procedural reasonableness of sentence\n\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because\n\nthe district court made several errors in calculating his total offense level under the\n\nsentencing guidelines and because the jury, rather than the sentencing court, should\n\nhave been required to find that these enhancements applied to his case. Because we\n\ncould not find where Mr. Poterbin raised these arguments at sentencing, we review\n\nthem for plain error. See United States v. Harbin, 56 F.4th 843, 845 (10th Cir. 2022);\n\nBrooks, 161 F.3d at 1247. “Under the plain error standard, we will vacate a sentence\n\nonly if” Mr. Poterbin can show: “(1) there is error, (2) that is plain; (3) that affects\n\nsubstantial rights, or in other words, affects the outcome of the proceeding; and\n\n(4) substantially affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial\n\nproceedings. . . . An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled\n\nlaw.” United States v. Pena, 963 F.3d 1016, 1023 (10th Cir. 2020) (further quotation\n\nmarks omitted).\n\n\n a. The district court’s application of offense-level enhancements\n\n Applying the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Mr.\n\nPoterbin’s total offense level based on his kidnapping conviction. The court began\n\nwith a base offense level of 32 for kidnapping, as provided by U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a).\n\nThe court then added three enhancements for a total offense level of 42. Mr.\n\nPoterbin, on appeal, asserts the district court erred in applying those enhancements.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\n\n\n\n i. Application of six-level enhancement for demanding a\n ransom\n\n The district court added six offense levels under § 2A4.1(b)(1) because a\n\nransom was demanded. Mr. Poterbin argues that that was error because it double\n\ncounted the ransom, which was also an element of his kidnapping conviction, which\n\nthe base offense level already counted.\n\n Mr. Poterbin does not assert that either the Supreme Court or this court has\n\npreviously decided this question and we could not locate any such case. Two cases\n\nfrom other circuits have rejected this argument, for different reasons. See United\n\nStates v. Acevedo, 824 F.3d 179, 184‒85 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that\n\napplication of six-level ransom enhancement is impermissible double counting,\n\nnoting U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a)’s base offense level will not always be based on a ransom\n\nbecause it also applies to kidnapping convictions where victim is held for “reward or\n\notherwise,” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), as well as to convictions for offenses other than\n\nkidnapping); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 519‒27 (7th Cir. 2012)\n\n(holding guidelines’ structure permitted applying six-level enhancement for\n\nkidnapping involving ransom demand when ransom was also element of kidnapping\n\nconviction).\n\n We need not definitively decide the double counting question presented here.\n\nInstead, we conclude that Mr. Poterbin has failed to establish that any error the\n\ndistrict court may have made in applying § 2A4.1(b)(1)’s six-level enhancement was\n\n\n\n\n 18\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\n\n\n\nplain error; that is, he has not shown that the error was “clear or obvious under\n\ncurrent, well-established law.” Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\n\n\n ii. Application of a two-level enhancement for causing serious\n bodily injury and another two-level enhancement for using a\n dangerous weapon\n\n The district court also added two offense levels under U.S.S.G.\n\n§ 2A4.1(b)(2)(B) after finding that the victim, D.B., suffered “serious injury.” In\n\naddition, the district court added another two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3)\n\nbecause a dangerous weapon was used, based on D.B. being shot and stabbed. Mr.\n\nPoterbin contended that applying both of these two-level enhancements amounted to\n\nimpermissible double-counting. But again he fails to cite, and we have not found,\n\nany Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases holding that applying both of these\n\nenhancements amounts to impermissible double counting. Cf. United States v.\n\nCampus, 147 F.4th 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d\n\n1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). We again need not definitively resolve this question in\n\norder to hold that Mr. Poterbin has not established that any error the sentencing court\n\nmade in applying both of these enhancements in his case was plain error; that is, error\n\nthat was clear or obvious. See Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\n\n\n b. The sentencing court, rather than a jury, properly found the\n sentencing guideline enhancements applied\n\n Lastly, Mr. Poterbin is incorrect in asserting that a jury had to find that these\n\nsentencing guideline enhancements applied to his case. See United States v. Walker,\n\n\n 19\n\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\n\n\n\n74 F.4th 1163, 1193‒95 (10th Cir. 2023). The case on which Mr. Poterbin relies,\n\nErlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), is distinguishable. In Erlinger, the\n\nSupreme Court reiterated that a jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any factor\n\nthat increases the statutory maximum or statutory mandatory minimum sentence a\n\ndefendant faces. See id. at 833‒35. Here, based on the jury’s convicting Mr.\n\nPoterbin of kidnapping, he was subject to a statutory maximum life sentence. See 18\n\nU.S.C. § 1201(a). That never changed. The sentencing guideline enhancements only\n\nincreased his advisory guideline range within that statutory maximum. See Walker,\n\n74 F.4th at 1194‒95.\n\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n\n We have determined that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was\n\nharmless. We DISMISS Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims without\n\nprejudice. The rest of Mr. Poterbin’s challenges to his convictions and sentence also\n\ndo not warrant relief. We, therefore, AFFIRM his convictions and sentence.\n\n\n\n\n 20\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Poterbin\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-31\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n PUBLISH Tenth Circuit\\n\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 31, 2025\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellee,\\n\\n v. No. 23-3128\\n\\n JAMES MICHAEL POTERBIN,\\n\\n Defendant - Appellant.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Kansas\\n (D.C. No. 2:19-CR-20079-JAR-7)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nKevin Kumar, Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Los Angeles, California (Keith Bradley,\\nSquire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\nJames Michael Poterbin, pro se, filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.\\n\\nNatasha K. Harnwell-Davis (Kate E. Brubacher, former United States Attorney, James A.\\nBrown, Appellate Chief, Ryan J. Huschka, and Duston J. Slinkard, former Acting United\\nStates Attorney, Topeka, Kansas; Nicole M. Argentieri, Acting Assistant Attorney\\nGeneral and Lisa H. Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Section,\\nCriminal Division, Washington, D.C., with her on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellee.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HARTZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nEBEL, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\n In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant James Poterbin challenges his\\n\\nconvictions and sentence for 1) conspiring to distribute and to possess with the intent\\n\\nto distribute methamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance\\n\\nof a drug-trafficking crime. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18\\n\\nU.S.C. § 3742(a), we AFFIRM his convictions and sentence. We DISMISS without\\n\\nprejudice his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.\\n\\n\\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\\n\\n The evidence at Mr. Poterbin’s trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the\\n\\nverdict, see United States v. Chapman, 839 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2016),\\n\\nestablished the following: Brandon West stayed at a house on Ruby Avenue in\\n\\nKansas City, Kansas, where he used and sold illicit drugs—primarily\\n\\nmethamphetamine. Mr. West let his buyers use the drugs at his house. Mr. West’s\\n\\ncousin David Carr supplied Mr. West with methamphetamine. Mr. Carr, in turn,\\n\\nobtained methamphetamine from Mr. Poterbin.\\n\\n On April 18, 2019, Mr. West and a group that included Mariah Vieni and her\\n\\nboyfriend D.B. were using drugs at the house. When the drugs ran out, Mr. West\\n\\nasked if anyone in the group could help him buy more methamphetamine. Ms. Vieni\\n\\noffered to get some from a supplier she knew. After getting Mr. Carr’s approval, Mr.\\n\\nWest gave Ms. Vieni approximately $500 from his earlier drug sales so that Ms.\\n\\nVieni could go buy more methamphetamine. Mr. West got Mr. Carr’s approval\\n\\nbecause some of that money belonged to Mr. Carr and Mr. Poterbin. When Ms.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\nVieni did not return to the house after more than an hour, Mr. West concluded that\\n\\nshe had stolen the money. (Ms. Vieni had, instead, been robbed.) Mr. West and\\n\\nothers would not let Ms. Vieni’s boyfriend leave the house. Mr. West then called\\n\\nMessrs. Carr and Poterbin, telling them that Ms. Vieni had stolen their drug proceeds\\n\\nand that her boyfriend was still at the house. Messrs. Carr and Poterbin came over to\\n\\nthe house and beat, tortured, stabbed and shot D.B. twice.\\n\\n\\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n\\n The United States prosecuted several people present at the Ruby Avenue house\\n\\nfrom April 18 through 20, 2019. The United States charged Mr. Poterbin with\\n\\n1) conspiring with Messrs. Carr and West and others, from March 1, 2019, through\\n\\nApril 19, 2019, to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine; 2) kidnapping; and 3) using a firearm in furtherance of the\\n\\ndrug-trafficking offense charged in Count 1. Mr. Poterbin was charged as both a\\n\\nprincipal and as an aider-and-abettor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. Mr. Poterbin and his\\n\\nco-defendant Carr were tried together. The jury convicted both defendants,\\n\\nspecifically convicting Mr. Poterbin of all three offenses charged against him. The\\n\\ndistrict court sentenced him to a total of 480 months in prison and five years’\\n\\nsupervised release.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n On appeal, Mr. Poterbin, through defense counsel, contends that the district\\n\\ncourt abused its discretion in admitting at trial, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), evidence\\n\\nthat after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in this case ended, Mr. Poterbin\\n\\ntwice sold distributable amounts of methamphetamine to an unknown person who\\n\\nwas not involved in the drug trafficking charged in this case. Mr. Poterbin also raises\\n\\nseveral other issues in his pro se supplemental brief. We conclude none of these\\n\\narguments warrant reversing Mr. Poterbin’s convictions or vacating his sentence.\\n\\n\\nA. Any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was harmless\\n\\n To convict Mr. Poterbin of the drug conspiracy charged in Count 1, the\\n\\nGovernment had to prove, among other elements, that 1) two or more people agreed\\n\\n(a) to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and/or (b) to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine; 2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy,\\n\\nand 3) he knowingly and voluntarily involved himself in the conspiracy. See United\\n\\nStates v. Davis, 995 F.3d 1161, 1165‒66 (10th Cir. 2021). Alternatively, to convict\\n\\nhim of aiding and abetting the conspiracy, the Government had to prove that others\\n\\nconspired to distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine,\\n\\nMr. Poterbin knew about and intentionally associated himself with that conspiracy,\\n\\nand he acted to bring about the conspiracy’s success. See United States v.\\n\\nIbarra-Diaz, 805 F.3d 908, 932 (10th Cir. 2015).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\n In order to help prove Mr. Poterbin’s knowledge of the conspiracy and his\\n\\nintent to participate in methamphetamine distribution, the trial court allowed the\\n\\nGovernment to present evidence of two sales of distributable amounts of\\n\\nmethamphetamine that Mr. Poterbin made to an unknown person after the conspiracy\\n\\ncharged in Count 1 ended. Specifically, the trial court admitted evidence of two\\n\\nseparate text message conversations between Mr. Poterbin and an unknown person,\\n\\nidentified in Mr. Poterbin’s phone as G David; and testimony from the Government’s\\n\\ncase agent interpreting the text messages to indicate that Mr. Poterbin twice sold a\\n\\ndistributable amount of methamphetamine to G David. These text messages occurred\\n\\nseveral months after the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1 ended, and\\n\\nthere was no indication that G David was involved in that charged drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy.\\n\\n The trial court admitted this evidence of these two later methamphetamine\\n\\nsales, over Mr. Poterbin’s objection, under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), which permits\\n\\nevidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove, among other things, intent and\\n\\nknowledge. 1\\n\\n\\n\\n1\\n Rule 404(b) provides in relevant part:\\n\\n (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not\\n admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a\\n particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.\\n\\n (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another\\n purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,\\n knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.\\n 5\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\n There are four requirements for evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b):\\n 1. It must be “offered for a proper purpose”; 2. It must be relevant; 3. Its\\n probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for\\n unfair prejudice; and 4. Upon request, the trial court must “instruct the jury\\n that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose\\n for which it was admitted.”\\n\\nUnited States v. Little, 119 F.4th 750, 777 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Huddleston v.\\n\\nUnited States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824198 (U.S. Oct.\\n\\n6, 2025) (No. 25-5015).\\n\\n The district court admitted the evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s later\\n\\nmethamphetamine sales for two purposes identified in Rule 404(b), to prove his\\n\\nknowledge and intent as to the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. The\\n\\ntrial court gave jurors limiting instructions at the time the court admitted this\\n\\nevidence and again at the conclusion of the trial, telling jurors that they could “not\\n\\nuse this evidence to decide whether or not Mr. Poterbin carried out the acts involved\\n\\nin the . . . crime or crimes charged in the indictment.” (R. 3.1524.) But they could\\n\\nconsider the Rule 404(b) evidence “to the extent you determine that it is relevant to\\n\\nthe issues of intent or knowledge as it relates to the conspiracy, the drug conspiracy\\n\\ncharge that is at issue in this case.” (R. 3.1525‒26.)\\n\\n Focusing on the second and third requirements for the admission of Rule\\n\\n404(b) evidence, Mr. Poterbin contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of\\n\\nhis two later methamphetamine sales. “[T]he admissibility of evidence under Rule\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b).\\n 6\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n404(b)” is “a ‘case-specific inquiry,’” United States v. Martinez, 122 F.4th 389, 416 (10th\\n\\nCir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Henthorn, 864 F.3d 1241, 1248 (10th Cir. 2017)),\\n\\nthat we review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Veneno, 107 F.4th\\n\\n1103, 1116 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 2025 WL 3131791 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2025)\\n\\n(No. 24-5191).\\n\\n Even when the trial court abuses it discretion in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence,\\n\\n“[w]e will not reverse a defendant’s conviction on th[at] basis . . . if the error was\\n\\nharmless to the defendant.” United States v. Kupfer, 797 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2015). Such an error is harmless unless it “had a substantial influence on the trial’s\\n\\noutcome or generates grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” Id. (citations,\\n\\ninternal quotation marks omitted). “To make this assessment, we review the entire\\n\\nrecord de novo, ‘examining the context, timing, and use of the erroneously admitted\\n\\nevidence at trial and how it compares to properly admitted evidence.’” Id. (quoting\\n\\nUnited States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999)).\\n\\n Here, we need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in\\n\\nadmitting the challenged Rule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later\\n\\nmethamphetamine sales because any such error would be harmless. The challenged\\n\\nRule 404(b) evidence played only a minor role at trial and the prosecutor did not\\n\\nrefer to it at all in closing arguments. See id.\\n\\n Moreover, there was a significant amount of other evidence presented at trial\\n\\nto support the jury convicting Mr. Poterbin of the charged drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy. See United States v. Summers, 147 F.4th 1135, 1146 n.6 (10th Cir.\\n\\n 7\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\n2025) (noting any error in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence would be harmless where\\n\\nthere was other overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt); United States v. Olivo,\\n\\n80 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding conviction where, even if trial court\\n\\nerred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence, there was considerable other evidence\\n\\nlinking defendant to charged drug-trafficking conspiracy).\\n\\n That other evidence included testimony that Mr. Poterbin supplied Mr. Carr\\n\\nwith methamphetamine which Mr. Carr, in turn, supplied to Mr. West, who sold it at\\n\\nthe Ruby Avenue house; Mr. West once accompanied Mr. Carr on a trip to Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin’s home to obtain an ounce of methamphetamine; prior to the April 18, 2019\\n\\nincident involving D.B., Mr. Poterbin had been at the Ruby Avenue house where he\\n\\nviolently enforced a drug debt owed to him by an individual nicknamed “Smurf”; Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin called Mr. West on April 18, wanting to know where his money was because\\n\\nMr. Poterbin wanted to buy more methamphetamine; and Mr. Poterbin, along with\\n\\nMr. Carr, came over to the Ruby Avenue house later on April 18 to get their drug\\n\\nmoney back from Ms. Vieni by torturing D.B. In addition, after April 18, Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin told Bryan Spaulding, another person who was at the Ruby Avenue house on\\n\\nthat day, that Mr. Poterbin sold ounce quantities of methamphetamine.\\n\\n Finally, the district court gave thorough instructions limiting the jury’s\\n\\nconsideration of this Rule 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d\\n\\n1105, 1118 (10th Cir. 2020) (“‘When the evidence against a defendant is overwhelming,\\n\\nan erroneous admission of’” Rule 404(b) evidence “‘is harmless—especially when the\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\ntrial court issues a proper limiting instruction.’” (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 589\\n\\nF.3d 1323, 1334 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Olivo, 80 F.3d at 1469.\\n\\n For these reasons, even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the\\n\\nRule 404(b) evidence of Mr. Poterbin’s two later methamphetamine sales, that error was\\n\\nharmless. 2\\n\\n\\nB. Mr. Poterbin’s arguments raised in his pro se supplemental brief\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin raises the following arguments in his pro se supplemental brief,\\n\\nwhich we authorized him to file and which we liberally construe. 3 See Haines v.\\n\\nKerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520‒21 (1972) (per curiam); see also United States v.\\n\\nEdwards, 69 F.3d 419, 427 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995). 4\\n\\n\\n2\\n For the same reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr.\\nPoterbin’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial based on admission of the Rule\\n404(b) evidence. See United States v. Orozco, 916 F.3d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 2019)\\n(noting this court reviews for abuse of discretion district court’s decisions on Rule 33\\nmotions for a new trial).\\n3\\n The Government contends that Mr. Poterbin has waived the arguments he raised in\\nhis pro se brief by failing to follow this court’s briefing requirement to identify where\\nin the record he preserved these arguments for review. See 10th Cir. R. 28.1(A).\\nEven so, we exercise our discretion, see United States v. McBride, 94 F.4th 1036,\\n1049 n.15 (10th Cir. 2024), to “review[] the entire appellate record” ourselves,\\nUnited States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1219 n.4 (10th Cir. 2024), and, therefore, we\\nwill overlook those omissions in Mr. Poterbin’s pro se supplemental brief. In doing\\nso, we note that the Government has addressed the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s\\narguments in its supplemental answer brief. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d\\n1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998).\\n4\\n We have already addressed and rejected one of the issues Mr. Poterbin raised in his\\npro se supplemental brief—that the district court abused its discretion in admitting\\nRule 404(b) evidence of the two methamphetamine sales Mr. Poterbin made after the\\ncharged drug-trafficking conspiracy ended.\\n 9\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n 1. There was sufficient evidence to support each of Mr. Poterbin’s\\n convictions\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues there was insufficient evidence to support each of his\\n\\nthree convictions. His defense attorney raised these arguments in the district court in\\n\\nFed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions made during and after trial.\\n\\n We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction de novo to\\n “determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty\\n of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d\\n 1124, 1141 (10th Cir. 2013). In conducting this review, “we consider all of\\n the evidence, direct and circumstantial, along with reasonable inferences, but\\n we do not weigh the evidence or consider the relative credibility of\\n witnesses.” United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 868–69 (10th Cir. 2019)\\n (quotation marks omitted). Thus, our review is limited and deferential; “we\\n may reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential\\n elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 869 (quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n\\nUnited States v. Earls, 129 F.4th 850, 859 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.\\n\\nStepp, 89 F.4th 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 2023)), cert. denied, 2025 WL 2824364 (U.S. Oct.\\n\\n6, 2025) (No. 52-5276). We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support each of\\n\\nMr. Poterbin’s three convictions.\\n\\n\\n a. Count 1, conspiring to distribute, or to possess with the intent to\\n distribute, methamphetamine\\n\\n For a reasonable jury to convict Mr. Poterbin on Count 1, the Government had\\n\\nto prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 1) two or more persons agreed to distribute\\n\\nmethamphetamine, or to possess methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it;\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\n2) Mr. Poterbin knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy; 3) he knowingly and\\n\\nvoluntarily participated in the conspiracy; 4) there was an interdependence among\\n\\nmembers of the conspiracy; and 5) the overall scope of the conspiracy involved a\\n\\nmeasurable amount of methamphetamine. See Davis, 995 F.3d at 1166. We have\\n\\nalready set forth in detail the significant evidence presented at trial from which a\\n\\nrational jury could find each element of this conspiracy. That evidence was more\\n\\nthan sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict.\\n\\n\\n b. Count 2, kidnapping\\n\\n Count 2 charged Mr. Poterbin with kidnapping and, alternatively, aiding and\\n\\nabetting kidnapping. The district court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin\\n\\nof kidnapping, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he 1) knowingly\\n\\nkidnapped D.B. by seizing, confining, or holding him, 2) kidnapped D.B. for ransom,\\n\\nand 3) willfully used an instrumentality of interstate commerce—a cell phone—to\\n\\ncommit or further the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence for jurors to find\\n\\neither the first or the third element. He specifically contends that there was no\\n\\nevidence that he confined and held D.B. because D.B. was already being confined by\\n\\nMr. West and others before Mr. Poterbin arrived at the Ruby Avenue house. But\\n\\nthere was evidence from which a rational jury could find that, after he and Mr. Carr\\n\\narrived at the house, they continued to confine and hold D.B., blocking his exit,\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 11\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nbinding his arms, and eventually duct-taping his shirt over his head, in addition to\\n\\nbeating and torturing D.B.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin also argues that there was no evidence that he used a cell phone\\n\\nin connection with the charged kidnapping. Mr. Poterbin asserts that it was instead\\n\\nMr. Carr who used D.B.’s cell phone to call Ms. Vieni twice. During those calls, Mr.\\n\\nCarr engaged the speaker phone in the presence of Mr. Poterbin’s assault on D.B. to\\n\\nadvance Mr. Poterbin’s efforts to collect drug money he believed had been stolen by\\n\\nMs. Vieni. The purpose of the calls was so that Ms. Vieni could hear D.B. screaming\\n\\nand begging Ms. Vieni to bring back the money to Messrs. Carr and Poterbin. Based\\n\\non this evidence, a rational jury could find that Mr. Poterbin used a cell phone to\\n\\nfacilitate his kidnapping D.B. and holding him for ransom.\\n\\n Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could\\n\\nhave found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Poterbin aided and abetted Mr. Carr’s\\n\\nkidnapping D.B. and using a cell phone to facilitate that offense. See Ibarra-Diaz,\\n\\n805 F.3d at 932‒34 (holding, alternatively, that there was sufficient evidence to\\n\\nsupport a jury finding that the defendant aided and abetted the offense of possessing\\n\\ndrugs with the intent to distribute). That is, there was sufficient evidence for a\\n\\nreasonable jury to find that Mr. Carr committed all the elements of kidnapping, and\\n\\nthat Mr. Poterbin both willfully associated himself with the kidnapping and sought to\\n\\nmake that venture succeed through some action of his own. See id. at 932 (setting\\n\\nforth elements of aiding and abetting).\\n\\n\\n\\n 12\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n c. Count 7, using, brandishing and discharging a firearm during the\\n drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1\\n\\n Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with using, carrying, brandishing and\\n\\ndischarging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\\n\\nCount 1. Alternatively, Count 7 charged Mr. Poterbin with aiding and abetting that\\n\\noffense. The trial court instructed jurors that, to convict Mr. Poterbin of using,\\n\\nbrandishing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy charged in Count 1, they first had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that\\n\\nMr. Poterbin committed the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1. We\\n\\nhave already explained that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find\\n\\nthat element beyond a reasonable doubt.\\n\\n Second, the trial court instructed jurors they had to find that Mr. Poterbin used,\\n\\nbrandished and/or discharged a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking\\n\\nconspiracy. (The jury found he possessed, brandished, and discharged a firearm.)\\n\\nMr. Poterbin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support finding this\\n\\nsecond element because his possession and use of a firearm on April 18 was not in\\n\\nproximity to any methamphetamine or proceeds from methamphetamine sales. But\\n\\nthere was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt\\n\\nthat Mr. Poterbin used, brandished and discharged a firearm on April 18 to try to\\n\\ncollect a drug debt resulting from the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in Count 1.\\n\\nThat is sufficient. See United States v. Hamilton, 587 F.3d 1199, 1210 (10th Cir.\\n\\n2009) (citing cases holding that a drug conspiracy conviction can be based solely on\\n\\n\\n 13\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\nproof the defendant helped collect drug debts). That included evidence that when\\n\\nMessrs. Poterbin and Carr arrived at the Ruby Avenue house to try to get their drug\\n\\nmoney back, they brandished their guns in D.B.’s presence. Then they\\n\\npistol-whipped D.B. before Mr. Carr shot him.\\n\\n In a related argument, Mr. Poterbin asserts that the jury was confused by the\\n\\naiding-and-abetting instruction’s application to Count 7. The Government argued\\n\\nduring its closing that, if jurors found that it was Mr. Carr who shot D.B. in each leg\\n\\nor if they were not sure whether it was Mr. Carr or Mr. Poterbin who shot D.B.,\\n\\njurors could find Mr. Poterbin guilty of aiding and abetting that discharge. During\\n\\ndeliberations, the jury sent the court a question, asking for “further clarification on\\n\\nInstruction no. 18 [the aiding-and-abetting instruction] in relation to counts 6 and 7.\\n\\nSpecifically, if we believe both defendants were present and a weapon was\\n\\nbrandished and discharged, can a guilty verdict be inferred for one or both\\n\\ndefendants.” (R. 1.406.) The court answered: “The government must prove the First\\n\\nand Second elements detailed in Instruction 18, beyond a reasonable doubt. Please\\n\\nread Instruction no. 18 as a whole for further explanation of what the government\\n\\nmust prove.” (Id.) Both defense attorneys and the prosecutor approved the court’s\\n\\nresponse. The jury thereafter convicted Mr. Poterbin on Count 7, using, brandishing,\\n\\nand discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug-trafficking conspiracy charged in\\n\\nCount 1. To the extent jury confusion resulted in the note to the court, there is no\\n\\nindication that jurors were confused after the court’s response to their question.\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\n d. Credibility of Government witnesses Vieni and D.B.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin argues that “[t]here was insufficient evidence that any crime ever\\n\\noccurred because” Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. “have both lied to the police before.”\\n\\n(Aplt. S. Br. 3.) We construe this argument to assert that his convictions should be\\n\\noverturned because Ms. Vieni and Mr. D.B. lack credibility. In reviewing on appeal\\n\\nwhether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, however, we may not\\n\\nweigh the credibility of the evidence. See, e.g., Earls, 129 F.4th at 859. Moreover,\\n\\nthere was much more evidence than just Ms. Vieni’s and Mr. D.B.’s testimony that\\n\\nsupported Mr. Poterbin’s convictions.\\n\\n\\n 2. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his trial attorney provided constitutionally ineffective\\n\\nrepresentation. Specifically, Mr. Poterbin asserts that defense counsel failed to\\n\\nrecognize a flaw in the special verdict form; failed to recognize that the pattern\\n\\ninstruction, apparently on kidnapping, was erroneously amended to change the word\\n\\n“seized” to “seizing”; and gave Mr. Poterbin incompetent advice during the plea\\n\\nnegotiations, leading to Mr. Poterbin proceeding to trial.\\n\\n “We generally do not review an ineffective assistance of counsel argument on\\n\\ndirect appeal.” United States v. Sjodin, 139 F.4th 1188, 1206 (10th Cir. 2025). In fact,\\n\\n“[s]uch claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all\\n\\nwill be dismissed.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en\\n\\nbanc). The reason is that the defendant, in a later collateral 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding,\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nwill be able to develop the factual record often necessary to support his ineffective\\n\\nassistance claim. See id. “Even if evidence is not necessary, at the very least counsel\\n\\naccused of deficient performance can explain their reasoning and actions, and the district\\n\\ncourt can render its opinion on the merits of the claim.” Id. We, therefore, do not\\n\\naddress the merits of Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims now on direct appeal\\n\\nbut instead dismiss those claims without prejudice to his raising them in a collateral\\n\\nproceeding.\\n\\n\\n 3. Brady violation/ineffective assistance\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin next argues that his trial attorney committed a Brady 5 violation\\n\\nby failing to provide Mr. Poterbin with discovery that the Government turned over to\\n\\ndefense counsel. Brady and its progeny require the Government to turn over\\n\\nexculpatory evidence to the defense. See United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148,\\n\\n1196 (10th Cir. 2025). Mr. Poterbin’s contention, instead, is that his defense attorney\\n\\nfailed to provide Mr. Poterbin with the discovery that the Government turned over to\\n\\ndefense counsel. We deem that argument to assert defense counsel was ineffective, a\\n\\nclaim which we decline to address now in this direct criminal appeal. See Galloway,\\n\\n56 F.3d at 1240.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n5\\n Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).\\n 16\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\n 4. Procedural reasonableness of sentence\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin asserts that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because\\n\\nthe district court made several errors in calculating his total offense level under the\\n\\nsentencing guidelines and because the jury, rather than the sentencing court, should\\n\\nhave been required to find that these enhancements applied to his case. Because we\\n\\ncould not find where Mr. Poterbin raised these arguments at sentencing, we review\\n\\nthem for plain error. See United States v. Harbin, 56 F.4th 843, 845 (10th Cir. 2022);\\n\\nBrooks, 161 F.3d at 1247. “Under the plain error standard, we will vacate a sentence\\n\\nonly if” Mr. Poterbin can show: “(1) there is error, (2) that is plain; (3) that affects\\n\\nsubstantial rights, or in other words, affects the outcome of the proceeding; and\\n\\n(4) substantially affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial\\n\\nproceedings. . . . An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current, well-settled\\n\\nlaw.” United States v. Pena, 963 F.3d 1016, 1023 (10th Cir. 2020) (further quotation\\n\\nmarks omitted).\\n\\n\\n a. The district court’s application of offense-level enhancements\\n\\n Applying the 2021 Sentencing Guidelines, the district court calculated Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin’s total offense level based on his kidnapping conviction. The court began\\n\\nwith a base offense level of 32 for kidnapping, as provided by U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a).\\n\\nThe court then added three enhancements for a total offense level of 42. Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin, on appeal, asserts the district court erred in applying those enhancements.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\n i. Application of six-level enhancement for demanding a\\n ransom\\n\\n The district court added six offense levels under § 2A4.1(b)(1) because a\\n\\nransom was demanded. Mr. Poterbin argues that that was error because it double\\n\\ncounted the ransom, which was also an element of his kidnapping conviction, which\\n\\nthe base offense level already counted.\\n\\n Mr. Poterbin does not assert that either the Supreme Court or this court has\\n\\npreviously decided this question and we could not locate any such case. Two cases\\n\\nfrom other circuits have rejected this argument, for different reasons. See United\\n\\nStates v. Acevedo, 824 F.3d 179, 184‒85 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting argument that\\n\\napplication of six-level ransom enhancement is impermissible double counting,\\n\\nnoting U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a)’s base offense level will not always be based on a ransom\\n\\nbecause it also applies to kidnapping convictions where victim is held for “reward or\\n\\notherwise,” 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), as well as to convictions for offenses other than\\n\\nkidnapping); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 519‒27 (7th Cir. 2012)\\n\\n(holding guidelines’ structure permitted applying six-level enhancement for\\n\\nkidnapping involving ransom demand when ransom was also element of kidnapping\\n\\nconviction).\\n\\n We need not definitively decide the double counting question presented here.\\n\\nInstead, we conclude that Mr. Poterbin has failed to establish that any error the\\n\\ndistrict court may have made in applying § 2A4.1(b)(1)’s six-level enhancement was\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nplain error; that is, he has not shown that the error was “clear or obvious under\\n\\ncurrent, well-established law.” Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\\n\\n\\n ii. Application of a two-level enhancement for causing serious\\n bodily injury and another two-level enhancement for using a\\n dangerous weapon\\n\\n The district court also added two offense levels under U.S.S.G.\\n\\n§ 2A4.1(b)(2)(B) after finding that the victim, D.B., suffered “serious injury.” In\\n\\naddition, the district court added another two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3)\\n\\nbecause a dangerous weapon was used, based on D.B. being shot and stabbed. Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin contended that applying both of these two-level enhancements amounted to\\n\\nimpermissible double-counting. But again he fails to cite, and we have not found,\\n\\nany Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases holding that applying both of these\\n\\nenhancements amounts to impermissible double counting. Cf. United States v.\\n\\nCampus, 147 F.4th 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d\\n\\n1204, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000). We again need not definitively resolve this question in\\n\\norder to hold that Mr. Poterbin has not established that any error the sentencing court\\n\\nmade in applying both of these enhancements in his case was plain error; that is, error\\n\\nthat was clear or obvious. See Pena, 963 F.3d at 1023.\\n\\n\\n b. The sentencing court, rather than a jury, properly found the\\n sentencing guideline enhancements applied\\n\\n Lastly, Mr. Poterbin is incorrect in asserting that a jury had to find that these\\n\\nsentencing guideline enhancements applied to his case. See United States v. Walker,\\n\\n\\n 19\\n\\f Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\n74 F.4th 1163, 1193‒95 (10th Cir. 2023). The case on which Mr. Poterbin relies,\\n\\nErlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), is distinguishable. In Erlinger, the\\n\\nSupreme Court reiterated that a jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any factor\\n\\nthat increases the statutory maximum or statutory mandatory minimum sentence a\\n\\ndefendant faces. See id. at 833‒35. Here, based on the jury’s convicting Mr.\\n\\nPoterbin of kidnapping, he was subject to a statutory maximum life sentence. See 18\\n\\nU.S.C. § 1201(a). That never changed. The sentencing guideline enhancements only\\n\\nincreased his advisory guideline range within that statutory maximum. See Walker,\\n\\n74 F.4th at 1194‒95.\\n\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n We have determined that any error in admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence was\\n\\nharmless. We DISMISS Mr. Poterbin’s ineffective-assistance claims without\\n\\nprejudice. The rest of Mr. Poterbin’s challenges to his convictions and sentence also\\n\\ndo not warrant relief. We, therefore, AFFIRM his convictions and sentence.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30956,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10767599,"string":"10,767,599"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-31"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-4039"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before HARTZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Tenth Circuit\\n PUBLISH\\n December 31, 2025\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\nNORTH BREVARD COUNTY\\nHOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a Parrish\\nMedical Center,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\nv. No. 24-4039\\n\\nC.R. BARD, INC.; BARD ACCESS\\nSYSTEMS, INC.,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Utah\\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00144-RJS)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nR. Stephen Berry of Berry Law PLLC, Washington, D.C. (Brent O. Hatch of\\nHatch Law Group PC, Salt Lake City, Utah; Velvel Freedman, Edward\\nNormand, and Richard Cipolla of Freedman Normand Friedland LLP, New\\nYork, New York, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.\\n\\nBrian P. Quinn of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. (Andrew J.\\nFrackman and Colleen Powers, New York, New York; Sergei Zaslavsky and\\nEmily Murphy of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.; Andrew G. Deiss\\nand Corey D. Riley of Deiss Law PC, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the\\nbriefs), for Defendants-Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HARTZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nFEDERICO, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n North Brevard County Hospital, doing business as Parrish Medical\\n\\nCenter, filed an antitrust class action complaint against C.R. Bard, a\\n\\nmedical device manufacturer. 1 Parrish alleged that Bard engaged in\\n\\nunlawful tying of products and monopolization in violation of the Sherman\\n\\nAct and the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed Parrish’s tying claim\\n\\nfor lack of antitrust standing and denied class certification for Parrish’s\\n\\nmonopolization claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\\n\\naffirm the dismissal of Parrish’s tying claim and dismiss Parrish’s appeal\\n\\nfrom the denial of class certification.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Bard produces a range of medical devices, including a type of catheter\\n\\nknown as a peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC). PICCs are used\\n\\nto administer fluids into the bloodstream by passing through a patient’s\\n\\narm vein and into a vein near the heart. It is important that a PICC be\\n\\nprecisely placed within the patient’s body. Traditionally, this was done\\n\\nusing separate chest x-rays and fluoroscopy. Today, doctors generally use a\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 According to the complaint, Bard Access Systems, the other named\\n\\nDefendant-Appellee, is a subsidiary and division of C.R. Bard. We therefore\\nrefer to the Defendants-Appellees as one entity “Bard” for the purposes of\\nthis opinion, just as the parties do.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\ntip-location system (TLS) that automatically reports the PICC’s location\\n\\nthrough a combination of ultra-sound, magnetic tracking, and\\n\\nelectrocardiography.\\n\\n Parrish alleges that Bard is a leader in the TLS market and controls\\n\\n70 percent market share. It also alleges that Bard has used its commanding\\n\\nposition in the TLS market to manipulate the PICC market. Bard PICCs\\n\\nare sold with a proprietary tool known as a stylet that is required to\\n\\nintegrate the PICC with a Bard TLS. If a hospital wanted to use another\\n\\nbrand of PICC, it could not use a Bard TLS to determine the PICC’s location\\n\\nunless the hospital also purchased a Bard PICC to use the stylet.\\n\\n In simple terms, Parrish alleges that using one Bard product\\n\\neffectively forces hospitals to buy the other. This is known as “tying,” and,\\n\\nunder certain circumstances, it may be a violation of federal antitrust law.\\n\\nWhile Parrish did not buy Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), it claims\\n\\nthat Bard’s practices have allowed it to monopolize the PICC market (the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nalleged tied product), 2 suppressing competition and harming all buyers\\n\\nwhether or not they purchase PICCs in conjunction with TLSs. As a result\\n\\nof this purported tying between PICCs and TLSs, Parrish alleges that\\n\\nhospitals pay 9.7 to 34.5 percent higher prices for PICCs than they would\\n\\nin a competitive market.\\n\\n II\\n\\n In March 2020, Parrish filed suit against Bard. 3 Parrish’s complaint\\n\\ncontained two claims: illegal per se tying of separate products under Section\\n\\n1 of the Sherman Act and illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the\\n\\nSherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Parrish sought to certify a class\\n\\n\\n 2 This opinion will repeatedly distinguish between tying products and\\n\\ntied products. As a simple illustration to help keep them straight in mind,\\nthink of a balloon tied to a birthday cake. The buyer really wants the cake,\\nwhich is the best in town. But the baker will only sell cakes on the condition\\nthat the buyer also buys her balloons, which are a separate cost. So, the\\nballoon tags along, tied to the cake. The cake is the tying product – the\\nproduct that the consumer really wants. The balloon is the tied product –\\nthe product that the consumer doesn’t want but must buy to access the cake.\\nThis arrangement raises the overall cost to the buyer.\\n\\n Sometimes, the tie-in is explicit, like a contract that includes a term\\nrequiring the purchase of the tied product. Other times, it is more subtle,\\nas alleged here, when the seller requires the purchase of one product in\\norder to use and operate another product. See Daniel A. Crane, Tying Law\\nfor the Digital Age, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 821, 847, 851–56 (2024)\\n(providing historic examples of tying arrangements).\\n 3 Parrish originally filed in the District Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of New York. In February 2022, its case was transferred to the\\nDistrict of Utah, where Bard’s PICC business is headquartered.\\n\\n 4\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\ncomprised of hospitals, hospital systems, and clinics that had purchased\\n\\nBard PICCs, and requested damages and injunctive relief for this class\\n\\nunder the remedial provisions of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.\\n\\n Parrish filed a motion for class certification, while Bard filed a motion\\n\\nfor judgment on the pleadings. In November 2022, after hearing oral\\n\\nargument, the district court granted Bard’s motion with respect to Parrish’s\\n\\ntying claim. The district court found that Parrish did not have antitrust\\n\\nstanding to bring its claim for illegal tying because Parrish did not allege\\n\\nthat it also purchased Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), and so Parrish\\n\\ndid not show that it was forced to buy Bard’s PICCs (the alleged tied\\n\\nproduct).\\n\\n The district court allowed Parrish’s monopolization claim to proceed.\\n\\nIn response, Parrish filed a renewed motion for class certification. The\\n\\ndistrict court, however, denied this motion. It found that Parrish’s proposed\\n\\nclass failed to meet the required elements for class certification, and that\\n\\nits pleadings were insufficient to establish a basis for either a damages class\\n\\nor an injunctive class.\\n\\n Parrish petitioned for permission from this court to appeal the district\\n\\ncourt’s order denying class certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court\\n\\nof appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-\\n\\naction certification[.]”) This petition was denied. As a result, Parrish then\\n\\n 5\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nmoved for the district court to dismiss its monopolization claim with\\n\\nprejudice so that Parrish could appeal the entry of final judgment, which\\n\\nthe district court granted. Parrish then appealed. On appeal, Bard filed a\\n\\nmotion to dismiss the appeal from the district court’s class certification\\n\\norder, arguing that Parrish’s voluntary dismissal of the underlying\\n\\nmonopolization claim forecloses our jurisdiction over the class certification\\n\\norder. 4\\n\\n III\\n\\n We review a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings just as we would a\\n\\nRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38,\\n\\n566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). That is, we review\\n\\nde novo whether a plaintiff fails to plead facts that state a plausible claim.\\n\\nId. at 1223–24. In doing so, we take all facts in the complaint as true and\\n\\ndraw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Martin Marietta\\n\\nMaterials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016)\\n\\n(citation omitted). Likewise, “[w]e review questions of our appellate\\n\\njurisdiction de novo.” City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d\\n\\n1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Bard also seeks an order that Parrish pay fees and costs associated\\n\\nwith this motion, alleging that Parrish knowingly filed an appeal that is\\ncontrary to controlling law from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit.\\n\\n 6\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n Our disposition of this appeal begins with a general overview of\\n\\nsubstantive antitrust law before proceeding to whether Parrish has\\n\\nantitrust standing to pursue its tying claim against Bard. After describing\\n\\nthe antitrust standing doctrine in broad strokes and the parties’ arguments,\\n\\nwe hold that Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue its tying\\n\\nclaim against Bard because it is not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust\\n\\nlaws in this context.\\n\\n We turn next to Parrish’s class certification appeal and hold that we\\n\\ndo not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of class\\n\\ncertification because Parrish voluntarily dismissed the underlying\\n\\nsubstantive claim below. We therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss this\\n\\npart of the appeal. At this stage, however, we deny Bard’s request for\\n\\nsanctions.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The Sherman Act of 1890 sets out the major substantive rules of\\n\\nantitrust law. The Clayton Act of 1914 followed and, inter alia, provides private\\n\\nparties with relief for the violation of these rules. We begin this section by\\n\\nbriefly describing the substantive antitrust rule that Parrish accuses Bard of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nviolating before turning to the Clayton Act and whether it provides a cause of\\n\\naction for Parrish to pursue its claim against Bard.\\n\\n The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\\n\\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1.\\n\\nSometimes, a tying arrangement may fall within this prohibition. “A tying\\n\\narrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the\\n\\ncondition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or least\\n\\nagrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’”\\n\\nEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)\\n\\n(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958)). For\\n\\nexample, when a grocer sells sugar only on the condition that a buyer also\\n\\npurchases flour, the grocer has tied the purchase of flour to the purchase of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\nsugar and made a tying arrangement. Where a tying arrangement satisfies\\n\\ncertain additional requirements, it may violate the Sherman Act. 5\\n\\n Under the Clayton Act, private parties may sue alleged antitrust\\n\\nviolators and obtain treble damages or an injunction. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§\\n\\n4 (damages), 16 (injunction), 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737 (1914) (current version at\\n\\n15 U.S.C. § 15, 26). 6 But although the Clayton Act authorizes broad access to\\n\\nrelief, “the mere fact that the claim is literally encompassed by the Clayton Act\\n\\ndoes not end the inquiry.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.\\n\\nCalifornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983) (hereinafter\\n\\nAGC).\\n\\n A claimed injury “must be analyzed to determine whether it is of the type\\n\\nthat the antitrust statute was intended to forestall.” Id. at 540. “An additional\\n\\nfactor is the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.” Id. Relatedly,\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The Supreme Court requires proof of other elements to ensure that\\n\\nantitrust enforcement is focused on conduct that is anticompetitive: the\\nseller of the products must have “appreciable economic power” in the tying\\nmarket, and the tying arrangement must affect a “substantial volume of\\ncommerce” in the tied market. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).\\nNorthern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (“[I]f one of a dozen food stores\\nin a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar\\nit would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were\\nready and able to sell flour by itself.”).\\n 6 The remainder of this opinion, like most antitrust cases, will cite to\\n\\nthe Clayton Act using the section numbers found in the session law, not the\\nUnited States Code.\\n\\n 9\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n“[t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\\n\\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\\n\\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party” to\\n\\nsue. Id. at 542. These principles, along with others not relevant here, together\\n\\ndescribe the doctrine known as antitrust standing, which a plaintiff must\\n\\nsatisfy to obtain relief under the Clayton Act. 7\\n\\n This court has distilled the Supreme Court’s caselaw into the\\n\\nfollowing rule for antitrust standing: “a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘antitrust\\n\\ninjury;’ and (2) a direct causal connection between that injury and a\\n\\ndefendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” Sports Racing Services, Inc. v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 The Supreme Court has explained that the term “standing” can be\\n\\nmisleading when used to refer to statutory or “prudential” standing.\\nLexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125,\\n128 n.4 (2014). Whereas constitutional standing is jurisdictional, statutory\\nstanding really refers not to the jurisdiction of the court, but rather to\\n“whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular\\nplaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 127. Antitrust standing is a breed of statutory\\nstanding. Id. at 126. The phrase “antitrust standing” could be similarly\\nmisleading, but since our cases and the parties uniformly use this phrase,\\nwe will do the same.\\n\\n 10\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nSports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1997). 8 We\\n\\nexplained that with respect to the first element, “the standing analysis must\\n\\ntake into account the type of antitrust claim being asserted.” Id. Where the\\n\\nplaintiff asserts an antitrust injury based on a tying claim, “two types of\\n\\nparties may have standing . . . the purchasers who are forced to buy the tied\\n\\nproduct to obtain the tying product (the prototypical tying plaintiff), and\\n\\nthe competitor who is restrained from entering the market for the tied\\n\\nproduct.” Id. at 887.\\n\\n In Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., this court\\n\\nrearticulated the second element of the antitrust standing analysis: the\\n\\ncausal connection between the antitrust injury and the defendant’s\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Sports Racing is a Clayton Act § 4 case – that is, it described the rule\\n\\nof antitrust standing with respect to compensatory damages, not injunctive\\nrelief. Our cases, however, have not made a distinction between § 4\\n(damages) and § 16 (injunctions) cases with respect to these two elements\\nof antitrust standing analysis. See, e.g., B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that\\nmore than antitrust injury is required in order to establish antitrust\\nstanding even for injunctive relief); Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d\\n542, 543 (10th Cir. 1995) (enumerating factors relevant to second element\\nof antitrust standing analysis without distinguishing the relief sought).\\nEven if it were otherwise, however, Parrish has not argued that there is any\\nmaterial difference between antitrust standing for damages and injunctive\\nrelief. As Bard correctly points out, then, the matter is waived. United\\nStates v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019). We therefore assume\\nfor the purposes of this case that Sports Racing applies regardless of the\\nrelief sought.\\n\\n 11\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nunlawful conduct must be direct enough to demonstrate that the plaintiff\\n\\n“is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.” 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th\\n\\nCir. 2006). “Factors to be considered in this analysis include the directness\\n\\nor remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, which, in turn, depends\\n\\non the existence of other more directly-injured possible plaintiffs.” Id.\\n\\n(citing, inter alia, AGC, 459 U.S. at 542). We held that the existence of other\\n\\nparties who “would be more directly harmed by” the anticompetitive\\n\\nconduct will ordinarily defeat a plaintiff’s antitrust standing. Id.\\n\\n Our cases therefore establish the following framework: to obtain a\\n\\nprivate antitrust remedy under the Clayton Act, plaintiffs must establish\\n\\nan “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that\\n\\nflows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful[.]” Black v.\\n\\nOccidental Petro. Corp., 69 F.4th 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation\\n\\nomitted). An antitrust plaintiff “must also demonstrate that it is an efficient\\n\\nenforcer of the antitrust laws.” Abraham, 461 F.3d at 1268. These two\\n\\nrequirements faithfully apply the overarching principle: only plaintiffs who\\n\\nbest vindicate “the central interest in protecting the economic freedom of\\n\\nparticipants in the relevant market” have a right to sue under the Clayton\\n\\nAct. AGC, 459 U.S. at 538; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,\\n\\n479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495\\n\\nU.S. 328, 334 (1990).\\n\\n 12\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n The district court in this case held that Parrish lacked antitrust\\n\\nstanding under the first element of our test, antitrust injury. The district\\n\\ncourt read our precedent – specifically Sports Racing – as setting out an\\n\\nexhaustive list of potential plaintiffs who have an antitrust injury sufficient\\n\\nto challenge tying arrangements: “the purchasers who were forced to buy\\n\\nthe tied product to obtain the tying product, and the competitor who is\\n\\nrestrained from entering the market for the tied products.” Aplt. App. I at\\n\\n202–03. In other words, Sports Racing, as interpreted by the district court,\\n\\nestablishes a categorical rule excluding plaintiffs who bought only the tied\\n\\nproduct, and not the tying product. Because Parrish purchased only the tied\\n\\nproduct here, the district court relied on Sports Racing to reject Parrish’s\\n\\nantitrust standing.\\n\\n Parrish disputes this reading of our cases. It argues that because\\n\\ntying arrangements allow the seller to compel purchases of the tied product,\\n\\ndirect purchasers of the tied product are forced to pay higher prices in the\\n\\nmarket and that alone suffices to demonstrate an antitrust injury. Sports\\n\\nRacing neither considered nor decided this argument, according to Parrish,\\n\\nso that case should not be read to control this case. And Parrish argues\\n\\nSports Racing did not purport to set forth a categorical list of plaintiffs,\\n\\nexcluding all others, who have the right to challenge tying arrangements\\n\\nunder the Clayton Act.\\n\\n 13\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\n Bard responds by agreeing with the district court that Sports Racing\\n\\ndictates the outcome here. According to Bard, Sports Racing announced a\\n\\n“rule” that two types of plaintiffs have antitrust standing: tying product\\n\\npurchasers and competitors. Additionally, Bard argues that Sports Racing’s\\n\\nrule was necessary to its outcome: without a rule excluding tied product\\n\\npurchasers, Sports Racing would not have needed to relax the direct\\n\\npurchaser requirement so that the tying product purchaser in that case\\n\\ncould proceed.\\n\\n Taking these arguments into account, we instead resolve this case on\\n\\nan alternative ground. The district court did not analyze the second element\\n\\nof the antitrust standing analysis, efficient enforcer, because it granted\\n\\nBard’s Rule 12(c) motion based on the first element. Nor did Parrish address\\n\\nthe second element in its opening brief. That said, we are free to affirm on\\n\\nany basis supported by the record, even if it was not reached by the district\\n\\ncourt or addressed by the parties before us. Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc.,\\n\\n634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). Indeed, we commonly and properly do\\n\\nso, for as we said in Richison, the courts of appeals stand “ready to affirm\\n\\nwhenever the record allows.” Id. For several reasons, we reach and decide\\n\\nthis appeal based upon the efficient enforcer element.\\n\\n First, the parties did brief the second element, after Bard raised it as\\n\\nan alternative basis to affirm in its response brief. Second, because we have\\n\\n 14\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\nenough information before us to decide the issue, reaching it now would\\n\\nprevent this case “from needlessly bouncing back and forth between” us and\\n\\nthe district court. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nAnd third, as mentioned above, our application of the second element of\\n\\nantitrust standing is closely related to our interpretation of the first\\n\\nelement. We therefore discuss the efficient enforcer element of our antitrust\\n\\nprecedent, hold that Parrish is not an efficient enforcer, and affirm the\\n\\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order on that basis.\\n\\n B\\n\\n As we have recounted, Sports Racing held that in addition to antitrust\\n\\ninjury, a plaintiff must show “a direct causal connection between that injury\\n\\nand a defendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” 131 F.3d at 882. “The\\n\\nexistence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\\n\\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\\n\\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party\\n\\n. . . to perform the office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at\\n\\n542. In other words, we infer from the existence of more directly injured\\n\\nparties that the plaintiff before us is indirectly, or at least less directly,\\n\\ninjured. This inference is consequential because antitrust standing is not\\n\\nmerely a question of whether we have before us a proper plaintiff, but rather\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nwhether we have an “effective” plaintiff. B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\\n\\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006). 9\\n\\n The rationale for this procedural requirement is rooted in substantive\\n\\nantitrust law. Generally, antitrust laws “were enacted for ‘the protection of\\n\\ncompetition, not competitors[.]’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,\\n\\nInc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370\\n\\nU.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Put differently, the substantive prohibitions on\\n\\nanticompetitive conduct are concerned not with “its effect upon any\\n\\nindividual in the marketplace, but rather [] its effect generally upon\\n\\ncompetition in a particular market.” Daniel C. Richman, Note, Antitrust\\n\\nStanding, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309,\\n\\n1310 (1984). Thus, we “have required the plaintiff . . . to relate his private\\n\\ninjury to a more public wrong – a threat to competition in his own market.”\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 The efficient enforcer element of the antitrust standing inquiry is\\n\\nnecessarily comparative. But we caution that district courts should not end\\na plaintiff’s suit solely because it is not the best, most effective, or most\\nefficient plaintiff. The Clayton Act’s promise of “justice to every man,\\nwhenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws,” would\\nhardly be vindicated if only one plaintiff in the world had antitrust standing\\nto sue. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10\\n(1977). The efficient enforcer element does not require a plaintiff to exclude\\nall others to then seek relief. There will be instances (maybe many) where\\neven a “second-best” or third-best plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the\\nantitrust laws. SAS of Puerto Rico, Inc., 48 F.3d at 44. Even so, the efficient\\nenforcer element is more exacting than the antitrust injury element.\\nAntitrust injury alone is insufficient to state a cause of action.\\n\\n 16\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\nId. at 1312. The “broad principle of compensation” under the Clayton Act is\\n\\ntherefore qualified by a second element of antitrust standing. Id.\\n\\n We held in Abraham that the second prong of the antitrust standing\\n\\ninquiry requires a plaintiff to show “that it is an efficient enforcer of the\\n\\nantitrust laws.” 461 F.3d at 1268. “Factors to be considered in this analysis\\n\\ninclude the directness or remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff,\\n\\nwhich, in turn, depends on the existence of other more directly-injured\\n\\npossible plaintiffs.” Id. Other factors that may bear on the question include\\n\\nthe defendants’ motivations, “the speculative nature of the damages\\n\\nsought,” and “the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex damages\\n\\napportionment.” Sharp, 967 F.2d at 406–07.\\n\\n Bard argues that Parrish’s alleged antitrust injury is too distantly\\n\\nremoved from the alleged antitrust violation. Relying on Sports Racing,\\n\\nBard points out that it is the tying product purchasers who are the “targeted\\n\\nvictims of an illegal tying arrangement.” Resp. Br. at 34 (quoting Sports\\n\\nRacing, 131 F.3d at 889 n.15). Parrish, by contrast, does not experience\\n\\nmarket restraint to the same extent as victims who purchase both the tied\\n\\nand tying product because only those victims experience the “lack of choice”\\n\\nthat tying arrangements induce. Id. Parrish responds that the causal\\n\\nconnection between its antitrust injury and the alleged antitrust violation\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nis straightforward: because of the tying arrangement, Parrish must pay\\n\\nsupracompetitive prices for the tied product.\\n\\n On this point, we agree with Bard. Sports Racing held that in the\\n\\nusual case, “tying product purchasers . . . are in the best position to identify\\n\\nan illegal tie and have the most incentive to bring an action to enforce the\\n\\nprohibition against tying.” 131 F.3d at 889 n.15 (emphasis added). Although\\n\\nboth the tied-product purchaser and the tying-product purchaser may\\n\\nexperience an anticompetitive harm, Parrish does not contest that the\\n\\ntying-product purchaser experiences the harm to a greater extent. Thus,\\n\\nordinarily it is the tying product purchaser whose self-interest is best\\n\\naligned with the public interest, and therefore best positioned “to perform\\n\\nthe office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542.\\n\\n Parrish fails to persuade us that this is the rare case where tied-\\n\\nproduct purchasers are the efficient enforcer plaintiff as opposed to tying-\\n\\nproduct purchasers or competitors. Parrish claims that “the standard for\\n\\nantitrust causation is low,” citing out of circuit precedent. Reply Br. at 10–\\n\\n11. While that may well be true with respect to the antitrust injury element,\\n\\nParrish’s claim is irreconcilable with the efficient enforcer element. Parrish\\n\\nfurther argues that our task is “only to determine whether Parrish has\\n\\nadequate standing.” Id. at 12. But we foreclosed this argument in B-S Steel,\\n\\n439 F.3d at 667, as did the Supreme Court in AGC, 459 U.S. at 542. Finally,\\n\\n 18\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nwe are aware of at least one case where a competitor did sue Bard and\\n\\nlitigated its claims all the way through trial. AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R.\\n\\nBard, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 273 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2021), (denying cross-\\n\\nmotions for summary judgment); Judgment in a Civil Case, AngioDynamics,\\n\\nInc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2022 WL 18402240 (Oct. 6, 2022) (No. 1:17-cv-00598)\\n\\n(jury verdict in favor of Bard). The fact that Bard has already faced a\\n\\ncompetitor suit diminishes any concern that affirmance would leave an\\n\\nenforcement gap and underscores that there are other plaintiffs who are\\n\\nbetter positioned to enforce the antitrust laws. Parrish points to no other\\n\\nfactor favoring its right to sue.\\n\\n In a footnote, Parrish claims the district court found that Parrish was\\n\\nan efficient enforcer with respect to its monopolization claim, and that Bard\\n\\nconceded that the question of whether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of\\n\\nthe monopoly claim would be the same or overlap with the question of\\n\\nwhether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of the tying claim. But Sports\\n\\nRacing holds that a plaintiff may be an efficient enforcer for one antitrust\\n\\npurpose but not another. 131 F.3d at 884–85, 889 n.15. The district court’s\\n\\nlater findings with respect to monopolization (which are not binding on us\\n\\nin any event) do not prevent us from finding otherwise with respect to the\\n\\ntying claim. Moreover, we do not understand Bard’s purported concession\\n\\nto stand for anything more than antitrust standing for a monopolization\\n\\n 19\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\nclaim is “obviously related to but analytically distinct from the tying claim.”\\n\\nId. Monopolization and tying claims are related, but each survives, or not,\\n\\non its own terms.\\n\\n Here, Parrish’s tying claim does not survive. Parrish is not an efficient\\n\\nenforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore does not have antitrust\\n\\nstanding to sue Bard for its alleged per se violation of Section 1 of the\\n\\nSherman Act for the product tying arrangement.\\n\\n III\\n\\n In addition to the tying claim, Parrish also alleged a monopolization\\n\\nclaim in the district court under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After the\\n\\ndistrict court declined to certify a class for this claim, and we thereafter\\n\\ndeclined discretionary interlocutory review, Parrish voluntarily dismissed\\n\\nwith prejudice its monopolization claim to induce an appealable final\\n\\njudgment. Parrish now seeks our review of the district court’s order denying\\n\\nclass certification. But Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent\\n\\nforeclose our jurisdiction over the class certification order, so we cannot\\n\\nconsider it.\\n\\n We have mandatory jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions”\\n\\nof the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our jurisdiction over a final judgment\\n\\nextends to all interlocutory orders that merge into the final judgment.\\n\\nEdmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 985 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\n 20\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\nBut not all interlocutory orders merge. Where a plaintiff abandons\\n\\nremaining substantive claims to obtain immediate review as of right over a\\n\\nclass certification denial, the Supreme Court has held that there is no\\n\\njurisdiction over the class certification denial. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582\\n\\nU.S. 23, 27 (2017). This voluntary dismissal tactic “subverts the final-\\n\\njudgment rule,” “invites protracted litigation,” and “undercuts Rule 23(f)’s\\n\\ndiscretionary regime.” Id. at 37, 39.\\n\\n Applying Baker, we have held that when a plaintiff voluntarily\\n\\ndismisses their claims with prejudice and then seeks appellate review of a\\n\\nclass certification denial order, that order does not merge with final\\n\\njudgment, and our § 1291 jurisdiction therefore does not extend to the order.\\n\\nAnderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC, 904 F.3d 1135,\\n\\n1144–45 (10th Cir. 2018). 10 Parrish’s appeal from the district court’s class\\n\\ncertification order falls neatly within the scope of this rule and we therefore\\n\\nhave no jurisdiction to consider it. 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 The fact that the plaintiffs in Anderson Living Trust settled their\\n\\nindividual claims before voluntary dismissal was immaterial to this court’s\\nholding that Baker applies.\\n 11 We also decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the\\n\\ndistrict court’s class certification order because it is neither “inextricably\\nintertwined with” nor “necessary to ensure meaningful review of” the\\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order dismissing Parrish’s tying claim. Cummings\\nv. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n 21\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\n Also pending before us is Bard’s motion to dismiss this portion of the\\n\\nappeal relating to the class certification denial order. Doc. 23-1; see also\\n\\nFed. R. App. P. 27; 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1). Because we dispose of this\\n\\nargument in a way that provides part of the primary relief Bard requested,\\n\\nwe therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal of\\n\\nthe appeal from the district court’s order denying class certification. 10th\\n\\nCir. R. 2.1 (we have discretion to overlook technical errors under our local\\n\\nrules). However, at this point we deny Bard’s request for associated fees\\n\\nand costs, which must be sought by a “separately filed motion.” Fed. R. App.\\n\\nP. 38. Our denial of Bard’s request is without prejudice to any renewed\\n\\nrequest Bard may make post-judgment in accordance with applicable rules.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n Although we diverge from the rationale for the district court’s decision,\\n\\nwe AFFIRM its bottom line. Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue\\n\\nits tying claim against Bard. Parrish’s remaining claims of error are\\n\\nDISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 24-4039, N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., et al.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11234184/\", \"author_raw\": \"FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.\"}, {\"author\": \"FEDERICO, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"FEDERICO, Circuit Judge, concurring.\\n\\n\\n Although I join with my colleagues in the opinion of the court, I also\\n\\nwrite separately to address and discuss the injury element of antitrust\\n\\nstanding, which was the sole basis for the district court’s decision\\n\\ndismissing Parrish’s tying claim. The parties’ arguments on this legal\\n\\nquestion present a confounding understanding of our antitrust injury\\n\\nprecedent. The district court, relying upon Sports Racing Services, Inc. v.\\n\\nSports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1997), interpreted\\n\\nour caselaw to strictly exclude parties who purchase only tied products as\\n\\ntying claim plaintiffs. However, consistent with first principles of antitrust\\n\\nlaw, our case law sets forth a broad, flexible rule of antitrust standing.\\n\\n This court’s failure to reach and decide this critical issue is not an\\n\\nexercise of prudence. I first address our need to clarify this important\\n\\nelement of antitrust law – if not in this case, then in a future one. I then\\n\\nexplain why the district court’s decision, though understandable, was\\n\\nerroneous. Neither Sports Racing nor any subsequent case sets forth the\\n\\nkind of categorical rule excluding plaintiffs who purchase only the tied\\n\\nproduct from the antitrust laws’ remedial protections. In my view, district\\n\\ncourts should read our antitrust cases contextually and in harmony with\\n\\nthe general corpus of antitrust law, not against it.\\n 1\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 24\\n\\n\\n\\n I\\n\\n The existential purpose of appellate courts is the duty to correct legal\\n\\nerrors made by the district court. As an incident to this error-correcting\\n\\nduty, appellate courts also serve “the institutional function of announcing,\\n\\nclarifying, and harmonizing the rules of decision employed by the legal\\n\\nsystem in which they serve.” Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th\\n\\nCir. 1984). We do not perform these functions in the abstract. The appellate\\n\\njudge is not a “knight-errant,” tasked to sally forth and correct errors and\\n\\nannounce rules at will. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial\\n\\nProcess 141 (1921). But where, as here, such errors are properly brought\\n\\nbefore us, we should rightly correct them and expound our reasons for doing\\n\\nso.\\n\\n Parrish argues that the district court committed an error, which was\\n\\nthe sole basis for the decision on antitrust standing that we were tasked to\\n\\nreview. On appeal, this claimed error was fully briefed by all parties. It is\\n\\nwithin our jurisdiction to consider whether the district court erred here.\\n\\nAnd having properly invoked our jurisdiction to address this issue, Parrish\\n\\nhas also triggered our “virtually unflagging” duty to say what the law is.\\n\\nColorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,\\n\\n817 (1976). The court’s decision to resolve this appeal on alternative\\n\\ngrounds certainly does not deprive us of the authority to address the error\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 25\\n\\n\\n\\nthat Parrish complains of. If this court has the discretion to affirm on any\\n\\nbasis supported by the record, we also have the discretion to decide the issue\\n\\nthat was reached by the district court, is fully briefed by the parties, and is\\n\\nthereby central to the appeal before us. In my view, that was the correct\\n\\nway to proceed in deciding this appeal.\\n\\n First, the parties’ arguments set out opposite interpretations of the\\n\\nrule in Sports Racing (one of which aligned with the district court’s\\n\\nreasoning), which illustrates there is uncertainty or confusion concerning\\n\\nhow that decision applies in other market contexts. By looking the other\\n\\nway, we now add to the uncertainty and confusion that has been directly\\n\\nbrought to our attention.\\n\\n That uncertainty and confusion is particularly intolerable with\\n\\nrespect to antitrust law. Antitrust law relies on highly simplified, common-\\n\\nlaw-esque rules of decision and decentralized enforcement. That is why\\n\\ncourts applying antitrust principles must articulate clearly the law’s\\n\\nexpectations as to regulated parties. See A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust\\n\\nLaw and Its Critics, 83 Antitrust L.J. 269, 271–74 (2020) (observing that\\n\\nantitrust “principles and rules are largely made by judges.”). This case\\n\\nsmacks of confusion about our precedent, so there is a compelling need to\\n\\naddress it.\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 26\\n\\n\\n\\n Second, our application of the second element of antitrust standing\\n\\n(efficient enforcer) is closely related to our interpretation of the first\\n\\nelement (antitrust injury). Indeed, before Sports Racing, the Supreme Court\\n\\narticulated efficient enforcement as merely one factor in a holistic inquiry,\\n\\nrather than a two-step test. Associated General Contractors of California,\\n\\nInc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536–45 (1983).\\n\\nThus, it makes good sense in this case to also consider antitrust injury so\\n\\nthat we may properly analyze whether Parrish has standing as an efficient\\n\\nenforcer. But in failing to address the antitrust injury element, the court’s\\n\\nopinion leaves regulated entities and district courts to speculate as to our\\n\\nantitrust injury rules, which will collaterally affect the efficient\\n\\nenforcement analysis, given the strong ties between these doctrines.\\n\\n Although I join and respect my colleagues’ decision to travel down\\n\\nanother, narrower path of decision, I am concerned that by doing so we have\\n\\nalso needlessly added to the uncertainty regarding the antitrust injury\\n\\nelement. Our decision should address the properly presented, fully briefed,\\n\\nand central issue of whether the district court erred in its interpretation of\\n\\nour antitrust injury precedent. Our failure to do so leaves the parties, the\\n\\ndistrict court, and this court in impoverished circumstances. I write\\n\\nseparately with the goal to narrow the gap between uncertainty and clarity\\n\\n\\n\\n 4\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 27\\n\\n\\n\\nand turn now to the antitrust injury element that we should have\\n\\naddressed.\\n\\n II\\n\\n Because the parties’ arguments turn so heavily on our language and\\n\\nreasoning in Sports Racing, I will first examine that case in more detail. I will\\n\\nthen turn to the parties’ arguments and conclude that Parrish has the better\\n\\nread of our cases.\\n\\n Before diving into Sports Racing, it is worth observing that “the language\\n\\nof an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with\\n\\nlanguage of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979). That\\n\\nis especially true in the antitrust context, where common law-type adjudication\\n\\nprevails. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,\\n\\n899 (2007).\\n\\n A\\n\\n Sports Racing involved a unique set-up. The Sports Car Club of\\n\\nAmerica required all racers who wished to participate in its car races to\\n\\npurchase specialty cars and car parts from an authorized third-party\\n\\ndistributor. Sports Racing, 131 F.3d at 878. The third-party distributor, in\\n\\nturn, purchased the specialty cars and parts from the Club itself. Id. By\\n\\ntying participation in car races to the purchase of cars and parts, the Club\\n\\nwas able to charge higher prices for cars and parts and establish a monopoly\\n\\n 5\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 28\\n\\n\\n\\nin that market. Id. at 879. Two plaintiffs – a car racer and a distributor –\\n\\nsued the Club for antitrust violations. 1 Id at 878–79. As to the tying claim,\\n\\nwe held that both plaintiffs had antitrust standing.\\n\\n The distributor had antitrust standing because it was a “potential\\n\\ncompetitor,” or at least, at the summary judgment stage, had raised a\\n\\ngenuine dispute as to whether it was a “potential competitor.” Id. at 887.\\n\\nThe car racer had bought both the tied and the tying product and so had to\\n\\npay higher prices. Id. Thus, we said: “[r]elevant to plaintiffs’ claim, two\\n\\ntypes of parties may have standing to challenge illegal tying arrangements\\n\\n– the purchasers who are forced to buy the tied product to obtain the tying\\n\\nproduct (the prototypical tying plaintiff), and the competitor who is\\n\\nrestrained from entering the market for the tied product . . . Both types of\\n\\nplaintiffs are present here[.]” Id.\\n\\n But the racer-plaintiff had a problem. Longstanding precedent\\n\\nrestricted antitrust suits to plaintiffs who purchase the relevant product\\n\\ndirectly from the defendant. Illinois Brick Company v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,\\n\\n729–36 (1977); Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 587 U.S. 273, 277 (2019). The racer\\n\\nbought access to the races (tying product) directly from the Club, but\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n The racer (Freeman) was also the sole owner of the distribution\\n 1\\n\\ncompany (SRS). Sports Racing, 131 F.3d at 878.\\n\\n 6\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 29\\n\\n\\n\\nbecause the Club required all racers to buy their cars and parts (tied\\n\\nproduct) from an authorized third-party distributor, the racer did not\\n\\ndirectly purchase the tied product from the Club – indeed, no racer ever\\n\\ncould. Sports Racing, 131 F.3d at 889. There was thus no direct purchaser\\n\\nof both the tying and the tied product.\\n\\n We relaxed the direct purchaser rule and held that it was sufficient\\n\\nthat the Club had a “direct economic interest” in the sale of the tied product\\n\\nto the racer, even though it did not directly sell the product to him. Id. at\\n\\n888–89. Our analysis was driven in large part by the fact that the “only\\n\\nother possible” direct purchaser of the tied product was the distributor\\n\\naligned with the Club. Id. at 889 n.15. But that distributor was neither tied\\n\\nnor injured by the tie. Id. We said: “[b]ecause the tying product purchasers\\n\\n(here, the purchasers of racing services) are the targeted victims of an\\n\\nillegal tying arrangement, these purchasers are in the best position to\\n\\nidentify an illegal tie and have the most incentive to bring an action to\\n\\nenforce the prohibition against tying.” Id.\\n\\n B\\n\\n With the context and key aspects of Sports Racing now in view, I turn\\n\\nto the task of discerning whether, as Bard argues, Sports Racing\\n\\ncategorically forecloses the suit brought by Parrish. Even if Parrish is\\n\\ncorrect that the district court misinterpreted Sports Racing’s language, I\\n\\n 7\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 30\\n\\n\\n\\nam sympathetic to the district court’s dilemma. There is certainly language\\n\\nin Sports Racing that leans in Bard’s favor.\\n\\n First, there is the list, where we appeared to suggest that only\\n\\npurchasers of both the tied and the tying product and competitors have\\n\\nantitrust standing to challenge tying arrangements. Id. at 887. Second,\\n\\nthere is footnote 15 in the opinion, where we expressly rejected the\\n\\npossibility that the tied product purchaser could challenge the tying\\n\\narrangement. Id. at 889 n.15. But I am persuaded that our precedent does\\n\\nnot set forth a categorical rule that automatically excludes tied product\\n\\npurchasers from the list of potential plaintiffs who have suffered an\\n\\nantitrust injury.\\n\\n To begin with, the “list” of potential antitrust plaintiffs does not\\n\\nenumerate an exclusive set of entities who may challenge tying\\n\\narrangements. As Parrish correctly points out, context points the other way.\\n\\nWe qualified the pertinent statement in Sports Racing by acknowledging\\n\\nthat the list was only as “[r]elevant to plaintiffs’ claim.” Id. at 887.\\n\\nRestricting our discussion of antitrust standing to those archetypes\\n\\n“relevant to plaintiffs’ claims” signaled two things: 1) the unique market\\n\\narrangement in Sports Racing implicated those two types of possible\\n\\nplaintiffs, and only those two types; and 2) we did not intend to approve or\\n\\ndisapprove other types of potential plaintiffs because those other types, not\\n\\n 8\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 31\\n\\n\\n\\npresent in the case, were not relevant to plaintiffs’ claims. I therefore do not\\n\\nread this language in Sports Racing to consider or decide the question of\\n\\nwhether a plaintiff who buys only the tied product has suffered an antitrust\\n\\ninjury sufficient to confer standing to challenge a tying arrangement in all\\n\\ncases.\\n\\n Bard asks us to adopt a maximalist reading of footnote 15 to exclude\\n\\nall tied product purchasers from Clayton Act suits, but again, I conclude\\n\\nthat context demands a narrower interpretation of the rule from that case.\\n\\nThe tying arrangement in Sports Racing, by the court’s own terms, was “not\\n\\na typical tying situation.” Id. at 887. The structural role of third-party\\n\\ndistributors in the tying arrangement made it a unique market, and Sports\\n\\nRacing merely recognized this fact. Because the distributor was not,\\n\\npractically speaking, a true consumer of the tied product, it was not the\\n\\ntruly injured party. Id. at 889 n.15; see also Serpa Corp. v. McWane, Inc.,\\n\\n199 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[A] commercial intermediary, such as a\\n\\ndistributor or sales representative, generally lacks standing because its\\n\\nantitrust injury is too remote.”). But this determination was made without\\n\\ndistinction between tied and tying product purchasers.\\n\\n Moreover, the last sentence of footnote 15 strongly suggests that it is\\n\\nforeshadowing the efficient enforcer element of the antitrust standing\\n\\nanalysis, not opining on the antitrust injury element. Recall that we said:\\n\\n 9\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 32\\n\\n\\n\\n“Because the tying product purchasers (here, the purchasers of racing\\n\\nservices) are the targeted victims of an illegal tying arrangement, these\\n\\npurchasers are in the best position to identify an illegal tie and have the\\n\\nmost incentive to bring an action to enforce the prohibition against tying.”\\n\\nSports Racing, 131 F.3d at 889 n.15 (emphasis added). The court’s focus on\\n\\nthe best positioned party with the most incentive to sue for an antitrust\\n\\nviolation fits neatly with the efficient enforcer requirement we described in\\n\\nAbraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., as part of the second element\\n\\nin the antitrust standing analysis. 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006). So,\\n\\nalthough there is some ambiguity in footnote 15’s analysis, I read it to\\n\\naddress the second element of antitrust standing concerning efficient\\n\\nenforcement.\\n\\n Additionally, the district court relied on footnote 10 of Abraham,\\n\\nwhere without further reasoning we quoted Sports Racing to reject the\\n\\nantitrust standing of the plaintiffs there. 461 F.3d 1249, 1266 n.10 (10th\\n\\nCir. 2006)) But in Abraham, the plaintiffs did not buy any products at all –\\n\\nthey were competitors. 461 F.3d at 1266 n.10. Indeed, Abraham actually\\n\\nsupports Parrish’s reading of the caselaw, because it suggests that had the\\n\\nAbraham plaintiff purchased the tied product, the result might have been\\n\\ndifferent. Id. (“As the Plaintiffs neither purchase nor provide SEC [the tied\\n\\nproduct], they lack standing to assert this claim.”). Also, by tucking this\\n\\n 10\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 33\\n\\n\\n\\nlanguage in a footnote only, the Abraham court treated this principle of law\\n\\nas an aside. The language is at minimum ambivalent about antitrust injury\\n\\nand at most supports the view that purchasers of tied products alone can\\n\\nhave antitrust standing in the appropriate circumstances. That perhaps\\n\\nexplains why Bard did not respond to Parrish’s arguments about Abraham\\n\\nin its response brief.\\n\\n In all, I do not read Sports Racing or any of our other cases to set forth\\n\\na categorical rule excluding plaintiffs who purchase only the tied product\\n\\nfrom challenging a tying arrangement. My interpretation of Sports Racing\\n\\nis consistent with the Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of “formalistic\\n\\ndistinctions” in the interpretation and implementation of the antitrust\\n\\nlaws. E.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 466–67. We have also\\n\\nacknowledged that “the Supreme Court has avoided black-letter rules about\\n\\nantitrust standing.” Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 406 (10th\\n\\nCir. 1992). Bard’s position requires us to assume that we silently but\\n\\nsharply departed from this norm in Sports Racing. Bard offers no\\n\\nexplanation for why we would have inexplicably abandoned this norm, and\\n\\nI think that assumption is implausible.\\n\\n My interpretation of Sports Racing also minimizes any divergence\\n\\nfrom our sister circuits. In Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc., the Sixth Circuit\\n\\nrejected the argument that because a plaintiff declined to participate in the\\n\\n 11\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 34\\n\\n\\n\\ntying arrangement, he lacked antitrust standing to challenge a tying\\n\\narrangement. 623 F.2d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir. 1980). It explained “that this\\n\\nargument begs the question. [Plaintiff] has alleged a wrongful deprivation\\n\\nof money[.] He incurred this loss because of [Defendant’s] anticompetitive\\n\\nconduct[.]” The Sixth Circuit “therefore [found] that [Plaintiff] has properly\\n\\nclaimed an injury under Section 4 and may, accordingly, sue to recover\\n\\ndamages for the alleged violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.” Id.\\n\\nWhatever the factual distinctions between Ware and this case, the rule of\\n\\nantitrust injury that the Sixth Circuit applied is certainly more capacious\\n\\nthan the one Bard asks us to adopt via Sports Racing.\\n\\n Additionally, in Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Fourth Circuit\\n\\nrejected a rule of antitrust injury that would have turned on the plaintiff’s\\n\\nstatus instead of a more holistic, fact-bound inquiry. 505 F.3d 302, 310–14\\n\\n(4th Cir. 2007). Relying on circuit precedent like Bard does here, Microsoft\\n\\nasked the court “to adopt a bright-line rule that only consumers or\\n\\ncompetitors in the relevant market have antitrust standing.” Id. at 311.\\n\\nSuch a rule would have excluded Novell, which was neither. Id. at 308. But\\n\\nthe Fourth Circuit declined Microsoft’s invitation to potentially bring circuit\\n\\nprecedent into conflict with the Supreme Court. Id. at 311–14. Although\\n\\nNovell did not involve a tying claim, it set forth a general holding with\\n\\nrespect to antitrust standing that would encompass tying claims and\\n\\n 12\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 35\\n\\n\\n\\nforeclose Bard’s argument. My rejection of Bard’s categorical interpretation\\n\\nof our caselaw is therefore in harmony with at least the Fourth and Sixth\\n\\nCircuit. I am aware of no precedent to the contrary. 2\\n\\n In sum, I do not read Sports Racing as setting forth a brightline,\\n\\ncategorical rule of antitrust injury that constructs a permanent wall\\n\\nbetween tying and tied product purchasers. Direct purchasers of only tied\\n\\nproducts may sometimes have an antitrust injury and therefore satisfy the\\n\\nfirst element of our antitrust standing inquiry. Any language in Sports\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Although the argument that Parrish raises does not appear to be\\ndirectly resolved by other courts, nearly all the circuits caution against black\\nletter or brightline rules for antitrust standing. See, e.g., SAS of Puerto Rico,\\nInc. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 48 F.3d 39, 43–44 (1st Cir. 1995); Crimpers\\nPromotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1983); City of\\nPittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 1998); Los\\nAngeles Memorial Coliseum Com’n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356,\\n1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (no “mechanical tests”); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare\\nAuthority, 921 F.2d 1438, 1450–51 (11th Cir. 1991). So too have district courts\\ndeclined to apply hard and fast rules for antitrust standing, sometimes in cases\\nanalogous to this one. See, e.g., Warner Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data\\nGeneral Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 967 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Heartland Payment\\nSystems, Inc. v. MICROS Systems, Inc., 2008 WL 4510260, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept.\\n29, 2008). I am therefore satisfied that Bard’s position is contrary to the\\nmajority position of the circuit courts. Were I firmly convinced that Bard is\\nnonetheless correct about the law or the state of our precedent, this court would\\nbe duty-bound to depart from our sister circuits. But the consensus of our sister\\ncircuits (even at a high level of generality) is good evidence of the correct\\ninterpretation of the law, and here, we are offered little more than a strained\\ninterpretation of one of our cases as a basis to break from that consensus – too\\nthin a reed to bear the weight of a possible circuit split. United States v.\\nThomas, 939 F.3d 1121, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n 13\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 36\\n\\n\\n\\nRacing to the contrary is best read as addressing antitrust standing’s\\n\\nsecond element, the efficient enforcer requirement. 3\\n\\n III\\n\\n Almost four decades ago, the Seventh Circuit observed that the “issue of\\n\\nantitrust standing has become somewhat confused.” Local Beauty Supply, Inc.\\n\\nv. Lamaur Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1986). To the extent that\\n\\nconfusion persists about our precedents, which seems obvious given how this\\n\\ncase was presented and the district court’s decision that we are reviewing in\\n\\nthis appeal, we should not side-step our obligation to attempt to provide clarity.\\n\\n I would hold that Sports Racing does not categorically foreclose antitrust\\n\\nchallenges to tying arrangements that are brought by plaintiffs who have\\n\\npurchased only the tied product. Instead, our law establishes a broad, flexible,\\n\\nand fact-bound standard for antitrust standing: the plaintiff must show that\\n\\n1) they bear an antitrust injury; and 2) they are an efficient enforcer of the\\n\\nantitrust laws. Sports Racing does not establish any brightline rule under\\n\\neither of these elements, but with respect to the latter, Sports Racing and other\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 The panel opinion is correct to hold that Parrish fails to demonstrate\\n\\nthat it is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws in this context. But since\\nI would have held that tied product purchasers can, in some instances, have\\nan antitrust injury sufficient to challenge a tying arrangement, my\\nconcurrence should not be construed to foreclose the possibility that, in a\\nfuture case, a tied product purchaser could have an antitrust injury and\\nalso be an efficient enforcer of antitrust law.\\n\\n 14\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 37\\n\\n\\n\\nprecedent requires that tied-product purchasers show why they are efficient\\n\\nenforcers against tying arrangements, when tying-product purchasers and\\n\\ncompetitors are usually more directly injured. Here, Parrish has not met this\\n\\nburden. I respectfully concur in the opinion of the court and the affirmance of\\n\\nthe district court’s judgment.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 38\\n\\n\\n\\n24-4039, N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., et al.\\nHARTZ, J., concurring\\n\\n I join the opinion of Judge Federico for the court. As for his concurring opinion, I\\n\\nwould be inclined to agree with his reading of Sports Racing, but I think we are bound by\\n\\nfootnote 10 in Abraham, which I view as rejecting that reading.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11234184/\", \"author_raw\": \"FEDERICO, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"HARTZ"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"EID"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"FEDERICO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"HARTZ\": \", Circuit\", \"EID\": \", Circuit\", \"FEDERICO\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10767599/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-31\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nAppellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n United States Court of Appeals\n Tenth Circuit\n PUBLISH\n December 31, 2025\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n Christopher M. Wolpert\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\n _________________________________\n\nNORTH BREVARD COUNTY\nHOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a Parrish\nMedical Center,\n\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\n\nv. No. 24-4039\n\nC.R. BARD, INC.; BARD ACCESS\nSYSTEMS, INC.,\n\n Defendants - Appellees.\n _________________________________\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Utah\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00144-RJS)\n _________________________________\n\nR. Stephen Berry of Berry Law PLLC, Washington, D.C. (Brent O. Hatch of\nHatch Law Group PC, Salt Lake City, Utah; Velvel Freedman, Edward\nNormand, and Richard Cipolla of Freedman Normand Friedland LLP, New\nYork, New York, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.\n\nBrian P. Quinn of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. (Andrew J.\nFrackman and Colleen Powers, New York, New York; Sergei Zaslavsky and\nEmily Murphy of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.; Andrew G. Deiss\nand Corey D. Riley of Deiss Law PC, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the\nbriefs), for Defendants-Appellees.\n _________________________________\n\nBefore HARTZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\n _________________________________\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\n\n\n\nFEDERICO, Circuit Judge.\n _________________________________\n\n North Brevard County Hospital, doing business as Parrish Medical\n\nCenter, filed an antitrust class action complaint against C.R. Bard, a\n\nmedical device manufacturer. 1 Parrish alleged that Bard engaged in\n\nunlawful tying of products and monopolization in violation of the Sherman\n\nAct and the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed Parrish’s tying claim\n\nfor lack of antitrust standing and denied class certification for Parrish’s\n\nmonopolization claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\n\naffirm the dismissal of Parrish’s tying claim and dismiss Parrish’s appeal\n\nfrom the denial of class certification.\n\n I\n\n Bard produces a range of medical devices, including a type of catheter\n\nknown as a peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC). PICCs are used\n\nto administer fluids into the bloodstream by passing through a patient’s\n\narm vein and into a vein near the heart. It is important that a PICC be\n\nprecisely placed within the patient’s body. Traditionally, this was done\n\nusing separate chest x-rays and fluoroscopy. Today, doctors generally use a\n\n\n\n 1 According to the complaint, Bard Access Systems, the other named\n\nDefendant-Appellee, is a subsidiary and division of C.R. Bard. We therefore\nrefer to the Defendants-Appellees as one entity “Bard” for the purposes of\nthis opinion, just as the parties do.\n\n 2\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\n\n\n\ntip-location system (TLS) that automatically reports the PICC’s location\n\nthrough a combination of ultra-sound, magnetic tracking, and\n\nelectrocardiography.\n\n Parrish alleges that Bard is a leader in the TLS market and controls\n\n70 percent market share. It also alleges that Bard has used its commanding\n\nposition in the TLS market to manipulate the PICC market. Bard PICCs\n\nare sold with a proprietary tool known as a stylet that is required to\n\nintegrate the PICC with a Bard TLS. If a hospital wanted to use another\n\nbrand of PICC, it could not use a Bard TLS to determine the PICC’s location\n\nunless the hospital also purchased a Bard PICC to use the stylet.\n\n In simple terms, Parrish alleges that using one Bard product\n\neffectively forces hospitals to buy the other. This is known as “tying,” and,\n\nunder certain circumstances, it may be a violation of federal antitrust law.\n\nWhile Parrish did not buy Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), it claims\n\nthat Bard’s practices have allowed it to monopolize the PICC market (the\n\n\n\n\n 3\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\n\n\n\nalleged tied product), 2 suppressing competition and harming all buyers\n\nwhether or not they purchase PICCs in conjunction with TLSs. As a result\n\nof this purported tying between PICCs and TLSs, Parrish alleges that\n\nhospitals pay 9.7 to 34.5 percent higher prices for PICCs than they would\n\nin a competitive market.\n\n II\n\n In March 2020, Parrish filed suit against Bard. 3 Parrish’s complaint\n\ncontained two claims: illegal per se tying of separate products under Section\n\n1 of the Sherman Act and illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the\n\nSherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Parrish sought to certify a class\n\n\n 2 This opinion will repeatedly distinguish between tying products and\n\ntied products. As a simple illustration to help keep them straight in mind,\nthink of a balloon tied to a birthday cake. The buyer really wants the cake,\nwhich is the best in town. But the baker will only sell cakes on the condition\nthat the buyer also buys her balloons, which are a separate cost. So, the\nballoon tags along, tied to the cake. The cake is the tying product – the\nproduct that the consumer really wants. The balloon is the tied product –\nthe product that the consumer doesn’t want but must buy to access the cake.\nThis arrangement raises the overall cost to the buyer.\n\n Sometimes, the tie-in is explicit, like a contract that includes a term\nrequiring the purchase of the tied product. Other times, it is more subtle,\nas alleged here, when the seller requires the purchase of one product in\norder to use and operate another product. See Daniel A. Crane, Tying Law\nfor the Digital Age, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 821, 847, 851–56 (2024)\n(providing historic examples of tying arrangements).\n 3 Parrish originally filed in the District Court for the Northern\nDistrict of New York. In February 2022, its case was transferred to the\nDistrict of Utah, where Bard’s PICC business is headquartered.\n\n 4\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\n\n\n\ncomprised of hospitals, hospital systems, and clinics that had purchased\n\nBard PICCs, and requested damages and injunctive relief for this class\n\nunder the remedial provisions of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.\n\n Parrish filed a motion for class certification, while Bard filed a motion\n\nfor judgment on the pleadings. In November 2022, after hearing oral\n\nargument, the district court granted Bard’s motion with respect to Parrish’s\n\ntying claim. The district court found that Parrish did not have antitrust\n\nstanding to bring its claim for illegal tying because Parrish did not allege\n\nthat it also purchased Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), and so Parrish\n\ndid not show that it was forced to buy Bard’s PICCs (the alleged tied\n\nproduct).\n\n The district court allowed Parrish’s monopolization claim to proceed.\n\nIn response, Parrish filed a renewed motion for class certification. The\n\ndistrict court, however, denied this motion. It found that Parrish’s proposed\n\nclass failed to meet the required elements for class certification, and that\n\nits pleadings were insufficient to establish a basis for either a damages class\n\nor an injunctive class.\n\n Parrish petitioned for permission from this court to appeal the district\n\ncourt’s order denying class certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court\n\nof appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-\n\naction certification[.]”) This petition was denied. As a result, Parrish then\n\n 5\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\n\n\n\nmoved for the district court to dismiss its monopolization claim with\n\nprejudice so that Parrish could appeal the entry of final judgment, which\n\nthe district court granted. Parrish then appealed. On appeal, Bard filed a\n\nmotion to dismiss the appeal from the district court’s class certification\n\norder, arguing that Parrish’s voluntary dismissal of the underlying\n\nmonopolization claim forecloses our jurisdiction over the class certification\n\norder. 4\n\n III\n\n We review a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings just as we would a\n\nRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38,\n\n566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). That is, we review\n\nde novo whether a plaintiff fails to plead facts that state a plausible claim.\n\nId. at 1223–24. In doing so, we take all facts in the complaint as true and\n\ndraw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Martin Marietta\n\nMaterials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016)\n\n(citation omitted). Likewise, “[w]e review questions of our appellate\n\njurisdiction de novo.” City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d\n\n1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2017).\n\n\n\n 4 Bard also seeks an order that Parrish pay fees and costs associated\n\nwith this motion, alleging that Parrish knowingly filed an appeal that is\ncontrary to controlling law from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit.\n\n 6\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\n\n\n\n Our disposition of this appeal begins with a general overview of\n\nsubstantive antitrust law before proceeding to whether Parrish has\n\nantitrust standing to pursue its tying claim against Bard. After describing\n\nthe antitrust standing doctrine in broad strokes and the parties’ arguments,\n\nwe hold that Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue its tying\n\nclaim against Bard because it is not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust\n\nlaws in this context.\n\n We turn next to Parrish’s class certification appeal and hold that we\n\ndo not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of class\n\ncertification because Parrish voluntarily dismissed the underlying\n\nsubstantive claim below. We therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss this\n\npart of the appeal. At this stage, however, we deny Bard’s request for\n\nsanctions.\n\n A\n\n The Sherman Act of 1890 sets out the major substantive rules of\n\nantitrust law. The Clayton Act of 1914 followed and, inter alia, provides private\n\nparties with relief for the violation of these rules. We begin this section by\n\nbriefly describing the substantive antitrust rule that Parrish accuses Bard of\n\n\n\n\n 7\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\n\n\n\nviolating before turning to the Clayton Act and whether it provides a cause of\n\naction for Parrish to pursue its claim against Bard.\n\n The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\n\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1.\n\nSometimes, a tying arrangement may fall within this prohibition. “A tying\n\narrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the\n\ncondition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or least\n\nagrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’”\n\nEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)\n\n(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958)). For\n\nexample, when a grocer sells sugar only on the condition that a buyer also\n\npurchases flour, the grocer has tied the purchase of flour to the purchase of\n\n\n\n\n 8\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\n\n\n\nsugar and made a tying arrangement. Where a tying arrangement satisfies\n\ncertain additional requirements, it may violate the Sherman Act. 5\n\n Under the Clayton Act, private parties may sue alleged antitrust\n\nviolators and obtain treble damages or an injunction. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§\n\n4 (damages), 16 (injunction), 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737 (1914) (current version at\n\n15 U.S.C. § 15, 26). 6 But although the Clayton Act authorizes broad access to\n\nrelief, “the mere fact that the claim is literally encompassed by the Clayton Act\n\ndoes not end the inquiry.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.\n\nCalifornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983) (hereinafter\n\nAGC).\n\n A claimed injury “must be analyzed to determine whether it is of the type\n\nthat the antitrust statute was intended to forestall.” Id. at 540. “An additional\n\nfactor is the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.” Id. Relatedly,\n\n\n\n 5 The Supreme Court requires proof of other elements to ensure that\n\nantitrust enforcement is focused on conduct that is anticompetitive: the\nseller of the products must have “appreciable economic power” in the tying\nmarket, and the tying arrangement must affect a “substantial volume of\ncommerce” in the tied market. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).\nNorthern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (“[I]f one of a dozen food stores\nin a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar\nit would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were\nready and able to sell flour by itself.”).\n 6 The remainder of this opinion, like most antitrust cases, will cite to\n\nthe Clayton Act using the section numbers found in the session law, not the\nUnited States Code.\n\n 9\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\n\n\n\n“[t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\n\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\n\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party” to\n\nsue. Id. at 542. These principles, along with others not relevant here, together\n\ndescribe the doctrine known as antitrust standing, which a plaintiff must\n\nsatisfy to obtain relief under the Clayton Act. 7\n\n This court has distilled the Supreme Court’s caselaw into the\n\nfollowing rule for antitrust standing: “a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘antitrust\n\ninjury;’ and (2) a direct causal connection between that injury and a\n\ndefendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” Sports Racing Services, Inc. v.\n\n\n\n\n 7 The Supreme Court has explained that the term “standing” can be\n\nmisleading when used to refer to statutory or “prudential” standing.\nLexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125,\n128 n.4 (2014). Whereas constitutional standing is jurisdictional, statutory\nstanding really refers not to the jurisdiction of the court, but rather to\n“whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular\nplaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 127. Antitrust standing is a breed of statutory\nstanding. Id. at 126. The phrase “antitrust standing” could be similarly\nmisleading, but since our cases and the parties uniformly use this phrase,\nwe will do the same.\n\n 10\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\n\n\n\nSports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1997). 8 We\n\nexplained that with respect to the first element, “the standing analysis must\n\ntake into account the type of antitrust claim being asserted.” Id. Where the\n\nplaintiff asserts an antitrust injury based on a tying claim, “two types of\n\nparties may have standing . . . the purchasers who are forced to buy the tied\n\nproduct to obtain the tying product (the prototypical tying plaintiff), and\n\nthe competitor who is restrained from entering the market for the tied\n\nproduct.” Id. at 887.\n\n In Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., this court\n\nrearticulated the second element of the antitrust standing analysis: the\n\ncausal connection between the antitrust injury and the defendant’s\n\n\n\n\n 8 Sports Racing is a Clayton Act § 4 case – that is, it described the rule\n\nof antitrust standing with respect to compensatory damages, not injunctive\nrelief. Our cases, however, have not made a distinction between § 4\n(damages) and § 16 (injunctions) cases with respect to these two elements\nof antitrust standing analysis. See, e.g., B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that\nmore than antitrust injury is required in order to establish antitrust\nstanding even for injunctive relief); Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d\n542, 543 (10th Cir. 1995) (enumerating factors relevant to second element\nof antitrust standing analysis without distinguishing the relief sought).\nEven if it were otherwise, however, Parrish has not argued that there is any\nmaterial difference between antitrust standing for damages and injunctive\nrelief. As Bard correctly points out, then, the matter is waived. United\nStates v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019). We therefore assume\nfor the purposes of this case that Sports Racing applies regardless of the\nrelief sought.\n\n 11\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\n\n\n\nunlawful conduct must be direct enough to demonstrate that the plaintiff\n\n“is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.” 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th\n\nCir. 2006). “Factors to be considered in this analysis include the directness\n\nor remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, which, in turn, depends\n\non the existence of other more directly-injured possible plaintiffs.” Id.\n\n(citing, inter alia, AGC, 459 U.S. at 542). We held that the existence of other\n\nparties who “would be more directly harmed by” the anticompetitive\n\nconduct will ordinarily defeat a plaintiff’s antitrust standing. Id.\n\n Our cases therefore establish the following framework: to obtain a\n\nprivate antitrust remedy under the Clayton Act, plaintiffs must establish\n\nan “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that\n\nflows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful[.]” Black v.\n\nOccidental Petro. Corp., 69 F.4th 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation\n\nomitted). An antitrust plaintiff “must also demonstrate that it is an efficient\n\nenforcer of the antitrust laws.” Abraham, 461 F.3d at 1268. These two\n\nrequirements faithfully apply the overarching principle: only plaintiffs who\n\nbest vindicate “the central interest in protecting the economic freedom of\n\nparticipants in the relevant market” have a right to sue under the Clayton\n\nAct. AGC, 459 U.S. at 538; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,\n\n479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495\n\nU.S. 328, 334 (1990).\n\n 12\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\n\n\n\n The district court in this case held that Parrish lacked antitrust\n\nstanding under the first element of our test, antitrust injury. The district\n\ncourt read our precedent – specifically Sports Racing – as setting out an\n\nexhaustive list of potential plaintiffs who have an antitrust injury sufficient\n\nto challenge tying arrangements: “the purchasers who were forced to buy\n\nthe tied product to obtain the tying product, and the competitor who is\n\nrestrained from entering the market for the tied products.” Aplt. App. I at\n\n202–03. In other words, Sports Racing, as interpreted by the district court,\n\nestablishes a categorical rule excluding plaintiffs who bought only the tied\n\nproduct, and not the tying product. Because Parrish purchased only the tied\n\nproduct here, the district court relied on Sports Racing to reject Parrish’s\n\nantitrust standing.\n\n Parrish disputes this reading of our cases. It argues that because\n\ntying arrangements allow the seller to compel purchases of the tied product,\n\ndirect purchasers of the tied product are forced to pay higher prices in the\n\nmarket and that alone suffices to demonstrate an antitrust injury. Sports\n\nRacing neither considered nor decided this argument, according to Parrish,\n\nso that case should not be read to control this case. And Parrish argues\n\nSports Racing did not purport to set forth a categorical list of plaintiffs,\n\nexcluding all others, who have the right to challenge tying arrangements\n\nunder the Clayton Act.\n\n 13\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\n\n\n\n Bard responds by agreeing with the district court that Sports Racing\n\ndictates the outcome here. According to Bard, Sports Racing announced a\n\n“rule” that two types of plaintiffs have antitrust standing: tying product\n\npurchasers and competitors. Additionally, Bard argues that Sports Racing’s\n\nrule was necessary to its outcome: without a rule excluding tied product\n\npurchasers, Sports Racing would not have needed to relax the direct\n\npurchaser requirement so that the tying product purchaser in that case\n\ncould proceed.\n\n Taking these arguments into account, we instead resolve this case on\n\nan alternative ground. The district court did not analyze the second element\n\nof the antitrust standing analysis, efficient enforcer, because it granted\n\nBard’s Rule 12(c) motion based on the first element. Nor did Parrish address\n\nthe second element in its opening brief. That said, we are free to affirm on\n\nany basis supported by the record, even if it was not reached by the district\n\ncourt or addressed by the parties before us. Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc.,\n\n634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). Indeed, we commonly and properly do\n\nso, for as we said in Richison, the courts of appeals stand “ready to affirm\n\nwhenever the record allows.” Id. For several reasons, we reach and decide\n\nthis appeal based upon the efficient enforcer element.\n\n First, the parties did brief the second element, after Bard raised it as\n\nan alternative basis to affirm in its response brief. Second, because we have\n\n 14\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\n\n\n\nenough information before us to decide the issue, reaching it now would\n\nprevent this case “from needlessly bouncing back and forth between” us and\n\nthe district court. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2016).\n\nAnd third, as mentioned above, our application of the second element of\n\nantitrust standing is closely related to our interpretation of the first\n\nelement. We therefore discuss the efficient enforcer element of our antitrust\n\nprecedent, hold that Parrish is not an efficient enforcer, and affirm the\n\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order on that basis.\n\n B\n\n As we have recounted, Sports Racing held that in addition to antitrust\n\ninjury, a plaintiff must show “a direct causal connection between that injury\n\nand a defendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” 131 F.3d at 882. “The\n\nexistence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\n\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\n\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party\n\n. . . to perform the office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at\n\n542. In other words, we infer from the existence of more directly injured\n\nparties that the plaintiff before us is indirectly, or at least less directly,\n\ninjured. This inference is consequential because antitrust standing is not\n\nmerely a question of whether we have before us a proper plaintiff, but rather\n\n\n\n 15\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\n\n\n\nwhether we have an “effective” plaintiff. B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\n\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006). 9\n\n The rationale for this procedural requirement is rooted in substantive\n\nantitrust law. Generally, antitrust laws “were enacted for ‘the protection of\n\ncompetition, not competitors[.]’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,\n\nInc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370\n\nU.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Put differently, the substantive prohibitions on\n\nanticompetitive conduct are concerned not with “its effect upon any\n\nindividual in the marketplace, but rather [] its effect generally upon\n\ncompetition in a particular market.” Daniel C. Richman, Note, Antitrust\n\nStanding, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309,\n\n1310 (1984). Thus, we “have required the plaintiff . . . to relate his private\n\ninjury to a more public wrong – a threat to competition in his own market.”\n\n\n\n 9 The efficient enforcer element of the antitrust standing inquiry is\n\nnecessarily comparative. But we caution that district courts should not end\na plaintiff’s suit solely because it is not the best, most effective, or most\nefficient plaintiff. The Clayton Act’s promise of “justice to every man,\nwhenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws,” would\nhardly be vindicated if only one plaintiff in the world had antitrust standing\nto sue. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10\n(1977). The efficient enforcer element does not require a plaintiff to exclude\nall others to then seek relief. There will be instances (maybe many) where\neven a “second-best” or third-best plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the\nantitrust laws. SAS of Puerto Rico, Inc., 48 F.3d at 44. Even so, the efficient\nenforcer element is more exacting than the antitrust injury element.\nAntitrust injury alone is insufficient to state a cause of action.\n\n 16\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\n\n\n\nId. at 1312. The “broad principle of compensation” under the Clayton Act is\n\ntherefore qualified by a second element of antitrust standing. Id.\n\n We held in Abraham that the second prong of the antitrust standing\n\ninquiry requires a plaintiff to show “that it is an efficient enforcer of the\n\nantitrust laws.” 461 F.3d at 1268. “Factors to be considered in this analysis\n\ninclude the directness or remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff,\n\nwhich, in turn, depends on the existence of other more directly-injured\n\npossible plaintiffs.” Id. Other factors that may bear on the question include\n\nthe defendants’ motivations, “the speculative nature of the damages\n\nsought,” and “the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex damages\n\napportionment.” Sharp, 967 F.2d at 406–07.\n\n Bard argues that Parrish’s alleged antitrust injury is too distantly\n\nremoved from the alleged antitrust violation. Relying on Sports Racing,\n\nBard points out that it is the tying product purchasers who are the “targeted\n\nvictims of an illegal tying arrangement.” Resp. Br. at 34 (quoting Sports\n\nRacing, 131 F.3d at 889 n.15). Parrish, by contrast, does not experience\n\nmarket restraint to the same extent as victims who purchase both the tied\n\nand tying product because only those victims experience the “lack of choice”\n\nthat tying arrangements induce. Id. Parrish responds that the causal\n\nconnection between its antitrust injury and the alleged antitrust violation\n\n\n\n 17\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\n\n\n\nis straightforward: because of the tying arrangement, Parrish must pay\n\nsupracompetitive prices for the tied product.\n\n On this point, we agree with Bard. Sports Racing held that in the\n\nusual case, “tying product purchasers . . . are in the best position to identify\n\nan illegal tie and have the most incentive to bring an action to enforce the\n\nprohibition against tying.” 131 F.3d at 889 n.15 (emphasis added). Although\n\nboth the tied-product purchaser and the tying-product purchaser may\n\nexperience an anticompetitive harm, Parrish does not contest that the\n\ntying-product purchaser experiences the harm to a greater extent. Thus,\n\nordinarily it is the tying product purchaser whose self-interest is best\n\naligned with the public interest, and therefore best positioned “to perform\n\nthe office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542.\n\n Parrish fails to persuade us that this is the rare case where tied-\n\nproduct purchasers are the efficient enforcer plaintiff as opposed to tying-\n\nproduct purchasers or competitors. Parrish claims that “the standard for\n\nantitrust causation is low,” citing out of circuit precedent. Reply Br. at 10–\n\n11. While that may well be true with respect to the antitrust injury element,\n\nParrish’s claim is irreconcilable with the efficient enforcer element. Parrish\n\nfurther argues that our task is “only to determine whether Parrish has\n\nadequate standing.” Id. at 12. But we foreclosed this argument in B-S Steel,\n\n439 F.3d at 667, as did the Supreme Court in AGC, 459 U.S. at 542. Finally,\n\n 18\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\n\n\n\nwe are aware of at least one case where a competitor did sue Bard and\n\nlitigated its claims all the way through trial. AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R.\n\nBard, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 273 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2021), (denying cross-\n\nmotions for summary judgment); Judgment in a Civil Case, AngioDynamics,\n\nInc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2022 WL 18402240 (Oct. 6, 2022) (No. 1:17-cv-00598)\n\n(jury verdict in favor of Bard). The fact that Bard has already faced a\n\ncompetitor suit diminishes any concern that affirmance would leave an\n\nenforcement gap and underscores that there are other plaintiffs who are\n\nbetter positioned to enforce the antitrust laws. Parrish points to no other\n\nfactor favoring its right to sue.\n\n In a footnote, Parrish claims the district court found that Parrish was\n\nan efficient enforcer with respect to its monopolization claim, and that Bard\n\nconceded that the question of whether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of\n\nthe monopoly claim would be the same or overlap with the question of\n\nwhether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of the tying claim. But Sports\n\nRacing holds that a plaintiff may be an efficient enforcer for one antitrust\n\npurpose but not another. 131 F.3d at 884–85, 889 n.15. The district court’s\n\nlater findings with respect to monopolization (which are not binding on us\n\nin any event) do not prevent us from finding otherwise with respect to the\n\ntying claim. Moreover, we do not understand Bard’s purported concession\n\nto stand for anything more than antitrust standing for a monopolization\n\n 19\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\n\n\n\nclaim is “obviously related to but analytically distinct from the tying claim.”\n\nId. Monopolization and tying claims are related, but each survives, or not,\n\non its own terms.\n\n Here, Parrish’s tying claim does not survive. Parrish is not an efficient\n\nenforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore does not have antitrust\n\nstanding to sue Bard for its alleged per se violation of Section 1 of the\n\nSherman Act for the product tying arrangement.\n\n III\n\n In addition to the tying claim, Parrish also alleged a monopolization\n\nclaim in the district court under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After the\n\ndistrict court declined to certify a class for this claim, and we thereafter\n\ndeclined discretionary interlocutory review, Parrish voluntarily dismissed\n\nwith prejudice its monopolization claim to induce an appealable final\n\njudgment. Parrish now seeks our review of the district court’s order denying\n\nclass certification. But Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent\n\nforeclose our jurisdiction over the class certification order, so we cannot\n\nconsider it.\n\n We have mandatory jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions”\n\nof the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our jurisdiction over a final judgment\n\nextends to all interlocutory orders that merge into the final judgment.\n\nEdmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 985 (10th Cir. 2021).\n\n 20\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 21\n\n\n\nBut not all interlocutory orders merge. Where a plaintiff abandons\n\nremaining substantive claims to obtain immediate review as of right over a\n\nclass certification denial, the Supreme Court has held that there is no\n\njurisdiction over the class certification denial. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582\n\nU.S. 23, 27 (2017). This voluntary dismissal tactic “subverts the final-\n\njudgment rule,” “invites protracted litigation,” and “undercuts Rule 23(f)’s\n\ndiscretionary regime.” Id. at 37, 39.\n\n Applying Baker, we have held that when a plaintiff voluntarily\n\ndismisses their claims with prejudice and then seeks appellate review of a\n\nclass certification denial order, that order does not merge with final\n\njudgment, and our § 1291 jurisdiction therefore does not extend to the order.\n\nAnderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC, 904 F.3d 1135,\n\n1144–45 (10th Cir. 2018). 10 Parrish’s appeal from the district court’s class\n\ncertification order falls neatly within the scope of this rule and we therefore\n\nhave no jurisdiction to consider it. 11\n\n\n\n 10 The fact that the plaintiffs in Anderson Living Trust settled their\n\nindividual claims before voluntary dismissal was immaterial to this court’s\nholding that Baker applies.\n 11 We also decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the\n\ndistrict court’s class certification order because it is neither “inextricably\nintertwined with” nor “necessary to ensure meaningful review of” the\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order dismissing Parrish’s tying claim. Cummings\nv. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2019).\n\n 21\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 22\n\n\n\n Also pending before us is Bard’s motion to dismiss this portion of the\n\nappeal relating to the class certification denial order. Doc. 23-1; see also\n\nFed. R. App. P. 27; 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1). Because we dispose of this\n\nargument in a way that provides part of the primary relief Bard requested,\n\nwe therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal of\n\nthe appeal from the district court’s order denying class certification. 10th\n\nCir. R. 2.1 (we have discretion to overlook technical errors under our local\n\nrules). However, at this point we deny Bard’s request for associated fees\n\nand costs, which must be sought by a “separately filed motion.” Fed. R. App.\n\nP. 38. Our denial of Bard’s request is without prejudice to any renewed\n\nrequest Bard may make post-judgment in accordance with applicable rules.\n\n IV\n\n Although we diverge from the rationale for the district court’s decision,\n\nwe AFFIRM its bottom line. Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue\n\nits tying claim against Bard. Parrish’s remaining claims of error are\n\nDISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\n\n\n\n\n 22\n\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 23\n\n\n\nNo. 24-4039, N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., et al.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-31\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nAppellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\\n FILED\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n Tenth Circuit\\n PUBLISH\\n December 31, 2025\\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\\n Christopher M. Wolpert\\n FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court\\n _________________________________\\n\\nNORTH BREVARD COUNTY\\nHOSPITAL DISTRICT, d/b/a Parrish\\nMedical Center,\\n\\n Plaintiff - Appellant,\\n\\nv. No. 24-4039\\n\\nC.R. BARD, INC.; BARD ACCESS\\nSYSTEMS, INC.,\\n\\n Defendants - Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Utah\\n (D.C. No. 2:22-CV-00144-RJS)\\n _________________________________\\n\\nR. Stephen Berry of Berry Law PLLC, Washington, D.C. (Brent O. Hatch of\\nHatch Law Group PC, Salt Lake City, Utah; Velvel Freedman, Edward\\nNormand, and Richard Cipolla of Freedman Normand Friedland LLP, New\\nYork, New York, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant.\\n\\nBrian P. Quinn of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C. (Andrew J.\\nFrackman and Colleen Powers, New York, New York; Sergei Zaslavsky and\\nEmily Murphy of O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C.; Andrew G. Deiss\\nand Corey D. Riley of Deiss Law PC, Salt Lake City, Utah, with him on the\\nbriefs), for Defendants-Appellees.\\n _________________________________\\n\\nBefore HARTZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 2\\n\\n\\n\\nFEDERICO, Circuit Judge.\\n _________________________________\\n\\n North Brevard County Hospital, doing business as Parrish Medical\\n\\nCenter, filed an antitrust class action complaint against C.R. Bard, a\\n\\nmedical device manufacturer. 1 Parrish alleged that Bard engaged in\\n\\nunlawful tying of products and monopolization in violation of the Sherman\\n\\nAct and the Clayton Act. The district court dismissed Parrish’s tying claim\\n\\nfor lack of antitrust standing and denied class certification for Parrish’s\\n\\nmonopolization claim. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we\\n\\naffirm the dismissal of Parrish’s tying claim and dismiss Parrish’s appeal\\n\\nfrom the denial of class certification.\\n\\n I\\n\\n Bard produces a range of medical devices, including a type of catheter\\n\\nknown as a peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC). PICCs are used\\n\\nto administer fluids into the bloodstream by passing through a patient’s\\n\\narm vein and into a vein near the heart. It is important that a PICC be\\n\\nprecisely placed within the patient’s body. Traditionally, this was done\\n\\nusing separate chest x-rays and fluoroscopy. Today, doctors generally use a\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 According to the complaint, Bard Access Systems, the other named\\n\\nDefendant-Appellee, is a subsidiary and division of C.R. Bard. We therefore\\nrefer to the Defendants-Appellees as one entity “Bard” for the purposes of\\nthis opinion, just as the parties do.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 3\\n\\n\\n\\ntip-location system (TLS) that automatically reports the PICC’s location\\n\\nthrough a combination of ultra-sound, magnetic tracking, and\\n\\nelectrocardiography.\\n\\n Parrish alleges that Bard is a leader in the TLS market and controls\\n\\n70 percent market share. It also alleges that Bard has used its commanding\\n\\nposition in the TLS market to manipulate the PICC market. Bard PICCs\\n\\nare sold with a proprietary tool known as a stylet that is required to\\n\\nintegrate the PICC with a Bard TLS. If a hospital wanted to use another\\n\\nbrand of PICC, it could not use a Bard TLS to determine the PICC’s location\\n\\nunless the hospital also purchased a Bard PICC to use the stylet.\\n\\n In simple terms, Parrish alleges that using one Bard product\\n\\neffectively forces hospitals to buy the other. This is known as “tying,” and,\\n\\nunder certain circumstances, it may be a violation of federal antitrust law.\\n\\nWhile Parrish did not buy Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), it claims\\n\\nthat Bard’s practices have allowed it to monopolize the PICC market (the\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 4\\n\\n\\n\\nalleged tied product), 2 suppressing competition and harming all buyers\\n\\nwhether or not they purchase PICCs in conjunction with TLSs. As a result\\n\\nof this purported tying between PICCs and TLSs, Parrish alleges that\\n\\nhospitals pay 9.7 to 34.5 percent higher prices for PICCs than they would\\n\\nin a competitive market.\\n\\n II\\n\\n In March 2020, Parrish filed suit against Bard. 3 Parrish’s complaint\\n\\ncontained two claims: illegal per se tying of separate products under Section\\n\\n1 of the Sherman Act and illegal monopolization under Section 2 of the\\n\\nSherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Parrish sought to certify a class\\n\\n\\n 2 This opinion will repeatedly distinguish between tying products and\\n\\ntied products. As a simple illustration to help keep them straight in mind,\\nthink of a balloon tied to a birthday cake. The buyer really wants the cake,\\nwhich is the best in town. But the baker will only sell cakes on the condition\\nthat the buyer also buys her balloons, which are a separate cost. So, the\\nballoon tags along, tied to the cake. The cake is the tying product – the\\nproduct that the consumer really wants. The balloon is the tied product –\\nthe product that the consumer doesn’t want but must buy to access the cake.\\nThis arrangement raises the overall cost to the buyer.\\n\\n Sometimes, the tie-in is explicit, like a contract that includes a term\\nrequiring the purchase of the tied product. Other times, it is more subtle,\\nas alleged here, when the seller requires the purchase of one product in\\norder to use and operate another product. See Daniel A. Crane, Tying Law\\nfor the Digital Age, 99 Notre Dame L. Rev. 821, 847, 851–56 (2024)\\n(providing historic examples of tying arrangements).\\n 3 Parrish originally filed in the District Court for the Northern\\nDistrict of New York. In February 2022, its case was transferred to the\\nDistrict of Utah, where Bard’s PICC business is headquartered.\\n\\n 4\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 5\\n\\n\\n\\ncomprised of hospitals, hospital systems, and clinics that had purchased\\n\\nBard PICCs, and requested damages and injunctive relief for this class\\n\\nunder the remedial provisions of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.\\n\\n Parrish filed a motion for class certification, while Bard filed a motion\\n\\nfor judgment on the pleadings. In November 2022, after hearing oral\\n\\nargument, the district court granted Bard’s motion with respect to Parrish’s\\n\\ntying claim. The district court found that Parrish did not have antitrust\\n\\nstanding to bring its claim for illegal tying because Parrish did not allege\\n\\nthat it also purchased Bard’s TLS (the alleged tying product), and so Parrish\\n\\ndid not show that it was forced to buy Bard’s PICCs (the alleged tied\\n\\nproduct).\\n\\n The district court allowed Parrish’s monopolization claim to proceed.\\n\\nIn response, Parrish filed a renewed motion for class certification. The\\n\\ndistrict court, however, denied this motion. It found that Parrish’s proposed\\n\\nclass failed to meet the required elements for class certification, and that\\n\\nits pleadings were insufficient to establish a basis for either a damages class\\n\\nor an injunctive class.\\n\\n Parrish petitioned for permission from this court to appeal the district\\n\\ncourt’s order denying class certification. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court\\n\\nof appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-\\n\\naction certification[.]”) This petition was denied. As a result, Parrish then\\n\\n 5\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 6\\n\\n\\n\\nmoved for the district court to dismiss its monopolization claim with\\n\\nprejudice so that Parrish could appeal the entry of final judgment, which\\n\\nthe district court granted. Parrish then appealed. On appeal, Bard filed a\\n\\nmotion to dismiss the appeal from the district court’s class certification\\n\\norder, arguing that Parrish’s voluntary dismissal of the underlying\\n\\nmonopolization claim forecloses our jurisdiction over the class certification\\n\\norder. 4\\n\\n III\\n\\n We review a Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings just as we would a\\n\\nRule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38,\\n\\n566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). That is, we review\\n\\nde novo whether a plaintiff fails to plead facts that state a plausible claim.\\n\\nId. at 1223–24. In doing so, we take all facts in the complaint as true and\\n\\ndraw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Martin Marietta\\n\\nMaterials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161, 1171 (10th Cir. 2016)\\n\\n(citation omitted). Likewise, “[w]e review questions of our appellate\\n\\njurisdiction de novo.” City of Albuquerque v. Soto Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d\\n\\n1089, 1091 (10th Cir. 2017).\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Bard also seeks an order that Parrish pay fees and costs associated\\n\\nwith this motion, alleging that Parrish knowingly filed an appeal that is\\ncontrary to controlling law from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit.\\n\\n 6\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 7\\n\\n\\n\\n Our disposition of this appeal begins with a general overview of\\n\\nsubstantive antitrust law before proceeding to whether Parrish has\\n\\nantitrust standing to pursue its tying claim against Bard. After describing\\n\\nthe antitrust standing doctrine in broad strokes and the parties’ arguments,\\n\\nwe hold that Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue its tying\\n\\nclaim against Bard because it is not an efficient enforcer of the antitrust\\n\\nlaws in this context.\\n\\n We turn next to Parrish’s class certification appeal and hold that we\\n\\ndo not have jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of class\\n\\ncertification because Parrish voluntarily dismissed the underlying\\n\\nsubstantive claim below. We therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss this\\n\\npart of the appeal. At this stage, however, we deny Bard’s request for\\n\\nsanctions.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The Sherman Act of 1890 sets out the major substantive rules of\\n\\nantitrust law. The Clayton Act of 1914 followed and, inter alia, provides private\\n\\nparties with relief for the violation of these rules. We begin this section by\\n\\nbriefly describing the substantive antitrust rule that Parrish accuses Bard of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 8\\n\\n\\n\\nviolating before turning to the Clayton Act and whether it provides a cause of\\n\\naction for Parrish to pursue its claim against Bard.\\n\\n The Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of\\n\\ntrust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1.\\n\\nSometimes, a tying arrangement may fall within this prohibition. “A tying\\n\\narrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the\\n\\ncondition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or least\\n\\nagrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.’”\\n\\nEastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992)\\n\\n(quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958)). For\\n\\nexample, when a grocer sells sugar only on the condition that a buyer also\\n\\npurchases flour, the grocer has tied the purchase of flour to the purchase of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 9\\n\\n\\n\\nsugar and made a tying arrangement. Where a tying arrangement satisfies\\n\\ncertain additional requirements, it may violate the Sherman Act. 5\\n\\n Under the Clayton Act, private parties may sue alleged antitrust\\n\\nviolators and obtain treble damages or an injunction. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§\\n\\n4 (damages), 16 (injunction), 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737 (1914) (current version at\\n\\n15 U.S.C. § 15, 26). 6 But although the Clayton Act authorizes broad access to\\n\\nrelief, “the mere fact that the claim is literally encompassed by the Clayton Act\\n\\ndoes not end the inquiry.” Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.\\n\\nCalifornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983) (hereinafter\\n\\nAGC).\\n\\n A claimed injury “must be analyzed to determine whether it is of the type\\n\\nthat the antitrust statute was intended to forestall.” Id. at 540. “An additional\\n\\nfactor is the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.” Id. Relatedly,\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 The Supreme Court requires proof of other elements to ensure that\\n\\nantitrust enforcement is focused on conduct that is anticompetitive: the\\nseller of the products must have “appreciable economic power” in the tying\\nmarket, and the tying arrangement must affect a “substantial volume of\\ncommerce” in the tied market. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992).\\nNorthern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (“[I]f one of a dozen food stores\\nin a community were to refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar\\nit would hardly tend to restrain competition in sugar if its competitors were\\nready and able to sell flour by itself.”).\\n 6 The remainder of this opinion, like most antitrust cases, will cite to\\n\\nthe Clayton Act using the section numbers found in the session law, not the\\nUnited States Code.\\n\\n 9\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 10\\n\\n\\n\\n“[t]he existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\\n\\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\\n\\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party” to\\n\\nsue. Id. at 542. These principles, along with others not relevant here, together\\n\\ndescribe the doctrine known as antitrust standing, which a plaintiff must\\n\\nsatisfy to obtain relief under the Clayton Act. 7\\n\\n This court has distilled the Supreme Court’s caselaw into the\\n\\nfollowing rule for antitrust standing: “a plaintiff must show (1) an ‘antitrust\\n\\ninjury;’ and (2) a direct causal connection between that injury and a\\n\\ndefendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” Sports Racing Services, Inc. v.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 The Supreme Court has explained that the term “standing” can be\\n\\nmisleading when used to refer to statutory or “prudential” standing.\\nLexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125,\\n128 n.4 (2014). Whereas constitutional standing is jurisdictional, statutory\\nstanding really refers not to the jurisdiction of the court, but rather to\\n“whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular\\nplaintiff’s claim.” Id. at 127. Antitrust standing is a breed of statutory\\nstanding. Id. at 126. The phrase “antitrust standing” could be similarly\\nmisleading, but since our cases and the parties uniformly use this phrase,\\nwe will do the same.\\n\\n 10\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 11\\n\\n\\n\\nSports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir. 1997). 8 We\\n\\nexplained that with respect to the first element, “the standing analysis must\\n\\ntake into account the type of antitrust claim being asserted.” Id. Where the\\n\\nplaintiff asserts an antitrust injury based on a tying claim, “two types of\\n\\nparties may have standing . . . the purchasers who are forced to buy the tied\\n\\nproduct to obtain the tying product (the prototypical tying plaintiff), and\\n\\nthe competitor who is restrained from entering the market for the tied\\n\\nproduct.” Id. at 887.\\n\\n In Abraham v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., this court\\n\\nrearticulated the second element of the antitrust standing analysis: the\\n\\ncausal connection between the antitrust injury and the defendant’s\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Sports Racing is a Clayton Act § 4 case – that is, it described the rule\\n\\nof antitrust standing with respect to compensatory damages, not injunctive\\nrelief. Our cases, however, have not made a distinction between § 4\\n(damages) and § 16 (injunctions) cases with respect to these two elements\\nof antitrust standing analysis. See, e.g., B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that\\nmore than antitrust injury is required in order to establish antitrust\\nstanding even for injunctive relief); Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d\\n542, 543 (10th Cir. 1995) (enumerating factors relevant to second element\\nof antitrust standing analysis without distinguishing the relief sought).\\nEven if it were otherwise, however, Parrish has not argued that there is any\\nmaterial difference between antitrust standing for damages and injunctive\\nrelief. As Bard correctly points out, then, the matter is waived. United\\nStates v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1151 (10th Cir. 2019). We therefore assume\\nfor the purposes of this case that Sports Racing applies regardless of the\\nrelief sought.\\n\\n 11\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 12\\n\\n\\n\\nunlawful conduct must be direct enough to demonstrate that the plaintiff\\n\\n“is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.” 461 F.3d 1249, 1268 (10th\\n\\nCir. 2006). “Factors to be considered in this analysis include the directness\\n\\nor remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff, which, in turn, depends\\n\\non the existence of other more directly-injured possible plaintiffs.” Id.\\n\\n(citing, inter alia, AGC, 459 U.S. at 542). We held that the existence of other\\n\\nparties who “would be more directly harmed by” the anticompetitive\\n\\nconduct will ordinarily defeat a plaintiff’s antitrust standing. Id.\\n\\n Our cases therefore establish the following framework: to obtain a\\n\\nprivate antitrust remedy under the Clayton Act, plaintiffs must establish\\n\\nan “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that\\n\\nflows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful[.]” Black v.\\n\\nOccidental Petro. Corp., 69 F.4th 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation\\n\\nomitted). An antitrust plaintiff “must also demonstrate that it is an efficient\\n\\nenforcer of the antitrust laws.” Abraham, 461 F.3d at 1268. These two\\n\\nrequirements faithfully apply the overarching principle: only plaintiffs who\\n\\nbest vindicate “the central interest in protecting the economic freedom of\\n\\nparticipants in the relevant market” have a right to sue under the Clayton\\n\\nAct. AGC, 459 U.S. at 538; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,\\n\\n479 U.S. 104, 109 (1986); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495\\n\\nU.S. 328, 334 (1990).\\n\\n 12\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 13\\n\\n\\n\\n The district court in this case held that Parrish lacked antitrust\\n\\nstanding under the first element of our test, antitrust injury. The district\\n\\ncourt read our precedent – specifically Sports Racing – as setting out an\\n\\nexhaustive list of potential plaintiffs who have an antitrust injury sufficient\\n\\nto challenge tying arrangements: “the purchasers who were forced to buy\\n\\nthe tied product to obtain the tying product, and the competitor who is\\n\\nrestrained from entering the market for the tied products.” Aplt. App. I at\\n\\n202–03. In other words, Sports Racing, as interpreted by the district court,\\n\\nestablishes a categorical rule excluding plaintiffs who bought only the tied\\n\\nproduct, and not the tying product. Because Parrish purchased only the tied\\n\\nproduct here, the district court relied on Sports Racing to reject Parrish’s\\n\\nantitrust standing.\\n\\n Parrish disputes this reading of our cases. It argues that because\\n\\ntying arrangements allow the seller to compel purchases of the tied product,\\n\\ndirect purchasers of the tied product are forced to pay higher prices in the\\n\\nmarket and that alone suffices to demonstrate an antitrust injury. Sports\\n\\nRacing neither considered nor decided this argument, according to Parrish,\\n\\nso that case should not be read to control this case. And Parrish argues\\n\\nSports Racing did not purport to set forth a categorical list of plaintiffs,\\n\\nexcluding all others, who have the right to challenge tying arrangements\\n\\nunder the Clayton Act.\\n\\n 13\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 14\\n\\n\\n\\n Bard responds by agreeing with the district court that Sports Racing\\n\\ndictates the outcome here. According to Bard, Sports Racing announced a\\n\\n“rule” that two types of plaintiffs have antitrust standing: tying product\\n\\npurchasers and competitors. Additionally, Bard argues that Sports Racing’s\\n\\nrule was necessary to its outcome: without a rule excluding tied product\\n\\npurchasers, Sports Racing would not have needed to relax the direct\\n\\npurchaser requirement so that the tying product purchaser in that case\\n\\ncould proceed.\\n\\n Taking these arguments into account, we instead resolve this case on\\n\\nan alternative ground. The district court did not analyze the second element\\n\\nof the antitrust standing analysis, efficient enforcer, because it granted\\n\\nBard’s Rule 12(c) motion based on the first element. Nor did Parrish address\\n\\nthe second element in its opening brief. That said, we are free to affirm on\\n\\nany basis supported by the record, even if it was not reached by the district\\n\\ncourt or addressed by the parties before us. Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc.,\\n\\n634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011). Indeed, we commonly and properly do\\n\\nso, for as we said in Richison, the courts of appeals stand “ready to affirm\\n\\nwhenever the record allows.” Id. For several reasons, we reach and decide\\n\\nthis appeal based upon the efficient enforcer element.\\n\\n First, the parties did brief the second element, after Bard raised it as\\n\\nan alternative basis to affirm in its response brief. Second, because we have\\n\\n 14\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 15\\n\\n\\n\\nenough information before us to decide the issue, reaching it now would\\n\\nprevent this case “from needlessly bouncing back and forth between” us and\\n\\nthe district court. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 2016).\\n\\nAnd third, as mentioned above, our application of the second element of\\n\\nantitrust standing is closely related to our interpretation of the first\\n\\nelement. We therefore discuss the efficient enforcer element of our antitrust\\n\\nprecedent, hold that Parrish is not an efficient enforcer, and affirm the\\n\\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order on that basis.\\n\\n B\\n\\n As we have recounted, Sports Racing held that in addition to antitrust\\n\\ninjury, a plaintiff must show “a direct causal connection between that injury\\n\\nand a defendant’s violation of the antitrust laws.” 131 F.3d at 882. “The\\n\\nexistence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would\\n\\nnormally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust\\n\\nenforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party\\n\\n. . . to perform the office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at\\n\\n542. In other words, we infer from the existence of more directly injured\\n\\nparties that the plaintiff before us is indirectly, or at least less directly,\\n\\ninjured. This inference is consequential because antitrust standing is not\\n\\nmerely a question of whether we have before us a proper plaintiff, but rather\\n\\n\\n\\n 15\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 16\\n\\n\\n\\nwhether we have an “effective” plaintiff. B-S Steel of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas\\n\\nIndustries, Inc., 439 F.3d 653, 667 (10th Cir. 2006). 9\\n\\n The rationale for this procedural requirement is rooted in substantive\\n\\nantitrust law. Generally, antitrust laws “were enacted for ‘the protection of\\n\\ncompetition, not competitors[.]’” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,\\n\\nInc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370\\n\\nU.S. 294, 320 (1962)). Put differently, the substantive prohibitions on\\n\\nanticompetitive conduct are concerned not with “its effect upon any\\n\\nindividual in the marketplace, but rather [] its effect generally upon\\n\\ncompetition in a particular market.” Daniel C. Richman, Note, Antitrust\\n\\nStanding, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L.J. 1309,\\n\\n1310 (1984). Thus, we “have required the plaintiff . . . to relate his private\\n\\ninjury to a more public wrong – a threat to competition in his own market.”\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 The efficient enforcer element of the antitrust standing inquiry is\\n\\nnecessarily comparative. But we caution that district courts should not end\\na plaintiff’s suit solely because it is not the best, most effective, or most\\nefficient plaintiff. The Clayton Act’s promise of “justice to every man,\\nwhenever he may be injured by those who violate the antitrust laws,” would\\nhardly be vindicated if only one plaintiff in the world had antitrust standing\\nto sue. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10\\n(1977). The efficient enforcer element does not require a plaintiff to exclude\\nall others to then seek relief. There will be instances (maybe many) where\\neven a “second-best” or third-best plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the\\nantitrust laws. SAS of Puerto Rico, Inc., 48 F.3d at 44. Even so, the efficient\\nenforcer element is more exacting than the antitrust injury element.\\nAntitrust injury alone is insufficient to state a cause of action.\\n\\n 16\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 17\\n\\n\\n\\nId. at 1312. The “broad principle of compensation” under the Clayton Act is\\n\\ntherefore qualified by a second element of antitrust standing. Id.\\n\\n We held in Abraham that the second prong of the antitrust standing\\n\\ninquiry requires a plaintiff to show “that it is an efficient enforcer of the\\n\\nantitrust laws.” 461 F.3d at 1268. “Factors to be considered in this analysis\\n\\ninclude the directness or remoteness of the injury suffered by the plaintiff,\\n\\nwhich, in turn, depends on the existence of other more directly-injured\\n\\npossible plaintiffs.” Id. Other factors that may bear on the question include\\n\\nthe defendants’ motivations, “the speculative nature of the damages\\n\\nsought,” and “the risk of duplicative recoveries or complex damages\\n\\napportionment.” Sharp, 967 F.2d at 406–07.\\n\\n Bard argues that Parrish’s alleged antitrust injury is too distantly\\n\\nremoved from the alleged antitrust violation. Relying on Sports Racing,\\n\\nBard points out that it is the tying product purchasers who are the “targeted\\n\\nvictims of an illegal tying arrangement.” Resp. Br. at 34 (quoting Sports\\n\\nRacing, 131 F.3d at 889 n.15). Parrish, by contrast, does not experience\\n\\nmarket restraint to the same extent as victims who purchase both the tied\\n\\nand tying product because only those victims experience the “lack of choice”\\n\\nthat tying arrangements induce. Id. Parrish responds that the causal\\n\\nconnection between its antitrust injury and the alleged antitrust violation\\n\\n\\n\\n 17\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 18\\n\\n\\n\\nis straightforward: because of the tying arrangement, Parrish must pay\\n\\nsupracompetitive prices for the tied product.\\n\\n On this point, we agree with Bard. Sports Racing held that in the\\n\\nusual case, “tying product purchasers . . . are in the best position to identify\\n\\nan illegal tie and have the most incentive to bring an action to enforce the\\n\\nprohibition against tying.” 131 F.3d at 889 n.15 (emphasis added). Although\\n\\nboth the tied-product purchaser and the tying-product purchaser may\\n\\nexperience an anticompetitive harm, Parrish does not contest that the\\n\\ntying-product purchaser experiences the harm to a greater extent. Thus,\\n\\nordinarily it is the tying product purchaser whose self-interest is best\\n\\naligned with the public interest, and therefore best positioned “to perform\\n\\nthe office of a private attorney general.” AGC, 459 U.S. at 542.\\n\\n Parrish fails to persuade us that this is the rare case where tied-\\n\\nproduct purchasers are the efficient enforcer plaintiff as opposed to tying-\\n\\nproduct purchasers or competitors. Parrish claims that “the standard for\\n\\nantitrust causation is low,” citing out of circuit precedent. Reply Br. at 10–\\n\\n11. While that may well be true with respect to the antitrust injury element,\\n\\nParrish’s claim is irreconcilable with the efficient enforcer element. Parrish\\n\\nfurther argues that our task is “only to determine whether Parrish has\\n\\nadequate standing.” Id. at 12. But we foreclosed this argument in B-S Steel,\\n\\n439 F.3d at 667, as did the Supreme Court in AGC, 459 U.S. at 542. Finally,\\n\\n 18\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 19\\n\\n\\n\\nwe are aware of at least one case where a competitor did sue Bard and\\n\\nlitigated its claims all the way through trial. AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R.\\n\\nBard, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 3d 273 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 2021), (denying cross-\\n\\nmotions for summary judgment); Judgment in a Civil Case, AngioDynamics,\\n\\nInc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 2022 WL 18402240 (Oct. 6, 2022) (No. 1:17-cv-00598)\\n\\n(jury verdict in favor of Bard). The fact that Bard has already faced a\\n\\ncompetitor suit diminishes any concern that affirmance would leave an\\n\\nenforcement gap and underscores that there are other plaintiffs who are\\n\\nbetter positioned to enforce the antitrust laws. Parrish points to no other\\n\\nfactor favoring its right to sue.\\n\\n In a footnote, Parrish claims the district court found that Parrish was\\n\\nan efficient enforcer with respect to its monopolization claim, and that Bard\\n\\nconceded that the question of whether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of\\n\\nthe monopoly claim would be the same or overlap with the question of\\n\\nwhether Parrish was an efficient enforcer of the tying claim. But Sports\\n\\nRacing holds that a plaintiff may be an efficient enforcer for one antitrust\\n\\npurpose but not another. 131 F.3d at 884–85, 889 n.15. The district court’s\\n\\nlater findings with respect to monopolization (which are not binding on us\\n\\nin any event) do not prevent us from finding otherwise with respect to the\\n\\ntying claim. Moreover, we do not understand Bard’s purported concession\\n\\nto stand for anything more than antitrust standing for a monopolization\\n\\n 19\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 20\\n\\n\\n\\nclaim is “obviously related to but analytically distinct from the tying claim.”\\n\\nId. Monopolization and tying claims are related, but each survives, or not,\\n\\non its own terms.\\n\\n Here, Parrish’s tying claim does not survive. Parrish is not an efficient\\n\\nenforcer of the antitrust laws and therefore does not have antitrust\\n\\nstanding to sue Bard for its alleged per se violation of Section 1 of the\\n\\nSherman Act for the product tying arrangement.\\n\\n III\\n\\n In addition to the tying claim, Parrish also alleged a monopolization\\n\\nclaim in the district court under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. After the\\n\\ndistrict court declined to certify a class for this claim, and we thereafter\\n\\ndeclined discretionary interlocutory review, Parrish voluntarily dismissed\\n\\nwith prejudice its monopolization claim to induce an appealable final\\n\\njudgment. Parrish now seeks our review of the district court’s order denying\\n\\nclass certification. But Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent\\n\\nforeclose our jurisdiction over the class certification order, so we cannot\\n\\nconsider it.\\n\\n We have mandatory jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions”\\n\\nof the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our jurisdiction over a final judgment\\n\\nextends to all interlocutory orders that merge into the final judgment.\\n\\nEdmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 985 (10th Cir. 2021).\\n\\n 20\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 21\\n\\n\\n\\nBut not all interlocutory orders merge. Where a plaintiff abandons\\n\\nremaining substantive claims to obtain immediate review as of right over a\\n\\nclass certification denial, the Supreme Court has held that there is no\\n\\njurisdiction over the class certification denial. Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582\\n\\nU.S. 23, 27 (2017). This voluntary dismissal tactic “subverts the final-\\n\\njudgment rule,” “invites protracted litigation,” and “undercuts Rule 23(f)’s\\n\\ndiscretionary regime.” Id. at 37, 39.\\n\\n Applying Baker, we have held that when a plaintiff voluntarily\\n\\ndismisses their claims with prejudice and then seeks appellate review of a\\n\\nclass certification denial order, that order does not merge with final\\n\\njudgment, and our § 1291 jurisdiction therefore does not extend to the order.\\n\\nAnderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Production, LLC, 904 F.3d 1135,\\n\\n1144–45 (10th Cir. 2018). 10 Parrish’s appeal from the district court’s class\\n\\ncertification order falls neatly within the scope of this rule and we therefore\\n\\nhave no jurisdiction to consider it. 11\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 The fact that the plaintiffs in Anderson Living Trust settled their\\n\\nindividual claims before voluntary dismissal was immaterial to this court’s\\nholding that Baker applies.\\n 11 We also decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the\\n\\ndistrict court’s class certification order because it is neither “inextricably\\nintertwined with” nor “necessary to ensure meaningful review of” the\\ndistrict court’s Rule 12(c) order dismissing Parrish’s tying claim. Cummings\\nv. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235 (10th Cir. 2019).\\n\\n 21\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 22\\n\\n\\n\\n Also pending before us is Bard’s motion to dismiss this portion of the\\n\\nappeal relating to the class certification denial order. Doc. 23-1; see also\\n\\nFed. R. App. P. 27; 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(1). Because we dispose of this\\n\\nargument in a way that provides part of the primary relief Bard requested,\\n\\nwe therefore grant Bard’s motion to dismiss insofar as it seeks dismissal of\\n\\nthe appeal from the district court’s order denying class certification. 10th\\n\\nCir. R. 2.1 (we have discretion to overlook technical errors under our local\\n\\nrules). However, at this point we deny Bard’s request for associated fees\\n\\nand costs, which must be sought by a “separately filed motion.” Fed. R. App.\\n\\nP. 38. Our denial of Bard’s request is without prejudice to any renewed\\n\\nrequest Bard may make post-judgment in accordance with applicable rules.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n Although we diverge from the rationale for the district court’s decision,\\n\\nwe AFFIRM its bottom line. Parrish does not have antitrust standing to pursue\\n\\nits tying claim against Bard. Parrish’s remaining claims of error are\\n\\nDISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22\\n\\n Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 23\\n\\n\\n\\nNo. 24-4039, N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., et al.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30957,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745291,"string":"10,745,291"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Tiffany Wingo v. Major Branson Harris"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10933"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10933\\n ____________________\\n\\n TIFFANY WINGO,\\n as Administrator of the Estate of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n KIEARA WINGO,\\n as surviving child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n ERIKA WINGO,\\n as Surviving Child of Kevin Wingo, Sr.,\\n ESQ. TERI FIELDS,\\n Conservator of Kevil Wingo, Jr., Surviving\\n Minor Child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n ANGEL CALLOWAY,\\n as mother and next friend of Erika Wingo,\\n surviving minor child of Kevil Wingo, Sr., et al.,\\n Plaintiffs,\\n versus\\n\\n WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n MAJOR BRANSON HARRIS,\\n individually,\\n LIEUTENANT CHARLES GORDON,\\n individually,\\n DEPUTY PAUL WILKERSON,\\n individually,\\n DEPUTY LYNDA MARSHALL,\\n individually,\\n JOHN DOES 1 - 10,\\n individually and in their capacity as employees of\\n Cobb County Sheriff's Office, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03662-VMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n The main question in this appeal is whether nonmedical jail\\n officers were deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s serious medical\\n condition when they followed the advice of the jail’s medical staff.\\n Kevil Wingo was a pretrial detainee in the Cobb County Adult De-\\n tention Center when he died from a perforated ulcer. He was un-\\n der the care of nurses at the center when he died, and those nurses\\n had misdiagnosed him as suffering from drug withdrawal or “de-\\n tox.” His estate sued the Center’s sheriff’s deputies for deliberate\\n indifference. We hold that a nonmedical jail officer cannot be\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n found liable for deliberate indifference when he or she reasonably\\n relies on the advice or opinion of a medical professional. Because\\n the sheriff’s deputies reasonably relied on the nurses’ diagnosis, we\\n conclude that they were not deliberately indifferent. The district\\n court also correctly granted summary judgment to Deputy Wilker-\\n son because the plaintiff’s medical expert could not say with any\\n degree of medical certainty that he caused Wingo’s death. As a re-\\n sult, we affirm.\\n I.\\n\\n In September 2019, Kevil Wingo was arrested in Cobb\\n County for possessing 0.2 grams of cocaine. After his arrest, he was\\n booked as a pretrial detainee at the Cobb County Adult Detention\\n Center.\\n A few days after entering detention, Wingo began to com-\\n plain of abdominal pain and sweating. In response to these com-\\n plaints, Deputy Quinton Appleby took Wingo to the detention cen-\\n ter’s infirmary. En route to the infirmary, Wingo told Deputy Ap-\\n pleby that he had an ulcer, which Appleby relayed to the nursing\\n staff.\\n Nurse Yvette Burton admitted Wingo to the infirmary at\\n 12:35 a.m. that night. In the infirmary, medical staff hired through\\n WellStar Health Systems, Inc., including Nurse Burton, were re-\\n sponsible for overseeing operations. Sheriff’s deputies, however,\\n were responsible for security. Those deputies were trained not to\\n make medical decisions but instead to defer to the medical staff.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n When Wingo was admitted, he was complaining of nausea,\\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. He was also heard pleading\\n with God, saying that he would never touch drugs again should he\\n survive.\\n Based on these signs and symptoms, Nurse Burton believed\\n Wingo to be detoxing or suffering from withdrawals. Indeed, at the\\n time, Wingo was in the middle of a mandatory 5-day period of re-\\n ceiving “withdrawal checks” for opiates, which further confirmed\\n her suspicion that his symptoms were a result of detoxing. Her ex-\\n perience as a nurse only strengthened this belief. After all, detoxing\\n afflicts as many as 40 percent of the inmates in the infirmary. Ac-\\n cording to Nurse Shanna Griffith, another nurse on the night shift,\\n the medical staff took Wingo’s vitals and then admitted him “so he\\n could stay overnight . . . [and] see the doctor in the morning.” Doc.\\n 200-6 at 28.\\n Over the course of that night, Deputy Britton McPhee, a\\n Sheriff’s Deputy serving in the infirmary, watched Wingo. Deputy\\n McPhee observed Wingo being “very loud” from the time he en-\\n tered the infirmary. This disruption continued throughout the\\n night, causing his cell mates to protest that they could not sleep.\\n Continuing to complain of his symptoms, Wingo repeatedly asked\\n Deputy McPhee to send him to the hospital. In accordance with his\\n training, Deputy McPhee replied that this decision would be up to\\n the medical staff. Displeased with this response, Wingo replied:\\n “just shut . . . up and do what I’m telling you to do.” Doc 191-3 at\\n 174.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n At 6:00 a.m., Deputy Lynda Marshall relieved Deputy\\n McPhee. Deputy McPhee informed Deputy Marshall that Wingo\\n had been generally disruptive, “hollering,” and demanding to go to\\n the hospital. He also told her that, according to the nurses, Wingo\\n was detoxing. Deputy Marshall, who had served in the Sheriff’s Of-\\n fice for over 27 years, had frequently seen individuals detoxing dur-\\n ing pretrial detention. Based on this experience, and judging from\\n Wingo’s symptoms, Deputy Marshall agreed with the nurses’ as-\\n sessment.\\n Nurse Annaleen Visser, who took over from Nurse Burton\\n during the day shift, also believed that Wingo was detoxing.\\n Wingo’s frequent demands to go to the hospital did nothing to\\n change her mind. In her experience, detoxing inmates always wish\\n to go to the hospital in hopes of a better bed, better meals, more\\n privacy, and opiates. In Nurse Visser’s mind, inmates will “do any-\\n thing to go to the ER.” Doc. 200-5 at 88. Because she was so sure\\n that Wingo was detoxing, she declined to do a physical assessment\\n of him, preferring to wait—in accordance with detoxing proto-\\n cols—for him to be “calm.”\\n Throughout the early morning, Deputy Marshall observed\\n Wingo continuing to yell that he needed to go to the hospital.\\n Wingo also told Deputy Marshall that he could not breathe. In re-\\n sponse, she told him that “if you are talking to me, you are breath-\\n ing,” but she also asked him for more details. Doc. 191-4 at 138. He\\n reiterated that he could not breathe and that he needed to go to the\\n hospital. Deputy Marshall relayed these complaints to the nurses,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n who told her that Wingo was “just trying to go to the hospital, he\\n was detoxing, drug seeking, [and] that he was okay.” Id.\\n By this time, Wingo’s repeated yelling and disruption had\\n become a source of frustration to Wingo’s fellow inmates. The\\n frustration eventually reached a breaking point, and Deputy Mar-\\n shall heard that Wingo’s inmates were planning to fight him in his\\n cell. She went to retrieve him. But when she opened the door,\\n Wingo fell to the floor and again asked to go to the hospital. She\\n informed the nurses, who did nothing in response. Then, fearing\\n that Wingo would suffer physical harm if she put him back in his\\n cell, she called her supervisor, Lieutenant Charles Gordon, for ad-\\n vice.\\n When Lieutenant Gordon arrived at the infirmary at\\n 7:30 a.m., he observed Wingo on the ground. Deputy Marshall in-\\n formed him that Wingo had been “causing some type [of] issue\\n with other inmates in the cell.” Doc. 191-6 at 80. Lieutenant Gor-\\n don then asked Nurse Visser whether Wingo was “okay,” to which\\n she replied that he was “medically fine.” Id. at 65, 87-90, 96. He also\\n asked Deputy Marshall to call his superior, Major Branson Harris,\\n to assess the situation.\\n Upon Major Harris’s arrival, Nurse Visser told him—as she\\n had told Lieutenant Gordon—that Wingo was simply detoxing and\\n drug seeking. She further told him that, in her opinion, Wingo\\n needed to be isolated in a cell by himself. Unfortunately, the only\\n individual cell in the infirmary was already occupied. As a result,\\n Nurse Visser recommended, and Major Harris agreed, that Wingo\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n should be transferred to a padded, isolated cell in the infirmary ex-\\n tension. There, he would be kept under close observation.\\n Before transferring Wingo to the extension, Major Harris\\n asked Nurse Visser again if it would be medically appropriate to do\\n so. She assured him that it was.\\n Accordingly, at 7:45 a.m., Major Harris and Lieutenant Gor-\\n don escorted Wingo to the extension. As they walked him there,\\n they determined that he was too unstable to walk on his own and\\n placed him in a wheelchair. Lieutenant Gordon asked the nursing\\n staff why Wingo was so unbalanced. The nurses said it was simply\\n a symptom of detoxing. Shortly after 7:45, Major Harris and Lieu-\\n tenant Gordon left Wingo in a padded cell.\\n Deputy Paul Wilkerson, who worked in the infirmary, took\\n over responsibility for observing Wingo. Because Wingo was sup-\\n posed to be under close observation in the infirmary extension, it\\n was part of Deputy Wilkerson’s duties to check in on him during\\n security rounds every 12 minutes. In part, this was to ensure that\\n Wingo was still alive. During these security rounds, Deputy\\n Wilkerson was required to look in each cell rather than just rely on\\n the cell’s camera feed.\\n Deputy Wilkerson admits that he did not look in Wingo’s\\n cell during each security round as required. But because he saw\\n Wingo change positions a few times through the camera feed, he\\n believed Wingo to be alive and well. And when Major Harris and\\n Deputy Wilkerson did a security check together at 8:22 a.m., both\\n believed that they saw Wingo’s chest rising and falling.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n In the hour after Wingo arrived in the extension, neither Ma-\\n jor Harris nor Deputy Wilkerson saw any cause for alarm. But,\\n once Deputy Wilkerson opened the door at 8:49 a.m., it became\\n clear that Wingo was in serious trouble. Wingo was so motionless\\n that, initially, Deputy Wilkerson was concerned that Wingo was\\n “possibly in the corner playing a game and possibly could jump up\\n at any moment.” Doc. 191-7 at 201. He was quickly disabused of\\n this notion as he determined that Wingo was unresponsive, at\\n which point he summoned the medical team on an emergency ba-\\n sis.\\n Shortly thereafter, Wingo was declared dead. An autopsy by\\n the Cobb County Medical Examiner later found that Wingo died\\n from complications of a perforated gastric ulcer with peritonitis.\\n Later, Wingo’s daughter, Tiffany Wingo, acting on behalf of\\n his estate, along with other members of Wingo’s family, filed the\\n complaint underlying this appeal. She initially named and served\\n WellStar, several WellStar nurses, Major Harris, Lieutenant (now-\\n Sergeant) Gordon, and Deputy Wilkerson as defendants. Later, she\\n named and served Deputy Marshall. WellStar and the WellStar\\n nurses eventually reached a settlement with Wingo and were dis-\\n missed. This settlement left the sheriff’s deputies as the only de-\\n fendants.\\n As relevant to this appeal, Tiffany Wingo brought claims\\n against (1) all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they\\n were deliberately indifferent to her father’s serious medical needs,\\n and (2) Deputy Wilkerson under state tort law, alleging that he was\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n negligent in failing to properly conduct security rounds according\\n to official policy.\\n At the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for\\n summary judgment as to all claims. They also moved to exclude\\n the testimony of Tiffany Wingo’s causation expert, Dr. Brian My-\\n ers. Dr. Myers had testified that the defendants’ inaction caused\\n Wingo’s death. But in his deposition, Dr. Myers admitted that he\\n could not say, “with any degree of medical certainty” whether\\n Wingo could have been saved at 7:45 a.m. when he first entered\\n the extension and came under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch. Doc.\\n 200-1 at 107. Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion\\n “doesn’t bring into the issue of time;” to “opine on whether or not\\n at 7:45 . . . if he would have survived at that point, I can’t say . . . .”\\n Id.\\n The district court (1) granted summary judgment on the sec-\\n tion 1983 claims, concluding the defendants were protected by\\n qualified immunity, and (2) granted summary judgment to Deputy\\n Wilkerson on a state tort claim because Dr. Myers could not say\\n with any degree of medical certainty whether Wingo would have\\n survived if he had been treated differently at 7:45 a.m.\\n Tiffany Wingo appealed.\\n II.\\n\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Boigris v.\\n EWC P&T, LLC, 7 F.4th 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary judg-\\n ment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine\\n if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict\\n for the nonmoving party.” Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d\\n 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation\\n omitted).\\n III.\\n\\n Tiffany Wingo argues that the district court erred in two re-\\n spects. First, she says that, viewing the facts in the light most favor-\\n able to her, the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s\\n medical needs and, as a result, violated his constitutional rights.\\n This is so, she argues, even though it is undisputed that Deputy\\n Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, and Major Harris relied on the\\n nurses’ advice in their treatment of Wingo. Second, she says that\\n the district court erred in its treatment of Dr. Myers’s testimony.\\n Tiffany Wingo says that her claims against Deputy Wilkerson sur-\\n vive summary judgment because Dr. Myers’s testimony establishes\\n that Deputy Wilkerson could have saved her father’s life if he had\\n called for emergency medical care between 7:45 and 8:45 a.m. We\\n discuss each argument in turn below.\\n A.\\n\\n We will start with Tiffany Wingo’s argument about deliber-\\n ate indifference. Because the state has a “constitutional obligation\\n to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they\\n are punishing by incarceration,” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n 1504 (11th Cir. 1991), the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits\\n “[d]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”\\n Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n To establish liability on a deliberate indifference claim, a\\n plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the injured party suffered a dep-\\n rivation that was objectively “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the de-\\n fendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal\\n law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en\\n banc) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To meet\\n the second step, the plaintiff must show that the “defendant was\\n actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substan-\\n tial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Id.\\n Taking the undisputed facts in Tiffany Wingo’s favor, we\\n cannot say that Deputy Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, or Major\\n Harris were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical\\n needs. Over the course of the night, the jail’s medical staff assured\\n each of these guards that Wingo’s symptoms were consistent with\\n drug withdrawal and that he was medically fine. Our caselaw rec-\\n ognizes that a nonmedical officer cannot be held liable for deliber-\\n ate indifference if he reasonably relies on the opinion of a medical\\n officer in his treatment of a detainee or inmate. For instance, in\\n Townsend v. Jefferson County, we determined that correctional offic-\\n ers were not deliberately indifferent when they reasonably relied\\n on a nurse’s professional judgment that the situation was “not an\\n emergency.” 601 F.3d 1152, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n Our decision in Townsend is consistent with the law of other\\n circuits. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has noted that “a prison\\n official may rely on a medical professional’s opinion if reliance on\\n that opinion is reasonable.” Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 601 (8th\\n Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit\\n has similarly made clear that “[p]rison officials generally may rely\\n on the advice and course of treatment prescribed by medical per-\\n sonnel.” Est. of Beauford v. Mesa County, 35 F.4th 1248, 1265 (10th\\n Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit, too, has “long recognized” that\\n “non-medical officials may reasonably defer to the judgment of\\n medical professionals regarding inmate treatment.” Giles v.\\n Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019). The Sixth and Third\\n Circuits also take this approach. See Winkler v. Madison County, 893\\n F.3d 877, 901 (6th Cir. 2018); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d\\n Cir. 2004).\\n Applying that approach here, the guards were not deliber-\\n ately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical condition. The record\\n establishes that the medical staff assured security personnel that\\n Wingo was medically stable and exhibiting symptoms consistent\\n with detox. The nurses told Deputy Marshall, for instance, that\\n Wingo was detoxing and that his requests for hospitalization were\\n about seeking attention and drugs. Likewise, Nurse Visser told\\n Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was “fine medically,” and the nurs-\\n ing staff told Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was simply unbal-\\n anced due to detoxing. Finally, Nurse Visser told Major Harris that\\n Wingo was detoxing and drug seeking. On this record, we can’t say\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n the deputies’ reliance on the nursing professionals was unreasona-\\n ble.\\n Tiffany Wingo makes two arguments in response to this rea-\\n soning. But neither works.\\n First, she argues that nonmedical officers cannot rely on\\n medical opinions when those opinions are obviously wrong even\\n to a layman. We will assume without deciding that her statement\\n of the law is correct. Cf. Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1159 (“Townsend\\n has not presented evidence that her situation was so obviously dire\\n that two lay deputies must have known that a medical professional\\n had grossly misjudged Townsend’s condition.”). Even so, we can-\\n not say that the facts support her assertion that the nurses’ diagno-\\n sis here would be obviously wrong to a layman. A perforated ulcer\\n is hidden in the body and presents diffuse symptoms like nausea,\\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. It is not the kind of ailment\\n that a layman can easily diagnose.\\n Second, Tiffany Wingo argues that the guards could not rea-\\n sonably rely on the nurses’ opinions because the guards did not\\n have the nurses reexamine Wingo after he began to stumble. We\\n disagree. When Wingo was admitted to the infirmary, the nurses\\n took his vitals and diagnosed him as detoxing. He was then set for\\n observation overnight. Over the course of that night and into the\\n morning, as Wingo began to show signs of distress, the guards\\n alerted the nurses to his symptoms. Each time, the nurses assured\\n the guards that Wingo was okay. The nurses concluded that Wingo\\n was experiencing drug withdrawal, a condition they viewed as\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n uncomfortable but not life-threatening. That medical judgment\\n later proved incorrect. Still, the record does not show that a rea-\\n sonable nonmedical officer would have had a clear basis to ques-\\n tion that assessment at the time.\\n B.\\n\\n We turn now to the grant of summary judgment in favor of\\n Deputy Wilkerson. Dr. Myers’s testimony formed the only basis\\n for Tiffany Wingo’s causation argument against Deputy Wilker-\\n son. The district court entered judgment on the claims against Dep-\\n uty Wilkerson because Dr. Myers was unwilling to say with any\\n degree of medical certainty that Deputy Wilkerson’s inaction\\n caused Wingo’s death. The district court concluded that, even if\\n Dr. Myers’s testimony were admissible, his testimony would be in-\\n sufficient to survive summary judgment on causation.\\n We agree that Dr. Myers’s testimony, even if admissible,\\n does not create an issue of fact on causation with respect to Deputy\\n Wilkerson’s liability. Dr. Myers testified that, as a general matter,\\n the chances of survivability of a ruptured ulcer decrease over time.\\n When asked about Wingo’s chances of survival when he first came\\n under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch at 7:45 a.m., Dr. Myers admitted\\n that he could not say “with any degree of medical certainty”\\n whether Wingo could have been saved. Doc. 200-1 at 107. Instead,\\n Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion “doesn’t bring into\\n the issue of time” and he could not “opine on whether or not at\\n 7:45 . . . [Wingo] would have survived . . . .” Id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n The lack of meaningful causation evidence is fatal to Tiffany\\n Wingo’s state and federal claims against Deputy Wilkerson. Both\\n the deliberate indifference and state tort law claims against Deputy\\n Wilkerson require that a plaintiff demonstrate causation. Marbury\\n v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that a suc-\\n cessful deliberate indifference claim requires that the plaintiff show\\n causation); Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 837 S.E.2d 310,\\n 312 (Ga. 2019) (explaining that a negligence claim under Georgia\\n law contains four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation,\\n and damages). When the issue of causation presents a medical\\n question beyond a layperson’s ordinary experience, expert testi-\\n mony is necessary for both kind of claims as well. See Alberson v.\\n Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2006) (section 1983 claim);\\n Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Cowart\\n v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010) (state law claim); Fed. R. Evid.\\n 702.\\n Although Dr. Myers’s testimony may have allowed a rea-\\n sonable jury to find the nurses or other guards liable for their con-\\n duct earlier in the night, no reasonable jury could find Deputy\\n Wilkerson liable based on this testimony. The district court did not\\n err in granting Deputy Wilkerson summary judgment.\\n IV.\\n\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11211876/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRASHER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRASHER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745291/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Tiffany Wingo v. Major Branson Harris\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10933\n ____________________\n\n TIFFANY WINGO,\n as Administrator of the Estate of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\n KIEARA WINGO,\n as surviving child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\n ERIKA WINGO,\n as Surviving Child of Kevin Wingo, Sr.,\n ESQ. TERI FIELDS,\n Conservator of Kevil Wingo, Jr., Surviving\n Minor Child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n ANGEL CALLOWAY,\n as mother and next friend of Erika Wingo,\n surviving minor child of Kevil Wingo, Sr., et al.,\n Plaintiffs,\n versus\n\n WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al.,\n Defendants,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n MAJOR BRANSON HARRIS,\n individually,\n LIEUTENANT CHARLES GORDON,\n individually,\n DEPUTY PAUL WILKERSON,\n individually,\n DEPUTY LYNDA MARSHALL,\n individually,\n JOHN DOES 1 - 10,\n individually and in their capacity as employees of\n Cobb County Sheriff's Office, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03662-VMC\n ____________________\n\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\n The main question in this appeal is whether nonmedical jail\n officers were deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s serious medical\n condition when they followed the advice of the jail’s medical staff.\n Kevil Wingo was a pretrial detainee in the Cobb County Adult De-\n tention Center when he died from a perforated ulcer. He was un-\n der the care of nurses at the center when he died, and those nurses\n had misdiagnosed him as suffering from drug withdrawal or “de-\n tox.” His estate sued the Center’s sheriff’s deputies for deliberate\n indifference. We hold that a nonmedical jail officer cannot be\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n found liable for deliberate indifference when he or she reasonably\n relies on the advice or opinion of a medical professional. Because\n the sheriff’s deputies reasonably relied on the nurses’ diagnosis, we\n conclude that they were not deliberately indifferent. The district\n court also correctly granted summary judgment to Deputy Wilker-\n son because the plaintiff’s medical expert could not say with any\n degree of medical certainty that he caused Wingo’s death. As a re-\n sult, we affirm.\n I.\n\n In September 2019, Kevil Wingo was arrested in Cobb\n County for possessing 0.2 grams of cocaine. After his arrest, he was\n booked as a pretrial detainee at the Cobb County Adult Detention\n Center.\n A few days after entering detention, Wingo began to com-\n plain of abdominal pain and sweating. In response to these com-\n plaints, Deputy Quinton Appleby took Wingo to the detention cen-\n ter’s infirmary. En route to the infirmary, Wingo told Deputy Ap-\n pleby that he had an ulcer, which Appleby relayed to the nursing\n staff.\n Nurse Yvette Burton admitted Wingo to the infirmary at\n 12:35 a.m. that night. In the infirmary, medical staff hired through\n WellStar Health Systems, Inc., including Nurse Burton, were re-\n sponsible for overseeing operations. Sheriff’s deputies, however,\n were responsible for security. Those deputies were trained not to\n make medical decisions but instead to defer to the medical staff.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n When Wingo was admitted, he was complaining of nausea,\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. He was also heard pleading\n with God, saying that he would never touch drugs again should he\n survive.\n Based on these signs and symptoms, Nurse Burton believed\n Wingo to be detoxing or suffering from withdrawals. Indeed, at the\n time, Wingo was in the middle of a mandatory 5-day period of re-\n ceiving “withdrawal checks” for opiates, which further confirmed\n her suspicion that his symptoms were a result of detoxing. Her ex-\n perience as a nurse only strengthened this belief. After all, detoxing\n afflicts as many as 40 percent of the inmates in the infirmary. Ac-\n cording to Nurse Shanna Griffith, another nurse on the night shift,\n the medical staff took Wingo’s vitals and then admitted him “so he\n could stay overnight . . . [and] see the doctor in the morning.” Doc.\n 200-6 at 28.\n Over the course of that night, Deputy Britton McPhee, a\n Sheriff’s Deputy serving in the infirmary, watched Wingo. Deputy\n McPhee observed Wingo being “very loud” from the time he en-\n tered the infirmary. This disruption continued throughout the\n night, causing his cell mates to protest that they could not sleep.\n Continuing to complain of his symptoms, Wingo repeatedly asked\n Deputy McPhee to send him to the hospital. In accordance with his\n training, Deputy McPhee replied that this decision would be up to\n the medical staff. Displeased with this response, Wingo replied:\n “just shut . . . up and do what I’m telling you to do.” Doc 191-3 at\n 174.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n At 6:00 a.m., Deputy Lynda Marshall relieved Deputy\n McPhee. Deputy McPhee informed Deputy Marshall that Wingo\n had been generally disruptive, “hollering,” and demanding to go to\n the hospital. He also told her that, according to the nurses, Wingo\n was detoxing. Deputy Marshall, who had served in the Sheriff’s Of-\n fice for over 27 years, had frequently seen individuals detoxing dur-\n ing pretrial detention. Based on this experience, and judging from\n Wingo’s symptoms, Deputy Marshall agreed with the nurses’ as-\n sessment.\n Nurse Annaleen Visser, who took over from Nurse Burton\n during the day shift, also believed that Wingo was detoxing.\n Wingo’s frequent demands to go to the hospital did nothing to\n change her mind. In her experience, detoxing inmates always wish\n to go to the hospital in hopes of a better bed, better meals, more\n privacy, and opiates. In Nurse Visser’s mind, inmates will “do any-\n thing to go to the ER.” Doc. 200-5 at 88. Because she was so sure\n that Wingo was detoxing, she declined to do a physical assessment\n of him, preferring to wait—in accordance with detoxing proto-\n cols—for him to be “calm.”\n Throughout the early morning, Deputy Marshall observed\n Wingo continuing to yell that he needed to go to the hospital.\n Wingo also told Deputy Marshall that he could not breathe. In re-\n sponse, she told him that “if you are talking to me, you are breath-\n ing,” but she also asked him for more details. Doc. 191-4 at 138. He\n reiterated that he could not breathe and that he needed to go to the\n hospital. Deputy Marshall relayed these complaints to the nurses,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n who told her that Wingo was “just trying to go to the hospital, he\n was detoxing, drug seeking, [and] that he was okay.” Id.\n By this time, Wingo’s repeated yelling and disruption had\n become a source of frustration to Wingo’s fellow inmates. The\n frustration eventually reached a breaking point, and Deputy Mar-\n shall heard that Wingo’s inmates were planning to fight him in his\n cell. She went to retrieve him. But when she opened the door,\n Wingo fell to the floor and again asked to go to the hospital. She\n informed the nurses, who did nothing in response. Then, fearing\n that Wingo would suffer physical harm if she put him back in his\n cell, she called her supervisor, Lieutenant Charles Gordon, for ad-\n vice.\n When Lieutenant Gordon arrived at the infirmary at\n 7:30 a.m., he observed Wingo on the ground. Deputy Marshall in-\n formed him that Wingo had been “causing some type [of] issue\n with other inmates in the cell.” Doc. 191-6 at 80. Lieutenant Gor-\n don then asked Nurse Visser whether Wingo was “okay,” to which\n she replied that he was “medically fine.” Id. at 65, 87-90, 96. He also\n asked Deputy Marshall to call his superior, Major Branson Harris,\n to assess the situation.\n Upon Major Harris’s arrival, Nurse Visser told him—as she\n had told Lieutenant Gordon—that Wingo was simply detoxing and\n drug seeking. She further told him that, in her opinion, Wingo\n needed to be isolated in a cell by himself. Unfortunately, the only\n individual cell in the infirmary was already occupied. As a result,\n Nurse Visser recommended, and Major Harris agreed, that Wingo\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n should be transferred to a padded, isolated cell in the infirmary ex-\n tension. There, he would be kept under close observation.\n Before transferring Wingo to the extension, Major Harris\n asked Nurse Visser again if it would be medically appropriate to do\n so. She assured him that it was.\n Accordingly, at 7:45 a.m., Major Harris and Lieutenant Gor-\n don escorted Wingo to the extension. As they walked him there,\n they determined that he was too unstable to walk on his own and\n placed him in a wheelchair. Lieutenant Gordon asked the nursing\n staff why Wingo was so unbalanced. The nurses said it was simply\n a symptom of detoxing. Shortly after 7:45, Major Harris and Lieu-\n tenant Gordon left Wingo in a padded cell.\n Deputy Paul Wilkerson, who worked in the infirmary, took\n over responsibility for observing Wingo. Because Wingo was sup-\n posed to be under close observation in the infirmary extension, it\n was part of Deputy Wilkerson’s duties to check in on him during\n security rounds every 12 minutes. In part, this was to ensure that\n Wingo was still alive. During these security rounds, Deputy\n Wilkerson was required to look in each cell rather than just rely on\n the cell’s camera feed.\n Deputy Wilkerson admits that he did not look in Wingo’s\n cell during each security round as required. But because he saw\n Wingo change positions a few times through the camera feed, he\n believed Wingo to be alive and well. And when Major Harris and\n Deputy Wilkerson did a security check together at 8:22 a.m., both\n believed that they saw Wingo’s chest rising and falling.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n In the hour after Wingo arrived in the extension, neither Ma-\n jor Harris nor Deputy Wilkerson saw any cause for alarm. But,\n once Deputy Wilkerson opened the door at 8:49 a.m., it became\n clear that Wingo was in serious trouble. Wingo was so motionless\n that, initially, Deputy Wilkerson was concerned that Wingo was\n “possibly in the corner playing a game and possibly could jump up\n at any moment.” Doc. 191-7 at 201. He was quickly disabused of\n this notion as he determined that Wingo was unresponsive, at\n which point he summoned the medical team on an emergency ba-\n sis.\n Shortly thereafter, Wingo was declared dead. An autopsy by\n the Cobb County Medical Examiner later found that Wingo died\n from complications of a perforated gastric ulcer with peritonitis.\n Later, Wingo’s daughter, Tiffany Wingo, acting on behalf of\n his estate, along with other members of Wingo’s family, filed the\n complaint underlying this appeal. She initially named and served\n WellStar, several WellStar nurses, Major Harris, Lieutenant (now-\n Sergeant) Gordon, and Deputy Wilkerson as defendants. Later, she\n named and served Deputy Marshall. WellStar and the WellStar\n nurses eventually reached a settlement with Wingo and were dis-\n missed. This settlement left the sheriff’s deputies as the only de-\n fendants.\n As relevant to this appeal, Tiffany Wingo brought claims\n against (1) all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they\n were deliberately indifferent to her father’s serious medical needs,\n and (2) Deputy Wilkerson under state tort law, alleging that he was\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n negligent in failing to properly conduct security rounds according\n to official policy.\n At the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for\n summary judgment as to all claims. They also moved to exclude\n the testimony of Tiffany Wingo’s causation expert, Dr. Brian My-\n ers. Dr. Myers had testified that the defendants’ inaction caused\n Wingo’s death. But in his deposition, Dr. Myers admitted that he\n could not say, “with any degree of medical certainty” whether\n Wingo could have been saved at 7:45 a.m. when he first entered\n the extension and came under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch. Doc.\n 200-1 at 107. Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion\n “doesn’t bring into the issue of time;” to “opine on whether or not\n at 7:45 . . . if he would have survived at that point, I can’t say . . . .”\n Id.\n The district court (1) granted summary judgment on the sec-\n tion 1983 claims, concluding the defendants were protected by\n qualified immunity, and (2) granted summary judgment to Deputy\n Wilkerson on a state tort claim because Dr. Myers could not say\n with any degree of medical certainty whether Wingo would have\n survived if he had been treated differently at 7:45 a.m.\n Tiffany Wingo appealed.\n II.\n\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Boigris v.\n EWC P&T, LLC, 7 F.4th 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary judg-\n ment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\n law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine\n if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict\n for the nonmoving party.” Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d\n 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation\n omitted).\n III.\n\n Tiffany Wingo argues that the district court erred in two re-\n spects. First, she says that, viewing the facts in the light most favor-\n able to her, the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s\n medical needs and, as a result, violated his constitutional rights.\n This is so, she argues, even though it is undisputed that Deputy\n Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, and Major Harris relied on the\n nurses’ advice in their treatment of Wingo. Second, she says that\n the district court erred in its treatment of Dr. Myers’s testimony.\n Tiffany Wingo says that her claims against Deputy Wilkerson sur-\n vive summary judgment because Dr. Myers’s testimony establishes\n that Deputy Wilkerson could have saved her father’s life if he had\n called for emergency medical care between 7:45 and 8:45 a.m. We\n discuss each argument in turn below.\n A.\n\n We will start with Tiffany Wingo’s argument about deliber-\n ate indifference. Because the state has a “constitutional obligation\n to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they\n are punishing by incarceration,” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n 1504 (11th Cir. 1991), the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits\n “[d]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”\n Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).\n To establish liability on a deliberate indifference claim, a\n plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the injured party suffered a dep-\n rivation that was objectively “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the de-\n fendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal\n law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en\n banc) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To meet\n the second step, the plaintiff must show that the “defendant was\n actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substan-\n tial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Id.\n Taking the undisputed facts in Tiffany Wingo’s favor, we\n cannot say that Deputy Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, or Major\n Harris were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical\n needs. Over the course of the night, the jail’s medical staff assured\n each of these guards that Wingo’s symptoms were consistent with\n drug withdrawal and that he was medically fine. Our caselaw rec-\n ognizes that a nonmedical officer cannot be held liable for deliber-\n ate indifference if he reasonably relies on the opinion of a medical\n officer in his treatment of a detainee or inmate. For instance, in\n Townsend v. Jefferson County, we determined that correctional offic-\n ers were not deliberately indifferent when they reasonably relied\n on a nurse’s professional judgment that the situation was “not an\n emergency.” 601 F.3d 1152, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2010).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 12 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n Our decision in Townsend is consistent with the law of other\n circuits. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has noted that “a prison\n official may rely on a medical professional’s opinion if reliance on\n that opinion is reasonable.” Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 601 (8th\n Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit\n has similarly made clear that “[p]rison officials generally may rely\n on the advice and course of treatment prescribed by medical per-\n sonnel.” Est. of Beauford v. Mesa County, 35 F.4th 1248, 1265 (10th\n Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit, too, has “long recognized” that\n “non-medical officials may reasonably defer to the judgment of\n medical professionals regarding inmate treatment.” Giles v.\n Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019). The Sixth and Third\n Circuits also take this approach. See Winkler v. Madison County, 893\n F.3d 877, 901 (6th Cir. 2018); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d\n Cir. 2004).\n Applying that approach here, the guards were not deliber-\n ately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical condition. The record\n establishes that the medical staff assured security personnel that\n Wingo was medically stable and exhibiting symptoms consistent\n with detox. The nurses told Deputy Marshall, for instance, that\n Wingo was detoxing and that his requests for hospitalization were\n about seeking attention and drugs. Likewise, Nurse Visser told\n Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was “fine medically,” and the nurs-\n ing staff told Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was simply unbal-\n anced due to detoxing. Finally, Nurse Visser told Major Harris that\n Wingo was detoxing and drug seeking. On this record, we can’t say\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 13 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n the deputies’ reliance on the nursing professionals was unreasona-\n ble.\n Tiffany Wingo makes two arguments in response to this rea-\n soning. But neither works.\n First, she argues that nonmedical officers cannot rely on\n medical opinions when those opinions are obviously wrong even\n to a layman. We will assume without deciding that her statement\n of the law is correct. Cf. Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1159 (“Townsend\n has not presented evidence that her situation was so obviously dire\n that two lay deputies must have known that a medical professional\n had grossly misjudged Townsend’s condition.”). Even so, we can-\n not say that the facts support her assertion that the nurses’ diagno-\n sis here would be obviously wrong to a layman. A perforated ulcer\n is hidden in the body and presents diffuse symptoms like nausea,\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. It is not the kind of ailment\n that a layman can easily diagnose.\n Second, Tiffany Wingo argues that the guards could not rea-\n sonably rely on the nurses’ opinions because the guards did not\n have the nurses reexamine Wingo after he began to stumble. We\n disagree. When Wingo was admitted to the infirmary, the nurses\n took his vitals and diagnosed him as detoxing. He was then set for\n observation overnight. Over the course of that night and into the\n morning, as Wingo began to show signs of distress, the guards\n alerted the nurses to his symptoms. Each time, the nurses assured\n the guards that Wingo was okay. The nurses concluded that Wingo\n was experiencing drug withdrawal, a condition they viewed as\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 14 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\n\n uncomfortable but not life-threatening. That medical judgment\n later proved incorrect. Still, the record does not show that a rea-\n sonable nonmedical officer would have had a clear basis to ques-\n tion that assessment at the time.\n B.\n\n We turn now to the grant of summary judgment in favor of\n Deputy Wilkerson. Dr. Myers’s testimony formed the only basis\n for Tiffany Wingo’s causation argument against Deputy Wilker-\n son. The district court entered judgment on the claims against Dep-\n uty Wilkerson because Dr. Myers was unwilling to say with any\n degree of medical certainty that Deputy Wilkerson’s inaction\n caused Wingo’s death. The district court concluded that, even if\n Dr. Myers’s testimony were admissible, his testimony would be in-\n sufficient to survive summary judgment on causation.\n We agree that Dr. Myers’s testimony, even if admissible,\n does not create an issue of fact on causation with respect to Deputy\n Wilkerson’s liability. Dr. Myers testified that, as a general matter,\n the chances of survivability of a ruptured ulcer decrease over time.\n When asked about Wingo’s chances of survival when he first came\n under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch at 7:45 a.m., Dr. Myers admitted\n that he could not say “with any degree of medical certainty”\n whether Wingo could have been saved. Doc. 200-1 at 107. Instead,\n Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion “doesn’t bring into\n the issue of time” and he could not “opine on whether or not at\n 7:45 . . . [Wingo] would have survived . . . .” Id.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 15 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n The lack of meaningful causation evidence is fatal to Tiffany\n Wingo’s state and federal claims against Deputy Wilkerson. Both\n the deliberate indifference and state tort law claims against Deputy\n Wilkerson require that a plaintiff demonstrate causation. Marbury\n v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that a suc-\n cessful deliberate indifference claim requires that the plaintiff show\n causation); Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 837 S.E.2d 310,\n 312 (Ga. 2019) (explaining that a negligence claim under Georgia\n law contains four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation,\n and damages). When the issue of causation presents a medical\n question beyond a layperson’s ordinary experience, expert testi-\n mony is necessary for both kind of claims as well. See Alberson v.\n Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2006) (section 1983 claim);\n Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Cowart\n v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010) (state law claim); Fed. R. Evid.\n 702.\n Although Dr. Myers’s testimony may have allowed a rea-\n sonable jury to find the nurses or other guards liable for their con-\n duct earlier in the night, no reasonable jury could find Deputy\n Wilkerson liable based on this testimony. The district court did not\n err in granting Deputy Wilkerson summary judgment.\n IV.\n\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Tiffany Wingo v. Major Branson Harris\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10933\\n ____________________\\n\\n TIFFANY WINGO,\\n as Administrator of the Estate of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n KIEARA WINGO,\\n as surviving child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n ERIKA WINGO,\\n as Surviving Child of Kevin Wingo, Sr.,\\n ESQ. TERI FIELDS,\\n Conservator of Kevil Wingo, Jr., Surviving\\n Minor Child of Kevil Wingo, Sr.,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n ANGEL CALLOWAY,\\n as mother and next friend of Erika Wingo,\\n surviving minor child of Kevil Wingo, Sr., et al.,\\n Plaintiffs,\\n versus\\n\\n WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., et al.,\\n Defendants,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n MAJOR BRANSON HARRIS,\\n individually,\\n LIEUTENANT CHARLES GORDON,\\n individually,\\n DEPUTY PAUL WILKERSON,\\n individually,\\n DEPUTY LYNDA MARSHALL,\\n individually,\\n JOHN DOES 1 - 10,\\n individually and in their capacity as employees of\\n Cobb County Sheriff's Office, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03662-VMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n The main question in this appeal is whether nonmedical jail\\n officers were deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s serious medical\\n condition when they followed the advice of the jail’s medical staff.\\n Kevil Wingo was a pretrial detainee in the Cobb County Adult De-\\n tention Center when he died from a perforated ulcer. He was un-\\n der the care of nurses at the center when he died, and those nurses\\n had misdiagnosed him as suffering from drug withdrawal or “de-\\n tox.” His estate sued the Center’s sheriff’s deputies for deliberate\\n indifference. We hold that a nonmedical jail officer cannot be\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n found liable for deliberate indifference when he or she reasonably\\n relies on the advice or opinion of a medical professional. Because\\n the sheriff’s deputies reasonably relied on the nurses’ diagnosis, we\\n conclude that they were not deliberately indifferent. The district\\n court also correctly granted summary judgment to Deputy Wilker-\\n son because the plaintiff’s medical expert could not say with any\\n degree of medical certainty that he caused Wingo’s death. As a re-\\n sult, we affirm.\\n I.\\n\\n In September 2019, Kevil Wingo was arrested in Cobb\\n County for possessing 0.2 grams of cocaine. After his arrest, he was\\n booked as a pretrial detainee at the Cobb County Adult Detention\\n Center.\\n A few days after entering detention, Wingo began to com-\\n plain of abdominal pain and sweating. In response to these com-\\n plaints, Deputy Quinton Appleby took Wingo to the detention cen-\\n ter’s infirmary. En route to the infirmary, Wingo told Deputy Ap-\\n pleby that he had an ulcer, which Appleby relayed to the nursing\\n staff.\\n Nurse Yvette Burton admitted Wingo to the infirmary at\\n 12:35 a.m. that night. In the infirmary, medical staff hired through\\n WellStar Health Systems, Inc., including Nurse Burton, were re-\\n sponsible for overseeing operations. Sheriff’s deputies, however,\\n were responsible for security. Those deputies were trained not to\\n make medical decisions but instead to defer to the medical staff.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n When Wingo was admitted, he was complaining of nausea,\\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. He was also heard pleading\\n with God, saying that he would never touch drugs again should he\\n survive.\\n Based on these signs and symptoms, Nurse Burton believed\\n Wingo to be detoxing or suffering from withdrawals. Indeed, at the\\n time, Wingo was in the middle of a mandatory 5-day period of re-\\n ceiving “withdrawal checks” for opiates, which further confirmed\\n her suspicion that his symptoms were a result of detoxing. Her ex-\\n perience as a nurse only strengthened this belief. After all, detoxing\\n afflicts as many as 40 percent of the inmates in the infirmary. Ac-\\n cording to Nurse Shanna Griffith, another nurse on the night shift,\\n the medical staff took Wingo’s vitals and then admitted him “so he\\n could stay overnight . . . [and] see the doctor in the morning.” Doc.\\n 200-6 at 28.\\n Over the course of that night, Deputy Britton McPhee, a\\n Sheriff’s Deputy serving in the infirmary, watched Wingo. Deputy\\n McPhee observed Wingo being “very loud” from the time he en-\\n tered the infirmary. This disruption continued throughout the\\n night, causing his cell mates to protest that they could not sleep.\\n Continuing to complain of his symptoms, Wingo repeatedly asked\\n Deputy McPhee to send him to the hospital. In accordance with his\\n training, Deputy McPhee replied that this decision would be up to\\n the medical staff. Displeased with this response, Wingo replied:\\n “just shut . . . up and do what I’m telling you to do.” Doc 191-3 at\\n 174.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n At 6:00 a.m., Deputy Lynda Marshall relieved Deputy\\n McPhee. Deputy McPhee informed Deputy Marshall that Wingo\\n had been generally disruptive, “hollering,” and demanding to go to\\n the hospital. He also told her that, according to the nurses, Wingo\\n was detoxing. Deputy Marshall, who had served in the Sheriff’s Of-\\n fice for over 27 years, had frequently seen individuals detoxing dur-\\n ing pretrial detention. Based on this experience, and judging from\\n Wingo’s symptoms, Deputy Marshall agreed with the nurses’ as-\\n sessment.\\n Nurse Annaleen Visser, who took over from Nurse Burton\\n during the day shift, also believed that Wingo was detoxing.\\n Wingo’s frequent demands to go to the hospital did nothing to\\n change her mind. In her experience, detoxing inmates always wish\\n to go to the hospital in hopes of a better bed, better meals, more\\n privacy, and opiates. In Nurse Visser’s mind, inmates will “do any-\\n thing to go to the ER.” Doc. 200-5 at 88. Because she was so sure\\n that Wingo was detoxing, she declined to do a physical assessment\\n of him, preferring to wait—in accordance with detoxing proto-\\n cols—for him to be “calm.”\\n Throughout the early morning, Deputy Marshall observed\\n Wingo continuing to yell that he needed to go to the hospital.\\n Wingo also told Deputy Marshall that he could not breathe. In re-\\n sponse, she told him that “if you are talking to me, you are breath-\\n ing,” but she also asked him for more details. Doc. 191-4 at 138. He\\n reiterated that he could not breathe and that he needed to go to the\\n hospital. Deputy Marshall relayed these complaints to the nurses,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n who told her that Wingo was “just trying to go to the hospital, he\\n was detoxing, drug seeking, [and] that he was okay.” Id.\\n By this time, Wingo’s repeated yelling and disruption had\\n become a source of frustration to Wingo’s fellow inmates. The\\n frustration eventually reached a breaking point, and Deputy Mar-\\n shall heard that Wingo’s inmates were planning to fight him in his\\n cell. She went to retrieve him. But when she opened the door,\\n Wingo fell to the floor and again asked to go to the hospital. She\\n informed the nurses, who did nothing in response. Then, fearing\\n that Wingo would suffer physical harm if she put him back in his\\n cell, she called her supervisor, Lieutenant Charles Gordon, for ad-\\n vice.\\n When Lieutenant Gordon arrived at the infirmary at\\n 7:30 a.m., he observed Wingo on the ground. Deputy Marshall in-\\n formed him that Wingo had been “causing some type [of] issue\\n with other inmates in the cell.” Doc. 191-6 at 80. Lieutenant Gor-\\n don then asked Nurse Visser whether Wingo was “okay,” to which\\n she replied that he was “medically fine.” Id. at 65, 87-90, 96. He also\\n asked Deputy Marshall to call his superior, Major Branson Harris,\\n to assess the situation.\\n Upon Major Harris’s arrival, Nurse Visser told him—as she\\n had told Lieutenant Gordon—that Wingo was simply detoxing and\\n drug seeking. She further told him that, in her opinion, Wingo\\n needed to be isolated in a cell by himself. Unfortunately, the only\\n individual cell in the infirmary was already occupied. As a result,\\n Nurse Visser recommended, and Major Harris agreed, that Wingo\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n should be transferred to a padded, isolated cell in the infirmary ex-\\n tension. There, he would be kept under close observation.\\n Before transferring Wingo to the extension, Major Harris\\n asked Nurse Visser again if it would be medically appropriate to do\\n so. She assured him that it was.\\n Accordingly, at 7:45 a.m., Major Harris and Lieutenant Gor-\\n don escorted Wingo to the extension. As they walked him there,\\n they determined that he was too unstable to walk on his own and\\n placed him in a wheelchair. Lieutenant Gordon asked the nursing\\n staff why Wingo was so unbalanced. The nurses said it was simply\\n a symptom of detoxing. Shortly after 7:45, Major Harris and Lieu-\\n tenant Gordon left Wingo in a padded cell.\\n Deputy Paul Wilkerson, who worked in the infirmary, took\\n over responsibility for observing Wingo. Because Wingo was sup-\\n posed to be under close observation in the infirmary extension, it\\n was part of Deputy Wilkerson’s duties to check in on him during\\n security rounds every 12 minutes. In part, this was to ensure that\\n Wingo was still alive. During these security rounds, Deputy\\n Wilkerson was required to look in each cell rather than just rely on\\n the cell’s camera feed.\\n Deputy Wilkerson admits that he did not look in Wingo’s\\n cell during each security round as required. But because he saw\\n Wingo change positions a few times through the camera feed, he\\n believed Wingo to be alive and well. And when Major Harris and\\n Deputy Wilkerson did a security check together at 8:22 a.m., both\\n believed that they saw Wingo’s chest rising and falling.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n In the hour after Wingo arrived in the extension, neither Ma-\\n jor Harris nor Deputy Wilkerson saw any cause for alarm. But,\\n once Deputy Wilkerson opened the door at 8:49 a.m., it became\\n clear that Wingo was in serious trouble. Wingo was so motionless\\n that, initially, Deputy Wilkerson was concerned that Wingo was\\n “possibly in the corner playing a game and possibly could jump up\\n at any moment.” Doc. 191-7 at 201. He was quickly disabused of\\n this notion as he determined that Wingo was unresponsive, at\\n which point he summoned the medical team on an emergency ba-\\n sis.\\n Shortly thereafter, Wingo was declared dead. An autopsy by\\n the Cobb County Medical Examiner later found that Wingo died\\n from complications of a perforated gastric ulcer with peritonitis.\\n Later, Wingo’s daughter, Tiffany Wingo, acting on behalf of\\n his estate, along with other members of Wingo’s family, filed the\\n complaint underlying this appeal. She initially named and served\\n WellStar, several WellStar nurses, Major Harris, Lieutenant (now-\\n Sergeant) Gordon, and Deputy Wilkerson as defendants. Later, she\\n named and served Deputy Marshall. WellStar and the WellStar\\n nurses eventually reached a settlement with Wingo and were dis-\\n missed. This settlement left the sheriff’s deputies as the only de-\\n fendants.\\n As relevant to this appeal, Tiffany Wingo brought claims\\n against (1) all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they\\n were deliberately indifferent to her father’s serious medical needs,\\n and (2) Deputy Wilkerson under state tort law, alleging that he was\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n negligent in failing to properly conduct security rounds according\\n to official policy.\\n At the close of discovery, the defendants filed a motion for\\n summary judgment as to all claims. They also moved to exclude\\n the testimony of Tiffany Wingo’s causation expert, Dr. Brian My-\\n ers. Dr. Myers had testified that the defendants’ inaction caused\\n Wingo’s death. But in his deposition, Dr. Myers admitted that he\\n could not say, “with any degree of medical certainty” whether\\n Wingo could have been saved at 7:45 a.m. when he first entered\\n the extension and came under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch. Doc.\\n 200-1 at 107. Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion\\n “doesn’t bring into the issue of time;” to “opine on whether or not\\n at 7:45 . . . if he would have survived at that point, I can’t say . . . .”\\n Id.\\n The district court (1) granted summary judgment on the sec-\\n tion 1983 claims, concluding the defendants were protected by\\n qualified immunity, and (2) granted summary judgment to Deputy\\n Wilkerson on a state tort claim because Dr. Myers could not say\\n with any degree of medical certainty whether Wingo would have\\n survived if he had been treated differently at 7:45 a.m.\\n Tiffany Wingo appealed.\\n II.\\n\\n We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Boigris v.\\n EWC P&T, LLC, 7 F.4th 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 2021). Summary judg-\\n ment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of\\n law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact “is genuine\\n if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict\\n for the nonmoving party.” Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d\\n 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation\\n omitted).\\n III.\\n\\n Tiffany Wingo argues that the district court erred in two re-\\n spects. First, she says that, viewing the facts in the light most favor-\\n able to her, the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s\\n medical needs and, as a result, violated his constitutional rights.\\n This is so, she argues, even though it is undisputed that Deputy\\n Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, and Major Harris relied on the\\n nurses’ advice in their treatment of Wingo. Second, she says that\\n the district court erred in its treatment of Dr. Myers’s testimony.\\n Tiffany Wingo says that her claims against Deputy Wilkerson sur-\\n vive summary judgment because Dr. Myers’s testimony establishes\\n that Deputy Wilkerson could have saved her father’s life if he had\\n called for emergency medical care between 7:45 and 8:45 a.m. We\\n discuss each argument in turn below.\\n A.\\n\\n We will start with Tiffany Wingo’s argument about deliber-\\n ate indifference. Because the state has a “constitutional obligation\\n to provide minimally adequate medical care to those whom they\\n are punishing by incarceration,” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n 1504 (11th Cir. 1991), the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits\\n “[d]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”\\n Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n To establish liability on a deliberate indifference claim, a\\n plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the injured party suffered a dep-\\n rivation that was objectively “sufficiently serious,” and (2) the de-\\n fendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal\\n law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en\\n banc) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To meet\\n the second step, the plaintiff must show that the “defendant was\\n actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substan-\\n tial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Id.\\n Taking the undisputed facts in Tiffany Wingo’s favor, we\\n cannot say that Deputy Marshall, Lieutenant Gordon, or Major\\n Harris were deliberately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical\\n needs. Over the course of the night, the jail’s medical staff assured\\n each of these guards that Wingo’s symptoms were consistent with\\n drug withdrawal and that he was medically fine. Our caselaw rec-\\n ognizes that a nonmedical officer cannot be held liable for deliber-\\n ate indifference if he reasonably relies on the opinion of a medical\\n officer in his treatment of a detainee or inmate. For instance, in\\n Townsend v. Jefferson County, we determined that correctional offic-\\n ers were not deliberately indifferent when they reasonably relied\\n on a nurse’s professional judgment that the situation was “not an\\n emergency.” 601 F.3d 1152, 1158–59 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n Our decision in Townsend is consistent with the law of other\\n circuits. The Eighth Circuit, for example, has noted that “a prison\\n official may rely on a medical professional’s opinion if reliance on\\n that opinion is reasonable.” Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 601 (8th\\n Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit\\n has similarly made clear that “[p]rison officials generally may rely\\n on the advice and course of treatment prescribed by medical per-\\n sonnel.” Est. of Beauford v. Mesa County, 35 F.4th 1248, 1265 (10th\\n Cir. 2022). The Seventh Circuit, too, has “long recognized” that\\n “non-medical officials may reasonably defer to the judgment of\\n medical professionals regarding inmate treatment.” Giles v.\\n Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049 (7th Cir. 2019). The Sixth and Third\\n Circuits also take this approach. See Winkler v. Madison County, 893\\n F.3d 877, 901 (6th Cir. 2018); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d\\n Cir. 2004).\\n Applying that approach here, the guards were not deliber-\\n ately indifferent to Wingo’s serious medical condition. The record\\n establishes that the medical staff assured security personnel that\\n Wingo was medically stable and exhibiting symptoms consistent\\n with detox. The nurses told Deputy Marshall, for instance, that\\n Wingo was detoxing and that his requests for hospitalization were\\n about seeking attention and drugs. Likewise, Nurse Visser told\\n Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was “fine medically,” and the nurs-\\n ing staff told Lieutenant Gordon that Wingo was simply unbal-\\n anced due to detoxing. Finally, Nurse Visser told Major Harris that\\n Wingo was detoxing and drug seeking. On this record, we can’t say\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n the deputies’ reliance on the nursing professionals was unreasona-\\n ble.\\n Tiffany Wingo makes two arguments in response to this rea-\\n soning. But neither works.\\n First, she argues that nonmedical officers cannot rely on\\n medical opinions when those opinions are obviously wrong even\\n to a layman. We will assume without deciding that her statement\\n of the law is correct. Cf. Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1159 (“Townsend\\n has not presented evidence that her situation was so obviously dire\\n that two lay deputies must have known that a medical professional\\n had grossly misjudged Townsend’s condition.”). Even so, we can-\\n not say that the facts support her assertion that the nurses’ diagno-\\n sis here would be obviously wrong to a layman. A perforated ulcer\\n is hidden in the body and presents diffuse symptoms like nausea,\\n vomiting, and abdominal discomfort. It is not the kind of ailment\\n that a layman can easily diagnose.\\n Second, Tiffany Wingo argues that the guards could not rea-\\n sonably rely on the nurses’ opinions because the guards did not\\n have the nurses reexamine Wingo after he began to stumble. We\\n disagree. When Wingo was admitted to the infirmary, the nurses\\n took his vitals and diagnosed him as detoxing. He was then set for\\n observation overnight. Over the course of that night and into the\\n morning, as Wingo began to show signs of distress, the guards\\n alerted the nurses to his symptoms. Each time, the nurses assured\\n the guards that Wingo was okay. The nurses concluded that Wingo\\n was experiencing drug withdrawal, a condition they viewed as\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10933\\n\\n uncomfortable but not life-threatening. That medical judgment\\n later proved incorrect. Still, the record does not show that a rea-\\n sonable nonmedical officer would have had a clear basis to ques-\\n tion that assessment at the time.\\n B.\\n\\n We turn now to the grant of summary judgment in favor of\\n Deputy Wilkerson. Dr. Myers’s testimony formed the only basis\\n for Tiffany Wingo’s causation argument against Deputy Wilker-\\n son. The district court entered judgment on the claims against Dep-\\n uty Wilkerson because Dr. Myers was unwilling to say with any\\n degree of medical certainty that Deputy Wilkerson’s inaction\\n caused Wingo’s death. The district court concluded that, even if\\n Dr. Myers’s testimony were admissible, his testimony would be in-\\n sufficient to survive summary judgment on causation.\\n We agree that Dr. Myers’s testimony, even if admissible,\\n does not create an issue of fact on causation with respect to Deputy\\n Wilkerson’s liability. Dr. Myers testified that, as a general matter,\\n the chances of survivability of a ruptured ulcer decrease over time.\\n When asked about Wingo’s chances of survival when he first came\\n under Deputy Wilkerson’s watch at 7:45 a.m., Dr. Myers admitted\\n that he could not say “with any degree of medical certainty”\\n whether Wingo could have been saved. Doc. 200-1 at 107. Instead,\\n Dr. Myers explained that his causation opinion “doesn’t bring into\\n the issue of time” and he could not “opine on whether or not at\\n 7:45 . . . [Wingo] would have survived . . . .” Id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10933 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n The lack of meaningful causation evidence is fatal to Tiffany\\n Wingo’s state and federal claims against Deputy Wilkerson. Both\\n the deliberate indifference and state tort law claims against Deputy\\n Wilkerson require that a plaintiff demonstrate causation. Marbury\\n v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that a suc-\\n cessful deliberate indifference claim requires that the plaintiff show\\n causation); Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., 837 S.E.2d 310,\\n 312 (Ga. 2019) (explaining that a negligence claim under Georgia\\n law contains four elements: a duty, a breach of that duty, causation,\\n and damages). When the issue of causation presents a medical\\n question beyond a layperson’s ordinary experience, expert testi-\\n mony is necessary for both kind of claims as well. See Alberson v.\\n Norris, 458 F.3d 762, 765–66 (8th Cir. 2006) (section 1983 claim);\\n Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Cowart\\n v. Widener, 697 S.E.2d 779 (2010) (state law claim); Fed. R. Evid.\\n 702.\\n Although Dr. Myers’s testimony may have allowed a rea-\\n sonable jury to find the nurses or other guards liable for their con-\\n duct earlier in the night, no reasonable jury could find Deputy\\n Wilkerson liable based on this testimony. The district court did not\\n err in granting Deputy Wilkerson summary judgment.\\n IV.\\n\\n The district court’s grant of summary judgment is\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30958,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745332,"string":"10,745,332"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. John Wayne Thomas"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-11427"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11427\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JOHN WAYNE THOMAS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00040-TKW-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\\n erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from a car.\\n Officer Anthony Kaiser approached John Thomas’s car after\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n receiving a complaint about littering. When Kaiser later asked for\\n identification, Thomas produced a fake driver’s license. Kaiser then\\n attempted to arrest him, but Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser and\\n fled. After Thomas left his car in a nearby neighborhood, officers\\n obtained a search warrant for it. Based on the evidence found in the\\n car, a grand jury indicted Thomas for unlawful possession of a\\n means of identification, fraudulent use of 15 or more unauthor-\\n ized access devices, mail theft, and possession with intent to distrib-\\n ute methamphetamine. The district court denied Thomas’s motion\\n to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search\\n warrant. We affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On January 31, 2023, a McDonald’s employee in DeFuniak\\n Springs, Florida, called the police to report that a male in a gray\\n Acura car littered in the restaurant’s parking lot. Officer Anthony\\n Kaiser went to the scene in response to that report. When he ar-\\n rived, Kaiser saw a parked car matching the employee’s description\\n and trash on the ground next to the driver’s side door. Kaiser asked\\n his dispatcher to check the Louisiana license plate on the car.\\n Officer Kaiser parked his police car and approached the\\n driver’s side door. Kaiser informed the man in the driver’s seat,\\n John Thomas, of the complaint. Thomas admitted that he had dis-\\n carded the trash. He exited the car and picked up the trash and then\\n returned to the driver’s seat and closed the car door.\\n After Kaiser asked Thomas for identification, Thomas pro-\\n duced a Louisiana driver’s license for a person born in 1947 with a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n different name. Kaiser suspected the identification was false be-\\n cause Thomas did not appear to be in his mid-70s.\\n At that point, Kaiser stepped away from the driver’s side\\n door and read Thomas’s license plate again to the dispatcher, as\\n well as his driver’s license number. Kaiser then reapproached the\\n driver’s door. While Kaiser and Thomas spoke, the dispatcher re-\\n ported back that the driver’s license number did not belong to\\n someone named S.M.D.\\n A few minutes later, a female passenger from Thomas’s car,\\n Amanda Breaux, approached Kaiser, who was still standing by the\\n driver’s side door of Thomas’s car. Kaiser and Breaux then walked\\n over to a different parking spot and had a conversation. During\\n their conversation, Kaiser began to suspect Breaux was engaged in\\n criminal activity, so he ordered her to follow him over to his police\\n car, a few more spots away. While Kaiser and Breaux were talking,\\n Thomas again exited his car, walked to an adjacent parking lot, and\\n returned a minute later.\\n During Breaux and Kaiser’s conversation, the dispatcher\\n confirmed that the driver’s license number was associated with a\\n different name and birth date than was displayed on it. Kaiser then\\n left Breaux by the police car, walked to Thomas’s car, opened the\\n door, grabbed Thomas, and told him to “come on out.” Thomas\\n did not immediately exit the car, and Kaiser told him that he was\\n putting him in handcuffs. Kaiser informed Thomas that he was be-\\n ing detained for giving false identification.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n After Thomas continued to refuse to exit his car, Kaiser went\\n back to his police car to retrieve a taser. Thomas closed his door\\n but left the driver’s side window slightly open. Kaiser approached\\n his car with his taser. Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser through the\\n crack, and Kaiser deployed his taser. Thomas quickly backed out of\\n the space, and Kaiser fired two shots at Thomas’s car. Thomas suc-\\n cessfully fled the parking lot and left his car in a nearby neighbor-\\n hood. A canine tracking unit found Thomas a few hours later with\\n several cans of pepper spray on his person.\\n An investigator later filed an affidavit to support a search\\n warrant for the contents of Thomas’s gray Acura. The affidavit re-\\n counted that “Thomas provided Officer . . . Kaiser with a fake Lou-\\n isiana driver’s license” with “fake information.” And it stated that\\n after Kaiser “informed . . . Thomas he was under arrest,” Thomas\\n “failed to follow verbal commands” and “sprayed Officer . . . Kaiser\\n in the face with mace.” Thomas himself “admitted he ‘maced’ . . .\\n Kaiser because . . . Kaiser had a taser and he did not feel . . . Kaiser\\n was being respectful.” The affidavit recounted that “Brea[u]x was\\n subsequently detained and told law enforcement . . . Thomas had\\n a firearm in his possession.” Police sought the warrant to obtain\\n “[f]irearms and ammunition, pepper spray or mace . . . , spent pro-\\n jectiles, . . . [and] documents to include false identification.” The\\n affidavit provided that these objects were evidence of battery on a\\n law enforcement officer and of giving false identification by a per-\\n son lawfully detained. The circuit judge issued the search warrant.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n When officers executed the warrant, they found approxi-\\n mately 105 grams of methamphetamine, two counterfeit $100 bills,\\n and personal identification documents of other people including\\n wage records, mail, copies of social security cards, birth certificates,\\n account statements, and tax documents. Officers also found a lap-\\n top containing pictures of social security cards, drivers’ licenses,\\n credit cards, checks, birth certificates, and multiple drivers’ licenses\\n with Thomas’s photograph alongside other people’s information.\\n On May 16, 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment charg-\\n ing Thomas with one count of unlawful possession of a means of\\n identification, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(2)(B); one count of fraud-\\n ulent use of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, id.\\n § 1029(a)(3), (c)(1)(A)(i); one count of unlawful possession of a\\n means of identification during and in relation to a felony, id.\\n § 1028A(a)(1); one count of mail theft, id. § 1708; and one count of\\n possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture\\n containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii).\\n Thomas pleaded not guilty, and the district court scheduled a trial.\\n Thomas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the\\n search of his gray Acura on the ground that the warrant was ob-\\n tained based on information gained during an illegal stop. He ar-\\n gued that Kaiser did not have reasonable suspicion of underlying\\n unlawful activity. Specifically, he argued that Florida law does not\\n allow an officer to detain a person on reasonable suspicion of non-\\n criminal violations, such as littering. He also argued that the search\\n warrant was defective because he was detained unlawfully.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n The government responded that Kaiser had the necessary\\n “information for an investigatory stop,” and in any event, Thomas\\n did not believe he was being detained. It also responded that be-\\n cause Thomas had given Kaiser false identification while “seated in\\n the vehicle” and deployed pepper spray from the vehicle, there was\\n probable cause that evidence of crimes existed in the vehicle.\\n The district court denied the motion to suppress. It ruled\\n that Kaiser had the “authority to lawfully detain [Thomas] for an\\n investigatory stop based on the littering complaint.” During that\\n lawful stop, Kaiser had the authority to ask for Thomas’s identifi-\\n cation, and Thomas was obliged to provide it. The district court\\n reasoned that even if Thomas “picked up the trash,” Kaiser “was\\n [not] required to terminate his investigation” and could “still cite\\n [Thomas] for littering.” The district court also ruled that the police\\n had probable cause to search the car for evidence of criminal activ-\\n ity because Thomas produced false identification during a “lawful\\n detention.”\\n The government dismissed one count of the indictment, and\\n Thomas pleaded guilty to the remaining four counts. But he “re-\\n serve[d] the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress.”\\n The district court sentenced him to 212 months of imprisonment\\n and five years of supervised release.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we re-\\n view findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.\\n United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2022). We\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n construe all facts in the light most favorable to the government. Id.\\n “[W]e may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground\\n supported by the record.” United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334,\\n 1340 n.6 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Thomas appeals only the denial of his motion to suppress.\\n He argues that police obtained the search warrant for his gray\\n Acura “based on information acquired during [an] illegal stop” be-\\n cause he committed a civil infraction, not a crime. The government\\n responds that under Florida law, officers “may detain an individual\\n to issue a citation for littering” and are allowed to request identifi-\\n cation to issue the citation. The government argues, in the alterna-\\n tive, that the encounter was initially consensual and matured into\\n a “brief, investigatory detention” when Kaiser instructed Thomas\\n to get out of the car. Kaiser could then detain Thomas.\\n\\n “Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment\\n must be suppressed.” United States v. Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d 1297,\\n 1302 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted). We have recognized “three broad categories of police-citizen\\n encounters for purposes of . . . Fourth Amendment analysis: [] po-\\n lice-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention; [] brief\\n seizures or investigatory detentions; and [] full-scale arrests.” United\\n States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n A consensual encounter between police and a citizen does\\n not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. United\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). An encounter\\n is consensual when an officer does not “by means of physical force\\n or show of authority . . . in some way restrain[] the liberty of a cit-\\n izen.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The test\\n for whether the officer restrained a citizen’s liberty is whether ‘a\\n reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.’” Id.\\n (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)). The test\\n depends on “[a]ll the circumstances” of the encounter, including\\n “whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded,” “the length of the\\n detention and questioning; the number of police officers present;\\n whether the officers displayed their weapons; any physical touch-\\n ing of the suspect; and the language and tone of voice of the po-\\n lice.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). Officers “may pose questions” and “ask for identifica-\\n tion” as part of a consensual encounter so long as “they do not in-\\n duce cooperation by coercive means.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.\\n In Knights, we affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress\\n where officers approached two individuals suspected of stealing\\n something from a vehicle. 989 F.3d at 1284, 1286. The officers\\n “parked in a way that would have allowed” the individuals to\\n “drive away.” Id. at 1284. One of the individuals left the scene and\\n walked into a nearby house. Id. The defendant sat in the driver’s\\n seat and closed the car door. Id. An officer approached the car with\\n a flashlight and knocked on the driver’s window, and the defendant\\n then opened the door. Id. The officer smelled marijuana and asked\\n whether the defendant had any. Id. We held that the defendant in-\\n itially “would have felt free to leave,” in part because he “was\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n physically capable of walking away,” “could have driven away,”\\n and the other individual “[i]n fact . . . did leave.” Id. at 1286–87.\\n In the light of Knights, the initial encounter between Kaiser\\n and Thomas was consensual. Kaiser did not block Thomas’s car\\n from leaving the parking lot by parking a few spaces away. By\\n Thomas’s own telling, Kaiser approached Thomas’s window, in-\\n formed him of the littering complaint, and allowed Thomas to exit\\n the car to throw away the litter. When asked for identification,\\n Thomas voluntarily showed Kaiser his false driver’s license.\\n Thomas left the scene after Kaiser stepped away. He exited his car\\n and walked around an adjacent parking lot. And nothing from the\\n video of the incident establishes that Kaiser exhibited “physical\\n force or show of authority” before he told Thomas to step out of\\n the vehicle. Id. at 1286 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted). There is no evidence suggesting that Thomas should have felt\\n compelled to produce identification or answer questions, even af-\\n ter Kaiser inquired about the littering. See id. at 1284, 1286 (holding\\n that a police encounter was consensual even after police asked the\\n suspect if he had any marijuana).\\n Thomas argues we cannot conclude that the encounter was\\n consensual because doing so would be “div[ing] into the record to\\n make [our] own factual determinations.” But “we may affirm the\\n denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the rec-\\n ord.” Schmitz, 153 F.4th at 1340 n.6 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). And “when the record contains video evidence,\\n the authenticity of which is not challenged, the court should\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n ordinarily view the facts in the light depicted by the video evi-\\n dence.” O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 531 (1st Cir.\\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Scott v.\\n Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (directing reviewing courts to\\n “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).\\n That the initial encounter was consensual does not end the\\n inquiry because, as the parties agree, Kaiser eventually effected a\\n seizure when he ordered Thomas to exit the car. The government\\n maintains that Kaiser only “conduct[ed] a Terry stop” at that point.\\n Yet the affiant statement in the search warrant application says that\\n after “Kaiser realized the identification was false, [he] informed . . .\\n Thomas he was under arrest, and directed him to exit the vehicle.”\\n And the video establishes that Kaiser told Thomas “come on out”\\n and “you’re going in handcuffs” and grabbed Thomas even before\\n he tried to resist. We agree with Thomas that Kaiser arrested him.\\n Kaiser arrested Thomas only after he had probable cause to\\n do so. Probable cause for an arrest exists when “at the moment the\\n arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers’\\n knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-\\n mation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that\\n the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Holmes\\n v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations\\n adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because\\n “the existence of probable cause is determined by objective stand-\\n ards” and not “on the basis of what [police] officers think,” United\\n States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir. 1989), any crime for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n which a reasonable policeman would have probable cause will sup-\\n port the arrest. Although the government does not mention the\\n statute, Florida makes it a third-degree felony to “[k]nowingly have\\n . . . possession or to display any . . . forged, stolen, fictitious, coun-\\n terfeit, or unlawfully issued driver license or identification card.”\\n FLA. STAT. § 322.212(1)(a), (6); see State v. Koczwara, 837 So. 2d 591,\\n 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that section 322.212(1)(a) for-\\n bids possession of a “license with a false name”). Kaiser had proba-\\n ble cause to believe Thomas violated that statute. When Kaiser ar-\\n rested Thomas, he knew that his driver’s license displayed a name\\n and birth date not associated with the driver’s license number and,\\n based on his “common sense view to the realities of normal life,”\\n he surmised that Thomas was not the over-70-year-old man the li-\\n cense described. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir.\\n 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Because Thomas was not seized in violation of the Fourth\\n Amendment, he cannot establish that the search warrant was based\\n on information acquired illegally. So the district court did not err\\n by denying Thomas’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during\\n the execution of the warrant. We affirm the denial of Thomas’s\\n motion to suppress.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM Thomas’s conviction.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11211917/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745332/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. John Wayne Thomas\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 11\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-11427\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n JOHN WAYNE THOMAS,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00040-TKW-1\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\n Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\n erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from a car.\n Officer Anthony Kaiser approached John Thomas’s car after\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\n\n receiving a complaint about littering. When Kaiser later asked for\n identification, Thomas produced a fake driver’s license. Kaiser then\n attempted to arrest him, but Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser and\n fled. After Thomas left his car in a nearby neighborhood, officers\n obtained a search warrant for it. Based on the evidence found in the\n car, a grand jury indicted Thomas for unlawful possession of a\n means of identification, fraudulent use of 15 or more unauthor-\n ized access devices, mail theft, and possession with intent to distrib-\n ute methamphetamine. The district court denied Thomas’s motion\n to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search\n warrant. We affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n On January 31, 2023, a McDonald’s employee in DeFuniak\n Springs, Florida, called the police to report that a male in a gray\n Acura car littered in the restaurant’s parking lot. Officer Anthony\n Kaiser went to the scene in response to that report. When he ar-\n rived, Kaiser saw a parked car matching the employee’s description\n and trash on the ground next to the driver’s side door. Kaiser asked\n his dispatcher to check the Louisiana license plate on the car.\n Officer Kaiser parked his police car and approached the\n driver’s side door. Kaiser informed the man in the driver’s seat,\n John Thomas, of the complaint. Thomas admitted that he had dis-\n carded the trash. He exited the car and picked up the trash and then\n returned to the driver’s seat and closed the car door.\n After Kaiser asked Thomas for identification, Thomas pro-\n duced a Louisiana driver’s license for a person born in 1947 with a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n different name. Kaiser suspected the identification was false be-\n cause Thomas did not appear to be in his mid-70s.\n At that point, Kaiser stepped away from the driver’s side\n door and read Thomas’s license plate again to the dispatcher, as\n well as his driver’s license number. Kaiser then reapproached the\n driver’s door. While Kaiser and Thomas spoke, the dispatcher re-\n ported back that the driver’s license number did not belong to\n someone named S.M.D.\n A few minutes later, a female passenger from Thomas’s car,\n Amanda Breaux, approached Kaiser, who was still standing by the\n driver’s side door of Thomas’s car. Kaiser and Breaux then walked\n over to a different parking spot and had a conversation. During\n their conversation, Kaiser began to suspect Breaux was engaged in\n criminal activity, so he ordered her to follow him over to his police\n car, a few more spots away. While Kaiser and Breaux were talking,\n Thomas again exited his car, walked to an adjacent parking lot, and\n returned a minute later.\n During Breaux and Kaiser’s conversation, the dispatcher\n confirmed that the driver’s license number was associated with a\n different name and birth date than was displayed on it. Kaiser then\n left Breaux by the police car, walked to Thomas’s car, opened the\n door, grabbed Thomas, and told him to “come on out.” Thomas\n did not immediately exit the car, and Kaiser told him that he was\n putting him in handcuffs. Kaiser informed Thomas that he was be-\n ing detained for giving false identification.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\n\n After Thomas continued to refuse to exit his car, Kaiser went\n back to his police car to retrieve a taser. Thomas closed his door\n but left the driver’s side window slightly open. Kaiser approached\n his car with his taser. Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser through the\n crack, and Kaiser deployed his taser. Thomas quickly backed out of\n the space, and Kaiser fired two shots at Thomas’s car. Thomas suc-\n cessfully fled the parking lot and left his car in a nearby neighbor-\n hood. A canine tracking unit found Thomas a few hours later with\n several cans of pepper spray on his person.\n An investigator later filed an affidavit to support a search\n warrant for the contents of Thomas’s gray Acura. The affidavit re-\n counted that “Thomas provided Officer . . . Kaiser with a fake Lou-\n isiana driver’s license” with “fake information.” And it stated that\n after Kaiser “informed . . . Thomas he was under arrest,” Thomas\n “failed to follow verbal commands” and “sprayed Officer . . . Kaiser\n in the face with mace.” Thomas himself “admitted he ‘maced’ . . .\n Kaiser because . . . Kaiser had a taser and he did not feel . . . Kaiser\n was being respectful.” The affidavit recounted that “Brea[u]x was\n subsequently detained and told law enforcement . . . Thomas had\n a firearm in his possession.” Police sought the warrant to obtain\n “[f]irearms and ammunition, pepper spray or mace . . . , spent pro-\n jectiles, . . . [and] documents to include false identification.” The\n affidavit provided that these objects were evidence of battery on a\n law enforcement officer and of giving false identification by a per-\n son lawfully detained. The circuit judge issued the search warrant.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n When officers executed the warrant, they found approxi-\n mately 105 grams of methamphetamine, two counterfeit $100 bills,\n and personal identification documents of other people including\n wage records, mail, copies of social security cards, birth certificates,\n account statements, and tax documents. Officers also found a lap-\n top containing pictures of social security cards, drivers’ licenses,\n credit cards, checks, birth certificates, and multiple drivers’ licenses\n with Thomas’s photograph alongside other people’s information.\n On May 16, 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment charg-\n ing Thomas with one count of unlawful possession of a means of\n identification, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(2)(B); one count of fraud-\n ulent use of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, id.\n § 1029(a)(3), (c)(1)(A)(i); one count of unlawful possession of a\n means of identification during and in relation to a felony, id.\n § 1028A(a)(1); one count of mail theft, id. § 1708; and one count of\n possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture\n containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii).\n Thomas pleaded not guilty, and the district court scheduled a trial.\n Thomas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the\n search of his gray Acura on the ground that the warrant was ob-\n tained based on information gained during an illegal stop. He ar-\n gued that Kaiser did not have reasonable suspicion of underlying\n unlawful activity. Specifically, he argued that Florida law does not\n allow an officer to detain a person on reasonable suspicion of non-\n criminal violations, such as littering. He also argued that the search\n warrant was defective because he was detained unlawfully.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\n\n The government responded that Kaiser had the necessary\n “information for an investigatory stop,” and in any event, Thomas\n did not believe he was being detained. It also responded that be-\n cause Thomas had given Kaiser false identification while “seated in\n the vehicle” and deployed pepper spray from the vehicle, there was\n probable cause that evidence of crimes existed in the vehicle.\n The district court denied the motion to suppress. It ruled\n that Kaiser had the “authority to lawfully detain [Thomas] for an\n investigatory stop based on the littering complaint.” During that\n lawful stop, Kaiser had the authority to ask for Thomas’s identifi-\n cation, and Thomas was obliged to provide it. The district court\n reasoned that even if Thomas “picked up the trash,” Kaiser “was\n [not] required to terminate his investigation” and could “still cite\n [Thomas] for littering.” The district court also ruled that the police\n had probable cause to search the car for evidence of criminal activ-\n ity because Thomas produced false identification during a “lawful\n detention.”\n The government dismissed one count of the indictment, and\n Thomas pleaded guilty to the remaining four counts. But he “re-\n serve[d] the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress.”\n The district court sentenced him to 212 months of imprisonment\n and five years of supervised release.\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we re-\n view findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.\n United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2022). We\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n construe all facts in the light most favorable to the government. Id.\n “[W]e may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground\n supported by the record.” United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334,\n 1340 n.6 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks\n omitted).\n III. DISCUSSION\n Thomas appeals only the denial of his motion to suppress.\n He argues that police obtained the search warrant for his gray\n Acura “based on information acquired during [an] illegal stop” be-\n cause he committed a civil infraction, not a crime. The government\n responds that under Florida law, officers “may detain an individual\n to issue a citation for littering” and are allowed to request identifi-\n cation to issue the citation. The government argues, in the alterna-\n tive, that the encounter was initially consensual and matured into\n a “brief, investigatory detention” when Kaiser instructed Thomas\n to get out of the car. Kaiser could then detain Thomas.\n\n “Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment\n must be suppressed.” United States v. Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d 1297,\n 1302 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\n ted). We have recognized “three broad categories of police-citizen\n encounters for purposes of . . . Fourth Amendment analysis: [] po-\n lice-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention; [] brief\n seizures or investigatory detentions; and [] full-scale arrests.” United\n States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006).\n A consensual encounter between police and a citizen does\n not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. United\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\n\n States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). An encounter\n is consensual when an officer does not “by means of physical force\n or show of authority . . . in some way restrain[] the liberty of a cit-\n izen.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The test\n for whether the officer restrained a citizen’s liberty is whether ‘a\n reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.’” Id.\n (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)). The test\n depends on “[a]ll the circumstances” of the encounter, including\n “whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded,” “the length of the\n detention and questioning; the number of police officers present;\n whether the officers displayed their weapons; any physical touch-\n ing of the suspect; and the language and tone of voice of the po-\n lice.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks\n omitted). Officers “may pose questions” and “ask for identifica-\n tion” as part of a consensual encounter so long as “they do not in-\n duce cooperation by coercive means.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.\n In Knights, we affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress\n where officers approached two individuals suspected of stealing\n something from a vehicle. 989 F.3d at 1284, 1286. The officers\n “parked in a way that would have allowed” the individuals to\n “drive away.” Id. at 1284. One of the individuals left the scene and\n walked into a nearby house. Id. The defendant sat in the driver’s\n seat and closed the car door. Id. An officer approached the car with\n a flashlight and knocked on the driver’s window, and the defendant\n then opened the door. Id. The officer smelled marijuana and asked\n whether the defendant had any. Id. We held that the defendant in-\n itially “would have felt free to leave,” in part because he “was\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n physically capable of walking away,” “could have driven away,”\n and the other individual “[i]n fact . . . did leave.” Id. at 1286–87.\n In the light of Knights, the initial encounter between Kaiser\n and Thomas was consensual. Kaiser did not block Thomas’s car\n from leaving the parking lot by parking a few spaces away. By\n Thomas’s own telling, Kaiser approached Thomas’s window, in-\n formed him of the littering complaint, and allowed Thomas to exit\n the car to throw away the litter. When asked for identification,\n Thomas voluntarily showed Kaiser his false driver’s license.\n Thomas left the scene after Kaiser stepped away. He exited his car\n and walked around an adjacent parking lot. And nothing from the\n video of the incident establishes that Kaiser exhibited “physical\n force or show of authority” before he told Thomas to step out of\n the vehicle. Id. at 1286 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\n ted). There is no evidence suggesting that Thomas should have felt\n compelled to produce identification or answer questions, even af-\n ter Kaiser inquired about the littering. See id. at 1284, 1286 (holding\n that a police encounter was consensual even after police asked the\n suspect if he had any marijuana).\n Thomas argues we cannot conclude that the encounter was\n consensual because doing so would be “div[ing] into the record to\n make [our] own factual determinations.” But “we may affirm the\n denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the rec-\n ord.” Schmitz, 153 F.4th at 1340 n.6 (citation and internal quotation\n marks omitted). And “when the record contains video evidence,\n the authenticity of which is not challenged, the court should\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\n\n ordinarily view the facts in the light depicted by the video evi-\n dence.” O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 531 (1st Cir.\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Scott v.\n Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (directing reviewing courts to\n “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).\n That the initial encounter was consensual does not end the\n inquiry because, as the parties agree, Kaiser eventually effected a\n seizure when he ordered Thomas to exit the car. The government\n maintains that Kaiser only “conduct[ed] a Terry stop” at that point.\n Yet the affiant statement in the search warrant application says that\n after “Kaiser realized the identification was false, [he] informed . . .\n Thomas he was under arrest, and directed him to exit the vehicle.”\n And the video establishes that Kaiser told Thomas “come on out”\n and “you’re going in handcuffs” and grabbed Thomas even before\n he tried to resist. We agree with Thomas that Kaiser arrested him.\n Kaiser arrested Thomas only after he had probable cause to\n do so. Probable cause for an arrest exists when “at the moment the\n arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers’\n knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-\n mation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that\n the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Holmes\n v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations\n adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because\n “the existence of probable cause is determined by objective stand-\n ards” and not “on the basis of what [police] officers think,” United\n States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir. 1989), any crime for\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 11\n\n\n\n\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n which a reasonable policeman would have probable cause will sup-\n port the arrest. Although the government does not mention the\n statute, Florida makes it a third-degree felony to “[k]nowingly have\n . . . possession or to display any . . . forged, stolen, fictitious, coun-\n terfeit, or unlawfully issued driver license or identification card.”\n FLA. STAT. § 322.212(1)(a), (6); see State v. Koczwara, 837 So. 2d 591,\n 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that section 322.212(1)(a) for-\n bids possession of a “license with a false name”). Kaiser had proba-\n ble cause to believe Thomas violated that statute. When Kaiser ar-\n rested Thomas, he knew that his driver’s license displayed a name\n and birth date not associated with the driver’s license number and,\n based on his “common sense view to the realities of normal life,”\n he surmised that Thomas was not the over-70-year-old man the li-\n cense described. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir.\n 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n Because Thomas was not seized in violation of the Fourth\n Amendment, he cannot establish that the search warrant was based\n on information acquired illegally. So the district court did not err\n by denying Thomas’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during\n the execution of the warrant. We affirm the denial of Thomas’s\n motion to suppress.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM Thomas’s conviction.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. John Wayne Thomas\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11427\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JOHN WAYNE THOMAS,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cr-00040-TKW-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\\n erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from a car.\\n Officer Anthony Kaiser approached John Thomas’s car after\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n receiving a complaint about littering. When Kaiser later asked for\\n identification, Thomas produced a fake driver’s license. Kaiser then\\n attempted to arrest him, but Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser and\\n fled. After Thomas left his car in a nearby neighborhood, officers\\n obtained a search warrant for it. Based on the evidence found in the\\n car, a grand jury indicted Thomas for unlawful possession of a\\n means of identification, fraudulent use of 15 or more unauthor-\\n ized access devices, mail theft, and possession with intent to distrib-\\n ute methamphetamine. The district court denied Thomas’s motion\\n to suppress the evidence found during the execution of the search\\n warrant. We affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On January 31, 2023, a McDonald’s employee in DeFuniak\\n Springs, Florida, called the police to report that a male in a gray\\n Acura car littered in the restaurant’s parking lot. Officer Anthony\\n Kaiser went to the scene in response to that report. When he ar-\\n rived, Kaiser saw a parked car matching the employee’s description\\n and trash on the ground next to the driver’s side door. Kaiser asked\\n his dispatcher to check the Louisiana license plate on the car.\\n Officer Kaiser parked his police car and approached the\\n driver’s side door. Kaiser informed the man in the driver’s seat,\\n John Thomas, of the complaint. Thomas admitted that he had dis-\\n carded the trash. He exited the car and picked up the trash and then\\n returned to the driver’s seat and closed the car door.\\n After Kaiser asked Thomas for identification, Thomas pro-\\n duced a Louisiana driver’s license for a person born in 1947 with a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n different name. Kaiser suspected the identification was false be-\\n cause Thomas did not appear to be in his mid-70s.\\n At that point, Kaiser stepped away from the driver’s side\\n door and read Thomas’s license plate again to the dispatcher, as\\n well as his driver’s license number. Kaiser then reapproached the\\n driver’s door. While Kaiser and Thomas spoke, the dispatcher re-\\n ported back that the driver’s license number did not belong to\\n someone named S.M.D.\\n A few minutes later, a female passenger from Thomas’s car,\\n Amanda Breaux, approached Kaiser, who was still standing by the\\n driver’s side door of Thomas’s car. Kaiser and Breaux then walked\\n over to a different parking spot and had a conversation. During\\n their conversation, Kaiser began to suspect Breaux was engaged in\\n criminal activity, so he ordered her to follow him over to his police\\n car, a few more spots away. While Kaiser and Breaux were talking,\\n Thomas again exited his car, walked to an adjacent parking lot, and\\n returned a minute later.\\n During Breaux and Kaiser’s conversation, the dispatcher\\n confirmed that the driver’s license number was associated with a\\n different name and birth date than was displayed on it. Kaiser then\\n left Breaux by the police car, walked to Thomas’s car, opened the\\n door, grabbed Thomas, and told him to “come on out.” Thomas\\n did not immediately exit the car, and Kaiser told him that he was\\n putting him in handcuffs. Kaiser informed Thomas that he was be-\\n ing detained for giving false identification.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n After Thomas continued to refuse to exit his car, Kaiser went\\n back to his police car to retrieve a taser. Thomas closed his door\\n but left the driver’s side window slightly open. Kaiser approached\\n his car with his taser. Thomas pepper-sprayed Kaiser through the\\n crack, and Kaiser deployed his taser. Thomas quickly backed out of\\n the space, and Kaiser fired two shots at Thomas’s car. Thomas suc-\\n cessfully fled the parking lot and left his car in a nearby neighbor-\\n hood. A canine tracking unit found Thomas a few hours later with\\n several cans of pepper spray on his person.\\n An investigator later filed an affidavit to support a search\\n warrant for the contents of Thomas’s gray Acura. The affidavit re-\\n counted that “Thomas provided Officer . . . Kaiser with a fake Lou-\\n isiana driver’s license” with “fake information.” And it stated that\\n after Kaiser “informed . . . Thomas he was under arrest,” Thomas\\n “failed to follow verbal commands” and “sprayed Officer . . . Kaiser\\n in the face with mace.” Thomas himself “admitted he ‘maced’ . . .\\n Kaiser because . . . Kaiser had a taser and he did not feel . . . Kaiser\\n was being respectful.” The affidavit recounted that “Brea[u]x was\\n subsequently detained and told law enforcement . . . Thomas had\\n a firearm in his possession.” Police sought the warrant to obtain\\n “[f]irearms and ammunition, pepper spray or mace . . . , spent pro-\\n jectiles, . . . [and] documents to include false identification.” The\\n affidavit provided that these objects were evidence of battery on a\\n law enforcement officer and of giving false identification by a per-\\n son lawfully detained. The circuit judge issued the search warrant.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n When officers executed the warrant, they found approxi-\\n mately 105 grams of methamphetamine, two counterfeit $100 bills,\\n and personal identification documents of other people including\\n wage records, mail, copies of social security cards, birth certificates,\\n account statements, and tax documents. Officers also found a lap-\\n top containing pictures of social security cards, drivers’ licenses,\\n credit cards, checks, birth certificates, and multiple drivers’ licenses\\n with Thomas’s photograph alongside other people’s information.\\n On May 16, 2023, a grand jury returned an indictment charg-\\n ing Thomas with one count of unlawful possession of a means of\\n identification, 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7), (b)(2)(B); one count of fraud-\\n ulent use of 15 or more unauthorized access devices, id.\\n § 1029(a)(3), (c)(1)(A)(i); one count of unlawful possession of a\\n means of identification during and in relation to a felony, id.\\n § 1028A(a)(1); one count of mail theft, id. § 1708; and one count of\\n possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture\\n containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii).\\n Thomas pleaded not guilty, and the district court scheduled a trial.\\n Thomas moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the\\n search of his gray Acura on the ground that the warrant was ob-\\n tained based on information gained during an illegal stop. He ar-\\n gued that Kaiser did not have reasonable suspicion of underlying\\n unlawful activity. Specifically, he argued that Florida law does not\\n allow an officer to detain a person on reasonable suspicion of non-\\n criminal violations, such as littering. He also argued that the search\\n warrant was defective because he was detained unlawfully.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n The government responded that Kaiser had the necessary\\n “information for an investigatory stop,” and in any event, Thomas\\n did not believe he was being detained. It also responded that be-\\n cause Thomas had given Kaiser false identification while “seated in\\n the vehicle” and deployed pepper spray from the vehicle, there was\\n probable cause that evidence of crimes existed in the vehicle.\\n The district court denied the motion to suppress. It ruled\\n that Kaiser had the “authority to lawfully detain [Thomas] for an\\n investigatory stop based on the littering complaint.” During that\\n lawful stop, Kaiser had the authority to ask for Thomas’s identifi-\\n cation, and Thomas was obliged to provide it. The district court\\n reasoned that even if Thomas “picked up the trash,” Kaiser “was\\n [not] required to terminate his investigation” and could “still cite\\n [Thomas] for littering.” The district court also ruled that the police\\n had probable cause to search the car for evidence of criminal activ-\\n ity because Thomas produced false identification during a “lawful\\n detention.”\\n The government dismissed one count of the indictment, and\\n Thomas pleaded guilty to the remaining four counts. But he “re-\\n serve[d] the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Suppress.”\\n The district court sentenced him to 212 months of imprisonment\\n and five years of supervised release.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we re-\\n view findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.\\n United States v. Cohen, 38 F.4th 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2022). We\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 7 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n construe all facts in the light most favorable to the government. Id.\\n “[W]e may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground\\n supported by the record.” United States v. Schmitz, 153 F.4th 1334,\\n 1340 n.6 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Thomas appeals only the denial of his motion to suppress.\\n He argues that police obtained the search warrant for his gray\\n Acura “based on information acquired during [an] illegal stop” be-\\n cause he committed a civil infraction, not a crime. The government\\n responds that under Florida law, officers “may detain an individual\\n to issue a citation for littering” and are allowed to request identifi-\\n cation to issue the citation. The government argues, in the alterna-\\n tive, that the encounter was initially consensual and matured into\\n a “brief, investigatory detention” when Kaiser instructed Thomas\\n to get out of the car. Kaiser could then detain Thomas.\\n\\n “Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment\\n must be suppressed.” United States v. Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d 1297,\\n 1302 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted). We have recognized “three broad categories of police-citizen\\n encounters for purposes of . . . Fourth Amendment analysis: [] po-\\n lice-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention; [] brief\\n seizures or investigatory detentions; and [] full-scale arrests.” United\\n States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n A consensual encounter between police and a citizen does\\n not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. United\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 8 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n States v. Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021). An encounter\\n is consensual when an officer does not “by means of physical force\\n or show of authority . . . in some way restrain[] the liberty of a cit-\\n izen.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “The test\\n for whether the officer restrained a citizen’s liberty is whether ‘a\\n reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.’” Id.\\n (quoting United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)). The test\\n depends on “[a]ll the circumstances” of the encounter, including\\n “whether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded,” “the length of the\\n detention and questioning; the number of police officers present;\\n whether the officers displayed their weapons; any physical touch-\\n ing of the suspect; and the language and tone of voice of the po-\\n lice.” Id. (alteration adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). Officers “may pose questions” and “ask for identifica-\\n tion” as part of a consensual encounter so long as “they do not in-\\n duce cooperation by coercive means.” Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201.\\n In Knights, we affirmed a denial of a motion to suppress\\n where officers approached two individuals suspected of stealing\\n something from a vehicle. 989 F.3d at 1284, 1286. The officers\\n “parked in a way that would have allowed” the individuals to\\n “drive away.” Id. at 1284. One of the individuals left the scene and\\n walked into a nearby house. Id. The defendant sat in the driver’s\\n seat and closed the car door. Id. An officer approached the car with\\n a flashlight and knocked on the driver’s window, and the defendant\\n then opened the door. Id. The officer smelled marijuana and asked\\n whether the defendant had any. Id. We held that the defendant in-\\n itially “would have felt free to leave,” in part because he “was\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 9 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n physically capable of walking away,” “could have driven away,”\\n and the other individual “[i]n fact . . . did leave.” Id. at 1286–87.\\n In the light of Knights, the initial encounter between Kaiser\\n and Thomas was consensual. Kaiser did not block Thomas’s car\\n from leaving the parking lot by parking a few spaces away. By\\n Thomas’s own telling, Kaiser approached Thomas’s window, in-\\n formed him of the littering complaint, and allowed Thomas to exit\\n the car to throw away the litter. When asked for identification,\\n Thomas voluntarily showed Kaiser his false driver’s license.\\n Thomas left the scene after Kaiser stepped away. He exited his car\\n and walked around an adjacent parking lot. And nothing from the\\n video of the incident establishes that Kaiser exhibited “physical\\n force or show of authority” before he told Thomas to step out of\\n the vehicle. Id. at 1286 (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted). There is no evidence suggesting that Thomas should have felt\\n compelled to produce identification or answer questions, even af-\\n ter Kaiser inquired about the littering. See id. at 1284, 1286 (holding\\n that a police encounter was consensual even after police asked the\\n suspect if he had any marijuana).\\n Thomas argues we cannot conclude that the encounter was\\n consensual because doing so would be “div[ing] into the record to\\n make [our] own factual determinations.” But “we may affirm the\\n denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the rec-\\n ord.” Schmitz, 153 F.4th at 1340 n.6 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). And “when the record contains video evidence,\\n the authenticity of which is not challenged, the court should\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 10 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11427\\n\\n ordinarily view the facts in the light depicted by the video evi-\\n dence.” O’Brien v. Town of Bellingham, 943 F.3d 514, 531 (1st Cir.\\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Scott v.\\n Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (directing reviewing courts to\\n “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).\\n That the initial encounter was consensual does not end the\\n inquiry because, as the parties agree, Kaiser eventually effected a\\n seizure when he ordered Thomas to exit the car. The government\\n maintains that Kaiser only “conduct[ed] a Terry stop” at that point.\\n Yet the affiant statement in the search warrant application says that\\n after “Kaiser realized the identification was false, [he] informed . . .\\n Thomas he was under arrest, and directed him to exit the vehicle.”\\n And the video establishes that Kaiser told Thomas “come on out”\\n and “you’re going in handcuffs” and grabbed Thomas even before\\n he tried to resist. We agree with Thomas that Kaiser arrested him.\\n Kaiser arrested Thomas only after he had probable cause to\\n do so. Probable cause for an arrest exists when “at the moment the\\n arrest was made, the facts and circumstances within the officers’\\n knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy infor-\\n mation were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that\\n the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Holmes\\n v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (alterations\\n adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because\\n “the existence of probable cause is determined by objective stand-\\n ards” and not “on the basis of what [police] officers think,” United\\n States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1433 (11th Cir. 1989), any crime for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 11 of 11\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11427 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n which a reasonable policeman would have probable cause will sup-\\n port the arrest. Although the government does not mention the\\n statute, Florida makes it a third-degree felony to “[k]nowingly have\\n . . . possession or to display any . . . forged, stolen, fictitious, coun-\\n terfeit, or unlawfully issued driver license or identification card.”\\n FLA. STAT. § 322.212(1)(a), (6); see State v. Koczwara, 837 So. 2d 591,\\n 593 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that section 322.212(1)(a) for-\\n bids possession of a “license with a false name”). Kaiser had proba-\\n ble cause to believe Thomas violated that statute. When Kaiser ar-\\n rested Thomas, he knew that his driver’s license displayed a name\\n and birth date not associated with the driver’s license number and,\\n based on his “common sense view to the realities of normal life,”\\n he surmised that Thomas was not the over-70-year-old man the li-\\n cense described. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1436 (11th Cir.\\n 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Because Thomas was not seized in violation of the Fourth\\n Amendment, he cannot establish that the search warrant was based\\n on information acquired illegally. So the district court did not err\\n by denying Thomas’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during\\n the execution of the warrant. We affirm the denial of Thomas’s\\n motion to suppress.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM Thomas’s conviction.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30959,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745333,"string":"10,745,333"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"In re: Georgia Senate Bill 202"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-13095"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13095\\n ____________________\\n\\n In re:\\n GEORGIA SENATE BILL 202.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-mi-55555-JPB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\\n Judge.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Many states, including Georgia, have long relied on election\\n laws to protect voters from fraud, intimidation, and interference at\\n the polls. Pointing to a recent uptick in individuals and organiza-\\n tions handing out gifts to voters in line to cast their ballots, Georgia\\n\\n * Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\\n\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n passed a law restricting this sort of gift-giving, which the state as-\\n serts is just a pretextual means of influencing voters or even buying\\n votes. The plaintiffs—assorted progressive advocacy groups—dis-\\n agree. They emphasize that the distribution of things like food and\\n water to waiting voters communicates support of and solidarity for\\n voters waiting in line and is part of what they call “a rich tradition\\n of Black political activism.” That expression, they say, is entitled\\n to First Amendment protection.\\n Whatever the respective merits of the parties’ positions, we\\n are unable to reach them. All here agree that the plaintiffs brought,\\n and the district court entertained, a facial First Amendment chal-\\n lenge. The district court, though, never conducted the facial-chal-\\n lenge analysis that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moody v.\\n NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), requires. Accordingly, we\\n VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further\\n proceedings consistent with Moody.\\n I\\n In 2021, Georgia passed the Election Integrity Act. See S.B.\\n 202, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021). The Act included a gift ban:\\n No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate\\n in the giving of any money or gifts, including, but not\\n limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . nor shall\\n any person . . . establish or set up any tables or booths\\n on any day in which ballots are being cast:\\n (1) Within 150 feet of the . . . polling place . . . .;\\n (2) Within any polling place; or\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n (3) Within 25 feet of any voter standing in line\\n to vote at any polling place.\\n O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a).\\n Following the gift ban’s enactment, several organizations\\n sued to enjoin its enforcement. They argued in their preliminary-\\n injunction motions that the gift bans were facially unconstitu-\\n tional—in particular, that both the 150-foot buffer zone around\\n polling places and the 25-foot buffer zone around polling lines were\\n content-based speech regulations that violated the First Amend-\\n ment.\\n The district court initially denied the plaintiffs’ requested re-\\n lief. It found the 150-foot polling-place buffer zone satisfied First\\n Amendment scrutiny because (1) Georgia had compelling interests\\n in “restoring peace and order around the polls[,] protecting voters\\n from political pressure and intimidation[,] and supporting election\\n integrity,” and (2) the law was narrowly tailored in that it allowed\\n pro-voting speech within the buffer zone and handouts outside the\\n buffer zone. Although the court found that the “limitless” 25-foot\\n polling-line buffer zone failed strict scrutiny—due to the lack of tai-\\n loring to any “fixed line of demarcation”—it nevertheless declined\\n to enjoin the ban on the ground that doing so would disrupt the\\n 2022 elections. As a consequence, both gift bans took effect during\\n the 2022 election cycle.\\n In May 2023, the plaintiffs renewed their preliminary-injunc-\\n tion motion, but only as to the 25-foot polling-line buffer zone.\\n Standing by the reasoning in its earlier order—and now without\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n the risk of disrupting an upcoming election—the district court\\n granted the preliminary injunction. Importantly here—and con-\\n sistent with the plaintiffs’ facial challenge—the court enjoined the\\n state defendants from enforcing the gift ban inside the 25-foot poll-\\n ing-line buffer zone against anyone.\\n The state defendants timely appealed. 1\\n II\\n We find that it would be inappropriate at this juncture to\\n address the merits of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.\\n Our reason is simple: It is undisputed here that the plaintiffs chal-\\n lenged the 25-foot-buffer-zone gift ban on its face rather than as ap-\\n plied specifically to their own activities. As the Supreme Court re-\\n cently underscored in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC., “that decision\\n comes at a cost” because “facial challenges [are] hard to win.” 603\\n U.S. at 723. In particular, the Court clarified that a facial challenge\\n in the First Amendment context requires an “inquiry into how a\\n law works in all of its applications.” Id. at 744. To adjudicate a\\n facial First Amendment challenge, a court must first “assess the []\\n law[’s] scope” by charting out the full range of covered activities.\\n Id. at 724–25. It must then “decide which of the law[’s] applications\\n violate the First Amendment” and which do not. Id. at 725. Finally,\\n the court must weigh the constitutional applications against the\\n\\n 1 This appeal has since been consolidated with an appeal addressing another\\n\\n provision of the same statute, which requires each absentee voter to print his\\n or her birthdate on the envelope containing his or her ballot. See In re: Georgia\\n Senate Bill 202, No. 23-13085. In this opinion, we address only the gift ban.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n unconstitutional ones. Id. While the “principal things regulated”\\n should get a heavier weight in this analysis, they shouldn’t be con-\\n sidered at the expense of the “sphere of other applications.” Id. at\\n 726. A facial challenge will succeed only when “the law’s unconsti-\\n tutional applications substantially outweigh its constitutional\\n ones.” Id. at 724.\\n The district court didn’t conduct the facial-challenge analysis\\n now required by Moody. 2 For instance, a critical question in this\\n case is whether Georgia’s gift ban targeted expressive conduct. Ra-\\n ther than answering that question by charting out “the full range\\n of activities,” id., the district court looked only to the plaintiffs’ own\\n line-relief efforts, focusing on the messages that voters said they\\n understood these efforts to be conveying. The same goes for the\\n downstream questions regarding content-neutrality, the requisite\\n level of scrutiny, and governmental interests and tailoring. With\\n respect to all those inquiries, the court failed to systematically as-\\n sess the full sweep of the regulation and weigh the constitutional\\n against the unconstitutional applications. It instead emphasized\\n the plaintiffs’ particular activities and the overarching justifications\\n offered by the government—lumping together a narrow range of\\n applications and considering them as a whole without accounting\\n\\n 2 Moody was decided after the district court issued its preliminary injunction,\\n\\n but we are required to apply the law as it exists at the time of our decision\\n absent manifest injustice. Cf. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S.\\n 696, 711–12 (2006) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders\\n its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice . . . .” (citing\\n United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801))).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n for the First Amendment’s varying protections across different ac-\\n tivities.\\n We decline to perform the Moody-prescribed facial-challenge\\n analysis in the first instance. Rather, we VACATE the judgment\\n of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11211918/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13095\\n ____________________\\n\\n In re:\\n GEORGIA SENATE BILL 202.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-mi-55555-JPB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\\n Judge.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Many states, including Georgia, have long relied on election\\n laws to protect voters from fraud, intimidation, and interference at\\n the polls. Pointing to a recent uptick in individuals and organiza-\\n tions handing out gifts to voters in line to cast their ballots, Georgia\\n\\n * Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\\n\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n passed a law restricting this sort of gift-giving, which the state as-\\n serts is just a pretextual means of influencing voters or even buying\\n votes. The plaintiffs—assorted progressive advocacy groups—dis-\\n agree. They emphasize that the distribution of things like food and\\n water to waiting voters communicates support of and solidarity for\\n voters waiting in line and is part of what they call “a rich tradition\\n of Black political activism.” That expression, they say, is entitled\\n to First Amendment protection.\\n Whatever the respective merits of the parties’ positions, we\\n are unable to reach them. All here agree that the plaintiffs brought,\\n and the district court entertained, a facial First Amendment chal-\\n lenge. The district court, though, never conducted the facial-chal-\\n lenge analysis that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moody v.\\n NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), requires. Accordingly, we\\n VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further\\n proceedings consistent with Moody.\\n I\\n In 2021, Georgia passed the Election Integrity Act. See S.B.\\n 202, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021). The Act included a gift ban:\\n No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate\\n in the giving of any money or gifts, including, but not\\n limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . nor shall\\n any person . . . establish or set up any tables or booths\\n on any day in which ballots are being cast:\\n (1) Within 150 feet of the . . . polling place . . . .;\\n (2) Within any polling place; or\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n (3) Within 25 feet of any voter standing in line\\n to vote at any polling place.\\n O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a).\\n Following the gift ban’s enactment, several organizations\\n sued to enjoin its enforcement. They argued in their preliminary-\\n injunction motions that the gift bans were facially unconstitu-\\n tional—in particular, that both the 150-foot buffer zone around\\n polling places and the 25-foot buffer zone around polling lines were\\n content-based speech regulations that violated the First Amend-\\n ment.\\n The district court initially denied the plaintiffs’ requested re-\\n lief. It found the 150-foot polling-place buffer zone satisfied First\\n Amendment scrutiny because (1) Georgia had compelling interests\\n in “restoring peace and order around the polls[,] protecting voters\\n from political pressure and intimidation[,] and supporting election\\n integrity,” and (2) the law was narrowly tailored in that it allowed\\n pro-voting speech within the buffer zone and handouts outside the\\n buffer zone. Although the court found that the “limitless” 25-foot\\n polling-line buffer zone failed strict scrutiny—due to the lack of tai-\\n loring to any “fixed line of demarcation”—it nevertheless declined\\n to enjoin the ban on the ground that doing so would disrupt the\\n 2022 elections. As a consequence, both gift bans took effect during\\n the 2022 election cycle.\\n In May 2023, the plaintiffs renewed their preliminary-injunc-\\n tion motion, but only as to the 25-foot polling-line buffer zone.\\n Standing by the reasoning in its earlier order—and now without\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n the risk of disrupting an upcoming election—the district court\\n granted the preliminary injunction. Importantly here—and con-\\n sistent with the plaintiffs’ facial challenge—the court enjoined the\\n state defendants from enforcing the gift ban inside the 25-foot poll-\\n ing-line buffer zone against anyone.\\n The state defendants timely appealed. 1\\n II\\n We find that it would be inappropriate at this juncture to\\n address the merits of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.\\n Our reason is simple: It is undisputed here that the plaintiffs chal-\\n lenged the 25-foot-buffer-zone gift ban on its face rather than as ap-\\n plied specifically to their own activities. As the Supreme Court re-\\n cently underscored in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC., “that decision\\n comes at a cost” because “facial challenges [are] hard to win.” 603\\n U.S. at 723. In particular, the Court clarified that a facial challenge\\n in the First Amendment context requires an “inquiry into how a\\n law works in all of its applications.” Id. at 744. To adjudicate a\\n facial First Amendment challenge, a court must first “assess the []\\n law[’s] scope” by charting out the full range of covered activities.\\n Id. at 724–25. It must then “decide which of the law[’s] applications\\n violate the First Amendment” and which do not. Id. at 725. Finally,\\n the court must weigh the constitutional applications against the\\n\\n 1 This appeal has since been consolidated with an appeal addressing another\\n\\n provision of the same statute, which requires each absentee voter to print his\\n or her birthdate on the envelope containing his or her ballot. See In re: Georgia\\n Senate Bill 202, No. 23-13085. In this opinion, we address only the gift ban.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n unconstitutional ones. Id. While the “principal things regulated”\\n should get a heavier weight in this analysis, they shouldn’t be con-\\n sidered at the expense of the “sphere of other applications.” Id. at\\n 726. A facial challenge will succeed only when “the law’s unconsti-\\n tutional applications substantially outweigh its constitutional\\n ones.” Id. at 724.\\n The district court didn’t conduct the facial-challenge analysis\\n now required by Moody. 2 For instance, a critical question in this\\n case is whether Georgia’s gift ban targeted expressive conduct. Ra-\\n ther than answering that question by charting out “the full range\\n of activities,” id., the district court looked only to the plaintiffs’ own\\n line-relief efforts, focusing on the messages that voters said they\\n understood these efforts to be conveying. The same goes for the\\n downstream questions regarding content-neutrality, the requisite\\n level of scrutiny, and governmental interests and tailoring. With\\n respect to all those inquiries, the court failed to systematically as-\\n sess the full sweep of the regulation and weigh the constitutional\\n against the unconstitutional applications. It instead emphasized\\n the plaintiffs’ particular activities and the overarching justifications\\n offered by the government—lumping together a narrow range of\\n applications and considering them as a whole without accounting\\n\\n 2 Moody was decided after the district court issued its preliminary injunction,\\n\\n but we are required to apply the law as it exists at the time of our decision\\n absent manifest injustice. Cf. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S.\\n 696, 711–12 (2006) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders\\n its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice . . . .” (citing\\n United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801))).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n for the First Amendment’s varying protections across different ac-\\n tivities.\\n We decline to perform the Moody-prescribed facial-challenge\\n analysis in the first instance. Rather, we VACATE the judgment\\n of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11211918/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CORRIGAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"CORRIGAN\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745333/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In re: Georgia Senate Bill 202\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-13095\n ____________________\n\n In re:\n GEORGIA SENATE BILL 202.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-mi-55555-JPB\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\n Judge.\n PER CURIAM:\n Many states, including Georgia, have long relied on election\n laws to protect voters from fraud, intimidation, and interference at\n the polls. Pointing to a recent uptick in individuals and organiza-\n tions handing out gifts to voters in line to cast their ballots, Georgia\n\n * Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\n\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\n\n passed a law restricting this sort of gift-giving, which the state as-\n serts is just a pretextual means of influencing voters or even buying\n votes. The plaintiffs—assorted progressive advocacy groups—dis-\n agree. They emphasize that the distribution of things like food and\n water to waiting voters communicates support of and solidarity for\n voters waiting in line and is part of what they call “a rich tradition\n of Black political activism.” That expression, they say, is entitled\n to First Amendment protection.\n Whatever the respective merits of the parties’ positions, we\n are unable to reach them. All here agree that the plaintiffs brought,\n and the district court entertained, a facial First Amendment chal-\n lenge. The district court, though, never conducted the facial-chal-\n lenge analysis that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moody v.\n NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), requires. Accordingly, we\n VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further\n proceedings consistent with Moody.\n I\n In 2021, Georgia passed the Election Integrity Act. See S.B.\n 202, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021). The Act included a gift ban:\n No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate\n in the giving of any money or gifts, including, but not\n limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . nor shall\n any person . . . establish or set up any tables or booths\n on any day in which ballots are being cast:\n (1) Within 150 feet of the . . . polling place . . . .;\n (2) Within any polling place; or\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n (3) Within 25 feet of any voter standing in line\n to vote at any polling place.\n O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a).\n Following the gift ban’s enactment, several organizations\n sued to enjoin its enforcement. They argued in their preliminary-\n injunction motions that the gift bans were facially unconstitu-\n tional—in particular, that both the 150-foot buffer zone around\n polling places and the 25-foot buffer zone around polling lines were\n content-based speech regulations that violated the First Amend-\n ment.\n The district court initially denied the plaintiffs’ requested re-\n lief. It found the 150-foot polling-place buffer zone satisfied First\n Amendment scrutiny because (1) Georgia had compelling interests\n in “restoring peace and order around the polls[,] protecting voters\n from political pressure and intimidation[,] and supporting election\n integrity,” and (2) the law was narrowly tailored in that it allowed\n pro-voting speech within the buffer zone and handouts outside the\n buffer zone. Although the court found that the “limitless” 25-foot\n polling-line buffer zone failed strict scrutiny—due to the lack of tai-\n loring to any “fixed line of demarcation”—it nevertheless declined\n to enjoin the ban on the ground that doing so would disrupt the\n 2022 elections. As a consequence, both gift bans took effect during\n the 2022 election cycle.\n In May 2023, the plaintiffs renewed their preliminary-injunc-\n tion motion, but only as to the 25-foot polling-line buffer zone.\n Standing by the reasoning in its earlier order—and now without\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\n\n the risk of disrupting an upcoming election—the district court\n granted the preliminary injunction. Importantly here—and con-\n sistent with the plaintiffs’ facial challenge—the court enjoined the\n state defendants from enforcing the gift ban inside the 25-foot poll-\n ing-line buffer zone against anyone.\n The state defendants timely appealed. 1\n II\n We find that it would be inappropriate at this juncture to\n address the merits of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.\n Our reason is simple: It is undisputed here that the plaintiffs chal-\n lenged the 25-foot-buffer-zone gift ban on its face rather than as ap-\n plied specifically to their own activities. As the Supreme Court re-\n cently underscored in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC., “that decision\n comes at a cost” because “facial challenges [are] hard to win.” 603\n U.S. at 723. In particular, the Court clarified that a facial challenge\n in the First Amendment context requires an “inquiry into how a\n law works in all of its applications.” Id. at 744. To adjudicate a\n facial First Amendment challenge, a court must first “assess the []\n law[’s] scope” by charting out the full range of covered activities.\n Id. at 724–25. It must then “decide which of the law[’s] applications\n violate the First Amendment” and which do not. Id. at 725. Finally,\n the court must weigh the constitutional applications against the\n\n 1 This appeal has since been consolidated with an appeal addressing another\n\n provision of the same statute, which requires each absentee voter to print his\n or her birthdate on the envelope containing his or her ballot. See In re: Georgia\n Senate Bill 202, No. 23-13085. In this opinion, we address only the gift ban.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n unconstitutional ones. Id. While the “principal things regulated”\n should get a heavier weight in this analysis, they shouldn’t be con-\n sidered at the expense of the “sphere of other applications.” Id. at\n 726. A facial challenge will succeed only when “the law’s unconsti-\n tutional applications substantially outweigh its constitutional\n ones.” Id. at 724.\n The district court didn’t conduct the facial-challenge analysis\n now required by Moody. 2 For instance, a critical question in this\n case is whether Georgia’s gift ban targeted expressive conduct. Ra-\n ther than answering that question by charting out “the full range\n of activities,” id., the district court looked only to the plaintiffs’ own\n line-relief efforts, focusing on the messages that voters said they\n understood these efforts to be conveying. The same goes for the\n downstream questions regarding content-neutrality, the requisite\n level of scrutiny, and governmental interests and tailoring. With\n respect to all those inquiries, the court failed to systematically as-\n sess the full sweep of the regulation and weigh the constitutional\n against the unconstitutional applications. It instead emphasized\n the plaintiffs’ particular activities and the overarching justifications\n offered by the government—lumping together a narrow range of\n applications and considering them as a whole without accounting\n\n 2 Moody was decided after the district court issued its preliminary injunction,\n\n but we are required to apply the law as it exists at the time of our decision\n absent manifest injustice. Cf. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S.\n 696, 711–12 (2006) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders\n its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice . . . .” (citing\n United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801))).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\n\n for the First Amendment’s varying protections across different ac-\n tivities.\n We decline to perform the Moody-prescribed facial-challenge\n analysis in the first instance. Rather, we VACATE the judgment\n of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings con-\n sistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In re: Georgia Senate Bill 202\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13095\\n ____________________\\n\\n In re:\\n GEORGIA SENATE BILL 202.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-mi-55555-JPB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\\n Judge.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Many states, including Georgia, have long relied on election\\n laws to protect voters from fraud, intimidation, and interference at\\n the polls. Pointing to a recent uptick in individuals and organiza-\\n tions handing out gifts to voters in line to cast their ballots, Georgia\\n\\n * Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\\n\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n passed a law restricting this sort of gift-giving, which the state as-\\n serts is just a pretextual means of influencing voters or even buying\\n votes. The plaintiffs—assorted progressive advocacy groups—dis-\\n agree. They emphasize that the distribution of things like food and\\n water to waiting voters communicates support of and solidarity for\\n voters waiting in line and is part of what they call “a rich tradition\\n of Black political activism.” That expression, they say, is entitled\\n to First Amendment protection.\\n Whatever the respective merits of the parties’ positions, we\\n are unable to reach them. All here agree that the plaintiffs brought,\\n and the district court entertained, a facial First Amendment chal-\\n lenge. The district court, though, never conducted the facial-chal-\\n lenge analysis that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Moody v.\\n NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024), requires. Accordingly, we\\n VACATE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further\\n proceedings consistent with Moody.\\n I\\n In 2021, Georgia passed the Election Integrity Act. See S.B.\\n 202, 156th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021). The Act included a gift ban:\\n No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate\\n in the giving of any money or gifts, including, but not\\n limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . nor shall\\n any person . . . establish or set up any tables or booths\\n on any day in which ballots are being cast:\\n (1) Within 150 feet of the . . . polling place . . . .;\\n (2) Within any polling place; or\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n (3) Within 25 feet of any voter standing in line\\n to vote at any polling place.\\n O.C.G.A. § 21-2-414(a).\\n Following the gift ban’s enactment, several organizations\\n sued to enjoin its enforcement. They argued in their preliminary-\\n injunction motions that the gift bans were facially unconstitu-\\n tional—in particular, that both the 150-foot buffer zone around\\n polling places and the 25-foot buffer zone around polling lines were\\n content-based speech regulations that violated the First Amend-\\n ment.\\n The district court initially denied the plaintiffs’ requested re-\\n lief. It found the 150-foot polling-place buffer zone satisfied First\\n Amendment scrutiny because (1) Georgia had compelling interests\\n in “restoring peace and order around the polls[,] protecting voters\\n from political pressure and intimidation[,] and supporting election\\n integrity,” and (2) the law was narrowly tailored in that it allowed\\n pro-voting speech within the buffer zone and handouts outside the\\n buffer zone. Although the court found that the “limitless” 25-foot\\n polling-line buffer zone failed strict scrutiny—due to the lack of tai-\\n loring to any “fixed line of demarcation”—it nevertheless declined\\n to enjoin the ban on the ground that doing so would disrupt the\\n 2022 elections. As a consequence, both gift bans took effect during\\n the 2022 election cycle.\\n In May 2023, the plaintiffs renewed their preliminary-injunc-\\n tion motion, but only as to the 25-foot polling-line buffer zone.\\n Standing by the reasoning in its earlier order—and now without\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n the risk of disrupting an upcoming election—the district court\\n granted the preliminary injunction. Importantly here—and con-\\n sistent with the plaintiffs’ facial challenge—the court enjoined the\\n state defendants from enforcing the gift ban inside the 25-foot poll-\\n ing-line buffer zone against anyone.\\n The state defendants timely appealed. 1\\n II\\n We find that it would be inappropriate at this juncture to\\n address the merits of the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge.\\n Our reason is simple: It is undisputed here that the plaintiffs chal-\\n lenged the 25-foot-buffer-zone gift ban on its face rather than as ap-\\n plied specifically to their own activities. As the Supreme Court re-\\n cently underscored in Moody v. NetChoice, LLC., “that decision\\n comes at a cost” because “facial challenges [are] hard to win.” 603\\n U.S. at 723. In particular, the Court clarified that a facial challenge\\n in the First Amendment context requires an “inquiry into how a\\n law works in all of its applications.” Id. at 744. To adjudicate a\\n facial First Amendment challenge, a court must first “assess the []\\n law[’s] scope” by charting out the full range of covered activities.\\n Id. at 724–25. It must then “decide which of the law[’s] applications\\n violate the First Amendment” and which do not. Id. at 725. Finally,\\n the court must weigh the constitutional applications against the\\n\\n 1 This appeal has since been consolidated with an appeal addressing another\\n\\n provision of the same statute, which requires each absentee voter to print his\\n or her birthdate on the envelope containing his or her ballot. See In re: Georgia\\n Senate Bill 202, No. 23-13085. In this opinion, we address only the gift ban.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13095 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n unconstitutional ones. Id. While the “principal things regulated”\\n should get a heavier weight in this analysis, they shouldn’t be con-\\n sidered at the expense of the “sphere of other applications.” Id. at\\n 726. A facial challenge will succeed only when “the law’s unconsti-\\n tutional applications substantially outweigh its constitutional\\n ones.” Id. at 724.\\n The district court didn’t conduct the facial-challenge analysis\\n now required by Moody. 2 For instance, a critical question in this\\n case is whether Georgia’s gift ban targeted expressive conduct. Ra-\\n ther than answering that question by charting out “the full range\\n of activities,” id., the district court looked only to the plaintiffs’ own\\n line-relief efforts, focusing on the messages that voters said they\\n understood these efforts to be conveying. The same goes for the\\n downstream questions regarding content-neutrality, the requisite\\n level of scrutiny, and governmental interests and tailoring. With\\n respect to all those inquiries, the court failed to systematically as-\\n sess the full sweep of the regulation and weigh the constitutional\\n against the unconstitutional applications. It instead emphasized\\n the plaintiffs’ particular activities and the overarching justifications\\n offered by the government—lumping together a narrow range of\\n applications and considering them as a whole without accounting\\n\\n 2 Moody was decided after the district court issued its preliminary injunction,\\n\\n but we are required to apply the law as it exists at the time of our decision\\n absent manifest injustice. Cf. Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S.\\n 696, 711–12 (2006) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders\\n its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice . . . .” (citing\\n United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801))).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13095\\n\\n for the First Amendment’s varying protections across different ac-\\n tivities.\\n We decline to perform the Moody-prescribed facial-challenge\\n analysis in the first instance. Rather, we VACATE the judgment\\n of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30960,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745334,"string":"10,745,334"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-01"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-12160"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before William Pryor, Chief Judge, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, Abudu, and Kidd, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\nIn the\\n\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\nHour the Eleventh Circuit\\n\\nNo. 23-12160\\n\\nHM FLORIDA-ORL, LLC,\\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\\nversus\\n\\nGOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, et al.,\\nDefendants,\\n\\nSECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF\\nBUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court\\nfor the Middle District of Florida\\nD.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00950-GAP-LHP\\n\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n2 Order of the Court 23-12160\\n\\nBefore William Pryor, Chief Judge, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor,\\nNewsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, Abudu, and Kidd,\\n\\nCircuit Judges.\\nBY THE COURT:\\n\\nA petition for rehearing having been filed and a member of\\nthis Court in active service having requested a poll on whether this\\nappeal should be reheard by the Court sitting en banc, and a ma-\\njority of the judges in active service on this Court having voted in\\nfavor of granting rehearing en banc, IT IS ORDERED that this ap-\\npeal will be reheard en banc. The panel’s opinion is VACATED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11211919/\", \"author_raw\": \"\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":"JILL PRYOR; NEWSOM; BRANCH; GRANT; LUCK; LAGOA; BRASHER; ABUDU; KIDD"},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745334/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\nIn the\n\nUnited States Court of Appeals\nHour the Eleventh Circuit\n\nNo. 23-12160\n\nHM FLORIDA-ORL, LLC,\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\nversus\n\nGOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, et al.,\nDefendants,\n\nSECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF\nBUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,\nDefendant-Appellant.\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court\nfor the Middle District of Florida\nD.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00950-GAP-LHP\n\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 2\n\n2 Order of the Court 23-12160\n\nBefore William Pryor, Chief Judge, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor,\nNewsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, Abudu, and Kidd,\n\nCircuit Judges.\nBY THE COURT:\n\nA petition for rehearing having been filed and a member of\nthis Court in active service having requested a poll on whether this\nappeal should be reheard by the Court sitting en banc, and a ma-\njority of the judges in active service on this Court having voted in\nfavor of granting rehearing en banc, IT IS ORDERED that this ap-\npeal will be reheard en banc. The panel’s opinion is VACATED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-01\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\nIn the\\n\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\nHour the Eleventh Circuit\\n\\nNo. 23-12160\\n\\nHM FLORIDA-ORL, LLC,\\nPlaintiff-Appellee,\\nversus\\n\\nGOVERNOR OF FLORIDA, et al.,\\nDefendants,\\n\\nSECRETARY OF THE FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF\\nBUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,\\nDefendant-Appellant.\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court\\nfor the Middle District of Florida\\nD.C. Docket No. 6:23-cv-00950-GAP-LHP\\n\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n2 Order of the Court 23-12160\\n\\nBefore William Pryor, Chief Judge, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor,\\nNewsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, Abudu, and Kidd,\\n\\nCircuit Judges.\\nBY THE COURT:\\n\\nA petition for rehearing having been filed and a member of\\nthis Court in active service having requested a poll on whether this\\nappeal should be reheard by the Court sitting en banc, and a ma-\\njority of the judges in active service on this Court having voted in\\nfavor of granting rehearing en banc, IT IS ORDERED that this ap-\\npeal will be reheard en banc. The panel’s opinion is VACATED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30961,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745962,"string":"10,745,962"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Francisco Lagos Marmol v. Kalonymus Development Partners, LLC"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-13678"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"LAGOA, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13678\\n ____________________\\n\\n FRANCISCO LAGOS MARMOL,\\n FERNANDO VAN PEBORGH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n KALONYMUS DEVELOPMENT\\n PARTNERS, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20703-RNS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n LAGOA, Circuit Judge:\\n This case involves the straightforward breach of a real-estate\\n contract. In June 2021, a buyer contracted with two sellers to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n purchase a piece of property for $5,450,000, with a closing date in\\n October 2021. The sellers breached that contract by failing to close\\n by the closing date. The buyer then exercised its right under the\\n contract to sue for specific performance and damages. Eventually,\\n after a bench trial, the district court entered a final judgment in fa-\\n vor of the buyer, in which it found that the buyer was entitled to\\n both specific performance and damages. The district court ordered\\n the parties to close on the sale of the property, and the parties did\\n just that. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argu-\\n ment, we hold that the issue of specific performance here is moot.\\n But because the issue of damages remains a live controversy, we\\n proceed to the merits on that issue, affirming in part and reversing\\n in part the district court’s damages award.\\n I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n In June 2021, Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Van\\n Peborgh (the “Sellers” or the “Appellants”) and Kalonymus Devel-\\n opment Partners, LLC, (the “Buyer” or “Kalonymus”) signed a con-\\n tract (the “Membership Purchase Agreement”) under which Mar-\\n mol and Van Peborgh would each sell their 50 percent ownership\\n interests in Best Peacock Inn, LLC, to Kalonymus and/or its as-\\n signee for a purchase price of $5,450,000. Best Peacock Inn, LLC,\\n owns a rental property in Miami known as the “Best Peacock Inn,”\\n the “Peacock Inn,” or “Best Peacock.” Kalonymus is a real-estate\\n investment and development firm that is 100 percent owned by\\n Maximilian Zeff. The closing date was set for September 13, 2021,\\n which was extended to October 8, 2021, and then October 22, 2021.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement lays out the\\n Buyer’s options in the event of the Sellers’ breach:\\n 8.2 In the event of a default by Seller under the\\n terms of this Agreement, Buyer shall have the sole\\n and exclusive remedies of either (i) terminating this\\n Agreement, and receiving the return of its Deposit,\\n whereupon all parties hereto shall be released and\\n relieved from any and all further liability or\\n obligations hereunder; or (ii) proceeding to enforce\\n this Agreement by an action for specific performance,\\n as Buyer shall thereby, without waiving Buyer’s right\\n to recover any and all losses, damages, costs and\\n expenses resulting from Seller’s default.\\n Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein\\n contained, in the event of an intentional willful failure\\n of Seller to perform any matter reasonably within its\\n control or in the event any of the warranties and\\n representations made by Seller herein shall be in any\\n material respect inaccurate or there is an omission of\\n a material fact necessary to make any representation\\n of Seller not misleading in light of the circumstances\\n under which it was made, Buyer shall have any and all\\n remedies available to Buyer under the laws of the\\n State of Florida.\\n The Sellers claim that, in early October 2021, they “discov-\\n ered a provision in the property’s mortgage that would prevent\\n them from closing until January of 2022.” Specifically, the Sellers\\n claim they realized that “under certain terms of the promissory\\n note, the mortgage could only be paid off during the first quarter\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n of each year, between January and March.” Consequently, the\\n Sellers told Kalonymus that they would be unable to hold up their\\n end of the bargain by the closing date. Though the Sellers say they\\n “did not remember or were not aware of the provision prior to Oc-\\n tober 2021,” they concede that they breached the contract by fail-\\n ing to close.\\n On October 28, 2021, Kalonymus sent the Sellers a letter ad-\\n vising them that they were “in material default under several of\\n [their] obligations” under the Membership Purchase Agreement.\\n Kalonymus stated that it had entered into the Agreement “reliant\\n upon [the Sellers’] express representations and warranties, which\\n include[d]” the “execution, delivery, and performance of [the]\\n Agreement.” Kalonymus added that it “had every right to rely\\n upon the truthfulness of each and every representation and war-\\n ranty contained in the Purchase Agreement,” and that it, “in fact,\\n did detrimentally rely upon [the Sellers’] misrepresentations.” Fur-\\n ther:\\n As [Kalonymus] has previously advised [the Sellers],\\n [their] breaches and misrepresentations have resulted\\n in [Kalonymus] suffering and continuing to incur sig-\\n nificant losses and damages. [Kalonymus] has had to\\n delay its financing resulting in increased transaction\\n fees as well as substantial losses related to the terms\\n of [its] loan, including a material increase in the inter-\\n est rate. [The Sellers] have known for some time that\\n [Kalonymus] would be financing this acquisition and\\n [their] breaches and misconduct are a direct cause of\\n the damages [Kalonymus] has sustained. Moreover,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n this delay in closing will result in lost rental income to\\n [Kalonymus], in an amount easily calculated based\\n upon the current rent roll.\\n Over the next few months, the parties communicated about\\n possible ways to salvage a deal. In December 2021, January 2022,\\n and February 2022, the Sellers offered to sell Kalonymus the Best\\n Peacock Inn at the same purchase price as laid out in the original\\n Agreement. But Kalonymus declined, informing the Sellers that\\n market conditions had changed for the worse, and that it would\\n now be willing only to buy the property at a significant discount to\\n make up for the damages it had incurred up until that point, includ-\\n ing legal fees and lost rental income. Kalonymus advised the Sellers\\n that they had failed to address the default, and that they could not\\n “simply reset the closing date” and demand that Kalonymus accept\\n the deal at the price originally negotiated. But the Sellers refused\\n to sell at a reduced purchase price, calling Kalonymus’s demands\\n “totally unreasonable” and “unfair” in light of what they felt was a\\n “short . . . delay in closing.”\\n The deal having fallen through, Kalonymus exercised its op-\\n tion under Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement to\\n sue the Sellers for specific performance, while at the same time\\n seeking damages. Kalonymus filed an action for specific perfor-\\n mance and damages (for breach of contract) in state court. The\\n Sellers then removed that action to federal court. Around the same\\n time, the Sellers filed their own lawsuit against Kalonymus in fed-\\n eral court, asserting a single count for a declaratory judgment that\\n Kalonymus—not the Sellers—had breached the Agreement. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n Sellers’ theory was that, by seeking to enforce the contract through\\n a lawsuit for specific performance, Kalonymus “elected to continue\\n with and enforce the Agreement rather than terminate it.” Thus,\\n according to the Sellers, it was Kalonymus that breached the con-\\n tract by rejecting the Sellers’ post-October-2021 offers to close at\\n the original purchase price.\\n These cases were consolidated before the district court.\\n Kalonymus moved to dismiss the Sellers’ complaint, which the dis-\\n trict court granted on the ground that the requested declarations\\n focused on acts committed in the past, and the court’s adjudication\\n of the issues would not prevent future monetary loss or lead either\\n party to conform their behavior to the law. That holding disposed\\n of the Sellers’ complaint, so for all intents and purposes,\\n Kalonymus became the Plaintiff in the case below, while Marmol\\n and Van Peborgh became the Defendants.\\n After more litigation, the parties cross-moved for summary\\n judgment. In the Sellers’ motion, Marmol and Van Peborgh again\\n argued that Kalonymus (1) remained bound by the Membership\\n Purchase Agreement after the Sellers breached in October 2021 be-\\n cause it chose to sue for specific performance (as well as damages);\\n (2) committed its own breaches over the next few months by failing\\n to perform under the terms of the original contract; and (3) as a\\n result, lost any claims for damages it might have had. Kalonymus\\n also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to\\n specific performance of the Agreement and damages because (1)\\n the parties had a valid contract; (2) the Sellers breached the contract\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n by failing to close in October 2021; and (3) Kalonymus was dam-\\n aged by this breach. Kalonymus added that, under Florida law, a\\n cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the\\n breach, so “the Sellers[’] contention that Kalonymus was required\\n to proceed with the closing in 2022 prior to filing suit is unavailing.”\\n The district court first denied the Sellers’ motion for sum-\\n mary judgment, finding that the Sellers had “fail[ed] to expressly\\n even mention any of the four specific counts” alleged by\\n Kalonymus, “never mind address whether there are genuine issues\\n of material fact as to the elements of those counts.” The district\\n court then granted in part Kalonymus’s motion for summary judg-\\n ment, agreeing with Kalonymus that it had established all elements\\n of a breach-of-contract claim. Although the district court “ha[d]\\n no difficulty concluding that [Kalonymus] proved it was damaged\\n by the Sellers’ breach,” the court found that “the parties’ dispute\\n regarding the amount of damages that should be awarded is not so\\n straight forward.” The case thus proceeded to a two-day bench\\n trial on the matter of Kalonymus’s damages, during which Zeff,\\n Marmol, Van Peborgh, and Kalonymus’s damages expert all testi-\\n fied. After the trial, the district court entered a final judgment in\\n favor of Kalonymus, reiterating its finding that Kalonymus was en-\\n titled to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\\n of $5,150,000, and to damages in the amount of $1,553,245, pro-\\n vided that the Sellers kept their promise to finance part of the trans-\\n action. The court ordered the parties to close on the Best Peacock\\n Inn on or before November 27, 2023, which the parties did.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n The Sellers now appeal the district court’s entries of sum-\\n mary and final judgment in favor of Kalonymus.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n A. Specific Performance\\n Our first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred\\n when it determined that Kalonymus was entitled to an award of\\n specific performance, both when it granted summary judgment in\\n favor of Kalonymus and when it entered a final judgment in favor\\n of Kalonymus following the bench trial. The Sellers advance two\\n arguments for why the district court erred. First, they argue that\\n “Kalonymus is not entitled to an award of specific performance . .\\n . because it did not meet its burden of proof of establishing its\\n prima facie case,” which includes proving that it was “ready, willing,\\n and able to perform the contract according to its terms” in the first\\n place. Second, the Sellers argue that “Kalonymus is not entitled to\\n an award of specific performance . . . because it failed to act in ac-\\n cordance with Section 8.2 of the Agreement and Florida law and\\n materially breached the Agreement.” But we need not—and can-\\n not—reach the merits of these arguments, because we conclude\\n that the issue of specific performance is moot following the sale of\\n the Best Peacock Inn.\\n “Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal\\n courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165,\\n 171 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). Indeed, as the Su-\\n preme Court has often stated, “[n]o principle is more fundamental\\n to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual\\n cases or controversies.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,\\n 408 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).\\n One doctrine deriving directly from the case-or-controversy\\n requirement is the doctrine of mootness. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273\\n F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has explained\\n that “a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot\\n questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules\\n of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before\\n it.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)\\n (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Thus, a case is\\n moot “when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect\\n to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.\\n Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208,\\n 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Stated another\\n way, “a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’\\n or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”\\n Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). This includes when\\n “events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a sit-\\n uation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaning-\\n ful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1217.\\n To sum up the relevant facts, Kalonymus contracted with\\n the Sellers to buy the Best Peacock Inn for $5,450,000, with a clos-\\n ing date in October 2021. After the Sellers breached in October\\n 2021, they offered to sell Kalonymus the property under the origi-\\n nal terms of the contract, but Kalonymus refused unless the Sellers\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n lowered the price. The deal did not materialize, and Kalonymus\\n exercised its right under the contract to sue for specific perfor-\\n mance and damages. Eventually, the district court entered a final\\n judgment in favor of Kalonymus, “reiterat[ing] the Buyer’s entitle-\\n ment to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\\n of $5,150,000.” 1 “[I]n conformance with the verdict,” the district\\n court ordered the parties to “close on the sale of the property on\\n or before November 27, 2023,” which they did. This much is un-\\n disputed; the Sellers themselves tell us that they “closed on the sale\\n of the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn “in compliance with the Fi-\\n nal Judgment and pursuant to [the] court order directing them to\\n close.”\\n At closing, as authorized under the terms of the Member-\\n ship Purchase Agreement, 2 Kalonymus assigned its “Membership\\n Interests”—i.e., its “rights, title and interests”—in the Best Peacock\\n Inn to two other limited liability companies: 3667 Poinciana, LLC,\\n\\n\\n 1 In its verdict order following the bench trial, the district court found that the\\n\\n parties initially agreed on a sales price of $5,450,000 but later changed the price\\n to $5,150,000 through an Amendment to the Membership Purchase Agree-\\n ment. The Sellers now argue that the “Amendment was ineffective, and the\\n purchase price remained $5,450,000.” But they add that “whether the pur-\\n chase price was $5,450,000 or $5,150,000, the analysis by Sellers [on appeal]\\n does not change.”\\n 2 The Membership Purchase Agreement was “made and entered into . . . by\\n\\n and among Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Carlos Van Peborgh, each\\n as to a 50% interest (collectively, ‘Seller’), and Kalonymus Development Part-\\n ners LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and/or its assignee (‘Buyer’ or\\n ‘Purchaser’), and Best Peacock Inn, LLC[.]” (emphasis added).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n and Poinciana, LLC. These two companies (the “Poinciana enti-\\n ties”) acquired title to the Best Peacock Inn on November 28, 2023,\\n as assignees of Kalonymus.\\n Also undisputed is the fact that the Sellers initially filed a mo-\\n tion to stay the final judgment but withdrew that motion prior to\\n closing. On November 3, 2023, on the same day that they filed their\\n notice of appeal, Marmol and Van Peborgh filed an “expedited mo-\\n tion for stay of execution of judgment pending appeal,” in which\\n they asked the district court to “stay[ ] the judgment of specific per-\\n formance” to “meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.”\\n The Sellers attested that, if “they are required to convey the Best\\n Peacock by November 27, [2023,]” they will “lose the sole asset at\\n issue in this case,” and their appeal will be moot. They stated, in\\n no uncertain terms:\\n If [the] Sellers are denied a stay, they will be forced to\\n convey the subject property and, as a result, their ap-\\n peal will become effectively moot as to their chal-\\n lenge on appeal of the [c]ourt’s Judgment granting\\n specific performance to Kalonymus . . . . [The] Sellers\\n are facing more than a risk of mootness: Absent a stay,\\n their appeal of the [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding\\n specific performance to Kalonymus will inevitably be-\\n come moot on November 27, 2023.\\n Kalonymus filed a response to the stay motion, indicating\\n that it did “not oppose a stay of the execution of judgment—pro-\\n vided that the Sellers post a satisfactory bond” of $3.2 million. On\\n November 14, 2023, the district court directed the Sellers to “file\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n either (1) a notice indicating they do not object to the bond amount\\n proposed by the Buyer; or (2) a reply to the Buyer’s response.” The\\n next day, however, rather than filing either a notice of non-objec-\\n tion to the bond amount or a reply, the Sellers withdrew their mo-\\n tion to stay.\\n With this factual background in mind, we conclude that the\\n sale of the Best Peacock Inn—the subject of this litigation and the\\n sole asset here—rendered the issue of specific performance moot.\\n The reason for mootness is simple: The Sellers sold the sub-\\n ject property to Kalonymus, which, upon closing, assigned its in-\\n terest in the property to two non-party entities, and thus there is\\n no more relief we can give the Sellers when it comes to the specific\\n performance of the Agreement. Recall, Kalonymus initiated this\\n action in state court to compel “specific performance of a contract\\n to convey membership shares in a limited liability company for the\\n purpose of conveying real property in Miami-Dade County, Flor-\\n ida.” Kalonymus demanded that the “Sellers be required to convey\\n [ ] 100% of the Membership Interest in [the] Best Peacock Inn pur-\\n suant to the terms of the Agreement.” And that is exactly what\\n occurred. In late November 2023, in compliance with the district\\n court’s order finding that Kalonymus was entitled to specific per-\\n formance and directing the parties to close, the Sellers sold all of\\n their shares in the Best Peacock Inn to Kalonymus’s assignees.\\n Therefore, the issue of specific performance is no longer “live,”\\n Powell, 395 U.S. at 496, and no further relief can be granted on the\\n matter of the sale.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Resisting, the Sellers now argue (contrary to their position\\n in their motion to stay) that the sale of the Best Peacock Inn did\\n not moot the issue of specific performance, because this Court\\n could, seemingly with ease, order the parties to “set aside” the sale.\\n Because this Court “can, as part of its mandate, instruct the district\\n court” to “order[ ] Kalonymus . . . to cause the return of the shares”\\n of the Best Peacock Inn to the Sellers, they insist, the issue of spe-\\n cific performance is not moot. We reject this argument for several\\n reasons.\\n First, we cannot simply un-moot the issue of specific perfor-\\n mance here by “setting aside” the sale of the Best Peacock Inn.\\n When the Sellers closed on the sale of the property, they accepted,\\n in writing, that once the deal closed, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and\\n Poinciana, LLC, would take title to the Best Peacock Inn as assign-\\n ees of Kalonymus. Under the terms of the assignment contract,\\n which was signed by Marmol and Van Peborgh, Kalonymus\\n “agreed to transfer all of its rights, title, and interests” in the Best\\n Peacock Inn to the Poinciana entities: “99.5% to 3667 Poinciana,\\n LLC, and 0.5% to Poinciana, LLC.” The Poinciana entities, in turn,\\n “agreed to accept and assume the transfer of the Membership In-\\n terests.” The Sellers thus understood that, upon closing,\\n Kalonymus would no longer have rights in the Best Peacock Inn\\n and the Poinciana entities, both non-parties, would take title to the\\n shares of the property moving forward.\\n In light of this assignment, we conclude that the issue of\\n specific performance is moot, because “intervening events have\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n made it ‘impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief whatever’”\\n to the Sellers. See Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.,\\n 179 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting John Roe, Inc. v. United\\n States, 142 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998)). There is no way for us\\n to give the Sellers the relief they are seeking—the “transfer of the\\n shares back to [the] Sellers”—because the property has been sold,\\n and Kalonymus has assigned its interest in the property to third-\\n party entities who are not parties here. See, e.g., Holloway v. United\\n States, 789 F.2d 1372, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Because the property\\n in question has been sold and the purchaser has not been made a\\n party to this action, we dismiss this case as moot . . . . [T]he pur-\\n chaser of the property . . . is not a party to this appeal, and this\\n court therefore cannot give any relief that would affect him or\\n her.”); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 361–62 (1921) (“As the ac-\\n tion was brought to recover the possession of real estate, and as the\\n defendant in error has, pending review in this court, sold it, we\\n agree with the contention that the case has become moot . . . .\\n [T]he defendant in error having sold and conveyed the property, a\\n judgment, if in his favor, will not give him possession of the prem-\\n ises . . . . [T]his court will not decide moot cases.”).\\n The Sellers acknowledge the transfer of the property to third\\n parties, but they argue that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and Poinciana,\\n LLC, are not “bona fide purchasers,” because “the Poinciana Enti-\\n ties took the property with knowledge of the litigation,” and the\\n district court could “join the Poinciana Entities as parties to this suit\\n on remand.” True, Kalonymus’s owner Maximilian Zeff helped\\n create the Poinciana entities “for the purpose of owning the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n majority of Best Peacock Inn, LLC,” so the Sellers are likely correct\\n that these entities “knew of ” this litigation when they took title to\\n the property. But this fact is only part of the equation.3 “Mootness\\n demands that there be something about the case that remains alive,\\n\\n\\n 3 Under Florida law, a buyer is considered a bona fide purchaser if “(1) the\\n\\n purchaser obtained legal title to the challenged property, (2) the purchaser\\n paid the value of the challenged property, and (3) the purchaser had no\\n knowledge of the claimed interest against the challenged property at the time\\n of the transaction.” Harkless v. Laubhan, 278 So. 3d 728, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA\\n 2019). The Sellers tell us that the Poinciana entities are “not bona fide third-\\n party purchasers because they acquired title to the shares of Best Peacock Inn\\n with full knowledge of the litigation and the pendency of the appeal.” But just\\n because a third-party purchaser has knowledge of a lawsuit does not mean he\\n acquired the property with knowledge of a “conflicting claim, interest, or right\\n in the property.” Harkless, 278 So. 3d at 733 (internal quotations omitted); see\\n also Miami Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of N.Y., 838 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1988)\\n (holding, in the bankruptcy context, that “[k]nowledge of claims asserted in a\\n pending appeal does not deprive a purchaser of good faith status”).\\n Here, at the time that the Poinciana entities accepted the assignment of inter-\\n ests from Kalonymus, the Sellers had made clear, in signed documents, that\\n Best Peacock Inn, LLC, had clean title to the property, free of encumbrances.\\n Puzzlingly, the Sellers direct our attention to an email they sent just before\\n closing, in which they proposed adding language to the closing documents\\n that would have purportedly preserved their rights to appeal the final judg-\\n ment. But the parties did not include this language in the closing documents.\\n Instead, as we’ve said, the Sellers signed closing documents attesting that they\\n were selling the property without encumbrances upon it or claims against it.\\n The Sellers did not record a notice of lis pendens on the property until July 25,\\n 2024—nearly eight months after the sale and over eight months after they in-\\n itiated this appeal. Therefore, the Sellers have not demonstrated that the Poin-\\n ciana entities (neither of which are parties) are anything other than bona fide\\n purchasers for value in this case.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n present, real, and immediate so that a federal court can provide re-\\n dress in some palpable way.” Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d\\n 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018). Not only are the Poinciana entities not\\n parties to this case, but, significantly, neither is Zeff, so we cannot\\n say that the relief sought by the Sellers, when it comes to specific\\n performance, presents a live, real, present, and immediate contro-\\n versy for which we can provide redress in a palpable way.\\n On this point, the Sellers direct our attention to Paris v. U.S.\\n Department of Housing & Urban Development, 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.\\n 1983), where the Seventh Circuit held that a case was not moot, in\\n spite of a sale of real property. There, the buyer (an individual) and\\n the seller (the government) “were [co-]defendants in th[e] proceed-\\n ing below” and had “completed the sale in the knowledge that it\\n was under legal challenge.” Id. at 1344. “In such a situation,” the\\n court reasoned, the court still had jurisdiction over the parties who\\n controlled the property and “thus [could] still reach the subject\\n matter of the suit [and] compel restoration of the status quo.” Id.\\n But that case materially differs from ours. As the Paris court took\\n care to mention, the subject property in that case had since been\\n transferred from the buyer to a non-party partnership, of which the\\n buyer was the “sole general partner.” Id. at 1345 n.3. Thus, under\\n Indiana law, the buyer still “ha[d] the power, in response to an or-\\n der of the court, to bind [the non-party partnership] either to re-\\n convey the property” or to enter into a contract with the seller. Id.\\n Here, by contrast, Zeff was not a party in the proceeding be-\\n low; Kalonymus was. We have no evidence indicating that\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n Kalonymus has the power to bind the Poinciana entities to recon-\\n vey the Best Peacock Inn or to enter into a new contract with the\\n Sellers. And even assuming that we could pierce the corporate veil\\n to reach Zeff, Zeff does not appear to have that power either, at\\n least according to the record evidence: While Zeff does fully own\\n Poinciana, LLC, he testified that he has “less than 1 percent owner-\\n ship interest in” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, which is the entity that was\\n assigned 99.5 percent of Kalonymus’s “rights, title, and interests”\\n and the parties agreed would become the “Manager” of the Best\\n Peacock Inn after the sale. Zeff testified that he has “no power to\\n remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as “Manager” of the Best Peacock\\n Inn, and no power to appoint a new manager of the property.\\n Zeff also testified that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, is “99.99 percent\\n owned by” an entity called “RDZ Family, LLC,” named for the in-\\n itials of Zeff’s father. Zeff testified that, while he is a “beneficiary”\\n of RDZ Family, LLC, he does not “sign[ ] for” the company. He\\n agreed, on cross-examination, that lawyers for RDZ Family, LLC,\\n represented his father but were “clear and specific” that they did\\n “not represent[ ] [him].” Zeff also agreed that his “father alone had\\n the power to appoint and remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as Man-\\n ager of the Best Peacock Inn.\\n To sum up, then, the evidence shows that the current 99.5\\n percent owner of the Best Peacock Inn—3667 Poinciana, LLC—is\\n a non-party entity controlled by another non-party entity—RDZ\\n Family, LLC—which is managed by members with no involve-\\n ment here. Therefore, contrary to the Sellers’ claim, and unlike in\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n Paris, we cannot simply order Kalonymus to “cause the return of\\n the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn back to the Sellers and compel\\n restoration of the status quo. The parties who now control the\\n property are not within our jurisdictional reach. We thus reject the\\n Sellers’ contention that the sale of the property to the Poinciana\\n entities did not moot the issue of specific performance.\\n This brings us to the second reason that the issue of specific\\n performance is moot: the Sellers’ decision to withdraw their mo-\\n tion to stay and voluntarily proceed with the transaction below. As\\n noted above, the Sellers initially filed a motion to stay the execution\\n of judgment, in which they expressed their willingness to comply\\n with an order requiring a supersedeas bond, if the district court did\\n stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. They noted\\n that, without a stay, conveyance of the subject property would de-\\n stroy “their appellate remedies” and “moot . . . their challenge on\\n appeal of the [district court’s] Judgment granting specific perfor-\\n mance to Kalonymus.” But on November 15, 2023, having been\\n presented with the options of assenting to the bond amount pro-\\n posed by Kalonymus or filing a reply to Kalonymus’s response to\\n their motion to stay, the Sellers filed a notice of withdrawal and\\n moved forward with the sale. They did so just twelve days after\\n telling the district court that, “[a]bsent a stay, their appeal of the\\n [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding specific performance to\\n Kalonymus will inevitably become moot on November 27, 2023.”\\n The Sellers’ decision to decline to post a bond, withdraw\\n their motion to stay, and proceed with the sale of the property\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n evinces that the issue of specific performance is moot. This Court\\n has held, in the bankruptcy context, that once a sale of property “is\\n approved by the bankruptcy court and consummated by the par-\\n ties,” an appellate court can no longer “grant[ ] effective relief if a\\n sale is not stayed,” and thus “the failure to obtain a stay renders the\\n appeal moot.” In re Charter Co., 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987);\\n see also In re Matos, 790 F.2d 864, 865 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is settled\\n law in this circuit that when the debtor fails to obtain a stay pending\\n appeal of the bankruptcy court’s or the district court’s order setting\\n aside an automatic stay and allowing a creditor to foreclose on\\n property, the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the property ren-\\n ders moot any appeal.”). This rule of law is “premised upon con-\\n siderations of finality.” In re Matos, 790 F.2d at 865–66; see also In re\\n Stanford, 17 F.4th 116, 126 (11th Cir. 2021) ( Jordan, J., concurring in\\n part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the afore-\\n mentioned rule is premised, in part, on the need to deter “buyer’s\\n remorse”).\\n Courts around the country have applied a similar rule to\\n sales of real property outside the bankruptcy context. As one of\\n our sister circuits remarked: “The general rule followed in the\\n United States is that absent a stay, sale of the property to a good\\n faith purchaser during the pendency of the appeal, ‘moots the ap-\\n peal of the judgment ordering the sale.’ This rule ‘applies to all\\n judgments ordering the sale of property and is not limited to bank-\\n ruptcy cases.’” Romspen Mortg. Ltd. P’ship v. BGC Holdings LLC – Ar-\\n lington Place One, 20 F.4th 359, 367 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting F.D.I.C.\\n v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n In Holloway, for example, the petitioners appealed the dis-\\n trict court’s denial of their petition for a writ of prohibition to pre-\\n vent the Internal Revenue Service from seizing and selling their\\n property to satisfy their unpaid taxes. 789 F.2d at 1373. After the\\n district court denied their petition, the Holloways did not seek a\\n stay, and their property was sold. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that\\n the appeal was moot. To begin with, “[t]he act or event sought to\\n be prohibited by the Holloways was the sale of their property,” and\\n [t]hat sale has already occurred.” Id. at 1374. The court then ex-\\n plained, analogizing to the bankruptcy context, that “a party seek-\\n ing to avoid any impairment in its ability to realize the benefit of a\\n successful appeal must seek to stay the progress of the proceeding\\n by obtaining a stay or injunction pending appeal. Thus a party who\\n chooses to appeal but who fails to obtain a stay or injunction pend-\\n ing appeal risks losing its ability to realize the benefit of a successful\\n appeal.” Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Combined Metals Reduction Co.,\\n 557 F.2d 179, 188 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation modified)). The court\\n reasoned that the Holloways “had an opportunity to prevent the\\n sale of their property through a stay of the order denying their pe-\\n tition” but “failed to take advantage of that opportunity.” Id. at\\n 1373–74. In light of this fact, and because the property had since\\n been sold to a non-party, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as\\n moot. Id. at 1374.\\n Similar considerations apply here. Not only did the Sellers\\n fail to obtain a stay pending appeal, but they voluntarily terminated\\n their effort to obtain one after urging the district court to enter an\\n order staying execution of the judgment so that they “might\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.” The Sellers were\\n under no illusion about what a stay would entail; they noted explic-\\n itly their willingness to post a bond or some other form of security.\\n But when Kalonymus came back with a number, the Sellers balked.\\n We cannot say for sure why the Sellers proceeded the way they did.\\n But Marmol and Van Peborgh’s decision to withdraw their motion\\n to stay only confirms that the subsequent sale of the property (and\\n the assignment to third parties beyond the reach of our equitable\\n powers) was both voluntary and final. Under these circumstances,\\n we conclude that the Sellers have lost their ability to realize the\\n benefit of a successful appeal on the matter of the sale—a position\\n they themselves advanced when they told the district court that\\n conveyance of the subject property would moot their challenge of\\n the court’s judgment granting specific performance to Kalonymus.\\n For these reasons, we hold that the issue of specific perfor-\\n mance is moot, having “lost its character as a present, live contro-\\n versy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opin-\\n ions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48\\n (1969) (per curiam).\\n B. Damages\\n We turn now to the issue of damages, which “remains a live\\n controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th\\n Cir. 1997) (instructing district court to dismiss moot claims but re-\\n solving non-moot claims on the merits); Powell, 395 U.S. at 497\\n (“Where one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the re-\\n maining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n or controversy.”). The Appellants argue that the district court erred\\n in granting Kalonymus’s motion for summary judgment on its en-\\n titlement to damages and in awarding Kalonymus damages after\\n the bench trial because Kalonymus failed to prove damages and\\n thus failed to prove an essential element of its breach-of-contract\\n claims. The Appellants contend that the evidence showed that in-\\n dividuals and entities other than Kalonymus—Zeff, Zeff’s family\\n members, and 3667 Poinciana, LLC—were the ones who might\\n have been damaged, but that “there is no record evidence that\\n Kalonymus [itself ] suffered ‘a single dime’ in damages.”\\n “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\n novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court, and\\n viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light\\n most favorable to the non-moving party.” Houston v. Williams, 547\\n F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate\\n when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mov-\\n ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In review-\\n ing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we resolve all ambi-\\n guities in the non-movant’s favor. Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,\\n 686 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n “After a bench trial, we review the district court’s conclu-\\n sions of law de novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear\\n error.” Tartell v. S. Fla. Sinus & Allergy Ctr., Inc., 790 F.3d 1253, 1257\\n (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). We review a damages award for\\n clear error and afford considerable deference to the district court.\\n Hiatt v. United States, 910 F.2d 737, 742 (11th Cir. 1990). “When\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n determining whether a district court’s damages award constituted\\n clear error, we must be especially careful about reversing findings\\n of fact based on the district court’s evaluation of live witness testi-\\n mony because the district court is better positioned to evaluate\\n such evidence.” Superior Constr. Co., Inc. v. Brock, 445 F.3d 1334, 1346\\n (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).\\n In this case, at the summary-judgment stage, there was evi-\\n dence in the record that Kalonymus suffered some amount of dam-\\n ages stemming from the Sellers’ breach. On October 28, 2021,\\n Kalonymus’s lawyers sent the Sellers a communication attesting\\n that the “Buyer”—Kalonymus—was “suffering and continuing to\\n incur significant losses and damages,” having to “delay its financing\\n resulting in increased transaction fees as well as substantial losses\\n related to the terms of [the] loan, including a material increase in\\n the interest rate,” and incurring “lost rental income . . . in an\\n amount easily calculated based upon the current rent roll,” all\\n caused by the Sellers’ “breaches and misrepresentations.”\\n Additionally, in support of its motion for summary judg-\\n ment, Kalonymus included a declaration from its damages expert,\\n Paul Habibi, who averred that the Sellers’ “delay in closing oc-\\n curred during one of the most turbulent periods for capital markets\\n in decades.” Habibi estimated that, if the parties had been able to\\n close in October 2021, the value of Kalonymus’s cost of capital\\n would have been $1,830,829, a figure he came to by weighing the\\n costs of debt and equity according to the proportion of each type\\n of capital in the Best Peacock Inn’s capital structure. Due to rapidly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n rising interest rates, Habibi explained, Kalonymus’s cost of capital\\n in December 2022 was all the way up to $3,538,129, resulting in\\n current cost-of-capital damages of $1,707,300. Habibi also esti-\\n mated that Kalonymus had suffered, among other things, $98,765\\n in the form of “lost cash flow damages.” The evidence thus sup-\\n ports the district court’s finding, on summary judgment, that\\n Kalonymus suffered some amount of damages greater than zero.\\n The Sellers also appeal the court’s award of damages follow-\\n ing the bench trial. At trial, Habibi testified that the total damages\\n suffered by Kalonymus until that point was $2,673,742. He came\\n to this figure by aggregating the sums of Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\\n ital ($2,346,638), lost profits ($175,028), cost of capital for portfolio\\n properties ($87,210), 4 duplicate expenses ($50,650), and lost tax sav-\\n ings ($14,217). But following Habibi’s testimony, Marmol and Van\\n Peborgh “offered to finance the credit portion of the transaction\\n under the same terms [that] Newmark”—a loan broker—“had of-\\n fered in October 2021.” Habibi was then recalled as a witness, and\\n he testified that, if the Sellers did finance the credit portion of the\\n transaction under the original loan terms, Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\\n ital would be $1,322,850 instead of $2,346,638, and one of the du-\\n plicate expenses (a lender counsel fee of $9,500) would have to be\\n\\n\\n 4 The district court ultimately declined to include the cost of capital for port-\\n\\n folio properties in its damages award, based on its finding that “Kalonymus\\n did not present any evidence linking these portfolio losses, incurred by sepa-\\n rate entities, to Kalonymus itself.” Kalonymus does not contest this issue on\\n appeal.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n erased. In light of these developments, the district court found that\\n Kalonymus had established damages resulting from the breach in\\n the amount of $1,553,245, 5 contingent on the Sellers following\\n through on their pledge to finance part of the transaction under\\n the original terms Newmark had offered in October 2021.\\n The Sellers now contest the entire damages award for the\\n overarching reason that entities or individuals other than\\n Kalonymus were the ones who suffered damages resulting from\\n the Sellers’ breach. Outside of the category of lost tax advantages,\\n which we’ll return to below, we are not persuaded by the Sellers’\\n arguments.\\n We begin with the cost of capital, or the combined cost of\\n debt and cost of equity. As defined by Habibi, cost of debt is “what-\\n ever a borrower would have to pay to borrow money.” This cost is\\n derived using a “risk-free” interest rate (set by the United States\\n Treasury) and a “risk premium” or “spread.” Cost of equity, on the\\n other hand, refers to the “expected return” for the investor provid-\\n ing equity capital. Habibi testified at trial that the cost of debt had\\n nearly doubled between October 2021 and November 2023, while\\n the cost of equity had “also skyrocketed, actually even more as a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 $1,553,245 is the sum of Kalonymus’s revised cost of capital ($1,322,850), lost\\n\\n profits ($175,028), revised duplicate expenses ($41,150), and lost tax savings\\n ($14,217).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n percentage increase than the cost of debt,” from 5.56 percent to\\n “roughly 12 percent.”\\n The Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no harm in the\\n form of capital costs. Their reasoning is that Kalonymus never lost\\n out on the more favorable loan terms Newmark offered in October\\n 2021, because Kalonymus was not a party to the loan transaction.\\n They similarly suggest that Kalonymus contributed no equity cap-\\n ital for the investment. As an initial matter, we note that the Sellers\\n seem to be ignoring the fact that Kalonymus paid the Sellers a de-\\n posit of $131,000 for the property in advance of the deal closing,\\n which the Sellers chose to keep even after they breached, on the\\n theory that Kalonymus owed them damages. It is undisputed that\\n Kalonymus itself borrowed these funds. Habibi also testified that,\\n based on the “entire ownership structure of the investment,” it was\\n his expert opinion that Kalonymus itself suffered equity costs as an\\n arm’s-length investor. So, we reject the Sellers’ assertion that\\n Kalonymus never put capital contributions toward the Best Pea-\\n cock Inn and “suffered absolutely no harm.”\\n As to the cost of debt, it’s true that, in the Newmark loan\\n agreement, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, was listed as the entity that\\n would be taking out the loan if the deal went through (although\\n the loan agreement also references “Kalonymus Credit Facility” on\\n the bottom of each page and throughout the document). But this\\n is a red herring. At the time that the district court awarded dam-\\n ages to Kalonymus, no special-purpose entities had taken assign-\\n ment of Kalonymus’s interest in the Membership Purchase\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n Agreement, since that assignment was contingent on the parties\\n closing on the sale. Thus, throughout the litigation and up until\\n the sale of the property in November 2023, Kalonymus remained\\n the buyer, and Kalonymus suffered the consequences of increasing\\n interest rates. Because the increased costs associated with rising\\n interest rates were incurred by Kalonymus, irrespective of what-\\n ever entities it planned to transfer its interests to in late 2021, we\\n reject the Sellers’ claim that the district court granted Kalonymus\\n a “windfall” in the form of cost-of-debt damages.\\n Next, the Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no lost prof-\\n its because “it was neither the landlord nor going to be an owner”\\n of the Best Peacock Inn. However, the Sellers point us to nothing\\n in the record showing that Kalonymus would not have earned cash\\n flow from the property if the parties had closed in October 2021.\\n They speculate that “distribution[s] would not have gone to\\n Kalonymus,” but they identify nothing concrete. On the other\\n hand, Habibi testified that Kalonymus lost out on $175,028 in “cash\\n flows from operations,” explaining that “the buyer entity”—\\n Kalonymus—“is entitled to receive those cash flows.” “Under Flor-\\n ida law, ‘evidence as to the amount of damages cannot be based on\\n speculation or conjecture, but must be proven with certainty.’” Sun\\n Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d\\n 1197, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co.\\n v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So. 2d 727, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Here,\\n the Sellers have provided us with nothing beyond speculation to\\n cast doubt on Habibi’s or the district court’s calculation of lost\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n profits, so we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in\\n granting those damages.\\n Additionally, the Sellers argue that the district court erred\\n when it awarded Kalonymus $41,150 in “duplicate expenses.”\\n These expenses have taken on something of a misnomer. At sum-\\n mary judgment, Kalonymus sought $50,650 in “administrative\\n fees” that it argued it would be forced to spend “in order to dupli-\\n cate the transaction.” In other words, these damages represent the\\n new set of administrative costs Kalonymus would have to incur in\\n order to close on the transaction. As Habibi explained in his decla-\\n ration, these expenses included a payment for a zoning report, a\\n payment for a “property condition report,” a fee for an appraisal, a\\n fee for an “environmental site assessment,” and legal fees. Regard-\\n less of who (if anyone) paid these expenses the first time around,\\n the evidence shows that Kalonymus took on these additional costs\\n later. The Sellers offer nothing to rebut this point. Therefore, we\\n find no clear error in the district court’s award of “duplicate ex-\\n penses.”\\n Finally, however, when it comes to lost tax advantages, we\\n agree with the Sellers that the record evidence does not support the\\n district court’s award of damages. Habibi testified that, under the\\n 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, bonus depreciation began to be phased\\n out on January 21, 2023, so, in simplified terms, a party filing taxes\\n before that date could have deducted more than a party filing after\\n that date. But Habibi also testified that a limited liability company\\n cannot itself take advantage of tax benefits related to asset\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n depreciation. Rather, he explained, “[i]t’s the members as individ-\\n uals” who suffer the loss of tax depreciation, because individuals\\n are the ones “filing the tax returns.” As such, even if the Sellers had\\n never breached and the deal went through in October 2021, the tax\\n benefits derived from a pre-phaseout closing would only have been\\n available to the individuals filing tax returns—not Kalonymus.\\n Therefore, the district court erred in awarding $14,217 in tax dam-\\n ages to Kalonymus.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the issue of specific\\n performance in this case is moot. We, therefore, DISMISS the ap-\\n peal as to that issue. 6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Normally, when an issue becomes moot on appeal, we not only “dismiss as\\n\\n to the mooted issue, but also vacate the portion of the district court’s order\\n that addresses it.” De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.\\n 2003). We do not do so here, because the policy of vacating the underlying\\n district court order is premised on the equitable principle that “[a] party who\\n seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries\\n of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”\\n U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994); see also\\n United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950) (holding that vaca-\\n tur of the judgment below in a case that has become moot on appeal “clears\\n the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates\\n a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance”). An ap-\\n pellate court need not “vacate[ ] the unreviewed court judgment to prevent\\n its having preclusive effect in subsequent litigation” if the equitable principles\\n laid out by the Supreme Court are not implicated. Westmoreland v. Nat’l\\n Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987). Here, it is not the “va-\\n garies of circumstance” that prevent us from reaching the merits of the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n The district court’s damages award is AFFIRMED in all re-\\n spects except to the extent that the court awarded damages for lost\\n tax savings, which we REVERSE. Accordingly, we vacate the dis-\\n trict court’s damages award and REMAND for recalculation of\\n damages consistent with this opinion.\\n DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED\\n IN PART; REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n court’s award of specific performance, but rather the Sellers’ deliberate deci-\\n sion to comply with the district court’s final judgment and forgo a stay of the\\n execution of judgment pending appeal. Thus, under the circumstances of this\\n case, we conclude that the parties remain bound by the portion of the district\\n court’s final order dealing with specific performance. See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at\\n 24–25 (“[Where] the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the\\n mootness by voluntary action,” he “voluntarily forfeit[s] his legal remedy by\\n the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim\\n to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”); e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606,\\n 620 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to vacate an underlying order where an issue was\\n rendered moot by the losing party’s “voluntary compliance with the district\\n court’s judgment”).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11212547/\", \"author_raw\": \"LAGOA, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"LUCK"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"LUCK\": \", Circuit\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745962/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Francisco Lagos Marmol v. Kalonymus Development Partners, LLC\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n In the\n\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-13678\n ____________________\n\n FRANCISCO LAGOS MARMOL,\n FERNANDO VAN PEBORGH,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n versus\n\n KALONYMUS DEVELOPMENT\n PARTNERS, LLC,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20703-RNS\n ____________________\n\n Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\n LAGOA, Circuit Judge:\n This case involves the straightforward breach of a real-estate\n contract. In June 2021, a buyer contracted with two sellers to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n purchase a piece of property for $5,450,000, with a closing date in\n October 2021. The sellers breached that contract by failing to close\n by the closing date. The buyer then exercised its right under the\n contract to sue for specific performance and damages. Eventually,\n after a bench trial, the district court entered a final judgment in fa-\n vor of the buyer, in which it found that the buyer was entitled to\n both specific performance and damages. The district court ordered\n the parties to close on the sale of the property, and the parties did\n just that. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argu-\n ment, we hold that the issue of specific performance here is moot.\n But because the issue of damages remains a live controversy, we\n proceed to the merits on that issue, affirming in part and reversing\n in part the district court’s damages award.\n I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n In June 2021, Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Van\n Peborgh (the “Sellers” or the “Appellants”) and Kalonymus Devel-\n opment Partners, LLC, (the “Buyer” or “Kalonymus”) signed a con-\n tract (the “Membership Purchase Agreement”) under which Mar-\n mol and Van Peborgh would each sell their 50 percent ownership\n interests in Best Peacock Inn, LLC, to Kalonymus and/or its as-\n signee for a purchase price of $5,450,000. Best Peacock Inn, LLC,\n owns a rental property in Miami known as the “Best Peacock Inn,”\n the “Peacock Inn,” or “Best Peacock.” Kalonymus is a real-estate\n investment and development firm that is 100 percent owned by\n Maximilian Zeff. The closing date was set for September 13, 2021,\n which was extended to October 8, 2021, and then October 22, 2021.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement lays out the\n Buyer’s options in the event of the Sellers’ breach:\n 8.2 In the event of a default by Seller under the\n terms of this Agreement, Buyer shall have the sole\n and exclusive remedies of either (i) terminating this\n Agreement, and receiving the return of its Deposit,\n whereupon all parties hereto shall be released and\n relieved from any and all further liability or\n obligations hereunder; or (ii) proceeding to enforce\n this Agreement by an action for specific performance,\n as Buyer shall thereby, without waiving Buyer’s right\n to recover any and all losses, damages, costs and\n expenses resulting from Seller’s default.\n Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein\n contained, in the event of an intentional willful failure\n of Seller to perform any matter reasonably within its\n control or in the event any of the warranties and\n representations made by Seller herein shall be in any\n material respect inaccurate or there is an omission of\n a material fact necessary to make any representation\n of Seller not misleading in light of the circumstances\n under which it was made, Buyer shall have any and all\n remedies available to Buyer under the laws of the\n State of Florida.\n The Sellers claim that, in early October 2021, they “discov-\n ered a provision in the property’s mortgage that would prevent\n them from closing until January of 2022.” Specifically, the Sellers\n claim they realized that “under certain terms of the promissory\n note, the mortgage could only be paid off during the first quarter\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n of each year, between January and March.” Consequently, the\n Sellers told Kalonymus that they would be unable to hold up their\n end of the bargain by the closing date. Though the Sellers say they\n “did not remember or were not aware of the provision prior to Oc-\n tober 2021,” they concede that they breached the contract by fail-\n ing to close.\n On October 28, 2021, Kalonymus sent the Sellers a letter ad-\n vising them that they were “in material default under several of\n [their] obligations” under the Membership Purchase Agreement.\n Kalonymus stated that it had entered into the Agreement “reliant\n upon [the Sellers’] express representations and warranties, which\n include[d]” the “execution, delivery, and performance of [the]\n Agreement.” Kalonymus added that it “had every right to rely\n upon the truthfulness of each and every representation and war-\n ranty contained in the Purchase Agreement,” and that it, “in fact,\n did detrimentally rely upon [the Sellers’] misrepresentations.” Fur-\n ther:\n As [Kalonymus] has previously advised [the Sellers],\n [their] breaches and misrepresentations have resulted\n in [Kalonymus] suffering and continuing to incur sig-\n nificant losses and damages. [Kalonymus] has had to\n delay its financing resulting in increased transaction\n fees as well as substantial losses related to the terms\n of [its] loan, including a material increase in the inter-\n est rate. [The Sellers] have known for some time that\n [Kalonymus] would be financing this acquisition and\n [their] breaches and misconduct are a direct cause of\n the damages [Kalonymus] has sustained. Moreover,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n this delay in closing will result in lost rental income to\n [Kalonymus], in an amount easily calculated based\n upon the current rent roll.\n Over the next few months, the parties communicated about\n possible ways to salvage a deal. In December 2021, January 2022,\n and February 2022, the Sellers offered to sell Kalonymus the Best\n Peacock Inn at the same purchase price as laid out in the original\n Agreement. But Kalonymus declined, informing the Sellers that\n market conditions had changed for the worse, and that it would\n now be willing only to buy the property at a significant discount to\n make up for the damages it had incurred up until that point, includ-\n ing legal fees and lost rental income. Kalonymus advised the Sellers\n that they had failed to address the default, and that they could not\n “simply reset the closing date” and demand that Kalonymus accept\n the deal at the price originally negotiated. But the Sellers refused\n to sell at a reduced purchase price, calling Kalonymus’s demands\n “totally unreasonable” and “unfair” in light of what they felt was a\n “short . . . delay in closing.”\n The deal having fallen through, Kalonymus exercised its op-\n tion under Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement to\n sue the Sellers for specific performance, while at the same time\n seeking damages. Kalonymus filed an action for specific perfor-\n mance and damages (for breach of contract) in state court. The\n Sellers then removed that action to federal court. Around the same\n time, the Sellers filed their own lawsuit against Kalonymus in fed-\n eral court, asserting a single count for a declaratory judgment that\n Kalonymus—not the Sellers—had breached the Agreement. The\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n Sellers’ theory was that, by seeking to enforce the contract through\n a lawsuit for specific performance, Kalonymus “elected to continue\n with and enforce the Agreement rather than terminate it.” Thus,\n according to the Sellers, it was Kalonymus that breached the con-\n tract by rejecting the Sellers’ post-October-2021 offers to close at\n the original purchase price.\n These cases were consolidated before the district court.\n Kalonymus moved to dismiss the Sellers’ complaint, which the dis-\n trict court granted on the ground that the requested declarations\n focused on acts committed in the past, and the court’s adjudication\n of the issues would not prevent future monetary loss or lead either\n party to conform their behavior to the law. That holding disposed\n of the Sellers’ complaint, so for all intents and purposes,\n Kalonymus became the Plaintiff in the case below, while Marmol\n and Van Peborgh became the Defendants.\n After more litigation, the parties cross-moved for summary\n judgment. In the Sellers’ motion, Marmol and Van Peborgh again\n argued that Kalonymus (1) remained bound by the Membership\n Purchase Agreement after the Sellers breached in October 2021 be-\n cause it chose to sue for specific performance (as well as damages);\n (2) committed its own breaches over the next few months by failing\n to perform under the terms of the original contract; and (3) as a\n result, lost any claims for damages it might have had. Kalonymus\n also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to\n specific performance of the Agreement and damages because (1)\n the parties had a valid contract; (2) the Sellers breached the contract\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n by failing to close in October 2021; and (3) Kalonymus was dam-\n aged by this breach. Kalonymus added that, under Florida law, a\n cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the\n breach, so “the Sellers[’] contention that Kalonymus was required\n to proceed with the closing in 2022 prior to filing suit is unavailing.”\n The district court first denied the Sellers’ motion for sum-\n mary judgment, finding that the Sellers had “fail[ed] to expressly\n even mention any of the four specific counts” alleged by\n Kalonymus, “never mind address whether there are genuine issues\n of material fact as to the elements of those counts.” The district\n court then granted in part Kalonymus’s motion for summary judg-\n ment, agreeing with Kalonymus that it had established all elements\n of a breach-of-contract claim. Although the district court “ha[d]\n no difficulty concluding that [Kalonymus] proved it was damaged\n by the Sellers’ breach,” the court found that “the parties’ dispute\n regarding the amount of damages that should be awarded is not so\n straight forward.” The case thus proceeded to a two-day bench\n trial on the matter of Kalonymus’s damages, during which Zeff,\n Marmol, Van Peborgh, and Kalonymus’s damages expert all testi-\n fied. After the trial, the district court entered a final judgment in\n favor of Kalonymus, reiterating its finding that Kalonymus was en-\n titled to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\n of $5,150,000, and to damages in the amount of $1,553,245, pro-\n vided that the Sellers kept their promise to finance part of the trans-\n action. The court ordered the parties to close on the Best Peacock\n Inn on or before November 27, 2023, which the parties did.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n The Sellers now appeal the district court’s entries of sum-\n mary and final judgment in favor of Kalonymus.\n II. ANALYSIS\n A. Specific Performance\n Our first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred\n when it determined that Kalonymus was entitled to an award of\n specific performance, both when it granted summary judgment in\n favor of Kalonymus and when it entered a final judgment in favor\n of Kalonymus following the bench trial. The Sellers advance two\n arguments for why the district court erred. First, they argue that\n “Kalonymus is not entitled to an award of specific performance . .\n . because it did not meet its burden of proof of establishing its\n prima facie case,” which includes proving that it was “ready, willing,\n and able to perform the contract according to its terms” in the first\n place. Second, the Sellers argue that “Kalonymus is not entitled to\n an award of specific performance . . . because it failed to act in ac-\n cordance with Section 8.2 of the Agreement and Florida law and\n materially breached the Agreement.” But we need not—and can-\n not—reach the merits of these arguments, because we conclude\n that the issue of specific performance is moot following the sale of\n the Best Peacock Inn.\n “Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal\n courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165,\n 171 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). Indeed, as the Su-\n preme Court has often stated, “[n]o principle is more fundamental\n to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual\n cases or controversies.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,\n 408 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).\n One doctrine deriving directly from the case-or-controversy\n requirement is the doctrine of mootness. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273\n F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has explained\n that “a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot\n questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules\n of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before\n it.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)\n (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Thus, a case is\n moot “when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect\n to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.\n Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208,\n 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Stated another\n way, “a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’\n or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”\n Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). This includes when\n “events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a sit-\n uation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaning-\n ful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1217.\n To sum up the relevant facts, Kalonymus contracted with\n the Sellers to buy the Best Peacock Inn for $5,450,000, with a clos-\n ing date in October 2021. After the Sellers breached in October\n 2021, they offered to sell Kalonymus the property under the origi-\n nal terms of the contract, but Kalonymus refused unless the Sellers\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n lowered the price. The deal did not materialize, and Kalonymus\n exercised its right under the contract to sue for specific perfor-\n mance and damages. Eventually, the district court entered a final\n judgment in favor of Kalonymus, “reiterat[ing] the Buyer’s entitle-\n ment to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\n of $5,150,000.” 1 “[I]n conformance with the verdict,” the district\n court ordered the parties to “close on the sale of the property on\n or before November 27, 2023,” which they did. This much is un-\n disputed; the Sellers themselves tell us that they “closed on the sale\n of the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn “in compliance with the Fi-\n nal Judgment and pursuant to [the] court order directing them to\n close.”\n At closing, as authorized under the terms of the Member-\n ship Purchase Agreement, 2 Kalonymus assigned its “Membership\n Interests”—i.e., its “rights, title and interests”—in the Best Peacock\n Inn to two other limited liability companies: 3667 Poinciana, LLC,\n\n\n 1 In its verdict order following the bench trial, the district court found that the\n\n parties initially agreed on a sales price of $5,450,000 but later changed the price\n to $5,150,000 through an Amendment to the Membership Purchase Agree-\n ment. The Sellers now argue that the “Amendment was ineffective, and the\n purchase price remained $5,450,000.” But they add that “whether the pur-\n chase price was $5,450,000 or $5,150,000, the analysis by Sellers [on appeal]\n does not change.”\n 2 The Membership Purchase Agreement was “made and entered into . . . by\n\n and among Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Carlos Van Peborgh, each\n as to a 50% interest (collectively, ‘Seller’), and Kalonymus Development Part-\n ners LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and/or its assignee (‘Buyer’ or\n ‘Purchaser’), and Best Peacock Inn, LLC[.]” (emphasis added).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n and Poinciana, LLC. These two companies (the “Poinciana enti-\n ties”) acquired title to the Best Peacock Inn on November 28, 2023,\n as assignees of Kalonymus.\n Also undisputed is the fact that the Sellers initially filed a mo-\n tion to stay the final judgment but withdrew that motion prior to\n closing. On November 3, 2023, on the same day that they filed their\n notice of appeal, Marmol and Van Peborgh filed an “expedited mo-\n tion for stay of execution of judgment pending appeal,” in which\n they asked the district court to “stay[ ] the judgment of specific per-\n formance” to “meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.”\n The Sellers attested that, if “they are required to convey the Best\n Peacock by November 27, [2023,]” they will “lose the sole asset at\n issue in this case,” and their appeal will be moot. They stated, in\n no uncertain terms:\n If [the] Sellers are denied a stay, they will be forced to\n convey the subject property and, as a result, their ap-\n peal will become effectively moot as to their chal-\n lenge on appeal of the [c]ourt’s Judgment granting\n specific performance to Kalonymus . . . . [The] Sellers\n are facing more than a risk of mootness: Absent a stay,\n their appeal of the [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding\n specific performance to Kalonymus will inevitably be-\n come moot on November 27, 2023.\n Kalonymus filed a response to the stay motion, indicating\n that it did “not oppose a stay of the execution of judgment—pro-\n vided that the Sellers post a satisfactory bond” of $3.2 million. On\n November 14, 2023, the district court directed the Sellers to “file\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n either (1) a notice indicating they do not object to the bond amount\n proposed by the Buyer; or (2) a reply to the Buyer’s response.” The\n next day, however, rather than filing either a notice of non-objec-\n tion to the bond amount or a reply, the Sellers withdrew their mo-\n tion to stay.\n With this factual background in mind, we conclude that the\n sale of the Best Peacock Inn—the subject of this litigation and the\n sole asset here—rendered the issue of specific performance moot.\n The reason for mootness is simple: The Sellers sold the sub-\n ject property to Kalonymus, which, upon closing, assigned its in-\n terest in the property to two non-party entities, and thus there is\n no more relief we can give the Sellers when it comes to the specific\n performance of the Agreement. Recall, Kalonymus initiated this\n action in state court to compel “specific performance of a contract\n to convey membership shares in a limited liability company for the\n purpose of conveying real property in Miami-Dade County, Flor-\n ida.” Kalonymus demanded that the “Sellers be required to convey\n [ ] 100% of the Membership Interest in [the] Best Peacock Inn pur-\n suant to the terms of the Agreement.” And that is exactly what\n occurred. In late November 2023, in compliance with the district\n court’s order finding that Kalonymus was entitled to specific per-\n formance and directing the parties to close, the Sellers sold all of\n their shares in the Best Peacock Inn to Kalonymus’s assignees.\n Therefore, the issue of specific performance is no longer “live,”\n Powell, 395 U.S. at 496, and no further relief can be granted on the\n matter of the sale.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n Resisting, the Sellers now argue (contrary to their position\n in their motion to stay) that the sale of the Best Peacock Inn did\n not moot the issue of specific performance, because this Court\n could, seemingly with ease, order the parties to “set aside” the sale.\n Because this Court “can, as part of its mandate, instruct the district\n court” to “order[ ] Kalonymus . . . to cause the return of the shares”\n of the Best Peacock Inn to the Sellers, they insist, the issue of spe-\n cific performance is not moot. We reject this argument for several\n reasons.\n First, we cannot simply un-moot the issue of specific perfor-\n mance here by “setting aside” the sale of the Best Peacock Inn.\n When the Sellers closed on the sale of the property, they accepted,\n in writing, that once the deal closed, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and\n Poinciana, LLC, would take title to the Best Peacock Inn as assign-\n ees of Kalonymus. Under the terms of the assignment contract,\n which was signed by Marmol and Van Peborgh, Kalonymus\n “agreed to transfer all of its rights, title, and interests” in the Best\n Peacock Inn to the Poinciana entities: “99.5% to 3667 Poinciana,\n LLC, and 0.5% to Poinciana, LLC.” The Poinciana entities, in turn,\n “agreed to accept and assume the transfer of the Membership In-\n terests.” The Sellers thus understood that, upon closing,\n Kalonymus would no longer have rights in the Best Peacock Inn\n and the Poinciana entities, both non-parties, would take title to the\n shares of the property moving forward.\n In light of this assignment, we conclude that the issue of\n specific performance is moot, because “intervening events have\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n made it ‘impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief whatever’”\n to the Sellers. See Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.,\n 179 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting John Roe, Inc. v. United\n States, 142 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998)). There is no way for us\n to give the Sellers the relief they are seeking—the “transfer of the\n shares back to [the] Sellers”—because the property has been sold,\n and Kalonymus has assigned its interest in the property to third-\n party entities who are not parties here. See, e.g., Holloway v. United\n States, 789 F.2d 1372, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Because the property\n in question has been sold and the purchaser has not been made a\n party to this action, we dismiss this case as moot . . . . [T]he pur-\n chaser of the property . . . is not a party to this appeal, and this\n court therefore cannot give any relief that would affect him or\n her.”); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 361–62 (1921) (“As the ac-\n tion was brought to recover the possession of real estate, and as the\n defendant in error has, pending review in this court, sold it, we\n agree with the contention that the case has become moot . . . .\n [T]he defendant in error having sold and conveyed the property, a\n judgment, if in his favor, will not give him possession of the prem-\n ises . . . . [T]his court will not decide moot cases.”).\n The Sellers acknowledge the transfer of the property to third\n parties, but they argue that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and Poinciana,\n LLC, are not “bona fide purchasers,” because “the Poinciana Enti-\n ties took the property with knowledge of the litigation,” and the\n district court could “join the Poinciana Entities as parties to this suit\n on remand.” True, Kalonymus’s owner Maximilian Zeff helped\n create the Poinciana entities “for the purpose of owning the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n majority of Best Peacock Inn, LLC,” so the Sellers are likely correct\n that these entities “knew of ” this litigation when they took title to\n the property. But this fact is only part of the equation.3 “Mootness\n demands that there be something about the case that remains alive,\n\n\n 3 Under Florida law, a buyer is considered a bona fide purchaser if “(1) the\n\n purchaser obtained legal title to the challenged property, (2) the purchaser\n paid the value of the challenged property, and (3) the purchaser had no\n knowledge of the claimed interest against the challenged property at the time\n of the transaction.” Harkless v. Laubhan, 278 So. 3d 728, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA\n 2019). The Sellers tell us that the Poinciana entities are “not bona fide third-\n party purchasers because they acquired title to the shares of Best Peacock Inn\n with full knowledge of the litigation and the pendency of the appeal.” But just\n because a third-party purchaser has knowledge of a lawsuit does not mean he\n acquired the property with knowledge of a “conflicting claim, interest, or right\n in the property.” Harkless, 278 So. 3d at 733 (internal quotations omitted); see\n also Miami Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of N.Y., 838 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1988)\n (holding, in the bankruptcy context, that “[k]nowledge of claims asserted in a\n pending appeal does not deprive a purchaser of good faith status”).\n Here, at the time that the Poinciana entities accepted the assignment of inter-\n ests from Kalonymus, the Sellers had made clear, in signed documents, that\n Best Peacock Inn, LLC, had clean title to the property, free of encumbrances.\n Puzzlingly, the Sellers direct our attention to an email they sent just before\n closing, in which they proposed adding language to the closing documents\n that would have purportedly preserved their rights to appeal the final judg-\n ment. But the parties did not include this language in the closing documents.\n Instead, as we’ve said, the Sellers signed closing documents attesting that they\n were selling the property without encumbrances upon it or claims against it.\n The Sellers did not record a notice of lis pendens on the property until July 25,\n 2024—nearly eight months after the sale and over eight months after they in-\n itiated this appeal. Therefore, the Sellers have not demonstrated that the Poin-\n ciana entities (neither of which are parties) are anything other than bona fide\n purchasers for value in this case.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 16 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n present, real, and immediate so that a federal court can provide re-\n dress in some palpable way.” Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d\n 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018). Not only are the Poinciana entities not\n parties to this case, but, significantly, neither is Zeff, so we cannot\n say that the relief sought by the Sellers, when it comes to specific\n performance, presents a live, real, present, and immediate contro-\n versy for which we can provide redress in a palpable way.\n On this point, the Sellers direct our attention to Paris v. U.S.\n Department of Housing & Urban Development, 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.\n 1983), where the Seventh Circuit held that a case was not moot, in\n spite of a sale of real property. There, the buyer (an individual) and\n the seller (the government) “were [co-]defendants in th[e] proceed-\n ing below” and had “completed the sale in the knowledge that it\n was under legal challenge.” Id. at 1344. “In such a situation,” the\n court reasoned, the court still had jurisdiction over the parties who\n controlled the property and “thus [could] still reach the subject\n matter of the suit [and] compel restoration of the status quo.” Id.\n But that case materially differs from ours. As the Paris court took\n care to mention, the subject property in that case had since been\n transferred from the buyer to a non-party partnership, of which the\n buyer was the “sole general partner.” Id. at 1345 n.3. Thus, under\n Indiana law, the buyer still “ha[d] the power, in response to an or-\n der of the court, to bind [the non-party partnership] either to re-\n convey the property” or to enter into a contract with the seller. Id.\n Here, by contrast, Zeff was not a party in the proceeding be-\n low; Kalonymus was. We have no evidence indicating that\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 17 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n Kalonymus has the power to bind the Poinciana entities to recon-\n vey the Best Peacock Inn or to enter into a new contract with the\n Sellers. And even assuming that we could pierce the corporate veil\n to reach Zeff, Zeff does not appear to have that power either, at\n least according to the record evidence: While Zeff does fully own\n Poinciana, LLC, he testified that he has “less than 1 percent owner-\n ship interest in” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, which is the entity that was\n assigned 99.5 percent of Kalonymus’s “rights, title, and interests”\n and the parties agreed would become the “Manager” of the Best\n Peacock Inn after the sale. Zeff testified that he has “no power to\n remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as “Manager” of the Best Peacock\n Inn, and no power to appoint a new manager of the property.\n Zeff also testified that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, is “99.99 percent\n owned by” an entity called “RDZ Family, LLC,” named for the in-\n itials of Zeff’s father. Zeff testified that, while he is a “beneficiary”\n of RDZ Family, LLC, he does not “sign[ ] for” the company. He\n agreed, on cross-examination, that lawyers for RDZ Family, LLC,\n represented his father but were “clear and specific” that they did\n “not represent[ ] [him].” Zeff also agreed that his “father alone had\n the power to appoint and remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as Man-\n ager of the Best Peacock Inn.\n To sum up, then, the evidence shows that the current 99.5\n percent owner of the Best Peacock Inn—3667 Poinciana, LLC—is\n a non-party entity controlled by another non-party entity—RDZ\n Family, LLC—which is managed by members with no involve-\n ment here. Therefore, contrary to the Sellers’ claim, and unlike in\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 18 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n Paris, we cannot simply order Kalonymus to “cause the return of\n the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn back to the Sellers and compel\n restoration of the status quo. The parties who now control the\n property are not within our jurisdictional reach. We thus reject the\n Sellers’ contention that the sale of the property to the Poinciana\n entities did not moot the issue of specific performance.\n This brings us to the second reason that the issue of specific\n performance is moot: the Sellers’ decision to withdraw their mo-\n tion to stay and voluntarily proceed with the transaction below. As\n noted above, the Sellers initially filed a motion to stay the execution\n of judgment, in which they expressed their willingness to comply\n with an order requiring a supersedeas bond, if the district court did\n stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. They noted\n that, without a stay, conveyance of the subject property would de-\n stroy “their appellate remedies” and “moot . . . their challenge on\n appeal of the [district court’s] Judgment granting specific perfor-\n mance to Kalonymus.” But on November 15, 2023, having been\n presented with the options of assenting to the bond amount pro-\n posed by Kalonymus or filing a reply to Kalonymus’s response to\n their motion to stay, the Sellers filed a notice of withdrawal and\n moved forward with the sale. They did so just twelve days after\n telling the district court that, “[a]bsent a stay, their appeal of the\n [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding specific performance to\n Kalonymus will inevitably become moot on November 27, 2023.”\n The Sellers’ decision to decline to post a bond, withdraw\n their motion to stay, and proceed with the sale of the property\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 19 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n evinces that the issue of specific performance is moot. This Court\n has held, in the bankruptcy context, that once a sale of property “is\n approved by the bankruptcy court and consummated by the par-\n ties,” an appellate court can no longer “grant[ ] effective relief if a\n sale is not stayed,” and thus “the failure to obtain a stay renders the\n appeal moot.” In re Charter Co., 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987);\n see also In re Matos, 790 F.2d 864, 865 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is settled\n law in this circuit that when the debtor fails to obtain a stay pending\n appeal of the bankruptcy court’s or the district court’s order setting\n aside an automatic stay and allowing a creditor to foreclose on\n property, the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the property ren-\n ders moot any appeal.”). This rule of law is “premised upon con-\n siderations of finality.” In re Matos, 790 F.2d at 865–66; see also In re\n Stanford, 17 F.4th 116, 126 (11th Cir. 2021) ( Jordan, J., concurring in\n part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the afore-\n mentioned rule is premised, in part, on the need to deter “buyer’s\n remorse”).\n Courts around the country have applied a similar rule to\n sales of real property outside the bankruptcy context. As one of\n our sister circuits remarked: “The general rule followed in the\n United States is that absent a stay, sale of the property to a good\n faith purchaser during the pendency of the appeal, ‘moots the ap-\n peal of the judgment ordering the sale.’ This rule ‘applies to all\n judgments ordering the sale of property and is not limited to bank-\n ruptcy cases.’” Romspen Mortg. Ltd. P’ship v. BGC Holdings LLC – Ar-\n lington Place One, 20 F.4th 359, 367 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting F.D.I.C.\n v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1986)).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 20 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n In Holloway, for example, the petitioners appealed the dis-\n trict court’s denial of their petition for a writ of prohibition to pre-\n vent the Internal Revenue Service from seizing and selling their\n property to satisfy their unpaid taxes. 789 F.2d at 1373. After the\n district court denied their petition, the Holloways did not seek a\n stay, and their property was sold. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that\n the appeal was moot. To begin with, “[t]he act or event sought to\n be prohibited by the Holloways was the sale of their property,” and\n [t]hat sale has already occurred.” Id. at 1374. The court then ex-\n plained, analogizing to the bankruptcy context, that “a party seek-\n ing to avoid any impairment in its ability to realize the benefit of a\n successful appeal must seek to stay the progress of the proceeding\n by obtaining a stay or injunction pending appeal. Thus a party who\n chooses to appeal but who fails to obtain a stay or injunction pend-\n ing appeal risks losing its ability to realize the benefit of a successful\n appeal.” Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Combined Metals Reduction Co.,\n 557 F.2d 179, 188 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation modified)). The court\n reasoned that the Holloways “had an opportunity to prevent the\n sale of their property through a stay of the order denying their pe-\n tition” but “failed to take advantage of that opportunity.” Id. at\n 1373–74. In light of this fact, and because the property had since\n been sold to a non-party, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as\n moot. Id. at 1374.\n Similar considerations apply here. Not only did the Sellers\n fail to obtain a stay pending appeal, but they voluntarily terminated\n their effort to obtain one after urging the district court to enter an\n order staying execution of the judgment so that they “might\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 21 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.” The Sellers were\n under no illusion about what a stay would entail; they noted explic-\n itly their willingness to post a bond or some other form of security.\n But when Kalonymus came back with a number, the Sellers balked.\n We cannot say for sure why the Sellers proceeded the way they did.\n But Marmol and Van Peborgh’s decision to withdraw their motion\n to stay only confirms that the subsequent sale of the property (and\n the assignment to third parties beyond the reach of our equitable\n powers) was both voluntary and final. Under these circumstances,\n we conclude that the Sellers have lost their ability to realize the\n benefit of a successful appeal on the matter of the sale—a position\n they themselves advanced when they told the district court that\n conveyance of the subject property would moot their challenge of\n the court’s judgment granting specific performance to Kalonymus.\n For these reasons, we hold that the issue of specific perfor-\n mance is moot, having “lost its character as a present, live contro-\n versy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opin-\n ions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48\n (1969) (per curiam).\n B. Damages\n We turn now to the issue of damages, which “remains a live\n controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th\n Cir. 1997) (instructing district court to dismiss moot claims but re-\n solving non-moot claims on the merits); Powell, 395 U.S. at 497\n (“Where one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the re-\n maining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 22 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n or controversy.”). The Appellants argue that the district court erred\n in granting Kalonymus’s motion for summary judgment on its en-\n titlement to damages and in awarding Kalonymus damages after\n the bench trial because Kalonymus failed to prove damages and\n thus failed to prove an essential element of its breach-of-contract\n claims. The Appellants contend that the evidence showed that in-\n dividuals and entities other than Kalonymus—Zeff, Zeff’s family\n members, and 3667 Poinciana, LLC—were the ones who might\n have been damaged, but that “there is no record evidence that\n Kalonymus [itself ] suffered ‘a single dime’ in damages.”\n “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\n novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court, and\n viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light\n most favorable to the non-moving party.” Houston v. Williams, 547\n F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate\n when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mov-\n ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In review-\n ing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we resolve all ambi-\n guities in the non-movant’s favor. Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,\n 686 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2012).\n “After a bench trial, we review the district court’s conclu-\n sions of law de novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear\n error.” Tartell v. S. Fla. Sinus & Allergy Ctr., Inc., 790 F.3d 1253, 1257\n (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). We review a damages award for\n clear error and afford considerable deference to the district court.\n Hiatt v. United States, 910 F.2d 737, 742 (11th Cir. 1990). “When\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 23 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n determining whether a district court’s damages award constituted\n clear error, we must be especially careful about reversing findings\n of fact based on the district court’s evaluation of live witness testi-\n mony because the district court is better positioned to evaluate\n such evidence.” Superior Constr. Co., Inc. v. Brock, 445 F.3d 1334, 1346\n (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).\n In this case, at the summary-judgment stage, there was evi-\n dence in the record that Kalonymus suffered some amount of dam-\n ages stemming from the Sellers’ breach. On October 28, 2021,\n Kalonymus’s lawyers sent the Sellers a communication attesting\n that the “Buyer”—Kalonymus—was “suffering and continuing to\n incur significant losses and damages,” having to “delay its financing\n resulting in increased transaction fees as well as substantial losses\n related to the terms of [the] loan, including a material increase in\n the interest rate,” and incurring “lost rental income . . . in an\n amount easily calculated based upon the current rent roll,” all\n caused by the Sellers’ “breaches and misrepresentations.”\n Additionally, in support of its motion for summary judg-\n ment, Kalonymus included a declaration from its damages expert,\n Paul Habibi, who averred that the Sellers’ “delay in closing oc-\n curred during one of the most turbulent periods for capital markets\n in decades.” Habibi estimated that, if the parties had been able to\n close in October 2021, the value of Kalonymus’s cost of capital\n would have been $1,830,829, a figure he came to by weighing the\n costs of debt and equity according to the proportion of each type\n of capital in the Best Peacock Inn’s capital structure. Due to rapidly\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 24 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n rising interest rates, Habibi explained, Kalonymus’s cost of capital\n in December 2022 was all the way up to $3,538,129, resulting in\n current cost-of-capital damages of $1,707,300. Habibi also esti-\n mated that Kalonymus had suffered, among other things, $98,765\n in the form of “lost cash flow damages.” The evidence thus sup-\n ports the district court’s finding, on summary judgment, that\n Kalonymus suffered some amount of damages greater than zero.\n The Sellers also appeal the court’s award of damages follow-\n ing the bench trial. At trial, Habibi testified that the total damages\n suffered by Kalonymus until that point was $2,673,742. He came\n to this figure by aggregating the sums of Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\n ital ($2,346,638), lost profits ($175,028), cost of capital for portfolio\n properties ($87,210), 4 duplicate expenses ($50,650), and lost tax sav-\n ings ($14,217). But following Habibi’s testimony, Marmol and Van\n Peborgh “offered to finance the credit portion of the transaction\n under the same terms [that] Newmark”—a loan broker—“had of-\n fered in October 2021.” Habibi was then recalled as a witness, and\n he testified that, if the Sellers did finance the credit portion of the\n transaction under the original loan terms, Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\n ital would be $1,322,850 instead of $2,346,638, and one of the du-\n plicate expenses (a lender counsel fee of $9,500) would have to be\n\n\n 4 The district court ultimately declined to include the cost of capital for port-\n\n folio properties in its damages award, based on its finding that “Kalonymus\n did not present any evidence linking these portfolio losses, incurred by sepa-\n rate entities, to Kalonymus itself.” Kalonymus does not contest this issue on\n appeal.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 25 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n erased. In light of these developments, the district court found that\n Kalonymus had established damages resulting from the breach in\n the amount of $1,553,245, 5 contingent on the Sellers following\n through on their pledge to finance part of the transaction under\n the original terms Newmark had offered in October 2021.\n The Sellers now contest the entire damages award for the\n overarching reason that entities or individuals other than\n Kalonymus were the ones who suffered damages resulting from\n the Sellers’ breach. Outside of the category of lost tax advantages,\n which we’ll return to below, we are not persuaded by the Sellers’\n arguments.\n We begin with the cost of capital, or the combined cost of\n debt and cost of equity. As defined by Habibi, cost of debt is “what-\n ever a borrower would have to pay to borrow money.” This cost is\n derived using a “risk-free” interest rate (set by the United States\n Treasury) and a “risk premium” or “spread.” Cost of equity, on the\n other hand, refers to the “expected return” for the investor provid-\n ing equity capital. Habibi testified at trial that the cost of debt had\n nearly doubled between October 2021 and November 2023, while\n the cost of equity had “also skyrocketed, actually even more as a\n\n\n\n\n 5 $1,553,245 is the sum of Kalonymus’s revised cost of capital ($1,322,850), lost\n\n profits ($175,028), revised duplicate expenses ($41,150), and lost tax savings\n ($14,217).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 26 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n percentage increase than the cost of debt,” from 5.56 percent to\n “roughly 12 percent.”\n The Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no harm in the\n form of capital costs. Their reasoning is that Kalonymus never lost\n out on the more favorable loan terms Newmark offered in October\n 2021, because Kalonymus was not a party to the loan transaction.\n They similarly suggest that Kalonymus contributed no equity cap-\n ital for the investment. As an initial matter, we note that the Sellers\n seem to be ignoring the fact that Kalonymus paid the Sellers a de-\n posit of $131,000 for the property in advance of the deal closing,\n which the Sellers chose to keep even after they breached, on the\n theory that Kalonymus owed them damages. It is undisputed that\n Kalonymus itself borrowed these funds. Habibi also testified that,\n based on the “entire ownership structure of the investment,” it was\n his expert opinion that Kalonymus itself suffered equity costs as an\n arm’s-length investor. So, we reject the Sellers’ assertion that\n Kalonymus never put capital contributions toward the Best Pea-\n cock Inn and “suffered absolutely no harm.”\n As to the cost of debt, it’s true that, in the Newmark loan\n agreement, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, was listed as the entity that\n would be taking out the loan if the deal went through (although\n the loan agreement also references “Kalonymus Credit Facility” on\n the bottom of each page and throughout the document). But this\n is a red herring. At the time that the district court awarded dam-\n ages to Kalonymus, no special-purpose entities had taken assign-\n ment of Kalonymus’s interest in the Membership Purchase\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 27 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n Agreement, since that assignment was contingent on the parties\n closing on the sale. Thus, throughout the litigation and up until\n the sale of the property in November 2023, Kalonymus remained\n the buyer, and Kalonymus suffered the consequences of increasing\n interest rates. Because the increased costs associated with rising\n interest rates were incurred by Kalonymus, irrespective of what-\n ever entities it planned to transfer its interests to in late 2021, we\n reject the Sellers’ claim that the district court granted Kalonymus\n a “windfall” in the form of cost-of-debt damages.\n Next, the Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no lost prof-\n its because “it was neither the landlord nor going to be an owner”\n of the Best Peacock Inn. However, the Sellers point us to nothing\n in the record showing that Kalonymus would not have earned cash\n flow from the property if the parties had closed in October 2021.\n They speculate that “distribution[s] would not have gone to\n Kalonymus,” but they identify nothing concrete. On the other\n hand, Habibi testified that Kalonymus lost out on $175,028 in “cash\n flows from operations,” explaining that “the buyer entity”—\n Kalonymus—“is entitled to receive those cash flows.” “Under Flor-\n ida law, ‘evidence as to the amount of damages cannot be based on\n speculation or conjecture, but must be proven with certainty.’” Sun\n Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d\n 1197, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co.\n v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So. 2d 727, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Here,\n the Sellers have provided us with nothing beyond speculation to\n cast doubt on Habibi’s or the district court’s calculation of lost\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 28 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n profits, so we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in\n granting those damages.\n Additionally, the Sellers argue that the district court erred\n when it awarded Kalonymus $41,150 in “duplicate expenses.”\n These expenses have taken on something of a misnomer. At sum-\n mary judgment, Kalonymus sought $50,650 in “administrative\n fees” that it argued it would be forced to spend “in order to dupli-\n cate the transaction.” In other words, these damages represent the\n new set of administrative costs Kalonymus would have to incur in\n order to close on the transaction. As Habibi explained in his decla-\n ration, these expenses included a payment for a zoning report, a\n payment for a “property condition report,” a fee for an appraisal, a\n fee for an “environmental site assessment,” and legal fees. Regard-\n less of who (if anyone) paid these expenses the first time around,\n the evidence shows that Kalonymus took on these additional costs\n later. The Sellers offer nothing to rebut this point. Therefore, we\n find no clear error in the district court’s award of “duplicate ex-\n penses.”\n Finally, however, when it comes to lost tax advantages, we\n agree with the Sellers that the record evidence does not support the\n district court’s award of damages. Habibi testified that, under the\n 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, bonus depreciation began to be phased\n out on January 21, 2023, so, in simplified terms, a party filing taxes\n before that date could have deducted more than a party filing after\n that date. But Habibi also testified that a limited liability company\n cannot itself take advantage of tax benefits related to asset\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 29 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n depreciation. Rather, he explained, “[i]t’s the members as individ-\n uals” who suffer the loss of tax depreciation, because individuals\n are the ones “filing the tax returns.” As such, even if the Sellers had\n never breached and the deal went through in October 2021, the tax\n benefits derived from a pre-phaseout closing would only have been\n available to the individuals filing tax returns—not Kalonymus.\n Therefore, the district court erred in awarding $14,217 in tax dam-\n ages to Kalonymus.\n III. CONCLUSION\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the issue of specific\n performance in this case is moot. We, therefore, DISMISS the ap-\n peal as to that issue. 6\n\n\n\n 6 Normally, when an issue becomes moot on appeal, we not only “dismiss as\n\n to the mooted issue, but also vacate the portion of the district court’s order\n that addresses it.” De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.\n 2003). We do not do so here, because the policy of vacating the underlying\n district court order is premised on the equitable principle that “[a] party who\n seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries\n of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”\n U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994); see also\n United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950) (holding that vaca-\n tur of the judgment below in a case that has become moot on appeal “clears\n the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates\n a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance”). An ap-\n pellate court need not “vacate[ ] the unreviewed court judgment to prevent\n its having preclusive effect in subsequent litigation” if the equitable principles\n laid out by the Supreme Court are not implicated. Westmoreland v. Nat’l\n Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987). Here, it is not the “va-\n garies of circumstance” that prevent us from reaching the merits of the district\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 30 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\n\n The district court’s damages award is AFFIRMED in all re-\n spects except to the extent that the court awarded damages for lost\n tax savings, which we REVERSE. Accordingly, we vacate the dis-\n trict court’s damages award and REMAND for recalculation of\n damages consistent with this opinion.\n DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED\n IN PART; REMANDED.\n\n\n\n\n court’s award of specific performance, but rather the Sellers’ deliberate deci-\n sion to comply with the district court’s final judgment and forgo a stay of the\n execution of judgment pending appeal. Thus, under the circumstances of this\n case, we conclude that the parties remain bound by the portion of the district\n court’s final order dealing with specific performance. See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at\n 24–25 (“[Where] the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the\n mootness by voluntary action,” he “voluntarily forfeit[s] his legal remedy by\n the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim\n to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”); e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606,\n 620 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to vacate an underlying order where an issue was\n rendered moot by the losing party’s “voluntary compliance with the district\n court’s judgment”).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Francisco Lagos Marmol v. Kalonymus Development Partners, LLC\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n In the\\n\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13678\\n ____________________\\n\\n FRANCISCO LAGOS MARMOL,\\n FERNANDO VAN PEBORGH,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n KALONYMUS DEVELOPMENT\\n PARTNERS, LLC,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20703-RNS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n LAGOA, Circuit Judge:\\n This case involves the straightforward breach of a real-estate\\n contract. In June 2021, a buyer contracted with two sellers to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n purchase a piece of property for $5,450,000, with a closing date in\\n October 2021. The sellers breached that contract by failing to close\\n by the closing date. The buyer then exercised its right under the\\n contract to sue for specific performance and damages. Eventually,\\n after a bench trial, the district court entered a final judgment in fa-\\n vor of the buyer, in which it found that the buyer was entitled to\\n both specific performance and damages. The district court ordered\\n the parties to close on the sale of the property, and the parties did\\n just that. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argu-\\n ment, we hold that the issue of specific performance here is moot.\\n But because the issue of damages remains a live controversy, we\\n proceed to the merits on that issue, affirming in part and reversing\\n in part the district court’s damages award.\\n I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n In June 2021, Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Van\\n Peborgh (the “Sellers” or the “Appellants”) and Kalonymus Devel-\\n opment Partners, LLC, (the “Buyer” or “Kalonymus”) signed a con-\\n tract (the “Membership Purchase Agreement”) under which Mar-\\n mol and Van Peborgh would each sell their 50 percent ownership\\n interests in Best Peacock Inn, LLC, to Kalonymus and/or its as-\\n signee for a purchase price of $5,450,000. Best Peacock Inn, LLC,\\n owns a rental property in Miami known as the “Best Peacock Inn,”\\n the “Peacock Inn,” or “Best Peacock.” Kalonymus is a real-estate\\n investment and development firm that is 100 percent owned by\\n Maximilian Zeff. The closing date was set for September 13, 2021,\\n which was extended to October 8, 2021, and then October 22, 2021.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement lays out the\\n Buyer’s options in the event of the Sellers’ breach:\\n 8.2 In the event of a default by Seller under the\\n terms of this Agreement, Buyer shall have the sole\\n and exclusive remedies of either (i) terminating this\\n Agreement, and receiving the return of its Deposit,\\n whereupon all parties hereto shall be released and\\n relieved from any and all further liability or\\n obligations hereunder; or (ii) proceeding to enforce\\n this Agreement by an action for specific performance,\\n as Buyer shall thereby, without waiving Buyer’s right\\n to recover any and all losses, damages, costs and\\n expenses resulting from Seller’s default.\\n Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein\\n contained, in the event of an intentional willful failure\\n of Seller to perform any matter reasonably within its\\n control or in the event any of the warranties and\\n representations made by Seller herein shall be in any\\n material respect inaccurate or there is an omission of\\n a material fact necessary to make any representation\\n of Seller not misleading in light of the circumstances\\n under which it was made, Buyer shall have any and all\\n remedies available to Buyer under the laws of the\\n State of Florida.\\n The Sellers claim that, in early October 2021, they “discov-\\n ered a provision in the property’s mortgage that would prevent\\n them from closing until January of 2022.” Specifically, the Sellers\\n claim they realized that “under certain terms of the promissory\\n note, the mortgage could only be paid off during the first quarter\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n of each year, between January and March.” Consequently, the\\n Sellers told Kalonymus that they would be unable to hold up their\\n end of the bargain by the closing date. Though the Sellers say they\\n “did not remember or were not aware of the provision prior to Oc-\\n tober 2021,” they concede that they breached the contract by fail-\\n ing to close.\\n On October 28, 2021, Kalonymus sent the Sellers a letter ad-\\n vising them that they were “in material default under several of\\n [their] obligations” under the Membership Purchase Agreement.\\n Kalonymus stated that it had entered into the Agreement “reliant\\n upon [the Sellers’] express representations and warranties, which\\n include[d]” the “execution, delivery, and performance of [the]\\n Agreement.” Kalonymus added that it “had every right to rely\\n upon the truthfulness of each and every representation and war-\\n ranty contained in the Purchase Agreement,” and that it, “in fact,\\n did detrimentally rely upon [the Sellers’] misrepresentations.” Fur-\\n ther:\\n As [Kalonymus] has previously advised [the Sellers],\\n [their] breaches and misrepresentations have resulted\\n in [Kalonymus] suffering and continuing to incur sig-\\n nificant losses and damages. [Kalonymus] has had to\\n delay its financing resulting in increased transaction\\n fees as well as substantial losses related to the terms\\n of [its] loan, including a material increase in the inter-\\n est rate. [The Sellers] have known for some time that\\n [Kalonymus] would be financing this acquisition and\\n [their] breaches and misconduct are a direct cause of\\n the damages [Kalonymus] has sustained. Moreover,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n this delay in closing will result in lost rental income to\\n [Kalonymus], in an amount easily calculated based\\n upon the current rent roll.\\n Over the next few months, the parties communicated about\\n possible ways to salvage a deal. In December 2021, January 2022,\\n and February 2022, the Sellers offered to sell Kalonymus the Best\\n Peacock Inn at the same purchase price as laid out in the original\\n Agreement. But Kalonymus declined, informing the Sellers that\\n market conditions had changed for the worse, and that it would\\n now be willing only to buy the property at a significant discount to\\n make up for the damages it had incurred up until that point, includ-\\n ing legal fees and lost rental income. Kalonymus advised the Sellers\\n that they had failed to address the default, and that they could not\\n “simply reset the closing date” and demand that Kalonymus accept\\n the deal at the price originally negotiated. But the Sellers refused\\n to sell at a reduced purchase price, calling Kalonymus’s demands\\n “totally unreasonable” and “unfair” in light of what they felt was a\\n “short . . . delay in closing.”\\n The deal having fallen through, Kalonymus exercised its op-\\n tion under Section 8.2 of the Membership Purchase Agreement to\\n sue the Sellers for specific performance, while at the same time\\n seeking damages. Kalonymus filed an action for specific perfor-\\n mance and damages (for breach of contract) in state court. The\\n Sellers then removed that action to federal court. Around the same\\n time, the Sellers filed their own lawsuit against Kalonymus in fed-\\n eral court, asserting a single count for a declaratory judgment that\\n Kalonymus—not the Sellers—had breached the Agreement. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n Sellers’ theory was that, by seeking to enforce the contract through\\n a lawsuit for specific performance, Kalonymus “elected to continue\\n with and enforce the Agreement rather than terminate it.” Thus,\\n according to the Sellers, it was Kalonymus that breached the con-\\n tract by rejecting the Sellers’ post-October-2021 offers to close at\\n the original purchase price.\\n These cases were consolidated before the district court.\\n Kalonymus moved to dismiss the Sellers’ complaint, which the dis-\\n trict court granted on the ground that the requested declarations\\n focused on acts committed in the past, and the court’s adjudication\\n of the issues would not prevent future monetary loss or lead either\\n party to conform their behavior to the law. That holding disposed\\n of the Sellers’ complaint, so for all intents and purposes,\\n Kalonymus became the Plaintiff in the case below, while Marmol\\n and Van Peborgh became the Defendants.\\n After more litigation, the parties cross-moved for summary\\n judgment. In the Sellers’ motion, Marmol and Van Peborgh again\\n argued that Kalonymus (1) remained bound by the Membership\\n Purchase Agreement after the Sellers breached in October 2021 be-\\n cause it chose to sue for specific performance (as well as damages);\\n (2) committed its own breaches over the next few months by failing\\n to perform under the terms of the original contract; and (3) as a\\n result, lost any claims for damages it might have had. Kalonymus\\n also moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to\\n specific performance of the Agreement and damages because (1)\\n the parties had a valid contract; (2) the Sellers breached the contract\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n by failing to close in October 2021; and (3) Kalonymus was dam-\\n aged by this breach. Kalonymus added that, under Florida law, a\\n cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of the\\n breach, so “the Sellers[’] contention that Kalonymus was required\\n to proceed with the closing in 2022 prior to filing suit is unavailing.”\\n The district court first denied the Sellers’ motion for sum-\\n mary judgment, finding that the Sellers had “fail[ed] to expressly\\n even mention any of the four specific counts” alleged by\\n Kalonymus, “never mind address whether there are genuine issues\\n of material fact as to the elements of those counts.” The district\\n court then granted in part Kalonymus’s motion for summary judg-\\n ment, agreeing with Kalonymus that it had established all elements\\n of a breach-of-contract claim. Although the district court “ha[d]\\n no difficulty concluding that [Kalonymus] proved it was damaged\\n by the Sellers’ breach,” the court found that “the parties’ dispute\\n regarding the amount of damages that should be awarded is not so\\n straight forward.” The case thus proceeded to a two-day bench\\n trial on the matter of Kalonymus’s damages, during which Zeff,\\n Marmol, Van Peborgh, and Kalonymus’s damages expert all testi-\\n fied. After the trial, the district court entered a final judgment in\\n favor of Kalonymus, reiterating its finding that Kalonymus was en-\\n titled to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\\n of $5,150,000, and to damages in the amount of $1,553,245, pro-\\n vided that the Sellers kept their promise to finance part of the trans-\\n action. The court ordered the parties to close on the Best Peacock\\n Inn on or before November 27, 2023, which the parties did.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n The Sellers now appeal the district court’s entries of sum-\\n mary and final judgment in favor of Kalonymus.\\n II. ANALYSIS\\n A. Specific Performance\\n Our first issue on appeal is whether the district court erred\\n when it determined that Kalonymus was entitled to an award of\\n specific performance, both when it granted summary judgment in\\n favor of Kalonymus and when it entered a final judgment in favor\\n of Kalonymus following the bench trial. The Sellers advance two\\n arguments for why the district court erred. First, they argue that\\n “Kalonymus is not entitled to an award of specific performance . .\\n . because it did not meet its burden of proof of establishing its\\n prima facie case,” which includes proving that it was “ready, willing,\\n and able to perform the contract according to its terms” in the first\\n place. Second, the Sellers argue that “Kalonymus is not entitled to\\n an award of specific performance . . . because it failed to act in ac-\\n cordance with Section 8.2 of the Agreement and Florida law and\\n materially breached the Agreement.” But we need not—and can-\\n not—reach the merits of these arguments, because we conclude\\n that the issue of specific performance is moot following the sale of\\n the Best Peacock Inn.\\n “Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal\\n courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165,\\n 171 (2013) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). Indeed, as the Su-\\n preme Court has often stated, “[n]o principle is more fundamental\\n to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual\\n cases or controversies.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398,\\n 408 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).\\n One doctrine deriving directly from the case-or-controversy\\n requirement is the doctrine of mootness. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273\\n F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court has explained\\n that “a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot\\n questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules\\n of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before\\n it.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)\\n (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Thus, a case is\\n moot “when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect\\n to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab.\\n Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208,\\n 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). Stated another\\n way, “a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’\\n or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”\\n Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). This includes when\\n “events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a sit-\\n uation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaning-\\n ful relief.” Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, 225 F.3d at 1217.\\n To sum up the relevant facts, Kalonymus contracted with\\n the Sellers to buy the Best Peacock Inn for $5,450,000, with a clos-\\n ing date in October 2021. After the Sellers breached in October\\n 2021, they offered to sell Kalonymus the property under the origi-\\n nal terms of the contract, but Kalonymus refused unless the Sellers\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n lowered the price. The deal did not materialize, and Kalonymus\\n exercised its right under the contract to sue for specific perfor-\\n mance and damages. Eventually, the district court entered a final\\n judgment in favor of Kalonymus, “reiterat[ing] the Buyer’s entitle-\\n ment to specific performance, based on a sale price for the property\\n of $5,150,000.” 1 “[I]n conformance with the verdict,” the district\\n court ordered the parties to “close on the sale of the property on\\n or before November 27, 2023,” which they did. This much is un-\\n disputed; the Sellers themselves tell us that they “closed on the sale\\n of the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn “in compliance with the Fi-\\n nal Judgment and pursuant to [the] court order directing them to\\n close.”\\n At closing, as authorized under the terms of the Member-\\n ship Purchase Agreement, 2 Kalonymus assigned its “Membership\\n Interests”—i.e., its “rights, title and interests”—in the Best Peacock\\n Inn to two other limited liability companies: 3667 Poinciana, LLC,\\n\\n\\n 1 In its verdict order following the bench trial, the district court found that the\\n\\n parties initially agreed on a sales price of $5,450,000 but later changed the price\\n to $5,150,000 through an Amendment to the Membership Purchase Agree-\\n ment. The Sellers now argue that the “Amendment was ineffective, and the\\n purchase price remained $5,450,000.” But they add that “whether the pur-\\n chase price was $5,450,000 or $5,150,000, the analysis by Sellers [on appeal]\\n does not change.”\\n 2 The Membership Purchase Agreement was “made and entered into . . . by\\n\\n and among Francisco Lagos Marmol and Fernando Carlos Van Peborgh, each\\n as to a 50% interest (collectively, ‘Seller’), and Kalonymus Development Part-\\n ners LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and/or its assignee (‘Buyer’ or\\n ‘Purchaser’), and Best Peacock Inn, LLC[.]” (emphasis added).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n and Poinciana, LLC. These two companies (the “Poinciana enti-\\n ties”) acquired title to the Best Peacock Inn on November 28, 2023,\\n as assignees of Kalonymus.\\n Also undisputed is the fact that the Sellers initially filed a mo-\\n tion to stay the final judgment but withdrew that motion prior to\\n closing. On November 3, 2023, on the same day that they filed their\\n notice of appeal, Marmol and Van Peborgh filed an “expedited mo-\\n tion for stay of execution of judgment pending appeal,” in which\\n they asked the district court to “stay[ ] the judgment of specific per-\\n formance” to “meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.”\\n The Sellers attested that, if “they are required to convey the Best\\n Peacock by November 27, [2023,]” they will “lose the sole asset at\\n issue in this case,” and their appeal will be moot. They stated, in\\n no uncertain terms:\\n If [the] Sellers are denied a stay, they will be forced to\\n convey the subject property and, as a result, their ap-\\n peal will become effectively moot as to their chal-\\n lenge on appeal of the [c]ourt’s Judgment granting\\n specific performance to Kalonymus . . . . [The] Sellers\\n are facing more than a risk of mootness: Absent a stay,\\n their appeal of the [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding\\n specific performance to Kalonymus will inevitably be-\\n come moot on November 27, 2023.\\n Kalonymus filed a response to the stay motion, indicating\\n that it did “not oppose a stay of the execution of judgment—pro-\\n vided that the Sellers post a satisfactory bond” of $3.2 million. On\\n November 14, 2023, the district court directed the Sellers to “file\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n either (1) a notice indicating they do not object to the bond amount\\n proposed by the Buyer; or (2) a reply to the Buyer’s response.” The\\n next day, however, rather than filing either a notice of non-objec-\\n tion to the bond amount or a reply, the Sellers withdrew their mo-\\n tion to stay.\\n With this factual background in mind, we conclude that the\\n sale of the Best Peacock Inn—the subject of this litigation and the\\n sole asset here—rendered the issue of specific performance moot.\\n The reason for mootness is simple: The Sellers sold the sub-\\n ject property to Kalonymus, which, upon closing, assigned its in-\\n terest in the property to two non-party entities, and thus there is\\n no more relief we can give the Sellers when it comes to the specific\\n performance of the Agreement. Recall, Kalonymus initiated this\\n action in state court to compel “specific performance of a contract\\n to convey membership shares in a limited liability company for the\\n purpose of conveying real property in Miami-Dade County, Flor-\\n ida.” Kalonymus demanded that the “Sellers be required to convey\\n [ ] 100% of the Membership Interest in [the] Best Peacock Inn pur-\\n suant to the terms of the Agreement.” And that is exactly what\\n occurred. In late November 2023, in compliance with the district\\n court’s order finding that Kalonymus was entitled to specific per-\\n formance and directing the parties to close, the Sellers sold all of\\n their shares in the Best Peacock Inn to Kalonymus’s assignees.\\n Therefore, the issue of specific performance is no longer “live,”\\n Powell, 395 U.S. at 496, and no further relief can be granted on the\\n matter of the sale.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Resisting, the Sellers now argue (contrary to their position\\n in their motion to stay) that the sale of the Best Peacock Inn did\\n not moot the issue of specific performance, because this Court\\n could, seemingly with ease, order the parties to “set aside” the sale.\\n Because this Court “can, as part of its mandate, instruct the district\\n court” to “order[ ] Kalonymus . . . to cause the return of the shares”\\n of the Best Peacock Inn to the Sellers, they insist, the issue of spe-\\n cific performance is not moot. We reject this argument for several\\n reasons.\\n First, we cannot simply un-moot the issue of specific perfor-\\n mance here by “setting aside” the sale of the Best Peacock Inn.\\n When the Sellers closed on the sale of the property, they accepted,\\n in writing, that once the deal closed, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and\\n Poinciana, LLC, would take title to the Best Peacock Inn as assign-\\n ees of Kalonymus. Under the terms of the assignment contract,\\n which was signed by Marmol and Van Peborgh, Kalonymus\\n “agreed to transfer all of its rights, title, and interests” in the Best\\n Peacock Inn to the Poinciana entities: “99.5% to 3667 Poinciana,\\n LLC, and 0.5% to Poinciana, LLC.” The Poinciana entities, in turn,\\n “agreed to accept and assume the transfer of the Membership In-\\n terests.” The Sellers thus understood that, upon closing,\\n Kalonymus would no longer have rights in the Best Peacock Inn\\n and the Poinciana entities, both non-parties, would take title to the\\n shares of the property moving forward.\\n In light of this assignment, we conclude that the issue of\\n specific performance is moot, because “intervening events have\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n made it ‘impossible for [us] to grant any effectual relief whatever’”\\n to the Sellers. See Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.,\\n 179 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting John Roe, Inc. v. United\\n States, 142 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998)). There is no way for us\\n to give the Sellers the relief they are seeking—the “transfer of the\\n shares back to [the] Sellers”—because the property has been sold,\\n and Kalonymus has assigned its interest in the property to third-\\n party entities who are not parties here. See, e.g., Holloway v. United\\n States, 789 F.2d 1372, 1373–74 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Because the property\\n in question has been sold and the purchaser has not been made a\\n party to this action, we dismiss this case as moot . . . . [T]he pur-\\n chaser of the property . . . is not a party to this appeal, and this\\n court therefore cannot give any relief that would affect him or\\n her.”); Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 361–62 (1921) (“As the ac-\\n tion was brought to recover the possession of real estate, and as the\\n defendant in error has, pending review in this court, sold it, we\\n agree with the contention that the case has become moot . . . .\\n [T]he defendant in error having sold and conveyed the property, a\\n judgment, if in his favor, will not give him possession of the prem-\\n ises . . . . [T]his court will not decide moot cases.”).\\n The Sellers acknowledge the transfer of the property to third\\n parties, but they argue that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, and Poinciana,\\n LLC, are not “bona fide purchasers,” because “the Poinciana Enti-\\n ties took the property with knowledge of the litigation,” and the\\n district court could “join the Poinciana Entities as parties to this suit\\n on remand.” True, Kalonymus’s owner Maximilian Zeff helped\\n create the Poinciana entities “for the purpose of owning the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n majority of Best Peacock Inn, LLC,” so the Sellers are likely correct\\n that these entities “knew of ” this litigation when they took title to\\n the property. But this fact is only part of the equation.3 “Mootness\\n demands that there be something about the case that remains alive,\\n\\n\\n 3 Under Florida law, a buyer is considered a bona fide purchaser if “(1) the\\n\\n purchaser obtained legal title to the challenged property, (2) the purchaser\\n paid the value of the challenged property, and (3) the purchaser had no\\n knowledge of the claimed interest against the challenged property at the time\\n of the transaction.” Harkless v. Laubhan, 278 So. 3d 728, 733 (Fla. 2d DCA\\n 2019). The Sellers tell us that the Poinciana entities are “not bona fide third-\\n party purchasers because they acquired title to the shares of Best Peacock Inn\\n with full knowledge of the litigation and the pendency of the appeal.” But just\\n because a third-party purchaser has knowledge of a lawsuit does not mean he\\n acquired the property with knowledge of a “conflicting claim, interest, or right\\n in the property.” Harkless, 278 So. 3d at 733 (internal quotations omitted); see\\n also Miami Ctr. Ltd. P’ship v. Bank of N.Y., 838 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1988)\\n (holding, in the bankruptcy context, that “[k]nowledge of claims asserted in a\\n pending appeal does not deprive a purchaser of good faith status”).\\n Here, at the time that the Poinciana entities accepted the assignment of inter-\\n ests from Kalonymus, the Sellers had made clear, in signed documents, that\\n Best Peacock Inn, LLC, had clean title to the property, free of encumbrances.\\n Puzzlingly, the Sellers direct our attention to an email they sent just before\\n closing, in which they proposed adding language to the closing documents\\n that would have purportedly preserved their rights to appeal the final judg-\\n ment. But the parties did not include this language in the closing documents.\\n Instead, as we’ve said, the Sellers signed closing documents attesting that they\\n were selling the property without encumbrances upon it or claims against it.\\n The Sellers did not record a notice of lis pendens on the property until July 25,\\n 2024—nearly eight months after the sale and over eight months after they in-\\n itiated this appeal. Therefore, the Sellers have not demonstrated that the Poin-\\n ciana entities (neither of which are parties) are anything other than bona fide\\n purchasers for value in this case.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n present, real, and immediate so that a federal court can provide re-\\n dress in some palpable way.” Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d\\n 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2018). Not only are the Poinciana entities not\\n parties to this case, but, significantly, neither is Zeff, so we cannot\\n say that the relief sought by the Sellers, when it comes to specific\\n performance, presents a live, real, present, and immediate contro-\\n versy for which we can provide redress in a palpable way.\\n On this point, the Sellers direct our attention to Paris v. U.S.\\n Department of Housing & Urban Development, 713 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.\\n 1983), where the Seventh Circuit held that a case was not moot, in\\n spite of a sale of real property. There, the buyer (an individual) and\\n the seller (the government) “were [co-]defendants in th[e] proceed-\\n ing below” and had “completed the sale in the knowledge that it\\n was under legal challenge.” Id. at 1344. “In such a situation,” the\\n court reasoned, the court still had jurisdiction over the parties who\\n controlled the property and “thus [could] still reach the subject\\n matter of the suit [and] compel restoration of the status quo.” Id.\\n But that case materially differs from ours. As the Paris court took\\n care to mention, the subject property in that case had since been\\n transferred from the buyer to a non-party partnership, of which the\\n buyer was the “sole general partner.” Id. at 1345 n.3. Thus, under\\n Indiana law, the buyer still “ha[d] the power, in response to an or-\\n der of the court, to bind [the non-party partnership] either to re-\\n convey the property” or to enter into a contract with the seller. Id.\\n Here, by contrast, Zeff was not a party in the proceeding be-\\n low; Kalonymus was. We have no evidence indicating that\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n Kalonymus has the power to bind the Poinciana entities to recon-\\n vey the Best Peacock Inn or to enter into a new contract with the\\n Sellers. And even assuming that we could pierce the corporate veil\\n to reach Zeff, Zeff does not appear to have that power either, at\\n least according to the record evidence: While Zeff does fully own\\n Poinciana, LLC, he testified that he has “less than 1 percent owner-\\n ship interest in” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, which is the entity that was\\n assigned 99.5 percent of Kalonymus’s “rights, title, and interests”\\n and the parties agreed would become the “Manager” of the Best\\n Peacock Inn after the sale. Zeff testified that he has “no power to\\n remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as “Manager” of the Best Peacock\\n Inn, and no power to appoint a new manager of the property.\\n Zeff also testified that 3667 Poinciana, LLC, is “99.99 percent\\n owned by” an entity called “RDZ Family, LLC,” named for the in-\\n itials of Zeff’s father. Zeff testified that, while he is a “beneficiary”\\n of RDZ Family, LLC, he does not “sign[ ] for” the company. He\\n agreed, on cross-examination, that lawyers for RDZ Family, LLC,\\n represented his father but were “clear and specific” that they did\\n “not represent[ ] [him].” Zeff also agreed that his “father alone had\\n the power to appoint and remove” 3667 Poinciana, LLC, as Man-\\n ager of the Best Peacock Inn.\\n To sum up, then, the evidence shows that the current 99.5\\n percent owner of the Best Peacock Inn—3667 Poinciana, LLC—is\\n a non-party entity controlled by another non-party entity—RDZ\\n Family, LLC—which is managed by members with no involve-\\n ment here. Therefore, contrary to the Sellers’ claim, and unlike in\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n Paris, we cannot simply order Kalonymus to “cause the return of\\n the shares” of the Best Peacock Inn back to the Sellers and compel\\n restoration of the status quo. The parties who now control the\\n property are not within our jurisdictional reach. We thus reject the\\n Sellers’ contention that the sale of the property to the Poinciana\\n entities did not moot the issue of specific performance.\\n This brings us to the second reason that the issue of specific\\n performance is moot: the Sellers’ decision to withdraw their mo-\\n tion to stay and voluntarily proceed with the transaction below. As\\n noted above, the Sellers initially filed a motion to stay the execution\\n of judgment, in which they expressed their willingness to comply\\n with an order requiring a supersedeas bond, if the district court did\\n stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. They noted\\n that, without a stay, conveyance of the subject property would de-\\n stroy “their appellate remedies” and “moot . . . their challenge on\\n appeal of the [district court’s] Judgment granting specific perfor-\\n mance to Kalonymus.” But on November 15, 2023, having been\\n presented with the options of assenting to the bond amount pro-\\n posed by Kalonymus or filing a reply to Kalonymus’s response to\\n their motion to stay, the Sellers filed a notice of withdrawal and\\n moved forward with the sale. They did so just twelve days after\\n telling the district court that, “[a]bsent a stay, their appeal of the\\n [c]ourt’s Final Judgment awarding specific performance to\\n Kalonymus will inevitably become moot on November 27, 2023.”\\n The Sellers’ decision to decline to post a bond, withdraw\\n their motion to stay, and proceed with the sale of the property\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n evinces that the issue of specific performance is moot. This Court\\n has held, in the bankruptcy context, that once a sale of property “is\\n approved by the bankruptcy court and consummated by the par-\\n ties,” an appellate court can no longer “grant[ ] effective relief if a\\n sale is not stayed,” and thus “the failure to obtain a stay renders the\\n appeal moot.” In re Charter Co., 829 F.2d 1054, 1056 (11th Cir. 1987);\\n see also In re Matos, 790 F.2d 864, 865 (11th Cir. 1986) (“It is settled\\n law in this circuit that when the debtor fails to obtain a stay pending\\n appeal of the bankruptcy court’s or the district court’s order setting\\n aside an automatic stay and allowing a creditor to foreclose on\\n property, the subsequent foreclosure and sale of the property ren-\\n ders moot any appeal.”). This rule of law is “premised upon con-\\n siderations of finality.” In re Matos, 790 F.2d at 865–66; see also In re\\n Stanford, 17 F.4th 116, 126 (11th Cir. 2021) ( Jordan, J., concurring in\\n part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the afore-\\n mentioned rule is premised, in part, on the need to deter “buyer’s\\n remorse”).\\n Courts around the country have applied a similar rule to\\n sales of real property outside the bankruptcy context. As one of\\n our sister circuits remarked: “The general rule followed in the\\n United States is that absent a stay, sale of the property to a good\\n faith purchaser during the pendency of the appeal, ‘moots the ap-\\n peal of the judgment ordering the sale.’ This rule ‘applies to all\\n judgments ordering the sale of property and is not limited to bank-\\n ruptcy cases.’” Romspen Mortg. Ltd. P’ship v. BGC Holdings LLC – Ar-\\n lington Place One, 20 F.4th 359, 367 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting F.D.I.C.\\n v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260, 1263–64 (7th Cir. 1986)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n In Holloway, for example, the petitioners appealed the dis-\\n trict court’s denial of their petition for a writ of prohibition to pre-\\n vent the Internal Revenue Service from seizing and selling their\\n property to satisfy their unpaid taxes. 789 F.2d at 1373. After the\\n district court denied their petition, the Holloways did not seek a\\n stay, and their property was sold. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that\\n the appeal was moot. To begin with, “[t]he act or event sought to\\n be prohibited by the Holloways was the sale of their property,” and\\n [t]hat sale has already occurred.” Id. at 1374. The court then ex-\\n plained, analogizing to the bankruptcy context, that “a party seek-\\n ing to avoid any impairment in its ability to realize the benefit of a\\n successful appeal must seek to stay the progress of the proceeding\\n by obtaining a stay or injunction pending appeal. Thus a party who\\n chooses to appeal but who fails to obtain a stay or injunction pend-\\n ing appeal risks losing its ability to realize the benefit of a successful\\n appeal.” Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Combined Metals Reduction Co.,\\n 557 F.2d 179, 188 (9th Cir. 1977) (citation modified)). The court\\n reasoned that the Holloways “had an opportunity to prevent the\\n sale of their property through a stay of the order denying their pe-\\n tition” but “failed to take advantage of that opportunity.” Id. at\\n 1373–74. In light of this fact, and because the property had since\\n been sold to a non-party, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal as\\n moot. Id. at 1374.\\n Similar considerations apply here. Not only did the Sellers\\n fail to obtain a stay pending appeal, but they voluntarily terminated\\n their effort to obtain one after urging the district court to enter an\\n order staying execution of the judgment so that they “might\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n meaningfully preserve their appellate remedies.” The Sellers were\\n under no illusion about what a stay would entail; they noted explic-\\n itly their willingness to post a bond or some other form of security.\\n But when Kalonymus came back with a number, the Sellers balked.\\n We cannot say for sure why the Sellers proceeded the way they did.\\n But Marmol and Van Peborgh’s decision to withdraw their motion\\n to stay only confirms that the subsequent sale of the property (and\\n the assignment to third parties beyond the reach of our equitable\\n powers) was both voluntary and final. Under these circumstances,\\n we conclude that the Sellers have lost their ability to realize the\\n benefit of a successful appeal on the matter of the sale—a position\\n they themselves advanced when they told the district court that\\n conveyance of the subject property would moot their challenge of\\n the court’s judgment granting specific performance to Kalonymus.\\n For these reasons, we hold that the issue of specific perfor-\\n mance is moot, having “lost its character as a present, live contro-\\n versy of the kind that must exist if we are to avoid advisory opin-\\n ions on abstract propositions of law.” Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48\\n (1969) (per curiam).\\n B. Damages\\n We turn now to the issue of damages, which “remains a live\\n controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1478 (11th\\n Cir. 1997) (instructing district court to dismiss moot claims but re-\\n solving non-moot claims on the merits); Powell, 395 U.S. at 497\\n (“Where one of the several issues presented becomes moot, the re-\\n maining live issues supply the constitutional requirement of a case\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n or controversy.”). The Appellants argue that the district court erred\\n in granting Kalonymus’s motion for summary judgment on its en-\\n titlement to damages and in awarding Kalonymus damages after\\n the bench trial because Kalonymus failed to prove damages and\\n thus failed to prove an essential element of its breach-of-contract\\n claims. The Appellants contend that the evidence showed that in-\\n dividuals and entities other than Kalonymus—Zeff, Zeff’s family\\n members, and 3667 Poinciana, LLC—were the ones who might\\n have been damaged, but that “there is no record evidence that\\n Kalonymus [itself ] suffered ‘a single dime’ in damages.”\\n “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\n novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court, and\\n viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light\\n most favorable to the non-moving party.” Houston v. Williams, 547\\n F.3d 1357, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate\\n when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the mov-\\n ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In review-\\n ing a grant or denial of summary judgment, we resolve all ambi-\\n guities in the non-movant’s favor. Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc.,\\n 686 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n “After a bench trial, we review the district court’s conclu-\\n sions of law de novo and the district court’s factual findings for clear\\n error.” Tartell v. S. Fla. Sinus & Allergy Ctr., Inc., 790 F.3d 1253, 1257\\n (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). We review a damages award for\\n clear error and afford considerable deference to the district court.\\n Hiatt v. United States, 910 F.2d 737, 742 (11th Cir. 1990). “When\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n determining whether a district court’s damages award constituted\\n clear error, we must be especially careful about reversing findings\\n of fact based on the district court’s evaluation of live witness testi-\\n mony because the district court is better positioned to evaluate\\n such evidence.” Superior Constr. Co., Inc. v. Brock, 445 F.3d 1334, 1346\\n (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).\\n In this case, at the summary-judgment stage, there was evi-\\n dence in the record that Kalonymus suffered some amount of dam-\\n ages stemming from the Sellers’ breach. On October 28, 2021,\\n Kalonymus’s lawyers sent the Sellers a communication attesting\\n that the “Buyer”—Kalonymus—was “suffering and continuing to\\n incur significant losses and damages,” having to “delay its financing\\n resulting in increased transaction fees as well as substantial losses\\n related to the terms of [the] loan, including a material increase in\\n the interest rate,” and incurring “lost rental income . . . in an\\n amount easily calculated based upon the current rent roll,” all\\n caused by the Sellers’ “breaches and misrepresentations.”\\n Additionally, in support of its motion for summary judg-\\n ment, Kalonymus included a declaration from its damages expert,\\n Paul Habibi, who averred that the Sellers’ “delay in closing oc-\\n curred during one of the most turbulent periods for capital markets\\n in decades.” Habibi estimated that, if the parties had been able to\\n close in October 2021, the value of Kalonymus’s cost of capital\\n would have been $1,830,829, a figure he came to by weighing the\\n costs of debt and equity according to the proportion of each type\\n of capital in the Best Peacock Inn’s capital structure. Due to rapidly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n rising interest rates, Habibi explained, Kalonymus’s cost of capital\\n in December 2022 was all the way up to $3,538,129, resulting in\\n current cost-of-capital damages of $1,707,300. Habibi also esti-\\n mated that Kalonymus had suffered, among other things, $98,765\\n in the form of “lost cash flow damages.” The evidence thus sup-\\n ports the district court’s finding, on summary judgment, that\\n Kalonymus suffered some amount of damages greater than zero.\\n The Sellers also appeal the court’s award of damages follow-\\n ing the bench trial. At trial, Habibi testified that the total damages\\n suffered by Kalonymus until that point was $2,673,742. He came\\n to this figure by aggregating the sums of Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\\n ital ($2,346,638), lost profits ($175,028), cost of capital for portfolio\\n properties ($87,210), 4 duplicate expenses ($50,650), and lost tax sav-\\n ings ($14,217). But following Habibi’s testimony, Marmol and Van\\n Peborgh “offered to finance the credit portion of the transaction\\n under the same terms [that] Newmark”—a loan broker—“had of-\\n fered in October 2021.” Habibi was then recalled as a witness, and\\n he testified that, if the Sellers did finance the credit portion of the\\n transaction under the original loan terms, Kalonymus’s cost of cap-\\n ital would be $1,322,850 instead of $2,346,638, and one of the du-\\n plicate expenses (a lender counsel fee of $9,500) would have to be\\n\\n\\n 4 The district court ultimately declined to include the cost of capital for port-\\n\\n folio properties in its damages award, based on its finding that “Kalonymus\\n did not present any evidence linking these portfolio losses, incurred by sepa-\\n rate entities, to Kalonymus itself.” Kalonymus does not contest this issue on\\n appeal.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n erased. In light of these developments, the district court found that\\n Kalonymus had established damages resulting from the breach in\\n the amount of $1,553,245, 5 contingent on the Sellers following\\n through on their pledge to finance part of the transaction under\\n the original terms Newmark had offered in October 2021.\\n The Sellers now contest the entire damages award for the\\n overarching reason that entities or individuals other than\\n Kalonymus were the ones who suffered damages resulting from\\n the Sellers’ breach. Outside of the category of lost tax advantages,\\n which we’ll return to below, we are not persuaded by the Sellers’\\n arguments.\\n We begin with the cost of capital, or the combined cost of\\n debt and cost of equity. As defined by Habibi, cost of debt is “what-\\n ever a borrower would have to pay to borrow money.” This cost is\\n derived using a “risk-free” interest rate (set by the United States\\n Treasury) and a “risk premium” or “spread.” Cost of equity, on the\\n other hand, refers to the “expected return” for the investor provid-\\n ing equity capital. Habibi testified at trial that the cost of debt had\\n nearly doubled between October 2021 and November 2023, while\\n the cost of equity had “also skyrocketed, actually even more as a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 $1,553,245 is the sum of Kalonymus’s revised cost of capital ($1,322,850), lost\\n\\n profits ($175,028), revised duplicate expenses ($41,150), and lost tax savings\\n ($14,217).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n percentage increase than the cost of debt,” from 5.56 percent to\\n “roughly 12 percent.”\\n The Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no harm in the\\n form of capital costs. Their reasoning is that Kalonymus never lost\\n out on the more favorable loan terms Newmark offered in October\\n 2021, because Kalonymus was not a party to the loan transaction.\\n They similarly suggest that Kalonymus contributed no equity cap-\\n ital for the investment. As an initial matter, we note that the Sellers\\n seem to be ignoring the fact that Kalonymus paid the Sellers a de-\\n posit of $131,000 for the property in advance of the deal closing,\\n which the Sellers chose to keep even after they breached, on the\\n theory that Kalonymus owed them damages. It is undisputed that\\n Kalonymus itself borrowed these funds. Habibi also testified that,\\n based on the “entire ownership structure of the investment,” it was\\n his expert opinion that Kalonymus itself suffered equity costs as an\\n arm’s-length investor. So, we reject the Sellers’ assertion that\\n Kalonymus never put capital contributions toward the Best Pea-\\n cock Inn and “suffered absolutely no harm.”\\n As to the cost of debt, it’s true that, in the Newmark loan\\n agreement, 3667 Poinciana, LLC, was listed as the entity that\\n would be taking out the loan if the deal went through (although\\n the loan agreement also references “Kalonymus Credit Facility” on\\n the bottom of each page and throughout the document). But this\\n is a red herring. At the time that the district court awarded dam-\\n ages to Kalonymus, no special-purpose entities had taken assign-\\n ment of Kalonymus’s interest in the Membership Purchase\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n Agreement, since that assignment was contingent on the parties\\n closing on the sale. Thus, throughout the litigation and up until\\n the sale of the property in November 2023, Kalonymus remained\\n the buyer, and Kalonymus suffered the consequences of increasing\\n interest rates. Because the increased costs associated with rising\\n interest rates were incurred by Kalonymus, irrespective of what-\\n ever entities it planned to transfer its interests to in late 2021, we\\n reject the Sellers’ claim that the district court granted Kalonymus\\n a “windfall” in the form of cost-of-debt damages.\\n Next, the Sellers argue that Kalonymus suffered no lost prof-\\n its because “it was neither the landlord nor going to be an owner”\\n of the Best Peacock Inn. However, the Sellers point us to nothing\\n in the record showing that Kalonymus would not have earned cash\\n flow from the property if the parties had closed in October 2021.\\n They speculate that “distribution[s] would not have gone to\\n Kalonymus,” but they identify nothing concrete. On the other\\n hand, Habibi testified that Kalonymus lost out on $175,028 in “cash\\n flows from operations,” explaining that “the buyer entity”—\\n Kalonymus—“is entitled to receive those cash flows.” “Under Flor-\\n ida law, ‘evidence as to the amount of damages cannot be based on\\n speculation or conjecture, but must be proven with certainty.’” Sun\\n Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Imperial Premium Fin., LLC, 904 F.3d\\n 1197, 1222 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co.\\n v. Nevins Fruit Co., 831 So. 2d 727, 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). Here,\\n the Sellers have provided us with nothing beyond speculation to\\n cast doubt on Habibi’s or the district court’s calculation of lost\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n profits, so we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in\\n granting those damages.\\n Additionally, the Sellers argue that the district court erred\\n when it awarded Kalonymus $41,150 in “duplicate expenses.”\\n These expenses have taken on something of a misnomer. At sum-\\n mary judgment, Kalonymus sought $50,650 in “administrative\\n fees” that it argued it would be forced to spend “in order to dupli-\\n cate the transaction.” In other words, these damages represent the\\n new set of administrative costs Kalonymus would have to incur in\\n order to close on the transaction. As Habibi explained in his decla-\\n ration, these expenses included a payment for a zoning report, a\\n payment for a “property condition report,” a fee for an appraisal, a\\n fee for an “environmental site assessment,” and legal fees. Regard-\\n less of who (if anyone) paid these expenses the first time around,\\n the evidence shows that Kalonymus took on these additional costs\\n later. The Sellers offer nothing to rebut this point. Therefore, we\\n find no clear error in the district court’s award of “duplicate ex-\\n penses.”\\n Finally, however, when it comes to lost tax advantages, we\\n agree with the Sellers that the record evidence does not support the\\n district court’s award of damages. Habibi testified that, under the\\n 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, bonus depreciation began to be phased\\n out on January 21, 2023, so, in simplified terms, a party filing taxes\\n before that date could have deducted more than a party filing after\\n that date. But Habibi also testified that a limited liability company\\n cannot itself take advantage of tax benefits related to asset\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13678 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n depreciation. Rather, he explained, “[i]t’s the members as individ-\\n uals” who suffer the loss of tax depreciation, because individuals\\n are the ones “filing the tax returns.” As such, even if the Sellers had\\n never breached and the deal went through in October 2021, the tax\\n benefits derived from a pre-phaseout closing would only have been\\n available to the individuals filing tax returns—not Kalonymus.\\n Therefore, the district court erred in awarding $14,217 in tax dam-\\n ages to Kalonymus.\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the issue of specific\\n performance in this case is moot. We, therefore, DISMISS the ap-\\n peal as to that issue. 6\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Normally, when an issue becomes moot on appeal, we not only “dismiss as\\n\\n to the mooted issue, but also vacate the portion of the district court’s order\\n that addresses it.” De La Teja v. United States, 321 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir.\\n 2003). We do not do so here, because the policy of vacating the underlying\\n district court order is premised on the equitable principle that “[a] party who\\n seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is frustrated by the vagaries\\n of circumstance, ought not in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment.”\\n U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994); see also\\n United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950) (holding that vaca-\\n tur of the judgment below in a case that has become moot on appeal “clears\\n the path for future relitigation of the issues between the parties and eliminates\\n a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance”). An ap-\\n pellate court need not “vacate[ ] the unreviewed court judgment to prevent\\n its having preclusive effect in subsequent litigation” if the equitable principles\\n laid out by the Supreme Court are not implicated. Westmoreland v. Nat’l\\n Transp. Safety Bd., 833 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987). Here, it is not the “va-\\n garies of circumstance” that prevent us from reaching the merits of the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13678\\n\\n The district court’s damages award is AFFIRMED in all re-\\n spects except to the extent that the court awarded damages for lost\\n tax savings, which we REVERSE. Accordingly, we vacate the dis-\\n trict court’s damages award and REMAND for recalculation of\\n damages consistent with this opinion.\\n DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED\\n IN PART; REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n court’s award of specific performance, but rather the Sellers’ deliberate deci-\\n sion to comply with the district court’s final judgment and forgo a stay of the\\n execution of judgment pending appeal. Thus, under the circumstances of this\\n case, we conclude that the parties remain bound by the portion of the district\\n court’s final order dealing with specific performance. See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at\\n 24–25 (“[Where] the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the\\n mootness by voluntary action,” he “voluntarily forfeit[s] his legal remedy by\\n the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim\\n to the equitable remedy of vacatur.”); e.g., Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606,\\n 620 (5th Cir. 1998) (declining to vacate an underlying order where an issue was\\n rendered moot by the losing party’s “voluntary compliance with the district\\n court’s judgment”).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30962,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10746149,"string":"10,746,149"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Ronald Anthony Beasley, II"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10506"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10506\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n RONALD ANTHONY BEASLEY, II,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00024-CEM-EJK-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a pharmacist con-\\n victed of health-care fraud is entitled to a new trial based on newly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n discovered evidence, and whether the district court erred in some\\n of its evidentiary rulings. A grand jury charged Ronald Beasley for\\n defrauding Medicare by billing for different drugs than he dis-\\n pensed and for prescriptions he never filled. He was convicted of\\n one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\\n counts of health-care fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1347, 1349. Beasley\\n contends that the district court erred by not granting his motion\\n for a new trial; by admitting evidence that he committed an un-\\n charged theft; and by not holding an in-camera hearing to deter-\\n mine whether a witness properly invoked her Fifth Amendment\\n right against self-incrimination, and he argues that the government\\n violated his right to present a complete defense by not offering the\\n witness immunity. We affirm.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On February 23, 2022, a grand jury indicted Ronald Beasley\\n on one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\\n counts of health-care fraud. See id. The indictment alleged that\\n Beasley, as “pharmacist-in-charge” of a Florida pharmacy called\\n NH Pharma, defrauded Medicare by seeking “reimbursement for\\n compound and other prescription medications . . . that NH Pharma\\n did not have the inventory to fill.” Beasley pleaded not guilty. The\\n pharmacy’s owner, Nava Hajiabadi, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to\\n commit health-care fraud and agreed to cooperate with the gov-\\n ernment.\\n Before trial, Beasley moved to exclude evidence that he stole\\n about $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy, an uncharged theft.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n The district court denied that motion. It ruled that the uncharged\\n theft was admissible as intrinsic evidence.\\n Beasley also sought to question Hajiabadi’s mother,\\n Mehrshid Khatami, at trial. Khatami was a part-owner of the phar-\\n macy, worked there as a pharmacy technician, and helped manage\\n its bank account. Khatami stated that she would invoke her Fifth\\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, so the district\\n court granted a hearing at Beasley’s request to evaluate Khatami’s\\n invocation of that privilege.\\n At the hearing, Beasley’s counsel outlined the questions he\\n would ask Khatami, and Khatami’s counsel responded that\\n Khatami “ha[d] a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in re-\\n sponse to every single one of those questions or topics.” Khatami’s\\n counsel alternatively suggested that the prosecution could provide\\n his client immunity. The prosecution responded that immunity for\\n witnesses is “rare,” determined “at a higher level within the De-\\n partment of Justice,” and not “warranted” “in this circumstance.”\\n The district court acknowledged the prosecution’s position and ex-\\n plained that it was “not going to recommend [immunity] or lobby\\n for it.” The district court ruled that Khatami had substantiated her\\n invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and that in-camera\\n questioning was unnecessary. So the district court excused\\n Khatami from testifying at trial.\\n At trial, Hajiabadi testified against Beasley. She explained\\n that a significant portion of the pharmacy’s business involved com-\\n pounded creams, which the pharmacy made in-house. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n pharmacy billed Medicare for compounded medicines based on the\\n ingredients it used to make them. But not all ingredients are reim-\\n bursable, and whether an ingredient is reimbursable may depend\\n on its form. For example, an ingredient in a powder form—called\\n a bulk agent—is ordinarily not reimbursable, but the same ingredi-\\n ent in a capsule, tablet, or gel form may be reimbursable. Hajiabadi\\n testified that she and Beasley fraudulently inflated the pharmacy’s\\n profits by preparing compounds using unreimbursable bulk agents\\n and billing Medicare for more expensive, reimbursable forms of the\\n relevant ingredients.\\n Hajiabadi also testified about how she and Beasley con-\\n cealed their scheme. She explained that Medicare and insurance\\n companies conduct audits in which they compare a pharmacy’s or-\\n ders and inventory against the quantity of drugs the pharmacy\\n claims to have dispensed. Because she and Beasley billed Medicare\\n for ingredients they had not used or ordered, the pharmacy faced\\n “shortages” of those ingredients. They addressed that problem by\\n purchasing certain drugs to ensure that they were “on the shelves”\\n when auditors inspected the pharmacy, and then returned the\\n drugs after an audit concluded.\\n Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole about $200,000 in cash\\n from the pharmacy. She said that Beasley did not deny the theft but\\n instead stated that “he felt undervalued and underappreciated,\\n based on the money that was being made by the pharmacy.” After\\n Hajiabadi and a private investigator confronted Beasley about the\\n theft, he repaid more than $60,000. In addition to Hajiabadi’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n testimony about the theft, the prosecution introduced a video\\n showing Beasley accept money from a cash transaction and not put\\n it in the register, bank records of large cash deposits in addition to\\n Beasley’s salary, and testimony from the private investigator.\\n Three Medicare beneficiaries in whose name Beasley billed\\n prescriptions also testified. They testified that they never re-\\n ceived—nor even believe they were prescribed—several of the pre-\\n scriptions Beasley purported to have dispensed to them.\\n Finally, the prosecution offered testimony from Martin Cal-\\n abrese, a Medicare expert. Calabrese testified that he conducted an\\n audit of the pharmacy and concluded it had billed Medicare for\\n drugs it could not have dispensed. He also opined that the quantity\\n and duration of prescription of the drugs Beasley purported to dis-\\n pense to the three Medicare beneficiaries was unusual, and that one\\n of the drugs was “carcinogenic.”\\n In closing, Beasley argued that he lacked knowledge of the\\n conspiracy and a motive to participate in it because, as a salaried\\n employee, he would not directly benefit from fraudulently inflating\\n the pharmacy’s profits. He contended that “[p]eople don’t enter\\n into agreements to [commit fraud] if there’s nothing in return.”\\n The jury found Beasley guilty on all four counts. At sentenc-\\n ing, Beasley denied stealing money from the pharmacy. Instead, he\\n said that he ran a side business selling “collectible merchandise and\\n apparel,” which explained his large cash deposits. Beasley further\\n contended that he feared a false accusation of theft would jeopard-\\n ize his then-pending application to join the Navy, so he “reluctantly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n gave [Hajiabadi] all the money [he] had justly earned.” The district\\n court did not entirely reject that story and sentenced him to 24\\n months’ imprisonment—a downward variance from the guideline\\n range of 51 to 63 months, which the government had requested.\\n After Beasley’s trial, Hajiabadi filed a sentencing memoran-\\n dum for her case. She argued that her case “is notable [in] that [it]\\n involves real patients who suffered from bona fide medical ailments,\\n and that [she] did dispense compound medications that were ap-\\n propriate to treat their conditions”—albeit in a manner that “made\\n them ineligible for reimbursement from Medicare.” Hajiabadi ar-\\n gued that her “case [was] substantially different than typical\\n healthcare cases where phantom patients are used as a means to\\n submit fraudulent billing.” Beasley moved for a new trial on the\\n ground that the arguments in Hajiabadi’s sentencing memoran-\\n dum constituted new evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). The\\n district court denied that motion.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n We review several issues for abuse of discretion. We review\\n the denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered\\n evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d\\n 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). We also review the denial of\\n an evidentiary hearing on that motion for abuse of discretion.\\n United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009). We re-\\n view the admission of evidence about the uncharged theft for\\n abuse of discretion. United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591, 605 (11th\\n Cir. 2023). And we review the decision not to question Khatami in\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n camera for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d\\n 568, 580 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n The government argues that we should review the latter is-\\n sue for plain error because Beasley did not specifically request an\\n in-camera hearing or object to the decision not to hold one. We dis-\\n agree. The district court understood Beasley to have requested in-\\n camera review, and it explained its reasoning for not conducting it.\\n Beasley’s request for an in-camera hearing “was adequately pre-\\n sented to the district court.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814,\\n 819 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n We review de novo Beasley’s constitutional challenge to the\\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity from prosecution. See United\\n States v. Mitrovic, 890 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion into four parts. First, we explain\\n that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying\\n Beasley’s motion for a new trial and by not holding an evidentiary\\n hearing. Second, we explain that the district court did not abuse its\\n discretion by admitting evidence of the uncharged theft. Third, we\\n explain that the prosecution did not violate Beasley’s right to a\\n complete defense by declining to provide Khatami immunity. Fi-\\n nally, we explain that the district court did not abuse its discretion\\n by not conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the\\n Motion for a New Trial Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing.\\n\\n Beasley argues that the district court should have granted\\n him a new trial based on what he describes as newly discovered\\n evidence from Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum. In that mem-\\n orandum, Hajiabadi argued that her case was less severe than the\\n “typical healthcare cases where phantom patients are used” to sub-\\n mit fraudulent bills because she provided prescriptions to real pa-\\n tients, even if using unreimbursable ingredients. Beasley contends\\n that with the benefit of Hajiabadi’s memorandum, he would not\\n have “inappropriately focused on defending allegations that\\n Beasley was guilty of writing phantom scripts and dispensing inap-\\n propriate and dangerous medications.”\\n\\n A district court may grant a motion for “a new trial\\n grounded on newly discovered evidence” “if the interest of justice\\n so requires.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a), (b)(1). “Motions for a new trial\\n based on newly discovered evidence are highly disfavored in the\\n Eleventh Circuit and should be granted only with great caution.”\\n Campa, 459 F.3d at 1151 (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). To succeed, Beasley must prove “[1] that the evidence\\n was discovered after trial, [2] the defendant’s failure to discover the\\n evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, [3] the evidence is not\\n merely cumulative or impeaching, [4] the evidence is material, and\\n [5] the evidence would probably produce a different result at trial.”\\n United States v. Markovich, 95 F.4th 1367, 1379 (11th Cir. 2024) (cita-\\n tion and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n We doubt that Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum counts\\n as “evidence” within the meaning of Rule 33. Evidence “tends to\\n prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact,” Evidence,\\n BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), and Hajiabadi’s memo-\\n randum offers only an argument about the facts of her case. As we\\n have explained, “arguments of counsel are not evidence.” United\\n States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 726 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and in-\\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Even if Hajiabadi’s memorandum were evidence, the dis-\\n trict court did not abuse its discretion by denying Beasley’s motion\\n for a new trial. Hajiabadi’s sentencing argument should have come\\n as no surprise to Beasley. Hajiabadi’s criminal information—un-\\n sealed nearly a year before Beasley’s trial—alleged that Hajiabadi\\n participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain “reimbursement\\n for compound medications prepared with [unreimbursable] bulk\\n ingredients,” but it did not allege that she sought reimbursement\\n for “phantom” prescriptions never filled. Likewise, at Beasley’s\\n trial, Hajiabadi testified that that her scheme involved “billing a dif-\\n ferent ingredient in [her] compounds than what [she was] actually\\n making them with,” but that she intended for “the quality of the\\n product” to be “the same . . . [as] the patient expected and what the\\n doctor ordered.” If Beasley had any doubt about Hajiabadi’s posi-\\n tion, he could have asked her during cross-examination. To the ex-\\n tent that Hajiabadi’s position was unknown to Beasley until after\\n his trial, it is because of his own “lack of diligence.” See Markovich,\\n 95 F.4th at 1379.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n Beasley argues that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “directly con-\\n tradicted the Government’s case against Beasley.” We disagree.\\n Hajiabadi’s memorandum described her legal argument, not\\n Beasley’s. That Hajiabadi claimed to not have billed Medicare for\\n “phantom” prescriptions does not speak to whether Beasley did or\\n did not bill Medicare for those prescriptions. Hajiabadi’s memoran-\\n dum also would have been “merely cumulative” because it restates\\n Hajiabadi’s testimony from Beasley’s trial. Id. at 1379. And we\\n agree with the district court that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “would\\n not have affected the result of the trial” in the light of the other\\n evidence of Beasley’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its dis-\\n cretion by denying the motion for a new trial.\\n\\n Beasley also argues that the district court erred in not hold-\\n ing an evidentiary hearing on his motion. “The law of this circuit is\\n well established that a motion for new trial may ordinarily be de-\\n cided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hearing.” Markovich,\\n 95 F.4th at 1380 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Here, the purported new information was undisputed. The district\\n court assumed it was “true” and “interpreted [it] the way [Beasley\\n was] interpreting it.” An evidentiary hearing would have served no\\n purpose, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by de-\\n clining to hold one.\\n\\n B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting\\n Evidence of the Uncharged Theft.\\n\\n Next, Beasley argues that the district court erroneously ad-\\n mitted evidence that he stole cash from the pharmacy under\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). But the district court ruled that\\n evidence of the uncharged theft was “not subject to 404(b),” but\\n was instead admissible as intrinsic evidence. Because Beasley “fails\\n to challenge . . . the ground[] on which the district court based its\\n judgment”—that the evidence was admissible as intrinsic—“he is\\n deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it\\n follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate\\n Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Even if Beasley had properly challenged the admission of the\\n uncharged theft, we would not hold that the district court abused\\n its discretion in admitting that evidence. Evidence is admissible as\\n intrinsic if it is either “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of\\n the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged of-\\n fense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inex-\\n tricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged of-\\n fense.” United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013)\\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The uncharged\\n theft was necessary to complete the story of the crime. Beasley ar-\\n gued at trial that he received none of the profits from the conspir-\\n acy and lacked a motive to participate in it. But evidence that he\\n was skimming cash from the pharmacy explains why Beasley\\n would have had a financial motive to participate in the conspiracy.\\n Indeed, when confronted about the theft, Beasley told Hajiabadi\\n that he felt “undervalued and underappreciated” for his role in the\\n pharmacy’s success, which could suggest that he viewed the\\n money he took as his fair share of the conspiracy’s profits.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n Beasley argues that the district court should not have admit-\\n ted evidence of the theft because there is insufficient proof that it\\n occurred. But we disagree. When the relevance of evidence is con-\\n ditioned on the existence of some fact—here, whether Beasley\\n stole from the pharmacy—that evidence is admissible if “the jury\\n could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance\\n of the evidence.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690\\n (1988) (discussing FED. R. EVID. 104(b)). There was ample evidence\\n for the jury to have reasonably inferred that Beasley committed the\\n theft: Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole money; a video showed\\n Beasley taking money from a cash sale and not depositing it in the\\n register; Beasley’s bank records showed large cash deposits in addi-\\n tion to his salary; both Hajiabadi and a private investigator testified\\n that Beasley did not deny stealing the money, but instead explained\\n that he felt undercompensated; and Beasley repaid the owner\\n about $60,000. To be sure, Beasley offers an alternate explanation\\n for some of that evidence, and the district court expressed doubt\\n during sentencing about whether the uncharged theft occurred.\\n But a reasonable jury could have found that the theft occurred. The\\n district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of\\n the uncharged theft.\\n\\n C. The Government’s Refusal to Grant Khatami Immunity Did Not Vio-\\n late Beasley’s Right to Present a Complete Defense.\\n\\n Beasley next argues that he suffered a violation of his right\\n to present a complete defense because he was unable to question\\n Khatami. He does not challenge the ruling that Khatami invoked\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n her privilege against self-incrimination; instead, he challenges the\\n prosecution’s refusal to grant Khatami immunity.\\n\\n “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or\\n in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth\\n Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a\\n meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v.\\n Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). That right is “not unlimited, but rather is subject\\n to reasonable restrictions” to “accommodate other legitimate in-\\n terests in the criminal trial process.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.\\n 303, 308 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n One reasonable restriction is that a defendant may not compel a\\n witness to testify when the witness has properly invoked her Fifth\\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Ah-\\n med, 73 F.4th 1363, 1380 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Generally, we resolve a\\n conflict between a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege and a de-\\n fendant’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right in favor of\\n the witness.”). We agree with the district court that Beasley’s right\\n to present a complete defense must yield to Khatami’s unchal-\\n lenged invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege.\\n Beasley argues that the district court should have “com-\\n pelled the government to grant [Khatami] . . . immunity” to resolve\\n the conflict between Beasley’s and Khatami’s rights. But the power\\n to confer immunity resides “exclusively in the Executive Branch,”\\n not in the courts. United States v. Merrill, 685 F.3d 1002, 1015 (11th\\n Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 18\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1). The district court could not exercise a power it\\n does not have.\\n Beasley alludes to two additional arguments, each unpersua-\\n sive. First, Beasley devotes a paragraph to an argument that the\\n government violated his equal protection rights “by selectively\\n prosecuting [him] and not indicting [Khatami].” He asserts that “no\\n showing of discriminatory intent is necessary when the equal pro-\\n tection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification.”\\n But Beasley fails to say what the allegedly discriminatory classifica-\\n tion is. Second, Beasley perfunctorily asserts that the government’s\\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity violated his Confrontation\\n Clause rights. That argument is forfeited for insufficient briefing.\\n Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. In any event, it fails on the merits. The\\n Confrontation Clause protects against the admission of testimo-\\n nial hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).\\n Beasley has not pointed to any testimonial hearsay admitted at trial,\\n so the Confrontation Clause is not implicated.\\n D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by\\n Declining to Question Khatami In Camera.\\n\\n Finally, Beasley argues that the district court erred by not\\n conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami. We disagree. The\\n purpose of such a hearing would have been to test Khatami’s invo-\\n cation of the Fifth Amendment. But a district court need not con-\\n duct an in-camera hearing when the record contains sufficient, un-\\n contested information to resolve the issue. See United States v. Zolin,\\n 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (district court has discretion to determine\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n whether to conduct in-camera review based on “the facts and cir-\\n cumstances of the particular case, including, among other things,\\n . . . the likelihood that the evidence produced through in camera re-\\n view” will show that the privilege does not apply). During the pre-\\n trial hearing, Beasley’s counsel identified the types of questions he\\n would ask Khatami, whose counsel stated that Khatami would “in-\\n voke her Fifth Amendment right to essentially every relevant ques-\\n tion that [Beasley] has for her.” On that record, the district court\\n did not abuse its discretion by determining that proceedings in cam-\\n era were unnecessary.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM Beasley’s convictions.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11212734/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRANCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"BRANCH\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746149/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Ronald Anthony Beasley, II\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10506\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n RONALD ANTHONY BEASLEY, II,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00024-CEM-EJK-1\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\n cuit Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a pharmacist con-\n victed of health-care fraud is entitled to a new trial based on newly\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n discovered evidence, and whether the district court erred in some\n of its evidentiary rulings. A grand jury charged Ronald Beasley for\n defrauding Medicare by billing for different drugs than he dis-\n pensed and for prescriptions he never filled. He was convicted of\n one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\n counts of health-care fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1347, 1349. Beasley\n contends that the district court erred by not granting his motion\n for a new trial; by admitting evidence that he committed an un-\n charged theft; and by not holding an in-camera hearing to deter-\n mine whether a witness properly invoked her Fifth Amendment\n right against self-incrimination, and he argues that the government\n violated his right to present a complete defense by not offering the\n witness immunity. We affirm.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n On February 23, 2022, a grand jury indicted Ronald Beasley\n on one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\n counts of health-care fraud. See id. The indictment alleged that\n Beasley, as “pharmacist-in-charge” of a Florida pharmacy called\n NH Pharma, defrauded Medicare by seeking “reimbursement for\n compound and other prescription medications . . . that NH Pharma\n did not have the inventory to fill.” Beasley pleaded not guilty. The\n pharmacy’s owner, Nava Hajiabadi, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to\n commit health-care fraud and agreed to cooperate with the gov-\n ernment.\n Before trial, Beasley moved to exclude evidence that he stole\n about $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy, an uncharged theft.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n The district court denied that motion. It ruled that the uncharged\n theft was admissible as intrinsic evidence.\n Beasley also sought to question Hajiabadi’s mother,\n Mehrshid Khatami, at trial. Khatami was a part-owner of the phar-\n macy, worked there as a pharmacy technician, and helped manage\n its bank account. Khatami stated that she would invoke her Fifth\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, so the district\n court granted a hearing at Beasley’s request to evaluate Khatami’s\n invocation of that privilege.\n At the hearing, Beasley’s counsel outlined the questions he\n would ask Khatami, and Khatami’s counsel responded that\n Khatami “ha[d] a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in re-\n sponse to every single one of those questions or topics.” Khatami’s\n counsel alternatively suggested that the prosecution could provide\n his client immunity. The prosecution responded that immunity for\n witnesses is “rare,” determined “at a higher level within the De-\n partment of Justice,” and not “warranted” “in this circumstance.”\n The district court acknowledged the prosecution’s position and ex-\n plained that it was “not going to recommend [immunity] or lobby\n for it.” The district court ruled that Khatami had substantiated her\n invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and that in-camera\n questioning was unnecessary. So the district court excused\n Khatami from testifying at trial.\n At trial, Hajiabadi testified against Beasley. She explained\n that a significant portion of the pharmacy’s business involved com-\n pounded creams, which the pharmacy made in-house. The\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n pharmacy billed Medicare for compounded medicines based on the\n ingredients it used to make them. But not all ingredients are reim-\n bursable, and whether an ingredient is reimbursable may depend\n on its form. For example, an ingredient in a powder form—called\n a bulk agent—is ordinarily not reimbursable, but the same ingredi-\n ent in a capsule, tablet, or gel form may be reimbursable. Hajiabadi\n testified that she and Beasley fraudulently inflated the pharmacy’s\n profits by preparing compounds using unreimbursable bulk agents\n and billing Medicare for more expensive, reimbursable forms of the\n relevant ingredients.\n Hajiabadi also testified about how she and Beasley con-\n cealed their scheme. She explained that Medicare and insurance\n companies conduct audits in which they compare a pharmacy’s or-\n ders and inventory against the quantity of drugs the pharmacy\n claims to have dispensed. Because she and Beasley billed Medicare\n for ingredients they had not used or ordered, the pharmacy faced\n “shortages” of those ingredients. They addressed that problem by\n purchasing certain drugs to ensure that they were “on the shelves”\n when auditors inspected the pharmacy, and then returned the\n drugs after an audit concluded.\n Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole about $200,000 in cash\n from the pharmacy. She said that Beasley did not deny the theft but\n instead stated that “he felt undervalued and underappreciated,\n based on the money that was being made by the pharmacy.” After\n Hajiabadi and a private investigator confronted Beasley about the\n theft, he repaid more than $60,000. In addition to Hajiabadi’s\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n testimony about the theft, the prosecution introduced a video\n showing Beasley accept money from a cash transaction and not put\n it in the register, bank records of large cash deposits in addition to\n Beasley’s salary, and testimony from the private investigator.\n Three Medicare beneficiaries in whose name Beasley billed\n prescriptions also testified. They testified that they never re-\n ceived—nor even believe they were prescribed—several of the pre-\n scriptions Beasley purported to have dispensed to them.\n Finally, the prosecution offered testimony from Martin Cal-\n abrese, a Medicare expert. Calabrese testified that he conducted an\n audit of the pharmacy and concluded it had billed Medicare for\n drugs it could not have dispensed. He also opined that the quantity\n and duration of prescription of the drugs Beasley purported to dis-\n pense to the three Medicare beneficiaries was unusual, and that one\n of the drugs was “carcinogenic.”\n In closing, Beasley argued that he lacked knowledge of the\n conspiracy and a motive to participate in it because, as a salaried\n employee, he would not directly benefit from fraudulently inflating\n the pharmacy’s profits. He contended that “[p]eople don’t enter\n into agreements to [commit fraud] if there’s nothing in return.”\n The jury found Beasley guilty on all four counts. At sentenc-\n ing, Beasley denied stealing money from the pharmacy. Instead, he\n said that he ran a side business selling “collectible merchandise and\n apparel,” which explained his large cash deposits. Beasley further\n contended that he feared a false accusation of theft would jeopard-\n ize his then-pending application to join the Navy, so he “reluctantly\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n gave [Hajiabadi] all the money [he] had justly earned.” The district\n court did not entirely reject that story and sentenced him to 24\n months’ imprisonment—a downward variance from the guideline\n range of 51 to 63 months, which the government had requested.\n After Beasley’s trial, Hajiabadi filed a sentencing memoran-\n dum for her case. She argued that her case “is notable [in] that [it]\n involves real patients who suffered from bona fide medical ailments,\n and that [she] did dispense compound medications that were ap-\n propriate to treat their conditions”—albeit in a manner that “made\n them ineligible for reimbursement from Medicare.” Hajiabadi ar-\n gued that her “case [was] substantially different than typical\n healthcare cases where phantom patients are used as a means to\n submit fraudulent billing.” Beasley moved for a new trial on the\n ground that the arguments in Hajiabadi’s sentencing memoran-\n dum constituted new evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). The\n district court denied that motion.\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\n We review several issues for abuse of discretion. We review\n the denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered\n evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d\n 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). We also review the denial of\n an evidentiary hearing on that motion for abuse of discretion.\n United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009). We re-\n view the admission of evidence about the uncharged theft for\n abuse of discretion. United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591, 605 (11th\n Cir. 2023). And we review the decision not to question Khatami in\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n camera for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d\n 568, 580 (11th Cir. 2011).\n The government argues that we should review the latter is-\n sue for plain error because Beasley did not specifically request an\n in-camera hearing or object to the decision not to hold one. We dis-\n agree. The district court understood Beasley to have requested in-\n camera review, and it explained its reasoning for not conducting it.\n Beasley’s request for an in-camera hearing “was adequately pre-\n sented to the district court.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814,\n 819 (11th Cir. 2006).\n We review de novo Beasley’s constitutional challenge to the\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity from prosecution. See United\n States v. Mitrovic, 890 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018).\n III. DISCUSSION\n We divide our discussion into four parts. First, we explain\n that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying\n Beasley’s motion for a new trial and by not holding an evidentiary\n hearing. Second, we explain that the district court did not abuse its\n discretion by admitting evidence of the uncharged theft. Third, we\n explain that the prosecution did not violate Beasley’s right to a\n complete defense by declining to provide Khatami immunity. Fi-\n nally, we explain that the district court did not abuse its discretion\n by not conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the\n Motion for a New Trial Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing.\n\n Beasley argues that the district court should have granted\n him a new trial based on what he describes as newly discovered\n evidence from Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum. In that mem-\n orandum, Hajiabadi argued that her case was less severe than the\n “typical healthcare cases where phantom patients are used” to sub-\n mit fraudulent bills because she provided prescriptions to real pa-\n tients, even if using unreimbursable ingredients. Beasley contends\n that with the benefit of Hajiabadi’s memorandum, he would not\n have “inappropriately focused on defending allegations that\n Beasley was guilty of writing phantom scripts and dispensing inap-\n propriate and dangerous medications.”\n\n A district court may grant a motion for “a new trial\n grounded on newly discovered evidence” “if the interest of justice\n so requires.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a), (b)(1). “Motions for a new trial\n based on newly discovered evidence are highly disfavored in the\n Eleventh Circuit and should be granted only with great caution.”\n Campa, 459 F.3d at 1151 (citation and internal quotation marks\n omitted). To succeed, Beasley must prove “[1] that the evidence\n was discovered after trial, [2] the defendant’s failure to discover the\n evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, [3] the evidence is not\n merely cumulative or impeaching, [4] the evidence is material, and\n [5] the evidence would probably produce a different result at trial.”\n United States v. Markovich, 95 F.4th 1367, 1379 (11th Cir. 2024) (cita-\n tion and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n We doubt that Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum counts\n as “evidence” within the meaning of Rule 33. Evidence “tends to\n prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact,” Evidence,\n BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), and Hajiabadi’s memo-\n randum offers only an argument about the facts of her case. As we\n have explained, “arguments of counsel are not evidence.” United\n States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 726 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and in-\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\n\n Even if Hajiabadi’s memorandum were evidence, the dis-\n trict court did not abuse its discretion by denying Beasley’s motion\n for a new trial. Hajiabadi’s sentencing argument should have come\n as no surprise to Beasley. Hajiabadi’s criminal information—un-\n sealed nearly a year before Beasley’s trial—alleged that Hajiabadi\n participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain “reimbursement\n for compound medications prepared with [unreimbursable] bulk\n ingredients,” but it did not allege that she sought reimbursement\n for “phantom” prescriptions never filled. Likewise, at Beasley’s\n trial, Hajiabadi testified that that her scheme involved “billing a dif-\n ferent ingredient in [her] compounds than what [she was] actually\n making them with,” but that she intended for “the quality of the\n product” to be “the same . . . [as] the patient expected and what the\n doctor ordered.” If Beasley had any doubt about Hajiabadi’s posi-\n tion, he could have asked her during cross-examination. To the ex-\n tent that Hajiabadi’s position was unknown to Beasley until after\n his trial, it is because of his own “lack of diligence.” See Markovich,\n 95 F.4th at 1379.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n Beasley argues that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “directly con-\n tradicted the Government’s case against Beasley.” We disagree.\n Hajiabadi’s memorandum described her legal argument, not\n Beasley’s. That Hajiabadi claimed to not have billed Medicare for\n “phantom” prescriptions does not speak to whether Beasley did or\n did not bill Medicare for those prescriptions. Hajiabadi’s memoran-\n dum also would have been “merely cumulative” because it restates\n Hajiabadi’s testimony from Beasley’s trial. Id. at 1379. And we\n agree with the district court that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “would\n not have affected the result of the trial” in the light of the other\n evidence of Beasley’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its dis-\n cretion by denying the motion for a new trial.\n\n Beasley also argues that the district court erred in not hold-\n ing an evidentiary hearing on his motion. “The law of this circuit is\n well established that a motion for new trial may ordinarily be de-\n cided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hearing.” Markovich,\n 95 F.4th at 1380 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n Here, the purported new information was undisputed. The district\n court assumed it was “true” and “interpreted [it] the way [Beasley\n was] interpreting it.” An evidentiary hearing would have served no\n purpose, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by de-\n clining to hold one.\n\n B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting\n Evidence of the Uncharged Theft.\n\n Next, Beasley argues that the district court erroneously ad-\n mitted evidence that he stole cash from the pharmacy under\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). But the district court ruled that\n evidence of the uncharged theft was “not subject to 404(b),” but\n was instead admissible as intrinsic evidence. Because Beasley “fails\n to challenge . . . the ground[] on which the district court based its\n judgment”—that the evidence was admissible as intrinsic—“he is\n deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it\n follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate\n Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).\n\n Even if Beasley had properly challenged the admission of the\n uncharged theft, we would not hold that the district court abused\n its discretion in admitting that evidence. Evidence is admissible as\n intrinsic if it is either “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of\n the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged of-\n fense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inex-\n tricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged of-\n fense.” United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013)\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The uncharged\n theft was necessary to complete the story of the crime. Beasley ar-\n gued at trial that he received none of the profits from the conspir-\n acy and lacked a motive to participate in it. But evidence that he\n was skimming cash from the pharmacy explains why Beasley\n would have had a financial motive to participate in the conspiracy.\n Indeed, when confronted about the theft, Beasley told Hajiabadi\n that he felt “undervalued and underappreciated” for his role in the\n pharmacy’s success, which could suggest that he viewed the\n money he took as his fair share of the conspiracy’s profits.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n Beasley argues that the district court should not have admit-\n ted evidence of the theft because there is insufficient proof that it\n occurred. But we disagree. When the relevance of evidence is con-\n ditioned on the existence of some fact—here, whether Beasley\n stole from the pharmacy—that evidence is admissible if “the jury\n could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance\n of the evidence.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690\n (1988) (discussing FED. R. EVID. 104(b)). There was ample evidence\n for the jury to have reasonably inferred that Beasley committed the\n theft: Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole money; a video showed\n Beasley taking money from a cash sale and not depositing it in the\n register; Beasley’s bank records showed large cash deposits in addi-\n tion to his salary; both Hajiabadi and a private investigator testified\n that Beasley did not deny stealing the money, but instead explained\n that he felt undercompensated; and Beasley repaid the owner\n about $60,000. To be sure, Beasley offers an alternate explanation\n for some of that evidence, and the district court expressed doubt\n during sentencing about whether the uncharged theft occurred.\n But a reasonable jury could have found that the theft occurred. The\n district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of\n the uncharged theft.\n\n C. The Government’s Refusal to Grant Khatami Immunity Did Not Vio-\n late Beasley’s Right to Present a Complete Defense.\n\n Beasley next argues that he suffered a violation of his right\n to present a complete defense because he was unable to question\n Khatami. He does not challenge the ruling that Khatami invoked\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n her privilege against self-incrimination; instead, he challenges the\n prosecution’s refusal to grant Khatami immunity.\n\n “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or\n in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth\n Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a\n meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v.\n Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations and internal quotation\n marks omitted). That right is “not unlimited, but rather is subject\n to reasonable restrictions” to “accommodate other legitimate in-\n terests in the criminal trial process.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.\n 303, 308 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\n One reasonable restriction is that a defendant may not compel a\n witness to testify when the witness has properly invoked her Fifth\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Ah-\n med, 73 F.4th 1363, 1380 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Generally, we resolve a\n conflict between a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege and a de-\n fendant’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right in favor of\n the witness.”). We agree with the district court that Beasley’s right\n to present a complete defense must yield to Khatami’s unchal-\n lenged invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege.\n Beasley argues that the district court should have “com-\n pelled the government to grant [Khatami] . . . immunity” to resolve\n the conflict between Beasley’s and Khatami’s rights. But the power\n to confer immunity resides “exclusively in the Executive Branch,”\n not in the courts. United States v. Merrill, 685 F.3d 1002, 1015 (11th\n Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 18\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\n\n U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1). The district court could not exercise a power it\n does not have.\n Beasley alludes to two additional arguments, each unpersua-\n sive. First, Beasley devotes a paragraph to an argument that the\n government violated his equal protection rights “by selectively\n prosecuting [him] and not indicting [Khatami].” He asserts that “no\n showing of discriminatory intent is necessary when the equal pro-\n tection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification.”\n But Beasley fails to say what the allegedly discriminatory classifica-\n tion is. Second, Beasley perfunctorily asserts that the government’s\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity violated his Confrontation\n Clause rights. That argument is forfeited for insufficient briefing.\n Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. In any event, it fails on the merits. The\n Confrontation Clause protects against the admission of testimo-\n nial hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).\n Beasley has not pointed to any testimonial hearsay admitted at trial,\n so the Confrontation Clause is not implicated.\n D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by\n Declining to Question Khatami In Camera.\n\n Finally, Beasley argues that the district court erred by not\n conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami. We disagree. The\n purpose of such a hearing would have been to test Khatami’s invo-\n cation of the Fifth Amendment. But a district court need not con-\n duct an in-camera hearing when the record contains sufficient, un-\n contested information to resolve the issue. See United States v. Zolin,\n 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (district court has discretion to determine\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n whether to conduct in-camera review based on “the facts and cir-\n cumstances of the particular case, including, among other things,\n . . . the likelihood that the evidence produced through in camera re-\n view” will show that the privilege does not apply). During the pre-\n trial hearing, Beasley’s counsel identified the types of questions he\n would ask Khatami, whose counsel stated that Khatami would “in-\n voke her Fifth Amendment right to essentially every relevant ques-\n tion that [Beasley] has for her.” On that record, the district court\n did not abuse its discretion by determining that proceedings in cam-\n era were unnecessary.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM Beasley’s convictions.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Ronald Anthony Beasley, II\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10506\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n RONALD ANTHONY BEASLEY, II,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00024-CEM-EJK-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a pharmacist con-\\n victed of health-care fraud is entitled to a new trial based on newly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n discovered evidence, and whether the district court erred in some\\n of its evidentiary rulings. A grand jury charged Ronald Beasley for\\n defrauding Medicare by billing for different drugs than he dis-\\n pensed and for prescriptions he never filled. He was convicted of\\n one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\\n counts of health-care fraud. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1347, 1349. Beasley\\n contends that the district court erred by not granting his motion\\n for a new trial; by admitting evidence that he committed an un-\\n charged theft; and by not holding an in-camera hearing to deter-\\n mine whether a witness properly invoked her Fifth Amendment\\n right against self-incrimination, and he argues that the government\\n violated his right to present a complete defense by not offering the\\n witness immunity. We affirm.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n On February 23, 2022, a grand jury indicted Ronald Beasley\\n on one count of conspiracy to commit health-care fraud and three\\n counts of health-care fraud. See id. The indictment alleged that\\n Beasley, as “pharmacist-in-charge” of a Florida pharmacy called\\n NH Pharma, defrauded Medicare by seeking “reimbursement for\\n compound and other prescription medications . . . that NH Pharma\\n did not have the inventory to fill.” Beasley pleaded not guilty. The\\n pharmacy’s owner, Nava Hajiabadi, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to\\n commit health-care fraud and agreed to cooperate with the gov-\\n ernment.\\n Before trial, Beasley moved to exclude evidence that he stole\\n about $200,000 in cash from the pharmacy, an uncharged theft.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n The district court denied that motion. It ruled that the uncharged\\n theft was admissible as intrinsic evidence.\\n Beasley also sought to question Hajiabadi’s mother,\\n Mehrshid Khatami, at trial. Khatami was a part-owner of the phar-\\n macy, worked there as a pharmacy technician, and helped manage\\n its bank account. Khatami stated that she would invoke her Fifth\\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, so the district\\n court granted a hearing at Beasley’s request to evaluate Khatami’s\\n invocation of that privilege.\\n At the hearing, Beasley’s counsel outlined the questions he\\n would ask Khatami, and Khatami’s counsel responded that\\n Khatami “ha[d] a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in re-\\n sponse to every single one of those questions or topics.” Khatami’s\\n counsel alternatively suggested that the prosecution could provide\\n his client immunity. The prosecution responded that immunity for\\n witnesses is “rare,” determined “at a higher level within the De-\\n partment of Justice,” and not “warranted” “in this circumstance.”\\n The district court acknowledged the prosecution’s position and ex-\\n plained that it was “not going to recommend [immunity] or lobby\\n for it.” The district court ruled that Khatami had substantiated her\\n invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege and that in-camera\\n questioning was unnecessary. So the district court excused\\n Khatami from testifying at trial.\\n At trial, Hajiabadi testified against Beasley. She explained\\n that a significant portion of the pharmacy’s business involved com-\\n pounded creams, which the pharmacy made in-house. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n pharmacy billed Medicare for compounded medicines based on the\\n ingredients it used to make them. But not all ingredients are reim-\\n bursable, and whether an ingredient is reimbursable may depend\\n on its form. For example, an ingredient in a powder form—called\\n a bulk agent—is ordinarily not reimbursable, but the same ingredi-\\n ent in a capsule, tablet, or gel form may be reimbursable. Hajiabadi\\n testified that she and Beasley fraudulently inflated the pharmacy’s\\n profits by preparing compounds using unreimbursable bulk agents\\n and billing Medicare for more expensive, reimbursable forms of the\\n relevant ingredients.\\n Hajiabadi also testified about how she and Beasley con-\\n cealed their scheme. She explained that Medicare and insurance\\n companies conduct audits in which they compare a pharmacy’s or-\\n ders and inventory against the quantity of drugs the pharmacy\\n claims to have dispensed. Because she and Beasley billed Medicare\\n for ingredients they had not used or ordered, the pharmacy faced\\n “shortages” of those ingredients. They addressed that problem by\\n purchasing certain drugs to ensure that they were “on the shelves”\\n when auditors inspected the pharmacy, and then returned the\\n drugs after an audit concluded.\\n Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole about $200,000 in cash\\n from the pharmacy. She said that Beasley did not deny the theft but\\n instead stated that “he felt undervalued and underappreciated,\\n based on the money that was being made by the pharmacy.” After\\n Hajiabadi and a private investigator confronted Beasley about the\\n theft, he repaid more than $60,000. In addition to Hajiabadi’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n testimony about the theft, the prosecution introduced a video\\n showing Beasley accept money from a cash transaction and not put\\n it in the register, bank records of large cash deposits in addition to\\n Beasley’s salary, and testimony from the private investigator.\\n Three Medicare beneficiaries in whose name Beasley billed\\n prescriptions also testified. They testified that they never re-\\n ceived—nor even believe they were prescribed—several of the pre-\\n scriptions Beasley purported to have dispensed to them.\\n Finally, the prosecution offered testimony from Martin Cal-\\n abrese, a Medicare expert. Calabrese testified that he conducted an\\n audit of the pharmacy and concluded it had billed Medicare for\\n drugs it could not have dispensed. He also opined that the quantity\\n and duration of prescription of the drugs Beasley purported to dis-\\n pense to the three Medicare beneficiaries was unusual, and that one\\n of the drugs was “carcinogenic.”\\n In closing, Beasley argued that he lacked knowledge of the\\n conspiracy and a motive to participate in it because, as a salaried\\n employee, he would not directly benefit from fraudulently inflating\\n the pharmacy’s profits. He contended that “[p]eople don’t enter\\n into agreements to [commit fraud] if there’s nothing in return.”\\n The jury found Beasley guilty on all four counts. At sentenc-\\n ing, Beasley denied stealing money from the pharmacy. Instead, he\\n said that he ran a side business selling “collectible merchandise and\\n apparel,” which explained his large cash deposits. Beasley further\\n contended that he feared a false accusation of theft would jeopard-\\n ize his then-pending application to join the Navy, so he “reluctantly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n gave [Hajiabadi] all the money [he] had justly earned.” The district\\n court did not entirely reject that story and sentenced him to 24\\n months’ imprisonment—a downward variance from the guideline\\n range of 51 to 63 months, which the government had requested.\\n After Beasley’s trial, Hajiabadi filed a sentencing memoran-\\n dum for her case. She argued that her case “is notable [in] that [it]\\n involves real patients who suffered from bona fide medical ailments,\\n and that [she] did dispense compound medications that were ap-\\n propriate to treat their conditions”—albeit in a manner that “made\\n them ineligible for reimbursement from Medicare.” Hajiabadi ar-\\n gued that her “case [was] substantially different than typical\\n healthcare cases where phantom patients are used as a means to\\n submit fraudulent billing.” Beasley moved for a new trial on the\\n ground that the arguments in Hajiabadi’s sentencing memoran-\\n dum constituted new evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(b)(1). The\\n district court denied that motion.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n We review several issues for abuse of discretion. We review\\n the denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered\\n evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d\\n 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). We also review the denial of\\n an evidentiary hearing on that motion for abuse of discretion.\\n United States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2009). We re-\\n view the admission of evidence about the uncharged theft for\\n abuse of discretion. United States v. Burnette, 65 F.4th 591, 605 (11th\\n Cir. 2023). And we review the decision not to question Khatami in\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n camera for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d\\n 568, 580 (11th Cir. 2011).\\n The government argues that we should review the latter is-\\n sue for plain error because Beasley did not specifically request an\\n in-camera hearing or object to the decision not to hold one. We dis-\\n agree. The district court understood Beasley to have requested in-\\n camera review, and it explained its reasoning for not conducting it.\\n Beasley’s request for an in-camera hearing “was adequately pre-\\n sented to the district court.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814,\\n 819 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n We review de novo Beasley’s constitutional challenge to the\\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity from prosecution. See United\\n States v. Mitrovic, 890 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2018).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion into four parts. First, we explain\\n that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying\\n Beasley’s motion for a new trial and by not holding an evidentiary\\n hearing. Second, we explain that the district court did not abuse its\\n discretion by admitting evidence of the uncharged theft. Third, we\\n explain that the prosecution did not violate Beasley’s right to a\\n complete defense by declining to provide Khatami immunity. Fi-\\n nally, we explain that the district court did not abuse its discretion\\n by not conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying the\\n Motion for a New Trial Without Holding an Evidentiary Hearing.\\n\\n Beasley argues that the district court should have granted\\n him a new trial based on what he describes as newly discovered\\n evidence from Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum. In that mem-\\n orandum, Hajiabadi argued that her case was less severe than the\\n “typical healthcare cases where phantom patients are used” to sub-\\n mit fraudulent bills because she provided prescriptions to real pa-\\n tients, even if using unreimbursable ingredients. Beasley contends\\n that with the benefit of Hajiabadi’s memorandum, he would not\\n have “inappropriately focused on defending allegations that\\n Beasley was guilty of writing phantom scripts and dispensing inap-\\n propriate and dangerous medications.”\\n\\n A district court may grant a motion for “a new trial\\n grounded on newly discovered evidence” “if the interest of justice\\n so requires.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a), (b)(1). “Motions for a new trial\\n based on newly discovered evidence are highly disfavored in the\\n Eleventh Circuit and should be granted only with great caution.”\\n Campa, 459 F.3d at 1151 (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). To succeed, Beasley must prove “[1] that the evidence\\n was discovered after trial, [2] the defendant’s failure to discover the\\n evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, [3] the evidence is not\\n merely cumulative or impeaching, [4] the evidence is material, and\\n [5] the evidence would probably produce a different result at trial.”\\n United States v. Markovich, 95 F.4th 1367, 1379 (11th Cir. 2024) (cita-\\n tion and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n We doubt that Hajiabadi’s sentencing memorandum counts\\n as “evidence” within the meaning of Rule 33. Evidence “tends to\\n prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact,” Evidence,\\n BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024), and Hajiabadi’s memo-\\n randum offers only an argument about the facts of her case. As we\\n have explained, “arguments of counsel are not evidence.” United\\n States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 726 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and in-\\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n Even if Hajiabadi’s memorandum were evidence, the dis-\\n trict court did not abuse its discretion by denying Beasley’s motion\\n for a new trial. Hajiabadi’s sentencing argument should have come\\n as no surprise to Beasley. Hajiabadi’s criminal information—un-\\n sealed nearly a year before Beasley’s trial—alleged that Hajiabadi\\n participated in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain “reimbursement\\n for compound medications prepared with [unreimbursable] bulk\\n ingredients,” but it did not allege that she sought reimbursement\\n for “phantom” prescriptions never filled. Likewise, at Beasley’s\\n trial, Hajiabadi testified that that her scheme involved “billing a dif-\\n ferent ingredient in [her] compounds than what [she was] actually\\n making them with,” but that she intended for “the quality of the\\n product” to be “the same . . . [as] the patient expected and what the\\n doctor ordered.” If Beasley had any doubt about Hajiabadi’s posi-\\n tion, he could have asked her during cross-examination. To the ex-\\n tent that Hajiabadi’s position was unknown to Beasley until after\\n his trial, it is because of his own “lack of diligence.” See Markovich,\\n 95 F.4th at 1379.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n Beasley argues that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “directly con-\\n tradicted the Government’s case against Beasley.” We disagree.\\n Hajiabadi’s memorandum described her legal argument, not\\n Beasley’s. That Hajiabadi claimed to not have billed Medicare for\\n “phantom” prescriptions does not speak to whether Beasley did or\\n did not bill Medicare for those prescriptions. Hajiabadi’s memoran-\\n dum also would have been “merely cumulative” because it restates\\n Hajiabadi’s testimony from Beasley’s trial. Id. at 1379. And we\\n agree with the district court that Hajiabadi’s memorandum “would\\n not have affected the result of the trial” in the light of the other\\n evidence of Beasley’s guilt. The district court did not abuse its dis-\\n cretion by denying the motion for a new trial.\\n\\n Beasley also argues that the district court erred in not hold-\\n ing an evidentiary hearing on his motion. “The law of this circuit is\\n well established that a motion for new trial may ordinarily be de-\\n cided upon affidavits without an evidentiary hearing.” Markovich,\\n 95 F.4th at 1380 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Here, the purported new information was undisputed. The district\\n court assumed it was “true” and “interpreted [it] the way [Beasley\\n was] interpreting it.” An evidentiary hearing would have served no\\n purpose, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by de-\\n clining to hold one.\\n\\n B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting\\n Evidence of the Uncharged Theft.\\n\\n Next, Beasley argues that the district court erroneously ad-\\n mitted evidence that he stole cash from the pharmacy under\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). But the district court ruled that\\n evidence of the uncharged theft was “not subject to 404(b),” but\\n was instead admissible as intrinsic evidence. Because Beasley “fails\\n to challenge . . . the ground[] on which the district court based its\\n judgment”—that the evidence was admissible as intrinsic—“he is\\n deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it\\n follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.” Sapuppo v. Allstate\\n Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n\\n Even if Beasley had properly challenged the admission of the\\n uncharged theft, we would not hold that the district court abused\\n its discretion in admitting that evidence. Evidence is admissible as\\n intrinsic if it is either “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of\\n the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged of-\\n fense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inex-\\n tricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged of-\\n fense.” United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013)\\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The uncharged\\n theft was necessary to complete the story of the crime. Beasley ar-\\n gued at trial that he received none of the profits from the conspir-\\n acy and lacked a motive to participate in it. But evidence that he\\n was skimming cash from the pharmacy explains why Beasley\\n would have had a financial motive to participate in the conspiracy.\\n Indeed, when confronted about the theft, Beasley told Hajiabadi\\n that he felt “undervalued and underappreciated” for his role in the\\n pharmacy’s success, which could suggest that he viewed the\\n money he took as his fair share of the conspiracy’s profits.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n Beasley argues that the district court should not have admit-\\n ted evidence of the theft because there is insufficient proof that it\\n occurred. But we disagree. When the relevance of evidence is con-\\n ditioned on the existence of some fact—here, whether Beasley\\n stole from the pharmacy—that evidence is admissible if “the jury\\n could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponderance\\n of the evidence.” Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690\\n (1988) (discussing FED. R. EVID. 104(b)). There was ample evidence\\n for the jury to have reasonably inferred that Beasley committed the\\n theft: Hajiabadi testified that Beasley stole money; a video showed\\n Beasley taking money from a cash sale and not depositing it in the\\n register; Beasley’s bank records showed large cash deposits in addi-\\n tion to his salary; both Hajiabadi and a private investigator testified\\n that Beasley did not deny stealing the money, but instead explained\\n that he felt undercompensated; and Beasley repaid the owner\\n about $60,000. To be sure, Beasley offers an alternate explanation\\n for some of that evidence, and the district court expressed doubt\\n during sentencing about whether the uncharged theft occurred.\\n But a reasonable jury could have found that the theft occurred. The\\n district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of\\n the uncharged theft.\\n\\n C. The Government’s Refusal to Grant Khatami Immunity Did Not Vio-\\n late Beasley’s Right to Present a Complete Defense.\\n\\n Beasley next argues that he suffered a violation of his right\\n to present a complete defense because he was unable to question\\n Khatami. He does not challenge the ruling that Khatami invoked\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n her privilege against self-incrimination; instead, he challenges the\\n prosecution’s refusal to grant Khatami immunity.\\n\\n “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause . . . , or\\n in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth\\n Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a\\n meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v.\\n Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (citations and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). That right is “not unlimited, but rather is subject\\n to reasonable restrictions” to “accommodate other legitimate in-\\n terests in the criminal trial process.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.\\n 303, 308 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n One reasonable restriction is that a defendant may not compel a\\n witness to testify when the witness has properly invoked her Fifth\\n Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Ah-\\n med, 73 F.4th 1363, 1380 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Generally, we resolve a\\n conflict between a witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege and a de-\\n fendant’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right in favor of\\n the witness.”). We agree with the district court that Beasley’s right\\n to present a complete defense must yield to Khatami’s unchal-\\n lenged invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege.\\n Beasley argues that the district court should have “com-\\n pelled the government to grant [Khatami] . . . immunity” to resolve\\n the conflict between Beasley’s and Khatami’s rights. But the power\\n to confer immunity resides “exclusively in the Executive Branch,”\\n not in the courts. United States v. Merrill, 685 F.3d 1002, 1015 (11th\\n Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); 18\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10506\\n\\n U.S.C. § 6003(b)(1). The district court could not exercise a power it\\n does not have.\\n Beasley alludes to two additional arguments, each unpersua-\\n sive. First, Beasley devotes a paragraph to an argument that the\\n government violated his equal protection rights “by selectively\\n prosecuting [him] and not indicting [Khatami].” He asserts that “no\\n showing of discriminatory intent is necessary when the equal pro-\\n tection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification.”\\n But Beasley fails to say what the allegedly discriminatory classifica-\\n tion is. Second, Beasley perfunctorily asserts that the government’s\\n refusal to provide Khatami immunity violated his Confrontation\\n Clause rights. That argument is forfeited for insufficient briefing.\\n Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. In any event, it fails on the merits. The\\n Confrontation Clause protects against the admission of testimo-\\n nial hearsay. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).\\n Beasley has not pointed to any testimonial hearsay admitted at trial,\\n so the Confrontation Clause is not implicated.\\n D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by\\n Declining to Question Khatami In Camera.\\n\\n Finally, Beasley argues that the district court erred by not\\n conducting in-camera questioning of Khatami. We disagree. The\\n purpose of such a hearing would have been to test Khatami’s invo-\\n cation of the Fifth Amendment. But a district court need not con-\\n duct an in-camera hearing when the record contains sufficient, un-\\n contested information to resolve the issue. See United States v. Zolin,\\n 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (district court has discretion to determine\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10506 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n whether to conduct in-camera review based on “the facts and cir-\\n cumstances of the particular case, including, among other things,\\n . . . the likelihood that the evidence produced through in camera re-\\n view” will show that the privilege does not apply). During the pre-\\n trial hearing, Beasley’s counsel identified the types of questions he\\n would ask Khatami, whose counsel stated that Khatami would “in-\\n voke her Fifth Amendment right to essentially every relevant ques-\\n tion that [Beasley] has for her.” On that record, the district court\\n did not abuse its discretion by determining that proceedings in cam-\\n era were unnecessary.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM Beasley’s convictions.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30963,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10746150,"string":"10,746,150"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-12336"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12336\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n KAREN ALTAGRACIA PEREZ,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12977\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n JOVAN RIVERA RODRIGUEZ,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-3\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum sentence for sub-\\n stantial assistance, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may depart further from\\n the statutory minimum based on the general sentencing factors, id.\\n § 3553(a). Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez were convicted\\n of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute vast quantities of\\n fentanyl. Because of the quantity involved, they each faced manda-\\n tory sentences of ten years in prison. The government moved to\\n reduce their sentences based on the substantial assistance they of-\\n fered, but it opposed any reduction based on other factors. In both\\n cases, the district court granted the substantial-assistance motion,\\n and it reduced each sentence further based on the factors in sec-\\n tion 3553(a). The government appealed both sentences. Because\\n the text of section 3553(e) and our precedents make clear that de-\\n partures for substantial assistance may be based only on the assis-\\n tance factors, we vacate the sentences and remand to the district\\n court to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n A federal grand jury indicted Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera\\n Rodriguez for their role in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl\\n throughout the Orlando area. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez, along\\n with their co-conspirators, distributed counterfeit pharmaceutical\\n pills containing small amounts of fentanyl. Rivera Rodriguez\\n picked up packages containing fentanyl and delivered them to his\\n co-conspirators. Perez assisted her partner in unpacking the fenta-\\n nyl pills at their house and sending them out to distributors. Both\\n Rivera Rodriguez and Perez played minor roles in the conspiracy.\\n But the quantity of drugs they distributed was not minor: both\\n were responsible for possession or distribution of multiple kilo-\\n grams of fentanyl.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez pleaded guilty. Possession with\\n intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl carries a min-\\n imum sentence of ten years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). The same\\n minimum applies to drug conspiracies. See id. § 846. Because the\\n amounts of fentanyl Perez and Rivera Rodriguez individually traf-\\n ficked exceeded 400 grams, they each faced a minimum ten-year\\n sentence.\\n Soon after she pleaded guilty, Perez and the prosecution be-\\n gan to dispute the appropriate sentence. Perez submitted a memo-\\n randum to the district court requesting two years of home confine-\\n ment followed by supervised release, without reference to the stat-\\n utory minimum. She relied on both sections 3553(a) and (e) as in-\\n dependent bases for a below-minimum sentence.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n The prosecution filed a substantial-assistance motion under\\n both section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and section\\n 3553(e). The motion requested a two-level reduction in Perez’s cal-\\n culated offense level. It also argued that the district court could not\\n depart further below the statutory minimum based on the general\\n sentencing factors in section 3553(a).\\n The district court granted the prosecution’s substantial-as-\\n sistance motion and calculated a guideline range of 97 to\\n 121 months. The district court asked the prosecutor what his posi-\\n tion was on “the constraint on the Court of the minimum manda-\\n tory in light of the Government’s 5K motion.” The prosecutor re-\\n iterated the position taken in its motion: that the district court\\n could not “vary below [the reduced sentence] based on noncoop-\\n eration factors.” After stating that it believed “the law is unsettled\\n on that point,” the district court asked defense counsel his opinion.\\n Perez’s counsel responded that, when the government files a sub-\\n stantial-assistance motion, “that resolves the minimum manda-\\n tory.” The district court agreed with Perez and stated that “until\\n the Eleventh Circuit tells me otherwise,” it would “take into ac-\\n count all of the 3553 factors in fashioning a sentence,” regardless of\\n the mandatory minimum. It then sentenced Perez to 66 months in\\n prison based on the factors in section 3553(a).\\n At Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing, the prosecution filed an-\\n other substantial-assistance motion and again requested a two-\\n point reduction in Rivera Rodriguez’s offense level. The prosecu-\\n tion again objected to reducing the statutory minimum sentence\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n further based on section 3553(a). Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing\\n memorandum stated in a footnote only that he “expects that [the\\n minimum] will not apply in this case.” The district court told the\\n parties at the hearing that when “the Government files a 5K mo-\\n tion, in my view I then have discretion to impose any sentence that\\n I think is warranted.” After considering the section 3553(a) factors,\\n the district court imposed a 60-month prison sentence.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Federal courts may reward defendants for substantial assis-\\n tance to the prosecution in three ways. First, section 5K1.1 of the\\n Sentencing Guidelines allows the government to move to reduce a\\n defendant’s guideline range based on substantial assistance. United\\n States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (Nov. 2024). That\\n section lists five non-exhaustive factors a district court might con-\\n sider in determining the extent of the reduction, each assistance-\\n related. See id. Second, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)\\n allows the government to move to reduce a criminal sentence to\\n reward a defendant’s post-conviction assistance. FED. R. CRIM.\\n P. 35(b). This rule allows the sentencing court to “reduce the sen-\\n tence to a level below the minimum sentence established by stat-\\n ute.” Id. R. 35(b)(4). Third, section 3553(e)—titled “Limited Au-\\n thority to Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum”—al-\\n lows the sentencing court, “[u]pon motion of the Government,” to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n sentence below a statutory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This de-\\n parture is “to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance” in inves-\\n tigating or prosecuting another defendant. Id.\\n The district court erred. Section 3553(e) does not grant dis-\\n trict courts authority to sentence a defendant below a statutory\\n minimum based on non-assistance factors. That conclusion follows\\n directly from the text and structure of section 3553(e), as made\\n clear in several of our precedents.\\n We begin with the text. Subsection (e) neither obviates the\\n statutory minimum nor allows a departure based on non-assistance\\n factors. First, the subsection allows district courts to “impose a sen-\\n tence below [the] level established by statute,” not to impose any\\n sentence they desire. Id. And it tells us why departures from the\\n statutory minimum are allowed: “so as to reflect a defendant’s sub-\\n stantial assistance.” Id. This clause establishes that the purpose of\\n the reduction is to “‘reflect’ a defendant’s assistance.” United States\\n v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011). Any further reduc-\\n tion based on non-assistance factors would not reflect a defendant’s\\n substantial assistance and would “exceed[] the limited authority\\n granted by [section] 3553(e).” United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d\\n 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n If the correct answer is not apparent from the text of subsec-\\n tion (e), the context leaves no doubt. Subsection (e) is paired with\\n subsection (f) as the “only two circumstances in which a court can\\n depart downward” from a minimum sentence in section 3553.\\n United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). Where\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n Congress includes language in one section and omits it elsewhere,\\n “it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-\\n posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United\\n States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). Unlike subsection (e), subsection (f) expressly allows a\\n district court to sentence a defendant “without regard to any stat-\\n utory minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). It allows the district\\n court to sentence as it pleases and to consider all the subsection (a)\\n factors. In contrast, subsection (e) “retains the mandatory mini-\\n mum.” United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002). Com-\\n parison with subsection (f) underscores what is clear from the text\\n of subsection (e): a substantial-assistance motion does not elimi-\\n nate the mandatory minimum. Instead, it allows “for a specific,\\n carefully circumscribed type of departure.” Id.\\n If the whole text of the statute failed to settle the issue, this\\n Court has left no doubt. Our precedents recognize each premise in\\n this chain and its inevitable conclusion. In United States v. Williams,\\n we held that section 3553(e), unlike subsection (f), leaves the statu-\\n tory minimum in place. 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008). In\\n United States v. Castaing-Sosa, we held that section 3553(a) provides\\n no authority to vary below a statutory minimum. 530 F.3d 1358,\\n 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). And in United States v. Mangaroo, we in-\\n structed a district court to “consider only substantial assistance fac-\\n tors” in determining the extent of the departure from the statutory\\n minimum. 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).\\n In so doing, we reaffirmed our decision in United States v. Aponte\\n that a motion under section 3553(e) could “accord[] [the defendant]\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n full credit only for the ‘substantial assistance’ he had rendered.” 36\\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). These prece-\\n dents settle that section 3553(e) grants no authority to depart from\\n a statutory minimum except based on assistance factors and that a\\n district court cannot vary further downward based on the factors\\n in section 3553(a).\\n All our numbered sister circuits agree. The First, Second,\\n Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-\\n cuits have each held that a departure under section 3553(e) must be\\n based on assistance factors alone. See Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 55; United\\n States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008); Winebarger,\\n 664 F.3d at 392–93; United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285, 287 (4th\\n Cir. 2014); United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2006);\\n United States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2012); United\\n States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2009); Williams, 474\\n F.3d at 1131–32; United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir.\\n 2013); United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008).\\n That unanimous consensus confirms our interpretation.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez argue that the “mandatory prin-\\n ciples” of “just sentencing” embedded in section 3553(a) must gov-\\n ern sentences under subsection (e). But this argument is foreclosed\\n by Castaing-Sosa. Subsection (a) “merely lists the factors the district\\n court must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”\\n Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361. A sentencing judge may still con-\\n sider the section 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to grant a de-\\n parture from the statutory minimum. This limited discretion does\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n not override Congress’s determination that a particular minimum\\n sentence is warranted. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez also fail to dis-\\n cuss the limiting clause of subsection (e) or the stark differences in\\n how statutory minimums are treated in subsections (e) and (f). And\\n they cannot deny the unanimous weight of circuit authority.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez suggest that the government re-\\n lies on dicta from inapposite cases, but we disagree. The holdings\\n of Williams, Mangaroo, and Castaing-Sosa alone dictate our decision.\\n Neither Perez nor Rivera Rodriguez address Aponte. Although they\\n argue that Mangaroo confronted a narrower issue, they ignore that\\n we instructed the district court to “consider only substantial assis-\\n tance factors” in determining the defendant’s sentence pursuant to\\n a section 3553(e) motion. 504 F.3d at 1356. “Specific instructions to\\n a trial court, which limit what it may consider or hold on remand,\\n are not dicta.” Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.9\\n (11th Cir. 2013).\\n The extent of any departure from a statutory minimum un-\\n der section 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance\\n factors. District courts may not vary downward based on sec-\\n tion 3553(a). If this Court has not yet squarely held it, we do so\\n now.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE the sentences and REMAND with instructions\\n to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez in accordance with this\\n opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 14\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 ABUDU, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11212735/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Concurring:\\n I join the Court’s opinion in full as the text and our prece-\\n dent make clear that a district court cannot invoke the general sen-\\n tencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to reduce a sentence below a\\n statutory mandatory minimum once that minimum applies. Sec-\\n tion 3553(e) permits departures only “to reflect a defendant’s sub-\\n stantial assistance” in investigating or prosecuting another of-\\n fender, and nothing more. As the district court here relied on Sec-\\n tion 3553(a) factors to go further below the statutory minimum,\\n vacatur and remand are required. I write separately to highlight\\n broader concerns about how this framework operates in practice.\\n Our Court has long held that statutory mandatory mini-\\n mums remain binding absent a narrow statutory exception. Our\\n decision today reinforces what this Court and every other num-\\n bered sister circuit has repeatedly said: a statutory minimum can-\\n not be displaced by reference to the general Section 3553(a) factors.\\n In United States v. Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir.\\n 2008), we explained that Section 3553(a) provides no authority to\\n vary below that minimum. In United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d\\n 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007), we instructed the district court to “con-\\n sider only substantial assistance factors” when departing under Sec-\\n tion 3553(e), reaffirming what we said in United States v. Aponte, 36\\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994): a defendant is entitled to credit for\\n assistance rendered, but not to a broader reconsideration of all Sec-\\n tion 3553(a) factors.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 12 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 ABUDU, J., Concurring 23-12336\\n\\n Taken together, these precedents create a one-directional\\n sentencing regime. A district court may always look upward,\\n guided by Section 3553(a), to impose a harsher sentence than the\\n Sentencing Guidelines recommend. However, when a statutory\\n minimum applies, a district court cannot look downward—except\\n to the extent permitted under Section 3553(e) for substantial assis-\\n tance, or under Section 3553(f) when the safety-valve provision ap-\\n plies.\\n This asymmetry warrants reflection. 1 Under the Guidelines,\\n Section 1B1.1 itself directs that the Section 3553(a) factors are al-\\n ways to be considered last in calculating a sentence. District courts\\n use these factors to vary above and below guideline sentences\\n based on a range of factors, including the nature and circumstances\\n of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and\\n the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to criminal\\n conduct and provide just punishment. Yet when a statutory mini-\\n mum applies, the district court cannot use the Section 3553(a) fac-\\n tors to vary downward. Instead, the factors give way, and in the\\n context of a Section 3553(e) motion, any departure must be solely\\n based on the defendant’s “substantial assistance.” Notably, a judge\\n may still increase a sentence to reflect the seriousness of an offense\\n or the need for deterrence, but she cannot decrease it to reflect a\\n\\n 1 The Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), em-\\n\\n phasized that the Guidelines should be “effectively advisory,” designed both\\n to promote national uniformity and to preserve individualized sentencing. In\\n United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th 1315, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2021), we confirmed\\n that courts err when they treat any Guidelines provision as binding.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 13 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 ABUDU, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n defendant’s minor role, personal history, or other Section 3553(a)\\n considerations once the floor is re-set.\\n This restriction means that defendants with markedly differ-\\n ent levels of culpability, personal histories, or prospects for rehabil-\\n itation may nonetheless receive identical sentences, or the defend-\\n ant who played a greater role may receive a lower sentence, based\\n entirely on the assistance rendered, the prosecutor’s willingness to\\n bring a motion, and how the district court measures such assis-\\n tance.2 See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir.\\n 2006) (holding that, when granting a U.S.S.G § 5K1.1 substantial-\\n assistance departure, a district court may base the extent of the re-\\n duction only on assistance-related factors and may not consider\\n other Section 3553(a) factors such as restitution, underscoring that\\n cooperation—not culpability or personal circumstances—drives\\n the reduction); United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1092–93 (11th\\n Cir. 2008) (explaining that a district court’s Section 5K1.1 departure\\n must be based solely on the defendant’s assistance, and may not\\n consider other factors such as culpability or personal history,\\n\\n 2 See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Dispar-\\n\\n ity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 6–7\\n (2013) (finding that prosecutorial charging decisions interact with mandatory\\n minimums in ways that heighten disparity, even in the post-Booker era); see also\\n Shana Knizhnik, Failed Snitches and Sentencing Stitches: Substantial Assistance and\\n the Cooperator's Dilemma, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1722, 1755 n.205 (2015) (“It is for\\n this reason that under the current sentencing regime, prosecutors must specif-\\n ically make motions . . . in order for a judge to sentence below a mandatory\\n minimum, rather than motions pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guide-\\n lines.”).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 14 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 ABUDU, J., Concurring 23-12336\\n\\n meaning that defendants with differing roles or histories could re-\\n ceive similar sentences if their cooperation is assessed similarly).\\n The present case illustrates the consequences. Ms. Perez\\n and Mr. Rivera Rodriguez were minor participants in a conspiracy\\n involving large quantities of fentanyl. The district court found\\n both had provided assistance, and it sought to impose sentences\\n that accounted not only for that cooperation but also for their lim-\\n ited culpability and other statutory factors. In many other sentenc-\\n ing circumstances, we trust district courts with that discretion.\\n However, in the current framework, that is not allowed under Sec-\\n tion 3553(e). See Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361; Mangaroo, 504 F.3d\\n at 1356. Restricting the district court’s discretion here heightens\\n the risk of unwarranted disparities among defendants whose cir-\\n cumstances are materially different. As a matter of public policy,\\n and perhaps due process, 3 a sentencing framework that allows wide\\n discretion to increase one’s sentence while barring comparable dis-\\n cretion for downward departures warrants reevaluation.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Cf United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3rd Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J.,\\n\\n concurring) (reasoning that a defendant's due process rights may be violated\\n by sentencing system that “replace[s] judicial discretion over sentencing with\\n prosecutorial discretion”).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11212735/\", \"author_raw\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRANCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"BRANCH\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746150/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 14\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-12336\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n KAREN ALTAGRACIA PEREZ,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-2\n ____________________\n ____________________\n No. 23-12977\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\n\n JOVAN RIVERA RODRIGUEZ,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-3\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\n cuit Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum sentence for sub-\n stantial assistance, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may depart further from\n the statutory minimum based on the general sentencing factors, id.\n § 3553(a). Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez were convicted\n of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute vast quantities of\n fentanyl. Because of the quantity involved, they each faced manda-\n tory sentences of ten years in prison. The government moved to\n reduce their sentences based on the substantial assistance they of-\n fered, but it opposed any reduction based on other factors. In both\n cases, the district court granted the substantial-assistance motion,\n and it reduced each sentence further based on the factors in sec-\n tion 3553(a). The government appealed both sentences. Because\n the text of section 3553(e) and our precedents make clear that de-\n partures for substantial assistance may be based only on the assis-\n tance factors, we vacate the sentences and remand to the district\n court to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n A federal grand jury indicted Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera\n Rodriguez for their role in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl\n throughout the Orlando area. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez, along\n with their co-conspirators, distributed counterfeit pharmaceutical\n pills containing small amounts of fentanyl. Rivera Rodriguez\n picked up packages containing fentanyl and delivered them to his\n co-conspirators. Perez assisted her partner in unpacking the fenta-\n nyl pills at their house and sending them out to distributors. Both\n Rivera Rodriguez and Perez played minor roles in the conspiracy.\n But the quantity of drugs they distributed was not minor: both\n were responsible for possession or distribution of multiple kilo-\n grams of fentanyl.\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez pleaded guilty. Possession with\n intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl carries a min-\n imum sentence of ten years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). The same\n minimum applies to drug conspiracies. See id. § 846. Because the\n amounts of fentanyl Perez and Rivera Rodriguez individually traf-\n ficked exceeded 400 grams, they each faced a minimum ten-year\n sentence.\n Soon after she pleaded guilty, Perez and the prosecution be-\n gan to dispute the appropriate sentence. Perez submitted a memo-\n randum to the district court requesting two years of home confine-\n ment followed by supervised release, without reference to the stat-\n utory minimum. She relied on both sections 3553(a) and (e) as in-\n dependent bases for a below-minimum sentence.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\n\n The prosecution filed a substantial-assistance motion under\n both section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and section\n 3553(e). The motion requested a two-level reduction in Perez’s cal-\n culated offense level. It also argued that the district court could not\n depart further below the statutory minimum based on the general\n sentencing factors in section 3553(a).\n The district court granted the prosecution’s substantial-as-\n sistance motion and calculated a guideline range of 97 to\n 121 months. The district court asked the prosecutor what his posi-\n tion was on “the constraint on the Court of the minimum manda-\n tory in light of the Government’s 5K motion.” The prosecutor re-\n iterated the position taken in its motion: that the district court\n could not “vary below [the reduced sentence] based on noncoop-\n eration factors.” After stating that it believed “the law is unsettled\n on that point,” the district court asked defense counsel his opinion.\n Perez’s counsel responded that, when the government files a sub-\n stantial-assistance motion, “that resolves the minimum manda-\n tory.” The district court agreed with Perez and stated that “until\n the Eleventh Circuit tells me otherwise,” it would “take into ac-\n count all of the 3553 factors in fashioning a sentence,” regardless of\n the mandatory minimum. It then sentenced Perez to 66 months in\n prison based on the factors in section 3553(a).\n At Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing, the prosecution filed an-\n other substantial-assistance motion and again requested a two-\n point reduction in Rivera Rodriguez’s offense level. The prosecu-\n tion again objected to reducing the statutory minimum sentence\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n further based on section 3553(a). Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing\n memorandum stated in a footnote only that he “expects that [the\n minimum] will not apply in this case.” The district court told the\n parties at the hearing that when “the Government files a 5K mo-\n tion, in my view I then have discretion to impose any sentence that\n I think is warranted.” After considering the section 3553(a) factors,\n the district court imposed a 60-month prison sentence.\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\n III. DISCUSSION\n Federal courts may reward defendants for substantial assis-\n tance to the prosecution in three ways. First, section 5K1.1 of the\n Sentencing Guidelines allows the government to move to reduce a\n defendant’s guideline range based on substantial assistance. United\n States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (Nov. 2024). That\n section lists five non-exhaustive factors a district court might con-\n sider in determining the extent of the reduction, each assistance-\n related. See id. Second, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)\n allows the government to move to reduce a criminal sentence to\n reward a defendant’s post-conviction assistance. FED. R. CRIM.\n P. 35(b). This rule allows the sentencing court to “reduce the sen-\n tence to a level below the minimum sentence established by stat-\n ute.” Id. R. 35(b)(4). Third, section 3553(e)—titled “Limited Au-\n thority to Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum”—al-\n lows the sentencing court, “[u]pon motion of the Government,” to\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\n\n sentence below a statutory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This de-\n parture is “to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance” in inves-\n tigating or prosecuting another defendant. Id.\n The district court erred. Section 3553(e) does not grant dis-\n trict courts authority to sentence a defendant below a statutory\n minimum based on non-assistance factors. That conclusion follows\n directly from the text and structure of section 3553(e), as made\n clear in several of our precedents.\n We begin with the text. Subsection (e) neither obviates the\n statutory minimum nor allows a departure based on non-assistance\n factors. First, the subsection allows district courts to “impose a sen-\n tence below [the] level established by statute,” not to impose any\n sentence they desire. Id. And it tells us why departures from the\n statutory minimum are allowed: “so as to reflect a defendant’s sub-\n stantial assistance.” Id. This clause establishes that the purpose of\n the reduction is to “‘reflect’ a defendant’s assistance.” United States\n v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011). Any further reduc-\n tion based on non-assistance factors would not reflect a defendant’s\n substantial assistance and would “exceed[] the limited authority\n granted by [section] 3553(e).” United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d\n 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007).\n If the correct answer is not apparent from the text of subsec-\n tion (e), the context leaves no doubt. Subsection (e) is paired with\n subsection (f) as the “only two circumstances in which a court can\n depart downward” from a minimum sentence in section 3553.\n United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). Where\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n Congress includes language in one section and omits it elsewhere,\n “it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-\n posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United\n States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks\n omitted). Unlike subsection (e), subsection (f) expressly allows a\n district court to sentence a defendant “without regard to any stat-\n utory minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). It allows the district\n court to sentence as it pleases and to consider all the subsection (a)\n factors. In contrast, subsection (e) “retains the mandatory mini-\n mum.” United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002). Com-\n parison with subsection (f) underscores what is clear from the text\n of subsection (e): a substantial-assistance motion does not elimi-\n nate the mandatory minimum. Instead, it allows “for a specific,\n carefully circumscribed type of departure.” Id.\n If the whole text of the statute failed to settle the issue, this\n Court has left no doubt. Our precedents recognize each premise in\n this chain and its inevitable conclusion. In United States v. Williams,\n we held that section 3553(e), unlike subsection (f), leaves the statu-\n tory minimum in place. 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008). In\n United States v. Castaing-Sosa, we held that section 3553(a) provides\n no authority to vary below a statutory minimum. 530 F.3d 1358,\n 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). And in United States v. Mangaroo, we in-\n structed a district court to “consider only substantial assistance fac-\n tors” in determining the extent of the departure from the statutory\n minimum. 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).\n In so doing, we reaffirmed our decision in United States v. Aponte\n that a motion under section 3553(e) could “accord[] [the defendant]\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\n\n full credit only for the ‘substantial assistance’ he had rendered.” 36\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). These prece-\n dents settle that section 3553(e) grants no authority to depart from\n a statutory minimum except based on assistance factors and that a\n district court cannot vary further downward based on the factors\n in section 3553(a).\n All our numbered sister circuits agree. The First, Second,\n Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-\n cuits have each held that a departure under section 3553(e) must be\n based on assistance factors alone. See Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 55; United\n States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008); Winebarger,\n 664 F.3d at 392–93; United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285, 287 (4th\n Cir. 2014); United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2006);\n United States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2012); United\n States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2009); Williams, 474\n F.3d at 1131–32; United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir.\n 2013); United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008).\n That unanimous consensus confirms our interpretation.\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez argue that the “mandatory prin-\n ciples” of “just sentencing” embedded in section 3553(a) must gov-\n ern sentences under subsection (e). But this argument is foreclosed\n by Castaing-Sosa. Subsection (a) “merely lists the factors the district\n court must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”\n Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361. A sentencing judge may still con-\n sider the section 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to grant a de-\n parture from the statutory minimum. This limited discretion does\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n not override Congress’s determination that a particular minimum\n sentence is warranted. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez also fail to dis-\n cuss the limiting clause of subsection (e) or the stark differences in\n how statutory minimums are treated in subsections (e) and (f). And\n they cannot deny the unanimous weight of circuit authority.\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez suggest that the government re-\n lies on dicta from inapposite cases, but we disagree. The holdings\n of Williams, Mangaroo, and Castaing-Sosa alone dictate our decision.\n Neither Perez nor Rivera Rodriguez address Aponte. Although they\n argue that Mangaroo confronted a narrower issue, they ignore that\n we instructed the district court to “consider only substantial assis-\n tance factors” in determining the defendant’s sentence pursuant to\n a section 3553(e) motion. 504 F.3d at 1356. “Specific instructions to\n a trial court, which limit what it may consider or hold on remand,\n are not dicta.” Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.9\n (11th Cir. 2013).\n The extent of any departure from a statutory minimum un-\n der section 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance\n factors. District courts may not vary downward based on sec-\n tion 3553(a). If this Court has not yet squarely held it, we do so\n now.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We VACATE the sentences and REMAND with instructions\n to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez in accordance with this\n opinion.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 14\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 14\n\n\n\n\n 23-12336 ABUDU, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12336\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n KAREN ALTAGRACIA PEREZ,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12977\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 2 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n JOVAN RIVERA RODRIGUEZ,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00204-RBD-DCI-3\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum sentence for sub-\\n stantial assistance, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may depart further from\\n the statutory minimum based on the general sentencing factors, id.\\n § 3553(a). Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera Rodriguez were convicted\\n of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute vast quantities of\\n fentanyl. Because of the quantity involved, they each faced manda-\\n tory sentences of ten years in prison. The government moved to\\n reduce their sentences based on the substantial assistance they of-\\n fered, but it opposed any reduction based on other factors. In both\\n cases, the district court granted the substantial-assistance motion,\\n and it reduced each sentence further based on the factors in sec-\\n tion 3553(a). The government appealed both sentences. Because\\n the text of section 3553(e) and our precedents make clear that de-\\n partures for substantial assistance may be based only on the assis-\\n tance factors, we vacate the sentences and remand to the district\\n court to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 3 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n A federal grand jury indicted Karen Perez and Jovan Rivera\\n Rodriguez for their role in a conspiracy to distribute fentanyl\\n throughout the Orlando area. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez, along\\n with their co-conspirators, distributed counterfeit pharmaceutical\\n pills containing small amounts of fentanyl. Rivera Rodriguez\\n picked up packages containing fentanyl and delivered them to his\\n co-conspirators. Perez assisted her partner in unpacking the fenta-\\n nyl pills at their house and sending them out to distributors. Both\\n Rivera Rodriguez and Perez played minor roles in the conspiracy.\\n But the quantity of drugs they distributed was not minor: both\\n were responsible for possession or distribution of multiple kilo-\\n grams of fentanyl.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez pleaded guilty. Possession with\\n intent to distribute more than 400 grams of fentanyl carries a min-\\n imum sentence of ten years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). The same\\n minimum applies to drug conspiracies. See id. § 846. Because the\\n amounts of fentanyl Perez and Rivera Rodriguez individually traf-\\n ficked exceeded 400 grams, they each faced a minimum ten-year\\n sentence.\\n Soon after she pleaded guilty, Perez and the prosecution be-\\n gan to dispute the appropriate sentence. Perez submitted a memo-\\n randum to the district court requesting two years of home confine-\\n ment followed by supervised release, without reference to the stat-\\n utory minimum. She relied on both sections 3553(a) and (e) as in-\\n dependent bases for a below-minimum sentence.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 4 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n The prosecution filed a substantial-assistance motion under\\n both section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and section\\n 3553(e). The motion requested a two-level reduction in Perez’s cal-\\n culated offense level. It also argued that the district court could not\\n depart further below the statutory minimum based on the general\\n sentencing factors in section 3553(a).\\n The district court granted the prosecution’s substantial-as-\\n sistance motion and calculated a guideline range of 97 to\\n 121 months. The district court asked the prosecutor what his posi-\\n tion was on “the constraint on the Court of the minimum manda-\\n tory in light of the Government’s 5K motion.” The prosecutor re-\\n iterated the position taken in its motion: that the district court\\n could not “vary below [the reduced sentence] based on noncoop-\\n eration factors.” After stating that it believed “the law is unsettled\\n on that point,” the district court asked defense counsel his opinion.\\n Perez’s counsel responded that, when the government files a sub-\\n stantial-assistance motion, “that resolves the minimum manda-\\n tory.” The district court agreed with Perez and stated that “until\\n the Eleventh Circuit tells me otherwise,” it would “take into ac-\\n count all of the 3553 factors in fashioning a sentence,” regardless of\\n the mandatory minimum. It then sentenced Perez to 66 months in\\n prison based on the factors in section 3553(a).\\n At Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing, the prosecution filed an-\\n other substantial-assistance motion and again requested a two-\\n point reduction in Rivera Rodriguez’s offense level. The prosecu-\\n tion again objected to reducing the statutory minimum sentence\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 5 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n further based on section 3553(a). Rivera Rodriguez’s sentencing\\n memorandum stated in a footnote only that he “expects that [the\\n minimum] will not apply in this case.” The district court told the\\n parties at the hearing that when “the Government files a 5K mo-\\n tion, in my view I then have discretion to impose any sentence that\\n I think is warranted.” After considering the section 3553(a) factors,\\n the district court imposed a 60-month prison sentence.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Federal courts may reward defendants for substantial assis-\\n tance to the prosecution in three ways. First, section 5K1.1 of the\\n Sentencing Guidelines allows the government to move to reduce a\\n defendant’s guideline range based on substantial assistance. United\\n States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (Nov. 2024). That\\n section lists five non-exhaustive factors a district court might con-\\n sider in determining the extent of the reduction, each assistance-\\n related. See id. Second, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)\\n allows the government to move to reduce a criminal sentence to\\n reward a defendant’s post-conviction assistance. FED. R. CRIM.\\n P. 35(b). This rule allows the sentencing court to “reduce the sen-\\n tence to a level below the minimum sentence established by stat-\\n ute.” Id. R. 35(b)(4). Third, section 3553(e)—titled “Limited Au-\\n thority to Impose a Sentence Below a Statutory Minimum”—al-\\n lows the sentencing court, “[u]pon motion of the Government,” to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 6 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n sentence below a statutory minimum. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). This de-\\n parture is “to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance” in inves-\\n tigating or prosecuting another defendant. Id.\\n The district court erred. Section 3553(e) does not grant dis-\\n trict courts authority to sentence a defendant below a statutory\\n minimum based on non-assistance factors. That conclusion follows\\n directly from the text and structure of section 3553(e), as made\\n clear in several of our precedents.\\n We begin with the text. Subsection (e) neither obviates the\\n statutory minimum nor allows a departure based on non-assistance\\n factors. First, the subsection allows district courts to “impose a sen-\\n tence below [the] level established by statute,” not to impose any\\n sentence they desire. Id. And it tells us why departures from the\\n statutory minimum are allowed: “so as to reflect a defendant’s sub-\\n stantial assistance.” Id. This clause establishes that the purpose of\\n the reduction is to “‘reflect’ a defendant’s assistance.” United States\\n v. Winebarger, 664 F.3d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 2011). Any further reduc-\\n tion based on non-assistance factors would not reflect a defendant’s\\n substantial assistance and would “exceed[] the limited authority\\n granted by [section] 3553(e).” United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d\\n 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2007).\\n If the correct answer is not apparent from the text of subsec-\\n tion (e), the context leaves no doubt. Subsection (e) is paired with\\n subsection (f) as the “only two circumstances in which a court can\\n depart downward” from a minimum sentence in section 3553.\\n United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000). Where\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 7 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n Congress includes language in one section and omits it elsewhere,\\n “it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and pur-\\n posely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United\\n States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (citation and internal quotation marks\\n omitted). Unlike subsection (e), subsection (f) expressly allows a\\n district court to sentence a defendant “without regard to any stat-\\n utory minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). It allows the district\\n court to sentence as it pleases and to consider all the subsection (a)\\n factors. In contrast, subsection (e) “retains the mandatory mini-\\n mum.” United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2002). Com-\\n parison with subsection (f) underscores what is clear from the text\\n of subsection (e): a substantial-assistance motion does not elimi-\\n nate the mandatory minimum. Instead, it allows “for a specific,\\n carefully circumscribed type of departure.” Id.\\n If the whole text of the statute failed to settle the issue, this\\n Court has left no doubt. Our precedents recognize each premise in\\n this chain and its inevitable conclusion. In United States v. Williams,\\n we held that section 3553(e), unlike subsection (f), leaves the statu-\\n tory minimum in place. 549 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008). In\\n United States v. Castaing-Sosa, we held that section 3553(a) provides\\n no authority to vary below a statutory minimum. 530 F.3d 1358,\\n 1361 (11th Cir. 2008). And in United States v. Mangaroo, we in-\\n structed a district court to “consider only substantial assistance fac-\\n tors” in determining the extent of the departure from the statutory\\n minimum. 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).\\n In so doing, we reaffirmed our decision in United States v. Aponte\\n that a motion under section 3553(e) could “accord[] [the defendant]\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 8 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-12336\\n\\n full credit only for the ‘substantial assistance’ he had rendered.” 36\\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). These prece-\\n dents settle that section 3553(e) grants no authority to depart from\\n a statutory minimum except based on assistance factors and that a\\n district court cannot vary further downward based on the factors\\n in section 3553(a).\\n All our numbered sister circuits agree. The First, Second,\\n Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-\\n cuits have each held that a departure under section 3553(e) must be\\n based on assistance factors alone. See Ahlers, 305 F.3d at 55; United\\n States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008); Winebarger,\\n 664 F.3d at 392–93; United States v. Spinks, 770 F.3d 285, 287 (4th\\n Cir. 2014); United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2006);\\n United States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2012); United\\n States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2009); Williams, 474\\n F.3d at 1131–32; United States v. Lee, 725 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir.\\n 2013); United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008).\\n That unanimous consensus confirms our interpretation.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez argue that the “mandatory prin-\\n ciples” of “just sentencing” embedded in section 3553(a) must gov-\\n ern sentences under subsection (e). But this argument is foreclosed\\n by Castaing-Sosa. Subsection (a) “merely lists the factors the district\\n court must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”\\n Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at 1361. A sentencing judge may still con-\\n sider the section 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to grant a de-\\n parture from the statutory minimum. This limited discretion does\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 9 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n not override Congress’s determination that a particular minimum\\n sentence is warranted. Perez and Rivera Rodriguez also fail to dis-\\n cuss the limiting clause of subsection (e) or the stark differences in\\n how statutory minimums are treated in subsections (e) and (f). And\\n they cannot deny the unanimous weight of circuit authority.\\n Perez and Rivera Rodriguez suggest that the government re-\\n lies on dicta from inapposite cases, but we disagree. The holdings\\n of Williams, Mangaroo, and Castaing-Sosa alone dictate our decision.\\n Neither Perez nor Rivera Rodriguez address Aponte. Although they\\n argue that Mangaroo confronted a narrower issue, they ignore that\\n we instructed the district court to “consider only substantial assis-\\n tance factors” in determining the defendant’s sentence pursuant to\\n a section 3553(e) motion. 504 F.3d at 1356. “Specific instructions to\\n a trial court, which limit what it may consider or hold on remand,\\n are not dicta.” Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.9\\n (11th Cir. 2013).\\n The extent of any departure from a statutory minimum un-\\n der section 3553(e) must be based only on substantial-assistance\\n factors. District courts may not vary downward based on sec-\\n tion 3553(a). If this Court has not yet squarely held it, we do so\\n now.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE the sentences and REMAND with instructions\\n to resentence Perez and Rivera Rodriguez in accordance with this\\n opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 10 of 14\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 11 of 14\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-12336 ABUDU, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30964,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10746612,"string":"10,746,612"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Cecil Dante Buckner v. United States"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-03"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10001"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10001\\n ____________________\\n\\n CECIL DANTE BUCKNER,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket Nos. 6:21-cv-01824-RBD-DCI,\\n 6:16-cr-00081-RBD-DCI-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether counsel provided\\n ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a defendant’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n career-offender classification at sentencing. Cecil Buckner is a fed-\\n eral prisoner convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to com-\\n mit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime\\n of violence. He appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sen-\\n tence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. At sentencing, the district court varied\\n below the career-offender range of 535 to 572 months and sen-\\n tenced Buckner to 414 months of imprisonment, including a statu-\\n tory mandatory term of 384 months. Without his classification as a\\n career offender, Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to\\n 534 months of imprisonment. Because counsel’s performance,\\n even if deficient, did not prejudice Buckner, we affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2016, Cecil Buckner was charged with Hobbs Act conspir-\\n acy and two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of using,\\n carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a\\n crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c). Buckner entered\\n into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to each count. The\\n presentence investigation report classified Buckner as a career of-\\n fender because “[o]ne of the offenses of conviction [was] a con-\\n trolled substance offense” and Buckner had “at least two prior fel-\\n ony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled sub-\\n stance offense.” See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a)\\n (Nov. 2016). The presentence investigation report combined the\\n statutory minimum sentences for Buckner’s convictions under sec-\\n tion 924(c) for a total of 384 months. It then calculated a career-of-\\n fender range of 535 to 572 months’ imprisonment based on an of-\\n fense level of 32. Without the career-offender classification,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to 534 months\\n based on an offense level of 29. See U.S.S.G. § 5A.\\n At Buckner’s sentencing, no party objected to the presen-\\n tence investigation report. The district court adopted the presen-\\n tence investigation report as its findings of fact and imposed a\\n prison sentence of 414 months. It varied downward by 121 months\\n because “the aggregate sentence including the 384 months which\\n was statutorily obligated to be imposed resulted in essentially a life\\n sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the stat-\\n utory purposes of sentencing.” It stated that a “severe” sentence\\n was still appropriate because the crime was violent and involved a\\n gun. This Court affirmed. See United States v. Buckner, 808 F. App’x\\n 755 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2020).\\n In November 2021, Buckner moved to vacate his sentence\\n on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance\\n by failing to object to his career-offender classification. See 28\\n U.S.C. § 2255. The district court determined that the presentence\\n investigation report erroneously classified Buckner’s Hobbs Act\\n robbery offenses as controlled-substance offenses. But it denied the\\n motion because “binding precedent did not foreclose the use of\\n Hobbs Act robbery as a predicate crime of violence” at the time of\\n sentencing, so “the scrivener’s error did not alter the fact [that\\n Buckner] had the requisite convictions necessary for the enhance-\\n ment.” The district court concluded that counsel was not ineffec-\\n tive for failing to predict our ruling in United States v. Eason that\\n “Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n the 2016 version of section 4B1.2(a). 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir.\\n 2020). And the district court stated that Buckner did not establish\\n prejudice because “even if counsel had objected, the objection\\n would have been overruled given that [Buckner] qualified for treat-\\n ment as a career offender under [section] 4B1.1.” The district court\\n denied a certificate of appealability. We granted a certificate of ap-\\n pealability on the issue whether counsel was ineffective.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate, we review\\n questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Ritchie\\n v. United States, 112 F.4th 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2024). Ineffective\\n assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we\\n review de novo. Id.\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Buckner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to\\n object to his career-offender classification at sentencing. To obtain\\n relief, Buckner must establish that counsel’s performance was both\\n deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.\\n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). But “[i]f it is eas-\\n ier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of\\n sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.\\n To establish prejudice, Buckner must prove that there is a\\n “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-\\n rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at\\n 694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not\\n just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). “In\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n most cases a defendant who has shown that the district court mis-\\n takenly deemed applicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range\\n has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”\\n Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016). But the\\n application of an erroneous guideline range may not be dispositive\\n when the district court gives “a detailed explanation of the reasons\\n the selected sentence is appropriate . . . mak[ing] it clear that the\\n judge based the sentence . . . on factors independent of the Guide-\\n lines.” Id.\\n The record makes clear that the district court sentenced\\n Buckner based on factors independent of his career-offender classi-\\n fication. After calculating a career-offender range of 535 to\\n 572 months, the district court imposed a sentence of 414 months of\\n imprisonment, 384 months of which were statutorily mandated.\\n The district court added 30 months to the statutory-minimum sen-\\n tence instead of the 151 to 188 additional months provided by the\\n career-offender guideline. The sentence imposed of 414 months\\n was also 90 months below the bottom of the guideline range that\\n would have applied had Buckner not been classified as a career of-\\n fender.\\n The district court explained that it “imposed a variant sen-\\n tence because . . . the aggregate sentence . . . resulted in essentially\\n a life sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the\\n statutory purposes of sentencing.” The district court stated that the\\n sentence imposed was “almost the rest of [Buckner’s] natural life”\\n and would “put [Buckner] in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n until [he is] a relatively old man.” But it explained that Buckner was\\n still due a “severe” sentence because when defendants commit a\\n “violent crime” and “brandish [a] gun and use that gun to intimi-\\n date and to force compliance,” the “message that needs to be sent”\\n is that “you’re going to prison for a long, long time.” Because the\\n district court arrived at Buckner’s sentence by balancing his life ex-\\n pectancy with the “terror” and “fear” that he inflicted upon his vic-\\n tims, Buckner has not established a reasonable probability that his\\n sentence would have been different if counsel had objected to his\\n career-offender classification. Buckner was not prejudiced by his\\n counsel’s performance, so we do not address whether that perfor-\\n mance was deficient.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the denial of Buckner’s motion to vacate his\\n sentence.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11213197/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRANCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"BRANCH\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746612/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Cecil Dante Buckner v. United States\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-03\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10001\n ____________________\n\n CECIL DANTE BUCKNER,\n Petitioner-Appellant,\n versus\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Respondent-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket Nos. 6:21-cv-01824-RBD-DCI,\n 6:16-cr-00081-RBD-DCI-1\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\n cuit Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether counsel provided\n ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a defendant’s\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\n\n career-offender classification at sentencing. Cecil Buckner is a fed-\n eral prisoner convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to com-\n mit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime\n of violence. He appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sen-\n tence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. At sentencing, the district court varied\n below the career-offender range of 535 to 572 months and sen-\n tenced Buckner to 414 months of imprisonment, including a statu-\n tory mandatory term of 384 months. Without his classification as a\n career offender, Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to\n 534 months of imprisonment. Because counsel’s performance,\n even if deficient, did not prejudice Buckner, we affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In 2016, Cecil Buckner was charged with Hobbs Act conspir-\n acy and two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of using,\n carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a\n crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c). Buckner entered\n into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to each count. The\n presentence investigation report classified Buckner as a career of-\n fender because “[o]ne of the offenses of conviction [was] a con-\n trolled substance offense” and Buckner had “at least two prior fel-\n ony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled sub-\n stance offense.” See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a)\n (Nov. 2016). The presentence investigation report combined the\n statutory minimum sentences for Buckner’s convictions under sec-\n tion 924(c) for a total of 384 months. It then calculated a career-of-\n fender range of 535 to 572 months’ imprisonment based on an of-\n fense level of 32. Without the career-offender classification,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to 534 months\n based on an offense level of 29. See U.S.S.G. § 5A.\n At Buckner’s sentencing, no party objected to the presen-\n tence investigation report. The district court adopted the presen-\n tence investigation report as its findings of fact and imposed a\n prison sentence of 414 months. It varied downward by 121 months\n because “the aggregate sentence including the 384 months which\n was statutorily obligated to be imposed resulted in essentially a life\n sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the stat-\n utory purposes of sentencing.” It stated that a “severe” sentence\n was still appropriate because the crime was violent and involved a\n gun. This Court affirmed. See United States v. Buckner, 808 F. App’x\n 755 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2020).\n In November 2021, Buckner moved to vacate his sentence\n on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance\n by failing to object to his career-offender classification. See 28\n U.S.C. § 2255. The district court determined that the presentence\n investigation report erroneously classified Buckner’s Hobbs Act\n robbery offenses as controlled-substance offenses. But it denied the\n motion because “binding precedent did not foreclose the use of\n Hobbs Act robbery as a predicate crime of violence” at the time of\n sentencing, so “the scrivener’s error did not alter the fact [that\n Buckner] had the requisite convictions necessary for the enhance-\n ment.” The district court concluded that counsel was not ineffec-\n tive for failing to predict our ruling in United States v. Eason that\n “Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\n\n the 2016 version of section 4B1.2(a). 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir.\n 2020). And the district court stated that Buckner did not establish\n prejudice because “even if counsel had objected, the objection\n would have been overruled given that [Buckner] qualified for treat-\n ment as a career offender under [section] 4B1.1.” The district court\n denied a certificate of appealability. We granted a certificate of ap-\n pealability on the issue whether counsel was ineffective.\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate, we review\n questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Ritchie\n v. United States, 112 F.4th 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2024). Ineffective\n assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we\n review de novo. Id.\n III. DISCUSSION\n Buckner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to\n object to his career-offender classification at sentencing. To obtain\n relief, Buckner must establish that counsel’s performance was both\n deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.\n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). But “[i]f it is eas-\n ier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of\n sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.\n To establish prejudice, Buckner must prove that there is a\n “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-\n rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at\n 694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not\n just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). “In\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n most cases a defendant who has shown that the district court mis-\n takenly deemed applicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range\n has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”\n Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016). But the\n application of an erroneous guideline range may not be dispositive\n when the district court gives “a detailed explanation of the reasons\n the selected sentence is appropriate . . . mak[ing] it clear that the\n judge based the sentence . . . on factors independent of the Guide-\n lines.” Id.\n The record makes clear that the district court sentenced\n Buckner based on factors independent of his career-offender classi-\n fication. After calculating a career-offender range of 535 to\n 572 months, the district court imposed a sentence of 414 months of\n imprisonment, 384 months of which were statutorily mandated.\n The district court added 30 months to the statutory-minimum sen-\n tence instead of the 151 to 188 additional months provided by the\n career-offender guideline. The sentence imposed of 414 months\n was also 90 months below the bottom of the guideline range that\n would have applied had Buckner not been classified as a career of-\n fender.\n The district court explained that it “imposed a variant sen-\n tence because . . . the aggregate sentence . . . resulted in essentially\n a life sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the\n statutory purposes of sentencing.” The district court stated that the\n sentence imposed was “almost the rest of [Buckner’s] natural life”\n and would “put [Buckner] in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\n\n until [he is] a relatively old man.” But it explained that Buckner was\n still due a “severe” sentence because when defendants commit a\n “violent crime” and “brandish [a] gun and use that gun to intimi-\n date and to force compliance,” the “message that needs to be sent”\n is that “you’re going to prison for a long, long time.” Because the\n district court arrived at Buckner’s sentence by balancing his life ex-\n pectancy with the “terror” and “fear” that he inflicted upon his vic-\n tims, Buckner has not established a reasonable probability that his\n sentence would have been different if counsel had objected to his\n career-offender classification. Buckner was not prejudiced by his\n counsel’s performance, so we do not address whether that perfor-\n mance was deficient.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the denial of Buckner’s motion to vacate his\n sentence.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Cecil Dante Buckner v. United States\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-03\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10001\\n ____________________\\n\\n CECIL DANTE BUCKNER,\\n Petitioner-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Respondent-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket Nos. 6:21-cv-01824-RBD-DCI,\\n 6:16-cr-00081-RBD-DCI-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether counsel provided\\n ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a defendant’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n career-offender classification at sentencing. Cecil Buckner is a fed-\\n eral prisoner convicted of Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy to com-\\n mit Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime\\n of violence. He appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sen-\\n tence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. At sentencing, the district court varied\\n below the career-offender range of 535 to 572 months and sen-\\n tenced Buckner to 414 months of imprisonment, including a statu-\\n tory mandatory term of 384 months. Without his classification as a\\n career offender, Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to\\n 534 months of imprisonment. Because counsel’s performance,\\n even if deficient, did not prejudice Buckner, we affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In 2016, Cecil Buckner was charged with Hobbs Act conspir-\\n acy and two counts of Hobbs Act robbery and two counts of using,\\n carrying, and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a\\n crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 924(c). Buckner entered\\n into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to each count. The\\n presentence investigation report classified Buckner as a career of-\\n fender because “[o]ne of the offenses of conviction [was] a con-\\n trolled substance offense” and Buckner had “at least two prior fel-\\n ony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled sub-\\n stance offense.” See United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1(a)\\n (Nov. 2016). The presentence investigation report combined the\\n statutory minimum sentences for Buckner’s convictions under sec-\\n tion 924(c) for a total of 384 months. It then calculated a career-of-\\n fender range of 535 to 572 months’ imprisonment based on an of-\\n fense level of 32. Without the career-offender classification,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Buckner’s guideline range would have been 504 to 534 months\\n based on an offense level of 29. See U.S.S.G. § 5A.\\n At Buckner’s sentencing, no party objected to the presen-\\n tence investigation report. The district court adopted the presen-\\n tence investigation report as its findings of fact and imposed a\\n prison sentence of 414 months. It varied downward by 121 months\\n because “the aggregate sentence including the 384 months which\\n was statutorily obligated to be imposed resulted in essentially a life\\n sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the stat-\\n utory purposes of sentencing.” It stated that a “severe” sentence\\n was still appropriate because the crime was violent and involved a\\n gun. This Court affirmed. See United States v. Buckner, 808 F. App’x\\n 755 (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2020).\\n In November 2021, Buckner moved to vacate his sentence\\n on the ground that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance\\n by failing to object to his career-offender classification. See 28\\n U.S.C. § 2255. The district court determined that the presentence\\n investigation report erroneously classified Buckner’s Hobbs Act\\n robbery offenses as controlled-substance offenses. But it denied the\\n motion because “binding precedent did not foreclose the use of\\n Hobbs Act robbery as a predicate crime of violence” at the time of\\n sentencing, so “the scrivener’s error did not alter the fact [that\\n Buckner] had the requisite convictions necessary for the enhance-\\n ment.” The district court concluded that counsel was not ineffec-\\n tive for failing to predict our ruling in United States v. Eason that\\n “Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n the 2016 version of section 4B1.2(a). 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir.\\n 2020). And the district court stated that Buckner did not establish\\n prejudice because “even if counsel had objected, the objection\\n would have been overruled given that [Buckner] qualified for treat-\\n ment as a career offender under [section] 4B1.1.” The district court\\n denied a certificate of appealability. We granted a certificate of ap-\\n pealability on the issue whether counsel was ineffective.\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n When reviewing the denial of a motion to vacate, we review\\n questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Ritchie\\n v. United States, 112 F.4th 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2024). Ineffective\\n assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we\\n review de novo. Id.\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Buckner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to\\n object to his career-offender classification at sentencing. To obtain\\n relief, Buckner must establish that counsel’s performance was both\\n deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.\\n Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). But “[i]f it is eas-\\n ier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of\\n sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.\\n To establish prejudice, Buckner must prove that there is a\\n “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-\\n rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at\\n 694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not\\n just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). “In\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10001 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n most cases a defendant who has shown that the district court mis-\\n takenly deemed applicable an incorrect, higher Guidelines range\\n has demonstrated a reasonable probability of a different outcome.”\\n Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 200 (2016). But the\\n application of an erroneous guideline range may not be dispositive\\n when the district court gives “a detailed explanation of the reasons\\n the selected sentence is appropriate . . . mak[ing] it clear that the\\n judge based the sentence . . . on factors independent of the Guide-\\n lines.” Id.\\n The record makes clear that the district court sentenced\\n Buckner based on factors independent of his career-offender classi-\\n fication. After calculating a career-offender range of 535 to\\n 572 months, the district court imposed a sentence of 414 months of\\n imprisonment, 384 months of which were statutorily mandated.\\n The district court added 30 months to the statutory-minimum sen-\\n tence instead of the 151 to 188 additional months provided by the\\n career-offender guideline. The sentence imposed of 414 months\\n was also 90 months below the bottom of the guideline range that\\n would have applied had Buckner not been classified as a career of-\\n fender.\\n The district court explained that it “imposed a variant sen-\\n tence because . . . the aggregate sentence . . . resulted in essentially\\n a life sentence which was greater than necessary to accomplish the\\n statutory purposes of sentencing.” The district court stated that the\\n sentence imposed was “almost the rest of [Buckner’s] natural life”\\n and would “put [Buckner] in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10001\\n\\n until [he is] a relatively old man.” But it explained that Buckner was\\n still due a “severe” sentence because when defendants commit a\\n “violent crime” and “brandish [a] gun and use that gun to intimi-\\n date and to force compliance,” the “message that needs to be sent”\\n is that “you’re going to prison for a long, long time.” Because the\\n district court arrived at Buckner’s sentence by balancing his life ex-\\n pectancy with the “terror” and “fear” that he inflicted upon his vic-\\n tims, Buckner has not established a reasonable probability that his\\n sentence would have been different if counsel had objected to his\\n career-offender classification. Buckner was not prejudiced by his\\n counsel’s performance, so we do not address whether that perfor-\\n mance was deficient.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the denial of Buckner’s motion to vacate his\\n sentence.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30965,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10747663,"string":"10,747,663"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-13501"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13501\\n ____________________\\n\\n FLORIDA PREBORN RESCUE, INC.,\\n ALLEN TUTHILL,\\n ANTONIETTE M. MIGLIORE,\\n SCOTT MAHURIN,\\n JUDITH GOLDSBERRY,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n CITY OF CLEARWATER, FLORIDA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-01173-MSS-AAS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 2 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Seeking to protect the safety of those driving into and out of\\n the parking lot of a local abortion clinic, the City of Clearwater,\\n Florida created a “vehicular safety zone.” The buffer zone applied\\n to most pedestrians, forbidding entrance to a 38-foot stretch of pub-\\n lic sidewalk (28 feet of which cross the clinic’s driveway) during\\n business hours. A non-profit and four pro-life sidewalk counselors\\n sued, challenging the buffer zone as a violation of the First Amend-\\n ment, and moved for a preliminary injunction against its enforce-\\n ment. The district court denied the motion, holding that the plain-\\n tiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.\\n We disagree. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in\\n McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014), we hold that the plaintiffs\\n are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment chal-\\n lenge and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in\\n denying the preliminary injunction on that ground. We further\\n hold that the remaining factors clearly counsel in favor of prelimi-\\n nary injunctive relief. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s\\n judgment and remand the case with instructions that it enter the\\n requested injunction.\\n I\\n A\\n Bread and Roses Woman’s Health Center is a medical clinic\\n located in Clearwater, Florida that performs abortions on Tues-\\n days, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. is a\\n non-profit that describes its work as “pro-life” and “religiously mo-\\n tivated.” Br. of Appellants at 9. Allen Tuthill, Antoniette Migliore,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 3 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n and Scott Mahurin are members of Florida Preborn; Judith\\n Goldsberry is a non-member who periodically works with or near\\n them. All four individuals are “sidewalk counselors” who typically\\n go to the clinic on Tuesdays and Thursdays “to have conversations\\n on the sidewalk with, and provide literature to, patients and other\\n persons entering and exiting medical centers providing abortion\\n services.” Order Den. Prelim. Inj., at 3–4, Dkt. No. 45. Usually, no\\n more than two or three counselors visit the clinic on Tuesdays and\\n Thursdays. A larger group of protesters—as distinguished from\\n counselors—typically go on Saturdays.\\n Clearwater alleges that it has had issues with “protestors re-\\n peatedly crossing the driveway of the health center and impeding\\n ingress and egress of vehicle traffic and getting within close prox-\\n imity of driving cars with the intent to frighten and intimidate the\\n vehicle occupants.” Proposed Ordinance Summ., Dkt. No. 26-2.\\n In an effort to address that issue, the city passed Ordinance No.\\n 9665-23. See Ordinance, Dkt. No. 26-4. The record includes four\\n sources of evidence about disruptions both before and after the Or-\\n dinance’s enactment: (1) testimony from three police officers; (2)\\n several videos of incidents at the clinic; (3) a report cataloguing re-\\n cent police visits to the clinic; and (4) a collection of police reports.\\n In the Ordinance’s recitals, the city asserted that the problem\\n couldn’t be solved with “targeted trespass warnings” because “the\\n driveway is located on the public right-of-way”—nor could it be\\n tackled with “targeted arrests” because officers can’t arrest viola-\\n tors for misdemeanors not committed in their presence and be-\\n cause “protesters will temporarily comply with an officer’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 4 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n instructions whenever told to vacate the driveway” and then re-\\n enter later. Ordinance at 2.\\n The Ordinance reads as follows:\\n Section 28.10 – VEHICLE SAFETY ZONE FOR\\n BREAD AND ROSES WOMAN’S HEALTH\\n CENTER LOCATED AT 1560 S. HIGHLAND\\n AVENUE.\\n\\n (1) VEHICULAR SAFETY ZONE. No pedestrian as\\n defined in Florida Statute 316.003(56), or person rid-\\n ing a bicycle as defined in Florida Statute 316.003(4),\\n or person operating any other non-motorized vehicle,\\n shall enter into or cross any portion of the vehicular\\n driveway located at the western entrance to the clinic,\\n or enter that portion of the sidewalk or swale located\\n within five (5) feet north or south of the concrete\\n driveway. This restriction shall be in effect only from\\n Monday through Saturday, beginning 7:00am and\\n ending 6:00pm each day.\\n\\n This section shall not apply to police and public safety\\n officers, fire and rescue personnel, or other emer-\\n gency workers in the course of their official business,\\n or to authorized security personnel employees or\\n agents of the hospital, medical office or clinic en-\\n gaged in assisting patients and other persons to enter\\n or exit the Clinic.\\n\\n (2) PENALTY. Any person, firm, or corporation who\\n pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is convicted of\\n violating of this section shall be guilty of a Class III\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 5 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n civil infraction pursuant to Section 1.12 of this Code\\n of Ordinances.\\n\\n Ordinance at 2–3.\\n The buffer zone extends five feet on either side of the clinic’s\\n driveway, such that the full length of sidewalk covered—including\\n the portion that crosses the driveway—is about 38 feet. Below is a\\n picture of the clinic entrance, the white lines demarcating the\\n buffer zone:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Pls.’ Ex. #6, Dkt. No. 42-6; see also Order at 8.\\n According to the testimony of Clearwater police officers,\\n real-world enforcement of the Ordinance diverges from its text in\\n two respects. First, as to coverage: Although by its terms the Or-\\n dinance applies not just to counselors and protesters but to essen-\\n tially all pedestrians—exempting only first responders and certain\\n clinic personnel—officers have usually allowed ordinary passersby\\n to go on about their business. Second, as to sanctions: Typically,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 6 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n an officer will first give an individual who breaches the buffer zone\\n a warning and, if the violation continues, issue a citation. If the\\n individual persists in his violation even after receiving the citation,\\n however, then, even though the law doesn’t provide for criminal\\n penalties, the officer will arrest him for obstruction.\\n B\\n Florida Preborn and the four sidewalk counselors (collec-\\n tively, Florida Preborn) challenged the Ordinance, arguing that it\\n violates the First Amendment (both the Free Speech and Free Ex-\\n ercise Clauses, facially and as-applied), the Florida Constitution (fa-\\n cially and as-applied), and the Florida Religious Freedom Restora-\\n tion Act of 1998. Florida Preborn then moved to preliminarily en-\\n join the Ordinance solely on First Amendment free-speech\\n grounds, arguing that it was content-based as applied and, even if\\n content neutral, that it failed intermediate scrutiny. The district\\n court denied the preliminary injunction.\\n Before us, Florida Preborn has (for purposes of the appeal)\\n abandoned its argument that the Ordinance is content-based as ap-\\n plied, leaving only a facial free-speech challenge. See Br. of Appel-\\n lant at 5 n.2; Oral Arg. at 1:57–2:30 (explaining that this is a facial\\n challenge).\\n II\\n “A district court may grant preliminary injunctive relief only\\n if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of\\n success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless\\n the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 7 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause\\n the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be\\n adverse to the public interest.” ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade\\n Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modi-\\n fied). The first factor is the most important, and “[w]here a court\\n concludes that the movant fails to establish a substantial likelihood\\n of success on the merits,” it needn’t reach the remaining consider-\\n ations. Barber v. Governor of Ala., 73 F.4th 1306, 1317 (11th Cir.\\n 2023).\\n The district court held that Florida Preborn was unlikely to\\n succeed on the merits, so it denied the preliminary injunction with-\\n out reaching the remaining factors. For reasons we will explain,\\n we disagree. 1\\n A\\n The First Amendment famously provides that “Congress\\n shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.\\n Const. amend. I. This command applies to the States—and\\n\\n\\n 1 “We generally review preliminary injunctions only for an abuse of discretion,\\n\\n but we review de novo the legal conclusions on which they are based.” ACLU\\n of Fla., 557 F.3d at 1198. “This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the\\n district court applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper proce-\\n dures, or relies on clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion\\n that is clearly unreasonable or incorrect.” Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). “Otherwise,\\n an abuse of discretion standard recognizes there is a range of choice within\\n which we will not reverse the district court even if we might have reached a\\n different decision.” Id. (citation modified).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 8 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n therefore to municipalities like Clearwater—through the Four-\\n teenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; Police Dep’t of Chi. v.\\n Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–98 (1972). Public sidewalks, like the one at\\n issue here, are traditional public fora, where “the government’s\\n ability to restrict speech . . . is ‘very limited.’” McCullen v. Coakley,\\n 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,\\n 177 (1983)). But “[e]ven in a public forum, the government may\\n enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression”\\n that survive intermediate scrutiny—i.e., those that “[1] are content-\\n neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government\\n interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of commu-\\n nication.” Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th\\n Cir. 1999) (citation modified). Because, again, Florida Preborn has\\n (for present purposes) jettisoned its argument that the Ordinance\\n is content-based, the relevant factors here are the second and third,\\n both of which the government has the burden to prove. 2\\n\\n 2 Briefly, one preliminary issue: As already noted, this case (at least as it exists\\n\\n before us) presents a facial challenge. The Supreme Court recently reiterated\\n the rules applicable to facial challenges in a First Amendment case arising out\\n of this circuit. See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). In addressing\\n a facial First Amendment challenge, the Court said, “the question is whether\\n a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in\\n relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 723 (citation modi-\\n fied). A reviewing court must therefore “address the full range of activities the\\n laws cover, and measure the constitutional against the unconstitutional appli-\\n cations.” Id. at 724.\\n It’s not immediately clear how the facial-challenge standard maps onto\\n a case like this one, where the allegation, fundamentally, is that Clearwater’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 9 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n B\\n The district court concluded that the city “will likely be able\\n to show” both that the Ordinance “is . . . narrowly tailored to serve\\n a significant government interest” and that it “leaves open ample\\n alternative channels of communication.” Order at 17–23, 26–28.\\n Respectfully, we disagree. At the very least, the Ordinance is not\\n narrowly tailored. And because it isn’t narrowly tailored, we\\n needn’t address whether it leaves open ample alternative channels.\\n McCullen is the most relevant precedent, and so we consider\\n it in some detail. In that case, sidewalk counselors like those here\\n sued to enjoin the enforcement of a Massachusetts statute that cre-\\n ated buffer zones around all abortion clinics in the state—specifi-\\n cally, by “mak[ing] it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way\\n\\n\\n ordinance is insufficiently narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes.\\n The Sixth Circuit, though, in a case similar to this one—in which sidewalk\\n counselors sued to enjoin the enforcement of a 10-foot buffer zone around\\n clinic sidewalks and driveways—explained the rule’s application this way: “In\\n facial First Amendment challenges, we consider a statute’s full range of appli-\\n cations even when some of them do not implicate a particular plaintiff.” Sisters\\n for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2022). Ac-\\n cordingly, the court continued, “if a statute is not narrowly tailored, it cannot\\n be constitutionally applied to anyone, even if a more narrowly tailored statute\\n might still capture a plaintiff’s conduct.” Id. That reasoning tracks our own\\n caselaw addressing facial vagueness challenges under the First Amendment.\\n There, we’ve held that “at least when vagueness is the constitutional vice,” “as\\n a logical matter, a law . . . found to be constitutionally unreasonable . . . due\\n to lack of standards and guidance is by definition facially invalid.” Young Isr. of\\n Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit Auth., 89 F.4th 1337, 1350 (11th\\n Cir. 2024).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 10 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place,\\n other than a hospital, where abortions are performed.” Id. at 469,\\n 475 (citation modified). As relevant here, the counselors brought a\\n facial free-speech challenge under the First Amendment, which\\n both the district court and the First Circuit rejected, upholding the\\n statute as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulation. Id. at\\n 475 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).\\n The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 497. Despite holding\\n that the statute was content-neutral and therefore subject only to\\n intermediate scrutiny, id. at 478–85, the Court invalidated it on the\\n ground that it wasn’t narrowly tailored, id. at 486–97. In explaining\\n the narrow-tailoring test, the Court observed that, “[f]or a content-\\n neutral time, place, or manner regulation to be narrowly tailored,\\n it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to\\n further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Id. at 486 (quoting\\n Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). The Court said that while the law “‘need\\n not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the\\n government’s interests,” the government “‘may not regulate ex-\\n pression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden\\n on speech does not serve to advance its goals.’” Id. (quoting Ward,\\n 491 U.S. at 798–99).\\n The Court then set about applying that standard. As an ini-\\n tial matter, it identified the two inputs that inform any narrow-tai-\\n loring analysis: the government’s regulatory interest and the na-\\n ture of the speech at issue. Id. at 486–90. The buffer zone, the\\n Court observed, “clearly serve[d]” the government’s interest in\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 11 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n ensuring “public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unob-\\n structed use of public sidewalks and roadways.” Id. at 486 (citation\\n modified). “At the same time,” the Court emphasized, the statute\\n “serious[ly] burden[ed]” the counselors’ “two primary methods of\\n communicating with patients”: (1) “initiat[ing] [] close, personal\\n conversations”; and (2) “distribut[ing] literature to arriving pa-\\n tients.” Id. at 487–88.\\n Having identified the inputs, the Court proceeded to apply\\n the narrow-tailoring test, which, again, asks whether a challenged\\n law “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to achieve\\n the [government’s] asserted interests.” Id. at 490. It held that the\\n Massachusetts statute did so for two independent reasons. First,\\n “the [government] ha[d] too readily forgone options that could\\n serve its interests just as well, without substantially burdening the\\n kind of speech in which petitioners wish to engage.” Id. at 490.\\n And second, “[f]or a problem shown to arise only once a week in\\n one city at one clinic”—there, the evidence of disturbances cen-\\n tered on a single facility in Boston—“creating 35-foot buffer zones\\n at every clinic across the [state was] hardly a narrowly tailored so-\\n lution.” Id. at 493. Because the statute at issue in McCullen bur-\\n dened substantially more speech than necessary to advance the\\n government’s concededly legitimate interest in public safety, the\\n Court held that it wasn’t narrowly tailored and thus violated the\\n First Amendment. Id. at 486–97.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 12 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n C\\n The district court here endeavored to apply McCullen. It be-\\n gan by recognizing that “vehicular safety” is a significant govern-\\n ment interest and that the Ordinance promotes that interest.\\n Then, though, it skipped straight to the question whether Clearwa-\\n ter had “considered potentially less restrictive alternatives.” Order\\n at 19–20. The remainder of the court’s narrow-tailoring analysis\\n focused on factual comparisons between the circumstances pre-\\n sented by this case and those in which courts had enjoined buffer\\n zones, see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 469, 493; Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louis-\\n ville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 402–07 (6th Cir. 2022), or upheld\\n them, see Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605–06 (11th Cir. 1997);\\n Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 941 F.3d 73, 77–78, 90 (3rd Cir. 2019).\\n We think it best to wed ourselves closely to the analysis es-\\n tablished in McCullen. In doing so, we take guidance from a sister\\n circuit’s decision that applied McCullen in assessing sidewalk coun-\\n selors’ facial First Amendment challenge to a 10-foot buffer zone.\\n See Sisters for Life, 56 F.4th at 404–08.\\n 1\\n First up, the two narrow-tailoring inputs. Our evaluation of\\n the government’s interest is straightforward. Here, as in McCullen,\\n the government asserts an interest in vehicular safety—that is, the\\n safety of both pedestrians and drivers as cars enter and exit the\\n clinic. In the Ordinance’s recitals and in Clearwater’s filings before\\n both the district court and us, the city has repeatedly invoked its\\n interest in protecting safe ingress and egress at the clinic. See\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 13 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Ordinance at 2 (“WHEREAS, this buffer zone will ensure the safety\\n of protesters and patients alike, by allowing safe vehicular ingress\\n and egress to and from the clinic”); Response in Opp’n to Mot. for\\n Prelim. Inj., at 9, 19, Dkt. No. 26 (describing the “significant gov-\\n ernmental interest” as “providing safe and unobstructed access to\\n this Clinic” and as “vehicular safety”); Br. of Appellees at 19 (“[T]he\\n City has a significant governmental interest in providing safe and\\n unobstructed access to this Clinic, as it would for any driveway,”);\\n see also Order at 18 (“The City asserts vehicular safety as its signifi-\\n cant government interest.”). This is clearly a qualifying govern-\\n ment interest. As the Supreme Court recognized in Schenck v. Pro-\\n Choice Network of Western New York, the government has a legiti-\\n mate interest in “ensuring public safety and order, promoting the\\n free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property\\n rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-re-\\n lated services.” 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). McCullen held that “buffer\\n zones clearly serve these interests,” 573 U.S. at 487, and Florida Pre-\\n born wisely hasn’t contended otherwise.\\n “At the same time,” though, as the McCullen Court said, the\\n Ordinance seriously burdens Florida Preborn’s speech—here, as\\n there, by restricting the sidewalk counselors’ ability to distribute\\n leaflets to patients as they arrive at the clinic. Id. at 487–88. Ex-\\n plaining exactly how and why will take a bit of doing. Let’s first\\n take a close(r) look at McCullen. The Supreme Court there recog-\\n nized two forms of expression that “have historically been [] closely\\n associated with the transmission of ideas”: (1) “normal conversa-\\n tion” and (2) “leafletting on a public sidewalk.” Id. at 488. It\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 14 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n explained that “[w]hen the government makes it more difficult to\\n engage in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially\\n significant First Amendment burden.” Id. at 489. The Court then\\n held that the buffer zone at issue seriously burdened both forms of\\n expression, which it recognized were the sidewalk counselors’\\n “two primary methods of communicating with patients.” Id. at\\n 488.\\n First, the Court observed that the statute “compromise[d]\\n petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, personal conversations that\\n they view as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling’” by making it diffi-\\n cult to identify patients before they entered the buffer zone, by\\n making sidewalk counselors appear “untrustworthy” because they\\n had to stand behind a “painted border,” and by reducing them to\\n “raising [their] voice[s] at patients from outside the zone.” Id. at\\n 487. In response to the state’s argument that the petitioners could\\n still chant slogans and display signs from outside the buffer zone,\\n the Court said it “misse[d] the point” that the petitioners were side-\\n walk counselors, not protesters: “If all that the women can see and\\n hear are vociferous opponents of abortion, then the buffer zones\\n have effectively stifled petitioners’ message.” Id. at 489–90.\\n Second, the McCullen Court emphasized that the statute at\\n issue “made it substantially more difficult for petitioners to distrib-\\n ute literature to arriving patients” because sidewalk counselors\\n couldn’t identify pedestrian patients before they entered the zone,\\n and because they could “no longer even attempt to offer literature\\n as drivers turn[ed] into the parking lots.” Id. at 488. The Court\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 15 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n particularly emphasized the buffer zone’s restriction on the peti-\\n tioners’ “right to stand on the public sidewalks by the driveway as\\n cars turn[ed] into the parking lot.” Id. at 490.\\n Florida Preborn contends that, just as in McCullen, Clearwa-\\n ter’s ordinance burdens their speech interests in (1) close commu-\\n nication and (2) leafletting. We agree, at least as to its interest in\\n delivering literature to clinic patients—and because we find a seri-\\n ous burden there, we needn’t separately consider Florida Preborn’s\\n close-conversation interest. 3\\n Florida Preborn has provided “uncontradicted testimony”\\n that the buffer zone has effectively stifled sidewalk counselors’\\n\\n 3 The record regarding Florida Preborn’s close-conversation interest is mixed.\\n\\n To be sure, Mahurin testified that the “painted line” discourages clinic patients\\n from “com[ing] over to talk to” them, “forces [them] to shout,” and prevents\\n patients from “see[ing] the kindness in [their] faces.” Prelim. Inj. Mot. Hr’g\\n Tr., 47:2–11, Dkt. No. 43. And Tuthill also emphasized the importance of “be-\\n ing able to be heard in a normal tone of voice and not from a far away dis-\\n tance” and of demonstrating a “body language” of “concern” that is harder to\\n communicate over a distance. Id. at 74:23–75:12, 78:14–18; 81:8–12. The dis-\\n trict court, though, made several findings to the contrary. In particular, it de-\\n termined that “[t]he Ordinance does not prevent Plaintiffs from speaking in\\n whatever tone or level they choose to use” and that “[t]he evidence demon-\\n strated that, without amplification and while speaking in normal tones, Plain-\\n tiffs can be heard five feet away.” Order at 11. For support, the court pointed\\n to an in-court demonstration showing that the sidewalk counselors’ voices\\n could “carry an additional five feet to attract the attention of an individual.”\\n Id. In any event, we needn’t definitively resolve this question today because,\\n for reasons we will explain, the Ordinance burdens Florida Preborn’s leaf-\\n letting substantially more than is necessary to protect the safety of pedestrians\\n and vehicles as cars enter and exit the clinic’s parking lot.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 16 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n ability to distribute literature to patients entering and exiting the\\n clinic. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 487–88. Migliore, for instance, testified\\n that before the Ordinance’s adoption, she could—and did—briefly\\n walk into the portion of the sidewalk crossing the clinic’s driveway\\n to hand literature to occupants of cars if they stopped and rolled\\n down their windows, but that she can no longer do so. See Prelim.\\n Inj. Mot. Hr’g Tr., 101:23–102:13, 120:5–11, Dkt. No. 43. Mahurin\\n likewise said that he had previously handed leaflets directly to cars’\\n occupants, but that the Ordinance now prevents him from doing\\n so. Id. at 37:25–38:11, 59:23–61:5. So too, in their declarations,\\n Tuthill and Goldsberry testified that Florida Preborn members\\n used to step into the “public right-of-way area of the driveway”\\n when vehicles stopped to “briefly converse” with the occupants—\\n “one of [their] main activities at the Clinic”—but that it is now “im-\\n possible for [them] to hand any leaflets to people in cars entering\\n the Clinic.” Tuthill Decl., ¶¶ 8–11, Dkt. No. 16-1; see also\\n Goldsberry Decl., ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 16-6 (“Due to the Ordinance and\\n the buffer zone it creates, it is impossible for sidewalk counselors\\n to distribute leaflets to people in vehicles entering or exiting the\\n Clinic[,]” which “has been one of our main activities at the\\n Clinic . . . .”).\\n Photographs in the record confirm the witnesses’ testimony\\n that cars entering and exiting the clinic are now out of the reach of\\n counselors standing behind the buffer-zone lines. See Pls.’ Ex. #12,\\n Dkt. No. 42-12; Pls.’ Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And that matters\\n because, as the city admitted at the preliminary-injunction hearing,\\n most patients arrive at the clinic by car. See Hr’g Tr., 20:19–21:10.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 17 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n The closest the city (or the district court) has come to contradicting\\n Florida Preborn’s testimony is by pointing to a post-Ordinance in-\\n cident in which a clinic patron parked and then approached the\\n sidewalk counselors—but he did so to assault a counselor, not to\\n receive literature. 4\\n The district court made no contrary findings about Florida\\n Preborn’s leafletting activity. To be sure, the district court faulted\\n Florida Preborn for “not keep[ing] track of leaflets numerically and\\n thus” not being able to “definitively quantify any purported de-\\n cline.” Order at 13. But the Supreme Court didn’t require that\\n level of precision in McCullen. To the contrary, it emphasized one\\n counselor’s “estimate[s],” another’s claim that “she reaches ‘far\\n fewer people’ than she did before the amendment,” and another’s\\n testimony that after the buffer zone went into effect “only one\\n woman out of 100 will make the effort to walk across [the street]\\n to speak with [her].” 573 U.S. at 487–88. And while the district\\n court here noted Tuthill’s testimony that “he had stopped trying to\\n distribute leaflets altogether,” Order at 13, others clearly testified\\n that they continue to attempt to pass out literature, see Prelim. Inj.\\n\\n 4 On appeal, the city asserts that “the Plaintiffs did not commonly distribute\\n\\n leaflets to the vehicles from the sidewalk.” Br. of Appellees at 24–26. And it’s\\n true that Tuthill testified that the 50 or 60 pamphlets he handed out before the\\n Ordinance’s adoption were to people who parked and then walked up to him,\\n see Hr’g Tr. at 65:7–12, 66:8–15, and that a Florida Preborn witness said that\\n Goldsberry was “not as engaging with the women going in,” id. at 43:6–9,\\n 44:11–17. But that doesn’t account for the other witnesses who testified (as\\n described above the line) that they distributed leaflets and briefly spoke with\\n vehicles’ occupants.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 18 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Mot. Hr’g Tr., 33:6–11, 101:13–20, Dkt. No. 43. Finally, the district\\n court observed that the “Ordinance continues to permit [the coun-\\n selors] to wave leaflets” and to “pass[] leaflets to persons” who ven-\\n ture across the buffer zone’s line. Order at 13, 28. But that’s the\\n very sort of argument the McCullen Court rejected. See 573 U.S. at\\n 489 (“It is easier to ignore a . . . waving hand than . . . an out-\\n stretched arm.”).\\n Separately, it remains the case that, by its terms, the Ordi-\\n nance forbids a clinic patient who has parked her car to approach\\n sidewalk counselors to receive a leaflet. It prohibits all “pedes-\\n trian[s]” from “enter[ing]” the buffer zone for any reason—conspic-\\n uously exempting only clinic employees “engaged in assisting pa-\\n tients and other persons to enter or exit the Clinic” and various first\\n responders, but not clinic patients. Ordinance at 2–3. The district\\n court concluded that the “assisting” exemption “implicitly\\n cover[s]” “patients and other persons” entering or exiting the clinic\\n on foot, Order at 6 n.2; see also id. at 13 (“[N]othing in the Ordi-\\n nance prohibits someone who wants a leaflet from walking up to\\n [Tuthill] to retrieve a leaflet.”), but the Ordinance’s plain text belies\\n that reading. Again, the Ordinance expressly lists exceptions to its\\n general prohibition—but “patients and other persons” aren’t\\n among them. See Ordinance at 2–3. The more natural reading,\\n supported by record evidence, is that the “patients and other per-\\n sons” to which the “assisting” exception refers are those arriving by\\n car. Photographs in the record depict clinic “[e]scorts” in the buffer\\n zone directing cars into the clinic parking lot. See Pls.’ Ex. #14, Dkt.\\n No. 42-14; Pls.’ Ex. #15, Dkt. No. 42-15; Pls.’ Ex. #16, Dkt. No. 42-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 19 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n 16; Pls.’ Ex. #17, Dkt. No. 42-17; Pls.’ Ex. #18, Dkt. No. 42-18; Pls.’\\n Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And the fact that police officers have\\n opted not to enforce the Ordinance’s plain terms against some pe-\\n destrians, see supra at 5, is neither here nor there. Because this is a\\n facial challenge, “we must analyze [the Ordinance] as written.”\\n Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1994).\\n 2\\n On, then, to the application of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\\n analysis. We think it clear that the Ordinance burdens substantially\\n more speech—namely, the sidewalk counselors’ leafletting activi-\\n ties—than is necessary to achieve the government’s asserted inter-\\n est in promoting vehicular safety. See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490.\\n McCullen recognizes two ways in which a law can burden substan-\\n tially more speech than necessary, each of which is an inde-\\n pendently suffices as a basis for invalidation. First, the law does so\\n if the government can’t show “that it seriously undertook to ad-\\n dress the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it”—\\n that is, the government hasn’t adequately considered “alternative\\n measures.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490, 494–95. Second, it does so—\\n regardless of the availability of alternate measures—if there’s a ma-\\n terial mismatch between the regulation’s breadth and the interests\\n the government seeks to advance. See id. at 493; see also Sisters for\\n Life, 56 F.4th at 405 (referring to this as the “breadth of the regula-\\n tion” inquiry).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 20 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Dispositively here, the city failed to adequately consider al-\\n ternative measures. 5 For this part of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\\n analysis, the plaintiff bears the burden to provide, in the record,\\n “evidence of [such] feasible alternatives.” Pine v. City of W. Palm\\n Beach, 762 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). The government can\\n then rebut by demonstrating that “alternative measures that bur-\\n den substantially less speech would fail to achieve [its] interests.”\\n McCullen, 573 U.S. at 495. Importantly, though, it isn’t enough for\\n the government merely to show that its “chosen route is easier” or\\n more “efficien[t].” Id.\\n With respect to alternative measures, McCullen is very nearly\\n on point. The Supreme Court found it fatal that the state “ha[d]\\n too readily forgone options that could serve its interests just as\\n well, without substantially burdening the kind of speech in which\\n [the plaintiffs] wish[ed] to engage.” Id. at 490. In particular, the\\n government there, as here, sought (among other things) to address\\n “a substantial public safety risk created when protesters obstruct\\n driveways leading to the clinics.” Id. at 492. The Court concluded,\\n though, that the state had “fail[ed] to look to less intrusive means\\n of addressing its concerns.” Id. In particular, the Court said that\\n “[a]ny such obstruction c[ould] readily be addressed through exist-\\n ing local ordinances.” Id. (first quoting Worcester, Mass., Rev. Or-\\n dinances of 2008, ch. 12, § 25(b) (“No person shall stand, or place\\n\\n\\n 5 Accordingly, we needn’t decide whether there is a fatal mismatch between\\n\\n the regulation’s breadth and the government’s asserted interest in vehicular\\n safety.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 21 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n any obstruction of any kind, upon any street, sidewalk or crosswalk\\n in such a manner as to obstruct a free passage for travelers\\n thereon.”); and then quoting Bos., Mass., Mun. Code, ch. 16–\\n 41.2(d) (2013) (“No person shall solicit while walking on, standing\\n on or going into any street or highway used for motor vehicle\\n travel, or any area appurtenant thereto (including medians, shoul-\\n der areas, bicycle lanes, ramps and exit ramps).”)).\\n Florida currently has a law on the books that is materially\\n identical to the anti-obstruction laws that the McCullen Court cited\\n as exemplars: “A person may not willfully obstruct the free, con-\\n venient, and normal use of a public street, highway, or road\\n by . . . [i]mpeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traf-\\n fic or passage thereon . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 316.2045(1)(a)(1). Notably\\n for present purposes, the Florida law expressly defines “[s]treet or\\n highway” as “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of\\n every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is\\n open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic.” Id.\\n § 316.003(90)(a).\\n The district court and the city have offered a handful of bases\\n for distinguishing the alternative-measures analysis here from that\\n in McCullen. Respectfully, we find none of them persuasive. First,\\n the district court repeatedly said that the clinic’s driveway isn’t\\n “public.” Even assuming those statements to be factual findings\\n subject to clear-error review, see Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011), they cannot stand. The\\n Ordinance’s own description of the driveway states that it is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 22 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n “located on the public right-of-way.” Ordinance at 2. And the aer-\\n ial map of the lot attached to the Ordinance confirms that the\\n clinic’s lot doesn’t extend to the part of the driveway crossed by the\\n sidewalk, meaning that the land at issue is indeed publicly owned.\\n See id. at 5.\\n Second, the city asserts that the driveway is not “considered\\n by the Clearwater Police Department to be a ‘road or highway’”\\n within the meaning of the Florida statute. Br. of Appellee at 34–35.\\n But whatever individual officers might have said about their own\\n subjective (and inconsistent) understandings, compare, e.g., Hr’g Tr.\\n at 177:16–178:5 (statute doesn’t apply), and id. at 187:22–25 (statute\\n doesn’t apply), with, e.g., id. at 178:24–179:12 (statute applies), what\\n matters here—on a facial challenge—is that the statute applies by\\n its terms. As just explained, the law’s definition of “[s]treet or high-\\n way” is quite broad—certainly broad enough to cover driveways\\n on public property. See Fla. Stat. § 316.003(90)(a).\\n Third, both the district court and the city say that the legiti-\\n mate vehicular-safety interests can’t be addressed through “after\\n the fact” citation mechanisms like a statute criminalizing obstruc-\\n tion. Br. of Appellee at 33; Order at 19–20. The problem, of course,\\n is that the Ordinance likewise provides only for after-the-fact cita-\\n tions and (on its face, anyway) doesn’t even provide a mechanism\\n for arresting violators.\\n Finally, the city asserts that enforcement of the existing anti-\\n obstruction statute would be “significantly more tedious and less\\n efficient.” Br. of Appellees at 36. But that is precisely the kind of\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 23 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n argument that the Court in McCullen rejected: The government,\\n the Court said, must show that an alternative enforcement mecha-\\n nism “would fail to achieve the government’s interests” entirely,\\n “not simply that the chosen route is easier.” 573 U.S. at 495; see id.\\n (“A painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but the prime\\n objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”). And the city\\n hasn’t argued that enforcing the existing statute would altogether\\n fail to achieve its interests. 6\\n\\n 6 The city separately asserts that Florida’s anti-obstruction statute “has had a\\n\\n history of being found unconstitutional.” Br. of Appellees at 35. That is tech-\\n nically correct—but misleading. The lone authority the city cites is an order\\n on a motion to dismiss that found that “Plaintiffs ha[d] plausibly alleged that\\n the amended version of section 316.2045 . . . is arguably overbroad.” Dream\\n Defenders v. DeSantis, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1098 (N.D. Fla. 2021). That case\\n was voluntarily dismissed, see Order for Dismissal, Dream Defenders v. DeSantis,\\n No. 4:21CV00191, Dkt. No. 200 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2024), after this Court re-\\n versed an order preliminarily enjoining a different provision, see Dream Defend-\\n ers v. Governor of Fla., 119 F.4th 872, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2024). And while it’s\\n true that two district courts have held § 316.2045 unconstitutional on various\\n First Amendment grounds, see Bischoff v. Florida, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235–\\n 38 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1222–25 (M.D. Fla.\\n 2020), virtually all the offending language has since been excised from the stat-\\n ute. Compare Fla. Stat. § 316.2045 (1996) (held unconstitutional by Bischoff),\\n and id. (2007) (held unconstitutional by Vigue), with id. (2021) (current ver-\\n sion). The only potentially troublesome text that remains is the single word\\n “[s]tanding,” which Bischoff faulted for its vagueness. 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.\\n But the amended statute clarifies that term in precisely the way recommended\\n by the district court. Compare id. (“Section one is ambiguous as to whether it\\n is unlawful for an individual to willfully obstruct the free use of the road ‘by\\n standing,’ or whether she must do so by standing on the road.”), with Fla. Stat.\\n § 316.2045(1)(a)(2) (2021) (“Standing on or remaining in the street, highway,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 24 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n * * *\\n In closing, an important coda: It isn’t lost on us, of course,\\n that the buffer zone invalidated in McCullen was much larger than\\n the one at issue here—35 feet on either side of a clinic’s driveway,\\n rather than just 5. That fact is undeniable. Even so, we don’t think\\n it dictates a different analysis or result. Size alone didn’t drive the\\n Supreme Court’s decision there—principle did. The statute’s chief\\n failing wasn’t, as such, that it kept the counselors 35 feet back, but\\n rather that, however far it kept them back, it prevented them from\\n (as relevant here) offering literature to clinic patients as they ar-\\n rived. The Supreme Court noted, for instance, that several peti-\\n tioners there claimed a right that mirrors the one that the counse-\\n lors here claim—namely, to stand “where the private walkway or\\n driveway intersects the sidewalk and offer leaflets to patients as\\n they walk or drive by,” or to “position [themselves] at an entrance\\n to one of the five driveways leading to the parking lots.” 573 U.S.\\n at 474. And the Court’s analysis was trained less on the buffer\\n zone’s sheer scope than on the zone’s infringement (whatever its\\n size) of that claimed right. See id. at 487 (“[T]he zones carve out a\\n significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing peti-\\n tioners well back from the clinics’ entrances and driveways. The\\n\\n\\n or road.”). Of course, it’s not our task here to adjudicate the constitutionality\\n of § 316.2045, which isn’t under review. Suffice it to say that so far as we are\\n aware, no part of the current version of the statute has ever been deemed in-\\n valid for any reason.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 25 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n zones thereby compromise petitioners’ ability to initiate the close,\\n personal conversations that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk\\n counseling.’”); id. at 488 (“The buffer zones have also made it sub-\\n stantially more difficult for petitioners to distribute literature to ar-\\n riving patients.”); id. (“[T]he zones have pushed petitioners so far\\n back from the clinics’ driveways that they can no longer even at-\\n tempt to offer literature as drivers turn into the parking lots.”); id.\\n at 489 (“When the government makes it more difficult to engage\\n in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially signifi-\\n cant First Amendment burden.”).\\n The Sixth Circuit’s post-McCullen decision in Sisters for Life is\\n illuminating. There, in holding that a local ordinance establishing\\n a 10-foot buffer zone around the sidewalks leading to clinic en-\\n trances was likely unconstitutional, the court said this: “That the\\n buffer zone in McCullen was larger does not change things.” Sisters\\n for Life, 56 F.4th at 407. McCullen, the Sixth Circuit explained, “does\\n not create distinct sets of rules for a 35-foot buffer zone near an\\n entrance, a 10-foot buffer zone near an entrance, and all manner of\\n buffer zones in between,” but rather holds “that narrow tailoring is\\n required for all such burdens on speech.” Id. (emphasis added). Ac-\\n cordingly, the court concluded—however large or small, and\\n “whether its yoke is heavy or light”—“[o]nce a buffer zone burdens\\n speech, McCullen demands narrow tailoring.” Id. Indeed, the Sixth\\n Circuit seemed to think it constitutionally significant that the ordi-\\n nance at issue there kept sidewalk counselors “more than an arm’s\\n length away” from clinic patients, and thereby frustrated the coun-\\n selors’ protected leafletting activities. Id. at 406; accord id. at 407\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 26 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n (“[T]he buffer zone suppresses speech . . . since distribution now\\n takes place beyond an arm’s length . . . .”).7\\n Under McCullen, the controlling question is whether the\\n challenged buffer zone—be it five, 10, or 35 feet—burdens substan-\\n tially more speech than necessary to achieve the government’s as-\\n serted interests. We think it likely that Clearwater’s buffer zone\\n does so.\\n III\\n Because the district court rejected Florida Preborn’s prelim-\\n inary-injunction request at the first step, it had no occasion to\\n\\n 7 Our own post-McCullen decision in Pine is of a piece. That case dealt with an\\n\\n ordinance that forbade loud sounds within 100 feet of healthcare facilities.\\n Even so, we methodically marched through the McCullen analysis. Pine, 762\\n F.3d at 1269–74.\\n Lastly, a coda to the coda: As did the district court, Clearwater points\\n to cases that have upheld larger buffer zones than the one at issue here. Two\\n of those cases, though—Lucero and Schenck—involved targeted injunctions ra-\\n ther than generally applicable laws. See Lucero, 121 F.3d at 601; Schecnk, 519\\n U.S. at 371. And the McCullen Court explicitly distinguished injunction-related\\n cases in its analysis. See 573 U.S. at 492 (“We have previously noted the First\\n Amendment virtues of targeted injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophy-\\n lactic measures.”). In particular, the Court explained there that “an injunction\\n ‘regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of a group,’ but only ‘because\\n of the group’s past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real par-\\n ties,’” while a law, like the Ordinance here, “categorically excludes non-ex-\\n empt individuals from the buffer zones, unnecessarily sweeping in innocent\\n individuals and their speech.” Id. at 492–93 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health\\n Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)). A third case, Bruni, is irrelevant because it\\n concerned a law that did “not prohibit the sidewalk counseling in which Plain-\\n tiffs seek to engage within the zone.” 941 F.3d at 85.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 27 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n address the remaining factors. Even so, we think it sensible to ad-\\n dress and resolve them here. The relevant facts are undisputed; the\\n second, third, and fourth factors have been “fully briefed and ar-\\n gued by the parties”; and their resolution—in the light of our hold-\\n ing that Florida Preborn is likely to succeed on the merits—is clear.\\n See Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307, 1311 n.12 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n The irreparable-injury factor favors preliminary-injunctive\\n relief. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal\\n periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” El-\\n rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). True, we have held that only\\n “direct penalization”—as opposed to “incidental inhibition”—of\\n “First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable injury.” Cate v.\\n Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1983). But the Ordinance\\n “categorically bars” Florida Preborn’s speech by prohibiting side-\\n walk counselors from using a public sidewalk to distribute litera-\\n ture. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th\\n Cir. 2006).\\n The balance-of-harms and public-interest factors “merge\\n when the Government is the opposing party,” Nken v. Holder, 556\\n U.S. 418, 435 (2009), and likewise counsel in favor of preliminary-\\n injunctive relief. “[E]ven a temporary infringement of First\\n Amendment rights constitutes a serious and substantial injury, and\\n the city has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional\\n ordinance.” KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 28 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n IV\\n For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Florida Preborn\\n has a substantial likelihood of establishing that the Ordinance is not\\n narrowly tailored. Accordingly, we hold that the district court\\n abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction on the\\n ground that Florida Preborn hadn’t established a likelihood of suc-\\n cess on the merits, and we VACATE the district court’s judgment.\\n And because the remaining preliminary-injunction factors straight-\\n forwardly counsel in favor of granting preliminary-injunctive relief,\\n we REMAND to the district court with instructions that it enter\\n the requested injunction.\\n VACATED and REMANDED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 29 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214248/\", \"author_raw\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:\\n Preliminary injunctions are a drastic remedy that require the\\n movant to demonstrate four requisites before the court can afford\\n relief. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).\\n The movant must show that she: (1) has substantial likelihood of\\n success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm if the court\\n does not grant an injunction, (3) will suffer a threatened injury\\n which outweighs damages the nonmovant will suffer, and (4) does\\n not request an injunction that would not go against public inter-\\n ests. Id.\\n I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because\\n Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. (“FPR”) has not established a likeli-\\n hood of success on the merits of their challenge against the City of\\n Clearwater’s ordinance, which created a mere five foot buffer zone\\n between leafleteers and patients seeking reproductive care in re-\\n sponse to law enforcement’s repeated requests for more effective\\n policing in the area. Specifically, FPR has not met its high burden\\n of showing that the ordinance is unconstitutional under most cir-\\n cumstances, that it is not sufficiently narrowly tailored, and that\\n the ample means available for communicating FPR’s message are\\n insufficient. Additionally, FPR fails to show it will incur irreparable\\n harm or that granting an injunction is in the public’s interests. For\\n these reasons, the district court’s order denying the preliminary in-\\n junction should be affirmed.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 30 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 23-13501\\n\\n I. The Proper Framework for Facial Constitutional\\n Challenges as Articulated in Moody\\n This Court reviews a lower court’s decision “to deny a pre-\\n liminary injunction for abuse of discretion” and, in doing so, re-\\n views “findings of fact of the district court for clear error and legal\\n conclusions de novo.” Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1289 (11th Cir.\\n 2010); see also Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605–06 (11th Cir. 1997)\\n (“[W]e will defer to the district court’s ‘reasonable assessment’ of\\n the number of feet necessary to ensure that access to the [c]linic is\\n not impeded.”); Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc.,\\n 304 F.3d 1167, 1171 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a district\\n court’s “judgments . . . about the viability of a plaintiff's claims and\\n the balancing of equities and the public interest, are the district\\n court’s to make and we will not set them aside unless the district\\n court has abused its discretion in making them”).\\n Facial constitutional challenges are necessarily “hard to\\n win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024); see also In\\n re: Georgia Senate Bill 202, __F.4th__, 2025 WL 3440334, at *2 (11th\\n Cir. Dec. 1, 2025). Typically, a plaintiff’s facial challenge only suc-\\n ceeds if they “establish[] that no set of circumstances exists under\\n which the [challenged law] would be valid, i.e., that the law is un-\\n constitutional in all of its applications.” Washington State Grange v.\\n Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (internal\\n quotation marks and citations omitted). In Moody, the Court\\n slightly relaxed its “no set of circumstances” test to allow courts to\\n strike down laws that impact a substantial amount of speech, “[b]ut\\n that is so only if the law’s unconstitutional applications substantially\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 31 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 3\\n\\n outweigh its constitutional ones.” 603 U.S. at 723–24 (emphasis\\n added). Moody was careful to identify the flaws in lower court\\n opinions, including some of our own, in which we failed to address\\n the “full range of activities the laws cover, and measure the consti-\\n tutional against the unconstitutional applications.” Id. at 724. As\\n the Court admonished, we had been treating facial challenges\\n more like as-applied claims. Id. Unfortunately, the majority in this\\n case has made that same error—again. Regardless, the “unconsti-\\n tutional under most circumstances” test still places the burden on\\n the FPR to show that the City’s narrow tailoring and alternative\\n channels of communication are more constitutionally flawed than\\n favored. See id at 23 (relaxing the burden for First Amendment fa-\\n cial challenges but not shifting that burden away from plaintiffs).\\n When engaging in the balancing test the Court set forth in\\n Moody, we must follow a two-step process. First, we should assess\\n the scope of the City’s ordinance, including the activities it covers,\\n the parties impacted, the law’s specific prohibitions, and what\\n other conduct it regulates. Id. Second, we must “decide which of\\n the laws’ applications violate the First Amendment,” and then\\n “measure them against the rest.” Id. at 725. As to the measuring\\n part, our mandate is to compare the law’s permissible and imper-\\n missible applications and then determine whether the ordinance\\n principally regulates expressive conduct in an unconstitutional\\n manner or has a sphere of other applications that prevent facial in-\\n validation. Id. at 726. The majority skips this part entirely, appar-\\n ently because it viewed these prerequisites as easily bypassed if the\\n case hinges on narrow tailoring. However, Moody dictates that\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 32 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 23-13501\\n\\n there is no bypassing the elements of analysis: “[I]n the First\\n Amendment context, facial challenges are disfavored, and neither\\n parties nor courts can disregard the requisite inquiry into how a\\n law works in all of its applications.” Id. at 744.\\n II. The City of Clearwater Satisfies the Moody Test\\n Even assuming there are some unconstitutional aspects to\\n the City’s ordinance, which there do not appear to be, there are still\\n constitutional applications of the law that undercut FPR’s facial\\n challenge. It is undisputed that the City has an interest in “provid-\\n ing safe and unobstructed access to [the] clinic, as it would for any\\n driveway.” Both precedent and the majority agree such an interest\\n exists and is substantial. See Lucero, 121 F.3d at 607 (recognizing a\\n “significant” government interest in “promoting the free flow of\\n traffic on public streets”); see also McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464,\\n 486–87 (2014) (recognizing the government’s interest in “ensuring\\n . . . a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-related services”); Mad-\\n sen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (acknowledg-\\n ing the government has an interest in protecting “public safety and\\n order”); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997)\\n (same).\\n In the district court, the City proffered evidence that the Or-\\n dinance achieved their substantial and lawful interests in safe access\\n to the clinic. It introduced the testimony of multiple police officers\\n who described how FPR volunteers and protestors were obstruct-\\n ing access to the clinic and creating public disturbances, which is\\n why law enforcement championed the Ordinance’s passage. The\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 33 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 5\\n\\n City proffered an incident report showing 73 calls to the Clearwater\\n Police Department (“CPD”) from the clinic from January 2022 to\\n January 2023. CPD responded to those calls involving “continuing\\n and recently escalating confrontation,” during which CPD “ob-\\n served protest[e]rs repeatedly crossing the driveway of the health\\n center and impeding ingress and egress of vehicle traffic and get-\\n ting within close proximity of driving cars with the intent to\\n frighten and intimidate the vehicle occupants.” Officers testified\\n that after the ordinance was adopted in March 2023, safety remark-\\n ably improved and, as the district court noted, FPR did not offer\\n any evidence to the contrary. As law enforcement further empha-\\n sized, FPR’s activities created a safety risk for themselves, patients,\\n clinic staff, and police officers.\\n The City created the buffer zone in response to the aggres-\\n sive and confrontational interactions between FPR volunteers and\\n the clinic’s patients and their volunteer escorts; consistent calls to\\n the CPD to respond to the “escalating confrontation[s]” at the\\n clinic; and the police’s experience that trespass warnings would not\\n suffice because the clinic’s driveway is on a public right-of-way.\\n There is no question from the record that the substantial interests\\n the City articulated were indeed its bases for enacting the Ordi-\\n nance.\\n Despite its lawful applications, the majority concludes that\\n the Ordinance was too burdensome. They heavily rely on McCullen\\n to support that view. The main argument appears to be that, be-\\n cause the leafleteers cannot cross the five foot buffer zone, FPR is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 34 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 23-13501\\n\\n completely unable to communicate its message with patients as the\\n group cannot offer them literature or sidewalk counseling. Those\\n types of allegations are the precise reason why, as the Supreme\\n Court has reminded us, striking a law down as facially unconstitu-\\n tional is such a high burden which requires a strong showing re-\\n garding the encroachment on free speech rights. It is ultimately\\n why the law allows for some leeway in terms of free speech re-\\n strictions, so long as the message can still be delivered in a way that\\n does not upset the balance of interests Moody requires courts to\\n weigh. See Lucero, 121 F.3d at 605 (“As a matter of common sense,\\n this provision does not seem unreasonable and does not burden\\n more speech than necessary. . . . The defendants can still express\\n their message, but they must stand more than 25 feet from the\\n [c]linic.”). Therefore, our analysis is only complete when we con-\\n sider the unlawful ways in which the Ordinance could be enforced\\n and find that they “substantially outweigh” the lawful applications.\\n See Moody, 603 U.S. at 724.\\n FPR does not endure a substantial burden on its rights to\\n close communication or leafletting like the plaintiffs in McCullen.\\n There, the Court found the buffer zone “carve[d] out a significant\\n portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing petitioners well\\n back from the clinics’ entrances and driveway” and, in doing so,\\n impacted the protestors’ ability to engage in “close, personal con-\\n versations.” 573 U.S. at 466. Here, the buffer zone is only five feet\\n and the adjacent sidewalk area and the remaining portions of the\\n driveway remain available. FPR counselors testified that their\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 35 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 7\\n\\n voices could carry the additional five feet to communicate with an\\n individual inside the buffer zone.\\n As to their leafletting, the majority suggests that FPR has\\n been seriously burdened because the Ordinance demands five feet\\n of space. It says that, under McCullen, it is not sufficient that the\\n Ordinance permits FPR to wave leaflets and offer them from a rea-\\n sonable distance. However, neither our Court nor the Supreme\\n Court has said the requisite distance for leafletting is less than five\\n feet. In Hill v. Colorado, the plaintiff challenged a Colorado statute\\n that restricted sidewalk counselors from coming within 8 feet of an\\n individual who had not given consent to accept literature. 530 U.S.\\n 703, 707 (2000). The Court considered “whether [] Colorado[‘s]\\n [leafletting restriction] reflect[ed] an acceptable balance between\\n the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers and\\n the interests of unwilling listeners.” Id. at 714. The Court held that\\n it did. Id. at 718, 735.\\n\\n Of course, the First Amendment protects the right to leaflet,\\n including even messages that are offensive to the recipient. Id. at\\n 714. However, there are limits to that principle. The Supreme\\n Court has explained there is a “recognizable privacy interests in\\n avoiding unwanted communication.” Id. at 716. Specifically, “the\\n First Amendment does not demand that patients at a medical facil-\\n ity undertake Herculean efforts to escape the cacophony of politi-\\n cal [messages].” Id. at 716 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.\\n Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 (1994)). Indeed, the “right to be let alone”\\n is one of the most comprehensive of rights and the right most\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 36 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 23-13501\\n\\n valued by civilized men.” Id. at 716 (citation omitted). Thus, the\\n “right to be let alone” must be balanced against “the right of others\\n to communicate.” Id. at 718 (quoting Rowan v. United States, 397\\n U.S. 728, 738 (1970)). This is especially true when an unwilling lis-\\n tener is in a situation where “the degree of captivity makes it im-\\n practical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.”\\n Id. at 718 (citation omitted).\\n In striking the balance, Hill still carefully examined the im-\\n portance of leafletting. Admittedly, prohibitions on leafletting can\\n be serious, especially where leafleteers are restricted to a certain\\n distance. See id. at 727 (“The burden on the ability to distribute\\n handbills is more serious because it seems possible that an 8—foot\\n interval could hinder the ability of a leafleteer to deliver handbills\\n to some unwilling recipients.”). However, Colorado’s restriction\\n passed constitutional muster because it allowed leafleteers to\\n “stand near the path of oncoming pedestrians and proffer[] his or\\n her material, which the pedestrians can easily accept.” Id. The abil-\\n ity to “easily accept” the speaker’s message is the key factor. In-\\n deed, the First Amendment protects the right of every citizen\\n to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be\\n opportunity to win their attention.” Id. at 728 (emphasis added)\\n (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)). Thus, leafleteers\\n are entitled to present themselves and their cause in hopes of a pos-\\n itive interaction. However, it is the responsibility of courts and\\n then law enforcement to protect a passerby’s right to breathing\\n room when a leafleteer is trying to win her attention by invading\\n her personal space. See id.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 37 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 9\\n\\n Thus, Clearwater’s Ordinance operates in harmony with the\\n Supreme Court’s guidance in both Hill and McCullen. As for the\\n size of the buffer zone, it is difficult to even visualize how a distance\\n of five feet seriously burdens FPR’s ability to leaflet and otherwise\\n communicate with those entering the clinic. Importantly, there is\\n sufficient breathing room to try to win a driver’s attention, even if\\n cars continue their route without engaging FPR volunteers. The\\n record shows that counselors wait in brightly colored vests at the\\n edge of the driveway, offering materials to patients driving into the\\n clinic. If the patients desire, they can stop, roll down their window,\\n and engage with the leafleteers. However, many choose not to do\\n so. Thus, when balancing FPR’s right to communicate its message\\n against the rights of patients and others not to engage, it is clear\\n that there is no substantial burden on FPR’s ability to leaflet.\\n Moreover, the fact that FPR has alternative channels of com-\\n munication available further demonstrates why the Ordinance is\\n constitutional. As the district court found, the remaining portions\\n of the driveway and adjacent sidewalk area are still available. See\\n Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (involving\\n a nonpublic forum, but recognizing alternative means existed when\\n protestor still had unlimited access to other parts of street and side-\\n walk adjacent to restricted area); Nationalist Movement v. City of\\n Cumming, Georgia, 92 F.3d 1135, 1140 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding\\n city ordinance that restricted nationalist organization from protest-\\n ing near courthouse given multiple dates, times, and locations\\n where they could hold demonstrations). The record shows FPR\\n “can still express [its] message” in the exact manner that it prefers\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 38 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 23-13501\\n\\n to, but it “must [merely] stand more than [five] feet from the\\n [c]linic.” Lucero, 121 F.3d at 605.\\n III. FPR Did Not Satisfy the Other Requisites of a Pre-\\n liminary Injunction\\n Finally, FPR has not shown irreparable harm, that the bal-\\n ance of harms weighs in its favor, or that granting the stay is in the\\n public’s best interest. “[T]he irreparable injury ‘must be neither re-\\n mote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.’” Siegel, 234 F.3d\\n at 1177 (quoting N.E. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am.\\n v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990)). FPR\\n has not proven it suffered irreparable harm, especially given the\\n available means of communicating its message, or that any harm is\\n more weighty than the disturbances, confrontations, and other\\n harms the City documented for over a year. The City, on the other\\n hand, has shown the preliminary injunction serves the public inter-\\n est by increasing vehicular safety at the clinic for all people there.\\n Id.\\n For the reasons stated, FPR has not established any of the\\n necessary elements in support of its motion for a preliminary in-\\n junction, and the district court’s decision should be affirmed.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214248/\", \"author_raw\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10747663/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 of 38\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-13501\n ____________________\n\n FLORIDA PREBORN RESCUE, INC.,\n ALLEN TUTHILL,\n ANTONIETTE M. MIGLIORE,\n SCOTT MAHURIN,\n JUDITH GOLDSBERRY,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n versus\n\n CITY OF CLEARWATER, FLORIDA,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-01173-MSS-AAS\n ____________________\n\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 2 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n Seeking to protect the safety of those driving into and out of\n the parking lot of a local abortion clinic, the City of Clearwater,\n Florida created a “vehicular safety zone.” The buffer zone applied\n to most pedestrians, forbidding entrance to a 38-foot stretch of pub-\n lic sidewalk (28 feet of which cross the clinic’s driveway) during\n business hours. A non-profit and four pro-life sidewalk counselors\n sued, challenging the buffer zone as a violation of the First Amend-\n ment, and moved for a preliminary injunction against its enforce-\n ment. The district court denied the motion, holding that the plain-\n tiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.\n We disagree. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in\n McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014), we hold that the plaintiffs\n are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment chal-\n lenge and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in\n denying the preliminary injunction on that ground. We further\n hold that the remaining factors clearly counsel in favor of prelimi-\n nary injunctive relief. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s\n judgment and remand the case with instructions that it enter the\n requested injunction.\n I\n A\n Bread and Roses Woman’s Health Center is a medical clinic\n located in Clearwater, Florida that performs abortions on Tues-\n days, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. is a\n non-profit that describes its work as “pro-life” and “religiously mo-\n tivated.” Br. of Appellants at 9. Allen Tuthill, Antoniette Migliore,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 3 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n and Scott Mahurin are members of Florida Preborn; Judith\n Goldsberry is a non-member who periodically works with or near\n them. All four individuals are “sidewalk counselors” who typically\n go to the clinic on Tuesdays and Thursdays “to have conversations\n on the sidewalk with, and provide literature to, patients and other\n persons entering and exiting medical centers providing abortion\n services.” Order Den. Prelim. Inj., at 3–4, Dkt. No. 45. Usually, no\n more than two or three counselors visit the clinic on Tuesdays and\n Thursdays. A larger group of protesters—as distinguished from\n counselors—typically go on Saturdays.\n Clearwater alleges that it has had issues with “protestors re-\n peatedly crossing the driveway of the health center and impeding\n ingress and egress of vehicle traffic and getting within close prox-\n imity of driving cars with the intent to frighten and intimidate the\n vehicle occupants.” Proposed Ordinance Summ., Dkt. No. 26-2.\n In an effort to address that issue, the city passed Ordinance No.\n 9665-23. See Ordinance, Dkt. No. 26-4. The record includes four\n sources of evidence about disruptions both before and after the Or-\n dinance’s enactment: (1) testimony from three police officers; (2)\n several videos of incidents at the clinic; (3) a report cataloguing re-\n cent police visits to the clinic; and (4) a collection of police reports.\n In the Ordinance’s recitals, the city asserted that the problem\n couldn’t be solved with “targeted trespass warnings” because “the\n driveway is located on the public right-of-way”—nor could it be\n tackled with “targeted arrests” because officers can’t arrest viola-\n tors for misdemeanors not committed in their presence and be-\n cause “protesters will temporarily comply with an officer’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 4 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n instructions whenever told to vacate the driveway” and then re-\n enter later. Ordinance at 2.\n The Ordinance reads as follows:\n Section 28.10 – VEHICLE SAFETY ZONE FOR\n BREAD AND ROSES WOMAN’S HEALTH\n CENTER LOCATED AT 1560 S. HIGHLAND\n AVENUE.\n\n (1) VEHICULAR SAFETY ZONE. No pedestrian as\n defined in Florida Statute 316.003(56), or person rid-\n ing a bicycle as defined in Florida Statute 316.003(4),\n or person operating any other non-motorized vehicle,\n shall enter into or cross any portion of the vehicular\n driveway located at the western entrance to the clinic,\n or enter that portion of the sidewalk or swale located\n within five (5) feet north or south of the concrete\n driveway. This restriction shall be in effect only from\n Monday through Saturday, beginning 7:00am and\n ending 6:00pm each day.\n\n This section shall not apply to police and public safety\n officers, fire and rescue personnel, or other emer-\n gency workers in the course of their official business,\n or to authorized security personnel employees or\n agents of the hospital, medical office or clinic en-\n gaged in assisting patients and other persons to enter\n or exit the Clinic.\n\n (2) PENALTY. Any person, firm, or corporation who\n pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is convicted of\n violating of this section shall be guilty of a Class III\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 5 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n civil infraction pursuant to Section 1.12 of this Code\n of Ordinances.\n\n Ordinance at 2–3.\n The buffer zone extends five feet on either side of the clinic’s\n driveway, such that the full length of sidewalk covered—including\n the portion that crosses the driveway—is about 38 feet. Below is a\n picture of the clinic entrance, the white lines demarcating the\n buffer zone:\n\n\n\n\n Pls.’ Ex. #6, Dkt. No. 42-6; see also Order at 8.\n According to the testimony of Clearwater police officers,\n real-world enforcement of the Ordinance diverges from its text in\n two respects. First, as to coverage: Although by its terms the Or-\n dinance applies not just to counselors and protesters but to essen-\n tially all pedestrians—exempting only first responders and certain\n clinic personnel—officers have usually allowed ordinary passersby\n to go on about their business. Second, as to sanctions: Typically,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 6 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n an officer will first give an individual who breaches the buffer zone\n a warning and, if the violation continues, issue a citation. If the\n individual persists in his violation even after receiving the citation,\n however, then, even though the law doesn’t provide for criminal\n penalties, the officer will arrest him for obstruction.\n B\n Florida Preborn and the four sidewalk counselors (collec-\n tively, Florida Preborn) challenged the Ordinance, arguing that it\n violates the First Amendment (both the Free Speech and Free Ex-\n ercise Clauses, facially and as-applied), the Florida Constitution (fa-\n cially and as-applied), and the Florida Religious Freedom Restora-\n tion Act of 1998. Florida Preborn then moved to preliminarily en-\n join the Ordinance solely on First Amendment free-speech\n grounds, arguing that it was content-based as applied and, even if\n content neutral, that it failed intermediate scrutiny. The district\n court denied the preliminary injunction.\n Before us, Florida Preborn has (for purposes of the appeal)\n abandoned its argument that the Ordinance is content-based as ap-\n plied, leaving only a facial free-speech challenge. See Br. of Appel-\n lant at 5 n.2; Oral Arg. at 1:57–2:30 (explaining that this is a facial\n challenge).\n II\n “A district court may grant preliminary injunctive relief only\n if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of\n success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless\n the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 7 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause\n the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be\n adverse to the public interest.” ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade\n Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modi-\n fied). The first factor is the most important, and “[w]here a court\n concludes that the movant fails to establish a substantial likelihood\n of success on the merits,” it needn’t reach the remaining consider-\n ations. Barber v. Governor of Ala., 73 F.4th 1306, 1317 (11th Cir.\n 2023).\n The district court held that Florida Preborn was unlikely to\n succeed on the merits, so it denied the preliminary injunction with-\n out reaching the remaining factors. For reasons we will explain,\n we disagree. 1\n A\n The First Amendment famously provides that “Congress\n shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.\n Const. amend. I. This command applies to the States—and\n\n\n 1 “We generally review preliminary injunctions only for an abuse of discretion,\n\n but we review de novo the legal conclusions on which they are based.” ACLU\n of Fla., 557 F.3d at 1198. “This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the\n district court applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper proce-\n dures, or relies on clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion\n that is clearly unreasonable or incorrect.” Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). “Otherwise,\n an abuse of discretion standard recognizes there is a range of choice within\n which we will not reverse the district court even if we might have reached a\n different decision.” Id. (citation modified).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 8 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n therefore to municipalities like Clearwater—through the Four-\n teenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; Police Dep’t of Chi. v.\n Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–98 (1972). Public sidewalks, like the one at\n issue here, are traditional public fora, where “the government’s\n ability to restrict speech . . . is ‘very limited.’” McCullen v. Coakley,\n 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,\n 177 (1983)). But “[e]ven in a public forum, the government may\n enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression”\n that survive intermediate scrutiny—i.e., those that “[1] are content-\n neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government\n interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of commu-\n nication.” Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th\n Cir. 1999) (citation modified). Because, again, Florida Preborn has\n (for present purposes) jettisoned its argument that the Ordinance\n is content-based, the relevant factors here are the second and third,\n both of which the government has the burden to prove. 2\n\n 2 Briefly, one preliminary issue: As already noted, this case (at least as it exists\n\n before us) presents a facial challenge. The Supreme Court recently reiterated\n the rules applicable to facial challenges in a First Amendment case arising out\n of this circuit. See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). In addressing\n a facial First Amendment challenge, the Court said, “the question is whether\n a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in\n relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 723 (citation modi-\n fied). A reviewing court must therefore “address the full range of activities the\n laws cover, and measure the constitutional against the unconstitutional appli-\n cations.” Id. at 724.\n It’s not immediately clear how the facial-challenge standard maps onto\n a case like this one, where the allegation, fundamentally, is that Clearwater’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 9 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n B\n The district court concluded that the city “will likely be able\n to show” both that the Ordinance “is . . . narrowly tailored to serve\n a significant government interest” and that it “leaves open ample\n alternative channels of communication.” Order at 17–23, 26–28.\n Respectfully, we disagree. At the very least, the Ordinance is not\n narrowly tailored. And because it isn’t narrowly tailored, we\n needn’t address whether it leaves open ample alternative channels.\n McCullen is the most relevant precedent, and so we consider\n it in some detail. In that case, sidewalk counselors like those here\n sued to enjoin the enforcement of a Massachusetts statute that cre-\n ated buffer zones around all abortion clinics in the state—specifi-\n cally, by “mak[ing] it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way\n\n\n ordinance is insufficiently narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes.\n The Sixth Circuit, though, in a case similar to this one—in which sidewalk\n counselors sued to enjoin the enforcement of a 10-foot buffer zone around\n clinic sidewalks and driveways—explained the rule’s application this way: “In\n facial First Amendment challenges, we consider a statute’s full range of appli-\n cations even when some of them do not implicate a particular plaintiff.” Sisters\n for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2022). Ac-\n cordingly, the court continued, “if a statute is not narrowly tailored, it cannot\n be constitutionally applied to anyone, even if a more narrowly tailored statute\n might still capture a plaintiff’s conduct.” Id. That reasoning tracks our own\n caselaw addressing facial vagueness challenges under the First Amendment.\n There, we’ve held that “at least when vagueness is the constitutional vice,” “as\n a logical matter, a law . . . found to be constitutionally unreasonable . . . due\n to lack of standards and guidance is by definition facially invalid.” Young Isr. of\n Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit Auth., 89 F.4th 1337, 1350 (11th\n Cir. 2024).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 10 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place,\n other than a hospital, where abortions are performed.” Id. at 469,\n 475 (citation modified). As relevant here, the counselors brought a\n facial free-speech challenge under the First Amendment, which\n both the district court and the First Circuit rejected, upholding the\n statute as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulation. Id. at\n 475 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).\n The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 497. Despite holding\n that the statute was content-neutral and therefore subject only to\n intermediate scrutiny, id. at 478–85, the Court invalidated it on the\n ground that it wasn’t narrowly tailored, id. at 486–97. In explaining\n the narrow-tailoring test, the Court observed that, “[f]or a content-\n neutral time, place, or manner regulation to be narrowly tailored,\n it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to\n further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Id. at 486 (quoting\n Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). The Court said that while the law “‘need\n not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the\n government’s interests,” the government “‘may not regulate ex-\n pression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden\n on speech does not serve to advance its goals.’” Id. (quoting Ward,\n 491 U.S. at 798–99).\n The Court then set about applying that standard. As an ini-\n tial matter, it identified the two inputs that inform any narrow-tai-\n loring analysis: the government’s regulatory interest and the na-\n ture of the speech at issue. Id. at 486–90. The buffer zone, the\n Court observed, “clearly serve[d]” the government’s interest in\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 11 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n ensuring “public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unob-\n structed use of public sidewalks and roadways.” Id. at 486 (citation\n modified). “At the same time,” the Court emphasized, the statute\n “serious[ly] burden[ed]” the counselors’ “two primary methods of\n communicating with patients”: (1) “initiat[ing] [] close, personal\n conversations”; and (2) “distribut[ing] literature to arriving pa-\n tients.” Id. at 487–88.\n Having identified the inputs, the Court proceeded to apply\n the narrow-tailoring test, which, again, asks whether a challenged\n law “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to achieve\n the [government’s] asserted interests.” Id. at 490. It held that the\n Massachusetts statute did so for two independent reasons. First,\n “the [government] ha[d] too readily forgone options that could\n serve its interests just as well, without substantially burdening the\n kind of speech in which petitioners wish to engage.” Id. at 490.\n And second, “[f]or a problem shown to arise only once a week in\n one city at one clinic”—there, the evidence of disturbances cen-\n tered on a single facility in Boston—“creating 35-foot buffer zones\n at every clinic across the [state was] hardly a narrowly tailored so-\n lution.” Id. at 493. Because the statute at issue in McCullen bur-\n dened substantially more speech than necessary to advance the\n government’s concededly legitimate interest in public safety, the\n Court held that it wasn’t narrowly tailored and thus violated the\n First Amendment. Id. at 486–97.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 12 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n C\n The district court here endeavored to apply McCullen. It be-\n gan by recognizing that “vehicular safety” is a significant govern-\n ment interest and that the Ordinance promotes that interest.\n Then, though, it skipped straight to the question whether Clearwa-\n ter had “considered potentially less restrictive alternatives.” Order\n at 19–20. The remainder of the court’s narrow-tailoring analysis\n focused on factual comparisons between the circumstances pre-\n sented by this case and those in which courts had enjoined buffer\n zones, see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 469, 493; Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louis-\n ville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 402–07 (6th Cir. 2022), or upheld\n them, see Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605–06 (11th Cir. 1997);\n Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 941 F.3d 73, 77–78, 90 (3rd Cir. 2019).\n We think it best to wed ourselves closely to the analysis es-\n tablished in McCullen. In doing so, we take guidance from a sister\n circuit’s decision that applied McCullen in assessing sidewalk coun-\n selors’ facial First Amendment challenge to a 10-foot buffer zone.\n See Sisters for Life, 56 F.4th at 404–08.\n 1\n First up, the two narrow-tailoring inputs. Our evaluation of\n the government’s interest is straightforward. Here, as in McCullen,\n the government asserts an interest in vehicular safety—that is, the\n safety of both pedestrians and drivers as cars enter and exit the\n clinic. In the Ordinance’s recitals and in Clearwater’s filings before\n both the district court and us, the city has repeatedly invoked its\n interest in protecting safe ingress and egress at the clinic. See\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 13 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n Ordinance at 2 (“WHEREAS, this buffer zone will ensure the safety\n of protesters and patients alike, by allowing safe vehicular ingress\n and egress to and from the clinic”); Response in Opp’n to Mot. for\n Prelim. Inj., at 9, 19, Dkt. No. 26 (describing the “significant gov-\n ernmental interest” as “providing safe and unobstructed access to\n this Clinic” and as “vehicular safety”); Br. of Appellees at 19 (“[T]he\n City has a significant governmental interest in providing safe and\n unobstructed access to this Clinic, as it would for any driveway,”);\n see also Order at 18 (“The City asserts vehicular safety as its signifi-\n cant government interest.”). This is clearly a qualifying govern-\n ment interest. As the Supreme Court recognized in Schenck v. Pro-\n Choice Network of Western New York, the government has a legiti-\n mate interest in “ensuring public safety and order, promoting the\n free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property\n rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-re-\n lated services.” 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). McCullen held that “buffer\n zones clearly serve these interests,” 573 U.S. at 487, and Florida Pre-\n born wisely hasn’t contended otherwise.\n “At the same time,” though, as the McCullen Court said, the\n Ordinance seriously burdens Florida Preborn’s speech—here, as\n there, by restricting the sidewalk counselors’ ability to distribute\n leaflets to patients as they arrive at the clinic. Id. at 487–88. Ex-\n plaining exactly how and why will take a bit of doing. Let’s first\n take a close(r) look at McCullen. The Supreme Court there recog-\n nized two forms of expression that “have historically been [] closely\n associated with the transmission of ideas”: (1) “normal conversa-\n tion” and (2) “leafletting on a public sidewalk.” Id. at 488. It\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 14 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n explained that “[w]hen the government makes it more difficult to\n engage in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially\n significant First Amendment burden.” Id. at 489. The Court then\n held that the buffer zone at issue seriously burdened both forms of\n expression, which it recognized were the sidewalk counselors’\n “two primary methods of communicating with patients.” Id. at\n 488.\n First, the Court observed that the statute “compromise[d]\n petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, personal conversations that\n they view as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling’” by making it diffi-\n cult to identify patients before they entered the buffer zone, by\n making sidewalk counselors appear “untrustworthy” because they\n had to stand behind a “painted border,” and by reducing them to\n “raising [their] voice[s] at patients from outside the zone.” Id. at\n 487. In response to the state’s argument that the petitioners could\n still chant slogans and display signs from outside the buffer zone,\n the Court said it “misse[d] the point” that the petitioners were side-\n walk counselors, not protesters: “If all that the women can see and\n hear are vociferous opponents of abortion, then the buffer zones\n have effectively stifled petitioners’ message.” Id. at 489–90.\n Second, the McCullen Court emphasized that the statute at\n issue “made it substantially more difficult for petitioners to distrib-\n ute literature to arriving patients” because sidewalk counselors\n couldn’t identify pedestrian patients before they entered the zone,\n and because they could “no longer even attempt to offer literature\n as drivers turn[ed] into the parking lots.” Id. at 488. The Court\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 15 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n particularly emphasized the buffer zone’s restriction on the peti-\n tioners’ “right to stand on the public sidewalks by the driveway as\n cars turn[ed] into the parking lot.” Id. at 490.\n Florida Preborn contends that, just as in McCullen, Clearwa-\n ter’s ordinance burdens their speech interests in (1) close commu-\n nication and (2) leafletting. We agree, at least as to its interest in\n delivering literature to clinic patients—and because we find a seri-\n ous burden there, we needn’t separately consider Florida Preborn’s\n close-conversation interest. 3\n Florida Preborn has provided “uncontradicted testimony”\n that the buffer zone has effectively stifled sidewalk counselors’\n\n 3 The record regarding Florida Preborn’s close-conversation interest is mixed.\n\n To be sure, Mahurin testified that the “painted line” discourages clinic patients\n from “com[ing] over to talk to” them, “forces [them] to shout,” and prevents\n patients from “see[ing] the kindness in [their] faces.” Prelim. Inj. Mot. Hr’g\n Tr., 47:2–11, Dkt. No. 43. And Tuthill also emphasized the importance of “be-\n ing able to be heard in a normal tone of voice and not from a far away dis-\n tance” and of demonstrating a “body language” of “concern” that is harder to\n communicate over a distance. Id. at 74:23–75:12, 78:14–18; 81:8–12. The dis-\n trict court, though, made several findings to the contrary. In particular, it de-\n termined that “[t]he Ordinance does not prevent Plaintiffs from speaking in\n whatever tone or level they choose to use” and that “[t]he evidence demon-\n strated that, without amplification and while speaking in normal tones, Plain-\n tiffs can be heard five feet away.” Order at 11. For support, the court pointed\n to an in-court demonstration showing that the sidewalk counselors’ voices\n could “carry an additional five feet to attract the attention of an individual.”\n Id. In any event, we needn’t definitively resolve this question today because,\n for reasons we will explain, the Ordinance burdens Florida Preborn’s leaf-\n letting substantially more than is necessary to protect the safety of pedestrians\n and vehicles as cars enter and exit the clinic’s parking lot.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 16 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n ability to distribute literature to patients entering and exiting the\n clinic. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 487–88. Migliore, for instance, testified\n that before the Ordinance’s adoption, she could—and did—briefly\n walk into the portion of the sidewalk crossing the clinic’s driveway\n to hand literature to occupants of cars if they stopped and rolled\n down their windows, but that she can no longer do so. See Prelim.\n Inj. Mot. Hr’g Tr., 101:23–102:13, 120:5–11, Dkt. No. 43. Mahurin\n likewise said that he had previously handed leaflets directly to cars’\n occupants, but that the Ordinance now prevents him from doing\n so. Id. at 37:25–38:11, 59:23–61:5. So too, in their declarations,\n Tuthill and Goldsberry testified that Florida Preborn members\n used to step into the “public right-of-way area of the driveway”\n when vehicles stopped to “briefly converse” with the occupants—\n “one of [their] main activities at the Clinic”—but that it is now “im-\n possible for [them] to hand any leaflets to people in cars entering\n the Clinic.” Tuthill Decl., ¶¶ 8–11, Dkt. No. 16-1; see also\n Goldsberry Decl., ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 16-6 (“Due to the Ordinance and\n the buffer zone it creates, it is impossible for sidewalk counselors\n to distribute leaflets to people in vehicles entering or exiting the\n Clinic[,]” which “has been one of our main activities at the\n Clinic . . . .”).\n Photographs in the record confirm the witnesses’ testimony\n that cars entering and exiting the clinic are now out of the reach of\n counselors standing behind the buffer-zone lines. See Pls.’ Ex. #12,\n Dkt. No. 42-12; Pls.’ Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And that matters\n because, as the city admitted at the preliminary-injunction hearing,\n most patients arrive at the clinic by car. See Hr’g Tr., 20:19–21:10.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 17 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n The closest the city (or the district court) has come to contradicting\n Florida Preborn’s testimony is by pointing to a post-Ordinance in-\n cident in which a clinic patron parked and then approached the\n sidewalk counselors—but he did so to assault a counselor, not to\n receive literature. 4\n The district court made no contrary findings about Florida\n Preborn’s leafletting activity. To be sure, the district court faulted\n Florida Preborn for “not keep[ing] track of leaflets numerically and\n thus” not being able to “definitively quantify any purported de-\n cline.” Order at 13. But the Supreme Court didn’t require that\n level of precision in McCullen. To the contrary, it emphasized one\n counselor’s “estimate[s],” another’s claim that “she reaches ‘far\n fewer people’ than she did before the amendment,” and another’s\n testimony that after the buffer zone went into effect “only one\n woman out of 100 will make the effort to walk across [the street]\n to speak with [her].” 573 U.S. at 487–88. And while the district\n court here noted Tuthill’s testimony that “he had stopped trying to\n distribute leaflets altogether,” Order at 13, others clearly testified\n that they continue to attempt to pass out literature, see Prelim. Inj.\n\n 4 On appeal, the city asserts that “the Plaintiffs did not commonly distribute\n\n leaflets to the vehicles from the sidewalk.” Br. of Appellees at 24–26. And it’s\n true that Tuthill testified that the 50 or 60 pamphlets he handed out before the\n Ordinance’s adoption were to people who parked and then walked up to him,\n see Hr’g Tr. at 65:7–12, 66:8–15, and that a Florida Preborn witness said that\n Goldsberry was “not as engaging with the women going in,” id. at 43:6–9,\n 44:11–17. But that doesn’t account for the other witnesses who testified (as\n described above the line) that they distributed leaflets and briefly spoke with\n vehicles’ occupants.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 18 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n Mot. Hr’g Tr., 33:6–11, 101:13–20, Dkt. No. 43. Finally, the district\n court observed that the “Ordinance continues to permit [the coun-\n selors] to wave leaflets” and to “pass[] leaflets to persons” who ven-\n ture across the buffer zone’s line. Order at 13, 28. But that’s the\n very sort of argument the McCullen Court rejected. See 573 U.S. at\n 489 (“It is easier to ignore a . . . waving hand than . . . an out-\n stretched arm.”).\n Separately, it remains the case that, by its terms, the Ordi-\n nance forbids a clinic patient who has parked her car to approach\n sidewalk counselors to receive a leaflet. It prohibits all “pedes-\n trian[s]” from “enter[ing]” the buffer zone for any reason—conspic-\n uously exempting only clinic employees “engaged in assisting pa-\n tients and other persons to enter or exit the Clinic” and various first\n responders, but not clinic patients. Ordinance at 2–3. The district\n court concluded that the “assisting” exemption “implicitly\n cover[s]” “patients and other persons” entering or exiting the clinic\n on foot, Order at 6 n.2; see also id. at 13 (“[N]othing in the Ordi-\n nance prohibits someone who wants a leaflet from walking up to\n [Tuthill] to retrieve a leaflet.”), but the Ordinance’s plain text belies\n that reading. Again, the Ordinance expressly lists exceptions to its\n general prohibition—but “patients and other persons” aren’t\n among them. See Ordinance at 2–3. The more natural reading,\n supported by record evidence, is that the “patients and other per-\n sons” to which the “assisting” exception refers are those arriving by\n car. Photographs in the record depict clinic “[e]scorts” in the buffer\n zone directing cars into the clinic parking lot. See Pls.’ Ex. #14, Dkt.\n No. 42-14; Pls.’ Ex. #15, Dkt. No. 42-15; Pls.’ Ex. #16, Dkt. No. 42-\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 19 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n 16; Pls.’ Ex. #17, Dkt. No. 42-17; Pls.’ Ex. #18, Dkt. No. 42-18; Pls.’\n Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And the fact that police officers have\n opted not to enforce the Ordinance’s plain terms against some pe-\n destrians, see supra at 5, is neither here nor there. Because this is a\n facial challenge, “we must analyze [the Ordinance] as written.”\n Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1994).\n 2\n On, then, to the application of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\n analysis. We think it clear that the Ordinance burdens substantially\n more speech—namely, the sidewalk counselors’ leafletting activi-\n ties—than is necessary to achieve the government’s asserted inter-\n est in promoting vehicular safety. See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490.\n McCullen recognizes two ways in which a law can burden substan-\n tially more speech than necessary, each of which is an inde-\n pendently suffices as a basis for invalidation. First, the law does so\n if the government can’t show “that it seriously undertook to ad-\n dress the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it”—\n that is, the government hasn’t adequately considered “alternative\n measures.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490, 494–95. Second, it does so—\n regardless of the availability of alternate measures—if there’s a ma-\n terial mismatch between the regulation’s breadth and the interests\n the government seeks to advance. See id. at 493; see also Sisters for\n Life, 56 F.4th at 405 (referring to this as the “breadth of the regula-\n tion” inquiry).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 20 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n Dispositively here, the city failed to adequately consider al-\n ternative measures. 5 For this part of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\n analysis, the plaintiff bears the burden to provide, in the record,\n “evidence of [such] feasible alternatives.” Pine v. City of W. Palm\n Beach, 762 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). The government can\n then rebut by demonstrating that “alternative measures that bur-\n den substantially less speech would fail to achieve [its] interests.”\n McCullen, 573 U.S. at 495. Importantly, though, it isn’t enough for\n the government merely to show that its “chosen route is easier” or\n more “efficien[t].” Id.\n With respect to alternative measures, McCullen is very nearly\n on point. The Supreme Court found it fatal that the state “ha[d]\n too readily forgone options that could serve its interests just as\n well, without substantially burdening the kind of speech in which\n [the plaintiffs] wish[ed] to engage.” Id. at 490. In particular, the\n government there, as here, sought (among other things) to address\n “a substantial public safety risk created when protesters obstruct\n driveways leading to the clinics.” Id. at 492. The Court concluded,\n though, that the state had “fail[ed] to look to less intrusive means\n of addressing its concerns.” Id. In particular, the Court said that\n “[a]ny such obstruction c[ould] readily be addressed through exist-\n ing local ordinances.” Id. (first quoting Worcester, Mass., Rev. Or-\n dinances of 2008, ch. 12, § 25(b) (“No person shall stand, or place\n\n\n 5 Accordingly, we needn’t decide whether there is a fatal mismatch between\n\n the regulation’s breadth and the government’s asserted interest in vehicular\n safety.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 21 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n any obstruction of any kind, upon any street, sidewalk or crosswalk\n in such a manner as to obstruct a free passage for travelers\n thereon.”); and then quoting Bos., Mass., Mun. Code, ch. 16–\n 41.2(d) (2013) (“No person shall solicit while walking on, standing\n on or going into any street or highway used for motor vehicle\n travel, or any area appurtenant thereto (including medians, shoul-\n der areas, bicycle lanes, ramps and exit ramps).”)).\n Florida currently has a law on the books that is materially\n identical to the anti-obstruction laws that the McCullen Court cited\n as exemplars: “A person may not willfully obstruct the free, con-\n venient, and normal use of a public street, highway, or road\n by . . . [i]mpeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traf-\n fic or passage thereon . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 316.2045(1)(a)(1). Notably\n for present purposes, the Florida law expressly defines “[s]treet or\n highway” as “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of\n every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is\n open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic.” Id.\n § 316.003(90)(a).\n The district court and the city have offered a handful of bases\n for distinguishing the alternative-measures analysis here from that\n in McCullen. Respectfully, we find none of them persuasive. First,\n the district court repeatedly said that the clinic’s driveway isn’t\n “public.” Even assuming those statements to be factual findings\n subject to clear-error review, see Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011), they cannot stand. The\n Ordinance’s own description of the driveway states that it is\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 22 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n “located on the public right-of-way.” Ordinance at 2. And the aer-\n ial map of the lot attached to the Ordinance confirms that the\n clinic’s lot doesn’t extend to the part of the driveway crossed by the\n sidewalk, meaning that the land at issue is indeed publicly owned.\n See id. at 5.\n Second, the city asserts that the driveway is not “considered\n by the Clearwater Police Department to be a ‘road or highway’”\n within the meaning of the Florida statute. Br. of Appellee at 34–35.\n But whatever individual officers might have said about their own\n subjective (and inconsistent) understandings, compare, e.g., Hr’g Tr.\n at 177:16–178:5 (statute doesn’t apply), and id. at 187:22–25 (statute\n doesn’t apply), with, e.g., id. at 178:24–179:12 (statute applies), what\n matters here—on a facial challenge—is that the statute applies by\n its terms. As just explained, the law’s definition of “[s]treet or high-\n way” is quite broad—certainly broad enough to cover driveways\n on public property. See Fla. Stat. § 316.003(90)(a).\n Third, both the district court and the city say that the legiti-\n mate vehicular-safety interests can’t be addressed through “after\n the fact” citation mechanisms like a statute criminalizing obstruc-\n tion. Br. of Appellee at 33; Order at 19–20. The problem, of course,\n is that the Ordinance likewise provides only for after-the-fact cita-\n tions and (on its face, anyway) doesn’t even provide a mechanism\n for arresting violators.\n Finally, the city asserts that enforcement of the existing anti-\n obstruction statute would be “significantly more tedious and less\n efficient.” Br. of Appellees at 36. But that is precisely the kind of\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 23 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n argument that the Court in McCullen rejected: The government,\n the Court said, must show that an alternative enforcement mecha-\n nism “would fail to achieve the government’s interests” entirely,\n “not simply that the chosen route is easier.” 573 U.S. at 495; see id.\n (“A painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but the prime\n objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”). And the city\n hasn’t argued that enforcing the existing statute would altogether\n fail to achieve its interests. 6\n\n 6 The city separately asserts that Florida’s anti-obstruction statute “has had a\n\n history of being found unconstitutional.” Br. of Appellees at 35. That is tech-\n nically correct—but misleading. The lone authority the city cites is an order\n on a motion to dismiss that found that “Plaintiffs ha[d] plausibly alleged that\n the amended version of section 316.2045 . . . is arguably overbroad.” Dream\n Defenders v. DeSantis, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1098 (N.D. Fla. 2021). That case\n was voluntarily dismissed, see Order for Dismissal, Dream Defenders v. DeSantis,\n No. 4:21CV00191, Dkt. No. 200 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2024), after this Court re-\n versed an order preliminarily enjoining a different provision, see Dream Defend-\n ers v. Governor of Fla., 119 F.4th 872, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2024). And while it’s\n true that two district courts have held § 316.2045 unconstitutional on various\n First Amendment grounds, see Bischoff v. Florida, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235–\n 38 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1222–25 (M.D. Fla.\n 2020), virtually all the offending language has since been excised from the stat-\n ute. Compare Fla. Stat. § 316.2045 (1996) (held unconstitutional by Bischoff),\n and id. (2007) (held unconstitutional by Vigue), with id. (2021) (current ver-\n sion). The only potentially troublesome text that remains is the single word\n “[s]tanding,” which Bischoff faulted for its vagueness. 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.\n But the amended statute clarifies that term in precisely the way recommended\n by the district court. Compare id. (“Section one is ambiguous as to whether it\n is unlawful for an individual to willfully obstruct the free use of the road ‘by\n standing,’ or whether she must do so by standing on the road.”), with Fla. Stat.\n § 316.2045(1)(a)(2) (2021) (“Standing on or remaining in the street, highway,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 24 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n * * *\n In closing, an important coda: It isn’t lost on us, of course,\n that the buffer zone invalidated in McCullen was much larger than\n the one at issue here—35 feet on either side of a clinic’s driveway,\n rather than just 5. That fact is undeniable. Even so, we don’t think\n it dictates a different analysis or result. Size alone didn’t drive the\n Supreme Court’s decision there—principle did. The statute’s chief\n failing wasn’t, as such, that it kept the counselors 35 feet back, but\n rather that, however far it kept them back, it prevented them from\n (as relevant here) offering literature to clinic patients as they ar-\n rived. The Supreme Court noted, for instance, that several peti-\n tioners there claimed a right that mirrors the one that the counse-\n lors here claim—namely, to stand “where the private walkway or\n driveway intersects the sidewalk and offer leaflets to patients as\n they walk or drive by,” or to “position [themselves] at an entrance\n to one of the five driveways leading to the parking lots.” 573 U.S.\n at 474. And the Court’s analysis was trained less on the buffer\n zone’s sheer scope than on the zone’s infringement (whatever its\n size) of that claimed right. See id. at 487 (“[T]he zones carve out a\n significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing peti-\n tioners well back from the clinics’ entrances and driveways. The\n\n\n or road.”). Of course, it’s not our task here to adjudicate the constitutionality\n of § 316.2045, which isn’t under review. Suffice it to say that so far as we are\n aware, no part of the current version of the statute has ever been deemed in-\n valid for any reason.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 25 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n zones thereby compromise petitioners’ ability to initiate the close,\n personal conversations that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk\n counseling.’”); id. at 488 (“The buffer zones have also made it sub-\n stantially more difficult for petitioners to distribute literature to ar-\n riving patients.”); id. (“[T]he zones have pushed petitioners so far\n back from the clinics’ driveways that they can no longer even at-\n tempt to offer literature as drivers turn into the parking lots.”); id.\n at 489 (“When the government makes it more difficult to engage\n in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially signifi-\n cant First Amendment burden.”).\n The Sixth Circuit’s post-McCullen decision in Sisters for Life is\n illuminating. There, in holding that a local ordinance establishing\n a 10-foot buffer zone around the sidewalks leading to clinic en-\n trances was likely unconstitutional, the court said this: “That the\n buffer zone in McCullen was larger does not change things.” Sisters\n for Life, 56 F.4th at 407. McCullen, the Sixth Circuit explained, “does\n not create distinct sets of rules for a 35-foot buffer zone near an\n entrance, a 10-foot buffer zone near an entrance, and all manner of\n buffer zones in between,” but rather holds “that narrow tailoring is\n required for all such burdens on speech.” Id. (emphasis added). Ac-\n cordingly, the court concluded—however large or small, and\n “whether its yoke is heavy or light”—“[o]nce a buffer zone burdens\n speech, McCullen demands narrow tailoring.” Id. Indeed, the Sixth\n Circuit seemed to think it constitutionally significant that the ordi-\n nance at issue there kept sidewalk counselors “more than an arm’s\n length away” from clinic patients, and thereby frustrated the coun-\n selors’ protected leafletting activities. Id. at 406; accord id. at 407\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 26 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n (“[T]he buffer zone suppresses speech . . . since distribution now\n takes place beyond an arm’s length . . . .”).7\n Under McCullen, the controlling question is whether the\n challenged buffer zone—be it five, 10, or 35 feet—burdens substan-\n tially more speech than necessary to achieve the government’s as-\n serted interests. We think it likely that Clearwater’s buffer zone\n does so.\n III\n Because the district court rejected Florida Preborn’s prelim-\n inary-injunction request at the first step, it had no occasion to\n\n 7 Our own post-McCullen decision in Pine is of a piece. That case dealt with an\n\n ordinance that forbade loud sounds within 100 feet of healthcare facilities.\n Even so, we methodically marched through the McCullen analysis. Pine, 762\n F.3d at 1269–74.\n Lastly, a coda to the coda: As did the district court, Clearwater points\n to cases that have upheld larger buffer zones than the one at issue here. Two\n of those cases, though—Lucero and Schenck—involved targeted injunctions ra-\n ther than generally applicable laws. See Lucero, 121 F.3d at 601; Schecnk, 519\n U.S. at 371. And the McCullen Court explicitly distinguished injunction-related\n cases in its analysis. See 573 U.S. at 492 (“We have previously noted the First\n Amendment virtues of targeted injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophy-\n lactic measures.”). In particular, the Court explained there that “an injunction\n ‘regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of a group,’ but only ‘because\n of the group’s past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real par-\n ties,’” while a law, like the Ordinance here, “categorically excludes non-ex-\n empt individuals from the buffer zones, unnecessarily sweeping in innocent\n individuals and their speech.” Id. at 492–93 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health\n Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)). A third case, Bruni, is irrelevant because it\n concerned a law that did “not prohibit the sidewalk counseling in which Plain-\n tiffs seek to engage within the zone.” 941 F.3d at 85.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 27 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n address the remaining factors. Even so, we think it sensible to ad-\n dress and resolve them here. The relevant facts are undisputed; the\n second, third, and fourth factors have been “fully briefed and ar-\n gued by the parties”; and their resolution—in the light of our hold-\n ing that Florida Preborn is likely to succeed on the merits—is clear.\n See Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307, 1311 n.12 (11th Cir. 2000).\n The irreparable-injury factor favors preliminary-injunctive\n relief. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal\n periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” El-\n rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). True, we have held that only\n “direct penalization”—as opposed to “incidental inhibition”—of\n “First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable injury.” Cate v.\n Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1983). But the Ordinance\n “categorically bars” Florida Preborn’s speech by prohibiting side-\n walk counselors from using a public sidewalk to distribute litera-\n ture. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th\n Cir. 2006).\n The balance-of-harms and public-interest factors “merge\n when the Government is the opposing party,” Nken v. Holder, 556\n U.S. 418, 435 (2009), and likewise counsel in favor of preliminary-\n injunctive relief. “[E]ven a temporary infringement of First\n Amendment rights constitutes a serious and substantial injury, and\n the city has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional\n ordinance.” KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 28 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\n\n IV\n For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Florida Preborn\n has a substantial likelihood of establishing that the Ordinance is not\n narrowly tailored. Accordingly, we hold that the district court\n abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction on the\n ground that Florida Preborn hadn’t established a likelihood of suc-\n cess on the merits, and we VACATE the district court’s judgment.\n And because the remaining preliminary-injunction factors straight-\n forwardly counsel in favor of granting preliminary-injunctive relief,\n we REMAND to the district court with instructions that it enter\n the requested injunction.\n VACATED and REMANDED.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 29 of 38\n\n\n\n\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13501\\n ____________________\\n\\n FLORIDA PREBORN RESCUE, INC.,\\n ALLEN TUTHILL,\\n ANTONIETTE M. MIGLIORE,\\n SCOTT MAHURIN,\\n JUDITH GOLDSBERRY,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n CITY OF CLEARWATER, FLORIDA,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-01173-MSS-AAS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 2 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Seeking to protect the safety of those driving into and out of\\n the parking lot of a local abortion clinic, the City of Clearwater,\\n Florida created a “vehicular safety zone.” The buffer zone applied\\n to most pedestrians, forbidding entrance to a 38-foot stretch of pub-\\n lic sidewalk (28 feet of which cross the clinic’s driveway) during\\n business hours. A non-profit and four pro-life sidewalk counselors\\n sued, challenging the buffer zone as a violation of the First Amend-\\n ment, and moved for a preliminary injunction against its enforce-\\n ment. The district court denied the motion, holding that the plain-\\n tiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits.\\n We disagree. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in\\n McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014), we hold that the plaintiffs\\n are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment chal-\\n lenge and that the district court therefore abused its discretion in\\n denying the preliminary injunction on that ground. We further\\n hold that the remaining factors clearly counsel in favor of prelimi-\\n nary injunctive relief. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s\\n judgment and remand the case with instructions that it enter the\\n requested injunction.\\n I\\n A\\n Bread and Roses Woman’s Health Center is a medical clinic\\n located in Clearwater, Florida that performs abortions on Tues-\\n days, Thursdays, and Saturdays. Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. is a\\n non-profit that describes its work as “pro-life” and “religiously mo-\\n tivated.” Br. of Appellants at 9. Allen Tuthill, Antoniette Migliore,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 3 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n and Scott Mahurin are members of Florida Preborn; Judith\\n Goldsberry is a non-member who periodically works with or near\\n them. All four individuals are “sidewalk counselors” who typically\\n go to the clinic on Tuesdays and Thursdays “to have conversations\\n on the sidewalk with, and provide literature to, patients and other\\n persons entering and exiting medical centers providing abortion\\n services.” Order Den. Prelim. Inj., at 3–4, Dkt. No. 45. Usually, no\\n more than two or three counselors visit the clinic on Tuesdays and\\n Thursdays. A larger group of protesters—as distinguished from\\n counselors—typically go on Saturdays.\\n Clearwater alleges that it has had issues with “protestors re-\\n peatedly crossing the driveway of the health center and impeding\\n ingress and egress of vehicle traffic and getting within close prox-\\n imity of driving cars with the intent to frighten and intimidate the\\n vehicle occupants.” Proposed Ordinance Summ., Dkt. No. 26-2.\\n In an effort to address that issue, the city passed Ordinance No.\\n 9665-23. See Ordinance, Dkt. No. 26-4. The record includes four\\n sources of evidence about disruptions both before and after the Or-\\n dinance’s enactment: (1) testimony from three police officers; (2)\\n several videos of incidents at the clinic; (3) a report cataloguing re-\\n cent police visits to the clinic; and (4) a collection of police reports.\\n In the Ordinance’s recitals, the city asserted that the problem\\n couldn’t be solved with “targeted trespass warnings” because “the\\n driveway is located on the public right-of-way”—nor could it be\\n tackled with “targeted arrests” because officers can’t arrest viola-\\n tors for misdemeanors not committed in their presence and be-\\n cause “protesters will temporarily comply with an officer’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 4 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n instructions whenever told to vacate the driveway” and then re-\\n enter later. Ordinance at 2.\\n The Ordinance reads as follows:\\n Section 28.10 – VEHICLE SAFETY ZONE FOR\\n BREAD AND ROSES WOMAN’S HEALTH\\n CENTER LOCATED AT 1560 S. HIGHLAND\\n AVENUE.\\n\\n (1) VEHICULAR SAFETY ZONE. No pedestrian as\\n defined in Florida Statute 316.003(56), or person rid-\\n ing a bicycle as defined in Florida Statute 316.003(4),\\n or person operating any other non-motorized vehicle,\\n shall enter into or cross any portion of the vehicular\\n driveway located at the western entrance to the clinic,\\n or enter that portion of the sidewalk or swale located\\n within five (5) feet north or south of the concrete\\n driveway. This restriction shall be in effect only from\\n Monday through Saturday, beginning 7:00am and\\n ending 6:00pm each day.\\n\\n This section shall not apply to police and public safety\\n officers, fire and rescue personnel, or other emer-\\n gency workers in the course of their official business,\\n or to authorized security personnel employees or\\n agents of the hospital, medical office or clinic en-\\n gaged in assisting patients and other persons to enter\\n or exit the Clinic.\\n\\n (2) PENALTY. Any person, firm, or corporation who\\n pleads guilty or nolo contendere, or is convicted of\\n violating of this section shall be guilty of a Class III\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 5 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n civil infraction pursuant to Section 1.12 of this Code\\n of Ordinances.\\n\\n Ordinance at 2–3.\\n The buffer zone extends five feet on either side of the clinic’s\\n driveway, such that the full length of sidewalk covered—including\\n the portion that crosses the driveway—is about 38 feet. Below is a\\n picture of the clinic entrance, the white lines demarcating the\\n buffer zone:\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n Pls.’ Ex. #6, Dkt. No. 42-6; see also Order at 8.\\n According to the testimony of Clearwater police officers,\\n real-world enforcement of the Ordinance diverges from its text in\\n two respects. First, as to coverage: Although by its terms the Or-\\n dinance applies not just to counselors and protesters but to essen-\\n tially all pedestrians—exempting only first responders and certain\\n clinic personnel—officers have usually allowed ordinary passersby\\n to go on about their business. Second, as to sanctions: Typically,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 6 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n an officer will first give an individual who breaches the buffer zone\\n a warning and, if the violation continues, issue a citation. If the\\n individual persists in his violation even after receiving the citation,\\n however, then, even though the law doesn’t provide for criminal\\n penalties, the officer will arrest him for obstruction.\\n B\\n Florida Preborn and the four sidewalk counselors (collec-\\n tively, Florida Preborn) challenged the Ordinance, arguing that it\\n violates the First Amendment (both the Free Speech and Free Ex-\\n ercise Clauses, facially and as-applied), the Florida Constitution (fa-\\n cially and as-applied), and the Florida Religious Freedom Restora-\\n tion Act of 1998. Florida Preborn then moved to preliminarily en-\\n join the Ordinance solely on First Amendment free-speech\\n grounds, arguing that it was content-based as applied and, even if\\n content neutral, that it failed intermediate scrutiny. The district\\n court denied the preliminary injunction.\\n Before us, Florida Preborn has (for purposes of the appeal)\\n abandoned its argument that the Ordinance is content-based as ap-\\n plied, leaving only a facial free-speech challenge. See Br. of Appel-\\n lant at 5 n.2; Oral Arg. at 1:57–2:30 (explaining that this is a facial\\n challenge).\\n II\\n “A district court may grant preliminary injunctive relief only\\n if the moving party shows that: (1) it has a substantial likelihood of\\n success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless\\n the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to the movant\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 7 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause\\n the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be\\n adverse to the public interest.” ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade\\n Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modi-\\n fied). The first factor is the most important, and “[w]here a court\\n concludes that the movant fails to establish a substantial likelihood\\n of success on the merits,” it needn’t reach the remaining consider-\\n ations. Barber v. Governor of Ala., 73 F.4th 1306, 1317 (11th Cir.\\n 2023).\\n The district court held that Florida Preborn was unlikely to\\n succeed on the merits, so it denied the preliminary injunction with-\\n out reaching the remaining factors. For reasons we will explain,\\n we disagree. 1\\n A\\n The First Amendment famously provides that “Congress\\n shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S.\\n Const. amend. I. This command applies to the States—and\\n\\n\\n 1 “We generally review preliminary injunctions only for an abuse of discretion,\\n\\n but we review de novo the legal conclusions on which they are based.” ACLU\\n of Fla., 557 F.3d at 1198. “This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the\\n district court applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper proce-\\n dures, or relies on clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion\\n that is clearly unreasonable or incorrect.” Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation modified). “Otherwise,\\n an abuse of discretion standard recognizes there is a range of choice within\\n which we will not reverse the district court even if we might have reached a\\n different decision.” Id. (citation modified).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 8 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n therefore to municipalities like Clearwater—through the Four-\\n teenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, § 1; Police Dep’t of Chi. v.\\n Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96–98 (1972). Public sidewalks, like the one at\\n issue here, are traditional public fora, where “the government’s\\n ability to restrict speech . . . is ‘very limited.’” McCullen v. Coakley,\\n 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014) (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171,\\n 177 (1983)). But “[e]ven in a public forum, the government may\\n enforce regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression”\\n that survive intermediate scrutiny—i.e., those that “[1] are content-\\n neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government\\n interest, and [3] leave open ample alternative channels of commu-\\n nication.” Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th\\n Cir. 1999) (citation modified). Because, again, Florida Preborn has\\n (for present purposes) jettisoned its argument that the Ordinance\\n is content-based, the relevant factors here are the second and third,\\n both of which the government has the burden to prove. 2\\n\\n 2 Briefly, one preliminary issue: As already noted, this case (at least as it exists\\n\\n before us) presents a facial challenge. The Supreme Court recently reiterated\\n the rules applicable to facial challenges in a First Amendment case arising out\\n of this circuit. See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707 (2024). In addressing\\n a facial First Amendment challenge, the Court said, “the question is whether\\n a substantial number of the law’s applications are unconstitutional, judged in\\n relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Id. at 723 (citation modi-\\n fied). A reviewing court must therefore “address the full range of activities the\\n laws cover, and measure the constitutional against the unconstitutional appli-\\n cations.” Id. at 724.\\n It’s not immediately clear how the facial-challenge standard maps onto\\n a case like this one, where the allegation, fundamentally, is that Clearwater’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 9 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n B\\n The district court concluded that the city “will likely be able\\n to show” both that the Ordinance “is . . . narrowly tailored to serve\\n a significant government interest” and that it “leaves open ample\\n alternative channels of communication.” Order at 17–23, 26–28.\\n Respectfully, we disagree. At the very least, the Ordinance is not\\n narrowly tailored. And because it isn’t narrowly tailored, we\\n needn’t address whether it leaves open ample alternative channels.\\n McCullen is the most relevant precedent, and so we consider\\n it in some detail. In that case, sidewalk counselors like those here\\n sued to enjoin the enforcement of a Massachusetts statute that cre-\\n ated buffer zones around all abortion clinics in the state—specifi-\\n cally, by “mak[ing] it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way\\n\\n\\n ordinance is insufficiently narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes.\\n The Sixth Circuit, though, in a case similar to this one—in which sidewalk\\n counselors sued to enjoin the enforcement of a 10-foot buffer zone around\\n clinic sidewalks and driveways—explained the rule’s application this way: “In\\n facial First Amendment challenges, we consider a statute’s full range of appli-\\n cations even when some of them do not implicate a particular plaintiff.” Sisters\\n for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2022). Ac-\\n cordingly, the court continued, “if a statute is not narrowly tailored, it cannot\\n be constitutionally applied to anyone, even if a more narrowly tailored statute\\n might still capture a plaintiff’s conduct.” Id. That reasoning tracks our own\\n caselaw addressing facial vagueness challenges under the First Amendment.\\n There, we’ve held that “at least when vagueness is the constitutional vice,” “as\\n a logical matter, a law . . . found to be constitutionally unreasonable . . . due\\n to lack of standards and guidance is by definition facially invalid.” Young Isr. of\\n Tampa, Inc. v. Hillsborough Area Reg’l Transit Auth., 89 F.4th 1337, 1350 (11th\\n Cir. 2024).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 10 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any place,\\n other than a hospital, where abortions are performed.” Id. at 469,\\n 475 (citation modified). As relevant here, the counselors brought a\\n facial free-speech challenge under the First Amendment, which\\n both the district court and the First Circuit rejected, upholding the\\n statute as a reasonable “time, place, and manner” regulation. Id. at\\n 475 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).\\n The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 497. Despite holding\\n that the statute was content-neutral and therefore subject only to\\n intermediate scrutiny, id. at 478–85, the Court invalidated it on the\\n ground that it wasn’t narrowly tailored, id. at 486–97. In explaining\\n the narrow-tailoring test, the Court observed that, “[f]or a content-\\n neutral time, place, or manner regulation to be narrowly tailored,\\n it must not ‘burden substantially more speech than is necessary to\\n further the government’s legitimate interests.’” Id. at 486 (quoting\\n Ward, 491 U.S. at 799). The Court said that while the law “‘need\\n not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of’ serving the\\n government’s interests,” the government “‘may not regulate ex-\\n pression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden\\n on speech does not serve to advance its goals.’” Id. (quoting Ward,\\n 491 U.S. at 798–99).\\n The Court then set about applying that standard. As an ini-\\n tial matter, it identified the two inputs that inform any narrow-tai-\\n loring analysis: the government’s regulatory interest and the na-\\n ture of the speech at issue. Id. at 486–90. The buffer zone, the\\n Court observed, “clearly serve[d]” the government’s interest in\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 11 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n ensuring “public safety, patient access to healthcare, and the unob-\\n structed use of public sidewalks and roadways.” Id. at 486 (citation\\n modified). “At the same time,” the Court emphasized, the statute\\n “serious[ly] burden[ed]” the counselors’ “two primary methods of\\n communicating with patients”: (1) “initiat[ing] [] close, personal\\n conversations”; and (2) “distribut[ing] literature to arriving pa-\\n tients.” Id. at 487–88.\\n Having identified the inputs, the Court proceeded to apply\\n the narrow-tailoring test, which, again, asks whether a challenged\\n law “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to achieve\\n the [government’s] asserted interests.” Id. at 490. It held that the\\n Massachusetts statute did so for two independent reasons. First,\\n “the [government] ha[d] too readily forgone options that could\\n serve its interests just as well, without substantially burdening the\\n kind of speech in which petitioners wish to engage.” Id. at 490.\\n And second, “[f]or a problem shown to arise only once a week in\\n one city at one clinic”—there, the evidence of disturbances cen-\\n tered on a single facility in Boston—“creating 35-foot buffer zones\\n at every clinic across the [state was] hardly a narrowly tailored so-\\n lution.” Id. at 493. Because the statute at issue in McCullen bur-\\n dened substantially more speech than necessary to advance the\\n government’s concededly legitimate interest in public safety, the\\n Court held that it wasn’t narrowly tailored and thus violated the\\n First Amendment. Id. at 486–97.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 12 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n C\\n The district court here endeavored to apply McCullen. It be-\\n gan by recognizing that “vehicular safety” is a significant govern-\\n ment interest and that the Ordinance promotes that interest.\\n Then, though, it skipped straight to the question whether Clearwa-\\n ter had “considered potentially less restrictive alternatives.” Order\\n at 19–20. The remainder of the court’s narrow-tailoring analysis\\n focused on factual comparisons between the circumstances pre-\\n sented by this case and those in which courts had enjoined buffer\\n zones, see McCullen, 573 U.S. at 469, 493; Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louis-\\n ville-Jefferson Cnty., 56 F.4th 400, 402–07 (6th Cir. 2022), or upheld\\n them, see Lucero v. Trosch, 121 F.3d 591, 605–06 (11th Cir. 1997);\\n Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 941 F.3d 73, 77–78, 90 (3rd Cir. 2019).\\n We think it best to wed ourselves closely to the analysis es-\\n tablished in McCullen. In doing so, we take guidance from a sister\\n circuit’s decision that applied McCullen in assessing sidewalk coun-\\n selors’ facial First Amendment challenge to a 10-foot buffer zone.\\n See Sisters for Life, 56 F.4th at 404–08.\\n 1\\n First up, the two narrow-tailoring inputs. Our evaluation of\\n the government’s interest is straightforward. Here, as in McCullen,\\n the government asserts an interest in vehicular safety—that is, the\\n safety of both pedestrians and drivers as cars enter and exit the\\n clinic. In the Ordinance’s recitals and in Clearwater’s filings before\\n both the district court and us, the city has repeatedly invoked its\\n interest in protecting safe ingress and egress at the clinic. See\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 13 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Ordinance at 2 (“WHEREAS, this buffer zone will ensure the safety\\n of protesters and patients alike, by allowing safe vehicular ingress\\n and egress to and from the clinic”); Response in Opp’n to Mot. for\\n Prelim. Inj., at 9, 19, Dkt. No. 26 (describing the “significant gov-\\n ernmental interest” as “providing safe and unobstructed access to\\n this Clinic” and as “vehicular safety”); Br. of Appellees at 19 (“[T]he\\n City has a significant governmental interest in providing safe and\\n unobstructed access to this Clinic, as it would for any driveway,”);\\n see also Order at 18 (“The City asserts vehicular safety as its signifi-\\n cant government interest.”). This is clearly a qualifying govern-\\n ment interest. As the Supreme Court recognized in Schenck v. Pro-\\n Choice Network of Western New York, the government has a legiti-\\n mate interest in “ensuring public safety and order, promoting the\\n free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property\\n rights, and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-re-\\n lated services.” 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). McCullen held that “buffer\\n zones clearly serve these interests,” 573 U.S. at 487, and Florida Pre-\\n born wisely hasn’t contended otherwise.\\n “At the same time,” though, as the McCullen Court said, the\\n Ordinance seriously burdens Florida Preborn’s speech—here, as\\n there, by restricting the sidewalk counselors’ ability to distribute\\n leaflets to patients as they arrive at the clinic. Id. at 487–88. Ex-\\n plaining exactly how and why will take a bit of doing. Let’s first\\n take a close(r) look at McCullen. The Supreme Court there recog-\\n nized two forms of expression that “have historically been [] closely\\n associated with the transmission of ideas”: (1) “normal conversa-\\n tion” and (2) “leafletting on a public sidewalk.” Id. at 488. It\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 14 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n explained that “[w]hen the government makes it more difficult to\\n engage in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially\\n significant First Amendment burden.” Id. at 489. The Court then\\n held that the buffer zone at issue seriously burdened both forms of\\n expression, which it recognized were the sidewalk counselors’\\n “two primary methods of communicating with patients.” Id. at\\n 488.\\n First, the Court observed that the statute “compromise[d]\\n petitioners’ ability to initiate the close, personal conversations that\\n they view as essential to ‘sidewalk counseling’” by making it diffi-\\n cult to identify patients before they entered the buffer zone, by\\n making sidewalk counselors appear “untrustworthy” because they\\n had to stand behind a “painted border,” and by reducing them to\\n “raising [their] voice[s] at patients from outside the zone.” Id. at\\n 487. In response to the state’s argument that the petitioners could\\n still chant slogans and display signs from outside the buffer zone,\\n the Court said it “misse[d] the point” that the petitioners were side-\\n walk counselors, not protesters: “If all that the women can see and\\n hear are vociferous opponents of abortion, then the buffer zones\\n have effectively stifled petitioners’ message.” Id. at 489–90.\\n Second, the McCullen Court emphasized that the statute at\\n issue “made it substantially more difficult for petitioners to distrib-\\n ute literature to arriving patients” because sidewalk counselors\\n couldn’t identify pedestrian patients before they entered the zone,\\n and because they could “no longer even attempt to offer literature\\n as drivers turn[ed] into the parking lots.” Id. at 488. The Court\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 15 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n particularly emphasized the buffer zone’s restriction on the peti-\\n tioners’ “right to stand on the public sidewalks by the driveway as\\n cars turn[ed] into the parking lot.” Id. at 490.\\n Florida Preborn contends that, just as in McCullen, Clearwa-\\n ter’s ordinance burdens their speech interests in (1) close commu-\\n nication and (2) leafletting. We agree, at least as to its interest in\\n delivering literature to clinic patients—and because we find a seri-\\n ous burden there, we needn’t separately consider Florida Preborn’s\\n close-conversation interest. 3\\n Florida Preborn has provided “uncontradicted testimony”\\n that the buffer zone has effectively stifled sidewalk counselors’\\n\\n 3 The record regarding Florida Preborn’s close-conversation interest is mixed.\\n\\n To be sure, Mahurin testified that the “painted line” discourages clinic patients\\n from “com[ing] over to talk to” them, “forces [them] to shout,” and prevents\\n patients from “see[ing] the kindness in [their] faces.” Prelim. Inj. Mot. Hr’g\\n Tr., 47:2–11, Dkt. No. 43. And Tuthill also emphasized the importance of “be-\\n ing able to be heard in a normal tone of voice and not from a far away dis-\\n tance” and of demonstrating a “body language” of “concern” that is harder to\\n communicate over a distance. Id. at 74:23–75:12, 78:14–18; 81:8–12. The dis-\\n trict court, though, made several findings to the contrary. In particular, it de-\\n termined that “[t]he Ordinance does not prevent Plaintiffs from speaking in\\n whatever tone or level they choose to use” and that “[t]he evidence demon-\\n strated that, without amplification and while speaking in normal tones, Plain-\\n tiffs can be heard five feet away.” Order at 11. For support, the court pointed\\n to an in-court demonstration showing that the sidewalk counselors’ voices\\n could “carry an additional five feet to attract the attention of an individual.”\\n Id. In any event, we needn’t definitively resolve this question today because,\\n for reasons we will explain, the Ordinance burdens Florida Preborn’s leaf-\\n letting substantially more than is necessary to protect the safety of pedestrians\\n and vehicles as cars enter and exit the clinic’s parking lot.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 16 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n ability to distribute literature to patients entering and exiting the\\n clinic. McCullen, 573 U.S. at 487–88. Migliore, for instance, testified\\n that before the Ordinance’s adoption, she could—and did—briefly\\n walk into the portion of the sidewalk crossing the clinic’s driveway\\n to hand literature to occupants of cars if they stopped and rolled\\n down their windows, but that she can no longer do so. See Prelim.\\n Inj. Mot. Hr’g Tr., 101:23–102:13, 120:5–11, Dkt. No. 43. Mahurin\\n likewise said that he had previously handed leaflets directly to cars’\\n occupants, but that the Ordinance now prevents him from doing\\n so. Id. at 37:25–38:11, 59:23–61:5. So too, in their declarations,\\n Tuthill and Goldsberry testified that Florida Preborn members\\n used to step into the “public right-of-way area of the driveway”\\n when vehicles stopped to “briefly converse” with the occupants—\\n “one of [their] main activities at the Clinic”—but that it is now “im-\\n possible for [them] to hand any leaflets to people in cars entering\\n the Clinic.” Tuthill Decl., ¶¶ 8–11, Dkt. No. 16-1; see also\\n Goldsberry Decl., ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 16-6 (“Due to the Ordinance and\\n the buffer zone it creates, it is impossible for sidewalk counselors\\n to distribute leaflets to people in vehicles entering or exiting the\\n Clinic[,]” which “has been one of our main activities at the\\n Clinic . . . .”).\\n Photographs in the record confirm the witnesses’ testimony\\n that cars entering and exiting the clinic are now out of the reach of\\n counselors standing behind the buffer-zone lines. See Pls.’ Ex. #12,\\n Dkt. No. 42-12; Pls.’ Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And that matters\\n because, as the city admitted at the preliminary-injunction hearing,\\n most patients arrive at the clinic by car. See Hr’g Tr., 20:19–21:10.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 17 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n The closest the city (or the district court) has come to contradicting\\n Florida Preborn’s testimony is by pointing to a post-Ordinance in-\\n cident in which a clinic patron parked and then approached the\\n sidewalk counselors—but he did so to assault a counselor, not to\\n receive literature. 4\\n The district court made no contrary findings about Florida\\n Preborn’s leafletting activity. To be sure, the district court faulted\\n Florida Preborn for “not keep[ing] track of leaflets numerically and\\n thus” not being able to “definitively quantify any purported de-\\n cline.” Order at 13. But the Supreme Court didn’t require that\\n level of precision in McCullen. To the contrary, it emphasized one\\n counselor’s “estimate[s],” another’s claim that “she reaches ‘far\\n fewer people’ than she did before the amendment,” and another’s\\n testimony that after the buffer zone went into effect “only one\\n woman out of 100 will make the effort to walk across [the street]\\n to speak with [her].” 573 U.S. at 487–88. And while the district\\n court here noted Tuthill’s testimony that “he had stopped trying to\\n distribute leaflets altogether,” Order at 13, others clearly testified\\n that they continue to attempt to pass out literature, see Prelim. Inj.\\n\\n 4 On appeal, the city asserts that “the Plaintiffs did not commonly distribute\\n\\n leaflets to the vehicles from the sidewalk.” Br. of Appellees at 24–26. And it’s\\n true that Tuthill testified that the 50 or 60 pamphlets he handed out before the\\n Ordinance’s adoption were to people who parked and then walked up to him,\\n see Hr’g Tr. at 65:7–12, 66:8–15, and that a Florida Preborn witness said that\\n Goldsberry was “not as engaging with the women going in,” id. at 43:6–9,\\n 44:11–17. But that doesn’t account for the other witnesses who testified (as\\n described above the line) that they distributed leaflets and briefly spoke with\\n vehicles’ occupants.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 18 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Mot. Hr’g Tr., 33:6–11, 101:13–20, Dkt. No. 43. Finally, the district\\n court observed that the “Ordinance continues to permit [the coun-\\n selors] to wave leaflets” and to “pass[] leaflets to persons” who ven-\\n ture across the buffer zone’s line. Order at 13, 28. But that’s the\\n very sort of argument the McCullen Court rejected. See 573 U.S. at\\n 489 (“It is easier to ignore a . . . waving hand than . . . an out-\\n stretched arm.”).\\n Separately, it remains the case that, by its terms, the Ordi-\\n nance forbids a clinic patient who has parked her car to approach\\n sidewalk counselors to receive a leaflet. It prohibits all “pedes-\\n trian[s]” from “enter[ing]” the buffer zone for any reason—conspic-\\n uously exempting only clinic employees “engaged in assisting pa-\\n tients and other persons to enter or exit the Clinic” and various first\\n responders, but not clinic patients. Ordinance at 2–3. The district\\n court concluded that the “assisting” exemption “implicitly\\n cover[s]” “patients and other persons” entering or exiting the clinic\\n on foot, Order at 6 n.2; see also id. at 13 (“[N]othing in the Ordi-\\n nance prohibits someone who wants a leaflet from walking up to\\n [Tuthill] to retrieve a leaflet.”), but the Ordinance’s plain text belies\\n that reading. Again, the Ordinance expressly lists exceptions to its\\n general prohibition—but “patients and other persons” aren’t\\n among them. See Ordinance at 2–3. The more natural reading,\\n supported by record evidence, is that the “patients and other per-\\n sons” to which the “assisting” exception refers are those arriving by\\n car. Photographs in the record depict clinic “[e]scorts” in the buffer\\n zone directing cars into the clinic parking lot. See Pls.’ Ex. #14, Dkt.\\n No. 42-14; Pls.’ Ex. #15, Dkt. No. 42-15; Pls.’ Ex. #16, Dkt. No. 42-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 19 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n 16; Pls.’ Ex. #17, Dkt. No. 42-17; Pls.’ Ex. #18, Dkt. No. 42-18; Pls.’\\n Ex. #19, Dkt. No. 42-19. And the fact that police officers have\\n opted not to enforce the Ordinance’s plain terms against some pe-\\n destrians, see supra at 5, is neither here nor there. Because this is a\\n facial challenge, “we must analyze [the Ordinance] as written.”\\n Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1994).\\n 2\\n On, then, to the application of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\\n analysis. We think it clear that the Ordinance burdens substantially\\n more speech—namely, the sidewalk counselors’ leafletting activi-\\n ties—than is necessary to achieve the government’s asserted inter-\\n est in promoting vehicular safety. See McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490.\\n McCullen recognizes two ways in which a law can burden substan-\\n tially more speech than necessary, each of which is an inde-\\n pendently suffices as a basis for invalidation. First, the law does so\\n if the government can’t show “that it seriously undertook to ad-\\n dress the problem with less intrusive tools readily available to it”—\\n that is, the government hasn’t adequately considered “alternative\\n measures.” McCullen, 573 U.S. at 490, 494–95. Second, it does so—\\n regardless of the availability of alternate measures—if there’s a ma-\\n terial mismatch between the regulation’s breadth and the interests\\n the government seeks to advance. See id. at 493; see also Sisters for\\n Life, 56 F.4th at 405 (referring to this as the “breadth of the regula-\\n tion” inquiry).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 20 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n Dispositively here, the city failed to adequately consider al-\\n ternative measures. 5 For this part of McCullen’s narrow-tailoring\\n analysis, the plaintiff bears the burden to provide, in the record,\\n “evidence of [such] feasible alternatives.” Pine v. City of W. Palm\\n Beach, 762 F.3d 1262, 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). The government can\\n then rebut by demonstrating that “alternative measures that bur-\\n den substantially less speech would fail to achieve [its] interests.”\\n McCullen, 573 U.S. at 495. Importantly, though, it isn’t enough for\\n the government merely to show that its “chosen route is easier” or\\n more “efficien[t].” Id.\\n With respect to alternative measures, McCullen is very nearly\\n on point. The Supreme Court found it fatal that the state “ha[d]\\n too readily forgone options that could serve its interests just as\\n well, without substantially burdening the kind of speech in which\\n [the plaintiffs] wish[ed] to engage.” Id. at 490. In particular, the\\n government there, as here, sought (among other things) to address\\n “a substantial public safety risk created when protesters obstruct\\n driveways leading to the clinics.” Id. at 492. The Court concluded,\\n though, that the state had “fail[ed] to look to less intrusive means\\n of addressing its concerns.” Id. In particular, the Court said that\\n “[a]ny such obstruction c[ould] readily be addressed through exist-\\n ing local ordinances.” Id. (first quoting Worcester, Mass., Rev. Or-\\n dinances of 2008, ch. 12, § 25(b) (“No person shall stand, or place\\n\\n\\n 5 Accordingly, we needn’t decide whether there is a fatal mismatch between\\n\\n the regulation’s breadth and the government’s asserted interest in vehicular\\n safety.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 21 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n any obstruction of any kind, upon any street, sidewalk or crosswalk\\n in such a manner as to obstruct a free passage for travelers\\n thereon.”); and then quoting Bos., Mass., Mun. Code, ch. 16–\\n 41.2(d) (2013) (“No person shall solicit while walking on, standing\\n on or going into any street or highway used for motor vehicle\\n travel, or any area appurtenant thereto (including medians, shoul-\\n der areas, bicycle lanes, ramps and exit ramps).”)).\\n Florida currently has a law on the books that is materially\\n identical to the anti-obstruction laws that the McCullen Court cited\\n as exemplars: “A person may not willfully obstruct the free, con-\\n venient, and normal use of a public street, highway, or road\\n by . . . [i]mpeding, hindering, stifling, retarding, or restraining traf-\\n fic or passage thereon . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 316.2045(1)(a)(1). Notably\\n for present purposes, the Florida law expressly defines “[s]treet or\\n highway” as “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of\\n every way or place of whatever nature when any part thereof is\\n open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic.” Id.\\n § 316.003(90)(a).\\n The district court and the city have offered a handful of bases\\n for distinguishing the alternative-measures analysis here from that\\n in McCullen. Respectfully, we find none of them persuasive. First,\\n the district court repeatedly said that the clinic’s driveway isn’t\\n “public.” Even assuming those statements to be factual findings\\n subject to clear-error review, see Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of\\n Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011), they cannot stand. The\\n Ordinance’s own description of the driveway states that it is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 22 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n “located on the public right-of-way.” Ordinance at 2. And the aer-\\n ial map of the lot attached to the Ordinance confirms that the\\n clinic’s lot doesn’t extend to the part of the driveway crossed by the\\n sidewalk, meaning that the land at issue is indeed publicly owned.\\n See id. at 5.\\n Second, the city asserts that the driveway is not “considered\\n by the Clearwater Police Department to be a ‘road or highway’”\\n within the meaning of the Florida statute. Br. of Appellee at 34–35.\\n But whatever individual officers might have said about their own\\n subjective (and inconsistent) understandings, compare, e.g., Hr’g Tr.\\n at 177:16–178:5 (statute doesn’t apply), and id. at 187:22–25 (statute\\n doesn’t apply), with, e.g., id. at 178:24–179:12 (statute applies), what\\n matters here—on a facial challenge—is that the statute applies by\\n its terms. As just explained, the law’s definition of “[s]treet or high-\\n way” is quite broad—certainly broad enough to cover driveways\\n on public property. See Fla. Stat. § 316.003(90)(a).\\n Third, both the district court and the city say that the legiti-\\n mate vehicular-safety interests can’t be addressed through “after\\n the fact” citation mechanisms like a statute criminalizing obstruc-\\n tion. Br. of Appellee at 33; Order at 19–20. The problem, of course,\\n is that the Ordinance likewise provides only for after-the-fact cita-\\n tions and (on its face, anyway) doesn’t even provide a mechanism\\n for arresting violators.\\n Finally, the city asserts that enforcement of the existing anti-\\n obstruction statute would be “significantly more tedious and less\\n efficient.” Br. of Appellees at 36. But that is precisely the kind of\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 23 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n argument that the Court in McCullen rejected: The government,\\n the Court said, must show that an alternative enforcement mecha-\\n nism “would fail to achieve the government’s interests” entirely,\\n “not simply that the chosen route is easier.” 573 U.S. at 495; see id.\\n (“A painted line on the sidewalk is easy to enforce, but the prime\\n objective of the First Amendment is not efficiency.”). And the city\\n hasn’t argued that enforcing the existing statute would altogether\\n fail to achieve its interests. 6\\n\\n 6 The city separately asserts that Florida’s anti-obstruction statute “has had a\\n\\n history of being found unconstitutional.” Br. of Appellees at 35. That is tech-\\n nically correct—but misleading. The lone authority the city cites is an order\\n on a motion to dismiss that found that “Plaintiffs ha[d] plausibly alleged that\\n the amended version of section 316.2045 . . . is arguably overbroad.” Dream\\n Defenders v. DeSantis, 553 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1098 (N.D. Fla. 2021). That case\\n was voluntarily dismissed, see Order for Dismissal, Dream Defenders v. DeSantis,\\n No. 4:21CV00191, Dkt. No. 200 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2024), after this Court re-\\n versed an order preliminarily enjoining a different provision, see Dream Defend-\\n ers v. Governor of Fla., 119 F.4th 872, 874–75 (11th Cir. 2024). And while it’s\\n true that two district courts have held § 316.2045 unconstitutional on various\\n First Amendment grounds, see Bischoff v. Florida, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235–\\n 38 (M.D. Fla. 2003); Vigue v. Shoar, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1222–25 (M.D. Fla.\\n 2020), virtually all the offending language has since been excised from the stat-\\n ute. Compare Fla. Stat. § 316.2045 (1996) (held unconstitutional by Bischoff),\\n and id. (2007) (held unconstitutional by Vigue), with id. (2021) (current ver-\\n sion). The only potentially troublesome text that remains is the single word\\n “[s]tanding,” which Bischoff faulted for its vagueness. 242 F. Supp. 2d at 1236.\\n But the amended statute clarifies that term in precisely the way recommended\\n by the district court. Compare id. (“Section one is ambiguous as to whether it\\n is unlawful for an individual to willfully obstruct the free use of the road ‘by\\n standing,’ or whether she must do so by standing on the road.”), with Fla. Stat.\\n § 316.2045(1)(a)(2) (2021) (“Standing on or remaining in the street, highway,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 24 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n * * *\\n In closing, an important coda: It isn’t lost on us, of course,\\n that the buffer zone invalidated in McCullen was much larger than\\n the one at issue here—35 feet on either side of a clinic’s driveway,\\n rather than just 5. That fact is undeniable. Even so, we don’t think\\n it dictates a different analysis or result. Size alone didn’t drive the\\n Supreme Court’s decision there—principle did. The statute’s chief\\n failing wasn’t, as such, that it kept the counselors 35 feet back, but\\n rather that, however far it kept them back, it prevented them from\\n (as relevant here) offering literature to clinic patients as they ar-\\n rived. The Supreme Court noted, for instance, that several peti-\\n tioners there claimed a right that mirrors the one that the counse-\\n lors here claim—namely, to stand “where the private walkway or\\n driveway intersects the sidewalk and offer leaflets to patients as\\n they walk or drive by,” or to “position [themselves] at an entrance\\n to one of the five driveways leading to the parking lots.” 573 U.S.\\n at 474. And the Court’s analysis was trained less on the buffer\\n zone’s sheer scope than on the zone’s infringement (whatever its\\n size) of that claimed right. See id. at 487 (“[T]he zones carve out a\\n significant portion of the adjacent public sidewalks, pushing peti-\\n tioners well back from the clinics’ entrances and driveways. The\\n\\n\\n or road.”). Of course, it’s not our task here to adjudicate the constitutionality\\n of § 316.2045, which isn’t under review. Suffice it to say that so far as we are\\n aware, no part of the current version of the statute has ever been deemed in-\\n valid for any reason.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 25 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n zones thereby compromise petitioners’ ability to initiate the close,\\n personal conversations that they view as essential to ‘sidewalk\\n counseling.’”); id. at 488 (“The buffer zones have also made it sub-\\n stantially more difficult for petitioners to distribute literature to ar-\\n riving patients.”); id. (“[T]he zones have pushed petitioners so far\\n back from the clinics’ driveways that they can no longer even at-\\n tempt to offer literature as drivers turn into the parking lots.”); id.\\n at 489 (“When the government makes it more difficult to engage\\n in these modes of communication, it imposes an especially signifi-\\n cant First Amendment burden.”).\\n The Sixth Circuit’s post-McCullen decision in Sisters for Life is\\n illuminating. There, in holding that a local ordinance establishing\\n a 10-foot buffer zone around the sidewalks leading to clinic en-\\n trances was likely unconstitutional, the court said this: “That the\\n buffer zone in McCullen was larger does not change things.” Sisters\\n for Life, 56 F.4th at 407. McCullen, the Sixth Circuit explained, “does\\n not create distinct sets of rules for a 35-foot buffer zone near an\\n entrance, a 10-foot buffer zone near an entrance, and all manner of\\n buffer zones in between,” but rather holds “that narrow tailoring is\\n required for all such burdens on speech.” Id. (emphasis added). Ac-\\n cordingly, the court concluded—however large or small, and\\n “whether its yoke is heavy or light”—“[o]nce a buffer zone burdens\\n speech, McCullen demands narrow tailoring.” Id. Indeed, the Sixth\\n Circuit seemed to think it constitutionally significant that the ordi-\\n nance at issue there kept sidewalk counselors “more than an arm’s\\n length away” from clinic patients, and thereby frustrated the coun-\\n selors’ protected leafletting activities. Id. at 406; accord id. at 407\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 26 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n (“[T]he buffer zone suppresses speech . . . since distribution now\\n takes place beyond an arm’s length . . . .”).7\\n Under McCullen, the controlling question is whether the\\n challenged buffer zone—be it five, 10, or 35 feet—burdens substan-\\n tially more speech than necessary to achieve the government’s as-\\n serted interests. We think it likely that Clearwater’s buffer zone\\n does so.\\n III\\n Because the district court rejected Florida Preborn’s prelim-\\n inary-injunction request at the first step, it had no occasion to\\n\\n 7 Our own post-McCullen decision in Pine is of a piece. That case dealt with an\\n\\n ordinance that forbade loud sounds within 100 feet of healthcare facilities.\\n Even so, we methodically marched through the McCullen analysis. Pine, 762\\n F.3d at 1269–74.\\n Lastly, a coda to the coda: As did the district court, Clearwater points\\n to cases that have upheld larger buffer zones than the one at issue here. Two\\n of those cases, though—Lucero and Schenck—involved targeted injunctions ra-\\n ther than generally applicable laws. See Lucero, 121 F.3d at 601; Schecnk, 519\\n U.S. at 371. And the McCullen Court explicitly distinguished injunction-related\\n cases in its analysis. See 573 U.S. at 492 (“We have previously noted the First\\n Amendment virtues of targeted injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophy-\\n lactic measures.”). In particular, the Court explained there that “an injunction\\n ‘regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of a group,’ but only ‘because\\n of the group’s past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real par-\\n ties,’” while a law, like the Ordinance here, “categorically excludes non-ex-\\n empt individuals from the buffer zones, unnecessarily sweeping in innocent\\n individuals and their speech.” Id. at 492–93 (quoting Madsen v. Women’s Health\\n Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)). A third case, Bruni, is irrelevant because it\\n concerned a law that did “not prohibit the sidewalk counseling in which Plain-\\n tiffs seek to engage within the zone.” 941 F.3d at 85.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 27 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n address the remaining factors. Even so, we think it sensible to ad-\\n dress and resolve them here. The relevant facts are undisputed; the\\n second, third, and fourth factors have been “fully briefed and ar-\\n gued by the parties”; and their resolution—in the light of our hold-\\n ing that Florida Preborn is likely to succeed on the merits—is clear.\\n See Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307, 1311 n.12 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n The irreparable-injury factor favors preliminary-injunctive\\n relief. “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal\\n periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” El-\\n rod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976). True, we have held that only\\n “direct penalization”—as opposed to “incidental inhibition”—of\\n “First Amendment rights constitutes irreparable injury.” Cate v.\\n Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir. 1983). But the Ordinance\\n “categorically bars” Florida Preborn’s speech by prohibiting side-\\n walk counselors from using a public sidewalk to distribute litera-\\n ture. KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 458 F.3d 1261, 1272 (11th\\n Cir. 2006).\\n The balance-of-harms and public-interest factors “merge\\n when the Government is the opposing party,” Nken v. Holder, 556\\n U.S. 418, 435 (2009), and likewise counsel in favor of preliminary-\\n injunctive relief. “[E]ven a temporary infringement of First\\n Amendment rights constitutes a serious and substantial injury, and\\n the city has no legitimate interest in enforcing an unconstitutional\\n ordinance.” KH Outdoor, 458 F.3d at 1272.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 28 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13501\\n\\n IV\\n For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Florida Preborn\\n has a substantial likelihood of establishing that the Ordinance is not\\n narrowly tailored. Accordingly, we hold that the district court\\n abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction on the\\n ground that Florida Preborn hadn’t established a likelihood of suc-\\n cess on the merits, and we VACATE the district court’s judgment.\\n And because the remaining preliminary-injunction factors straight-\\n forwardly counsel in favor of granting preliminary-injunctive relief,\\n we REMAND to the district court with instructions that it enter\\n the requested injunction.\\n VACATED and REMANDED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 29 of 38\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13501 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30966,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10748218,"string":"10,748,218"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-10604"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10604\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n AHMED S. ISMAEL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SHERIFF RICHARD ROUNDTREE,\\n in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of the Richmond\\n County Sheriff's Office,\\n CAPT. EVERETTE JENKINS,\\n in his individual capacity and acting under color of law as supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\\n SGT. WILLIAM MCCARTY,\\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\\n COL. CALVIN CHEW,\\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n AUGUSTA RICHMOND COUNTY COMMISSION,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n Defendant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00108-JRH-BKE\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:\\n Ahmed Ismael appeals the District Court’s grant of sum-\\n mary judgment, which dismissed his § 1981 retaliatory discharge\\n suit. We hold that the District Court improperly conflated the\\n McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the “convincing mosaic”\\n standard. We reverse and remand for the District Court to, in the\\n first instance, apply the correct standard.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The Richmond County Sherrif’s Office (“RCSO”) hired\\n Ismael as a deputy sheriff on March 21, 2020. Shortly thereafter,\\n Ismael was offered the opportunity to work an ongoing special, off-\\n duty, assignment providing security at the Urban Air Adventure\\n Park in Augusta, Georgia (“Urban Air”). By mid-2021, Ismael was\\n promoted to “officer-in-charge” at Urban Air.\\n A. Ismael’s Alleged Workplace Harassment\\n Lieutenant Everette Jenkins worked the Urban Air special\\n assignment with Ismael. There, Ismael alleges that Jenkins fre-\\n quently harassed him because of his race. Ismael was born in the\\n Republic of Iraq and is a person of Arabic descent. Jenkins allegedly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n called Ismael a “terrorist,” told him to “go play in the sand,” and\\n warned colleagues that Ismael “may have a bomb.” Jenkins admit-\\n ted to making the terrorist comment but denied all others.\\n The owner of Urban Air, William Gilbert, testified that he\\n “frequently” witnessed Jenkins make racist remarks to Ismael. Gen-\\n eral Manager Jordan Chambliss said there was “not one instance”\\n where Jenkins “did not refer to [Ismael] as a terrorist, or make some\\n crude remark about sand, bombs or not being able to speak Eng-\\n lish.”\\n Jenkins’ job performance was allegedly less than stellar. Gil-\\n bert testified that he had to ask Jenkins at least five times to do his\\n job instead of sitting in his car in the parking lot. He described Jen-\\n kins’ work ethic as “unprofessional.” Chambliss added that Jenkins\\n “was late to most every shift,” often left early, but always de-\\n manded a full paycheck.\\n At the same time, Jenkins was the commander of the RCSO\\n SWAT team, which Ismael hoped to join. Though Ismael wanted\\n to report Jenkins’ racial harassment and poor job performance, Jen-\\n kins allegedly warned Ismael that it would sink his chances at mak-\\n ing the SWAT team. According to Chambliss, Jenkins “made it\\n abundantly clear that he could walk all over Ismael because he\\n would be the determining factor as to whether he would ever make\\n it onto ‘his’ team or approve any training.”\\n B. Ismael’s Formal Complaint and Firing\\n On September 13, 2021, Ismael attended a five-day SWAT\\n team training course in Forsyth County. On the final day, Ismael\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n failed the written exam, and, accordingly, Jenkins told him he could\\n not join the team. Ismael’s drive home was approximately two-\\n and-a-half hours. Although he was driving his patrol vehicle and\\n still in RCSO uniform, Ismael decided to briefly visit the Burke\\n County Sherrif’s Office (“Burke County”) to inquire about job\\n openings. He was told that he could apply online and completed\\n his drive home.\\n Since Ismael was no longer a prospect for the SWAT team,\\n Jenkins no longer had leverage over Ismael. Accordingly, Ismael\\n filed an internal affairs complaint on Monday, September 20, 2021.\\n He detailed Jenkins’ offensive remarks, harassment, and general\\n misconduct at Urban Air. Gilbert and Chambliss submitted letters\\n corroborating Ismael’s account. At the time he filed the complaint,\\n Ismael was in good standing with RCSO and had no prior discipli-\\n nary infractions.\\n Sergeant William McCarty was assigned to investigate\\n Ismael’s complaint. McCarty’s investigation included calls to at\\n least seven officers and an interview with Jenkins. McCarty tried to\\n call Gilbert and Chambliss but could not reach them. He issued his\\n report on October 19, 2021, writing that he could not verify\\n Ismael’s allegations and concluding: “The complaint is not sus-\\n tained.”\\n On September 23, 2021, while the investigation into Jenkins\\n was still ongoing, McCarty received an email from Jimmy Wylds\\n of Burke County, inquiring about Ismael. First, McCarty forwarded\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n the email to RCSO Captain Glen Rahn, writing “Lookie here.”\\n Then McCarty answered Wylds:\\n Ismael isn’t very impressive. He failed swat school\\n and Jenkins told him he had to turn his stuff in. So\\n now Ismael has filed a complaint against Jenkins\\n claiming hostile work environment among other\\n things which I am having to deal with. I worked a spe-\\n cial with him one night and he seems to have a big\\n chip on his shoulder about something.\\n Discipline wise he ok…thus far.\\n (emphasis added)\\n A few days later, RCSO Colonel Calvin Chew allegedly re-\\n ceived a call from an anonymous Burke County deputy. According\\n to Chew, the deputy told him about Ismael’s brief pit-stop to Burke\\n County to inquire about job openings. McCarty emailed Wylds to\\n confirm this information, and Wylds responded affirmatively.\\n Here, the parties differ on a couple of facts. In discovery,\\n Ismael received access to Chew’s phone records, which show that\\n no anonymous call was received in the timeframe alleged by\\n Chew. Ismael, though, does not assert an alternative theory as to\\n how McCarty and RCSO learned about his visit to Burke County.\\n The parties also differ on whether Ismael was technically “on duty”\\n or “off duty” when he stopped at Burke County, and whether his\\n behavior violated an official RCSO policy. McCarty flip-flopped as\\n to whether Ismael was on or off duty but eventually testified: “I\\n would probably say that he was off duty.” Nonetheless, Appellees\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n contend that “[w]hether he was off duty or on duty, the act of using\\n a patrol vehicle for personal errands is a violation of RCSO policy.”\\n On September 28, 2021, Ismael was slated to begin work at\\n 6:00 p.m. He scheduled an interview with Burke County at noon,\\n believing he would have ample time before beginning his shift.\\n Shortly before his interview, though, McCarty called Ismael and\\n asked him to report to RCSO “as soon as possible.” McCarty testi-\\n fied that the timing was merely “coincidental.” Ismael attended the\\n interview in uniform and then reported directly to RCSO. During\\n the interview, Chew allegedly received a second anonymous call,\\n informing him that Ismael had returned to Burke County.\\n At this point, Rahn emailed Chew and Sherriff Roundtree\\n the following: “Just confirmed Deputy [Ismael] was in Burke\\n County in our vehicle doing an interview to be hired. He will not\\n be hired and we will have the DR for Termination ready by the\\n time we finish talking with him.” A few minutes later, McCarty be-\\n gan the termination paperwork. The report cited a violation of\\n RCSO’s “Manner of Conduct” policy Rule 4.4. 1 It listed two inci-\\n dents: (1) Ismael visiting Burke County on September 17, 2021, in\\n his patrol car to inquire about employment opportunities while he\\n was “still on Richmond County time” and (2) Ismael visiting Burke\\n County on September 28, 2021, in his patrol car to interview for a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Rule 4.4 reads, in relevant part: “An off-duty employee will not conduct\\n\\n themselves in a manner as to reflect discredit upon the Sherriff’s Office.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n position. Sherriff Roundtree signed the termination report that\\n same day.\\n C. Lawsuit and Ismael’s Evidence of Retaliation\\n Ismael claims he was fired in retaliation for his harassment\\n complaint against Jenkins. On August 14, 2022, Ismael sued Round-\\n tree, Jenkins, McCarty, and Chew for retaliation in violation of 42\\n U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 He\\n amended his complaint twice, retaining only the § 1981 claim. Dis-\\n covery commenced, and Defendants moved for summary judg-\\n ment. In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,\\n Ismael presented the following circumstantial evidence in support\\n of his claim:\\n • McCarty’s email to Wylds, where he improperly disclosed\\n Ismael’s hostile work environment complaint and wrote\\n that Ismael’s disciplinary status is “okay…thus far,” poten-\\n tially suggesting it would not remain “okay” for long.\\n • Phone records showing that Chew did not receive any anon-\\n ymous calls during the timeframe he alleges.\\n • Affidavits from former RCSO personnel stating that they of-\\n ten made personal detours in their patrol vehicles, that\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Ismael also alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under law\\n\\n in violation of both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. These counts were later\\n dropped.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n supervising officers knew of the practice, and that they were\\n never investigated or punished.\\n • McCarty’s testimony that he could not recall any other of-\\n ficer being investigated or punished for making personal use\\n of their patrol vehicle.\\n • Roundtree’s inability to find records or otherwise identify\\n specific instances of officers disciplined for similar vehicle in-\\n fractions, despite testifying that it happened in the past.\\n • Roundtree’s testimony that he was “very good friends” with\\n Jenkins for over twenty-five years.\\n • The fact that Ismael was fired only eight days after filing his\\n complaint against Jenkins.\\n • Ismael’s termination report, which was created before he\\n was interviewed about or informed of an investigation into\\n his potential misconduct, contrary to RCSO investigatory\\n procedures.\\n • Roundtree and McCarty’s early insistence that Ismael was\\n fired for using his patrol car for personal errands while “on\\n duty,” followed by McCarty’s acknowledgment that he was\\n “probably . . . off duty.”\\n • The disparity between the investigations conducted into\\n Jenkins and Ismael.\\n The District Court granted the motion for summary judg-\\n ment. First, the Court found that Ismael had established a prima\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Then, the Court found that the\\n defendants properly articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason\\n for Ismael’s termination. Finally, the Court held that Ismael “failed\\n to prove” that the defendants’ articulated reason was a pretext for\\n retaliation.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\n novo, conducting our inquiry with the same legal principles as the\\n district court. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th\\n Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows\\n that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-\\n vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is\\n such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-mov-\\n ing party.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235\\n (11th Cir. 2016). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor\\n of the nonmoving party, but a “mere scintilla of evidence . . . will\\n not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Young\\n v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have\\n the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full\\n and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” In\\n 1975, the Supreme Court held that § 1981 “affords a federal remedy\\n against discrimination in private employment,” notwithstanding\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n other available remedies like Title VII. 3 Johnson v. Ry. Express\\n Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457–61, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1719–20 (1975). In\\n 2008, the Court held that § 1981 also supports a private cause of\\n action for employees who face retaliation for their complaints\\n about workplace discrimination. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553\\n U.S. 442, 445, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).\\n A. The District Court Conflated McDonnell Douglas Pretext\\n and the Convincing Mosaic Standard\\n Employment discrimination and retaliation cases, including\\n those brought under § 1981, are shaped by the famous yet ill-un-\\n derstood Supreme Court holding in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green,\\n 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). There, the Court introduced a\\n three-part evidentiary burden shifting framework:\\n 1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, which\\n may be done by showing: (i) the plaintiff is in a protected\\n group; (ii) the plaintiff was well qualified; (iii) the plaintiff\\n suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the\\n plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated\\n employees outside of the plaintiff’s protected group.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 State and local government employees must bring their § 1981 claims under\\n\\n § 1983, because it serves as the “exclusive federal remedy for violations of the\\n rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units.” Jett v. Dallas Indep.\\n Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989). Here, plaintiffs ap-\\n propriately brought their action under § 1983.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n 2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate\\n some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ad-\\n verse action.\\n 3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate reason, the\\n plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the em-\\n ployer’s proffered rationale is pretextual.\\n See id. at 802–04, 93 S. Ct. at 1824–25; see also Jenkins v. Nell,\\n 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022). Retaliation claims (as opposed\\n to direct discrimination claims) follow the same framework, but\\n the prima facie case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i)\\n that she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a complaint for\\n discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a material adverse action; and\\n (iii) that there was a causal connection between the protected ac-\\n tivity and the adverse action. Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683\\n F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n The McDonnell Douglas framework is canonical; it can be\\n found in first order across employment law textbooks, treatises,\\n and hornbooks. But burden-shifting regimes are hardly unique;\\n many have existed for centuries at common law. See, e.g., Byrne v.\\n Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 200 (Exch. 1863). Our Court has repeatedly\\n intimated that McDonnell Douglas is not all it’s cracked up to be. To\\n understand what the framework does, we find it useful to begin by\\n answering what it does not do.\\n 1. McDonnell Douglas is Limited\\n Decisions from both the Supreme Court and our Circuit\\n cabin the substantive application of McDonnell Douglas. First,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n McDonnell Douglas “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading re-\\n quirement,” so it has no application on a motion to dismiss.\\n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997\\n (2002). Second, it plays no role at trial. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores,\\n Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is unnecessary and\\n inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analy-\\n sis.”); Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.\\n Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983) (reversing bench trial findings because the\\n court “erroneously focused on the question of prima facie case ra-\\n ther than directly on the question of discrimination”). This is be-\\n cause “once the prima facie case has ‘fulfilled its role in forcing the\\n defendant to come forward with some response,’ it no longer has\\n any work to do.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 945\\n (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 154 (2024) (quoting St. Mary’s\\n Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 609 U.S. 502, 510–11 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2742\\n (1993)). Third, the framework is inapplicable on post-trial motions.\\n Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S. Ct. at 1482 (1983).\\n Most relevant here, our Court has held that McDonnell Doug-\\n las was “never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to\\n survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimi-\\n nation case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328\\n (11th Cir. 2011). In Smith, we held (1) that a “plaintiff will always\\n survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence\\n that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discrimina-\\n tory intent” and (2) that a “triable issue of fact exists if the record,\\n viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convinc-\\n ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (quoting\\n Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)) (internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n This holding adopted what is often referred to as the “con-\\n vincing mosaic standard.” See, e.g., Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946. We have\\n applied it in equal measure to claims of discrimination and retalia-\\n tion. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.\\n 2023) (“An employee may rely on a convincing mosaic of circum-\\n stantial evidence to prove retaliation.”). Initially, there was confu-\\n sion as to whether we had created a new analytical framework,\\n something of a McDonnell Douglas 2.0. In time, however, we made\\n clear that the “convincing mosaic” analysis—despite its flowery\\n language—is a stand-in for the Rule 56 summary judgment stand-\\n ard applied to employment discrimination. See id. at 1311 (“[A]\\n ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a frame-\\n work.”); Tynes, 88 F.4th at 1311 (describing the convincing mosaic\\n standard as a “rearticulation of the summary judgment standard”).\\n As in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid summary judg-\\n ment by presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence. Such\\n evidence may include “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous state-\\n ments . . ., and other bits and pieces from which an inference of\\n discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better\\n treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the em-\\n ployer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Geor-\\n gia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Silverman, 673\\n F.3d at 733–34) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n 2. Convincing Mosaic is Broader than Pretext\\n Our precedent, then, makes clear that a plaintiff who cannot\\n establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is entitled to a full\\n review under the convincing mosaic standard. But here, Ismael did\\n establish his prima facie case, and the District Court advanced to\\n steps two and three of McDonnell Douglas. At step three, the Court\\n held that Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext. But the\\n Court was confronted with one final question: should it also ana-\\n lyze the evidence under the convincing mosaic standard? It de-\\n clined, reasoning that a separate analysis would be redundant. Re-\\n lying on dicta in Ossman v. Meredith Corp., the District Court de-\\n cided that “the convincing mosaic inquiry is identical to the final\\n stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework,” so it “need not decide\\n if the convincing mosaic framework also serves as an independent\\n basis” to support Ismael’s claim. 82 F.4th 1007, 1020 (11th Cir.\\n 2023).\\n Appellees ask us to sign off on this interpretation. They ar-\\n gue that “the terms pretext, convincing mosaic, and summary\\n judgment are substantively the same thing” and that “the pretext\\n prong . . . is the same as the ordinary summary judgment stand-\\n ard.” We disagree. Though we recognize that both inquiries are\\n probative of the same ultimate question, we are persuaded that\\n they are not identical.\\n To show pretext, a plaintiff must show “both that the [em-\\n ployer’s] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-\\n son” for the adverse action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n The latter requirement unquestionably holds the same focus as the\\n convincing mosaic standard. The former, however, does not. Re-\\n quiring a plaintiff to negate the defendant’s explanation on sum-\\n mary judgment has at least two defects. First, it is not required to\\n succeed at trial. Second, it detracts from the plaintiff’s affirmative\\n case that the driving cause was illegal discrimination or retaliation.\\n In Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, the\\n Supreme Court held that claims brought under § 1981 must show\\n that an illicit motive was a “but-for” cause for the adverse action,\\n rather than merely a “motivating factor.” 589 U.S. 327, 340, 140 S.\\n Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). But it is not required, under either § 1981 or\\n Title VII, to show that the unlawful purpose was the only contrib-\\n uting factor. “[T]he traditional but-for causation standard means a\\n defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor\\n that contributed to its challenged employment decision.” Bostock v.\\n Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 656, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739\\n (2020).\\n A plaintiff can even succeed where there are multiple but-\\n for causes: “so long as the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] was\\n one but-for cause of [the adverse] decision, that is enough to trigger\\n the law.” Id. at 656, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (emphasis added). In this sit-\\n uation, the employer’s reason might be both factually grounded\\n and directly causal—in other words, unassailable as pretext. If we\\n require the plaintiff to negate their counterparty’s rationale, we\\n permit the absurd result of a plaintiff losing on summary judgment\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n for failing to demonstrate a falsity that she would not need to show\\n at trial.\\n Moreover, focusing on the defendant’s justification can lead\\n both litigants and the court down a rabbit hole that obfuscates the\\n plaintiff’s affirmative claim. This is precisely what we sought to\\n avoid when we adopted the convincing mosaic standard. See Smith,\\n 644 F.3d at 1328. In Tynes, we emphasized that, at summary judg-\\n ment, “we ask only one question: whether there is sufficient evi-\\n dentiary basis for the jury to find that the defendant internationally\\n discriminated against the plaintiff.” 88 F.4th at 947. In retaliation\\n claims, we ask whether the defendant intentionally retaliated\\n against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected activity.\\n Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310. These questions appropriately frame the in-\\n quiry on the plaintiff’s asserted theory of the case. By contrast, the\\n pretext inquiry lets the defendant’s explanation take center stage,\\n requiring the plaintiff to present contradictory evidence rather than\\n direct or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of dis-\\n crimination.\\n Surely, the plaintiff might find it useful to attack the defend-\\n ant’s account. Evidence that their explanation is untruthful, incon-\\n sistent, or that the alleged conduct was not typically punished may\\n all be probative of malfeasance. But, as we have explained before,\\n the “entire evidentiary picture” goes further than pretext. See Yell-\\n ing v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1242 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n Our precedent specifically describes evidence of pretext as a subset\\n of potentially relevant circumstantial evidence. Id. And, while this\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n Circuit has no published opinion finding the requisite summary\\n judgment inference after a plaintiff failed on pretext, 4 we have rec-\\n ognized the possibility, and we conduct both analyses accordingly.\\n See id.; Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\\n Finally, we do not think the Supreme Court intended pretext\\n to be the sole determinate at any stage of litigation, but especially\\n at summary judgment. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that\\n when a defendant’s reason for the adverse action “suffices to meet\\n the prima facie case,” the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair oppor-\\n tunity to show that [the defendant’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s]\\n rejection was in fact pretext.” 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 (em-\\n phasis added). We do not take this language to reframe the dispos-\\n itive question on summary judgment or at trial, but rather to em-\\n phasize that the “inquiry must not end” with a defendant’s plausi-\\n ble explanation. See id. Even taken literally, the plaintiff is always\\n given the ”opportunity” to show pretext; our Court has simply\\n elaborated that it is not the “exclusive means” to survive summary\\n judgment. See Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\\n In Burdine, the Supreme Court further explained that the\\n plaintiff’s “opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason\\n was not the true reason for the employment decision . . . merges\\n\\n 4 In a 2023 unpublished opinion, however, we found exactly this. See Brown v.\\n\\n Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, No. 21-11328, 2023 WL 2386500, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 7,\\n 2023). There, we concluded that the plaintiff did not show pretext under\\n McDonnell Douglas but that he did present a convincing mosaic of discrimina-\\n tory intent because that standard allowed him to add his “more general evi-\\n dence of discriminatory intent to the equation.” Id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been\\n the victim of intentional discrimination.” 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct.\\n at 1095. “She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the\\n court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-\\n ployer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered ex-\\n planation is unworthy of credence.” Id. This appropriately catego-\\n rizes pretext as an avenue to demonstrate the defendant’s illicit mo-\\n tive, but not as the end-all be-all.\\n Most recently, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from\\n a denial of certiorari, arguing that the McDonnell Douglas frame-\\n work has spawned “widespread confusion” and that the Court\\n should offer “clear guidance” on how lower courts should conduct\\n their review on summary judgment. Hittle v. City of Stockton, Cali-\\n fornia, 604 U.S. __, __, 145 S. Ct. 759, 763 (2025) (Thomas, J., dis-\\n senting from denial of certiorari). The posture in Hittle matches the\\n posture here; the district court granted summary judgment “on the\\n ground that Hittle had not shown sufficient evidence of pretext.”\\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 763–64. Thomas explained:\\n This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may dis-\\n tort a lower court’s analysis. Hittle presented “ample”\\n evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of those\\n who decided to terminate him. That evidence is more\\n than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a genuine\\n dispute of material fact as required by Rule 56. Yet,\\n after applying McDonnell Douglas, the District Court\\n and the Ninth Circuit ruled for the city.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 764. Though we lack clarity from the Su-\\n preme Court regarding McDonnell Douglas’ appropriate role—if\\n any—at summary judgment, we reaffirm that it is not the only\\n game in town, and that it does not supplant Rule 56.\\n A plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to confront her\\n burden of proof head-on, if she so chooses. Our Court’s convincing\\n mosaic standard heeds this directive and preserves the plaintiff’s\\n opportunity at summary judgment to directly create an inference\\n of discrimination or retaliation—“shorn of all [the] McDonnell Doug-\\n las prophylaxis.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 953 (Newsom, J., concurring).\\n For these reasons, we hold that summary judgment should not be\\n granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also “reflects a\\n failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the\\n plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination” or retaliation.\\n Id. at 947.\\n B. The Legal Error Stifled Review of Ismael’s Evidence\\n The previous Section explains why, as a legal matter, the\\n District Court was wrong to conflate a showing of pretext with the\\n standard to survive summary judgment. If we could find that this\\n error was in name only, and that the district court considered all\\n appropriate evidence, it might have been a harmless error. See 28\\n U.S.C. § 2111 (“[T]he court shall give judgment after an examina-\\n tion of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not\\n affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). But the Court’s lan-\\n guage shows that it focused narrowly on the defendant’s purported\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n rationale and ignored other evidence probative of Appellees’ illicit\\n intent.\\n For example, Ismael presented evidence that other officers\\n often ran errands in their patrol cars, such as picking up food, going\\n to the gym, and picking up children, but were never punished. The\\n Court found this immaterial:\\n [E]ven assuming the alleged personal errands were\\n common and Defendants were aware of these prac-\\n tices, they do not show the reason for [Ismael’s] ter-\\n mination was unworthy of credence because these\\n are not appropriate comparators, nor do they estab-\\n lish conflicting testimony regarding the reason for\\n [Ismael’s] termination. Further, the fact that no other\\n officer has been fired for similar conduct, without ev-\\n idence another officer has actually engaged in suffi-\\n ciently similar conduct, does not prove the stated rea-\\n son was false.\\n (emphasis added). The Court treated just about all of Ismael’s evi-\\n dence this way: rejecting it unless it “negated the proffered reason”\\n for his termination.\\n As a threshold matter, Ismael does not need to “prove” any-\\n thing to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, com-\\n parator evidence can still be useful even where there are “material\\n differences” between a plaintiff and her comparator. Tynes, 88 F.4th\\n at 947. “[I]t is the jury’s role—not ours—to determine how much\\n weight comparator evidence should be given.” Id. at 947; see also\\n Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n circumstantial evidence probative even when lacking a “strict com-\\n parator”). And, as we emphasize today, evidence does not need to\\n attack—or even have anything to do with—the defendant’s pur-\\n ported rationale to help raise an inference of discrimination.\\n Because the District Court only analyzed Ismael’s claim\\n through the narrow lens of McDonnell Douglas pretext, we reverse\\n and remand with instruction to apply the correct summary judg-\\n ment standard. Specifically, the Court should ask whether Ismael’s\\n circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered together and\\n viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of\\n retaliation and find in Ismael’s favor.\\n C. Proper Review on Summary Judgment\\n Today’s holding takes one more swing at the McDonnell\\n Douglas game of whack-a-mole, where we must strike down courts\\n that find new and creative ways to incorrectly apply the framework\\n as substantive doctrine. Correctly understood, McDonnell Douglas is\\n a “procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof\\n and production.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. No more,\\n no less. Accordingly, we offer the following instruction for district\\n courts to properly review summary judgment motions. The\\n roadmap differs depending on whether the plaintiff can demon-\\n strate a prima facie case or not.\\n 1. Plaintiff Demonstrates Prima Facie Case\\n If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled\\n to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent. This necessarily means\\n that if the defendant fails to proffer evidence of a legitimate reason\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n for the adverse employment action, summary judgment in favor of\\n the plaintiff is appropriate. 5\\n Where, as is more common, the defendant comes forth with\\n evidence and successfully rebuts the presumption, “the McDonnell\\n Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no\\n longer relevant.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. It “simply\\n drops out of the picture.” Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. At this point,\\n the court must proceed to ask whether “the record, viewed in a\\n light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic\\n of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-\\n tional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker.” Smith,\\n 644 F.3d at 1328. A showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would cer-\\n tainly be relevant. But a plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defend-\\n ant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.\\n 2. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Prima Facie Case\\n If the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, she does\\n not automatically lose on summary judgment. See Smith, 644 F.4th\\n at 1328. In Tynes, we explained why this is so:\\n When the Supreme Court uses the term “prima facie\\n case” in this context, it does so “in a special sense.”\\n The Court itself has explained that although that\\n phrase may sometimes “describe the plaintiff's bur-\\n den of producing enough evidence to permit the trier\\n of fact to infer the fact at issue,” within the McDonnell\\n\\n 5 Or, if only the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the court must\\n\\n reject that motion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n Douglas framework the term “prima facie case” has a\\n different meaning—it marks “the establishment of a\\n legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.”\\n 88 F.4th at 945 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7, 101 S.Ct. at\\n 1094) (internal citations omitted). Rather than lose by default, the\\n consequence is that the plaintiff must produce enough evidence,\\n on her own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or pre-\\n sumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable fact. A court,\\n therefore, should advance directly to the convincing mosaic in-\\n quiry.\\n A helpful analogy can be drawn to the common law doctrine\\n of res ipsa loquitur for negligence. If a plaintiff invokes that doc-\\n trine, the court must determine whether “the plaintiff’s evidence is\\n sufficient for a reasonable jury to find . . . the accident is of the type\\n that usually happens because of negligence.” Restatement (Third)\\n of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 17 cmt. j (A.L.I. 2010). If the court\\n so finds, some jurisdictions employ a “rebuttable presumption,\\n thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with some excul-\\n patory evidence or suffer judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This\\n “level[s] the playing field and encourage[s] the defendant to dis-\\n close relevant evidence.“ Id. cmt. i. But a court would never grant\\n summary judgment just because a plaintiff failed res ipsa’s thresh-\\n old inquiry. Instead, it would evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence un-\\n der the appropriate summary judgment standard for ordinary neg-\\n ligence, without any inferences or presumptions.\\n McDonnell Douglas, like res ipsa, offers plaintiffs an eviden-\\n tiary advantage if their case satisfies a preliminary assessment,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n namely, the prima facie case. If plaintiffs cannot satisfy that test, the\\n inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to evaluate\\n the evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated Rule 56 sum-\\n mary judgment standard.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for the\\n District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard in\\n the first instance.\\n REVERSED and REMANDED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214803/\", \"author_raw\": \"TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"TJOFLAT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ANDERSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\", \"TJOFLAT\": \", Circuit\", \"ANDERSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748218/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 24\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 25-10604\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n AHMED S. ISMAEL,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n SHERIFF RICHARD ROUNDTREE,\n in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of the Richmond\n County Sheriff's Office,\n CAPT. EVERETTE JENKINS,\n in his individual capacity and acting under color of law as supervisor\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\n SGT. WILLIAM MCCARTY,\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\n COL. CALVIN CHEW,\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\n of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office,\n Defendants-Appellees,\n AUGUSTA RICHMOND COUNTY COMMISSION,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n Defendant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00108-JRH-BKE\n ____________________\n\n Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\n TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:\n Ahmed Ismael appeals the District Court’s grant of sum-\n mary judgment, which dismissed his § 1981 retaliatory discharge\n suit. We hold that the District Court improperly conflated the\n McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the “convincing mosaic”\n standard. We reverse and remand for the District Court to, in the\n first instance, apply the correct standard.\n I. BACKGROUND\n The Richmond County Sherrif’s Office (“RCSO”) hired\n Ismael as a deputy sheriff on March 21, 2020. Shortly thereafter,\n Ismael was offered the opportunity to work an ongoing special, off-\n duty, assignment providing security at the Urban Air Adventure\n Park in Augusta, Georgia (“Urban Air”). By mid-2021, Ismael was\n promoted to “officer-in-charge” at Urban Air.\n A. Ismael’s Alleged Workplace Harassment\n Lieutenant Everette Jenkins worked the Urban Air special\n assignment with Ismael. There, Ismael alleges that Jenkins fre-\n quently harassed him because of his race. Ismael was born in the\n Republic of Iraq and is a person of Arabic descent. Jenkins allegedly\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n called Ismael a “terrorist,” told him to “go play in the sand,” and\n warned colleagues that Ismael “may have a bomb.” Jenkins admit-\n ted to making the terrorist comment but denied all others.\n The owner of Urban Air, William Gilbert, testified that he\n “frequently” witnessed Jenkins make racist remarks to Ismael. Gen-\n eral Manager Jordan Chambliss said there was “not one instance”\n where Jenkins “did not refer to [Ismael] as a terrorist, or make some\n crude remark about sand, bombs or not being able to speak Eng-\n lish.”\n Jenkins’ job performance was allegedly less than stellar. Gil-\n bert testified that he had to ask Jenkins at least five times to do his\n job instead of sitting in his car in the parking lot. He described Jen-\n kins’ work ethic as “unprofessional.” Chambliss added that Jenkins\n “was late to most every shift,” often left early, but always de-\n manded a full paycheck.\n At the same time, Jenkins was the commander of the RCSO\n SWAT team, which Ismael hoped to join. Though Ismael wanted\n to report Jenkins’ racial harassment and poor job performance, Jen-\n kins allegedly warned Ismael that it would sink his chances at mak-\n ing the SWAT team. According to Chambliss, Jenkins “made it\n abundantly clear that he could walk all over Ismael because he\n would be the determining factor as to whether he would ever make\n it onto ‘his’ team or approve any training.”\n B. Ismael’s Formal Complaint and Firing\n On September 13, 2021, Ismael attended a five-day SWAT\n team training course in Forsyth County. On the final day, Ismael\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n failed the written exam, and, accordingly, Jenkins told him he could\n not join the team. Ismael’s drive home was approximately two-\n and-a-half hours. Although he was driving his patrol vehicle and\n still in RCSO uniform, Ismael decided to briefly visit the Burke\n County Sherrif’s Office (“Burke County”) to inquire about job\n openings. He was told that he could apply online and completed\n his drive home.\n Since Ismael was no longer a prospect for the SWAT team,\n Jenkins no longer had leverage over Ismael. Accordingly, Ismael\n filed an internal affairs complaint on Monday, September 20, 2021.\n He detailed Jenkins’ offensive remarks, harassment, and general\n misconduct at Urban Air. Gilbert and Chambliss submitted letters\n corroborating Ismael’s account. At the time he filed the complaint,\n Ismael was in good standing with RCSO and had no prior discipli-\n nary infractions.\n Sergeant William McCarty was assigned to investigate\n Ismael’s complaint. McCarty’s investigation included calls to at\n least seven officers and an interview with Jenkins. McCarty tried to\n call Gilbert and Chambliss but could not reach them. He issued his\n report on October 19, 2021, writing that he could not verify\n Ismael’s allegations and concluding: “The complaint is not sus-\n tained.”\n On September 23, 2021, while the investigation into Jenkins\n was still ongoing, McCarty received an email from Jimmy Wylds\n of Burke County, inquiring about Ismael. First, McCarty forwarded\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n the email to RCSO Captain Glen Rahn, writing “Lookie here.”\n Then McCarty answered Wylds:\n Ismael isn’t very impressive. He failed swat school\n and Jenkins told him he had to turn his stuff in. So\n now Ismael has filed a complaint against Jenkins\n claiming hostile work environment among other\n things which I am having to deal with. I worked a spe-\n cial with him one night and he seems to have a big\n chip on his shoulder about something.\n Discipline wise he ok…thus far.\n (emphasis added)\n A few days later, RCSO Colonel Calvin Chew allegedly re-\n ceived a call from an anonymous Burke County deputy. According\n to Chew, the deputy told him about Ismael’s brief pit-stop to Burke\n County to inquire about job openings. McCarty emailed Wylds to\n confirm this information, and Wylds responded affirmatively.\n Here, the parties differ on a couple of facts. In discovery,\n Ismael received access to Chew’s phone records, which show that\n no anonymous call was received in the timeframe alleged by\n Chew. Ismael, though, does not assert an alternative theory as to\n how McCarty and RCSO learned about his visit to Burke County.\n The parties also differ on whether Ismael was technically “on duty”\n or “off duty” when he stopped at Burke County, and whether his\n behavior violated an official RCSO policy. McCarty flip-flopped as\n to whether Ismael was on or off duty but eventually testified: “I\n would probably say that he was off duty.” Nonetheless, Appellees\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n contend that “[w]hether he was off duty or on duty, the act of using\n a patrol vehicle for personal errands is a violation of RCSO policy.”\n On September 28, 2021, Ismael was slated to begin work at\n 6:00 p.m. He scheduled an interview with Burke County at noon,\n believing he would have ample time before beginning his shift.\n Shortly before his interview, though, McCarty called Ismael and\n asked him to report to RCSO “as soon as possible.” McCarty testi-\n fied that the timing was merely “coincidental.” Ismael attended the\n interview in uniform and then reported directly to RCSO. During\n the interview, Chew allegedly received a second anonymous call,\n informing him that Ismael had returned to Burke County.\n At this point, Rahn emailed Chew and Sherriff Roundtree\n the following: “Just confirmed Deputy [Ismael] was in Burke\n County in our vehicle doing an interview to be hired. He will not\n be hired and we will have the DR for Termination ready by the\n time we finish talking with him.” A few minutes later, McCarty be-\n gan the termination paperwork. The report cited a violation of\n RCSO’s “Manner of Conduct” policy Rule 4.4. 1 It listed two inci-\n dents: (1) Ismael visiting Burke County on September 17, 2021, in\n his patrol car to inquire about employment opportunities while he\n was “still on Richmond County time” and (2) Ismael visiting Burke\n County on September 28, 2021, in his patrol car to interview for a\n\n\n\n\n 1 Rule 4.4 reads, in relevant part: “An off-duty employee will not conduct\n\n themselves in a manner as to reflect discredit upon the Sherriff’s Office.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n position. Sherriff Roundtree signed the termination report that\n same day.\n C. Lawsuit and Ismael’s Evidence of Retaliation\n Ismael claims he was fired in retaliation for his harassment\n complaint against Jenkins. On August 14, 2022, Ismael sued Round-\n tree, Jenkins, McCarty, and Chew for retaliation in violation of 42\n U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 He\n amended his complaint twice, retaining only the § 1981 claim. Dis-\n covery commenced, and Defendants moved for summary judg-\n ment. In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,\n Ismael presented the following circumstantial evidence in support\n of his claim:\n • McCarty’s email to Wylds, where he improperly disclosed\n Ismael’s hostile work environment complaint and wrote\n that Ismael’s disciplinary status is “okay…thus far,” poten-\n tially suggesting it would not remain “okay” for long.\n • Phone records showing that Chew did not receive any anon-\n ymous calls during the timeframe he alleges.\n • Affidavits from former RCSO personnel stating that they of-\n ten made personal detours in their patrol vehicles, that\n\n\n\n\n 2 Ismael also alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under law\n\n in violation of both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. These counts were later\n dropped.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n supervising officers knew of the practice, and that they were\n never investigated or punished.\n • McCarty’s testimony that he could not recall any other of-\n ficer being investigated or punished for making personal use\n of their patrol vehicle.\n • Roundtree’s inability to find records or otherwise identify\n specific instances of officers disciplined for similar vehicle in-\n fractions, despite testifying that it happened in the past.\n • Roundtree’s testimony that he was “very good friends” with\n Jenkins for over twenty-five years.\n • The fact that Ismael was fired only eight days after filing his\n complaint against Jenkins.\n • Ismael’s termination report, which was created before he\n was interviewed about or informed of an investigation into\n his potential misconduct, contrary to RCSO investigatory\n procedures.\n • Roundtree and McCarty’s early insistence that Ismael was\n fired for using his patrol car for personal errands while “on\n duty,” followed by McCarty’s acknowledgment that he was\n “probably . . . off duty.”\n • The disparity between the investigations conducted into\n Jenkins and Ismael.\n The District Court granted the motion for summary judg-\n ment. First, the Court found that Ismael had established a prima\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Then, the Court found that the\n defendants properly articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason\n for Ismael’s termination. Finally, the Court held that Ismael “failed\n to prove” that the defendants’ articulated reason was a pretext for\n retaliation.\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\n novo, conducting our inquiry with the same legal principles as the\n district court. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th\n Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows\n that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-\n vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is\n such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-mov-\n ing party.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235\n (11th Cir. 2016). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor\n of the nonmoving party, but a “mere scintilla of evidence . . . will\n not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Young\n v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).\n III. DISCUSSION\n 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have\n the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full\n and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” In\n 1975, the Supreme Court held that § 1981 “affords a federal remedy\n against discrimination in private employment,” notwithstanding\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n other available remedies like Title VII. 3 Johnson v. Ry. Express\n Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457–61, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1719–20 (1975). In\n 2008, the Court held that § 1981 also supports a private cause of\n action for employees who face retaliation for their complaints\n about workplace discrimination. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553\n U.S. 442, 445, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).\n A. The District Court Conflated McDonnell Douglas Pretext\n and the Convincing Mosaic Standard\n Employment discrimination and retaliation cases, including\n those brought under § 1981, are shaped by the famous yet ill-un-\n derstood Supreme Court holding in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green,\n 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). There, the Court introduced a\n three-part evidentiary burden shifting framework:\n 1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, which\n may be done by showing: (i) the plaintiff is in a protected\n group; (ii) the plaintiff was well qualified; (iii) the plaintiff\n suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the\n plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated\n employees outside of the plaintiff’s protected group.\n\n\n\n\n 3 State and local government employees must bring their § 1981 claims under\n\n § 1983, because it serves as the “exclusive federal remedy for violations of the\n rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units.” Jett v. Dallas Indep.\n Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989). Here, plaintiffs ap-\n propriately brought their action under § 1983.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n 2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate\n some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ad-\n verse action.\n 3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate reason, the\n plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the em-\n ployer’s proffered rationale is pretextual.\n See id. at 802–04, 93 S. Ct. at 1824–25; see also Jenkins v. Nell,\n 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022). Retaliation claims (as opposed\n to direct discrimination claims) follow the same framework, but\n the prima facie case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i)\n that she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a complaint for\n discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a material adverse action; and\n (iii) that there was a causal connection between the protected ac-\n tivity and the adverse action. Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683\n F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).\n The McDonnell Douglas framework is canonical; it can be\n found in first order across employment law textbooks, treatises,\n and hornbooks. But burden-shifting regimes are hardly unique;\n many have existed for centuries at common law. See, e.g., Byrne v.\n Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 200 (Exch. 1863). Our Court has repeatedly\n intimated that McDonnell Douglas is not all it’s cracked up to be. To\n understand what the framework does, we find it useful to begin by\n answering what it does not do.\n 1. McDonnell Douglas is Limited\n Decisions from both the Supreme Court and our Circuit\n cabin the substantive application of McDonnell Douglas. First,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n McDonnell Douglas “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading re-\n quirement,” so it has no application on a motion to dismiss.\n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997\n (2002). Second, it plays no role at trial. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores,\n Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is unnecessary and\n inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analy-\n sis.”); Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.\n Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983) (reversing bench trial findings because the\n court “erroneously focused on the question of prima facie case ra-\n ther than directly on the question of discrimination”). This is be-\n cause “once the prima facie case has ‘fulfilled its role in forcing the\n defendant to come forward with some response,’ it no longer has\n any work to do.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 945\n (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 154 (2024) (quoting St. Mary’s\n Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 609 U.S. 502, 510–11 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2742\n (1993)). Third, the framework is inapplicable on post-trial motions.\n Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S. Ct. at 1482 (1983).\n Most relevant here, our Court has held that McDonnell Doug-\n las was “never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to\n survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimi-\n nation case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328\n (11th Cir. 2011). In Smith, we held (1) that a “plaintiff will always\n survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence\n that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discrimina-\n tory intent” and (2) that a “triable issue of fact exists if the record,\n viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convinc-\n ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (quoting\n Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)) (internal\n quotation marks omitted).\n This holding adopted what is often referred to as the “con-\n vincing mosaic standard.” See, e.g., Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946. We have\n applied it in equal measure to claims of discrimination and retalia-\n tion. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.\n 2023) (“An employee may rely on a convincing mosaic of circum-\n stantial evidence to prove retaliation.”). Initially, there was confu-\n sion as to whether we had created a new analytical framework,\n something of a McDonnell Douglas 2.0. In time, however, we made\n clear that the “convincing mosaic” analysis—despite its flowery\n language—is a stand-in for the Rule 56 summary judgment stand-\n ard applied to employment discrimination. See id. at 1311 (“[A]\n ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a frame-\n work.”); Tynes, 88 F.4th at 1311 (describing the convincing mosaic\n standard as a “rearticulation of the summary judgment standard”).\n As in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid summary judg-\n ment by presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence. Such\n evidence may include “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous state-\n ments . . ., and other bits and pieces from which an inference of\n discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better\n treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the em-\n ployer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Geor-\n gia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Silverman, 673\n F.3d at 733–34) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n 2. Convincing Mosaic is Broader than Pretext\n Our precedent, then, makes clear that a plaintiff who cannot\n establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is entitled to a full\n review under the convincing mosaic standard. But here, Ismael did\n establish his prima facie case, and the District Court advanced to\n steps two and three of McDonnell Douglas. At step three, the Court\n held that Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext. But the\n Court was confronted with one final question: should it also ana-\n lyze the evidence under the convincing mosaic standard? It de-\n clined, reasoning that a separate analysis would be redundant. Re-\n lying on dicta in Ossman v. Meredith Corp., the District Court de-\n cided that “the convincing mosaic inquiry is identical to the final\n stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework,” so it “need not decide\n if the convincing mosaic framework also serves as an independent\n basis” to support Ismael’s claim. 82 F.4th 1007, 1020 (11th Cir.\n 2023).\n Appellees ask us to sign off on this interpretation. They ar-\n gue that “the terms pretext, convincing mosaic, and summary\n judgment are substantively the same thing” and that “the pretext\n prong . . . is the same as the ordinary summary judgment stand-\n ard.” We disagree. Though we recognize that both inquiries are\n probative of the same ultimate question, we are persuaded that\n they are not identical.\n To show pretext, a plaintiff must show “both that the [em-\n ployer’s] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-\n son” for the adverse action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n The latter requirement unquestionably holds the same focus as the\n convincing mosaic standard. The former, however, does not. Re-\n quiring a plaintiff to negate the defendant’s explanation on sum-\n mary judgment has at least two defects. First, it is not required to\n succeed at trial. Second, it detracts from the plaintiff’s affirmative\n case that the driving cause was illegal discrimination or retaliation.\n In Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, the\n Supreme Court held that claims brought under § 1981 must show\n that an illicit motive was a “but-for” cause for the adverse action,\n rather than merely a “motivating factor.” 589 U.S. 327, 340, 140 S.\n Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). But it is not required, under either § 1981 or\n Title VII, to show that the unlawful purpose was the only contrib-\n uting factor. “[T]he traditional but-for causation standard means a\n defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor\n that contributed to its challenged employment decision.” Bostock v.\n Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 656, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739\n (2020).\n A plaintiff can even succeed where there are multiple but-\n for causes: “so long as the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] was\n one but-for cause of [the adverse] decision, that is enough to trigger\n the law.” Id. at 656, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (emphasis added). In this sit-\n uation, the employer’s reason might be both factually grounded\n and directly causal—in other words, unassailable as pretext. If we\n require the plaintiff to negate their counterparty’s rationale, we\n permit the absurd result of a plaintiff losing on summary judgment\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n for failing to demonstrate a falsity that she would not need to show\n at trial.\n Moreover, focusing on the defendant’s justification can lead\n both litigants and the court down a rabbit hole that obfuscates the\n plaintiff’s affirmative claim. This is precisely what we sought to\n avoid when we adopted the convincing mosaic standard. See Smith,\n 644 F.3d at 1328. In Tynes, we emphasized that, at summary judg-\n ment, “we ask only one question: whether there is sufficient evi-\n dentiary basis for the jury to find that the defendant internationally\n discriminated against the plaintiff.” 88 F.4th at 947. In retaliation\n claims, we ask whether the defendant intentionally retaliated\n against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected activity.\n Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310. These questions appropriately frame the in-\n quiry on the plaintiff’s asserted theory of the case. By contrast, the\n pretext inquiry lets the defendant’s explanation take center stage,\n requiring the plaintiff to present contradictory evidence rather than\n direct or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of dis-\n crimination.\n Surely, the plaintiff might find it useful to attack the defend-\n ant’s account. Evidence that their explanation is untruthful, incon-\n sistent, or that the alleged conduct was not typically punished may\n all be probative of malfeasance. But, as we have explained before,\n the “entire evidentiary picture” goes further than pretext. See Yell-\n ing v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1242 (11th Cir. 2023).\n Our precedent specifically describes evidence of pretext as a subset\n of potentially relevant circumstantial evidence. Id. And, while this\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n Circuit has no published opinion finding the requisite summary\n judgment inference after a plaintiff failed on pretext, 4 we have rec-\n ognized the possibility, and we conduct both analyses accordingly.\n See id.; Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\n Finally, we do not think the Supreme Court intended pretext\n to be the sole determinate at any stage of litigation, but especially\n at summary judgment. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that\n when a defendant’s reason for the adverse action “suffices to meet\n the prima facie case,” the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair oppor-\n tunity to show that [the defendant’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s]\n rejection was in fact pretext.” 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 (em-\n phasis added). We do not take this language to reframe the dispos-\n itive question on summary judgment or at trial, but rather to em-\n phasize that the “inquiry must not end” with a defendant’s plausi-\n ble explanation. See id. Even taken literally, the plaintiff is always\n given the ”opportunity” to show pretext; our Court has simply\n elaborated that it is not the “exclusive means” to survive summary\n judgment. See Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\n In Burdine, the Supreme Court further explained that the\n plaintiff’s “opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason\n was not the true reason for the employment decision . . . merges\n\n 4 In a 2023 unpublished opinion, however, we found exactly this. See Brown v.\n\n Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, No. 21-11328, 2023 WL 2386500, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 7,\n 2023). There, we concluded that the plaintiff did not show pretext under\n McDonnell Douglas but that he did present a convincing mosaic of discrimina-\n tory intent because that standard allowed him to add his “more general evi-\n dence of discriminatory intent to the equation.” Id.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been\n the victim of intentional discrimination.” 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct.\n at 1095. “She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the\n court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-\n ployer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered ex-\n planation is unworthy of credence.” Id. This appropriately catego-\n rizes pretext as an avenue to demonstrate the defendant’s illicit mo-\n tive, but not as the end-all be-all.\n Most recently, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from\n a denial of certiorari, arguing that the McDonnell Douglas frame-\n work has spawned “widespread confusion” and that the Court\n should offer “clear guidance” on how lower courts should conduct\n their review on summary judgment. Hittle v. City of Stockton, Cali-\n fornia, 604 U.S. __, __, 145 S. Ct. 759, 763 (2025) (Thomas, J., dis-\n senting from denial of certiorari). The posture in Hittle matches the\n posture here; the district court granted summary judgment “on the\n ground that Hittle had not shown sufficient evidence of pretext.”\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 763–64. Thomas explained:\n This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may dis-\n tort a lower court’s analysis. Hittle presented “ample”\n evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of those\n who decided to terminate him. That evidence is more\n than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a genuine\n dispute of material fact as required by Rule 56. Yet,\n after applying McDonnell Douglas, the District Court\n and the Ninth Circuit ruled for the city.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 764. Though we lack clarity from the Su-\n preme Court regarding McDonnell Douglas’ appropriate role—if\n any—at summary judgment, we reaffirm that it is not the only\n game in town, and that it does not supplant Rule 56.\n A plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to confront her\n burden of proof head-on, if she so chooses. Our Court’s convincing\n mosaic standard heeds this directive and preserves the plaintiff’s\n opportunity at summary judgment to directly create an inference\n of discrimination or retaliation—“shorn of all [the] McDonnell Doug-\n las prophylaxis.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 953 (Newsom, J., concurring).\n For these reasons, we hold that summary judgment should not be\n granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also “reflects a\n failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the\n plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination” or retaliation.\n Id. at 947.\n B. The Legal Error Stifled Review of Ismael’s Evidence\n The previous Section explains why, as a legal matter, the\n District Court was wrong to conflate a showing of pretext with the\n standard to survive summary judgment. If we could find that this\n error was in name only, and that the district court considered all\n appropriate evidence, it might have been a harmless error. See 28\n U.S.C. § 2111 (“[T]he court shall give judgment after an examina-\n tion of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not\n affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). But the Court’s lan-\n guage shows that it focused narrowly on the defendant’s purported\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n rationale and ignored other evidence probative of Appellees’ illicit\n intent.\n For example, Ismael presented evidence that other officers\n often ran errands in their patrol cars, such as picking up food, going\n to the gym, and picking up children, but were never punished. The\n Court found this immaterial:\n [E]ven assuming the alleged personal errands were\n common and Defendants were aware of these prac-\n tices, they do not show the reason for [Ismael’s] ter-\n mination was unworthy of credence because these\n are not appropriate comparators, nor do they estab-\n lish conflicting testimony regarding the reason for\n [Ismael’s] termination. Further, the fact that no other\n officer has been fired for similar conduct, without ev-\n idence another officer has actually engaged in suffi-\n ciently similar conduct, does not prove the stated rea-\n son was false.\n (emphasis added). The Court treated just about all of Ismael’s evi-\n dence this way: rejecting it unless it “negated the proffered reason”\n for his termination.\n As a threshold matter, Ismael does not need to “prove” any-\n thing to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, com-\n parator evidence can still be useful even where there are “material\n differences” between a plaintiff and her comparator. Tynes, 88 F.4th\n at 947. “[I]t is the jury’s role—not ours—to determine how much\n weight comparator evidence should be given.” Id. at 947; see also\n Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n circumstantial evidence probative even when lacking a “strict com-\n parator”). And, as we emphasize today, evidence does not need to\n attack—or even have anything to do with—the defendant’s pur-\n ported rationale to help raise an inference of discrimination.\n Because the District Court only analyzed Ismael’s claim\n through the narrow lens of McDonnell Douglas pretext, we reverse\n and remand with instruction to apply the correct summary judg-\n ment standard. Specifically, the Court should ask whether Ismael’s\n circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered together and\n viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of\n retaliation and find in Ismael’s favor.\n C. Proper Review on Summary Judgment\n Today’s holding takes one more swing at the McDonnell\n Douglas game of whack-a-mole, where we must strike down courts\n that find new and creative ways to incorrectly apply the framework\n as substantive doctrine. Correctly understood, McDonnell Douglas is\n a “procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof\n and production.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. No more,\n no less. Accordingly, we offer the following instruction for district\n courts to properly review summary judgment motions. The\n roadmap differs depending on whether the plaintiff can demon-\n strate a prima facie case or not.\n 1. Plaintiff Demonstrates Prima Facie Case\n If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled\n to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent. This necessarily means\n that if the defendant fails to proffer evidence of a legitimate reason\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n for the adverse employment action, summary judgment in favor of\n the plaintiff is appropriate. 5\n Where, as is more common, the defendant comes forth with\n evidence and successfully rebuts the presumption, “the McDonnell\n Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no\n longer relevant.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. It “simply\n drops out of the picture.” Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. At this point,\n the court must proceed to ask whether “the record, viewed in a\n light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic\n of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-\n tional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker.” Smith,\n 644 F.3d at 1328. A showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would cer-\n tainly be relevant. But a plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defend-\n ant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.\n 2. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Prima Facie Case\n If the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, she does\n not automatically lose on summary judgment. See Smith, 644 F.4th\n at 1328. In Tynes, we explained why this is so:\n When the Supreme Court uses the term “prima facie\n case” in this context, it does so “in a special sense.”\n The Court itself has explained that although that\n phrase may sometimes “describe the plaintiff's bur-\n den of producing enough evidence to permit the trier\n of fact to infer the fact at issue,” within the McDonnell\n\n 5 Or, if only the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the court must\n\n reject that motion.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n Douglas framework the term “prima facie case” has a\n different meaning—it marks “the establishment of a\n legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.”\n 88 F.4th at 945 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7, 101 S.Ct. at\n 1094) (internal citations omitted). Rather than lose by default, the\n consequence is that the plaintiff must produce enough evidence,\n on her own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or pre-\n sumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable fact. A court,\n therefore, should advance directly to the convincing mosaic in-\n quiry.\n A helpful analogy can be drawn to the common law doctrine\n of res ipsa loquitur for negligence. If a plaintiff invokes that doc-\n trine, the court must determine whether “the plaintiff’s evidence is\n sufficient for a reasonable jury to find . . . the accident is of the type\n that usually happens because of negligence.” Restatement (Third)\n of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 17 cmt. j (A.L.I. 2010). If the court\n so finds, some jurisdictions employ a “rebuttable presumption,\n thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with some excul-\n patory evidence or suffer judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This\n “level[s] the playing field and encourage[s] the defendant to dis-\n close relevant evidence.“ Id. cmt. i. But a court would never grant\n summary judgment just because a plaintiff failed res ipsa’s thresh-\n old inquiry. Instead, it would evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence un-\n der the appropriate summary judgment standard for ordinary neg-\n ligence, without any inferences or presumptions.\n McDonnell Douglas, like res ipsa, offers plaintiffs an eviden-\n tiary advantage if their case satisfies a preliminary assessment,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 24\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\n\n namely, the prima facie case. If plaintiffs cannot satisfy that test, the\n inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to evaluate\n the evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated Rule 56 sum-\n mary judgment standard.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for the\n District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard in\n the first instance.\n REVERSED and REMANDED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10604\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n AHMED S. ISMAEL,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SHERIFF RICHARD ROUNDTREE,\\n in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of the Richmond\\n County Sheriff's Office,\\n CAPT. EVERETTE JENKINS,\\n in his individual capacity and acting under color of law as supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\\n SGT. WILLIAM MCCARTY,\\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriffs Office,\\n COL. CALVIN CHEW,\\n in his individual capacity acting under color of law as a supervisor\\n of the Richmond County Sheriff's Office,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n AUGUSTA RICHMOND COUNTY COMMISSION,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n Defendant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00108-JRH-BKE\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:\\n Ahmed Ismael appeals the District Court’s grant of sum-\\n mary judgment, which dismissed his § 1981 retaliatory discharge\\n suit. We hold that the District Court improperly conflated the\\n McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and the “convincing mosaic”\\n standard. We reverse and remand for the District Court to, in the\\n first instance, apply the correct standard.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n The Richmond County Sherrif’s Office (“RCSO”) hired\\n Ismael as a deputy sheriff on March 21, 2020. Shortly thereafter,\\n Ismael was offered the opportunity to work an ongoing special, off-\\n duty, assignment providing security at the Urban Air Adventure\\n Park in Augusta, Georgia (“Urban Air”). By mid-2021, Ismael was\\n promoted to “officer-in-charge” at Urban Air.\\n A. Ismael’s Alleged Workplace Harassment\\n Lieutenant Everette Jenkins worked the Urban Air special\\n assignment with Ismael. There, Ismael alleges that Jenkins fre-\\n quently harassed him because of his race. Ismael was born in the\\n Republic of Iraq and is a person of Arabic descent. Jenkins allegedly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n called Ismael a “terrorist,” told him to “go play in the sand,” and\\n warned colleagues that Ismael “may have a bomb.” Jenkins admit-\\n ted to making the terrorist comment but denied all others.\\n The owner of Urban Air, William Gilbert, testified that he\\n “frequently” witnessed Jenkins make racist remarks to Ismael. Gen-\\n eral Manager Jordan Chambliss said there was “not one instance”\\n where Jenkins “did not refer to [Ismael] as a terrorist, or make some\\n crude remark about sand, bombs or not being able to speak Eng-\\n lish.”\\n Jenkins’ job performance was allegedly less than stellar. Gil-\\n bert testified that he had to ask Jenkins at least five times to do his\\n job instead of sitting in his car in the parking lot. He described Jen-\\n kins’ work ethic as “unprofessional.” Chambliss added that Jenkins\\n “was late to most every shift,” often left early, but always de-\\n manded a full paycheck.\\n At the same time, Jenkins was the commander of the RCSO\\n SWAT team, which Ismael hoped to join. Though Ismael wanted\\n to report Jenkins’ racial harassment and poor job performance, Jen-\\n kins allegedly warned Ismael that it would sink his chances at mak-\\n ing the SWAT team. According to Chambliss, Jenkins “made it\\n abundantly clear that he could walk all over Ismael because he\\n would be the determining factor as to whether he would ever make\\n it onto ‘his’ team or approve any training.”\\n B. Ismael’s Formal Complaint and Firing\\n On September 13, 2021, Ismael attended a five-day SWAT\\n team training course in Forsyth County. On the final day, Ismael\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n failed the written exam, and, accordingly, Jenkins told him he could\\n not join the team. Ismael’s drive home was approximately two-\\n and-a-half hours. Although he was driving his patrol vehicle and\\n still in RCSO uniform, Ismael decided to briefly visit the Burke\\n County Sherrif’s Office (“Burke County”) to inquire about job\\n openings. He was told that he could apply online and completed\\n his drive home.\\n Since Ismael was no longer a prospect for the SWAT team,\\n Jenkins no longer had leverage over Ismael. Accordingly, Ismael\\n filed an internal affairs complaint on Monday, September 20, 2021.\\n He detailed Jenkins’ offensive remarks, harassment, and general\\n misconduct at Urban Air. Gilbert and Chambliss submitted letters\\n corroborating Ismael’s account. At the time he filed the complaint,\\n Ismael was in good standing with RCSO and had no prior discipli-\\n nary infractions.\\n Sergeant William McCarty was assigned to investigate\\n Ismael’s complaint. McCarty’s investigation included calls to at\\n least seven officers and an interview with Jenkins. McCarty tried to\\n call Gilbert and Chambliss but could not reach them. He issued his\\n report on October 19, 2021, writing that he could not verify\\n Ismael’s allegations and concluding: “The complaint is not sus-\\n tained.”\\n On September 23, 2021, while the investigation into Jenkins\\n was still ongoing, McCarty received an email from Jimmy Wylds\\n of Burke County, inquiring about Ismael. First, McCarty forwarded\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n the email to RCSO Captain Glen Rahn, writing “Lookie here.”\\n Then McCarty answered Wylds:\\n Ismael isn’t very impressive. He failed swat school\\n and Jenkins told him he had to turn his stuff in. So\\n now Ismael has filed a complaint against Jenkins\\n claiming hostile work environment among other\\n things which I am having to deal with. I worked a spe-\\n cial with him one night and he seems to have a big\\n chip on his shoulder about something.\\n Discipline wise he ok…thus far.\\n (emphasis added)\\n A few days later, RCSO Colonel Calvin Chew allegedly re-\\n ceived a call from an anonymous Burke County deputy. According\\n to Chew, the deputy told him about Ismael’s brief pit-stop to Burke\\n County to inquire about job openings. McCarty emailed Wylds to\\n confirm this information, and Wylds responded affirmatively.\\n Here, the parties differ on a couple of facts. In discovery,\\n Ismael received access to Chew’s phone records, which show that\\n no anonymous call was received in the timeframe alleged by\\n Chew. Ismael, though, does not assert an alternative theory as to\\n how McCarty and RCSO learned about his visit to Burke County.\\n The parties also differ on whether Ismael was technically “on duty”\\n or “off duty” when he stopped at Burke County, and whether his\\n behavior violated an official RCSO policy. McCarty flip-flopped as\\n to whether Ismael was on or off duty but eventually testified: “I\\n would probably say that he was off duty.” Nonetheless, Appellees\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n contend that “[w]hether he was off duty or on duty, the act of using\\n a patrol vehicle for personal errands is a violation of RCSO policy.”\\n On September 28, 2021, Ismael was slated to begin work at\\n 6:00 p.m. He scheduled an interview with Burke County at noon,\\n believing he would have ample time before beginning his shift.\\n Shortly before his interview, though, McCarty called Ismael and\\n asked him to report to RCSO “as soon as possible.” McCarty testi-\\n fied that the timing was merely “coincidental.” Ismael attended the\\n interview in uniform and then reported directly to RCSO. During\\n the interview, Chew allegedly received a second anonymous call,\\n informing him that Ismael had returned to Burke County.\\n At this point, Rahn emailed Chew and Sherriff Roundtree\\n the following: “Just confirmed Deputy [Ismael] was in Burke\\n County in our vehicle doing an interview to be hired. He will not\\n be hired and we will have the DR for Termination ready by the\\n time we finish talking with him.” A few minutes later, McCarty be-\\n gan the termination paperwork. The report cited a violation of\\n RCSO’s “Manner of Conduct” policy Rule 4.4. 1 It listed two inci-\\n dents: (1) Ismael visiting Burke County on September 17, 2021, in\\n his patrol car to inquire about employment opportunities while he\\n was “still on Richmond County time” and (2) Ismael visiting Burke\\n County on September 28, 2021, in his patrol car to interview for a\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 Rule 4.4 reads, in relevant part: “An off-duty employee will not conduct\\n\\n themselves in a manner as to reflect discredit upon the Sherriff’s Office.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n position. Sherriff Roundtree signed the termination report that\\n same day.\\n C. Lawsuit and Ismael’s Evidence of Retaliation\\n Ismael claims he was fired in retaliation for his harassment\\n complaint against Jenkins. On August 14, 2022, Ismael sued Round-\\n tree, Jenkins, McCarty, and Chew for retaliation in violation of 42\\n U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 He\\n amended his complaint twice, retaining only the § 1981 claim. Dis-\\n covery commenced, and Defendants moved for summary judg-\\n ment. In response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,\\n Ismael presented the following circumstantial evidence in support\\n of his claim:\\n • McCarty’s email to Wylds, where he improperly disclosed\\n Ismael’s hostile work environment complaint and wrote\\n that Ismael’s disciplinary status is “okay…thus far,” poten-\\n tially suggesting it would not remain “okay” for long.\\n • Phone records showing that Chew did not receive any anon-\\n ymous calls during the timeframe he alleges.\\n • Affidavits from former RCSO personnel stating that they of-\\n ten made personal detours in their patrol vehicles, that\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Ismael also alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of equal protection under law\\n\\n in violation of both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. These counts were later\\n dropped.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n supervising officers knew of the practice, and that they were\\n never investigated or punished.\\n • McCarty’s testimony that he could not recall any other of-\\n ficer being investigated or punished for making personal use\\n of their patrol vehicle.\\n • Roundtree’s inability to find records or otherwise identify\\n specific instances of officers disciplined for similar vehicle in-\\n fractions, despite testifying that it happened in the past.\\n • Roundtree’s testimony that he was “very good friends” with\\n Jenkins for over twenty-five years.\\n • The fact that Ismael was fired only eight days after filing his\\n complaint against Jenkins.\\n • Ismael’s termination report, which was created before he\\n was interviewed about or informed of an investigation into\\n his potential misconduct, contrary to RCSO investigatory\\n procedures.\\n • Roundtree and McCarty’s early insistence that Ismael was\\n fired for using his patrol car for personal errands while “on\\n duty,” followed by McCarty’s acknowledgment that he was\\n “probably . . . off duty.”\\n • The disparity between the investigations conducted into\\n Jenkins and Ismael.\\n The District Court granted the motion for summary judg-\\n ment. First, the Court found that Ismael had established a prima\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Then, the Court found that the\\n defendants properly articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason\\n for Ismael’s termination. Finally, the Court held that Ismael “failed\\n to prove” that the defendants’ articulated reason was a pretext for\\n retaliation.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\n novo, conducting our inquiry with the same legal principles as the\\n district court. Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th\\n Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows\\n that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mo-\\n vant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is\\n such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-mov-\\n ing party.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235\\n (11th Cir. 2016). All reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor\\n of the nonmoving party, but a “mere scintilla of evidence . . . will\\n not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Young\\n v. City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have\\n the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full\\n and equal benefit of all laws . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” In\\n 1975, the Supreme Court held that § 1981 “affords a federal remedy\\n against discrimination in private employment,” notwithstanding\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n other available remedies like Title VII. 3 Johnson v. Ry. Express\\n Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457–61, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1719–20 (1975). In\\n 2008, the Court held that § 1981 also supports a private cause of\\n action for employees who face retaliation for their complaints\\n about workplace discrimination. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553\\n U.S. 442, 445, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008).\\n A. The District Court Conflated McDonnell Douglas Pretext\\n and the Convincing Mosaic Standard\\n Employment discrimination and retaliation cases, including\\n those brought under § 1981, are shaped by the famous yet ill-un-\\n derstood Supreme Court holding in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green,\\n 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). There, the Court introduced a\\n three-part evidentiary burden shifting framework:\\n 1. First, the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, which\\n may be done by showing: (i) the plaintiff is in a protected\\n group; (ii) the plaintiff was well qualified; (iii) the plaintiff\\n suffered an adverse employment action; and (iv) the\\n plaintiff was treated less favorably than similarly situated\\n employees outside of the plaintiff’s protected group.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 State and local government employees must bring their § 1981 claims under\\n\\n § 1983, because it serves as the “exclusive federal remedy for violations of the\\n rights guaranteed in § 1981 by state governmental units.” Jett v. Dallas Indep.\\n Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2722 (1989). Here, plaintiffs ap-\\n propriately brought their action under § 1983.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n 2. Second, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate\\n some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the ad-\\n verse action.\\n 3. Third, if the employer provides an adequate reason, the\\n plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the em-\\n ployer’s proffered rationale is pretextual.\\n See id. at 802–04, 93 S. Ct. at 1824–25; see also Jenkins v. Nell,\\n 26 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2022). Retaliation claims (as opposed\\n to direct discrimination claims) follow the same framework, but\\n the prima facie case is modified. There, a plaintiff must show: (i)\\n that she engaged in a protected activity, like filing a complaint for\\n discrimination; (ii) that she suffered a material adverse action; and\\n (iii) that there was a causal connection between the protected ac-\\n tivity and the adverse action. Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683\\n F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n The McDonnell Douglas framework is canonical; it can be\\n found in first order across employment law textbooks, treatises,\\n and hornbooks. But burden-shifting regimes are hardly unique;\\n many have existed for centuries at common law. See, e.g., Byrne v.\\n Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 200 (Exch. 1863). Our Court has repeatedly\\n intimated that McDonnell Douglas is not all it’s cracked up to be. To\\n understand what the framework does, we find it useful to begin by\\n answering what it does not do.\\n 1. McDonnell Douglas is Limited\\n Decisions from both the Supreme Court and our Circuit\\n cabin the substantive application of McDonnell Douglas. First,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n McDonnell Douglas “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading re-\\n quirement,” so it has no application on a motion to dismiss.\\n Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 122 S. Ct. 992, 997\\n (2002). Second, it plays no role at trial. Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores,\\n Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (“It is unnecessary and\\n inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analy-\\n sis.”); Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.\\n Ct. 1478, 1482 (1983) (reversing bench trial findings because the\\n court “erroneously focused on the question of prima facie case ra-\\n ther than directly on the question of discrimination”). This is be-\\n cause “once the prima facie case has ‘fulfilled its role in forcing the\\n defendant to come forward with some response,’ it no longer has\\n any work to do.” Tynes v. Fla. Dep't of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 945\\n (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 154 (2024) (quoting St. Mary’s\\n Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 609 U.S. 502, 510–11 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2742\\n (1993)). Third, the framework is inapplicable on post-trial motions.\\n Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S. Ct. at 1482 (1983).\\n Most relevant here, our Court has held that McDonnell Doug-\\n las was “never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to\\n survive a summary judgment motion in an employment discrimi-\\n nation case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328\\n (11th Cir. 2011). In Smith, we held (1) that a “plaintiff will always\\n survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence\\n that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discrimina-\\n tory intent” and (2) that a “triable issue of fact exists if the record,\\n viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convinc-\\n ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (quoting\\n Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)) (internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n This holding adopted what is often referred to as the “con-\\n vincing mosaic standard.” See, e.g., Tynes, 88 F.4th at 946. We have\\n applied it in equal measure to claims of discrimination and retalia-\\n tion. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th Cir.\\n 2023) (“An employee may rely on a convincing mosaic of circum-\\n stantial evidence to prove retaliation.”). Initially, there was confu-\\n sion as to whether we had created a new analytical framework,\\n something of a McDonnell Douglas 2.0. In time, however, we made\\n clear that the “convincing mosaic” analysis—despite its flowery\\n language—is a stand-in for the Rule 56 summary judgment stand-\\n ard applied to employment discrimination. See id. at 1311 (“[A]\\n ‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not a frame-\\n work.”); Tynes, 88 F.4th at 1311 (describing the convincing mosaic\\n standard as a “rearticulation of the summary judgment standard”).\\n As in other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid summary judg-\\n ment by presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence. Such\\n evidence may include “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous state-\\n ments . . ., and other bits and pieces from which an inference of\\n discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better\\n treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) that the em-\\n ployer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Geor-\\n gia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Silverman, 673\\n F.3d at 733–34) (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n 2. Convincing Mosaic is Broader than Pretext\\n Our precedent, then, makes clear that a plaintiff who cannot\\n establish the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is entitled to a full\\n review under the convincing mosaic standard. But here, Ismael did\\n establish his prima facie case, and the District Court advanced to\\n steps two and three of McDonnell Douglas. At step three, the Court\\n held that Ismael failed to raise an inference of pretext. But the\\n Court was confronted with one final question: should it also ana-\\n lyze the evidence under the convincing mosaic standard? It de-\\n clined, reasoning that a separate analysis would be redundant. Re-\\n lying on dicta in Ossman v. Meredith Corp., the District Court de-\\n cided that “the convincing mosaic inquiry is identical to the final\\n stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework,” so it “need not decide\\n if the convincing mosaic framework also serves as an independent\\n basis” to support Ismael’s claim. 82 F.4th 1007, 1020 (11th Cir.\\n 2023).\\n Appellees ask us to sign off on this interpretation. They ar-\\n gue that “the terms pretext, convincing mosaic, and summary\\n judgment are substantively the same thing” and that “the pretext\\n prong . . . is the same as the ordinary summary judgment stand-\\n ard.” We disagree. Though we recognize that both inquiries are\\n probative of the same ultimate question, we are persuaded that\\n they are not identical.\\n To show pretext, a plaintiff must show “both that the [em-\\n ployer’s] reason was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-\\n son” for the adverse action. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n The latter requirement unquestionably holds the same focus as the\\n convincing mosaic standard. The former, however, does not. Re-\\n quiring a plaintiff to negate the defendant’s explanation on sum-\\n mary judgment has at least two defects. First, it is not required to\\n succeed at trial. Second, it detracts from the plaintiff’s affirmative\\n case that the driving cause was illegal discrimination or retaliation.\\n In Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, the\\n Supreme Court held that claims brought under § 1981 must show\\n that an illicit motive was a “but-for” cause for the adverse action,\\n rather than merely a “motivating factor.” 589 U.S. 327, 340, 140 S.\\n Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). But it is not required, under either § 1981 or\\n Title VII, to show that the unlawful purpose was the only contrib-\\n uting factor. “[T]he traditional but-for causation standard means a\\n defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor\\n that contributed to its challenged employment decision.” Bostock v.\\n Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 656, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739\\n (2020).\\n A plaintiff can even succeed where there are multiple but-\\n for causes: “so long as the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] was\\n one but-for cause of [the adverse] decision, that is enough to trigger\\n the law.” Id. at 656, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (emphasis added). In this sit-\\n uation, the employer’s reason might be both factually grounded\\n and directly causal—in other words, unassailable as pretext. If we\\n require the plaintiff to negate their counterparty’s rationale, we\\n permit the absurd result of a plaintiff losing on summary judgment\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n for failing to demonstrate a falsity that she would not need to show\\n at trial.\\n Moreover, focusing on the defendant’s justification can lead\\n both litigants and the court down a rabbit hole that obfuscates the\\n plaintiff’s affirmative claim. This is precisely what we sought to\\n avoid when we adopted the convincing mosaic standard. See Smith,\\n 644 F.3d at 1328. In Tynes, we emphasized that, at summary judg-\\n ment, “we ask only one question: whether there is sufficient evi-\\n dentiary basis for the jury to find that the defendant internationally\\n discriminated against the plaintiff.” 88 F.4th at 947. In retaliation\\n claims, we ask whether the defendant intentionally retaliated\\n against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s protected activity.\\n Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310. These questions appropriately frame the in-\\n quiry on the plaintiff’s asserted theory of the case. By contrast, the\\n pretext inquiry lets the defendant’s explanation take center stage,\\n requiring the plaintiff to present contradictory evidence rather than\\n direct or circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of dis-\\n crimination.\\n Surely, the plaintiff might find it useful to attack the defend-\\n ant’s account. Evidence that their explanation is untruthful, incon-\\n sistent, or that the alleged conduct was not typically punished may\\n all be probative of malfeasance. But, as we have explained before,\\n the “entire evidentiary picture” goes further than pretext. See Yell-\\n ing v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1242 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n Our precedent specifically describes evidence of pretext as a subset\\n of potentially relevant circumstantial evidence. Id. And, while this\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n Circuit has no published opinion finding the requisite summary\\n judgment inference after a plaintiff failed on pretext, 4 we have rec-\\n ognized the possibility, and we conduct both analyses accordingly.\\n See id.; Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\\n Finally, we do not think the Supreme Court intended pretext\\n to be the sole determinate at any stage of litigation, but especially\\n at summary judgment. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that\\n when a defendant’s reason for the adverse action “suffices to meet\\n the prima facie case,” the plaintiff must “be afforded a fair oppor-\\n tunity to show that [the defendant’s] stated reason for [the plaintiff’s]\\n rejection was in fact pretext.” 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825 (em-\\n phasis added). We do not take this language to reframe the dispos-\\n itive question on summary judgment or at trial, but rather to em-\\n phasize that the “inquiry must not end” with a defendant’s plausi-\\n ble explanation. See id. Even taken literally, the plaintiff is always\\n given the ”opportunity” to show pretext; our Court has simply\\n elaborated that it is not the “exclusive means” to survive summary\\n judgment. See Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310.\\n In Burdine, the Supreme Court further explained that the\\n plaintiff’s “opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason\\n was not the true reason for the employment decision . . . merges\\n\\n 4 In a 2023 unpublished opinion, however, we found exactly this. See Brown v.\\n\\n Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, No. 21-11328, 2023 WL 2386500, at *6 (11th Cir. Mar. 7,\\n 2023). There, we concluded that the plaintiff did not show pretext under\\n McDonnell Douglas but that he did present a convincing mosaic of discrimina-\\n tory intent because that standard allowed him to add his “more general evi-\\n dence of discriminatory intent to the equation.” Id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been\\n the victim of intentional discrimination.” 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S. Ct.\\n at 1095. “She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the\\n court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the em-\\n ployer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered ex-\\n planation is unworthy of credence.” Id. This appropriately catego-\\n rizes pretext as an avenue to demonstrate the defendant’s illicit mo-\\n tive, but not as the end-all be-all.\\n Most recently, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch dissented from\\n a denial of certiorari, arguing that the McDonnell Douglas frame-\\n work has spawned “widespread confusion” and that the Court\\n should offer “clear guidance” on how lower courts should conduct\\n their review on summary judgment. Hittle v. City of Stockton, Cali-\\n fornia, 604 U.S. __, __, 145 S. Ct. 759, 763 (2025) (Thomas, J., dis-\\n senting from denial of certiorari). The posture in Hittle matches the\\n posture here; the district court granted summary judgment “on the\\n ground that Hittle had not shown sufficient evidence of pretext.”\\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 763–64. Thomas explained:\\n This case highlights how McDonnell Douglas may dis-\\n tort a lower court’s analysis. Hittle presented “ample”\\n evidence of discriminatory intent on the part of those\\n who decided to terminate him. That evidence is more\\n than likely sufficient for Hittle to establish a genuine\\n dispute of material fact as required by Rule 56. Yet,\\n after applying McDonnell Douglas, the District Court\\n and the Ninth Circuit ruled for the city.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Id. at __, 145 S. Ct. at 764. Though we lack clarity from the Su-\\n preme Court regarding McDonnell Douglas’ appropriate role—if\\n any—at summary judgment, we reaffirm that it is not the only\\n game in town, and that it does not supplant Rule 56.\\n A plaintiff must be afforded the opportunity to confront her\\n burden of proof head-on, if she so chooses. Our Court’s convincing\\n mosaic standard heeds this directive and preserves the plaintiff’s\\n opportunity at summary judgment to directly create an inference\\n of discrimination or retaliation—“shorn of all [the] McDonnell Doug-\\n las prophylaxis.” Tynes, 88 F.4th at 953 (Newsom, J., concurring).\\n For these reasons, we hold that summary judgment should not be\\n granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also “reflects a\\n failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the\\n plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination” or retaliation.\\n Id. at 947.\\n B. The Legal Error Stifled Review of Ismael’s Evidence\\n The previous Section explains why, as a legal matter, the\\n District Court was wrong to conflate a showing of pretext with the\\n standard to survive summary judgment. If we could find that this\\n error was in name only, and that the district court considered all\\n appropriate evidence, it might have been a harmless error. See 28\\n U.S.C. § 2111 (“[T]he court shall give judgment after an examina-\\n tion of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not\\n affect the substantial rights of the parties.”). But the Court’s lan-\\n guage shows that it focused narrowly on the defendant’s purported\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n rationale and ignored other evidence probative of Appellees’ illicit\\n intent.\\n For example, Ismael presented evidence that other officers\\n often ran errands in their patrol cars, such as picking up food, going\\n to the gym, and picking up children, but were never punished. The\\n Court found this immaterial:\\n [E]ven assuming the alleged personal errands were\\n common and Defendants were aware of these prac-\\n tices, they do not show the reason for [Ismael’s] ter-\\n mination was unworthy of credence because these\\n are not appropriate comparators, nor do they estab-\\n lish conflicting testimony regarding the reason for\\n [Ismael’s] termination. Further, the fact that no other\\n officer has been fired for similar conduct, without ev-\\n idence another officer has actually engaged in suffi-\\n ciently similar conduct, does not prove the stated rea-\\n son was false.\\n (emphasis added). The Court treated just about all of Ismael’s evi-\\n dence this way: rejecting it unless it “negated the proffered reason”\\n for his termination.\\n As a threshold matter, Ismael does not need to “prove” any-\\n thing to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Moreover, com-\\n parator evidence can still be useful even where there are “material\\n differences” between a plaintiff and her comparator. Tynes, 88 F.4th\\n at 947. “[I]t is the jury’s role—not ours—to determine how much\\n weight comparator evidence should be given.” Id. at 947; see also\\n Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2022) (finding\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n circumstantial evidence probative even when lacking a “strict com-\\n parator”). And, as we emphasize today, evidence does not need to\\n attack—or even have anything to do with—the defendant’s pur-\\n ported rationale to help raise an inference of discrimination.\\n Because the District Court only analyzed Ismael’s claim\\n through the narrow lens of McDonnell Douglas pretext, we reverse\\n and remand with instruction to apply the correct summary judg-\\n ment standard. Specifically, the Court should ask whether Ismael’s\\n circumstantial evidence, when artfully adhered together and\\n viewed as one, allows a reasonable juror to envision an image of\\n retaliation and find in Ismael’s favor.\\n C. Proper Review on Summary Judgment\\n Today’s holding takes one more swing at the McDonnell\\n Douglas game of whack-a-mole, where we must strike down courts\\n that find new and creative ways to incorrectly apply the framework\\n as substantive doctrine. Correctly understood, McDonnell Douglas is\\n a “procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof\\n and production.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521, 113 S. Ct. at 2754. No more,\\n no less. Accordingly, we offer the following instruction for district\\n courts to properly review summary judgment motions. The\\n roadmap differs depending on whether the plaintiff can demon-\\n strate a prima facie case or not.\\n 1. Plaintiff Demonstrates Prima Facie Case\\n If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, she is entitled\\n to a rebuttable presumption of illicit intent. This necessarily means\\n that if the defendant fails to proffer evidence of a legitimate reason\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n for the adverse employment action, summary judgment in favor of\\n the plaintiff is appropriate. 5\\n Where, as is more common, the defendant comes forth with\\n evidence and successfully rebuts the presumption, “the McDonnell\\n Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—is no\\n longer relevant.” Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. It “simply\\n drops out of the picture.” Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. At this point,\\n the court must proceed to ask whether “the record, viewed in a\\n light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic\\n of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer inten-\\n tional discrimination [or retaliation] by the decisionmaker.” Smith,\\n 644 F.3d at 1328. A showing of pretext (or lack thereof) would cer-\\n tainly be relevant. But a plaintiff’s inability to disprove the defend-\\n ant’s rationale cannot be the sole grounds for summary judgment.\\n 2. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Prima Facie Case\\n If the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case, she does\\n not automatically lose on summary judgment. See Smith, 644 F.4th\\n at 1328. In Tynes, we explained why this is so:\\n When the Supreme Court uses the term “prima facie\\n case” in this context, it does so “in a special sense.”\\n The Court itself has explained that although that\\n phrase may sometimes “describe the plaintiff's bur-\\n den of producing enough evidence to permit the trier\\n of fact to infer the fact at issue,” within the McDonnell\\n\\n 5 Or, if only the defendant has moved for summary judgment, the court must\\n\\n reject that motion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10604 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n Douglas framework the term “prima facie case” has a\\n different meaning—it marks “the establishment of a\\n legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption.”\\n 88 F.4th at 945 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7, 101 S.Ct. at\\n 1094) (internal citations omitted). Rather than lose by default, the\\n consequence is that the plaintiff must produce enough evidence,\\n on her own and without any helpful evidentiary burdens or pre-\\n sumptions, to demonstrate a material issue of triable fact. A court,\\n therefore, should advance directly to the convincing mosaic in-\\n quiry.\\n A helpful analogy can be drawn to the common law doctrine\\n of res ipsa loquitur for negligence. If a plaintiff invokes that doc-\\n trine, the court must determine whether “the plaintiff’s evidence is\\n sufficient for a reasonable jury to find . . . the accident is of the type\\n that usually happens because of negligence.” Restatement (Third)\\n of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 17 cmt. j (A.L.I. 2010). If the court\\n so finds, some jurisdictions employ a “rebuttable presumption,\\n thereby requiring the defendant to come forward with some excul-\\n patory evidence or suffer judgment as a matter of law.” Id. This\\n “level[s] the playing field and encourage[s] the defendant to dis-\\n close relevant evidence.“ Id. cmt. i. But a court would never grant\\n summary judgment just because a plaintiff failed res ipsa’s thresh-\\n old inquiry. Instead, it would evaluate the plaintiff’s evidence un-\\n der the appropriate summary judgment standard for ordinary neg-\\n ligence, without any inferences or presumptions.\\n McDonnell Douglas, like res ipsa, offers plaintiffs an eviden-\\n tiary advantage if their case satisfies a preliminary assessment,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 24\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 25-10604\\n\\n namely, the prima facie case. If plaintiffs cannot satisfy that test, the\\n inquiry does not end. Rather, a district court must turn to evaluate\\n the evidence before it, applying the duly promulgated Rule 56 sum-\\n mary judgment standard.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for the\\n District Court to apply the correct summary judgment standard in\\n the first instance.\\n REVERSED and REMANDED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30967,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10748282,"string":"10,748,282"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Shane Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-10645"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRANT, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10645\\n ____________________\\n\\n SHANE VILLARINO,\\n LAURA KAREN JOHNSON,\\n JEFFERY MONDY,\\n JEROME GUNN,\\n on behalf of themselves and all others\\n similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE, INC.,\\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE OF FLORIDA, INC.,\\n FLORIDA STAFFING SERVICE, INC.,\\n TAMPA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60192-AHS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\\n Pacesetter Personnel Service matches workers with\\n employers for temporary labor on a day-to-day basis. To ensure\\n that those workers arrive at their jobsites on time and prepared, the\\n company offers transportation and tools to workers who need\\n them. Both can be accessed at the Pacesetter labor hall where job\\n tickets are offered and accepted. Some of the workers were not so\\n happy with this arrangement, so they sued Pacesetter for a variety\\n of labor-law violations. They say the company cannot deduct\\n transportation costs from their paychecks, and that it should pay\\n them for travel time, tool-collection time, and waiting time.\\n The district court sided with Pacesetter, and we agree.\\n Because the transportation offered is optional and provided for the\\n benefit of employees, Pacesetter can deduct the costs for those\\n workers who choose to use it. As for the three categories of time,\\n none are integral and indispensable to the core activities of the jobs,\\n so the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require that workers be\\n paid for that time. We thus affirm.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n I.\\n Pacesetter Personnel Service provides temporary labor to\\n clients in various industries across the Southeast, ranging from\\n construction to hospitality. Would-be employees known as “daily\\n ticket workers” gather at a Pacesetter labor hall, signing in to say\\n that they are available to work that day. Any worker who receives\\n a job offer is given a ticket that includes a start time, the worksite’s\\n location, and any suggested or required equipment.\\n Pacesetter’s transportation agreement advises the daily\\n ticket workers that it is their responsibility to arrive at assigned jobs\\n on time. That same agreement, signed by workers, provides\\n several options for getting to and from worksites—the worker’s\\n own vehicle, public transportation, Pacesetter vans, or carpools in\\n coworkers’ cars. Pacesetter deducts $3.00 per day ($1.50 each way)\\n from the paychecks of those workers who ride in a carpool or van\\n and pays carpool drivers $1.50 for each person driven per leg of the\\n trip.\\n Many jobs require tools, and here too workers have options.\\n They can either bring their own or use Pacesetter’s—basic items\\n like goggles, gloves, shovels, masks, and work boots. Workers\\n who fail to return the equipment after work are eventually charged\\n for it, but that is typically a last resort after unfruitful attempts to\\n retrieve the tools. In most cases, at day’s end the workers return\\n to the labor hall, give back the equipment, and get paid.\\n Shane Villarino and around 300 other daily ticket workers in\\n Broward County, Florida, brought a hybrid collective and class\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n action lawsuit against Pacesetter in 2020. They alleged, among\\n other things, that Pacesetter violated the Fair Labor Standards Act\\n and the Florida Minimum Wage Act for two reasons. 1 First, they\\n say that Pacesetter’s deductions for transportation charges mean\\n workers were ultimately paid less than the minimum wage.\\n Second, they say that Pacesetter should have paid workers for their\\n travel time to and from jobsites, as well as for the time spent\\n waiting at the labor hall and returning tools. The class also alleged\\n that Pacesetter violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging\\n workers above the statutory limit for transportation to and from\\n labor sites. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\\n In a series of orders, the district court granted in part and\\n denied in part Villarino’s attempts to certify several classes of\\n plaintiffs. And while several class-certification motions were\\n pending, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The\\n district court denied Villarino’s motion for summary judgment in\\n its entirety, and granted Pacesetter’s motion for summary\\n judgment on Villarino’s Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida\\n Minimum Wage Act claims. 2 Villarino now appeals those\\n decisions, as well as the district court’s earlier refusal to certify a\\n\\n 1 The Florida Minimum Wage Act adopts many of the statutory and\\n regulatory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fla. Stat.\\n § 448.110(3).\\n 2 The court also granted summary judgment to Pacesetter on Villarino’s claim\\n\\n that Pacesetter had violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging above\\n market value or the actual cost for equipment. Villarino does not appeal that\\n decision.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n subclass of plaintiffs bringing excessive-transportation-charge\\n claims under the Florida Labor Pool Act.\\n II.\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\n de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\n Villarino and drawing all inferences in his favor. Nehme v. Fla. Int’l\\n Univ. Bd. of Trs., 121 F.4th 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). Summary\\n judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\n material fact” meaning that Pacesetter is “entitled to judgment as a\\n matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n We review the denial of class certification under Rule 23 for\\n abuse of discretion. Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1300\\n (11th Cir. 2021). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear\\n error and legal determinations de novo. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,\\n 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n III.\\n We proceed in three parts, considering Villarino’s\\n transportation deduction and unpaid time claims, as well as his\\n disagreement with one of the district court’s class certification\\n decisions.\\n A.\\n Villarino first argues that Pacesetter was wrong to deduct\\n Pacesetter-arranged transportation from the daily pay of the\\n workers who used those services. This deduction, Villarino says,\\n “resulted in pay of less than the applicable minimum wage,”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n violating the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\\n Wage Act. We disagree. 3\\n It’s true that under the Fair Labor Standards Act an\\n employer cannot shift business expenses to its employees if that\\n shift would reduce employees’ wages below the statutory\\n minimum—that kind of end run around the FLSA is impermissible.\\n 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); see Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 594\\n (11th Cir. 2011). All employers face costs of doing business, and\\n allowing them to simply strip those costs out of employees’ wages\\n would quickly neuter any pretense of a true minimum wage.\\n But the rule is not that expenses can never be deducted from\\n wages—it is that expenses cannot be shifted to employees when\\n they are “for the employer’s benefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35; see also\\n Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.\\n 2002). So whether Pacesetter’s transportation deductions are\\n allowed under the FLSA depends on whether the transportation it\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Because neither Pacesetter’s motion for summary judgment nor the district\\n\\n court’s order granting that motion expressly addressed whether Pacesetter\\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act when it charged workers for\\n transportation, Villarino says he was deprived of notice and an opportunity to\\n respond on this claim.\\n That is incorrect. Villarino himself raised this issue in his motion for summary\\n judgment, which the district court denied after both parties briefed the issue.\\n Villarino cannot now claim that he lacked notice to address an issue he himself\\n raised. Cf. Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 846, 850 (11th Cir. 1986);\\n Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 1995).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n provided for workers was “primarily for the benefit or convenience\\n of the employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c). It was not.\\n To start, the company’s transportation agreement tells\\n workers that once they are assigned to a job—and accept it—it is\\n their own “responsibility to arrive at that job/customer/work site\\n by the time designated in [their] Time Ticket.” And that same\\n agreement emphasizes that workers have several “options” to get\\n to jobsites, including their own vehicles, public transit, Pacesetter\\n vans, or a carpool. The evidence backs this up—the company’s\\n regional vice president testified that customers never require\\n workers to be dropped off by Pacesetter at a jobsite, and confirmed\\n that workers can take their transportation of choice, including a\\n van, carpool, public transit, or rideshare service.\\n In fact, the workers’ own deposition testimony confirms\\n two things: they knew they had options, and they used them. One\\n worker said he varies between a Pacesetter van, a carpool, or a bus.\\n Another explained that Pacesetter never told him he could not\\n drive himself to work. And a third testified that no one instructed\\n her which form of transportation to use. The bottom line is that if\\n workers needed transportation the company would assign it, but\\n they remained free to choose other options—and did so regularly.\\n No doubt, organizing transportation for those who needed\\n it likely helped Pacesetter live up to its promise of a\\n “comprehensive employee transport system” that provided\\n “dependable, timely general labor” for clients. But the fact that\\n Pacesetter also benefited from the options it offered employees\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n does not mean that the company’s system was built to serve its\\n own interests rather than those of the workers. 4 Consider a\\n company snack bar or cafeteria offering breakfast before work.\\n Would it be an illegal kickback to charge workers for a bagel or\\n coffee simply because that option made it easier for them to be\\n nourished and energetic at work? Obviously not. And in any\\n event, according to one employee’s testimony, the company did\\n not advertise that it would “deliver workers to job sites” as a\\n competitive advantage against other firms.\\n Villarino contends that our decision in Arriaga v. Florida\\n Pacific Farms compels a different result. 305 F.3d 1228. There, we\\n concluded that the transportation costs for workers’ trips from\\n Mexico under the H-2A visa program were an “incident of and\\n necessary to” their employment—in other words, benefited the\\n employer—and thus the workers could not be made to pay them.\\n Id. at 1242. But cross-border travel under an international worker\\n program is not comparable to the job-hall-to-worksite\\n\\n\\n 4 Pacesetter’s argument that 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(1) allows employers to count\\n\\n certain non-cash benefits—room, board, and “other facilities”—as part of an\\n employee’s total wages to meet the minimum wage is true. See 29 C.F.R.\\n § 531.32(a), (c). But because neither party contends that Pacesetter’s cash\\n wages do not meet the minimum wage in the first place, this rule is beside the\\n point—it would only matter if Pacesetter was relying on the value of the\\n transportation services to meet the minimum wage. And so long as the prices\\n Pacesetter charged for transportation did not “exceed the ‘reasonable cost’” of\\n that transportation, which no one is arguing at this stage of the case,\\n deductions could be made “even if they reduce the cash wage below the\\n minimum wage.” Id. § 531.36(a).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n transportation we consider here. Pacesetter workers’\\n transportation is more like ordinary commuting that Department\\n of Labor regulations already make clear are to benefit employees,\\n not employers. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a); Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242.\\n The transportation is an optional benefit distinct from the\\n “free and clear” minimum wage that workers already receive. 29\\n C.F.R. § 531.36(a). That means Pacesetter can lawfully deduct the\\n workers’ transportation costs from their wages without running\\n afoul of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\\n Wage Act.\\n B.\\n Villarino’s next claim is that workers should have been paid\\n for the time they spent (1) traveling to and from worksites,\\n (2) collecting tools for their respective jobs, and (3) waiting for\\n transportation. He says Pacesetter’s failure to pay for this time\\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and its Florida equivalent.\\n That’s true only if traveling, collecting tools, or waiting is\\n part of the core work that the workers were hired to perform—in\\n other words, whether any of these was an “integral and\\n indispensable part of the principal activities” of the job. Integrity\\n Staffing Sols., Inc., v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 33 (2014) (quotation\\n omitted); Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). And an\\n activity is “integral and indispensable” if it is “an intrinsic element”\\n of the principal activities—something that an employee must\\n perform to carry out her primary duties. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33. None\\n of these meets the test.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n 1.\\n We begin with the travel-time claim. The Portal-to-Portal\\n Act amended the FLSA to exempt from compensation the time\\n workers spend “traveling to and from the actual place of\\n performance of the principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C.\\n § 254(a)(1). That explains why “[n]ormal travel from home to\\n work is not” compensable as “worktime.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. The\\n fact that workers need to get to their jobs in order to do them is\\n not enough—if “mere causal necessity was sufficient to constitute\\n a compensable activity, all commuting would be compensable\\n because it is a practical necessity.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const.,\\n Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). And that would make the\\n Portal-to-Portal Act a dead letter.\\n What’s more, ordinary commutes do not become\\n compensable just because an employer provides the\\n transportation. The Department of Labor itself characterizes\\n riding “between a town and an outlying mine or factory” as an\\n example of “walking, riding, or traveling” that is “preliminary” or\\n “postliminary” to the workday and thus noncompensable. 29\\n C.F.R. § 790.7(f). The same is true for “riding on buses or trains\\n from a logging camp to a particular site at which the logging\\n operations are actually being conducted.” Id.\\n Indeed, the Labor Department’s own Field Operations\\n Handbook—in a section addressing temporary labor firms like\\n Pacesetter—explains that travel from a central location to a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n customer’s establishment and back is noncompensable. 5 U.S.\\n Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations\\n Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). “In other words,” the handbook\\n explains, the employee’s “working time is computed in the same\\n manner as if he or she had gone directly from his or her home to\\n the customer’s establishment and returned home from there at the\\n end of the day.” Id. Though we are not bound by that guidance,\\n we find it persuasive, and conclude that the time Pacesetter\\n workers spend traveling to and from worksites is not compensable.\\n See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024);\\n Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).\\n Villarino disagrees. He does not argue that the employees\\n are performing any work before or during their travel time, but\\n says that the time is compensable because they “were required to\\n report to the Pacesetter labor hall.” That requirement is not\\n enough. If the integral-and-indispensable test could be “satisfied\\n merely by the fact that an employer required an activity”—as\\n Villarino would have it—the test “would sweep into ‘principal\\n activities’ the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act was\\n designed to address,” including time spent “walking, riding, or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We note that for this provision to apply, the “employment understanding”\\n\\n must “clearly” be that the employee’s pay or work “begins and ends at the\\n customer’s establishment.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division,\\n Field Operations Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). That condition is satisfied\\n here.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n traveling to and from the actual place” of employment.6 Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 36; 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).\\n 2.\\n Villarino next argues that because Pacesetter-issued tools\\n were “integral and indispensable” to workers’ principal job duties,\\n they must be paid for the time spent collecting and returning those\\n tools to Pacesetter’s labor hall.\\n The Portal-to-Portal Act once again governs. In this context,\\n the test is whether a non-travel activity “preliminary to or\\n postliminary to” a worker’s “principal activity” is integral and\\n indispensable to that activity. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2); see Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 33. Those two words have different meanings:\\n “indispensable is not synonymous with integral.” Llorca v. Sheriff,\\n Collier Cnty., 893 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted\\n and quotations omitted). So to qualify, a worker’s activities must\\n be integral, which means that they must form an “intrinsic portion\\n or element” of her principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33\\n\\n\\n 6 It is true that travel from a central meeting spot like Pacesetter’s to another\\n\\n jobsite “must be counted as hours worked” when employees are “required”\\n to report at the meeting place “to receive instructions.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.\\n Even so, the nature of the daily ticket workers’ employment makes that\\n regulation inapplicable here. The workers decide for themselves “when, if,\\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments,” and report to\\n Pacesetter’s labor hall accordingly. Arriving at the labor hall on their own\\n initiative to (hopefully) secure work is, by definition, not a “require[ment]” to\\n do anything. Id. It therefore does not make the workers’ travel time\\n compensable under the FLSA.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n (quotation omitted). The activities must also be indispensable,\\n which means that they “cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set\\n aside, disregarded, or neglected.” Id. (quotation omitted). So\\n “[e]ven activities required by the employer and for the employer’s\\n benefit” remain outside the bounds of the employee’s principal\\n activity if they are “not integral and indispensable to ‘the\\n productive work that the employee is employed to perform.’”\\n Balestrieri v. Menlo Park Fire Prot. Dist., 800 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.\\n 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Busk, 574 U.S. at 36). And just\\n because “certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to\\n engage in their principal activities” does not mean they qualify. IBP,\\n Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40–41 (2005).\\n On this record, tool collection and return are not an\\n indispensable part of the daily ticket workers’ duties. As discussed,\\n the daily ticket workers voluntarily select which days to work “at\\n their sole discretion.” Some jobs do not require tools, and for\\n others Pacesetter clients will supply tools at the jobsite. And\\n Pacesetter also allows workers to bring their own tools if they wish.\\n Some—including Villarino—do. What’s more, picking up generic\\n equipment—hard hats, safety vests, gloves, brooms, rakes, and\\n shovels—“may or may not be necessary in particular situations or\\n for every employee.” Id. at 40. While tools can increase the length\\n of a daily ticket worker’s employment, a worker may even arrive\\n at a jobsite without the recommended tool and still receive work.\\n That makes this case unlike Alvarez, where “the donning of certain\\n types of protective gear”—in hazardous occupations, for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n example—was deemed “always essential if the worker is to do his\\n job.” Id. (emphasis omitted).\\n Because daily ticket workers may bring their own\\n equipment, and not all jobs require tools in any event, we cannot\\n say that some employees’ collection and return of equipment on\\n some days for some jobs is a constituent duty that “cannot be\\n dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected” if\\n workers are to perform their principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at\\n 33 (quoting 5 Oxford English Dictionary 219 (1933)). Examples from\\n other cases are consistent with this conclusion. A firefighter’s\\n “collecting and loading” his turnout gear and “driving it to a\\n station” qualified as preliminary and thus “uncompensable under\\n the Act.” Balestrieri, 800 F.3d at 1098. So too for the time sheriff’s\\n deputies spent “donning and doffing protective gear” before\\n commencing their “law enforcement duties.” Llorca, 893 F.3d at\\n 1324. By contrast, a radiological technologist’s pre-shift activities\\n of turning on an X-ray machine and performing tests “to prepare\\n the office for receiving patients” qualified as integral and\\n indispensable to her principal employment duties because the\\n equipment needed to be operable as soon as the office opened to\\n patients. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d\\n 706, 715, 718 (2d Cir. 2001).\\n In short, the daily ticket workers’ collection of\\n nonspecialized tools used in the mine run of manual labor jobs does\\n not meet that benchmark. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(d). The time\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n workers spend collecting and returning tools is noncompensable\\n under the FLSA.\\n 3.\\n We turn now to Villarino’s waiting-time claim. He argues\\n that Pacesetter needed to compensate workers “for all time after\\n receiving their daily work ticket.” The reason? Workers, he says,\\n were compelled “to wait for Pacesetter-assigned/coordinated\\n transportation to take them to the job site,” so they “could not use\\n this time effectively for their own purposes.” Not so.\\n As before, the compensability of the workers’ wait time\\n hinges on whether it was integral and indispensable to their\\n principal activities. See Busk, 574 U.S. at 32–33. The Field\\n Operations Handbook again provides a helpful starting point: time\\n spent “waiting for assignments” at a central location is\\n noncompensable. Handbook 31c09. Supreme Court precedent\\n offers helpful data points too. In one case, “the time battery-plant\\n employees spent showering and changing clothes” was integral and\\n indispensable to their work—and thus compensable—“because the\\n chemicals in the plant were ‘toxic to human beings.’” Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 34 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249 (1956)). And\\n in another, “the time meatpacker employees spent sharpening\\n their knives” was compensable “because dull knives would ‘slow\\n down production’ on the assembly line, ‘affect the appearance of\\n the meat as well as the quality of the hides,’ ‘cause waste,’ and lead\\n to ‘accidents.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S.\\n 260, 262 (1956)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n On the other hand, “the time poultry-plant employees spent\\n waiting to don protective gear” was noncompensable because such\\n waiting was not closely related to “the productive activity on the\\n assembly line.” Id. (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42). And “the\\n employees’ time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing [an\\n employer’s] security screenings” was noncompensable for\\n warehouse staffers in Busk. Id. at 37.\\n The distinctions in those cases support our conclusion that\\n the workers’ waiting time is a noncompensable preliminary\\n activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). To start, workers did not even\\n need to wait for transportation—under the transportation\\n agreement, they could proceed directly to the jobsite if they\\n wished. 7 And the daily ticket workers themselves decide “when, if,\\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments.”\\n Not getting paid for time spent at the job hall came as no\\n surprise: several workers also testified to recognizing that they\\n were compensated only for time spent working at jobsites. That\\n makes them subject to the Department of Labor’s conclusion that\\n if “the employment understanding clearly is that the pay or the\\n time of the employee begins and ends at the customer’s\\n establishment, waiting for assignments at the central location or in\\n\\n\\n 7 Even if Pacesetter required workers to wait for transportation, that would\\n\\n not make this time integral and indispensable to their principal activities at\\n their respective jobsites. That is because “[t]he integral and indispensable test\\n is tied to the productive work that the employee is employed to perform”—not\\n “whether an employer required a particular activity.” Busk, 574 U.S. at 36.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n travel from there to the customer’s establishment and return\\n would not be compensable worktime.”8 Handbook 31c09; see also\\n Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1341.\\n On top of that, workers typically used their waiting time—\\n both for assignments and for Pacesetter transportation—doing as\\n they pleased. One testified that he watched the news or went to\\n buy coffee while waiting for a job assignment. Another added that\\n he would sit in the waiting room, sleep, go outside to smoke a\\n cigarette, or pop by a food store to buy coffee. These personal\\n activities are well removed “from the productive activity” that the\\n workers were hired to perform at their respective jobsites, meaning\\n their waiting time comfortably qualifies as preliminary activity.\\n Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42.\\n In sum, because the workers’ wait time was neither “the\\n principal activity or activities” that they were hired to perform nor\\n “integral and indispensable” to their job duties, it was not\\n compensable under the FLSA. Busk, 574 U.S. at 35 (quotation\\n omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Here, we note a Department of Labor audit finding that Pacesetter had\\n committed no minimum-wage violations at its Orlando, Florida, labor hall\\n between 2016 and 2018. The audit report stated that “the time waiting for\\n assignment or travelling from the central location to the worksite is not\\n compensable.” Pacesetter attested that the policies at all Florida locations\\n were the same during the relevant period.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n C.\\n Having rejected Villarino’s substantive claims, we turn to\\n his argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing\\n to certify the excessive-transportation-charge subclass under the\\n Florida Labor Pool Act. Though the district court certified certain\\n subclasses and refused to certify others, Villarino challenges only\\n the denial of the class of workers alleging that some workers were\\n charged more than the $1.50 each way that Florida law permits for\\n transportation. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\\n The district court determined that this class failed Federal\\n Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which permits class certification\\n if (among other things) “the court finds that the questions of law or\\n fact common to class members predominate over any questions\\n affecting only individual members.” But “certification is\\n inappropriate” under this provision if plaintiffs must “introduce a\\n great deal of individualized proof or argue a number of\\n individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements\\n of their individualized claims.” Sellers v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt.\\n Servs., LLC, 941 F.3d 1031, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation\\n omitted).\\n Here the court determined that resolving the\\n transportation-subclass claims would “require extensive amounts\\n of individualized proof that would predominate.” Villarino\\n contends that the class should be certified because Pacesetter’s own\\n records provide the necessary information, listing “each daily\\n charge in excess of $3.00 for transportation.” And he insists that\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n even if there are “individual fact determinations with respect to\\n charges,” these issues “depend on objective criteria that can be\\n organized by a computer.” Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106,\\n 1112 (5th Cir. 1978). 9\\n Villarino oversimplifies the issue. Resolution of the\\n subclass’s claims would require individualized determinations on\\n both damages and liability. Sometimes Pacesetter gave workers\\n transportation credits, though for what it is not entirely clear. And\\n other workers were charged more than $3.00 for transportation on\\n certain days. Some of these records specify that an excess charge\\n was for a work-related bus pass, but others lack any explanation at\\n all. Pacesetter asserts that these latter charges were for daily ticket\\n workers to purchase bus passes for personal use, which the\\n company provided to workers at a discount—and at a loss. These\\n charges have nothing to do with wages and would not violate the\\n Florida statute, but it is unclear from the Pacesetter records which\\n transportation charges were business and which were personal.\\n All that to say, rather than just examining Pacesetter’s\\n records, the district court would have to scrutinize each overcharge\\n or transportation credit. That would involve a lengthy and\\n particularized inquiry—in essence, a series of mini-trials—for\\n countless individual plaintiffs. Determining the legality of\\n deductions would thus devolve “into an unmanageable variety of\\n individual legal and factual issues.” Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,\\n\\n 9 Roper is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under Bonner v. City of\\n\\n Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by\\n Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). On this\\n record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its broad\\n discretion in refusing to certify this subclass of plaintiffs.\\n\\n * * *\\n Pacesetter is entitled to summary judgment on Villarino’s\\n Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida Minimum Wage Act claims.\\n And the district court acted within its discretion in not certifying\\n the transportation subclass. We therefore AFFIRM.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214867/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRANT, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748282/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Shane Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 20\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-10645\n ____________________\n\n SHANE VILLARINO,\n LAURA KAREN JOHNSON,\n JEFFERY MONDY,\n JEROME GUNN,\n on behalf of themselves and all others\n similarly situated,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n versus\n\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE, INC.,\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE OF FLORIDA, INC.,\n FLORIDA STAFFING SERVICE, INC.,\n TAMPA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60192-AHS\n ____________________\n\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\n Pacesetter Personnel Service matches workers with\n employers for temporary labor on a day-to-day basis. To ensure\n that those workers arrive at their jobsites on time and prepared, the\n company offers transportation and tools to workers who need\n them. Both can be accessed at the Pacesetter labor hall where job\n tickets are offered and accepted. Some of the workers were not so\n happy with this arrangement, so they sued Pacesetter for a variety\n of labor-law violations. They say the company cannot deduct\n transportation costs from their paychecks, and that it should pay\n them for travel time, tool-collection time, and waiting time.\n The district court sided with Pacesetter, and we agree.\n Because the transportation offered is optional and provided for the\n benefit of employees, Pacesetter can deduct the costs for those\n workers who choose to use it. As for the three categories of time,\n none are integral and indispensable to the core activities of the jobs,\n so the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require that workers be\n paid for that time. We thus affirm.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n I.\n Pacesetter Personnel Service provides temporary labor to\n clients in various industries across the Southeast, ranging from\n construction to hospitality. Would-be employees known as “daily\n ticket workers” gather at a Pacesetter labor hall, signing in to say\n that they are available to work that day. Any worker who receives\n a job offer is given a ticket that includes a start time, the worksite’s\n location, and any suggested or required equipment.\n Pacesetter’s transportation agreement advises the daily\n ticket workers that it is their responsibility to arrive at assigned jobs\n on time. That same agreement, signed by workers, provides\n several options for getting to and from worksites—the worker’s\n own vehicle, public transportation, Pacesetter vans, or carpools in\n coworkers’ cars. Pacesetter deducts $3.00 per day ($1.50 each way)\n from the paychecks of those workers who ride in a carpool or van\n and pays carpool drivers $1.50 for each person driven per leg of the\n trip.\n Many jobs require tools, and here too workers have options.\n They can either bring their own or use Pacesetter’s—basic items\n like goggles, gloves, shovels, masks, and work boots. Workers\n who fail to return the equipment after work are eventually charged\n for it, but that is typically a last resort after unfruitful attempts to\n retrieve the tools. In most cases, at day’s end the workers return\n to the labor hall, give back the equipment, and get paid.\n Shane Villarino and around 300 other daily ticket workers in\n Broward County, Florida, brought a hybrid collective and class\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n action lawsuit against Pacesetter in 2020. They alleged, among\n other things, that Pacesetter violated the Fair Labor Standards Act\n and the Florida Minimum Wage Act for two reasons. 1 First, they\n say that Pacesetter’s deductions for transportation charges mean\n workers were ultimately paid less than the minimum wage.\n Second, they say that Pacesetter should have paid workers for their\n travel time to and from jobsites, as well as for the time spent\n waiting at the labor hall and returning tools. The class also alleged\n that Pacesetter violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging\n workers above the statutory limit for transportation to and from\n labor sites. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\n In a series of orders, the district court granted in part and\n denied in part Villarino’s attempts to certify several classes of\n plaintiffs. And while several class-certification motions were\n pending, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The\n district court denied Villarino’s motion for summary judgment in\n its entirety, and granted Pacesetter’s motion for summary\n judgment on Villarino’s Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida\n Minimum Wage Act claims. 2 Villarino now appeals those\n decisions, as well as the district court’s earlier refusal to certify a\n\n 1 The Florida Minimum Wage Act adopts many of the statutory and\n regulatory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fla. Stat.\n § 448.110(3).\n 2 The court also granted summary judgment to Pacesetter on Villarino’s claim\n\n that Pacesetter had violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging above\n market value or the actual cost for equipment. Villarino does not appeal that\n decision.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n subclass of plaintiffs bringing excessive-transportation-charge\n claims under the Florida Labor Pool Act.\n II.\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\n de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\n Villarino and drawing all inferences in his favor. Nehme v. Fla. Int’l\n Univ. Bd. of Trs., 121 F.4th 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). Summary\n judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any\n material fact” meaning that Pacesetter is “entitled to judgment as a\n matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\n We review the denial of class certification under Rule 23 for\n abuse of discretion. Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1300\n (11th Cir. 2021). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear\n error and legal determinations de novo. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,\n 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).\n III.\n We proceed in three parts, considering Villarino’s\n transportation deduction and unpaid time claims, as well as his\n disagreement with one of the district court’s class certification\n decisions.\n A.\n Villarino first argues that Pacesetter was wrong to deduct\n Pacesetter-arranged transportation from the daily pay of the\n workers who used those services. This deduction, Villarino says,\n “resulted in pay of less than the applicable minimum wage,”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n violating the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\n Wage Act. We disagree. 3\n It’s true that under the Fair Labor Standards Act an\n employer cannot shift business expenses to its employees if that\n shift would reduce employees’ wages below the statutory\n minimum—that kind of end run around the FLSA is impermissible.\n 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); see Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 594\n (11th Cir. 2011). All employers face costs of doing business, and\n allowing them to simply strip those costs out of employees’ wages\n would quickly neuter any pretense of a true minimum wage.\n But the rule is not that expenses can never be deducted from\n wages—it is that expenses cannot be shifted to employees when\n they are “for the employer’s benefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35; see also\n Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.\n 2002). So whether Pacesetter’s transportation deductions are\n allowed under the FLSA depends on whether the transportation it\n\n\n\n 3 Because neither Pacesetter’s motion for summary judgment nor the district\n\n court’s order granting that motion expressly addressed whether Pacesetter\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act when it charged workers for\n transportation, Villarino says he was deprived of notice and an opportunity to\n respond on this claim.\n That is incorrect. Villarino himself raised this issue in his motion for summary\n judgment, which the district court denied after both parties briefed the issue.\n Villarino cannot now claim that he lacked notice to address an issue he himself\n raised. Cf. Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 846, 850 (11th Cir. 1986);\n Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 1995).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n provided for workers was “primarily for the benefit or convenience\n of the employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c). It was not.\n To start, the company’s transportation agreement tells\n workers that once they are assigned to a job—and accept it—it is\n their own “responsibility to arrive at that job/customer/work site\n by the time designated in [their] Time Ticket.” And that same\n agreement emphasizes that workers have several “options” to get\n to jobsites, including their own vehicles, public transit, Pacesetter\n vans, or a carpool. The evidence backs this up—the company’s\n regional vice president testified that customers never require\n workers to be dropped off by Pacesetter at a jobsite, and confirmed\n that workers can take their transportation of choice, including a\n van, carpool, public transit, or rideshare service.\n In fact, the workers’ own deposition testimony confirms\n two things: they knew they had options, and they used them. One\n worker said he varies between a Pacesetter van, a carpool, or a bus.\n Another explained that Pacesetter never told him he could not\n drive himself to work. And a third testified that no one instructed\n her which form of transportation to use. The bottom line is that if\n workers needed transportation the company would assign it, but\n they remained free to choose other options—and did so regularly.\n No doubt, organizing transportation for those who needed\n it likely helped Pacesetter live up to its promise of a\n “comprehensive employee transport system” that provided\n “dependable, timely general labor” for clients. But the fact that\n Pacesetter also benefited from the options it offered employees\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n does not mean that the company’s system was built to serve its\n own interests rather than those of the workers. 4 Consider a\n company snack bar or cafeteria offering breakfast before work.\n Would it be an illegal kickback to charge workers for a bagel or\n coffee simply because that option made it easier for them to be\n nourished and energetic at work? Obviously not. And in any\n event, according to one employee’s testimony, the company did\n not advertise that it would “deliver workers to job sites” as a\n competitive advantage against other firms.\n Villarino contends that our decision in Arriaga v. Florida\n Pacific Farms compels a different result. 305 F.3d 1228. There, we\n concluded that the transportation costs for workers’ trips from\n Mexico under the H-2A visa program were an “incident of and\n necessary to” their employment—in other words, benefited the\n employer—and thus the workers could not be made to pay them.\n Id. at 1242. But cross-border travel under an international worker\n program is not comparable to the job-hall-to-worksite\n\n\n 4 Pacesetter’s argument that 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(1) allows employers to count\n\n certain non-cash benefits—room, board, and “other facilities”—as part of an\n employee’s total wages to meet the minimum wage is true. See 29 C.F.R.\n § 531.32(a), (c). But because neither party contends that Pacesetter’s cash\n wages do not meet the minimum wage in the first place, this rule is beside the\n point—it would only matter if Pacesetter was relying on the value of the\n transportation services to meet the minimum wage. And so long as the prices\n Pacesetter charged for transportation did not “exceed the ‘reasonable cost’” of\n that transportation, which no one is arguing at this stage of the case,\n deductions could be made “even if they reduce the cash wage below the\n minimum wage.” Id. § 531.36(a).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n transportation we consider here. Pacesetter workers’\n transportation is more like ordinary commuting that Department\n of Labor regulations already make clear are to benefit employees,\n not employers. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a); Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242.\n The transportation is an optional benefit distinct from the\n “free and clear” minimum wage that workers already receive. 29\n C.F.R. § 531.36(a). That means Pacesetter can lawfully deduct the\n workers’ transportation costs from their wages without running\n afoul of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\n Wage Act.\n B.\n Villarino’s next claim is that workers should have been paid\n for the time they spent (1) traveling to and from worksites,\n (2) collecting tools for their respective jobs, and (3) waiting for\n transportation. He says Pacesetter’s failure to pay for this time\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and its Florida equivalent.\n That’s true only if traveling, collecting tools, or waiting is\n part of the core work that the workers were hired to perform—in\n other words, whether any of these was an “integral and\n indispensable part of the principal activities” of the job. Integrity\n Staffing Sols., Inc., v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 33 (2014) (quotation\n omitted); Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). And an\n activity is “integral and indispensable” if it is “an intrinsic element”\n of the principal activities—something that an employee must\n perform to carry out her primary duties. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33. None\n of these meets the test.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n 1.\n We begin with the travel-time claim. The Portal-to-Portal\n Act amended the FLSA to exempt from compensation the time\n workers spend “traveling to and from the actual place of\n performance of the principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C.\n § 254(a)(1). That explains why “[n]ormal travel from home to\n work is not” compensable as “worktime.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. The\n fact that workers need to get to their jobs in order to do them is\n not enough—if “mere causal necessity was sufficient to constitute\n a compensable activity, all commuting would be compensable\n because it is a practical necessity.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const.,\n Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). And that would make the\n Portal-to-Portal Act a dead letter.\n What’s more, ordinary commutes do not become\n compensable just because an employer provides the\n transportation. The Department of Labor itself characterizes\n riding “between a town and an outlying mine or factory” as an\n example of “walking, riding, or traveling” that is “preliminary” or\n “postliminary” to the workday and thus noncompensable. 29\n C.F.R. § 790.7(f). The same is true for “riding on buses or trains\n from a logging camp to a particular site at which the logging\n operations are actually being conducted.” Id.\n Indeed, the Labor Department’s own Field Operations\n Handbook—in a section addressing temporary labor firms like\n Pacesetter—explains that travel from a central location to a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n customer’s establishment and back is noncompensable. 5 U.S.\n Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations\n Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). “In other words,” the handbook\n explains, the employee’s “working time is computed in the same\n manner as if he or she had gone directly from his or her home to\n the customer’s establishment and returned home from there at the\n end of the day.” Id. Though we are not bound by that guidance,\n we find it persuasive, and conclude that the time Pacesetter\n workers spend traveling to and from worksites is not compensable.\n See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024);\n Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).\n Villarino disagrees. He does not argue that the employees\n are performing any work before or during their travel time, but\n says that the time is compensable because they “were required to\n report to the Pacesetter labor hall.” That requirement is not\n enough. If the integral-and-indispensable test could be “satisfied\n merely by the fact that an employer required an activity”—as\n Villarino would have it—the test “would sweep into ‘principal\n activities’ the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act was\n designed to address,” including time spent “walking, riding, or\n\n\n\n\n 5 We note that for this provision to apply, the “employment understanding”\n\n must “clearly” be that the employee’s pay or work “begins and ends at the\n customer’s establishment.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division,\n Field Operations Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). That condition is satisfied\n here.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n traveling to and from the actual place” of employment.6 Busk, 574\n U.S. at 36; 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).\n 2.\n Villarino next argues that because Pacesetter-issued tools\n were “integral and indispensable” to workers’ principal job duties,\n they must be paid for the time spent collecting and returning those\n tools to Pacesetter’s labor hall.\n The Portal-to-Portal Act once again governs. In this context,\n the test is whether a non-travel activity “preliminary to or\n postliminary to” a worker’s “principal activity” is integral and\n indispensable to that activity. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2); see Busk, 574\n U.S. at 33. Those two words have different meanings:\n “indispensable is not synonymous with integral.” Llorca v. Sheriff,\n Collier Cnty., 893 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted\n and quotations omitted). So to qualify, a worker’s activities must\n be integral, which means that they must form an “intrinsic portion\n or element” of her principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33\n\n\n 6 It is true that travel from a central meeting spot like Pacesetter’s to another\n\n jobsite “must be counted as hours worked” when employees are “required”\n to report at the meeting place “to receive instructions.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.\n Even so, the nature of the daily ticket workers’ employment makes that\n regulation inapplicable here. The workers decide for themselves “when, if,\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments,” and report to\n Pacesetter’s labor hall accordingly. Arriving at the labor hall on their own\n initiative to (hopefully) secure work is, by definition, not a “require[ment]” to\n do anything. Id. It therefore does not make the workers’ travel time\n compensable under the FLSA.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n (quotation omitted). The activities must also be indispensable,\n which means that they “cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set\n aside, disregarded, or neglected.” Id. (quotation omitted). So\n “[e]ven activities required by the employer and for the employer’s\n benefit” remain outside the bounds of the employee’s principal\n activity if they are “not integral and indispensable to ‘the\n productive work that the employee is employed to perform.’”\n Balestrieri v. Menlo Park Fire Prot. Dist., 800 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.\n 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Busk, 574 U.S. at 36). And just\n because “certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to\n engage in their principal activities” does not mean they qualify. IBP,\n Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40–41 (2005).\n On this record, tool collection and return are not an\n indispensable part of the daily ticket workers’ duties. As discussed,\n the daily ticket workers voluntarily select which days to work “at\n their sole discretion.” Some jobs do not require tools, and for\n others Pacesetter clients will supply tools at the jobsite. And\n Pacesetter also allows workers to bring their own tools if they wish.\n Some—including Villarino—do. What’s more, picking up generic\n equipment—hard hats, safety vests, gloves, brooms, rakes, and\n shovels—“may or may not be necessary in particular situations or\n for every employee.” Id. at 40. While tools can increase the length\n of a daily ticket worker’s employment, a worker may even arrive\n at a jobsite without the recommended tool and still receive work.\n That makes this case unlike Alvarez, where “the donning of certain\n types of protective gear”—in hazardous occupations, for\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n example—was deemed “always essential if the worker is to do his\n job.” Id. (emphasis omitted).\n Because daily ticket workers may bring their own\n equipment, and not all jobs require tools in any event, we cannot\n say that some employees’ collection and return of equipment on\n some days for some jobs is a constituent duty that “cannot be\n dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected” if\n workers are to perform their principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at\n 33 (quoting 5 Oxford English Dictionary 219 (1933)). Examples from\n other cases are consistent with this conclusion. A firefighter’s\n “collecting and loading” his turnout gear and “driving it to a\n station” qualified as preliminary and thus “uncompensable under\n the Act.” Balestrieri, 800 F.3d at 1098. So too for the time sheriff’s\n deputies spent “donning and doffing protective gear” before\n commencing their “law enforcement duties.” Llorca, 893 F.3d at\n 1324. By contrast, a radiological technologist’s pre-shift activities\n of turning on an X-ray machine and performing tests “to prepare\n the office for receiving patients” qualified as integral and\n indispensable to her principal employment duties because the\n equipment needed to be operable as soon as the office opened to\n patients. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d\n 706, 715, 718 (2d Cir. 2001).\n In short, the daily ticket workers’ collection of\n nonspecialized tools used in the mine run of manual labor jobs does\n not meet that benchmark. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(d). The time\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n workers spend collecting and returning tools is noncompensable\n under the FLSA.\n 3.\n We turn now to Villarino’s waiting-time claim. He argues\n that Pacesetter needed to compensate workers “for all time after\n receiving their daily work ticket.” The reason? Workers, he says,\n were compelled “to wait for Pacesetter-assigned/coordinated\n transportation to take them to the job site,” so they “could not use\n this time effectively for their own purposes.” Not so.\n As before, the compensability of the workers’ wait time\n hinges on whether it was integral and indispensable to their\n principal activities. See Busk, 574 U.S. at 32–33. The Field\n Operations Handbook again provides a helpful starting point: time\n spent “waiting for assignments” at a central location is\n noncompensable. Handbook 31c09. Supreme Court precedent\n offers helpful data points too. In one case, “the time battery-plant\n employees spent showering and changing clothes” was integral and\n indispensable to their work—and thus compensable—“because the\n chemicals in the plant were ‘toxic to human beings.’” Busk, 574\n U.S. at 34 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249 (1956)). And\n in another, “the time meatpacker employees spent sharpening\n their knives” was compensable “because dull knives would ‘slow\n down production’ on the assembly line, ‘affect the appearance of\n the meat as well as the quality of the hides,’ ‘cause waste,’ and lead\n to ‘accidents.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S.\n 260, 262 (1956)).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n On the other hand, “the time poultry-plant employees spent\n waiting to don protective gear” was noncompensable because such\n waiting was not closely related to “the productive activity on the\n assembly line.” Id. (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42). And “the\n employees’ time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing [an\n employer’s] security screenings” was noncompensable for\n warehouse staffers in Busk. Id. at 37.\n The distinctions in those cases support our conclusion that\n the workers’ waiting time is a noncompensable preliminary\n activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). To start, workers did not even\n need to wait for transportation—under the transportation\n agreement, they could proceed directly to the jobsite if they\n wished. 7 And the daily ticket workers themselves decide “when, if,\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments.”\n Not getting paid for time spent at the job hall came as no\n surprise: several workers also testified to recognizing that they\n were compensated only for time spent working at jobsites. That\n makes them subject to the Department of Labor’s conclusion that\n if “the employment understanding clearly is that the pay or the\n time of the employee begins and ends at the customer’s\n establishment, waiting for assignments at the central location or in\n\n\n 7 Even if Pacesetter required workers to wait for transportation, that would\n\n not make this time integral and indispensable to their principal activities at\n their respective jobsites. That is because “[t]he integral and indispensable test\n is tied to the productive work that the employee is employed to perform”—not\n “whether an employer required a particular activity.” Busk, 574 U.S. at 36.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n travel from there to the customer’s establishment and return\n would not be compensable worktime.”8 Handbook 31c09; see also\n Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1341.\n On top of that, workers typically used their waiting time—\n both for assignments and for Pacesetter transportation—doing as\n they pleased. One testified that he watched the news or went to\n buy coffee while waiting for a job assignment. Another added that\n he would sit in the waiting room, sleep, go outside to smoke a\n cigarette, or pop by a food store to buy coffee. These personal\n activities are well removed “from the productive activity” that the\n workers were hired to perform at their respective jobsites, meaning\n their waiting time comfortably qualifies as preliminary activity.\n Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42.\n In sum, because the workers’ wait time was neither “the\n principal activity or activities” that they were hired to perform nor\n “integral and indispensable” to their job duties, it was not\n compensable under the FLSA. Busk, 574 U.S. at 35 (quotation\n omitted).\n\n\n\n\n 8 Here, we note a Department of Labor audit finding that Pacesetter had\n committed no minimum-wage violations at its Orlando, Florida, labor hall\n between 2016 and 2018. The audit report stated that “the time waiting for\n assignment or travelling from the central location to the worksite is not\n compensable.” Pacesetter attested that the policies at all Florida locations\n were the same during the relevant period.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n C.\n Having rejected Villarino’s substantive claims, we turn to\n his argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing\n to certify the excessive-transportation-charge subclass under the\n Florida Labor Pool Act. Though the district court certified certain\n subclasses and refused to certify others, Villarino challenges only\n the denial of the class of workers alleging that some workers were\n charged more than the $1.50 each way that Florida law permits for\n transportation. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\n The district court determined that this class failed Federal\n Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which permits class certification\n if (among other things) “the court finds that the questions of law or\n fact common to class members predominate over any questions\n affecting only individual members.” But “certification is\n inappropriate” under this provision if plaintiffs must “introduce a\n great deal of individualized proof or argue a number of\n individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements\n of their individualized claims.” Sellers v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt.\n Servs., LLC, 941 F.3d 1031, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation\n omitted).\n Here the court determined that resolving the\n transportation-subclass claims would “require extensive amounts\n of individualized proof that would predominate.” Villarino\n contends that the class should be certified because Pacesetter’s own\n records provide the necessary information, listing “each daily\n charge in excess of $3.00 for transportation.” And he insists that\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n even if there are “individual fact determinations with respect to\n charges,” these issues “depend on objective criteria that can be\n organized by a computer.” Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106,\n 1112 (5th Cir. 1978). 9\n Villarino oversimplifies the issue. Resolution of the\n subclass’s claims would require individualized determinations on\n both damages and liability. Sometimes Pacesetter gave workers\n transportation credits, though for what it is not entirely clear. And\n other workers were charged more than $3.00 for transportation on\n certain days. Some of these records specify that an excess charge\n was for a work-related bus pass, but others lack any explanation at\n all. Pacesetter asserts that these latter charges were for daily ticket\n workers to purchase bus passes for personal use, which the\n company provided to workers at a discount—and at a loss. These\n charges have nothing to do with wages and would not violate the\n Florida statute, but it is unclear from the Pacesetter records which\n transportation charges were business and which were personal.\n All that to say, rather than just examining Pacesetter’s\n records, the district court would have to scrutinize each overcharge\n or transportation credit. That would involve a lengthy and\n particularized inquiry—in essence, a series of mini-trials—for\n countless individual plaintiffs. Determining the legality of\n deductions would thus devolve “into an unmanageable variety of\n individual legal and factual issues.” Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,\n\n 9 Roper is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under Bonner v. City of\n\n Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 20\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\n\n 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by\n Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). On this\n record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its broad\n discretion in refusing to certify this subclass of plaintiffs.\n\n * * *\n Pacesetter is entitled to summary judgment on Villarino’s\n Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida Minimum Wage Act claims.\n And the district court acted within its discretion in not certifying\n the transportation subclass. We therefore AFFIRM.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Shane Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10645\\n ____________________\\n\\n SHANE VILLARINO,\\n LAURA KAREN JOHNSON,\\n JEFFERY MONDY,\\n JEROME GUNN,\\n on behalf of themselves and all others\\n similarly situated,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE, INC.,\\n PACESETTER PERSONNEL SERVICE OF FLORIDA, INC.,\\n FLORIDA STAFFING SERVICE, INC.,\\n TAMPA SERVICE COMPANY, INC.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-60192-AHS\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\\n Pacesetter Personnel Service matches workers with\\n employers for temporary labor on a day-to-day basis. To ensure\\n that those workers arrive at their jobsites on time and prepared, the\\n company offers transportation and tools to workers who need\\n them. Both can be accessed at the Pacesetter labor hall where job\\n tickets are offered and accepted. Some of the workers were not so\\n happy with this arrangement, so they sued Pacesetter for a variety\\n of labor-law violations. They say the company cannot deduct\\n transportation costs from their paychecks, and that it should pay\\n them for travel time, tool-collection time, and waiting time.\\n The district court sided with Pacesetter, and we agree.\\n Because the transportation offered is optional and provided for the\\n benefit of employees, Pacesetter can deduct the costs for those\\n workers who choose to use it. As for the three categories of time,\\n none are integral and indispensable to the core activities of the jobs,\\n so the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require that workers be\\n paid for that time. We thus affirm.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n I.\\n Pacesetter Personnel Service provides temporary labor to\\n clients in various industries across the Southeast, ranging from\\n construction to hospitality. Would-be employees known as “daily\\n ticket workers” gather at a Pacesetter labor hall, signing in to say\\n that they are available to work that day. Any worker who receives\\n a job offer is given a ticket that includes a start time, the worksite’s\\n location, and any suggested or required equipment.\\n Pacesetter’s transportation agreement advises the daily\\n ticket workers that it is their responsibility to arrive at assigned jobs\\n on time. That same agreement, signed by workers, provides\\n several options for getting to and from worksites—the worker’s\\n own vehicle, public transportation, Pacesetter vans, or carpools in\\n coworkers’ cars. Pacesetter deducts $3.00 per day ($1.50 each way)\\n from the paychecks of those workers who ride in a carpool or van\\n and pays carpool drivers $1.50 for each person driven per leg of the\\n trip.\\n Many jobs require tools, and here too workers have options.\\n They can either bring their own or use Pacesetter’s—basic items\\n like goggles, gloves, shovels, masks, and work boots. Workers\\n who fail to return the equipment after work are eventually charged\\n for it, but that is typically a last resort after unfruitful attempts to\\n retrieve the tools. In most cases, at day’s end the workers return\\n to the labor hall, give back the equipment, and get paid.\\n Shane Villarino and around 300 other daily ticket workers in\\n Broward County, Florida, brought a hybrid collective and class\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n action lawsuit against Pacesetter in 2020. They alleged, among\\n other things, that Pacesetter violated the Fair Labor Standards Act\\n and the Florida Minimum Wage Act for two reasons. 1 First, they\\n say that Pacesetter’s deductions for transportation charges mean\\n workers were ultimately paid less than the minimum wage.\\n Second, they say that Pacesetter should have paid workers for their\\n travel time to and from jobsites, as well as for the time spent\\n waiting at the labor hall and returning tools. The class also alleged\\n that Pacesetter violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging\\n workers above the statutory limit for transportation to and from\\n labor sites. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\\n In a series of orders, the district court granted in part and\\n denied in part Villarino’s attempts to certify several classes of\\n plaintiffs. And while several class-certification motions were\\n pending, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The\\n district court denied Villarino’s motion for summary judgment in\\n its entirety, and granted Pacesetter’s motion for summary\\n judgment on Villarino’s Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida\\n Minimum Wage Act claims. 2 Villarino now appeals those\\n decisions, as well as the district court’s earlier refusal to certify a\\n\\n 1 The Florida Minimum Wage Act adopts many of the statutory and\\n regulatory provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Fla. Stat.\\n § 448.110(3).\\n 2 The court also granted summary judgment to Pacesetter on Villarino’s claim\\n\\n that Pacesetter had violated the Florida Labor Pool Act by charging above\\n market value or the actual cost for equipment. Villarino does not appeal that\\n decision.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n subclass of plaintiffs bringing excessive-transportation-charge\\n claims under the Florida Labor Pool Act.\\n II.\\n We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment\\n de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to\\n Villarino and drawing all inferences in his favor. Nehme v. Fla. Int’l\\n Univ. Bd. of Trs., 121 F.4th 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2024). Summary\\n judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any\\n material fact” meaning that Pacesetter is “entitled to judgment as a\\n matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).\\n We review the denial of class certification under Rule 23 for\\n abuse of discretion. Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1300\\n (11th Cir. 2021). Factual determinations are reviewed for clear\\n error and legal determinations de novo. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,\\n 564 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n III.\\n We proceed in three parts, considering Villarino’s\\n transportation deduction and unpaid time claims, as well as his\\n disagreement with one of the district court’s class certification\\n decisions.\\n A.\\n Villarino first argues that Pacesetter was wrong to deduct\\n Pacesetter-arranged transportation from the daily pay of the\\n workers who used those services. This deduction, Villarino says,\\n “resulted in pay of less than the applicable minimum wage,”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n violating the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\\n Wage Act. We disagree. 3\\n It’s true that under the Fair Labor Standards Act an\\n employer cannot shift business expenses to its employees if that\\n shift would reduce employees’ wages below the statutory\\n minimum—that kind of end run around the FLSA is impermissible.\\n 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1); see Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 594\\n (11th Cir. 2011). All employers face costs of doing business, and\\n allowing them to simply strip those costs out of employees’ wages\\n would quickly neuter any pretense of a true minimum wage.\\n But the rule is not that expenses can never be deducted from\\n wages—it is that expenses cannot be shifted to employees when\\n they are “for the employer’s benefit.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.35; see also\\n Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.\\n 2002). So whether Pacesetter’s transportation deductions are\\n allowed under the FLSA depends on whether the transportation it\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Because neither Pacesetter’s motion for summary judgment nor the district\\n\\n court’s order granting that motion expressly addressed whether Pacesetter\\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act when it charged workers for\\n transportation, Villarino says he was deprived of notice and an opportunity to\\n respond on this claim.\\n That is incorrect. Villarino himself raised this issue in his motion for summary\\n judgment, which the district court denied after both parties briefed the issue.\\n Villarino cannot now claim that he lacked notice to address an issue he himself\\n raised. Cf. Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 846, 850 (11th Cir. 1986);\\n Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 1995).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n provided for workers was “primarily for the benefit or convenience\\n of the employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c). It was not.\\n To start, the company’s transportation agreement tells\\n workers that once they are assigned to a job—and accept it—it is\\n their own “responsibility to arrive at that job/customer/work site\\n by the time designated in [their] Time Ticket.” And that same\\n agreement emphasizes that workers have several “options” to get\\n to jobsites, including their own vehicles, public transit, Pacesetter\\n vans, or a carpool. The evidence backs this up—the company’s\\n regional vice president testified that customers never require\\n workers to be dropped off by Pacesetter at a jobsite, and confirmed\\n that workers can take their transportation of choice, including a\\n van, carpool, public transit, or rideshare service.\\n In fact, the workers’ own deposition testimony confirms\\n two things: they knew they had options, and they used them. One\\n worker said he varies between a Pacesetter van, a carpool, or a bus.\\n Another explained that Pacesetter never told him he could not\\n drive himself to work. And a third testified that no one instructed\\n her which form of transportation to use. The bottom line is that if\\n workers needed transportation the company would assign it, but\\n they remained free to choose other options—and did so regularly.\\n No doubt, organizing transportation for those who needed\\n it likely helped Pacesetter live up to its promise of a\\n “comprehensive employee transport system” that provided\\n “dependable, timely general labor” for clients. But the fact that\\n Pacesetter also benefited from the options it offered employees\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n does not mean that the company’s system was built to serve its\\n own interests rather than those of the workers. 4 Consider a\\n company snack bar or cafeteria offering breakfast before work.\\n Would it be an illegal kickback to charge workers for a bagel or\\n coffee simply because that option made it easier for them to be\\n nourished and energetic at work? Obviously not. And in any\\n event, according to one employee’s testimony, the company did\\n not advertise that it would “deliver workers to job sites” as a\\n competitive advantage against other firms.\\n Villarino contends that our decision in Arriaga v. Florida\\n Pacific Farms compels a different result. 305 F.3d 1228. There, we\\n concluded that the transportation costs for workers’ trips from\\n Mexico under the H-2A visa program were an “incident of and\\n necessary to” their employment—in other words, benefited the\\n employer—and thus the workers could not be made to pay them.\\n Id. at 1242. But cross-border travel under an international worker\\n program is not comparable to the job-hall-to-worksite\\n\\n\\n 4 Pacesetter’s argument that 29 U.S.C. § 203(m)(1) allows employers to count\\n\\n certain non-cash benefits—room, board, and “other facilities”—as part of an\\n employee’s total wages to meet the minimum wage is true. See 29 C.F.R.\\n § 531.32(a), (c). But because neither party contends that Pacesetter’s cash\\n wages do not meet the minimum wage in the first place, this rule is beside the\\n point—it would only matter if Pacesetter was relying on the value of the\\n transportation services to meet the minimum wage. And so long as the prices\\n Pacesetter charged for transportation did not “exceed the ‘reasonable cost’” of\\n that transportation, which no one is arguing at this stage of the case,\\n deductions could be made “even if they reduce the cash wage below the\\n minimum wage.” Id. § 531.36(a).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n transportation we consider here. Pacesetter workers’\\n transportation is more like ordinary commuting that Department\\n of Labor regulations already make clear are to benefit employees,\\n not employers. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a); Arriaga, 305 F.3d at 1242.\\n The transportation is an optional benefit distinct from the\\n “free and clear” minimum wage that workers already receive. 29\\n C.F.R. § 531.36(a). That means Pacesetter can lawfully deduct the\\n workers’ transportation costs from their wages without running\\n afoul of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Florida Minimum\\n Wage Act.\\n B.\\n Villarino’s next claim is that workers should have been paid\\n for the time they spent (1) traveling to and from worksites,\\n (2) collecting tools for their respective jobs, and (3) waiting for\\n transportation. He says Pacesetter’s failure to pay for this time\\n violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and its Florida equivalent.\\n That’s true only if traveling, collecting tools, or waiting is\\n part of the core work that the workers were hired to perform—in\\n other words, whether any of these was an “integral and\\n indispensable part of the principal activities” of the job. Integrity\\n Staffing Sols., Inc., v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27, 33 (2014) (quotation\\n omitted); Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). And an\\n activity is “integral and indispensable” if it is “an intrinsic element”\\n of the principal activities—something that an employee must\\n perform to carry out her primary duties. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33. None\\n of these meets the test.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n 1.\\n We begin with the travel-time claim. The Portal-to-Portal\\n Act amended the FLSA to exempt from compensation the time\\n workers spend “traveling to and from the actual place of\\n performance of the principal activity or activities.” 29 U.S.C.\\n § 254(a)(1). That explains why “[n]ormal travel from home to\\n work is not” compensable as “worktime.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35. The\\n fact that workers need to get to their jobs in order to do them is\\n not enough—if “mere causal necessity was sufficient to constitute\\n a compensable activity, all commuting would be compensable\\n because it is a practical necessity.” Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const.,\\n Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). And that would make the\\n Portal-to-Portal Act a dead letter.\\n What’s more, ordinary commutes do not become\\n compensable just because an employer provides the\\n transportation. The Department of Labor itself characterizes\\n riding “between a town and an outlying mine or factory” as an\\n example of “walking, riding, or traveling” that is “preliminary” or\\n “postliminary” to the workday and thus noncompensable. 29\\n C.F.R. § 790.7(f). The same is true for “riding on buses or trains\\n from a logging camp to a particular site at which the logging\\n operations are actually being conducted.” Id.\\n Indeed, the Labor Department’s own Field Operations\\n Handbook—in a section addressing temporary labor firms like\\n Pacesetter—explains that travel from a central location to a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n customer’s establishment and back is noncompensable. 5 U.S.\\n Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Field Operations\\n Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). “In other words,” the handbook\\n explains, the employee’s “working time is computed in the same\\n manner as if he or she had gone directly from his or her home to\\n the customer’s establishment and returned home from there at the\\n end of the day.” Id. Though we are not bound by that guidance,\\n we find it persuasive, and conclude that the time Pacesetter\\n workers spend traveling to and from worksites is not compensable.\\n See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412–13 (2024);\\n Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).\\n Villarino disagrees. He does not argue that the employees\\n are performing any work before or during their travel time, but\\n says that the time is compensable because they “were required to\\n report to the Pacesetter labor hall.” That requirement is not\\n enough. If the integral-and-indispensable test could be “satisfied\\n merely by the fact that an employer required an activity”—as\\n Villarino would have it—the test “would sweep into ‘principal\\n activities’ the very activities that the Portal-to-Portal Act was\\n designed to address,” including time spent “walking, riding, or\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 We note that for this provision to apply, the “employment understanding”\\n\\n must “clearly” be that the employee’s pay or work “begins and ends at the\\n customer’s establishment.” U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Division,\\n Field Operations Handbook 31c09 (Aug. 10, 2016). That condition is satisfied\\n here.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n traveling to and from the actual place” of employment.6 Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 36; 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).\\n 2.\\n Villarino next argues that because Pacesetter-issued tools\\n were “integral and indispensable” to workers’ principal job duties,\\n they must be paid for the time spent collecting and returning those\\n tools to Pacesetter’s labor hall.\\n The Portal-to-Portal Act once again governs. In this context,\\n the test is whether a non-travel activity “preliminary to or\\n postliminary to” a worker’s “principal activity” is integral and\\n indispensable to that activity. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2); see Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 33. Those two words have different meanings:\\n “indispensable is not synonymous with integral.” Llorca v. Sheriff,\\n Collier Cnty., 893 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted\\n and quotations omitted). So to qualify, a worker’s activities must\\n be integral, which means that they must form an “intrinsic portion\\n or element” of her principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at 33\\n\\n\\n 6 It is true that travel from a central meeting spot like Pacesetter’s to another\\n\\n jobsite “must be counted as hours worked” when employees are “required”\\n to report at the meeting place “to receive instructions.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.38.\\n Even so, the nature of the daily ticket workers’ employment makes that\\n regulation inapplicable here. The workers decide for themselves “when, if,\\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments,” and report to\\n Pacesetter’s labor hall accordingly. Arriving at the labor hall on their own\\n initiative to (hopefully) secure work is, by definition, not a “require[ment]” to\\n do anything. Id. It therefore does not make the workers’ travel time\\n compensable under the FLSA.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n (quotation omitted). The activities must also be indispensable,\\n which means that they “cannot be dispensed with, remitted, set\\n aside, disregarded, or neglected.” Id. (quotation omitted). So\\n “[e]ven activities required by the employer and for the employer’s\\n benefit” remain outside the bounds of the employee’s principal\\n activity if they are “not integral and indispensable to ‘the\\n productive work that the employee is employed to perform.’”\\n Balestrieri v. Menlo Park Fire Prot. Dist., 800 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir.\\n 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Busk, 574 U.S. at 36). And just\\n because “certain preshift activities are necessary for employees to\\n engage in their principal activities” does not mean they qualify. IBP,\\n Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 40–41 (2005).\\n On this record, tool collection and return are not an\\n indispensable part of the daily ticket workers’ duties. As discussed,\\n the daily ticket workers voluntarily select which days to work “at\\n their sole discretion.” Some jobs do not require tools, and for\\n others Pacesetter clients will supply tools at the jobsite. And\\n Pacesetter also allows workers to bring their own tools if they wish.\\n Some—including Villarino—do. What’s more, picking up generic\\n equipment—hard hats, safety vests, gloves, brooms, rakes, and\\n shovels—“may or may not be necessary in particular situations or\\n for every employee.” Id. at 40. While tools can increase the length\\n of a daily ticket worker’s employment, a worker may even arrive\\n at a jobsite without the recommended tool and still receive work.\\n That makes this case unlike Alvarez, where “the donning of certain\\n types of protective gear”—in hazardous occupations, for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n example—was deemed “always essential if the worker is to do his\\n job.” Id. (emphasis omitted).\\n Because daily ticket workers may bring their own\\n equipment, and not all jobs require tools in any event, we cannot\\n say that some employees’ collection and return of equipment on\\n some days for some jobs is a constituent duty that “cannot be\\n dispensed with, remitted, set aside, disregarded, or neglected” if\\n workers are to perform their principal activities. Busk, 574 U.S. at\\n 33 (quoting 5 Oxford English Dictionary 219 (1933)). Examples from\\n other cases are consistent with this conclusion. A firefighter’s\\n “collecting and loading” his turnout gear and “driving it to a\\n station” qualified as preliminary and thus “uncompensable under\\n the Act.” Balestrieri, 800 F.3d at 1098. So too for the time sheriff’s\\n deputies spent “donning and doffing protective gear” before\\n commencing their “law enforcement duties.” Llorca, 893 F.3d at\\n 1324. By contrast, a radiological technologist’s pre-shift activities\\n of turning on an X-ray machine and performing tests “to prepare\\n the office for receiving patients” qualified as integral and\\n indispensable to her principal employment duties because the\\n equipment needed to be operable as soon as the office opened to\\n patients. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d\\n 706, 715, 718 (2d Cir. 2001).\\n In short, the daily ticket workers’ collection of\\n nonspecialized tools used in the mine run of manual labor jobs does\\n not meet that benchmark. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(d). The time\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n workers spend collecting and returning tools is noncompensable\\n under the FLSA.\\n 3.\\n We turn now to Villarino’s waiting-time claim. He argues\\n that Pacesetter needed to compensate workers “for all time after\\n receiving their daily work ticket.” The reason? Workers, he says,\\n were compelled “to wait for Pacesetter-assigned/coordinated\\n transportation to take them to the job site,” so they “could not use\\n this time effectively for their own purposes.” Not so.\\n As before, the compensability of the workers’ wait time\\n hinges on whether it was integral and indispensable to their\\n principal activities. See Busk, 574 U.S. at 32–33. The Field\\n Operations Handbook again provides a helpful starting point: time\\n spent “waiting for assignments” at a central location is\\n noncompensable. Handbook 31c09. Supreme Court precedent\\n offers helpful data points too. In one case, “the time battery-plant\\n employees spent showering and changing clothes” was integral and\\n indispensable to their work—and thus compensable—“because the\\n chemicals in the plant were ‘toxic to human beings.’” Busk, 574\\n U.S. at 34 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 249 (1956)). And\\n in another, “the time meatpacker employees spent sharpening\\n their knives” was compensable “because dull knives would ‘slow\\n down production’ on the assembly line, ‘affect the appearance of\\n the meat as well as the quality of the hides,’ ‘cause waste,’ and lead\\n to ‘accidents.’” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S.\\n 260, 262 (1956)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n On the other hand, “the time poultry-plant employees spent\\n waiting to don protective gear” was noncompensable because such\\n waiting was not closely related to “the productive activity on the\\n assembly line.” Id. (quoting Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42). And “the\\n employees’ time spent waiting to undergo and undergoing [an\\n employer’s] security screenings” was noncompensable for\\n warehouse staffers in Busk. Id. at 37.\\n The distinctions in those cases support our conclusion that\\n the workers’ waiting time is a noncompensable preliminary\\n activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). To start, workers did not even\\n need to wait for transportation—under the transportation\\n agreement, they could proceed directly to the jobsite if they\\n wished. 7 And the daily ticket workers themselves decide “when, if,\\n and for what days they wish to seek and accept assignments.”\\n Not getting paid for time spent at the job hall came as no\\n surprise: several workers also testified to recognizing that they\\n were compensated only for time spent working at jobsites. That\\n makes them subject to the Department of Labor’s conclusion that\\n if “the employment understanding clearly is that the pay or the\\n time of the employee begins and ends at the customer’s\\n establishment, waiting for assignments at the central location or in\\n\\n\\n 7 Even if Pacesetter required workers to wait for transportation, that would\\n\\n not make this time integral and indispensable to their principal activities at\\n their respective jobsites. That is because “[t]he integral and indispensable test\\n is tied to the productive work that the employee is employed to perform”—not\\n “whether an employer required a particular activity.” Busk, 574 U.S. at 36.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n travel from there to the customer’s establishment and return\\n would not be compensable worktime.”8 Handbook 31c09; see also\\n Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1341.\\n On top of that, workers typically used their waiting time—\\n both for assignments and for Pacesetter transportation—doing as\\n they pleased. One testified that he watched the news or went to\\n buy coffee while waiting for a job assignment. Another added that\\n he would sit in the waiting room, sleep, go outside to smoke a\\n cigarette, or pop by a food store to buy coffee. These personal\\n activities are well removed “from the productive activity” that the\\n workers were hired to perform at their respective jobsites, meaning\\n their waiting time comfortably qualifies as preliminary activity.\\n Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 42.\\n In sum, because the workers’ wait time was neither “the\\n principal activity or activities” that they were hired to perform nor\\n “integral and indispensable” to their job duties, it was not\\n compensable under the FLSA. Busk, 574 U.S. at 35 (quotation\\n omitted).\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Here, we note a Department of Labor audit finding that Pacesetter had\\n committed no minimum-wage violations at its Orlando, Florida, labor hall\\n between 2016 and 2018. The audit report stated that “the time waiting for\\n assignment or travelling from the central location to the worksite is not\\n compensable.” Pacesetter attested that the policies at all Florida locations\\n were the same during the relevant period.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n C.\\n Having rejected Villarino’s substantive claims, we turn to\\n his argument that the district court abused its discretion by refusing\\n to certify the excessive-transportation-charge subclass under the\\n Florida Labor Pool Act. Though the district court certified certain\\n subclasses and refused to certify others, Villarino challenges only\\n the denial of the class of workers alleging that some workers were\\n charged more than the $1.50 each way that Florida law permits for\\n transportation. See Fla. Stat. § 448.24(1)(b).\\n The district court determined that this class failed Federal\\n Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), which permits class certification\\n if (among other things) “the court finds that the questions of law or\\n fact common to class members predominate over any questions\\n affecting only individual members.” But “certification is\\n inappropriate” under this provision if plaintiffs must “introduce a\\n great deal of individualized proof or argue a number of\\n individualized legal points to establish most or all of the elements\\n of their individualized claims.” Sellers v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt.\\n Servs., LLC, 941 F.3d 1031, 1040 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation\\n omitted).\\n Here the court determined that resolving the\\n transportation-subclass claims would “require extensive amounts\\n of individualized proof that would predominate.” Villarino\\n contends that the class should be certified because Pacesetter’s own\\n records provide the necessary information, listing “each daily\\n charge in excess of $3.00 for transportation.” And he insists that\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10645 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n even if there are “individual fact determinations with respect to\\n charges,” these issues “depend on objective criteria that can be\\n organized by a computer.” Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106,\\n 1112 (5th Cir. 1978). 9\\n Villarino oversimplifies the issue. Resolution of the\\n subclass’s claims would require individualized determinations on\\n both damages and liability. Sometimes Pacesetter gave workers\\n transportation credits, though for what it is not entirely clear. And\\n other workers were charged more than $3.00 for transportation on\\n certain days. Some of these records specify that an excess charge\\n was for a work-related bus pass, but others lack any explanation at\\n all. Pacesetter asserts that these latter charges were for daily ticket\\n workers to purchase bus passes for personal use, which the\\n company provided to workers at a discount—and at a loss. These\\n charges have nothing to do with wages and would not violate the\\n Florida statute, but it is unclear from the Pacesetter records which\\n transportation charges were business and which were personal.\\n All that to say, rather than just examining Pacesetter’s\\n records, the district court would have to scrutinize each overcharge\\n or transportation credit. That would involve a lengthy and\\n particularized inquiry—in essence, a series of mini-trials—for\\n countless individual plaintiffs. Determining the legality of\\n deductions would thus devolve “into an unmanageable variety of\\n individual legal and factual issues.” Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,\\n\\n 9 Roper is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under Bonner v. City of\\n\\n Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 20\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10645\\n\\n 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds by\\n Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). On this\\n record, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its broad\\n discretion in refusing to certify this subclass of plaintiffs.\\n\\n * * *\\n Pacesetter is entitled to summary judgment on Villarino’s\\n Fair Labor Standards Act and Florida Minimum Wage Act claims.\\n And the district court acted within its discretion in not certifying\\n the transportation subclass. We therefore AFFIRM.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30968,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10748433,"string":"10,748,433"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Administrator for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10875"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10875\\n ____________________\\n\\n FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &\\n MEDICAID SERVICES,\\n Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, in her official capacity,\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH\\n AND HUMAN SERVICES,\\n Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,\\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-61595-WPD\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\\n Judge.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n Medicaid, the government-sponsored health-insurance pro-\\n gram for those with limited resources or special medical needs, has\\n been described as an exercise in “cooperative federalism.” Harris v.\\n McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,\\n 316 (1968)). The program is jointly funded and administered by the\\n states and the federal government. This case presents a question\\n about how states may—and may not—foot their share of the Med-\\n icaid bill. For years, Florida has raised a substantial portion of its\\n Medicaid contribution through an intricate arrangement called the\\n “Directed Payment Program.” In 2023, the federal Centers for\\n Medicare and Medicaid Services released a “Bulletin” that, while\\n innocuous in name, was potentially dramatic in effect. The Bulle-\\n tin advanced an understanding of federal law that Florida feared\\n could jeopardize its Directed Payment Program and the billions in\\n Medicaid funds it generated. Florida sued the federal government\\n and moved to preliminarily enjoin the Bulletin’s implementation.\\n\\n\\n * The Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, United States District Judge for the\\n\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n The district court denied Florida’s motion and dismissed the case\\n on the ground that the Bulletin wasn’t a reviewable “final agency\\n action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.\\n We hold that the district court was right to deny Florida’s\\n preliminary-injunction motion but that it did so for the wrong rea-\\n son. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the Bulletin was a\\n final agency action, and is therefore subject to judicial review. But\\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the\\n Bulletin and, accordingly, isn’t entitled to the preliminary injunc-\\n tion it seeks. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of\\n the complaint, affirm its denial of the preliminary injunction, and\\n remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n Medicaid funding is a group project. The federal govern-\\n ment provides financial assistance “to states that choose to reim-\\n burse certain costs of medical treatment for needy applicants.” Ga.,\\n Dep’t of Med. Assistance ex rel. Toal v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1565, 1566 (11th\\n Cir. 1993). A complex matching formula generates the “[f]ederal\\n medical assistance percentage” in any particular state. 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396d(b). The federal share is always some percentage of a state’s\\n Medicaid expenditures—never less than 50%, but often higher, see\\n id. § 1396d(b)(1). So the more of its own money a state spends on\\n Medicaid, the more the federal government has to kick in.\\n As in many group projects, the participants’ incentives aren’t\\n always aligned. Because of the way the federal matching formula\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n works, states are understandably motivated to inflate their own\\n Medicaid spending numbers as a means of driving up federal con-\\n tributions. One way states can do this—without internalizing the\\n budgetary costs, so to speak—is by imposing so-called “provider\\n taxes.” See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-98, Medicaid:\\n CMS Needs More Information on States’ Financing and Payment Ar-\\n rangements to Improve Oversight 8–10 (2020). In broad strokes, here’s\\n how it works: (1) A state imposes a tax on healthcare providers; (2)\\n the state uses those tax revenues to increase its own Medicaid con-\\n tribution; (3) by virtue of its matching obligation, the federal Med-\\n icaid contribution likewise increases; and (4) those Medicaid dol-\\n lars—now including the extra federal share—get returned to the\\n same tax-paying providers through more generous Medicaid pay-\\n ments. A counterintuitive consequence of all this is that healthcare\\n providers have an incentive to—and in fact do—lobby state and lo-\\n cal governments to impose higher taxes. That’s because although\\n institutions subject to the provider tax will have to pay bigger tax\\n bills, they expect to receive even more back once they get their\\n Medicaid payments, as supplemented with an inflated federal\\n share. In recent years, states have started relying more heavily on\\n provider taxes to finance their Medicaid contributions, which, in\\n turn, has driven dramatic increases in mandatory federal Medicaid\\n outlays. See id. at 22–34.\\n In 1991, Congress adopted an important limit on states’ abil-\\n ity to juice federal contributions in this way—the so-called “hold\\n harmless” rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii); Medicaid Vol-\\n untary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-234, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 1793, 1793–99. Under\\n § 1396b(w), the Department of Health and Human Services must\\n deduct from its federal-matching calculation certain kinds of state\\n revenue. Chief among these mandatory deductions is any funding\\n that the state obtained through “health care related taxes.” Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(1)(A), (3)(A). On its own, that provision would require\\n the exclusion of revenue raised through the sort of provider taxes\\n that we’ve described. But the “health care related tax[]” ban has an\\n exception: States may raise revenue through a healthcare-related\\n tax so long as it is “broad-based.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(ii). But, it\\n turns out, the “broad-based” tax exception has its own exception:\\n HHS must nonetheless deduct revenue from even a broad-based\\n tax “if there is in effect a hold harmless provision (described in par-\\n agraph (4)) with respect to the tax.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\\n The cross-referenced Paragraph (4) sets out four different\\n ways of detecting whether a “hold harmless provision” is in effect.\\n See id. § 1396b(w)(4). We’ll return to all four in due course, but for\\n now it’s important to know about the method described in subpar-\\n agraph (C), clause (i). According to (C)(i)—and the case basically\\n rides on this language—“there is in effect a hold harmless provision\\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax” if “[t]he State\\n or other unit of government imposing the tax provides (directly or\\n indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to\\n hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the tax.” Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i). This much is clear and undisputed: By virtue\\n of clause (C)(i), a state can’t impose a provider tax on hospitals\\n while also promising to promptly refund (i.e., “hold harmless”)\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n those very same hospitals. Were things otherwise, states could se-\\n cure practically unlimited extra federal matching funds using reve-\\n nue that is little more than a short-term loan from the hospitals.\\n HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (or\\n CMS) is concerned that states and providers have developed a so-\\n phisticated way to evade the hold-harmless rule. Things get pretty\\n involved, so we’ll try to simplify it using an illustrative example:\\n Imagine that a (very small) state has four private hospitals, each of\\n which provides care to a different number of Medicaid-insured pa-\\n tients. Hospital 1 opts not to take Medicaid insurance at all, so its\\n Medicaid share is 0%. Hospitals 2 and 3 accept Medicaid, but see\\n few low-income patients—let’s say their Medicaid share is 20%.\\n Hospital 4 both accepts Medicaid and receives many low-income\\n patients—its Medicaid share is 80%. The state opts to boost its own\\n Medicaid expenditures—and thus the federal match—by imposing\\n a provider tax on all four hospitals. This is a “broad based” tax, so\\n it doesn’t get deducted from the federal-share calculation.\\n The tax is good for Hospital 4 and bad for Hospital 1. Hos-\\n pital 4 will pay the tax but, in the end, will receive higher Medicaid\\n payments; Hospital 1, by contrast, has to pay the tax but won’t get\\n anything in return. Hospitals 2 and 3, obviously are somewhere in\\n between. The state could try to keep everyone happy by simply\\n refunding the hospital tax—but that the hold-harmless rule pre-\\n vents it from doing so. CMS worries that hospitals will end-run the\\n hold-harmless rule’s prohibition by redistributing their Medicaid\\n payments among themselves as a means of offsetting the provider\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n tax. So, for instance, Hospital 4 might transfer some of its new,\\n provider-tax-enabled Medicaid-payment surplus to Hospital 1 to\\n cover Hospital 1’s provider-tax assessment. That way, even\\n though both Hospital 1 and Hospital 4 are paying a new tax, they’re\\n both better off.\\n This case tests whether the hold-harmless rule prevents\\n these sorts of private-to-private redistributions.\\n B\\n In its ongoing efforts to implement the hold-harmless rule,\\n CMS has taken three regulatory steps that turn out to be important\\n to our analysis.\\n First, in 2008, CMS revised its hold-harmless regulations,\\n partly in response to a few congressional tweaks. See 2008 Final\\n Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 9,685 (Feb. 22, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R.\\n §§ 433.54–433.70); see also Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,\\n Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. B, title IV, § 403, 120 Stat. 2922, 2994–95\\n (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)). Neither the statutory\\n amendment nor the agency’s revisions materially altered the (C)(i)\\n definition’s text or its implementing regulations. Compare 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.68(f)(3) (1993), with id. § 433.68(f)(3) (2008). But in the rule’s\\n preamble, CMS explained that “[a] direct guarantee [under (C)(i)]\\n would be found when a State payment is made available to a tax-\\n payer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the reasonable expec-\\n tation that the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\\n harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 9,686; accord id.\\n at 9,694. In CMS’s view, “[a] direct guarantee does not need to be\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n an explicit promise or assurance of payment”; “[i]nstead, the ele-\\n ment necessary to constitute a direct guarantee is the provision for\\n payment by State statute, regulation, or policy.” Id. at 9,694.\\n Second, in 2019, CMS proposed another revision to its hold-\\n harmless regulations. See Medicaid Fiscal Accountability Regula-\\n tion, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,722 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019). The proposed\\n rule’s preamble reiterated CMS’s 2008 interpretation. See id. at\\n 63,730–31, 63,734. As CMS had said then, in its view a hold-harm-\\n less arrangement exists if “taxpayers have a reasonable expectation\\n that their forthcoming Medicaid payment (including any redistri-\\n bution) . . . results in participating taxpayers being held harmless\\n for all or a portion of the tax amount.” Id. at 63,734. But, CMS\\n continued, it had “become aware” of some novel—and it believed\\n unlawful—arrangements in which taxpaying providers were being\\n “held harmless” by way of payments not from state or local gov-\\n ernments, but rather from Medicaid Managed Care Organizations\\n or other taxpayers. Id. CMS insisted that “[t]he fact that a private\\n entity makes the redistribution payment does not change the es-\\n sential nature of the payment, which constitutes an indirect pay-\\n ment from the state or unit of government to the entity being\\n taxed that holds it harmless for the cost of the tax.” Id. at 63,735.\\n Put simply, CMS said, the sort of taxpayer-to-taxpayer redistribu-\\n tions exemplified in our hospital hypo are forbidden. CMS ex-\\n plained that in its view “[s]uch arrangements” were “inconsistent\\n with existing statutory and regulatory requirements prohibiting\\n hold harmless arrangements.” Id. at 63,734 (emphasis added).\\n Though CMS was proposing regulatory amendments, the changes,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n it said, did “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely\\n codif[ied] currently prohibited practices.” Id. at 63,735.\\n Third, in 2021, CMS withdrew its 2019 proposed rule. See\\n 2021 Proposed Rule Withdrawal, 86 Fed. Reg. 5,105 (Jan. 19, 2021).\\n The terse notice explained that “based on the considerable feed-\\n back we received . . . , we have determined it appropriate to with-\\n draw the proposed provisions at this time.” Id. at 5,105. The notice\\n explained that “the withdrawal of this proposed rule does not affect\\n existing federal legal requirements or policy that were merely pro-\\n posed to be codified in regulation.” Id.\\n C\\n The story underlying this case begins in earnest two years\\n later, in 2023, when CMS circulated a document that it called an\\n “Informational Bulletin.” See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs.\\n for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Health Care-Related Taxes and\\n Hold Harmless Arrangements Involving the Redistribution of\\n Medicaid Payments (Feb. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/VW7X-\\n GX8V. In the Bulletin, CMS explained that it had “been ap-\\n proached by several states with questions regarding the statutory\\n and regulatory requirements applicable to health care-related\\n taxes.” Id. at 1. Citing the 2008 rule’s preamble, the Bulletin in-\\n sisted that the hold-harmless prohibition covers purely private re-\\n distribution arrangements because they “result[] in a reasonable ex-\\n pectation that the taxpaying hospitals, whether directly through\\n their Medicaid payments or due to the availability of the redistrib-\\n uted payments . . . , are held harmless for at least part of their health\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n care-related tax costs.” Id. at 3–4. And the Bulletin warned that,\\n should CMS discover forbidden private arrangements, the agency\\n could “disallow” (i.e., claw back) a portion of the offending state’s\\n Medicaid funds. Id. at 5.\\n The Bulletin spelled trouble for Florida’s Directed Payment\\n Program, under which local governments can assess special fees on\\n private hospitals. See Fla. Stat. § 125.01(1)(r). The governments\\n pool those assessments in “Local Provider Participation Funds,”\\n which they then transfer to the Florida Agency for Healthcare Ad-\\n ministration. The Agency, in turn, uses that money to supplement\\n Florida’s Medicaid contribution, which, for reasons already ex-\\n plained, enables the state to collect additional federal matching\\n funds. The extra federal funds in hand, the Agency redistributes\\n the combined monies to entities known as “Managed Care Organ-\\n izations,” which, in turn, return them to Florida hospitals.\\n At least 20 Florida counties and municipalities assess fees\\n through the Directed Payment Program. One is Broward County,\\n which imposes a special assessment on private hospitals. See\\n Broward County, Fla., Code §§ 16-123 to -137 (2025). Assessments\\n like Broward County’s qualify as “broad based” taxes because (to\\n simplify just a bit) they apply uniformly “to all providers in a class”\\n in “the area over which the unit of government has jurisdiction.”\\n 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(c)(2); see Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-127\\n (2025) (requiring “[t]he Assessment [to] be broad based”). And be-\\n cause the assessments are broad-based, they are presumptively per-\\n mitted under § 1396b(w). According to Broward County’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n ordinance, local hospitals “requested enactment” of the assess-\\n ment. Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-137 (2025).\\n The Directed Payment Program has been lucrative. In fiscal\\n year 2023–2024, Florida expected to raise $1.1 billion in nonfederal\\n Medicaid funding through Local Provider Participation Funds,\\n which it planned to use to secure another $2 billion from the fed-\\n eral government. See Wallace Decl. ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 10-1. According\\n to the state, this money is “integral to Florida’s healthcare system.”\\n Br. of Appellants at 6. Though the state doesn’t concede that pri-\\n vate redistribution arrangements exist in Florida, it acknowledges\\n that CMS might determine that they do—and fears that those bil-\\n lions in provider-tax-based funds could therefore be at risk. See\\n Wallace Decl. ¶ 28.\\n The state has cause for concern. A few months before it is-\\n sued the Bulletin, CMS sent a letter to the state expressing concern\\n that it might be harboring private hold-harmless arrangements and\\n promising a future review of the Direct Payment Program. See\\n Resp. in Opp’n Ex. A, Dkt. No. 22-2. Then, just days after releasing\\n the Bulletin, CMS followed through and commenced a Financial\\n Management Review of Local Provider Participation Funds. See\\n Compl. Ex. B, at 1, Dkt. No. 1-8. According to the review letter,\\n CMS asserted that there “appear to be pre-arranged agreements to\\n redirect Medicaid payments away from Medicaid providers serving\\n a high percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries to hospitals that do not\\n participate in Medicaid or that serve a low percentage of Medicaid\\n beneficiaries.” Id. at 2.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n Displeased with the Bulletin, Florida sued under the Admin-\\n istrative Procedure Act. It alleged that the Bulletin misinterpreted\\n the hold-harmless rule, that it was arbitrary and capricious, and that\\n CMS had improperly issued it without the requisite notice and\\n comment. The state then moved for a preliminary injunction, and\\n CMS moved to dismiss.\\n Acting on the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the\\n district court denied Florida’s preliminary-injunction motion and\\n granted CMS’s motion to dismiss. The court based both decisions\\n on its conclusion that the Bulletin wasn’t a “final agency action”\\n within the meaning of the APA’s judicial-review provision, 5 U.S.C.\\n § 704, and, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction.\\n This is Florida’s appeal. 1\\n\\n\\n 1 A few different standards of review apply here. We review de novo a district\\n\\n court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tufts v.\\n Hay, 977 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 2020). We review for abuse of discretion\\n the denial of a preliminary injunction, “but the underlying legal conclusions\\n are reviewed de novo.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic\\n Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1229 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted). And “[a]s\\n a general matter, when an agency interprets a statute, judicial review of the\\n agency’s interpretation is de novo.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle\\n Cnty., 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1511 (2025) (emphasis omitted). But arbitrary-and-ca-\\n pricious review is “deferential.” Id.\\n In his separate opinion, Judge Jordan contends that legal issues embed-\\n ded within a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction\\n shouldn’t necessarily be subject to de novo review. See Jordan Concurring Op.\\n at 1. His argument is characteristically thoughtful and rigorous, and not with-\\n out some force. But it runs headlong into a wall of our precedent expressly\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n II\\n We begin with jurisdiction. According to CMS, the Bulletin\\n wasn’t a final agency action and Florida’s suit isn’t ripe. We disa-\\n gree.\\n A\\n The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial re-\\n view of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In this Circuit, final-\\n ity is jurisdictional. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d\\n 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). Two conditions “generally must be\\n satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’ under the APA.” U.S. Army\\n Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016). The action\\n must (1) “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking\\n process” and (2) “be one from which rights or obligations have\\n been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”\\n Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citation modified).\\n Nobody here disputes prong one—that the Bulletin consummates\\n CMS’s decisionmaking. 2 The disagreement is instead about prong\\n\\n\\n holding that although we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunc-\\n tion for abuse of discretion, we review constituent legal determinations de\\n novo. E.g., Wood v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 142 F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2025);\\n Gonzalez v. Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020); Bloedorn v.\\n Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011); LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone,\\n LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n 2 Nor could they. CMS’s conclusions in the Bulletin are neither tentative nor\\n poised for revision; no further “administrative steps [will] necessarily [] be\\n taken” with respect to CMS’s interpretation of the hold-harmless rule. Norton,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n two—whether the Bulletin determines “rights or obligations” or\\n portends “legal consequences.” We’ll lay out the doctrine and then\\n apply it to the Bulletin.\\n 1\\n CMS insists that the Bulletin is merely a “restatement of an\\n already-existing policy or interpretation” of the sort that we (and\\n others) have said “does not, on its own, determine any rights or\\n obligations and imposes no legal consequences.” Clayton Cnty. v.\\n FAA, 887 F.3d 1262, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2018); accord, e.g., Indep.\\n Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Rob-\\n erts, J.) (observing that when an agency “merely restate[s] in an ab-\\n stract setting—for the umpteenth time—[its] longstanding inter-\\n pretation,” that restatement is not a final agency action); Gen. Mo-\\n tors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (similar).\\n The reason for that rule is clear enough: When an aggrieved party\\n seeks judicial review of a mere restatement, it is, in effect, suing\\n about the wrong thing—it should have challenged whatever action\\n the agency took in which it first adopted the complained-of view.\\n See Gen. Motors, 363 F.3d at 451.\\n But in arguing that the Bulletin is such a restatement, CMS\\n seems to conflate finality with an altogether different doctrine—\\n namely, about whether a particular agency action is “interpretive”\\n\\n 324 F.3d at 1238 (citing City of San Diego v. Whitman, 242 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th\\n Cir. 2001)). To the contrary, the Bulletin’s explication of CMS’s views is deci-\\n sive and unambiguous, as it purports to “reiterate[]” the agency’s “longstand-\\n ing position.” Bulletin, supra, at 1.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n or “legislative.” Under the APA, when an agency introduces a new\\n rule, it must generally comply with the three-step notice-and-com-\\n ment process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575\\n U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (describing the steps). But there are exceptions:\\n The notice-and-comment requirement doesn’t apply to “interpre-\\n tative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organ-\\n ization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). We’ll have\\n reason to return to the vexing interpretive-legislative distinction\\n later. For now, it’s enough to know “that the critical feature of in-\\n terpretive rules is that they are issued by an agency to advise the\\n public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which\\n it administers.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (citation modified). While leg-\\n islative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” interpretive rules\\n “only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer v.\\n Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).\\n As we understand it, CMS is making roughly the following\\n argument: (1) Unlike legislative rules, interpretive rules merely re-\\n iterate existing obligations, id. at 1337; (2) when an agency merely\\n reiterates existing obligations, its action doesn’t have direct and ap-\\n preciable legal consequences, see Clayton Cnty., 887 F.3d at 1266–67;\\n (3) when an agency action doesn’t have direct and appreciable legal\\n consequences, it doesn’t constitute final agency action, Bennett, 520\\n U.S. at 178; (4) courts lack jurisdiction to review non-final agency\\n actions, Norton, 324 F.3d at 1236. From those premises, CMS seems\\n to say, the conclusion follows that interpretive (i.e., non-legislative)\\n rules aren’t subject to judicial review. And because, CMS adds, the\\n Bulletin is an interpretive rule, it isn’t subject to judicial review.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n Clever, but not right. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,\\n the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that interpretive rules can\\n be subject to judicial review. See 575 U.S. 92, 105–06 (2015). Ac-\\n cording to the decision there, “interpretive rules do not have the\\n force and effect of law,” id. at 103—and yet, the Court said, should\\n an agency revise a preexisting interpretive rule by way of a second\\n interpretive rule, the second rule would be subject to APA review,\\n id. at 105–06. Perez therefore “affirms that interpretive rules can be\\n final” and importantly, “by implication, that the test for finality is\\n independent of the analysis for whether an agency action is a legis-\\n lative rule rather than an interpretive rule.” Cal. Cmtys. Against Tox-\\n ics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019).\\n CMS’s deduction falters in premise No. 2. While the distinc-\\n tion between legislative and interpretive rules turns on a formal\\n analysis of whether an agency really is simply interpreting the un-\\n derlying statute, the distinction between final and non-final action\\n is pragmatic. Contrast Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (explaining that “inter-\\n pretive rules” are “issued by an agency to advise the public of the\\n agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it adminis-\\n ters” and “do not have the force and effect of law” (citation modi-\\n fied)), with Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 599 (describing “the pragmatic ap-\\n proach we have long taken to finality” (citation modified)). Sure,\\n an interpretive rule might accurately reflect a statute’s best read-\\n ing—but it can also be final because it triggers new real-world\\n rights or obligations.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n So, with an interpretive rule—as with any challenged agency\\n action—we should inquire whether, as a practical matter, and\\n given the particular statutory context, the rule has “direct and ap-\\n preciable legal consequences.” Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598 (quoting\\n Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178). Or, as our D.C. Circuit colleagues have\\n put it, we should “pragmatically focus on the concrete conse-\\n quences the action has or does not have as a result of the specific\\n statutes and regulations that govern it.” POET Biorefining, LLC v.\\n EPA, 970 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation modified); cf. Ap-\\n palachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ob-\\n serving that “an agency’s [non-legislative-rule] pronouncements\\n can, as a practical matter, have a binding effect”).\\n 2\\n The Bulletin has practical, concrete legal consequences. To\\n be sure, the Bulletin purports to “reiterate[]” CMS’s preexisting po-\\n sition, as stated in the 2008 rule’s preamble. Bulletin, supra, at 2–4.\\n But it portends investigation and enforcement. It promises (omi-\\n nously) that CMS will “inquire about potential redistribution ar-\\n rangements and may conduct detailed financial management re-\\n views of health care-related tax programs that appear to include\\n redistribution arrangements.” Id. at 5. It insists that states must\\n “make clear to their providers” that private redistribution arrange-\\n ments are “not permissible.” Id. It announces that “CMS expects\\n states to make available” “detailed information . . . regarding their\\n health care-related taxes”—apparently including information\\n about private-only arrangements. Id. It threatens clawing back\\n Medicaid funding through “deferral or disallowance of federal\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n financial participation.” Id. And it warns that, should CMS “dis-\\n cover[] the existence of impermissible financing practices,” it “will\\n take enforcement action as necessary.” Id. The 2008 rule’s pream-\\n ble included none of these portents.\\n The Bulletin’s demands that states make particular infor-\\n mation available and notify healthcare providers of updated expec-\\n tations have the ring of “appreciable legal consequences.” Hawkes,\\n 578 U.S. at 598. Perhaps even more so, the Bulletin’s discussion of\\n deferral or disallowance—which could put billions in Medicaid\\n funding at risk—signals final agency action because it could\\n “force[]” Florida “to choose between costly compliance and the risk\\n of prosecution at an uncertain point in the future.” Racing Enthu-\\n siasts & Suppliers Coal. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (ci-\\n tation modified).\\n Three subsequent developments bolster our conclusion that\\n the Bulletin constitutes final agency action. First, shortly after cir-\\n culating the Bulletin, CMS initiated its Financial Management Re-\\n view of Florida’s Local Provider Participation Funds—and sug-\\n gested that the state was harboring private hold-harmless arrange-\\n ments. Second, more than a year after issuing the Bulletin, CMS\\n circulated a new document announcing its intention to exercise its\\n enforcement discretion not to take immediate action against preex-\\n isting private redistribution arrangements of the sort described in\\n the Bulletin. See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs. for Medicare\\n & Medicaid Servs., Exercise of Enforcement Discretion (Apr. 22,\\n 2024), https://perma.cc/6ZE5-Y6DY. And third, CMS and Florida\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n recently executed a new agreement—as a precondition of federal\\n approval of one of the state’s Medicaid Managed Care Programs—\\n that imposes a new information-collection requirement: Florida\\n must provide to CMS a copy of any agreements “regarding any ar-\\n rangement among [healthcare] providers . . . relating to each local-\\n ity tax or payments received that are funded by the locality tax.”\\n Special Terms and Conditions, Florida Managed Medical Assis-\\n tance Program 55 (Jan. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/XZ5Z-JKSK.\\n The point isn’t that any of these documents is necessarily final\\n agency action on its own; rather, the point is that together they\\n serve to confirm that the Bulletin itself is driving fresh, practical\\n legal consequences. See POET, 970 F.3d at 405 (holding that EPA’s\\n application of a guidance document in a subsequent letter “rein-\\n forces the Guidance’s finality”).\\n Contrast the Bulletin with agency actions that courts have\\n deemed mere restatements of policy. In Clayton County, we held\\n that a letter from the FAA wasn’t a final agency action. 887 F.3d at\\n 1269. In so holding, we emphasized several considerations: The\\n letter took the same position that the FAA had expressed in a policy\\n statement two years earlier; the challenger knew about the earlier\\n policy statement; and by eliciting the letter the challenger had\\n transparently attempted to evade the applicable statute of limita-\\n tions. See id. at 1266–70. Similarly, in Independent Equipment Dealers,\\n the D.C. Circuit held that an EPA letter wasn’t final agency action.\\n 372 F.3d at 428. The EPA’s letter likewise restated a “longstanding\\n interpretation,” had no “concrete impact,” and “was purely infor-\\n mational in nature.” Id. at 427. To be sure, like the FAA and EPA\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n letters, the Bulletin appears to restate a preexisting interpretation—\\n but quite unlike those letters, the Bulletin is not “purely informa-\\n tional in nature.” Id. Rather, as already explained, it demands that\\n regulated parties take action by collecting data, examining program\\n participants, and enforcing CMS’s view of the hold-harmless rule—\\n and not so subtly hints at the dire consequences of non-compliance.\\n As we have said many times, for final-agency-action pur-\\n poses, finality is understood pragmatically, and no single feature of\\n the Bulletin is necessarily decisive. But taken together, the consid-\\n erations we’ve emphasized make clear that in the Bulletin, CMS\\n “has given the States their ‘marching orders’ and [CMS] expects\\n the[m] to fall in line.” Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023. Accord-\\n ingly, we hold that the Bulletin is final agency action subject to ju-\\n dicial review. 3\\n B\\n Separately, but relatedly, CMS contends that Florida’s chal-\\n lenge to the Bulletin isn’t ripe. For many of the same reasons that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 We reject CMS’s suggestion that the Bulletin isn’t a final agency action be-\\n\\n cause Florida could raise its arguments in defense to an enforcement action.\\n The Supreme Court long ago held that an agency order that threatened pen-\\n alties for noncompliance and “specif[ied] which commodities the [agency] be-\\n lieved were exempt by statute from regulation, and which it believed were\\n not,” was reviewable, even though the order “would have effect only if and\\n when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier.” Hawkes,\\n 578 U.S. at 599–600 (citation modified) (describing Frozen Food Express v. United\\n States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)). So too here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n we’ve found the Bulletin to be final agency action, we conclude\\n that it is ripe for review.\\n Ripeness turns on (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial de-\\n cision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding our con-\\n sideration. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967).\\n In administrative law, ripeness usually—if perhaps not always—\\n “overlaps with” finality. Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 307\\n F.3d 1300, 1311 n.10 (11th Cir. 2002); see Kristin E. Hickman &\\n Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 17.12 (7th ed. 2018\\n & Supp. 2025) (observing that courts often consider ripeness to be\\n “interchangeable with . . . finality,” but that it also can “sometimes\\n serve[] independent purposes”). Our analysis focuses in particular\\n on the hardship to the plaintiffs of delaying review, whether judi-\\n cial intervention would “inappropriately interfere” with the admin-\\n istrative process, and whether the case would benefit from further\\n factual development. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.\\n 726, 733 (1998).\\n Whatever the theoretical distinctions might be, the Bulletin\\n is ripe for essentially the same reasons it is final. Delaying review\\n will cause Florida hardship because the Bulletin “inflicts significant\\n practical harm,” id. at 733, in that the state now faces a new de-\\n mand to root out private hold-harmless arrangements. Review\\n won’t inappropriately interfere with CMS’s decisionmaking pro-\\n cess because, per the Bulletin’s own terms, it represents the\\n agency’s refined, non-tentative views. Cf. id. at 735 (holding that a\\n forest management plan was not ripe for review in part because\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n “further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is imple-\\n mented”). And no further factual development is necessary. This\\n is principally a dispute over the meaning of a statute, which won’t\\n require us to “entangl[e]” ourselves “in abstract disagreements\\n over administrative policies.” Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 148.\\n * * *\\n The Bulletin is final, and Florida’s challenge is ripe. We\\n therefore have jurisdiction. On, then, to the merits of the state’s\\n preliminary-injunction request. 4\\n III\\n To obtain the preliminary injunction it seeks, Florida must\\n show that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the mer-\\n its; (2) it will suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction is\\n granted; (3) the harm from the threatened injury outweighs the\\n harm the injunction would cause the opposing party; and (4) the\\n injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Dream Defs.\\n\\n\\n 4 A brief word about our decision to reach the merits: The district court never\\n\\n assessed the merits because it dismissed Florida’s suit and denied its prelimi-\\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds. Although we usually “go\\n no further into the merits than is necessary to decide the interlocutory appeal,”\\n that “is a rule of orderly judicial administration only”—we may go further if\\n it’s appropriate. Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985).\\n Deciding the merits of Florida’s preliminary-injunction request is appropriate\\n because “both sides’ arguments go to the merits, no facts are at issue and the\\n questions raised are purely legal ones.” Id. at 1287. Were we to remand with-\\n out addressing the request, it “would unnecessarily delay the disposition of\\n th[e] case.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n v. Governor of the State of Fla., 57 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\\n tation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed any further than the\\n preliminary-injunction test’s first prong because we conclude that\\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Johnson & Johnson Vi-\\n sion Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.\\n 2002).\\n Florida argues that CMS’s Bulletin is unlawful for three rea-\\n sons: (1) that it exceeds CMS’s statutory authority; (2) that it’s arbi-\\n trary and capricious; and (3) that CMS issued it without proper pro-\\n cess. For the following reasons, we reject all three contentions.5\\n A\\n 1\\n In assessing CMS’s statutory authority to issue the Bulletin,\\n “[w]e start, as always, with the text.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369,\\n 379 (2025). Here, that is no mean feat. The Social Security Act, of\\n which the hold-harmless rule is part, “is among the most intricate\\n ever drafted by Congress.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,\\n 43 (1981). As relevant here, the Act provides that CMS should de-\\n duct from the federal government’s Medicaid contribution an\\n amount corresponding to state revenue collected while a hold-\\n\\n\\n 5 Of course, at this preliminary stage, we do not conclusively decide the merits\\n\\n of Florida’s challenges; rather, we hold only that Florida is unlikely to succeed\\n on the merits and, therefore, isn’t entitled to a preliminary injunction. See\\n Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[I]t is generally inappro-\\n priate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final\\n judgment on the merits.”).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n harmless provision is in effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\\n Then comes the subsection at issue here—which, fair warning, is\\n both bulky and a little clunky:\\n For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(iii), there is in effect\\n a hold harmless provision with respect to a broad-\\n based health care related tax imposed with respect to\\n a class of items or services if the Secretary determines\\n that any of the following applies:\\n\\n (A) The State or other unit of government imposing\\n the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for a payment\\n (other than under this subchapter) to taxpayers and\\n the amount of such payment is positively correlated\\n either to the amount of such tax or to the difference\\n between the amount of the tax and the amount of\\n payment under the State plan.\\n\\n (B) All or any portion of the payment made under this\\n subchapter to the taxpayer varies based only upon the\\n amount of the total tax paid.\\n\\n (C)(i) The State or other unit of government impos-\\n ing the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for any\\n payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to hold\\n taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the\\n tax.\\n\\n (ii) For purposes of clause (i), a determination of the\\n existence of an indirect guarantee shall be made un-\\n der paragraph (3)(i) of section 433.68(f ) of title 42,\\n Code of Federal Regulations . . . .\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 25 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n Id. § 1396b(w)(4) (emphasis added).\\n Happily, just one sentence really matters. Nobody disputes\\n that county-level assessments under Florida’s Directed Payment\\n Program constitute “broad-based health care related tax[es]”\\n within the meaning of the prefatory clause. And nobody contends\\n that the Bulletin can be justified under subparagraphs (A) or (B), or\\n that it addresses indirect guarantees, which are the subject of clause\\n (C)(ii). Instead, everything pretty much rides on clause (C)(i)—\\n which, to repeat, states that a hold-harmless provision exists when\\n “[t]he State or other unit of government imposing the tax provides\\n (directly or indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guar-\\n antees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of\\n the tax.” CMS insists that (C)(i) is implicated when private “taxpay-\\n ing providers” choose to “redistribut[e] Medicaid payments after\\n receipt to ensure that all taxpaying providers receive all or a portion\\n of their tax costs back.” Bulletin, supra, at 2. The question before\\n us is whether CMS’s interpretation fits the statutory language.\\n We can begin to clarify matters by diagramming clause\\n (C)(i)’s single sentence, matching the two key verbs with their ac-\\n companying nouns. First up, “provides”: It is the “State or other\\n unit of government” that does the “provid[ing].” This much seems\\n obvious and uncontroversial. Next, “guarantees”: It is the “pay-\\n ment, offset, or waiver” that does the “guarantee[ing].” This too\\n seems obvious—but it’s hotly contested. Florida insists that there’s\\n a “grammatical link” “between the government, as the actor provid-\\n ing for something, and a guarantee, as the thing provided for.” Br.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 26 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n of Appellants at 49 (quoting Texas v. Brooks-LaSure, 680 F. Supp. 3d\\n 791, 808 (E.D. Tex. 2023)). Therefore, Florida says, a hold-harmless\\n provision under (C)(i) exists only when the state government “in-\\n tentionally, deliberately, and with certainty causes the taxpayer’s\\n liability to be offset.” Id. We disagree. However intuitive, Flor-\\n ida’s reading has no footing in the ordinary rules of syntax. Con-\\n trary to Florida’s contention, the phrase “that guarantees to hold\\n taxpayers harmless” is a restrictive relative clause that modifies the\\n phrase “payment, offset, or waiver.” So grammatically, (C)(i)\\n works in two steps: (1) The state or local government provides for\\n a payment offset or waiver; and (2) the payment, offset, or waiver\\n in turn “guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless” for at least part of\\n the government-imposed healthcare tax.\\n With this clarification in hand, it seems clear to us that CMS\\n has the better argument. CMS’s position, stretching all the way\\n back to 2008 and reiterated in the Bulletin, is that “[a] direct guar-\\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\\n 9,686; accord Bulletin, supra, at 4. In the ways that matter, CMS’s\\n interpretation tracks (C)(i)’s text. The statute requires that the gov-\\n ernment “provide[] . . . for any payment, offset, or waiver”; so too,\\n CMS anchors its interpretation to a state “ma[king] available” a\\n “payment.” And, crucially, the statute then asks whether the “pay-\\n ment” “guarantee[s] to hold taxpayers harmless”; so too, CMS asks\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 27 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n whether “the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\\n harmless.”\\n It’s true, as Florida says, that “result in” doesn’t mean exactly\\n the same thing as “guarantee.” According to the state, to “guaran-\\n tee” is to “‘make oneself answerable for (something) on behalf of\\n someone else,’ ‘undertake to ensure for another,’ ‘serve as a war-\\n rant or guaranty for,’ ‘engage to . . . indemnify . . . loss,’ or ‘prom-\\n ise.’” Br. of Appellants at 48–49 (omissions in original) (quoting\\n Guarantee, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)). Per-\\n haps CMS’s phrase “[r]esult in” is more an approximation of “guar-\\n antee” than a jot-for-jot synonym, but it captures the same kind of\\n conduct: If a follow-on consequence of a state disbursing Medicaid\\n payments is that providers use those payments to offset taxes, then\\n the Medicaid funds are “ensur[ing]” or “indemnify[ing]” providers.\\n Put another way, the Medicaid payments “result in” a tax offset.\\n Florida seems to suggest that by using the word “guaran-\\n tee,” (C)(i) imports something like an intent requirement, which a\\n payment—an inanimate object—can’t meet. We disagree, for two\\n reasons. First, lifeless items can most certainly “guarantee” things.\\n Money deposited as bail guarantees the accused’s presence at\\n trial—no matter who ponied up the cash or what that person was\\n thinking. A title guarantees ownership of a car—no matter\\n whether the previous owner had regrets about selling. Gravity\\n guarantees that objects will fall—no matter who was thinking\\n about that. So too, a “payment, offset, or waiver” can “guarantee”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 28 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n that a provider will be made whole after it is taxed regardless of\\n whether the state intends to promise anything.\\n Second, Florida’s intent-based interpretation would make\\n (C)(i) the odd one out in an otherwise effects-based list. As the state\\n recognizes, (A), (B), and (C)(ii) “all define effects-based tests.” Re-\\n ply Br. at 21. But under Florida’s reading, (C)(i) alone would turn\\n on intent. See, e.g., Br. of Appellants at 2 (arguing that (C)(i) applies\\n “only if the taxing government requires or promises that the taxpayer\\n will be reimbursed for the tax”). Not dispositive, but weird. Under\\n CMS’s reading, by contrast, (C)(i) dovetails with (A), (B), and\\n (C)(ii).\\n * * *\\n CMS’s central insight—with which we agree—is that clause\\n (C)(i) simply doesn’t say that the state must guarantee anything.\\n Rather, the state provides a payment, which itself, in turn, guaran-\\n tees that a taxpayer will be held harmless. To the same effect, un-\\n der the Bulletin, when healthcare providers redistribute state Med-\\n icaid payments to offset taxes, those payments result in the taxpay-\\n ers being held harmless. If anything, CMS extends to states a dis-\\n cretionary boon the statute itself doesn’t require. The Bulletin cab-\\n ins its interpretation to instances in which the state or other unit of\\n government has a “reasonable expectation” that its payment will\\n be misused. The statute includes no such limitation.\\n In sum, we aren’t persuaded by Florida’s first-order textual\\n arguments.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 29 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n 2\\n The state challenges the Bulletin on two additional textual\\n bases. We find them no more persuasive.\\n First, Florida contends that CMS’s interpretation in the Bul-\\n letin renders subparagraphs (A) and (B) and clause (C)(ii) superflu-\\n ous. On CMS’s reading, the state says, every circumstance covered\\n by (A), (B), and (C)(ii) would also satisfy (C)(i). For instance, imag-\\n ine that a county government levies a 10% tax on hospital revenue.\\n The county also operates a grant program that reimburses resi-\\n dents up to 10% of the cost of their hospital stays. As a result, al-\\n most all the tax gets funneled back to the hospitals. This arrange-\\n ment would qualify as an “indirect” guarantee under (C)(ii). 6 Un-\\n der CMS’s reading of (C)(i), it would also constitute a “direct” guar-\\n antee, because the county would be providing for a payment—the\\n reimbursement to residents—that guarantees to hold the hospitals\\n\\n 6 Explaining exactly why this scheme would constitute an indirect guarantee\\n\\n requires a detour into the regulatory weeds. According to (C)(ii), a deci-\\n sionmaker seeking to determine whether a funding arrangement amounts to\\n an indirect guarantee should look to 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i). That regula-\\n tion, in turn, outlines a two-part test. First, the decisionmaker should ask\\n whether “the health care-related tax or taxes on each health care class are ap-\\n plied at a rate that produces revenues less than or equal to 6 percent of the\\n revenues received by the taxpayer.” 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(A). If so, there\\n is no indirect guarantee. Id. If, however, the tax generates revenue above the\\n 6 percent threshold, the decisionmaker should proceed to ask whether “75\\n percent or more of the taxpayers in the class receive 75 percent or more of\\n their total tax costs back in enhanced Medicaid payments or other State pay-\\n ments.” Id. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(B). If the answer is yes, then an impermissible\\n indirect guarantee exists.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 30 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n harmless for a portion of the tax. Under Florida’s interpretation of\\n (C)(i), by contrast, this program wouldn’t be a direct guarantee, be-\\n cause the state isn’t itself doing the guaranteeing—whether the\\n money flows to the hospitals depends on the actions of third-party\\n patients.\\n Florida may well be right that CMS’s interpretation gener-\\n ates some (even substantial) overlap. But—and it’s an important\\n but—§ 1396b(w)(4) isn’t quite like other statutes with respect to\\n which courts have relied on the presumption against superfluity.\\n That canon has “special force” when “a statutory construction []\\n renders an entire subparagraph meaningless.” Pulsifer v. United\\n States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024). That issue doesn’t exist here. CMS\\n isn’t interpreting (C)(i) in a way that swallows up the rest of the\\n statutory provision. By the statute’s own terms, each subpara-\\n graph (and clause) embodies a separate means of getting at the\\n same thing: whether “there is in effect a hold harmless provision\\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396b(w)(4). Because (A), (B), (C)(i), and (C)(ii) are all designed\\n to identify hold-harmless arrangements—which come in different\\n shapes and sizes—the overlap among them is unsurprising.7 At the\\n\\n 7 It’s worth noting that even under Florida’s reading of (C)(i), the clause’s test\\n\\n overlaps substantially with other provisions of § 1396b(w)(4). Consider a\\n scheme that functions like the private transfers at issue here but that the state\\n operates directly. Under such a program, the state would impose a broad-\\n based provider tax and then remit extra payments to hospitals that pay the tax\\n but receive little or no Medicaid funding. Subparagraph (A) would cover this\\n arrangement, because the state—which imposed the tax—would “provide[]\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 31 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n same time, each subparagraph and clause is different in the sense\\n that each identifies a different means—or, in the case of (C)(ii), de-\\n fines a means—by which a hold-harmless arrangement might be\\n accomplished.\\n Consider, in particular, the methods for sussing out direct\\n and indirect guarantees. As we’ve said, to ascertain whether there\\n is a direct guarantee, we must determine (1) whether the state pro-\\n vides a payment and (2) whether that payment guarantees that tax-\\n payers are held harmless. By contrast, to detect an indirect guaran-\\n tee, we ignore the mechanics of any funding arrangement and in-\\n stead ask simply (1) whether provider taxes exceed a certain thresh-\\n old and (2) whether a certain percentage of taxpayers recover a cer-\\n tain percentage of the tax. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(ii); 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.68(f)(3)(i). The direct and indirect tests may often arrive at\\n the same place, but they travel different routes. So, in sum, while\\n § 1396b(w)(4) admits some superfluity of coverage, it doesn’t entail\\n superfluity of method.\\n Second, and separately, Florida insists that, for (C)(i) to ap-\\n ply, the “‘unit of government imposing the tax’ [must] be the same\\n\\n\\n . . . for a payment . . . to taxpayers and the amount of such payment [would\\n be] positively correlated . . . to the difference between the amount of the tax\\n and the amount of payment under the State [Medicaid] plan.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(A). The scheme would also satisfy (C)(i) under either Florida or\\n CMS’s interpretation, because the state would be “provid[ing] . . . directly . . .\\n for [a] payment . . . that guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless”—regardless\\n of whether it’s the state or the payment doing the guaranteeing. Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 32 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n ‘unit of government’ that ‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Reply\\n Br. at 24; see Br. of Appellants at 52–53 & n.11. We disagree. As an\\n initial matter, the state is again mixing up which verbs go with\\n which nouns. It’s the payment—not the unit of government—that\\n “‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Moreover, and in any event,\\n Florida’s reading proves too much. Were it correct, a state could\\n end-run the entirety of § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) simply by assigning—as\\n Florida has—the taxing job to local governments, while retaining\\n the payment job for itself.\\n 3\\n Florida finally challenges CMS’s interpretation on two extra-\\n textual bases, neither of which convinces us.\\n First, the state contends that it would be absurd for the le-\\n gality of its tax scheme to depend on private companies’ behavior.\\n We don’t think so. For one thing, federal law already requires Flor-\\n ida to collect information on Medicaid funding recipients, so the\\n state shouldn’t be operating in the dark. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.74(a) (“[E]ach State must submit to CMS quarterly summary\\n information on the source and use of all . . . health care-related\\n taxes collected.”); id. (“Each State must also provide any additional\\n information requested by the Secretary related to . . . any taxes im-\\n posed on, health care providers.”). For another, the way healthcare\\n providers respond to and implement provider taxes isn’t really “in-\\n dependent” behavior. Hospitals and clinics have close, ongoing\\n contractual relationships with Florida’s state healthcare agency.\\n And Florida seems to have freely chosen to adopt its particular\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 33 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n (provider-solicited) healthcare-related tax scheme so as to boost the\\n federal government’s contribution to state Medicaid coffers. “Med-\\n icaid offers States a bargain.” Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl.,\\n 145 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2025). Part of the bargain is following the\\n hold-harmless rule.\\n Second, Florida cites the presumption that, under the Spend-\\n ing Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, “Congress must speak ‘un-\\n ambiguously’ and ‘with a clear voice’ when it imposes conditions\\n on federal funds.” West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of the\\n Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124, 1141 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pennhurst\\n State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). True, inter-\\n preting § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t without its challenges. Even so, we are\\n convinced that CMS’s interpretation in the Bulletin is demonstra-\\n bly superior to Florida’s. Because § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t ambiguous,\\n the limitations imposed by the Spending Clause are satisfied.\\n * * *\\n Because the Bulletin is consistent with the statutory text,\\n Florida is not substantially likely to succeed in its frontal challenge\\n to CMS’s interpretation.\\n B\\n Next up, Florida’s contention that CMS acted arbitrarily and\\n capriciously in adopting the Bulletin. Arbitrary-and-capricious re-\\n view is deferential—an agency’s decisions need only “be reasona-\\n ble and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592\\n U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Nonetheless, “[a]n agency may not . . . depart\\n from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 34 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n on the books.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515\\n (2009). “[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned expla-\\n nation for its action [] ordinarily demand[s] that it display aware-\\n ness that it is changing position.” Id. And “[w]hen an agency\\n changes course, . . . it must be cognizant that longstanding policies\\n may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken\\n into account.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,\\n 591 U.S. 1, 31 (2020) (citation modified). Florida asserts that when\\n CMS issued the Bulletin, it changed its position without acknowl-\\n edging as much and, in the process, ignored important reliance in-\\n terests.\\n CMS didn’t change its position in the way that matters—that\\n is, regarding the meaning of (C)(i). Rather, the Bulletin simply ap-\\n plies, using more specific language, an interpretation of (C)(i) that\\n the agency embraced more than a decade and a half ago. In the\\n 2008 Final Rule’s preamble, CMS announced that “[a] direct guar-\\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\\n 9,686; accord id. at 9,694. Then, in the 2019 proposal, CMS—\\n applying the same interpretation—insisted that “[t]he fact that a\\n private entity makes the redistribution payment does not change\\n the essential nature of the payment.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735. Alt-\\n hough CMS withdrew the 2019 proposed rule, both the proposed\\n rule’s preamble and the rescission notice made clear that CMS’s\\n positions didn’t depend on whether the proposed regulations went\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 35 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n into effect. See id. at 63,735 (explaining that the proposed rule did\\n “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely codified\\n currently prohibited practices”); 86 Fed. Reg. at 5,105 (“[T]he with-\\n drawal of this proposed rule does not affect existing federal legal\\n requirements or policy that were merely proposed to be codified\\n in regulation.”). The Bulletin undoubtedly signaled a shift in en-\\n forcement priorities. But “a belief about how an agency is likely to\\n exercise its enforcement discretion is not a serious reliance inter-\\n est.” FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 145 S. Ct. 898, 927\\n (2025)\\n Florida makes much of the fact that CMS withdrew the 2019\\n proposed rule. On Florida’s telling, “the 2019 proposal’s existence\\n proves that the policy it articulated—and that the Bulletin later\\n adopted—was new because, if the policy already existed, the 2019\\n proposal (and the later Bulletin) would have been unnecessary.”\\n Reply Br. at 9. It’s true that a withdrawn proposal probably isn’t\\n evidence of CMS’s official views. Cf. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,\\n 845 (1986) (“It goes without saying that a proposed regulation does\\n not represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute.”).\\n But the converse—that the 2019 interpretation can’t be CMS’s\\n view—doesn’t follow. CMS was absolutely clear in 2019 that, as\\n the agency saw it, the hold-harmless arrangements covered by the\\n proposal were already forbidden and that the proposal was exeget-\\n ical, not inventive. See, e.g., 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735 (describing the\\n proposal as “add[ing] clarifying language to the hold harmless defi-\\n nition” (emphasis added)). Nobody doubts that the 2008 preamble\\n embodied CMS’s official position, and in that document CMS\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 36 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n advanced its reasonable-expectation interpretation of (C)(i). See 73\\n Fed. Reg. at 9,686; id. at 9,694. CMS applied that interpretation in\\n the Bulletin. And never—not in 2008, 2019, 2021, or 2023—did\\n CMS purport to exempt private-only arrangements from the hold-\\n harmless rule.\\n As evidence that CMS harbored views inconsistent with the\\n Bulletin, Florida cites two HHS Office of Inspector General state-\\n ments, a decision of the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, and a\\n brief email exchange about a telephone call that included the Di-\\n rector of CMS’s Financial Management Group. But none of these\\n is a relevant source for identifying CMS’s official views.\\n An agency’s “interpretation must at the least emanate from\\n those actors, using those vehicles, understood to make authorita-\\n tive policy in the relevant context.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558,\\n 577 (2019). Both the Inspector General and the Appeals Board op-\\n erate at some remove from the rest of HHS, and so we can’t as-\\n sume that their views are CMS’s views. Cf. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry\\n of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The Office of\\n Inspector General of HHS, along with inspector generalships for\\n other federal administrative agencies and departments, . . . . are de-\\n signed to be independent and objective units separate from their\\n respective departments and agencies.” (citation modified)); Ariz.\\n Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1248\\n n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The [Appeals Board] is a separate adjudicatory\\n department within HHS that provides independent review of dis-\\n puted decisions for many HHS programs.”). And the curt email\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 37 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n referencing a phone call from the Financial Management Group\\n Director is far too little to establish CMS’s authoritative views.\\n Like our sister circuit, “[w]e would marvel if a few casual commu-\\n nications in the guise of informal calls and a staff email constituted\\n an agency’s formal position.” UnitedHealthcare of N.Y., Inc. v. Lace-\\n well, 967 F.3d 82, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2020); cf. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 577 (in-\\n dicating that “an ‘informal memorandum’ recounting a telephone\\n conversation between employees” is not an “authoritative pro-\\n nouncement” (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bowen, 835\\n F.2d 360, 365–366 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).\\n In the end, the documents that do express CMS’s official po-\\n sitions—the 2008 rule, the 2021 rescission, and the Bulletin—are all\\n consistent. So, CMS didn’t sub silentio change its mind. Florida’s\\n arbitrary-and-capricious argument is unlikely to succeed.\\n C\\n Last of all we briefly return, as promised, see supra at 15, to\\n the distinction between “legislative” and “interpretive” rules. Im-\\n portantly here, legislative rules require the promulgating agency to\\n abide by notice-and-comment procedures, while interpretive rules\\n don’t. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). CMS released the Bulletin without no-\\n tice and an opportunity for comment. Accordingly, if the Bulletin\\n was a legislative rule, then it is procedurally invalid. But it wasn’t,\\n and so it isn’t.\\n Legislative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” while\\n interpretive rules “do[] not modify or add to a legal norm based on\\n the agency’s own authority.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337. To\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 38 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n distinguish a legislative from an interpretive rule, we consider two\\n things. First, we look to “the agency’s characterization of the\\n rule”—though this is “not dispositive.” Id. (citation modified). And\\n second, we consider that an “interpretative” rule should “simply\\n state[] what the administrative agency thinks the statute means,\\n and only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Id. (citation\\n modified).\\n The Bulletin is an interpretive rule. For one thing, CMS\\n characterizes the Bulletin as mere interpretation, not an announce-\\n ment of new law. See Bulletin at 1 (saying that “this informational\\n bulletin reiterates our longstanding position”). And for another,\\n because the Bulletin properly and without novelty interprets\\n § 1396b(w)(4)—at least with respect to the topics disputed in this\\n litigation—the Bulletin “simply states what the administrative\\n agency thinks the statute means,” and in fact does “only remind[]\\n affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337.\\n Of course, the mere fact that the Bulletin’s challenged as-\\n pects are consistent with the statutory text isn’t alone enough to\\n make the Bulletin a valid interpretive rule. Although statutes have\\n a “single, best meaning,” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.\\n 369, 400 (2024), at times “the best reading of a statute is that it del-\\n egates discretionary authority to an agency.” Id. at 395. So here,\\n it’s important that—with respect to the narrow question whether\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) can cover private hold-harmless arrange-\\n ments—the statute doesn’t confer on CMS any discretion, CMS\\n doesn’t purport to be exercising any such discretion, and the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 39 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 39\\n\\n Bulletin simply and correctly transcribes a longstanding and accu-\\n rate interpretation.\\n Because the Bulletin does “not have the force and effect of\\n law,” and simply “advise[s] the public of the agency’s construction\\n of the statutes and rules which it administers,” it’s an interpretive\\n rule. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (citation\\n modified). Florida’s argument that CMS evaded the notice-and-\\n comment requirement is therefore unlikely to succeed.\\n * * *\\n We are unpersuaded by Florida’s objections to the Bulletin.\\n The state has therefore failed to make the requisite showing on the\\n preliminary-injunction test’s threshold likelihood-of-success prong.\\n So while the district court was wrong to deny Florida’s prelimi-\\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds, its bottom line\\n was correct: No preliminary injunction should issue.\\n IV\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Bulletin is final\\n agency action, that Florida’s challenge to it is ripe, and that Florida\\n is unlikely to succeed on the merits. We therefore REVERSE the\\n district court’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter\\n jurisdiction, but AFFIRM the denial of Florida’s motion for a pre-\\n liminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this decision.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 40 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11215018/\", \"author_raw\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:\\n Although it is a close question, I agree with the majority that\\n under a pragmatic approach CMS’ Informational Bulletin consti-\\n tutes final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act,\\n 5 U.S.C. § 704. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149\\n (1967) (“The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative\\n actions have interpreted the ‘finality’ element in a pragmatic way.”).\\n I also agree that Florida’s challenge to the Bulletin is ripe. I join\\n Part I of the majority opinion except as to footnote 1, as well as\\n Parts II, III, and IV, and add the following thoughts.\\n *****\\n I do not believe we can say categorically, as the majority does\\n in footnote 1, that in a preliminary injunction appeal we always con-\\n duct plenary review of legal issues. I recognize that there are Su-\\n preme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases that stand for such a prop-\\n osition, and which conduct de novo review of legal issues when\\n reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief. See,\\n e.g., Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897); Wood v. Fla.\\n Dep’t of Educ., 142 F.4th 1286, 1289 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2025). But, as I\\n have tried to explain elsewhere, see Wood, 142 F.4th at 1294–96 ( Jor-\\n dan, J., dissenting), there are many cases to the contrary, and the\\n general (and better) rule is that on review of a preliminary injunc-\\n tion an appellate court reviews the substantial likelihood of success\\n prong for abuse of discretion even if it turns on a legal issue. See,\\n e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (concluding that the\\n district court’s determination as to likelihood of success on a First\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 41 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 JORDAN, J., Concurring 24-10875\\n\\n Amendment challenge to a federal statute “was not an abuse of\\n discretion”); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 934 (1975) (finding\\n no abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of a preliminary\\n injunction, and explaining that “[t]his is the extent of our appellate\\n inquiry, and we therefore ‘intimate no view as to the ultimate mer-\\n its of respondents’ contentions’”) (citation omitted).\\n The majority cites Eleventh Circuit cases spanning from\\n 2012 to 2025 to support its view that plenary review applies. But a\\n number of our earlier preliminary injunction cases conduct abuse\\n of discretion review as to likelihood of success. And where there\\n is an intra-circuit conflict, the earlier cases control. See Harris v. Lin-\\n coln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 42 F.4th 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022).\\n For example, in Butler v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 67 F.2d 632, 635\\n (5th Cir. 1933), we noted “the rule that on appeals from interlocu-\\n tory injunctions the merits will not ordinarily be considered, but\\n only whether there has been an abuse of discretion in preserving\\n the status pending hearing on the merits.” And Butler is not an out-\\n lier—there are other earlier cases holding that a district court’s rul-\\n ing on the substantial likelihood of success prong triggers deferen-\\n tial abuse of discretion review. See Wooten v. Ohler, 303 F.2d 759, 762\\n (5th Cir. 1962) (“[W]e do not review the intrinsic merits of the case\\n as such. Rather, our inquiry is whether there has been an abuse of\\n discretion. Our review of the probable merits does not go to the\\n question of whether we would ultimately hold that the trial [j]udge\\n was right or wrong, but only to the ascertainment of whether his\\n action was within his broad range of discretion.”); Lea v. Vasco\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 42 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 JORDAN, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n Prods., Inc., 81 F.2d 1011, 1011–12 (5th Cir. 1936) (“We cannot agree\\n with appellants that the merits are before us for decision. All that\\n we have here under case as made on the temporary application is\\n whether the [district] court abused its discretion in restraining the\\n defendants as it did.”).\\n As the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 664–\\n 65, makes clear, abuse of discretion review is appropriate even\\n where substantial likelihood of success turns on a purely legal is-\\n sue. A number of our more recent preliminary injunction cases\\n conduct this same deferential review with respect to issues of law.\\n See, e.g., Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns Cnty., 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.\\n 1993) (addressing substantial likelihood of success on a First\\n Amendment claim: “Whether the district court’s determination of\\n this point is right or wrong, the record before us indicates no abuse\\n of discretion.”). Given all of this caselaw, we cannot (and should\\n not) broadly declare that legal issues going to likelihood of success\\n always trigger plenary review in preliminary injunction appeals.\\n To me, deferential review of the district court’s preliminary\\n assessment of the merits usually makes sense. When a district\\n court, particularly on a close legal issue of first impression, ana-\\n lyzes whether the plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of\\n success on the merits, it is not definitely deciding who wins and\\n who loses; it is instead weighing the parties’ arguments and making\\n a probabilistic determination about which side is likely to prevail.\\n So, “[i]f the underlying constitutional [or legal] question is\\n close, . . . [the appellate court] should uphold the injunction [or the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 43 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 JORDAN, J., Concurring 24-10875\\n\\n denial of the injunction] and remand for trial on the merits.” Ash-\\n croft, 542 U.S. at 664–65. See also Doran, 422 U.S. at 932 (“While we\\n regard the question as a close one, we believe that the issuance of\\n a preliminary injunction in behalf of respondents . . . was not an\\n abuse of the District Court’s discretion.”); Meccano Ltd. v.\\n Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136, 142 (1920) (“If . . . two [appellate courts]\\n have expressed conflicting views, we cannot now declare which is\\n right or undertake finally to decide the several issues involved upon\\n their merits. The matter for review here is the action of the courts\\n below upon the preliminary order for injunction and we may go no\\n further.”).1\\n *****\\n Normally, I do not think it is a good idea for an appellate\\n court to decide in the first instance whether or not to grant prelim-\\n inary injunctive relief. We are not, for example, in the business of\\n fact-finding, and often facts will drive some of the preliminary in-\\n junction factors (i.e., likelihood of success, irreparable harm, and\\n the balancing of the equities). But because we are only addressing\\n the substantial likelihood of success prong on a legal issue, and rul-\\n ing adversely to Florida on that score, doing so here does not seem\\n too problematic.\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 The district court here did not address the merits. Because there is no un-\\n derlying merits decision to give deference to, the majority’s statement about\\n plenary review is dicta as to the merits.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 44 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 JORDAN, J., Concurring 5\\n\\n As the majority opinion notes, we are not conclusively de-\\n ciding the merits of Florida’s APA claims. In the words of the Su-\\n preme Court, “it is generally inappropriate for a federal court at the\\n preliminary-injunction stage to give a final judgment on the mer-\\n its.” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Compare\\n Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008) (“Adjudication of the merits\\n is most appropriate if the injunction rests on a question of law\\n and it is plain that the plaintiff cannot prevail.”) (emphasis added).\\n Although there is some support for Florida’s interpretation of 42\\n U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i), see Texas v. Brooks-LaSure, 680 F. Supp. 3d\\n 791, 808–09 (E.D. Tex. 2023), the statutory analysis conducted by\\n the majority—whether ultimately correct or not—is sufficient to\\n demonstrate that Florida has not shown a substantial likelihood of\\n success on the merits. And that is enough to deny Florida the pre-\\n liminary injunction it seeks.\\n *****\\n I close with one final observation. Even if we wanted to, we\\n could not definitively decide the merits of Florida’s APA claims in\\n favor of CMS in this appeal. The district court dismissed the action\\n without prejudice because it concluded that the Bulletin did not\\n constitute final agency action. See D.E. 53 at 2. Because CMS has\\n not cross-appealed, we cannot issue a merits ruling that expands its\\n victory in the district court by converting the dismissal into one\\n with prejudice. See, e.g., Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers, Local 387\\n Pension Fund v. S. Stress Wire Corp., 724 F.2d 1458, 1459 (11th Cir.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 45 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 JORDAN, J., Concurring 24-10875\\n\\n 1983) (“Absent a cross-appeal, an appellee may not attempt to en-\\n large his own rights or decrease the rights of his adversary[.]”). 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 On remand, therefore, the district court will need to address the merits of\\n\\n Florida’s APA claim.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11215018/\", \"author_raw\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CORRIGAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"CORRIGAN\": \", District\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748433/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Administrator for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 45\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10875\n ____________________\n\n FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\n versus\n\n ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &\n MEDICAID SERVICES,\n Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, in her official capacity,\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH\n AND HUMAN SERVICES,\n Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-61595-WPD\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\n Judge.\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\n Medicaid, the government-sponsored health-insurance pro-\n gram for those with limited resources or special medical needs, has\n been described as an exercise in “cooperative federalism.” Harris v.\n McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,\n 316 (1968)). The program is jointly funded and administered by the\n states and the federal government. This case presents a question\n about how states may—and may not—foot their share of the Med-\n icaid bill. For years, Florida has raised a substantial portion of its\n Medicaid contribution through an intricate arrangement called the\n “Directed Payment Program.” In 2023, the federal Centers for\n Medicare and Medicaid Services released a “Bulletin” that, while\n innocuous in name, was potentially dramatic in effect. The Bulle-\n tin advanced an understanding of federal law that Florida feared\n could jeopardize its Directed Payment Program and the billions in\n Medicaid funds it generated. Florida sued the federal government\n and moved to preliminarily enjoin the Bulletin’s implementation.\n\n\n * The Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, United States District Judge for the\n\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n The district court denied Florida’s motion and dismissed the case\n on the ground that the Bulletin wasn’t a reviewable “final agency\n action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.\n We hold that the district court was right to deny Florida’s\n preliminary-injunction motion but that it did so for the wrong rea-\n son. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the Bulletin was a\n final agency action, and is therefore subject to judicial review. But\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the\n Bulletin and, accordingly, isn’t entitled to the preliminary injunc-\n tion it seeks. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of\n the complaint, affirm its denial of the preliminary injunction, and\n remand for further proceedings.\n I\n A\n Medicaid funding is a group project. The federal govern-\n ment provides financial assistance “to states that choose to reim-\n burse certain costs of medical treatment for needy applicants.” Ga.,\n Dep’t of Med. Assistance ex rel. Toal v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1565, 1566 (11th\n Cir. 1993). A complex matching formula generates the “[f]ederal\n medical assistance percentage” in any particular state. 42 U.S.C.\n § 1396d(b). The federal share is always some percentage of a state’s\n Medicaid expenditures—never less than 50%, but often higher, see\n id. § 1396d(b)(1). So the more of its own money a state spends on\n Medicaid, the more the federal government has to kick in.\n As in many group projects, the participants’ incentives aren’t\n always aligned. Because of the way the federal matching formula\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n works, states are understandably motivated to inflate their own\n Medicaid spending numbers as a means of driving up federal con-\n tributions. One way states can do this—without internalizing the\n budgetary costs, so to speak—is by imposing so-called “provider\n taxes.” See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-98, Medicaid:\n CMS Needs More Information on States’ Financing and Payment Ar-\n rangements to Improve Oversight 8–10 (2020). In broad strokes, here’s\n how it works: (1) A state imposes a tax on healthcare providers; (2)\n the state uses those tax revenues to increase its own Medicaid con-\n tribution; (3) by virtue of its matching obligation, the federal Med-\n icaid contribution likewise increases; and (4) those Medicaid dol-\n lars—now including the extra federal share—get returned to the\n same tax-paying providers through more generous Medicaid pay-\n ments. A counterintuitive consequence of all this is that healthcare\n providers have an incentive to—and in fact do—lobby state and lo-\n cal governments to impose higher taxes. That’s because although\n institutions subject to the provider tax will have to pay bigger tax\n bills, they expect to receive even more back once they get their\n Medicaid payments, as supplemented with an inflated federal\n share. In recent years, states have started relying more heavily on\n provider taxes to finance their Medicaid contributions, which, in\n turn, has driven dramatic increases in mandatory federal Medicaid\n outlays. See id. at 22–34.\n In 1991, Congress adopted an important limit on states’ abil-\n ity to juice federal contributions in this way—the so-called “hold\n harmless” rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii); Medicaid Vol-\n untary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-234, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 1793, 1793–99. Under\n § 1396b(w), the Department of Health and Human Services must\n deduct from its federal-matching calculation certain kinds of state\n revenue. Chief among these mandatory deductions is any funding\n that the state obtained through “health care related taxes.” Id.\n § 1396b(w)(1)(A), (3)(A). On its own, that provision would require\n the exclusion of revenue raised through the sort of provider taxes\n that we’ve described. But the “health care related tax[]” ban has an\n exception: States may raise revenue through a healthcare-related\n tax so long as it is “broad-based.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(ii). But, it\n turns out, the “broad-based” tax exception has its own exception:\n HHS must nonetheless deduct revenue from even a broad-based\n tax “if there is in effect a hold harmless provision (described in par-\n agraph (4)) with respect to the tax.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\n The cross-referenced Paragraph (4) sets out four different\n ways of detecting whether a “hold harmless provision” is in effect.\n See id. § 1396b(w)(4). We’ll return to all four in due course, but for\n now it’s important to know about the method described in subpar-\n agraph (C), clause (i). According to (C)(i)—and the case basically\n rides on this language—“there is in effect a hold harmless provision\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax” if “[t]he State\n or other unit of government imposing the tax provides (directly or\n indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to\n hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the tax.” Id.\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i). This much is clear and undisputed: By virtue\n of clause (C)(i), a state can’t impose a provider tax on hospitals\n while also promising to promptly refund (i.e., “hold harmless”)\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n those very same hospitals. Were things otherwise, states could se-\n cure practically unlimited extra federal matching funds using reve-\n nue that is little more than a short-term loan from the hospitals.\n HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (or\n CMS) is concerned that states and providers have developed a so-\n phisticated way to evade the hold-harmless rule. Things get pretty\n involved, so we’ll try to simplify it using an illustrative example:\n Imagine that a (very small) state has four private hospitals, each of\n which provides care to a different number of Medicaid-insured pa-\n tients. Hospital 1 opts not to take Medicaid insurance at all, so its\n Medicaid share is 0%. Hospitals 2 and 3 accept Medicaid, but see\n few low-income patients—let’s say their Medicaid share is 20%.\n Hospital 4 both accepts Medicaid and receives many low-income\n patients—its Medicaid share is 80%. The state opts to boost its own\n Medicaid expenditures—and thus the federal match—by imposing\n a provider tax on all four hospitals. This is a “broad based” tax, so\n it doesn’t get deducted from the federal-share calculation.\n The tax is good for Hospital 4 and bad for Hospital 1. Hos-\n pital 4 will pay the tax but, in the end, will receive higher Medicaid\n payments; Hospital 1, by contrast, has to pay the tax but won’t get\n anything in return. Hospitals 2 and 3, obviously are somewhere in\n between. The state could try to keep everyone happy by simply\n refunding the hospital tax—but that the hold-harmless rule pre-\n vents it from doing so. CMS worries that hospitals will end-run the\n hold-harmless rule’s prohibition by redistributing their Medicaid\n payments among themselves as a means of offsetting the provider\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n tax. So, for instance, Hospital 4 might transfer some of its new,\n provider-tax-enabled Medicaid-payment surplus to Hospital 1 to\n cover Hospital 1’s provider-tax assessment. That way, even\n though both Hospital 1 and Hospital 4 are paying a new tax, they’re\n both better off.\n This case tests whether the hold-harmless rule prevents\n these sorts of private-to-private redistributions.\n B\n In its ongoing efforts to implement the hold-harmless rule,\n CMS has taken three regulatory steps that turn out to be important\n to our analysis.\n First, in 2008, CMS revised its hold-harmless regulations,\n partly in response to a few congressional tweaks. See 2008 Final\n Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 9,685 (Feb. 22, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R.\n §§ 433.54–433.70); see also Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,\n Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. B, title IV, § 403, 120 Stat. 2922, 2994–95\n (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)). Neither the statutory\n amendment nor the agency’s revisions materially altered the (C)(i)\n definition’s text or its implementing regulations. Compare 42 C.F.R.\n § 433.68(f)(3) (1993), with id. § 433.68(f)(3) (2008). But in the rule’s\n preamble, CMS explained that “[a] direct guarantee [under (C)(i)]\n would be found when a State payment is made available to a tax-\n payer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the reasonable expec-\n tation that the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\n harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 9,686; accord id.\n at 9,694. In CMS’s view, “[a] direct guarantee does not need to be\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n an explicit promise or assurance of payment”; “[i]nstead, the ele-\n ment necessary to constitute a direct guarantee is the provision for\n payment by State statute, regulation, or policy.” Id. at 9,694.\n Second, in 2019, CMS proposed another revision to its hold-\n harmless regulations. See Medicaid Fiscal Accountability Regula-\n tion, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,722 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019). The proposed\n rule’s preamble reiterated CMS’s 2008 interpretation. See id. at\n 63,730–31, 63,734. As CMS had said then, in its view a hold-harm-\n less arrangement exists if “taxpayers have a reasonable expectation\n that their forthcoming Medicaid payment (including any redistri-\n bution) . . . results in participating taxpayers being held harmless\n for all or a portion of the tax amount.” Id. at 63,734. But, CMS\n continued, it had “become aware” of some novel—and it believed\n unlawful—arrangements in which taxpaying providers were being\n “held harmless” by way of payments not from state or local gov-\n ernments, but rather from Medicaid Managed Care Organizations\n or other taxpayers. Id. CMS insisted that “[t]he fact that a private\n entity makes the redistribution payment does not change the es-\n sential nature of the payment, which constitutes an indirect pay-\n ment from the state or unit of government to the entity being\n taxed that holds it harmless for the cost of the tax.” Id. at 63,735.\n Put simply, CMS said, the sort of taxpayer-to-taxpayer redistribu-\n tions exemplified in our hospital hypo are forbidden. CMS ex-\n plained that in its view “[s]uch arrangements” were “inconsistent\n with existing statutory and regulatory requirements prohibiting\n hold harmless arrangements.” Id. at 63,734 (emphasis added).\n Though CMS was proposing regulatory amendments, the changes,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n it said, did “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely\n codif[ied] currently prohibited practices.” Id. at 63,735.\n Third, in 2021, CMS withdrew its 2019 proposed rule. See\n 2021 Proposed Rule Withdrawal, 86 Fed. Reg. 5,105 (Jan. 19, 2021).\n The terse notice explained that “based on the considerable feed-\n back we received . . . , we have determined it appropriate to with-\n draw the proposed provisions at this time.” Id. at 5,105. The notice\n explained that “the withdrawal of this proposed rule does not affect\n existing federal legal requirements or policy that were merely pro-\n posed to be codified in regulation.” Id.\n C\n The story underlying this case begins in earnest two years\n later, in 2023, when CMS circulated a document that it called an\n “Informational Bulletin.” See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs.\n for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Health Care-Related Taxes and\n Hold Harmless Arrangements Involving the Redistribution of\n Medicaid Payments (Feb. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/VW7X-\n GX8V. In the Bulletin, CMS explained that it had “been ap-\n proached by several states with questions regarding the statutory\n and regulatory requirements applicable to health care-related\n taxes.” Id. at 1. Citing the 2008 rule’s preamble, the Bulletin in-\n sisted that the hold-harmless prohibition covers purely private re-\n distribution arrangements because they “result[] in a reasonable ex-\n pectation that the taxpaying hospitals, whether directly through\n their Medicaid payments or due to the availability of the redistrib-\n uted payments . . . , are held harmless for at least part of their health\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n care-related tax costs.” Id. at 3–4. And the Bulletin warned that,\n should CMS discover forbidden private arrangements, the agency\n could “disallow” (i.e., claw back) a portion of the offending state’s\n Medicaid funds. Id. at 5.\n The Bulletin spelled trouble for Florida’s Directed Payment\n Program, under which local governments can assess special fees on\n private hospitals. See Fla. Stat. § 125.01(1)(r). The governments\n pool those assessments in “Local Provider Participation Funds,”\n which they then transfer to the Florida Agency for Healthcare Ad-\n ministration. The Agency, in turn, uses that money to supplement\n Florida’s Medicaid contribution, which, for reasons already ex-\n plained, enables the state to collect additional federal matching\n funds. The extra federal funds in hand, the Agency redistributes\n the combined monies to entities known as “Managed Care Organ-\n izations,” which, in turn, return them to Florida hospitals.\n At least 20 Florida counties and municipalities assess fees\n through the Directed Payment Program. One is Broward County,\n which imposes a special assessment on private hospitals. See\n Broward County, Fla., Code §§ 16-123 to -137 (2025). Assessments\n like Broward County’s qualify as “broad based” taxes because (to\n simplify just a bit) they apply uniformly “to all providers in a class”\n in “the area over which the unit of government has jurisdiction.”\n 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(c)(2); see Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-127\n (2025) (requiring “[t]he Assessment [to] be broad based”). And be-\n cause the assessments are broad-based, they are presumptively per-\n mitted under § 1396b(w). According to Broward County’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n ordinance, local hospitals “requested enactment” of the assess-\n ment. Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-137 (2025).\n The Directed Payment Program has been lucrative. In fiscal\n year 2023–2024, Florida expected to raise $1.1 billion in nonfederal\n Medicaid funding through Local Provider Participation Funds,\n which it planned to use to secure another $2 billion from the fed-\n eral government. See Wallace Decl. ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 10-1. According\n to the state, this money is “integral to Florida’s healthcare system.”\n Br. of Appellants at 6. Though the state doesn’t concede that pri-\n vate redistribution arrangements exist in Florida, it acknowledges\n that CMS might determine that they do—and fears that those bil-\n lions in provider-tax-based funds could therefore be at risk. See\n Wallace Decl. ¶ 28.\n The state has cause for concern. A few months before it is-\n sued the Bulletin, CMS sent a letter to the state expressing concern\n that it might be harboring private hold-harmless arrangements and\n promising a future review of the Direct Payment Program. See\n Resp. in Opp’n Ex. A, Dkt. No. 22-2. Then, just days after releasing\n the Bulletin, CMS followed through and commenced a Financial\n Management Review of Local Provider Participation Funds. See\n Compl. Ex. B, at 1, Dkt. No. 1-8. According to the review letter,\n CMS asserted that there “appear to be pre-arranged agreements to\n redirect Medicaid payments away from Medicaid providers serving\n a high percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries to hospitals that do not\n participate in Medicaid or that serve a low percentage of Medicaid\n beneficiaries.” Id. at 2.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n Displeased with the Bulletin, Florida sued under the Admin-\n istrative Procedure Act. It alleged that the Bulletin misinterpreted\n the hold-harmless rule, that it was arbitrary and capricious, and that\n CMS had improperly issued it without the requisite notice and\n comment. The state then moved for a preliminary injunction, and\n CMS moved to dismiss.\n Acting on the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the\n district court denied Florida’s preliminary-injunction motion and\n granted CMS’s motion to dismiss. The court based both decisions\n on its conclusion that the Bulletin wasn’t a “final agency action”\n within the meaning of the APA’s judicial-review provision, 5 U.S.C.\n § 704, and, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction.\n This is Florida’s appeal. 1\n\n\n 1 A few different standards of review apply here. We review de novo a district\n\n court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tufts v.\n Hay, 977 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 2020). We review for abuse of discretion\n the denial of a preliminary injunction, “but the underlying legal conclusions\n are reviewed de novo.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic\n Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1229 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted). And “[a]s\n a general matter, when an agency interprets a statute, judicial review of the\n agency’s interpretation is de novo.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle\n Cnty., 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1511 (2025) (emphasis omitted). But arbitrary-and-ca-\n pricious review is “deferential.” Id.\n In his separate opinion, Judge Jordan contends that legal issues embed-\n ded within a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction\n shouldn’t necessarily be subject to de novo review. See Jordan Concurring Op.\n at 1. His argument is characteristically thoughtful and rigorous, and not with-\n out some force. But it runs headlong into a wall of our precedent expressly\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n II\n We begin with jurisdiction. According to CMS, the Bulletin\n wasn’t a final agency action and Florida’s suit isn’t ripe. We disa-\n gree.\n A\n The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial re-\n view of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In this Circuit, final-\n ity is jurisdictional. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d\n 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). Two conditions “generally must be\n satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’ under the APA.” U.S. Army\n Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016). The action\n must (1) “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking\n process” and (2) “be one from which rights or obligations have\n been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”\n Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citation modified).\n Nobody here disputes prong one—that the Bulletin consummates\n CMS’s decisionmaking. 2 The disagreement is instead about prong\n\n\n holding that although we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunc-\n tion for abuse of discretion, we review constituent legal determinations de\n novo. E.g., Wood v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 142 F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2025);\n Gonzalez v. Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020); Bloedorn v.\n Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011); LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone,\n LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2012).\n 2 Nor could they. CMS’s conclusions in the Bulletin are neither tentative nor\n poised for revision; no further “administrative steps [will] necessarily [] be\n taken” with respect to CMS’s interpretation of the hold-harmless rule. Norton,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n two—whether the Bulletin determines “rights or obligations” or\n portends “legal consequences.” We’ll lay out the doctrine and then\n apply it to the Bulletin.\n 1\n CMS insists that the Bulletin is merely a “restatement of an\n already-existing policy or interpretation” of the sort that we (and\n others) have said “does not, on its own, determine any rights or\n obligations and imposes no legal consequences.” Clayton Cnty. v.\n FAA, 887 F.3d 1262, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2018); accord, e.g., Indep.\n Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Rob-\n erts, J.) (observing that when an agency “merely restate[s] in an ab-\n stract setting—for the umpteenth time—[its] longstanding inter-\n pretation,” that restatement is not a final agency action); Gen. Mo-\n tors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (similar).\n The reason for that rule is clear enough: When an aggrieved party\n seeks judicial review of a mere restatement, it is, in effect, suing\n about the wrong thing—it should have challenged whatever action\n the agency took in which it first adopted the complained-of view.\n See Gen. Motors, 363 F.3d at 451.\n But in arguing that the Bulletin is such a restatement, CMS\n seems to conflate finality with an altogether different doctrine—\n namely, about whether a particular agency action is “interpretive”\n\n 324 F.3d at 1238 (citing City of San Diego v. Whitman, 242 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th\n Cir. 2001)). To the contrary, the Bulletin’s explication of CMS’s views is deci-\n sive and unambiguous, as it purports to “reiterate[]” the agency’s “longstand-\n ing position.” Bulletin, supra, at 1.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n or “legislative.” Under the APA, when an agency introduces a new\n rule, it must generally comply with the three-step notice-and-com-\n ment process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575\n U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (describing the steps). But there are exceptions:\n The notice-and-comment requirement doesn’t apply to “interpre-\n tative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organ-\n ization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). We’ll have\n reason to return to the vexing interpretive-legislative distinction\n later. For now, it’s enough to know “that the critical feature of in-\n terpretive rules is that they are issued by an agency to advise the\n public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which\n it administers.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (citation modified). While leg-\n islative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” interpretive rules\n “only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer v.\n Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).\n As we understand it, CMS is making roughly the following\n argument: (1) Unlike legislative rules, interpretive rules merely re-\n iterate existing obligations, id. at 1337; (2) when an agency merely\n reiterates existing obligations, its action doesn’t have direct and ap-\n preciable legal consequences, see Clayton Cnty., 887 F.3d at 1266–67;\n (3) when an agency action doesn’t have direct and appreciable legal\n consequences, it doesn’t constitute final agency action, Bennett, 520\n U.S. at 178; (4) courts lack jurisdiction to review non-final agency\n actions, Norton, 324 F.3d at 1236. From those premises, CMS seems\n to say, the conclusion follows that interpretive (i.e., non-legislative)\n rules aren’t subject to judicial review. And because, CMS adds, the\n Bulletin is an interpretive rule, it isn’t subject to judicial review.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n Clever, but not right. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,\n the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that interpretive rules can\n be subject to judicial review. See 575 U.S. 92, 105–06 (2015). Ac-\n cording to the decision there, “interpretive rules do not have the\n force and effect of law,” id. at 103—and yet, the Court said, should\n an agency revise a preexisting interpretive rule by way of a second\n interpretive rule, the second rule would be subject to APA review,\n id. at 105–06. Perez therefore “affirms that interpretive rules can be\n final” and importantly, “by implication, that the test for finality is\n independent of the analysis for whether an agency action is a legis-\n lative rule rather than an interpretive rule.” Cal. Cmtys. Against Tox-\n ics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019).\n CMS’s deduction falters in premise No. 2. While the distinc-\n tion between legislative and interpretive rules turns on a formal\n analysis of whether an agency really is simply interpreting the un-\n derlying statute, the distinction between final and non-final action\n is pragmatic. Contrast Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (explaining that “inter-\n pretive rules” are “issued by an agency to advise the public of the\n agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it adminis-\n ters” and “do not have the force and effect of law” (citation modi-\n fied)), with Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 599 (describing “the pragmatic ap-\n proach we have long taken to finality” (citation modified)). Sure,\n an interpretive rule might accurately reflect a statute’s best read-\n ing—but it can also be final because it triggers new real-world\n rights or obligations.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n So, with an interpretive rule—as with any challenged agency\n action—we should inquire whether, as a practical matter, and\n given the particular statutory context, the rule has “direct and ap-\n preciable legal consequences.” Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598 (quoting\n Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178). Or, as our D.C. Circuit colleagues have\n put it, we should “pragmatically focus on the concrete conse-\n quences the action has or does not have as a result of the specific\n statutes and regulations that govern it.” POET Biorefining, LLC v.\n EPA, 970 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation modified); cf. Ap-\n palachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ob-\n serving that “an agency’s [non-legislative-rule] pronouncements\n can, as a practical matter, have a binding effect”).\n 2\n The Bulletin has practical, concrete legal consequences. To\n be sure, the Bulletin purports to “reiterate[]” CMS’s preexisting po-\n sition, as stated in the 2008 rule’s preamble. Bulletin, supra, at 2–4.\n But it portends investigation and enforcement. It promises (omi-\n nously) that CMS will “inquire about potential redistribution ar-\n rangements and may conduct detailed financial management re-\n views of health care-related tax programs that appear to include\n redistribution arrangements.” Id. at 5. It insists that states must\n “make clear to their providers” that private redistribution arrange-\n ments are “not permissible.” Id. It announces that “CMS expects\n states to make available” “detailed information . . . regarding their\n health care-related taxes”—apparently including information\n about private-only arrangements. Id. It threatens clawing back\n Medicaid funding through “deferral or disallowance of federal\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n financial participation.” Id. And it warns that, should CMS “dis-\n cover[] the existence of impermissible financing practices,” it “will\n take enforcement action as necessary.” Id. The 2008 rule’s pream-\n ble included none of these portents.\n The Bulletin’s demands that states make particular infor-\n mation available and notify healthcare providers of updated expec-\n tations have the ring of “appreciable legal consequences.” Hawkes,\n 578 U.S. at 598. Perhaps even more so, the Bulletin’s discussion of\n deferral or disallowance—which could put billions in Medicaid\n funding at risk—signals final agency action because it could\n “force[]” Florida “to choose between costly compliance and the risk\n of prosecution at an uncertain point in the future.” Racing Enthu-\n siasts & Suppliers Coal. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (ci-\n tation modified).\n Three subsequent developments bolster our conclusion that\n the Bulletin constitutes final agency action. First, shortly after cir-\n culating the Bulletin, CMS initiated its Financial Management Re-\n view of Florida’s Local Provider Participation Funds—and sug-\n gested that the state was harboring private hold-harmless arrange-\n ments. Second, more than a year after issuing the Bulletin, CMS\n circulated a new document announcing its intention to exercise its\n enforcement discretion not to take immediate action against preex-\n isting private redistribution arrangements of the sort described in\n the Bulletin. See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs. for Medicare\n & Medicaid Servs., Exercise of Enforcement Discretion (Apr. 22,\n 2024), https://perma.cc/6ZE5-Y6DY. And third, CMS and Florida\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n recently executed a new agreement—as a precondition of federal\n approval of one of the state’s Medicaid Managed Care Programs—\n that imposes a new information-collection requirement: Florida\n must provide to CMS a copy of any agreements “regarding any ar-\n rangement among [healthcare] providers . . . relating to each local-\n ity tax or payments received that are funded by the locality tax.”\n Special Terms and Conditions, Florida Managed Medical Assis-\n tance Program 55 (Jan. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/XZ5Z-JKSK.\n The point isn’t that any of these documents is necessarily final\n agency action on its own; rather, the point is that together they\n serve to confirm that the Bulletin itself is driving fresh, practical\n legal consequences. See POET, 970 F.3d at 405 (holding that EPA’s\n application of a guidance document in a subsequent letter “rein-\n forces the Guidance’s finality”).\n Contrast the Bulletin with agency actions that courts have\n deemed mere restatements of policy. In Clayton County, we held\n that a letter from the FAA wasn’t a final agency action. 887 F.3d at\n 1269. In so holding, we emphasized several considerations: The\n letter took the same position that the FAA had expressed in a policy\n statement two years earlier; the challenger knew about the earlier\n policy statement; and by eliciting the letter the challenger had\n transparently attempted to evade the applicable statute of limita-\n tions. See id. at 1266–70. Similarly, in Independent Equipment Dealers,\n the D.C. Circuit held that an EPA letter wasn’t final agency action.\n 372 F.3d at 428. The EPA’s letter likewise restated a “longstanding\n interpretation,” had no “concrete impact,” and “was purely infor-\n mational in nature.” Id. at 427. To be sure, like the FAA and EPA\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n letters, the Bulletin appears to restate a preexisting interpretation—\n but quite unlike those letters, the Bulletin is not “purely informa-\n tional in nature.” Id. Rather, as already explained, it demands that\n regulated parties take action by collecting data, examining program\n participants, and enforcing CMS’s view of the hold-harmless rule—\n and not so subtly hints at the dire consequences of non-compliance.\n As we have said many times, for final-agency-action pur-\n poses, finality is understood pragmatically, and no single feature of\n the Bulletin is necessarily decisive. But taken together, the consid-\n erations we’ve emphasized make clear that in the Bulletin, CMS\n “has given the States their ‘marching orders’ and [CMS] expects\n the[m] to fall in line.” Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023. Accord-\n ingly, we hold that the Bulletin is final agency action subject to ju-\n dicial review. 3\n B\n Separately, but relatedly, CMS contends that Florida’s chal-\n lenge to the Bulletin isn’t ripe. For many of the same reasons that\n\n\n\n 3 We reject CMS’s suggestion that the Bulletin isn’t a final agency action be-\n\n cause Florida could raise its arguments in defense to an enforcement action.\n The Supreme Court long ago held that an agency order that threatened pen-\n alties for noncompliance and “specif[ied] which commodities the [agency] be-\n lieved were exempt by statute from regulation, and which it believed were\n not,” was reviewable, even though the order “would have effect only if and\n when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier.” Hawkes,\n 578 U.S. at 599–600 (citation modified) (describing Frozen Food Express v. United\n States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)). So too here.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n we’ve found the Bulletin to be final agency action, we conclude\n that it is ripe for review.\n Ripeness turns on (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial de-\n cision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding our con-\n sideration. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967).\n In administrative law, ripeness usually—if perhaps not always—\n “overlaps with” finality. Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 307\n F.3d 1300, 1311 n.10 (11th Cir. 2002); see Kristin E. Hickman &\n Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 17.12 (7th ed. 2018\n & Supp. 2025) (observing that courts often consider ripeness to be\n “interchangeable with . . . finality,” but that it also can “sometimes\n serve[] independent purposes”). Our analysis focuses in particular\n on the hardship to the plaintiffs of delaying review, whether judi-\n cial intervention would “inappropriately interfere” with the admin-\n istrative process, and whether the case would benefit from further\n factual development. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.\n 726, 733 (1998).\n Whatever the theoretical distinctions might be, the Bulletin\n is ripe for essentially the same reasons it is final. Delaying review\n will cause Florida hardship because the Bulletin “inflicts significant\n practical harm,” id. at 733, in that the state now faces a new de-\n mand to root out private hold-harmless arrangements. Review\n won’t inappropriately interfere with CMS’s decisionmaking pro-\n cess because, per the Bulletin’s own terms, it represents the\n agency’s refined, non-tentative views. Cf. id. at 735 (holding that a\n forest management plan was not ripe for review in part because\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n “further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is imple-\n mented”). And no further factual development is necessary. This\n is principally a dispute over the meaning of a statute, which won’t\n require us to “entangl[e]” ourselves “in abstract disagreements\n over administrative policies.” Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 148.\n * * *\n The Bulletin is final, and Florida’s challenge is ripe. We\n therefore have jurisdiction. On, then, to the merits of the state’s\n preliminary-injunction request. 4\n III\n To obtain the preliminary injunction it seeks, Florida must\n show that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the mer-\n its; (2) it will suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction is\n granted; (3) the harm from the threatened injury outweighs the\n harm the injunction would cause the opposing party; and (4) the\n injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Dream Defs.\n\n\n 4 A brief word about our decision to reach the merits: The district court never\n\n assessed the merits because it dismissed Florida’s suit and denied its prelimi-\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds. Although we usually “go\n no further into the merits than is necessary to decide the interlocutory appeal,”\n that “is a rule of orderly judicial administration only”—we may go further if\n it’s appropriate. Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985).\n Deciding the merits of Florida’s preliminary-injunction request is appropriate\n because “both sides’ arguments go to the merits, no facts are at issue and the\n questions raised are purely legal ones.” Id. at 1287. Were we to remand with-\n out addressing the request, it “would unnecessarily delay the disposition of\n th[e] case.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n v. Governor of the State of Fla., 57 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\n tation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed any further than the\n preliminary-injunction test’s first prong because we conclude that\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Johnson & Johnson Vi-\n sion Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.\n 2002).\n Florida argues that CMS’s Bulletin is unlawful for three rea-\n sons: (1) that it exceeds CMS’s statutory authority; (2) that it’s arbi-\n trary and capricious; and (3) that CMS issued it without proper pro-\n cess. For the following reasons, we reject all three contentions.5\n A\n 1\n In assessing CMS’s statutory authority to issue the Bulletin,\n “[w]e start, as always, with the text.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369,\n 379 (2025). Here, that is no mean feat. The Social Security Act, of\n which the hold-harmless rule is part, “is among the most intricate\n ever drafted by Congress.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,\n 43 (1981). As relevant here, the Act provides that CMS should de-\n duct from the federal government’s Medicaid contribution an\n amount corresponding to state revenue collected while a hold-\n\n\n 5 Of course, at this preliminary stage, we do not conclusively decide the merits\n\n of Florida’s challenges; rather, we hold only that Florida is unlikely to succeed\n on the merits and, therefore, isn’t entitled to a preliminary injunction. See\n Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[I]t is generally inappro-\n priate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final\n judgment on the merits.”).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n harmless provision is in effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\n Then comes the subsection at issue here—which, fair warning, is\n both bulky and a little clunky:\n For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(iii), there is in effect\n a hold harmless provision with respect to a broad-\n based health care related tax imposed with respect to\n a class of items or services if the Secretary determines\n that any of the following applies:\n\n (A) The State or other unit of government imposing\n the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for a payment\n (other than under this subchapter) to taxpayers and\n the amount of such payment is positively correlated\n either to the amount of such tax or to the difference\n between the amount of the tax and the amount of\n payment under the State plan.\n\n (B) All or any portion of the payment made under this\n subchapter to the taxpayer varies based only upon the\n amount of the total tax paid.\n\n (C)(i) The State or other unit of government impos-\n ing the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for any\n payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to hold\n taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the\n tax.\n\n (ii) For purposes of clause (i), a determination of the\n existence of an indirect guarantee shall be made un-\n der paragraph (3)(i) of section 433.68(f ) of title 42,\n Code of Federal Regulations . . . .\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 25 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n Id. § 1396b(w)(4) (emphasis added).\n Happily, just one sentence really matters. Nobody disputes\n that county-level assessments under Florida’s Directed Payment\n Program constitute “broad-based health care related tax[es]”\n within the meaning of the prefatory clause. And nobody contends\n that the Bulletin can be justified under subparagraphs (A) or (B), or\n that it addresses indirect guarantees, which are the subject of clause\n (C)(ii). Instead, everything pretty much rides on clause (C)(i)—\n which, to repeat, states that a hold-harmless provision exists when\n “[t]he State or other unit of government imposing the tax provides\n (directly or indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guar-\n antees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of\n the tax.” CMS insists that (C)(i) is implicated when private “taxpay-\n ing providers” choose to “redistribut[e] Medicaid payments after\n receipt to ensure that all taxpaying providers receive all or a portion\n of their tax costs back.” Bulletin, supra, at 2. The question before\n us is whether CMS’s interpretation fits the statutory language.\n We can begin to clarify matters by diagramming clause\n (C)(i)’s single sentence, matching the two key verbs with their ac-\n companying nouns. First up, “provides”: It is the “State or other\n unit of government” that does the “provid[ing].” This much seems\n obvious and uncontroversial. Next, “guarantees”: It is the “pay-\n ment, offset, or waiver” that does the “guarantee[ing].” This too\n seems obvious—but it’s hotly contested. Florida insists that there’s\n a “grammatical link” “between the government, as the actor provid-\n ing for something, and a guarantee, as the thing provided for.” Br.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 26 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n of Appellants at 49 (quoting Texas v. Brooks-LaSure, 680 F. Supp. 3d\n 791, 808 (E.D. Tex. 2023)). Therefore, Florida says, a hold-harmless\n provision under (C)(i) exists only when the state government “in-\n tentionally, deliberately, and with certainty causes the taxpayer’s\n liability to be offset.” Id. We disagree. However intuitive, Flor-\n ida’s reading has no footing in the ordinary rules of syntax. Con-\n trary to Florida’s contention, the phrase “that guarantees to hold\n taxpayers harmless” is a restrictive relative clause that modifies the\n phrase “payment, offset, or waiver.” So grammatically, (C)(i)\n works in two steps: (1) The state or local government provides for\n a payment offset or waiver; and (2) the payment, offset, or waiver\n in turn “guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless” for at least part of\n the government-imposed healthcare tax.\n With this clarification in hand, it seems clear to us that CMS\n has the better argument. CMS’s position, stretching all the way\n back to 2008 and reiterated in the Bulletin, is that “[a] direct guar-\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\n 9,686; accord Bulletin, supra, at 4. In the ways that matter, CMS’s\n interpretation tracks (C)(i)’s text. The statute requires that the gov-\n ernment “provide[] . . . for any payment, offset, or waiver”; so too,\n CMS anchors its interpretation to a state “ma[king] available” a\n “payment.” And, crucially, the statute then asks whether the “pay-\n ment” “guarantee[s] to hold taxpayers harmless”; so too, CMS asks\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 27 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n whether “the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\n harmless.”\n It’s true, as Florida says, that “result in” doesn’t mean exactly\n the same thing as “guarantee.” According to the state, to “guaran-\n tee” is to “‘make oneself answerable for (something) on behalf of\n someone else,’ ‘undertake to ensure for another,’ ‘serve as a war-\n rant or guaranty for,’ ‘engage to . . . indemnify . . . loss,’ or ‘prom-\n ise.’” Br. of Appellants at 48–49 (omissions in original) (quoting\n Guarantee, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)). Per-\n haps CMS’s phrase “[r]esult in” is more an approximation of “guar-\n antee” than a jot-for-jot synonym, but it captures the same kind of\n conduct: If a follow-on consequence of a state disbursing Medicaid\n payments is that providers use those payments to offset taxes, then\n the Medicaid funds are “ensur[ing]” or “indemnify[ing]” providers.\n Put another way, the Medicaid payments “result in” a tax offset.\n Florida seems to suggest that by using the word “guaran-\n tee,” (C)(i) imports something like an intent requirement, which a\n payment—an inanimate object—can’t meet. We disagree, for two\n reasons. First, lifeless items can most certainly “guarantee” things.\n Money deposited as bail guarantees the accused’s presence at\n trial—no matter who ponied up the cash or what that person was\n thinking. A title guarantees ownership of a car—no matter\n whether the previous owner had regrets about selling. Gravity\n guarantees that objects will fall—no matter who was thinking\n about that. So too, a “payment, offset, or waiver” can “guarantee”\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 28 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n that a provider will be made whole after it is taxed regardless of\n whether the state intends to promise anything.\n Second, Florida’s intent-based interpretation would make\n (C)(i) the odd one out in an otherwise effects-based list. As the state\n recognizes, (A), (B), and (C)(ii) “all define effects-based tests.” Re-\n ply Br. at 21. But under Florida’s reading, (C)(i) alone would turn\n on intent. See, e.g., Br. of Appellants at 2 (arguing that (C)(i) applies\n “only if the taxing government requires or promises that the taxpayer\n will be reimbursed for the tax”). Not dispositive, but weird. Under\n CMS’s reading, by contrast, (C)(i) dovetails with (A), (B), and\n (C)(ii).\n * * *\n CMS’s central insight—with which we agree—is that clause\n (C)(i) simply doesn’t say that the state must guarantee anything.\n Rather, the state provides a payment, which itself, in turn, guaran-\n tees that a taxpayer will be held harmless. To the same effect, un-\n der the Bulletin, when healthcare providers redistribute state Med-\n icaid payments to offset taxes, those payments result in the taxpay-\n ers being held harmless. If anything, CMS extends to states a dis-\n cretionary boon the statute itself doesn’t require. The Bulletin cab-\n ins its interpretation to instances in which the state or other unit of\n government has a “reasonable expectation” that its payment will\n be misused. The statute includes no such limitation.\n In sum, we aren’t persuaded by Florida’s first-order textual\n arguments.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 29 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n 2\n The state challenges the Bulletin on two additional textual\n bases. We find them no more persuasive.\n First, Florida contends that CMS’s interpretation in the Bul-\n letin renders subparagraphs (A) and (B) and clause (C)(ii) superflu-\n ous. On CMS’s reading, the state says, every circumstance covered\n by (A), (B), and (C)(ii) would also satisfy (C)(i). For instance, imag-\n ine that a county government levies a 10% tax on hospital revenue.\n The county also operates a grant program that reimburses resi-\n dents up to 10% of the cost of their hospital stays. As a result, al-\n most all the tax gets funneled back to the hospitals. This arrange-\n ment would qualify as an “indirect” guarantee under (C)(ii). 6 Un-\n der CMS’s reading of (C)(i), it would also constitute a “direct” guar-\n antee, because the county would be providing for a payment—the\n reimbursement to residents—that guarantees to hold the hospitals\n\n 6 Explaining exactly why this scheme would constitute an indirect guarantee\n\n requires a detour into the regulatory weeds. According to (C)(ii), a deci-\n sionmaker seeking to determine whether a funding arrangement amounts to\n an indirect guarantee should look to 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i). That regula-\n tion, in turn, outlines a two-part test. First, the decisionmaker should ask\n whether “the health care-related tax or taxes on each health care class are ap-\n plied at a rate that produces revenues less than or equal to 6 percent of the\n revenues received by the taxpayer.” 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(A). If so, there\n is no indirect guarantee. Id. If, however, the tax generates revenue above the\n 6 percent threshold, the decisionmaker should proceed to ask whether “75\n percent or more of the taxpayers in the class receive 75 percent or more of\n their total tax costs back in enhanced Medicaid payments or other State pay-\n ments.” Id. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(B). If the answer is yes, then an impermissible\n indirect guarantee exists.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 30 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n harmless for a portion of the tax. Under Florida’s interpretation of\n (C)(i), by contrast, this program wouldn’t be a direct guarantee, be-\n cause the state isn’t itself doing the guaranteeing—whether the\n money flows to the hospitals depends on the actions of third-party\n patients.\n Florida may well be right that CMS’s interpretation gener-\n ates some (even substantial) overlap. But—and it’s an important\n but—§ 1396b(w)(4) isn’t quite like other statutes with respect to\n which courts have relied on the presumption against superfluity.\n That canon has “special force” when “a statutory construction []\n renders an entire subparagraph meaningless.” Pulsifer v. United\n States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024). That issue doesn’t exist here. CMS\n isn’t interpreting (C)(i) in a way that swallows up the rest of the\n statutory provision. By the statute’s own terms, each subpara-\n graph (and clause) embodies a separate means of getting at the\n same thing: whether “there is in effect a hold harmless provision\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax.” 42 U.S.C.\n § 1396b(w)(4). Because (A), (B), (C)(i), and (C)(ii) are all designed\n to identify hold-harmless arrangements—which come in different\n shapes and sizes—the overlap among them is unsurprising.7 At the\n\n 7 It’s worth noting that even under Florida’s reading of (C)(i), the clause’s test\n\n overlaps substantially with other provisions of § 1396b(w)(4). Consider a\n scheme that functions like the private transfers at issue here but that the state\n operates directly. Under such a program, the state would impose a broad-\n based provider tax and then remit extra payments to hospitals that pay the tax\n but receive little or no Medicaid funding. Subparagraph (A) would cover this\n arrangement, because the state—which imposed the tax—would “provide[]\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 31 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 31\n\n same time, each subparagraph and clause is different in the sense\n that each identifies a different means—or, in the case of (C)(ii), de-\n fines a means—by which a hold-harmless arrangement might be\n accomplished.\n Consider, in particular, the methods for sussing out direct\n and indirect guarantees. As we’ve said, to ascertain whether there\n is a direct guarantee, we must determine (1) whether the state pro-\n vides a payment and (2) whether that payment guarantees that tax-\n payers are held harmless. By contrast, to detect an indirect guaran-\n tee, we ignore the mechanics of any funding arrangement and in-\n stead ask simply (1) whether provider taxes exceed a certain thresh-\n old and (2) whether a certain percentage of taxpayers recover a cer-\n tain percentage of the tax. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(ii); 42 C.F.R.\n § 433.68(f)(3)(i). The direct and indirect tests may often arrive at\n the same place, but they travel different routes. So, in sum, while\n § 1396b(w)(4) admits some superfluity of coverage, it doesn’t entail\n superfluity of method.\n Second, and separately, Florida insists that, for (C)(i) to ap-\n ply, the “‘unit of government imposing the tax’ [must] be the same\n\n\n . . . for a payment . . . to taxpayers and the amount of such payment [would\n be] positively correlated . . . to the difference between the amount of the tax\n and the amount of payment under the State [Medicaid] plan.” 42 U.S.C.\n § 1396b(w)(4)(A). The scheme would also satisfy (C)(i) under either Florida or\n CMS’s interpretation, because the state would be “provid[ing] . . . directly . . .\n for [a] payment . . . that guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless”—regardless\n of whether it’s the state or the payment doing the guaranteeing. Id.\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 32 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 32 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n ‘unit of government’ that ‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Reply\n Br. at 24; see Br. of Appellants at 52–53 & n.11. We disagree. As an\n initial matter, the state is again mixing up which verbs go with\n which nouns. It’s the payment—not the unit of government—that\n “‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Moreover, and in any event,\n Florida’s reading proves too much. Were it correct, a state could\n end-run the entirety of § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) simply by assigning—as\n Florida has—the taxing job to local governments, while retaining\n the payment job for itself.\n 3\n Florida finally challenges CMS’s interpretation on two extra-\n textual bases, neither of which convinces us.\n First, the state contends that it would be absurd for the le-\n gality of its tax scheme to depend on private companies’ behavior.\n We don’t think so. For one thing, federal law already requires Flor-\n ida to collect information on Medicaid funding recipients, so the\n state shouldn’t be operating in the dark. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R.\n § 433.74(a) (“[E]ach State must submit to CMS quarterly summary\n information on the source and use of all . . . health care-related\n taxes collected.”); id. (“Each State must also provide any additional\n information requested by the Secretary related to . . . any taxes im-\n posed on, health care providers.”). For another, the way healthcare\n providers respond to and implement provider taxes isn’t really “in-\n dependent” behavior. Hospitals and clinics have close, ongoing\n contractual relationships with Florida’s state healthcare agency.\n And Florida seems to have freely chosen to adopt its particular\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 33 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 33\n\n (provider-solicited) healthcare-related tax scheme so as to boost the\n federal government’s contribution to state Medicaid coffers. “Med-\n icaid offers States a bargain.” Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl.,\n 145 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2025). Part of the bargain is following the\n hold-harmless rule.\n Second, Florida cites the presumption that, under the Spend-\n ing Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, “Congress must speak ‘un-\n ambiguously’ and ‘with a clear voice’ when it imposes conditions\n on federal funds.” West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of the\n Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124, 1141 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pennhurst\n State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). True, inter-\n preting § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t without its challenges. Even so, we are\n convinced that CMS’s interpretation in the Bulletin is demonstra-\n bly superior to Florida’s. Because § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t ambiguous,\n the limitations imposed by the Spending Clause are satisfied.\n * * *\n Because the Bulletin is consistent with the statutory text,\n Florida is not substantially likely to succeed in its frontal challenge\n to CMS’s interpretation.\n B\n Next up, Florida’s contention that CMS acted arbitrarily and\n capriciously in adopting the Bulletin. Arbitrary-and-capricious re-\n view is deferential—an agency’s decisions need only “be reasona-\n ble and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592\n U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Nonetheless, “[a]n agency may not . . . depart\n from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 34 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 34 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n on the books.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515\n (2009). “[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned expla-\n nation for its action [] ordinarily demand[s] that it display aware-\n ness that it is changing position.” Id. And “[w]hen an agency\n changes course, . . . it must be cognizant that longstanding policies\n may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken\n into account.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,\n 591 U.S. 1, 31 (2020) (citation modified). Florida asserts that when\n CMS issued the Bulletin, it changed its position without acknowl-\n edging as much and, in the process, ignored important reliance in-\n terests.\n CMS didn’t change its position in the way that matters—that\n is, regarding the meaning of (C)(i). Rather, the Bulletin simply ap-\n plies, using more specific language, an interpretation of (C)(i) that\n the agency embraced more than a decade and a half ago. In the\n 2008 Final Rule’s preamble, CMS announced that “[a] direct guar-\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\n 9,686; accord id. at 9,694. Then, in the 2019 proposal, CMS—\n applying the same interpretation—insisted that “[t]he fact that a\n private entity makes the redistribution payment does not change\n the essential nature of the payment.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735. Alt-\n hough CMS withdrew the 2019 proposed rule, both the proposed\n rule’s preamble and the rescission notice made clear that CMS’s\n positions didn’t depend on whether the proposed regulations went\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 35 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 35\n\n into effect. See id. at 63,735 (explaining that the proposed rule did\n “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely codified\n currently prohibited practices”); 86 Fed. Reg. at 5,105 (“[T]he with-\n drawal of this proposed rule does not affect existing federal legal\n requirements or policy that were merely proposed to be codified\n in regulation.”). The Bulletin undoubtedly signaled a shift in en-\n forcement priorities. But “a belief about how an agency is likely to\n exercise its enforcement discretion is not a serious reliance inter-\n est.” FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 145 S. Ct. 898, 927\n (2025)\n Florida makes much of the fact that CMS withdrew the 2019\n proposed rule. On Florida’s telling, “the 2019 proposal’s existence\n proves that the policy it articulated—and that the Bulletin later\n adopted—was new because, if the policy already existed, the 2019\n proposal (and the later Bulletin) would have been unnecessary.”\n Reply Br. at 9. It’s true that a withdrawn proposal probably isn’t\n evidence of CMS’s official views. Cf. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,\n 845 (1986) (“It goes without saying that a proposed regulation does\n not represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute.”).\n But the converse—that the 2019 interpretation can’t be CMS’s\n view—doesn’t follow. CMS was absolutely clear in 2019 that, as\n the agency saw it, the hold-harmless arrangements covered by the\n proposal were already forbidden and that the proposal was exeget-\n ical, not inventive. See, e.g., 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735 (describing the\n proposal as “add[ing] clarifying language to the hold harmless defi-\n nition” (emphasis added)). Nobody doubts that the 2008 preamble\n embodied CMS’s official position, and in that document CMS\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 36 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 36 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n advanced its reasonable-expectation interpretation of (C)(i). See 73\n Fed. Reg. at 9,686; id. at 9,694. CMS applied that interpretation in\n the Bulletin. And never—not in 2008, 2019, 2021, or 2023—did\n CMS purport to exempt private-only arrangements from the hold-\n harmless rule.\n As evidence that CMS harbored views inconsistent with the\n Bulletin, Florida cites two HHS Office of Inspector General state-\n ments, a decision of the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, and a\n brief email exchange about a telephone call that included the Di-\n rector of CMS’s Financial Management Group. But none of these\n is a relevant source for identifying CMS’s official views.\n An agency’s “interpretation must at the least emanate from\n those actors, using those vehicles, understood to make authorita-\n tive policy in the relevant context.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558,\n 577 (2019). Both the Inspector General and the Appeals Board op-\n erate at some remove from the rest of HHS, and so we can’t as-\n sume that their views are CMS’s views. Cf. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry\n of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The Office of\n Inspector General of HHS, along with inspector generalships for\n other federal administrative agencies and departments, . . . . are de-\n signed to be independent and objective units separate from their\n respective departments and agencies.” (citation modified)); Ariz.\n Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1248\n n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The [Appeals Board] is a separate adjudicatory\n department within HHS that provides independent review of dis-\n puted decisions for many HHS programs.”). And the curt email\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 37 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 37\n\n referencing a phone call from the Financial Management Group\n Director is far too little to establish CMS’s authoritative views.\n Like our sister circuit, “[w]e would marvel if a few casual commu-\n nications in the guise of informal calls and a staff email constituted\n an agency’s formal position.” UnitedHealthcare of N.Y., Inc. v. Lace-\n well, 967 F.3d 82, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2020); cf. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 577 (in-\n dicating that “an ‘informal memorandum’ recounting a telephone\n conversation between employees” is not an “authoritative pro-\n nouncement” (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bowen, 835\n F.2d 360, 365–366 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).\n In the end, the documents that do express CMS’s official po-\n sitions—the 2008 rule, the 2021 rescission, and the Bulletin—are all\n consistent. So, CMS didn’t sub silentio change its mind. Florida’s\n arbitrary-and-capricious argument is unlikely to succeed.\n C\n Last of all we briefly return, as promised, see supra at 15, to\n the distinction between “legislative” and “interpretive” rules. Im-\n portantly here, legislative rules require the promulgating agency to\n abide by notice-and-comment procedures, while interpretive rules\n don’t. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). CMS released the Bulletin without no-\n tice and an opportunity for comment. Accordingly, if the Bulletin\n was a legislative rule, then it is procedurally invalid. But it wasn’t,\n and so it isn’t.\n Legislative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” while\n interpretive rules “do[] not modify or add to a legal norm based on\n the agency’s own authority.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337. To\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 38 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 38 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\n\n distinguish a legislative from an interpretive rule, we consider two\n things. First, we look to “the agency’s characterization of the\n rule”—though this is “not dispositive.” Id. (citation modified). And\n second, we consider that an “interpretative” rule should “simply\n state[] what the administrative agency thinks the statute means,\n and only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Id. (citation\n modified).\n The Bulletin is an interpretive rule. For one thing, CMS\n characterizes the Bulletin as mere interpretation, not an announce-\n ment of new law. See Bulletin at 1 (saying that “this informational\n bulletin reiterates our longstanding position”). And for another,\n because the Bulletin properly and without novelty interprets\n § 1396b(w)(4)—at least with respect to the topics disputed in this\n litigation—the Bulletin “simply states what the administrative\n agency thinks the statute means,” and in fact does “only remind[]\n affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337.\n Of course, the mere fact that the Bulletin’s challenged as-\n pects are consistent with the statutory text isn’t alone enough to\n make the Bulletin a valid interpretive rule. Although statutes have\n a “single, best meaning,” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.\n 369, 400 (2024), at times “the best reading of a statute is that it del-\n egates discretionary authority to an agency.” Id. at 395. So here,\n it’s important that—with respect to the narrow question whether\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) can cover private hold-harmless arrange-\n ments—the statute doesn’t confer on CMS any discretion, CMS\n doesn’t purport to be exercising any such discretion, and the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 39 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 39\n\n Bulletin simply and correctly transcribes a longstanding and accu-\n rate interpretation.\n Because the Bulletin does “not have the force and effect of\n law,” and simply “advise[s] the public of the agency’s construction\n of the statutes and rules which it administers,” it’s an interpretive\n rule. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (citation\n modified). Florida’s argument that CMS evaded the notice-and-\n comment requirement is therefore unlikely to succeed.\n * * *\n We are unpersuaded by Florida’s objections to the Bulletin.\n The state has therefore failed to make the requisite showing on the\n preliminary-injunction test’s threshold likelihood-of-success prong.\n So while the district court was wrong to deny Florida’s prelimi-\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds, its bottom line\n was correct: No preliminary injunction should issue.\n IV\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Bulletin is final\n agency action, that Florida’s challenge to it is ripe, and that Florida\n is unlikely to succeed on the merits. We therefore REVERSE the\n district court’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter\n jurisdiction, but AFFIRM the denial of Florida’s motion for a pre-\n liminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings con-\n sistent with this decision.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 40 of 45\n\n\n\n\n 24-10875 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Administrator for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10875\\n ____________________\\n\\n FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION,\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellants,\\n versus\\n\\n ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &\\n MEDICAID SERVICES,\\n Chiquita Brooks-LaSure, in her official capacity,\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH\\n AND HUMAN SERVICES,\\n Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,\\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 2 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-61595-WPD\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District\\n Judge.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n Medicaid, the government-sponsored health-insurance pro-\\n gram for those with limited resources or special medical needs, has\\n been described as an exercise in “cooperative federalism.” Harris v.\\n McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,\\n 316 (1968)). The program is jointly funded and administered by the\\n states and the federal government. This case presents a question\\n about how states may—and may not—foot their share of the Med-\\n icaid bill. For years, Florida has raised a substantial portion of its\\n Medicaid contribution through an intricate arrangement called the\\n “Directed Payment Program.” In 2023, the federal Centers for\\n Medicare and Medicaid Services released a “Bulletin” that, while\\n innocuous in name, was potentially dramatic in effect. The Bulle-\\n tin advanced an understanding of federal law that Florida feared\\n could jeopardize its Directed Payment Program and the billions in\\n Medicaid funds it generated. Florida sued the federal government\\n and moved to preliminarily enjoin the Bulletin’s implementation.\\n\\n\\n * The Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, United States District Judge for the\\n\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 3 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n The district court denied Florida’s motion and dismissed the case\\n on the ground that the Bulletin wasn’t a reviewable “final agency\\n action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act.\\n We hold that the district court was right to deny Florida’s\\n preliminary-injunction motion but that it did so for the wrong rea-\\n son. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the Bulletin was a\\n final agency action, and is therefore subject to judicial review. But\\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the\\n Bulletin and, accordingly, isn’t entitled to the preliminary injunc-\\n tion it seeks. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of\\n the complaint, affirm its denial of the preliminary injunction, and\\n remand for further proceedings.\\n I\\n A\\n Medicaid funding is a group project. The federal govern-\\n ment provides financial assistance “to states that choose to reim-\\n burse certain costs of medical treatment for needy applicants.” Ga.,\\n Dep’t of Med. Assistance ex rel. Toal v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1565, 1566 (11th\\n Cir. 1993). A complex matching formula generates the “[f]ederal\\n medical assistance percentage” in any particular state. 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396d(b). The federal share is always some percentage of a state’s\\n Medicaid expenditures—never less than 50%, but often higher, see\\n id. § 1396d(b)(1). So the more of its own money a state spends on\\n Medicaid, the more the federal government has to kick in.\\n As in many group projects, the participants’ incentives aren’t\\n always aligned. Because of the way the federal matching formula\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 4 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n works, states are understandably motivated to inflate their own\\n Medicaid spending numbers as a means of driving up federal con-\\n tributions. One way states can do this—without internalizing the\\n budgetary costs, so to speak—is by imposing so-called “provider\\n taxes.” See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-21-98, Medicaid:\\n CMS Needs More Information on States’ Financing and Payment Ar-\\n rangements to Improve Oversight 8–10 (2020). In broad strokes, here’s\\n how it works: (1) A state imposes a tax on healthcare providers; (2)\\n the state uses those tax revenues to increase its own Medicaid con-\\n tribution; (3) by virtue of its matching obligation, the federal Med-\\n icaid contribution likewise increases; and (4) those Medicaid dol-\\n lars—now including the extra federal share—get returned to the\\n same tax-paying providers through more generous Medicaid pay-\\n ments. A counterintuitive consequence of all this is that healthcare\\n providers have an incentive to—and in fact do—lobby state and lo-\\n cal governments to impose higher taxes. That’s because although\\n institutions subject to the provider tax will have to pay bigger tax\\n bills, they expect to receive even more back once they get their\\n Medicaid payments, as supplemented with an inflated federal\\n share. In recent years, states have started relying more heavily on\\n provider taxes to finance their Medicaid contributions, which, in\\n turn, has driven dramatic increases in mandatory federal Medicaid\\n outlays. See id. at 22–34.\\n In 1991, Congress adopted an important limit on states’ abil-\\n ity to juice federal contributions in this way—the so-called “hold\\n harmless” rule. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii); Medicaid Vol-\\n untary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 5 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-234, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 1793, 1793–99. Under\\n § 1396b(w), the Department of Health and Human Services must\\n deduct from its federal-matching calculation certain kinds of state\\n revenue. Chief among these mandatory deductions is any funding\\n that the state obtained through “health care related taxes.” Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(1)(A), (3)(A). On its own, that provision would require\\n the exclusion of revenue raised through the sort of provider taxes\\n that we’ve described. But the “health care related tax[]” ban has an\\n exception: States may raise revenue through a healthcare-related\\n tax so long as it is “broad-based.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(ii). But, it\\n turns out, the “broad-based” tax exception has its own exception:\\n HHS must nonetheless deduct revenue from even a broad-based\\n tax “if there is in effect a hold harmless provision (described in par-\\n agraph (4)) with respect to the tax.” Id. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\\n The cross-referenced Paragraph (4) sets out four different\\n ways of detecting whether a “hold harmless provision” is in effect.\\n See id. § 1396b(w)(4). We’ll return to all four in due course, but for\\n now it’s important to know about the method described in subpar-\\n agraph (C), clause (i). According to (C)(i)—and the case basically\\n rides on this language—“there is in effect a hold harmless provision\\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax” if “[t]he State\\n or other unit of government imposing the tax provides (directly or\\n indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to\\n hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the tax.” Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i). This much is clear and undisputed: By virtue\\n of clause (C)(i), a state can’t impose a provider tax on hospitals\\n while also promising to promptly refund (i.e., “hold harmless”)\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 6 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n those very same hospitals. Were things otherwise, states could se-\\n cure practically unlimited extra federal matching funds using reve-\\n nue that is little more than a short-term loan from the hospitals.\\n HHS’s Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (or\\n CMS) is concerned that states and providers have developed a so-\\n phisticated way to evade the hold-harmless rule. Things get pretty\\n involved, so we’ll try to simplify it using an illustrative example:\\n Imagine that a (very small) state has four private hospitals, each of\\n which provides care to a different number of Medicaid-insured pa-\\n tients. Hospital 1 opts not to take Medicaid insurance at all, so its\\n Medicaid share is 0%. Hospitals 2 and 3 accept Medicaid, but see\\n few low-income patients—let’s say their Medicaid share is 20%.\\n Hospital 4 both accepts Medicaid and receives many low-income\\n patients—its Medicaid share is 80%. The state opts to boost its own\\n Medicaid expenditures—and thus the federal match—by imposing\\n a provider tax on all four hospitals. This is a “broad based” tax, so\\n it doesn’t get deducted from the federal-share calculation.\\n The tax is good for Hospital 4 and bad for Hospital 1. Hos-\\n pital 4 will pay the tax but, in the end, will receive higher Medicaid\\n payments; Hospital 1, by contrast, has to pay the tax but won’t get\\n anything in return. Hospitals 2 and 3, obviously are somewhere in\\n between. The state could try to keep everyone happy by simply\\n refunding the hospital tax—but that the hold-harmless rule pre-\\n vents it from doing so. CMS worries that hospitals will end-run the\\n hold-harmless rule’s prohibition by redistributing their Medicaid\\n payments among themselves as a means of offsetting the provider\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 7 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n tax. So, for instance, Hospital 4 might transfer some of its new,\\n provider-tax-enabled Medicaid-payment surplus to Hospital 1 to\\n cover Hospital 1’s provider-tax assessment. That way, even\\n though both Hospital 1 and Hospital 4 are paying a new tax, they’re\\n both better off.\\n This case tests whether the hold-harmless rule prevents\\n these sorts of private-to-private redistributions.\\n B\\n In its ongoing efforts to implement the hold-harmless rule,\\n CMS has taken three regulatory steps that turn out to be important\\n to our analysis.\\n First, in 2008, CMS revised its hold-harmless regulations,\\n partly in response to a few congressional tweaks. See 2008 Final\\n Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 9,685 (Feb. 22, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R.\\n §§ 433.54–433.70); see also Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006,\\n Pub. L. No. 109-432, div. B, title IV, § 403, 120 Stat. 2922, 2994–95\\n (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)). Neither the statutory\\n amendment nor the agency’s revisions materially altered the (C)(i)\\n definition’s text or its implementing regulations. Compare 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.68(f)(3) (1993), with id. § 433.68(f)(3) (2008). But in the rule’s\\n preamble, CMS explained that “[a] direct guarantee [under (C)(i)]\\n would be found when a State payment is made available to a tax-\\n payer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the reasonable expec-\\n tation that the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\\n harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at 9,686; accord id.\\n at 9,694. In CMS’s view, “[a] direct guarantee does not need to be\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 8 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n an explicit promise or assurance of payment”; “[i]nstead, the ele-\\n ment necessary to constitute a direct guarantee is the provision for\\n payment by State statute, regulation, or policy.” Id. at 9,694.\\n Second, in 2019, CMS proposed another revision to its hold-\\n harmless regulations. See Medicaid Fiscal Accountability Regula-\\n tion, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,722 (proposed Nov. 18, 2019). The proposed\\n rule’s preamble reiterated CMS’s 2008 interpretation. See id. at\\n 63,730–31, 63,734. As CMS had said then, in its view a hold-harm-\\n less arrangement exists if “taxpayers have a reasonable expectation\\n that their forthcoming Medicaid payment (including any redistri-\\n bution) . . . results in participating taxpayers being held harmless\\n for all or a portion of the tax amount.” Id. at 63,734. But, CMS\\n continued, it had “become aware” of some novel—and it believed\\n unlawful—arrangements in which taxpaying providers were being\\n “held harmless” by way of payments not from state or local gov-\\n ernments, but rather from Medicaid Managed Care Organizations\\n or other taxpayers. Id. CMS insisted that “[t]he fact that a private\\n entity makes the redistribution payment does not change the es-\\n sential nature of the payment, which constitutes an indirect pay-\\n ment from the state or unit of government to the entity being\\n taxed that holds it harmless for the cost of the tax.” Id. at 63,735.\\n Put simply, CMS said, the sort of taxpayer-to-taxpayer redistribu-\\n tions exemplified in our hospital hypo are forbidden. CMS ex-\\n plained that in its view “[s]uch arrangements” were “inconsistent\\n with existing statutory and regulatory requirements prohibiting\\n hold harmless arrangements.” Id. at 63,734 (emphasis added).\\n Though CMS was proposing regulatory amendments, the changes,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 9 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n it said, did “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely\\n codif[ied] currently prohibited practices.” Id. at 63,735.\\n Third, in 2021, CMS withdrew its 2019 proposed rule. See\\n 2021 Proposed Rule Withdrawal, 86 Fed. Reg. 5,105 (Jan. 19, 2021).\\n The terse notice explained that “based on the considerable feed-\\n back we received . . . , we have determined it appropriate to with-\\n draw the proposed provisions at this time.” Id. at 5,105. The notice\\n explained that “the withdrawal of this proposed rule does not affect\\n existing federal legal requirements or policy that were merely pro-\\n posed to be codified in regulation.” Id.\\n C\\n The story underlying this case begins in earnest two years\\n later, in 2023, when CMS circulated a document that it called an\\n “Informational Bulletin.” See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs.\\n for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Health Care-Related Taxes and\\n Hold Harmless Arrangements Involving the Redistribution of\\n Medicaid Payments (Feb. 17, 2023), https://perma.cc/VW7X-\\n GX8V. In the Bulletin, CMS explained that it had “been ap-\\n proached by several states with questions regarding the statutory\\n and regulatory requirements applicable to health care-related\\n taxes.” Id. at 1. Citing the 2008 rule’s preamble, the Bulletin in-\\n sisted that the hold-harmless prohibition covers purely private re-\\n distribution arrangements because they “result[] in a reasonable ex-\\n pectation that the taxpaying hospitals, whether directly through\\n their Medicaid payments or due to the availability of the redistrib-\\n uted payments . . . , are held harmless for at least part of their health\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 10 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n care-related tax costs.” Id. at 3–4. And the Bulletin warned that,\\n should CMS discover forbidden private arrangements, the agency\\n could “disallow” (i.e., claw back) a portion of the offending state’s\\n Medicaid funds. Id. at 5.\\n The Bulletin spelled trouble for Florida’s Directed Payment\\n Program, under which local governments can assess special fees on\\n private hospitals. See Fla. Stat. § 125.01(1)(r). The governments\\n pool those assessments in “Local Provider Participation Funds,”\\n which they then transfer to the Florida Agency for Healthcare Ad-\\n ministration. The Agency, in turn, uses that money to supplement\\n Florida’s Medicaid contribution, which, for reasons already ex-\\n plained, enables the state to collect additional federal matching\\n funds. The extra federal funds in hand, the Agency redistributes\\n the combined monies to entities known as “Managed Care Organ-\\n izations,” which, in turn, return them to Florida hospitals.\\n At least 20 Florida counties and municipalities assess fees\\n through the Directed Payment Program. One is Broward County,\\n which imposes a special assessment on private hospitals. See\\n Broward County, Fla., Code §§ 16-123 to -137 (2025). Assessments\\n like Broward County’s qualify as “broad based” taxes because (to\\n simplify just a bit) they apply uniformly “to all providers in a class”\\n in “the area over which the unit of government has jurisdiction.”\\n 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(c)(2); see Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-127\\n (2025) (requiring “[t]he Assessment [to] be broad based”). And be-\\n cause the assessments are broad-based, they are presumptively per-\\n mitted under § 1396b(w). According to Broward County’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 11 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n ordinance, local hospitals “requested enactment” of the assess-\\n ment. Broward County, Fla., Code § 16-137 (2025).\\n The Directed Payment Program has been lucrative. In fiscal\\n year 2023–2024, Florida expected to raise $1.1 billion in nonfederal\\n Medicaid funding through Local Provider Participation Funds,\\n which it planned to use to secure another $2 billion from the fed-\\n eral government. See Wallace Decl. ¶ 15, Dkt. No. 10-1. According\\n to the state, this money is “integral to Florida’s healthcare system.”\\n Br. of Appellants at 6. Though the state doesn’t concede that pri-\\n vate redistribution arrangements exist in Florida, it acknowledges\\n that CMS might determine that they do—and fears that those bil-\\n lions in provider-tax-based funds could therefore be at risk. See\\n Wallace Decl. ¶ 28.\\n The state has cause for concern. A few months before it is-\\n sued the Bulletin, CMS sent a letter to the state expressing concern\\n that it might be harboring private hold-harmless arrangements and\\n promising a future review of the Direct Payment Program. See\\n Resp. in Opp’n Ex. A, Dkt. No. 22-2. Then, just days after releasing\\n the Bulletin, CMS followed through and commenced a Financial\\n Management Review of Local Provider Participation Funds. See\\n Compl. Ex. B, at 1, Dkt. No. 1-8. According to the review letter,\\n CMS asserted that there “appear to be pre-arranged agreements to\\n redirect Medicaid payments away from Medicaid providers serving\\n a high percentage of Medicaid beneficiaries to hospitals that do not\\n participate in Medicaid or that serve a low percentage of Medicaid\\n beneficiaries.” Id. at 2.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 12 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n Displeased with the Bulletin, Florida sued under the Admin-\\n istrative Procedure Act. It alleged that the Bulletin misinterpreted\\n the hold-harmless rule, that it was arbitrary and capricious, and that\\n CMS had improperly issued it without the requisite notice and\\n comment. The state then moved for a preliminary injunction, and\\n CMS moved to dismiss.\\n Acting on the recommendation of a magistrate judge, the\\n district court denied Florida’s preliminary-injunction motion and\\n granted CMS’s motion to dismiss. The court based both decisions\\n on its conclusion that the Bulletin wasn’t a “final agency action”\\n within the meaning of the APA’s judicial-review provision, 5 U.S.C.\\n § 704, and, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction.\\n This is Florida’s appeal. 1\\n\\n\\n 1 A few different standards of review apply here. We review de novo a district\\n\\n court’s dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tufts v.\\n Hay, 977 F.3d 1204, 1208 (11th Cir. 2020). We review for abuse of discretion\\n the denial of a preliminary injunction, “but the underlying legal conclusions\\n are reviewed de novo.” Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic\\n Ass’n, Inc., 942 F.3d 1215, 1229 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted). And “[a]s\\n a general matter, when an agency interprets a statute, judicial review of the\\n agency’s interpretation is de novo.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle\\n Cnty., 145 S. Ct. 1497, 1511 (2025) (emphasis omitted). But arbitrary-and-ca-\\n pricious review is “deferential.” Id.\\n In his separate opinion, Judge Jordan contends that legal issues embed-\\n ded within a district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction\\n shouldn’t necessarily be subject to de novo review. See Jordan Concurring Op.\\n at 1. His argument is characteristically thoughtful and rigorous, and not with-\\n out some force. But it runs headlong into a wall of our precedent expressly\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 13 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n II\\n We begin with jurisdiction. According to CMS, the Bulletin\\n wasn’t a final agency action and Florida’s suit isn’t ripe. We disa-\\n gree.\\n A\\n The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes judicial re-\\n view of “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. In this Circuit, final-\\n ity is jurisdictional. Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d\\n 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). Two conditions “generally must be\\n satisfied for agency action to be ‘final’ under the APA.” U.S. Army\\n Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597 (2016). The action\\n must (1) “mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking\\n process” and (2) “be one from which rights or obligations have\\n been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.”\\n Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citation modified).\\n Nobody here disputes prong one—that the Bulletin consummates\\n CMS’s decisionmaking. 2 The disagreement is instead about prong\\n\\n\\n holding that although we review the grant or denial of a preliminary injunc-\\n tion for abuse of discretion, we review constituent legal determinations de\\n novo. E.g., Wood v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 142 F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2025);\\n Gonzalez v. Governor of Georgia, 978 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020); Bloedorn v.\\n Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011); LSSi Data Corp. v. Comcast Phone,\\n LLC, 696 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2012).\\n 2 Nor could they. CMS’s conclusions in the Bulletin are neither tentative nor\\n poised for revision; no further “administrative steps [will] necessarily [] be\\n taken” with respect to CMS’s interpretation of the hold-harmless rule. Norton,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 14 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n two—whether the Bulletin determines “rights or obligations” or\\n portends “legal consequences.” We’ll lay out the doctrine and then\\n apply it to the Bulletin.\\n 1\\n CMS insists that the Bulletin is merely a “restatement of an\\n already-existing policy or interpretation” of the sort that we (and\\n others) have said “does not, on its own, determine any rights or\\n obligations and imposes no legal consequences.” Clayton Cnty. v.\\n FAA, 887 F.3d 1262, 1266–67 (11th Cir. 2018); accord, e.g., Indep.\\n Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Rob-\\n erts, J.) (observing that when an agency “merely restate[s] in an ab-\\n stract setting—for the umpteenth time—[its] longstanding inter-\\n pretation,” that restatement is not a final agency action); Gen. Mo-\\n tors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (similar).\\n The reason for that rule is clear enough: When an aggrieved party\\n seeks judicial review of a mere restatement, it is, in effect, suing\\n about the wrong thing—it should have challenged whatever action\\n the agency took in which it first adopted the complained-of view.\\n See Gen. Motors, 363 F.3d at 451.\\n But in arguing that the Bulletin is such a restatement, CMS\\n seems to conflate finality with an altogether different doctrine—\\n namely, about whether a particular agency action is “interpretive”\\n\\n 324 F.3d at 1238 (citing City of San Diego v. Whitman, 242 F.3d 1097, 1101 (9th\\n Cir. 2001)). To the contrary, the Bulletin’s explication of CMS’s views is deci-\\n sive and unambiguous, as it purports to “reiterate[]” the agency’s “longstand-\\n ing position.” Bulletin, supra, at 1.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 15 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n or “legislative.” Under the APA, when an agency introduces a new\\n rule, it must generally comply with the three-step notice-and-com-\\n ment process. See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575\\n U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (describing the steps). But there are exceptions:\\n The notice-and-comment requirement doesn’t apply to “interpre-\\n tative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organ-\\n ization, procedure, or practice.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). We’ll have\\n reason to return to the vexing interpretive-legislative distinction\\n later. For now, it’s enough to know “that the critical feature of in-\\n terpretive rules is that they are issued by an agency to advise the\\n public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which\\n it administers.” Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (citation modified). While leg-\\n islative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” interpretive rules\\n “only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer v.\\n Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).\\n As we understand it, CMS is making roughly the following\\n argument: (1) Unlike legislative rules, interpretive rules merely re-\\n iterate existing obligations, id. at 1337; (2) when an agency merely\\n reiterates existing obligations, its action doesn’t have direct and ap-\\n preciable legal consequences, see Clayton Cnty., 887 F.3d at 1266–67;\\n (3) when an agency action doesn’t have direct and appreciable legal\\n consequences, it doesn’t constitute final agency action, Bennett, 520\\n U.S. at 178; (4) courts lack jurisdiction to review non-final agency\\n actions, Norton, 324 F.3d at 1236. From those premises, CMS seems\\n to say, the conclusion follows that interpretive (i.e., non-legislative)\\n rules aren’t subject to judicial review. And because, CMS adds, the\\n Bulletin is an interpretive rule, it isn’t subject to judicial review.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 16 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n Clever, but not right. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,\\n the Supreme Court implicitly recognized that interpretive rules can\\n be subject to judicial review. See 575 U.S. 92, 105–06 (2015). Ac-\\n cording to the decision there, “interpretive rules do not have the\\n force and effect of law,” id. at 103—and yet, the Court said, should\\n an agency revise a preexisting interpretive rule by way of a second\\n interpretive rule, the second rule would be subject to APA review,\\n id. at 105–06. Perez therefore “affirms that interpretive rules can be\\n final” and importantly, “by implication, that the test for finality is\\n independent of the analysis for whether an agency action is a legis-\\n lative rule rather than an interpretive rule.” Cal. Cmtys. Against Tox-\\n ics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2019).\\n CMS’s deduction falters in premise No. 2. While the distinc-\\n tion between legislative and interpretive rules turns on a formal\\n analysis of whether an agency really is simply interpreting the un-\\n derlying statute, the distinction between final and non-final action\\n is pragmatic. Contrast Perez, 575 U.S. at 97 (explaining that “inter-\\n pretive rules” are “issued by an agency to advise the public of the\\n agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it adminis-\\n ters” and “do not have the force and effect of law” (citation modi-\\n fied)), with Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 599 (describing “the pragmatic ap-\\n proach we have long taken to finality” (citation modified)). Sure,\\n an interpretive rule might accurately reflect a statute’s best read-\\n ing—but it can also be final because it triggers new real-world\\n rights or obligations.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 17 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n So, with an interpretive rule—as with any challenged agency\\n action—we should inquire whether, as a practical matter, and\\n given the particular statutory context, the rule has “direct and ap-\\n preciable legal consequences.” Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598 (quoting\\n Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178). Or, as our D.C. Circuit colleagues have\\n put it, we should “pragmatically focus on the concrete conse-\\n quences the action has or does not have as a result of the specific\\n statutes and regulations that govern it.” POET Biorefining, LLC v.\\n EPA, 970 F.3d 392, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (citation modified); cf. Ap-\\n palachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (ob-\\n serving that “an agency’s [non-legislative-rule] pronouncements\\n can, as a practical matter, have a binding effect”).\\n 2\\n The Bulletin has practical, concrete legal consequences. To\\n be sure, the Bulletin purports to “reiterate[]” CMS’s preexisting po-\\n sition, as stated in the 2008 rule’s preamble. Bulletin, supra, at 2–4.\\n But it portends investigation and enforcement. It promises (omi-\\n nously) that CMS will “inquire about potential redistribution ar-\\n rangements and may conduct detailed financial management re-\\n views of health care-related tax programs that appear to include\\n redistribution arrangements.” Id. at 5. It insists that states must\\n “make clear to their providers” that private redistribution arrange-\\n ments are “not permissible.” Id. It announces that “CMS expects\\n states to make available” “detailed information . . . regarding their\\n health care-related taxes”—apparently including information\\n about private-only arrangements. Id. It threatens clawing back\\n Medicaid funding through “deferral or disallowance of federal\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 18 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n financial participation.” Id. And it warns that, should CMS “dis-\\n cover[] the existence of impermissible financing practices,” it “will\\n take enforcement action as necessary.” Id. The 2008 rule’s pream-\\n ble included none of these portents.\\n The Bulletin’s demands that states make particular infor-\\n mation available and notify healthcare providers of updated expec-\\n tations have the ring of “appreciable legal consequences.” Hawkes,\\n 578 U.S. at 598. Perhaps even more so, the Bulletin’s discussion of\\n deferral or disallowance—which could put billions in Medicaid\\n funding at risk—signals final agency action because it could\\n “force[]” Florida “to choose between costly compliance and the risk\\n of prosecution at an uncertain point in the future.” Racing Enthu-\\n siasts & Suppliers Coal. v. EPA, 45 F.4th 353, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (ci-\\n tation modified).\\n Three subsequent developments bolster our conclusion that\\n the Bulletin constitutes final agency action. First, shortly after cir-\\n culating the Bulletin, CMS initiated its Financial Management Re-\\n view of Florida’s Local Provider Participation Funds—and sug-\\n gested that the state was harboring private hold-harmless arrange-\\n ments. Second, more than a year after issuing the Bulletin, CMS\\n circulated a new document announcing its intention to exercise its\\n enforcement discretion not to take immediate action against preex-\\n isting private redistribution arrangements of the sort described in\\n the Bulletin. See CMCS Informational Bulletin, Ctrs. for Medicare\\n & Medicaid Servs., Exercise of Enforcement Discretion (Apr. 22,\\n 2024), https://perma.cc/6ZE5-Y6DY. And third, CMS and Florida\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 19 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n recently executed a new agreement—as a precondition of federal\\n approval of one of the state’s Medicaid Managed Care Programs—\\n that imposes a new information-collection requirement: Florida\\n must provide to CMS a copy of any agreements “regarding any ar-\\n rangement among [healthcare] providers . . . relating to each local-\\n ity tax or payments received that are funded by the locality tax.”\\n Special Terms and Conditions, Florida Managed Medical Assis-\\n tance Program 55 (Jan. 31, 2025), https://perma.cc/XZ5Z-JKSK.\\n The point isn’t that any of these documents is necessarily final\\n agency action on its own; rather, the point is that together they\\n serve to confirm that the Bulletin itself is driving fresh, practical\\n legal consequences. See POET, 970 F.3d at 405 (holding that EPA’s\\n application of a guidance document in a subsequent letter “rein-\\n forces the Guidance’s finality”).\\n Contrast the Bulletin with agency actions that courts have\\n deemed mere restatements of policy. In Clayton County, we held\\n that a letter from the FAA wasn’t a final agency action. 887 F.3d at\\n 1269. In so holding, we emphasized several considerations: The\\n letter took the same position that the FAA had expressed in a policy\\n statement two years earlier; the challenger knew about the earlier\\n policy statement; and by eliciting the letter the challenger had\\n transparently attempted to evade the applicable statute of limita-\\n tions. See id. at 1266–70. Similarly, in Independent Equipment Dealers,\\n the D.C. Circuit held that an EPA letter wasn’t final agency action.\\n 372 F.3d at 428. The EPA’s letter likewise restated a “longstanding\\n interpretation,” had no “concrete impact,” and “was purely infor-\\n mational in nature.” Id. at 427. To be sure, like the FAA and EPA\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 20 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n letters, the Bulletin appears to restate a preexisting interpretation—\\n but quite unlike those letters, the Bulletin is not “purely informa-\\n tional in nature.” Id. Rather, as already explained, it demands that\\n regulated parties take action by collecting data, examining program\\n participants, and enforcing CMS’s view of the hold-harmless rule—\\n and not so subtly hints at the dire consequences of non-compliance.\\n As we have said many times, for final-agency-action pur-\\n poses, finality is understood pragmatically, and no single feature of\\n the Bulletin is necessarily decisive. But taken together, the consid-\\n erations we’ve emphasized make clear that in the Bulletin, CMS\\n “has given the States their ‘marching orders’ and [CMS] expects\\n the[m] to fall in line.” Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1023. Accord-\\n ingly, we hold that the Bulletin is final agency action subject to ju-\\n dicial review. 3\\n B\\n Separately, but relatedly, CMS contends that Florida’s chal-\\n lenge to the Bulletin isn’t ripe. For many of the same reasons that\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 We reject CMS’s suggestion that the Bulletin isn’t a final agency action be-\\n\\n cause Florida could raise its arguments in defense to an enforcement action.\\n The Supreme Court long ago held that an agency order that threatened pen-\\n alties for noncompliance and “specif[ied] which commodities the [agency] be-\\n lieved were exempt by statute from regulation, and which it believed were\\n not,” was reviewable, even though the order “would have effect only if and\\n when a particular action was brought against a particular carrier.” Hawkes,\\n 578 U.S. at 599–600 (citation modified) (describing Frozen Food Express v. United\\n States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956)). So too here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 21 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n we’ve found the Bulletin to be final agency action, we conclude\\n that it is ripe for review.\\n Ripeness turns on (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial de-\\n cision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding our con-\\n sideration. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–149 (1967).\\n In administrative law, ripeness usually—if perhaps not always—\\n “overlaps with” finality. Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 307\\n F.3d 1300, 1311 n.10 (11th Cir. 2002); see Kristin E. Hickman &\\n Richard J. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 17.12 (7th ed. 2018\\n & Supp. 2025) (observing that courts often consider ripeness to be\\n “interchangeable with . . . finality,” but that it also can “sometimes\\n serve[] independent purposes”). Our analysis focuses in particular\\n on the hardship to the plaintiffs of delaying review, whether judi-\\n cial intervention would “inappropriately interfere” with the admin-\\n istrative process, and whether the case would benefit from further\\n factual development. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S.\\n 726, 733 (1998).\\n Whatever the theoretical distinctions might be, the Bulletin\\n is ripe for essentially the same reasons it is final. Delaying review\\n will cause Florida hardship because the Bulletin “inflicts significant\\n practical harm,” id. at 733, in that the state now faces a new de-\\n mand to root out private hold-harmless arrangements. Review\\n won’t inappropriately interfere with CMS’s decisionmaking pro-\\n cess because, per the Bulletin’s own terms, it represents the\\n agency’s refined, non-tentative views. Cf. id. at 735 (holding that a\\n forest management plan was not ripe for review in part because\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 22 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n “further consideration will actually occur before the Plan is imple-\\n mented”). And no further factual development is necessary. This\\n is principally a dispute over the meaning of a statute, which won’t\\n require us to “entangl[e]” ourselves “in abstract disagreements\\n over administrative policies.” Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 148.\\n * * *\\n The Bulletin is final, and Florida’s challenge is ripe. We\\n therefore have jurisdiction. On, then, to the merits of the state’s\\n preliminary-injunction request. 4\\n III\\n To obtain the preliminary injunction it seeks, Florida must\\n show that “(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the mer-\\n its; (2) it will suffer an irreparable injury unless the injunction is\\n granted; (3) the harm from the threatened injury outweighs the\\n harm the injunction would cause the opposing party; and (4) the\\n injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Dream Defs.\\n\\n\\n 4 A brief word about our decision to reach the merits: The district court never\\n\\n assessed the merits because it dismissed Florida’s suit and denied its prelimi-\\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds. Although we usually “go\\n no further into the merits than is necessary to decide the interlocutory appeal,”\\n that “is a rule of orderly judicial administration only”—we may go further if\\n it’s appropriate. Callaway v. Block, 763 F.2d 1283, 1287 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985).\\n Deciding the merits of Florida’s preliminary-injunction request is appropriate\\n because “both sides’ arguments go to the merits, no facts are at issue and the\\n questions raised are purely legal ones.” Id. at 1287. Were we to remand with-\\n out addressing the request, it “would unnecessarily delay the disposition of\\n th[e] case.” Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 23 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n v. Governor of the State of Fla., 57 F.4th 879, 889 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\\n tation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed any further than the\\n preliminary-injunction test’s first prong because we conclude that\\n Florida is unlikely to succeed on the merits. Johnson & Johnson Vi-\\n sion Care, Inc. v. 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir.\\n 2002).\\n Florida argues that CMS’s Bulletin is unlawful for three rea-\\n sons: (1) that it exceeds CMS’s statutory authority; (2) that it’s arbi-\\n trary and capricious; and (3) that CMS issued it without proper pro-\\n cess. For the following reasons, we reject all three contentions.5\\n A\\n 1\\n In assessing CMS’s statutory authority to issue the Bulletin,\\n “[w]e start, as always, with the text.” Bufkin v. Collins, 604 U.S. 369,\\n 379 (2025). Here, that is no mean feat. The Social Security Act, of\\n which the hold-harmless rule is part, “is among the most intricate\\n ever drafted by Congress.” Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,\\n 43 (1981). As relevant here, the Act provides that CMS should de-\\n duct from the federal government’s Medicaid contribution an\\n amount corresponding to state revenue collected while a hold-\\n\\n\\n 5 Of course, at this preliminary stage, we do not conclusively decide the merits\\n\\n of Florida’s challenges; rather, we hold only that Florida is unlikely to succeed\\n on the merits and, therefore, isn’t entitled to a preliminary injunction. See\\n Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“[I]t is generally inappro-\\n priate for a federal court at the preliminary-injunction stage to give a final\\n judgment on the merits.”).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 24 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n harmless provision is in effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(1)(A)(iii).\\n Then comes the subsection at issue here—which, fair warning, is\\n both bulky and a little clunky:\\n For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(iii), there is in effect\\n a hold harmless provision with respect to a broad-\\n based health care related tax imposed with respect to\\n a class of items or services if the Secretary determines\\n that any of the following applies:\\n\\n (A) The State or other unit of government imposing\\n the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for a payment\\n (other than under this subchapter) to taxpayers and\\n the amount of such payment is positively correlated\\n either to the amount of such tax or to the difference\\n between the amount of the tax and the amount of\\n payment under the State plan.\\n\\n (B) All or any portion of the payment made under this\\n subchapter to the taxpayer varies based only upon the\\n amount of the total tax paid.\\n\\n (C)(i) The State or other unit of government impos-\\n ing the tax provides (directly or indirectly) for any\\n payment, offset, or waiver that guarantees to hold\\n taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of the\\n tax.\\n\\n (ii) For purposes of clause (i), a determination of the\\n existence of an indirect guarantee shall be made un-\\n der paragraph (3)(i) of section 433.68(f ) of title 42,\\n Code of Federal Regulations . . . .\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 25 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n Id. § 1396b(w)(4) (emphasis added).\\n Happily, just one sentence really matters. Nobody disputes\\n that county-level assessments under Florida’s Directed Payment\\n Program constitute “broad-based health care related tax[es]”\\n within the meaning of the prefatory clause. And nobody contends\\n that the Bulletin can be justified under subparagraphs (A) or (B), or\\n that it addresses indirect guarantees, which are the subject of clause\\n (C)(ii). Instead, everything pretty much rides on clause (C)(i)—\\n which, to repeat, states that a hold-harmless provision exists when\\n “[t]he State or other unit of government imposing the tax provides\\n (directly or indirectly) for any payment, offset, or waiver that guar-\\n antees to hold taxpayers harmless for any portion of the costs of\\n the tax.” CMS insists that (C)(i) is implicated when private “taxpay-\\n ing providers” choose to “redistribut[e] Medicaid payments after\\n receipt to ensure that all taxpaying providers receive all or a portion\\n of their tax costs back.” Bulletin, supra, at 2. The question before\\n us is whether CMS’s interpretation fits the statutory language.\\n We can begin to clarify matters by diagramming clause\\n (C)(i)’s single sentence, matching the two key verbs with their ac-\\n companying nouns. First up, “provides”: It is the “State or other\\n unit of government” that does the “provid[ing].” This much seems\\n obvious and uncontroversial. Next, “guarantees”: It is the “pay-\\n ment, offset, or waiver” that does the “guarantee[ing].” This too\\n seems obvious—but it’s hotly contested. Florida insists that there’s\\n a “grammatical link” “between the government, as the actor provid-\\n ing for something, and a guarantee, as the thing provided for.” Br.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 26 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n of Appellants at 49 (quoting Texas v. Brooks-LaSure, 680 F. Supp. 3d\\n 791, 808 (E.D. Tex. 2023)). Therefore, Florida says, a hold-harmless\\n provision under (C)(i) exists only when the state government “in-\\n tentionally, deliberately, and with certainty causes the taxpayer’s\\n liability to be offset.” Id. We disagree. However intuitive, Flor-\\n ida’s reading has no footing in the ordinary rules of syntax. Con-\\n trary to Florida’s contention, the phrase “that guarantees to hold\\n taxpayers harmless” is a restrictive relative clause that modifies the\\n phrase “payment, offset, or waiver.” So grammatically, (C)(i)\\n works in two steps: (1) The state or local government provides for\\n a payment offset or waiver; and (2) the payment, offset, or waiver\\n in turn “guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless” for at least part of\\n the government-imposed healthcare tax.\\n With this clarification in hand, it seems clear to us that CMS\\n has the better argument. CMS’s position, stretching all the way\\n back to 2008 and reiterated in the Bulletin, is that “[a] direct guar-\\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\\n 9,686; accord Bulletin, supra, at 4. In the ways that matter, CMS’s\\n interpretation tracks (C)(i)’s text. The statute requires that the gov-\\n ernment “provide[] . . . for any payment, offset, or waiver”; so too,\\n CMS anchors its interpretation to a state “ma[king] available” a\\n “payment.” And, crucially, the statute then asks whether the “pay-\\n ment” “guarantee[s] to hold taxpayers harmless”; so too, CMS asks\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 27 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n whether “the payment would result in the taxpayer being held\\n harmless.”\\n It’s true, as Florida says, that “result in” doesn’t mean exactly\\n the same thing as “guarantee.” According to the state, to “guaran-\\n tee” is to “‘make oneself answerable for (something) on behalf of\\n someone else,’ ‘undertake to ensure for another,’ ‘serve as a war-\\n rant or guaranty for,’ ‘engage to . . . indemnify . . . loss,’ or ‘prom-\\n ise.’” Br. of Appellants at 48–49 (omissions in original) (quoting\\n Guarantee, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)). Per-\\n haps CMS’s phrase “[r]esult in” is more an approximation of “guar-\\n antee” than a jot-for-jot synonym, but it captures the same kind of\\n conduct: If a follow-on consequence of a state disbursing Medicaid\\n payments is that providers use those payments to offset taxes, then\\n the Medicaid funds are “ensur[ing]” or “indemnify[ing]” providers.\\n Put another way, the Medicaid payments “result in” a tax offset.\\n Florida seems to suggest that by using the word “guaran-\\n tee,” (C)(i) imports something like an intent requirement, which a\\n payment—an inanimate object—can’t meet. We disagree, for two\\n reasons. First, lifeless items can most certainly “guarantee” things.\\n Money deposited as bail guarantees the accused’s presence at\\n trial—no matter who ponied up the cash or what that person was\\n thinking. A title guarantees ownership of a car—no matter\\n whether the previous owner had regrets about selling. Gravity\\n guarantees that objects will fall—no matter who was thinking\\n about that. So too, a “payment, offset, or waiver” can “guarantee”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 28 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n that a provider will be made whole after it is taxed regardless of\\n whether the state intends to promise anything.\\n Second, Florida’s intent-based interpretation would make\\n (C)(i) the odd one out in an otherwise effects-based list. As the state\\n recognizes, (A), (B), and (C)(ii) “all define effects-based tests.” Re-\\n ply Br. at 21. But under Florida’s reading, (C)(i) alone would turn\\n on intent. See, e.g., Br. of Appellants at 2 (arguing that (C)(i) applies\\n “only if the taxing government requires or promises that the taxpayer\\n will be reimbursed for the tax”). Not dispositive, but weird. Under\\n CMS’s reading, by contrast, (C)(i) dovetails with (A), (B), and\\n (C)(ii).\\n * * *\\n CMS’s central insight—with which we agree—is that clause\\n (C)(i) simply doesn’t say that the state must guarantee anything.\\n Rather, the state provides a payment, which itself, in turn, guaran-\\n tees that a taxpayer will be held harmless. To the same effect, un-\\n der the Bulletin, when healthcare providers redistribute state Med-\\n icaid payments to offset taxes, those payments result in the taxpay-\\n ers being held harmless. If anything, CMS extends to states a dis-\\n cretionary boon the statute itself doesn’t require. The Bulletin cab-\\n ins its interpretation to instances in which the state or other unit of\\n government has a “reasonable expectation” that its payment will\\n be misused. The statute includes no such limitation.\\n In sum, we aren’t persuaded by Florida’s first-order textual\\n arguments.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 29 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n 2\\n The state challenges the Bulletin on two additional textual\\n bases. We find them no more persuasive.\\n First, Florida contends that CMS’s interpretation in the Bul-\\n letin renders subparagraphs (A) and (B) and clause (C)(ii) superflu-\\n ous. On CMS’s reading, the state says, every circumstance covered\\n by (A), (B), and (C)(ii) would also satisfy (C)(i). For instance, imag-\\n ine that a county government levies a 10% tax on hospital revenue.\\n The county also operates a grant program that reimburses resi-\\n dents up to 10% of the cost of their hospital stays. As a result, al-\\n most all the tax gets funneled back to the hospitals. This arrange-\\n ment would qualify as an “indirect” guarantee under (C)(ii). 6 Un-\\n der CMS’s reading of (C)(i), it would also constitute a “direct” guar-\\n antee, because the county would be providing for a payment—the\\n reimbursement to residents—that guarantees to hold the hospitals\\n\\n 6 Explaining exactly why this scheme would constitute an indirect guarantee\\n\\n requires a detour into the regulatory weeds. According to (C)(ii), a deci-\\n sionmaker seeking to determine whether a funding arrangement amounts to\\n an indirect guarantee should look to 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i). That regula-\\n tion, in turn, outlines a two-part test. First, the decisionmaker should ask\\n whether “the health care-related tax or taxes on each health care class are ap-\\n plied at a rate that produces revenues less than or equal to 6 percent of the\\n revenues received by the taxpayer.” 42 C.F.R. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(A). If so, there\\n is no indirect guarantee. Id. If, however, the tax generates revenue above the\\n 6 percent threshold, the decisionmaker should proceed to ask whether “75\\n percent or more of the taxpayers in the class receive 75 percent or more of\\n their total tax costs back in enhanced Medicaid payments or other State pay-\\n ments.” Id. § 433.68(f)(3)(i)(B). If the answer is yes, then an impermissible\\n indirect guarantee exists.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 30 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n harmless for a portion of the tax. Under Florida’s interpretation of\\n (C)(i), by contrast, this program wouldn’t be a direct guarantee, be-\\n cause the state isn’t itself doing the guaranteeing—whether the\\n money flows to the hospitals depends on the actions of third-party\\n patients.\\n Florida may well be right that CMS’s interpretation gener-\\n ates some (even substantial) overlap. But—and it’s an important\\n but—§ 1396b(w)(4) isn’t quite like other statutes with respect to\\n which courts have relied on the presumption against superfluity.\\n That canon has “special force” when “a statutory construction []\\n renders an entire subparagraph meaningless.” Pulsifer v. United\\n States, 601 U.S. 124, 143 (2024). That issue doesn’t exist here. CMS\\n isn’t interpreting (C)(i) in a way that swallows up the rest of the\\n statutory provision. By the statute’s own terms, each subpara-\\n graph (and clause) embodies a separate means of getting at the\\n same thing: whether “there is in effect a hold harmless provision\\n with respect to a broad-based health care related tax.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396b(w)(4). Because (A), (B), (C)(i), and (C)(ii) are all designed\\n to identify hold-harmless arrangements—which come in different\\n shapes and sizes—the overlap among them is unsurprising.7 At the\\n\\n 7 It’s worth noting that even under Florida’s reading of (C)(i), the clause’s test\\n\\n overlaps substantially with other provisions of § 1396b(w)(4). Consider a\\n scheme that functions like the private transfers at issue here but that the state\\n operates directly. Under such a program, the state would impose a broad-\\n based provider tax and then remit extra payments to hospitals that pay the tax\\n but receive little or no Medicaid funding. Subparagraph (A) would cover this\\n arrangement, because the state—which imposed the tax—would “provide[]\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 31 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n same time, each subparagraph and clause is different in the sense\\n that each identifies a different means—or, in the case of (C)(ii), de-\\n fines a means—by which a hold-harmless arrangement might be\\n accomplished.\\n Consider, in particular, the methods for sussing out direct\\n and indirect guarantees. As we’ve said, to ascertain whether there\\n is a direct guarantee, we must determine (1) whether the state pro-\\n vides a payment and (2) whether that payment guarantees that tax-\\n payers are held harmless. By contrast, to detect an indirect guaran-\\n tee, we ignore the mechanics of any funding arrangement and in-\\n stead ask simply (1) whether provider taxes exceed a certain thresh-\\n old and (2) whether a certain percentage of taxpayers recover a cer-\\n tain percentage of the tax. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(ii); 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.68(f)(3)(i). The direct and indirect tests may often arrive at\\n the same place, but they travel different routes. So, in sum, while\\n § 1396b(w)(4) admits some superfluity of coverage, it doesn’t entail\\n superfluity of method.\\n Second, and separately, Florida insists that, for (C)(i) to ap-\\n ply, the “‘unit of government imposing the tax’ [must] be the same\\n\\n\\n . . . for a payment . . . to taxpayers and the amount of such payment [would\\n be] positively correlated . . . to the difference between the amount of the tax\\n and the amount of payment under the State [Medicaid] plan.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(A). The scheme would also satisfy (C)(i) under either Florida or\\n CMS’s interpretation, because the state would be “provid[ing] . . . directly . . .\\n for [a] payment . . . that guarantees to hold taxpayers harmless”—regardless\\n of whether it’s the state or the payment doing the guaranteeing. Id.\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 32 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n ‘unit of government’ that ‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Reply\\n Br. at 24; see Br. of Appellants at 52–53 & n.11. We disagree. As an\\n initial matter, the state is again mixing up which verbs go with\\n which nouns. It’s the payment—not the unit of government—that\\n “‘provides . . . for’ the guarantee.” Moreover, and in any event,\\n Florida’s reading proves too much. Were it correct, a state could\\n end-run the entirety of § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) simply by assigning—as\\n Florida has—the taxing job to local governments, while retaining\\n the payment job for itself.\\n 3\\n Florida finally challenges CMS’s interpretation on two extra-\\n textual bases, neither of which convinces us.\\n First, the state contends that it would be absurd for the le-\\n gality of its tax scheme to depend on private companies’ behavior.\\n We don’t think so. For one thing, federal law already requires Flor-\\n ida to collect information on Medicaid funding recipients, so the\\n state shouldn’t be operating in the dark. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R.\\n § 433.74(a) (“[E]ach State must submit to CMS quarterly summary\\n information on the source and use of all . . . health care-related\\n taxes collected.”); id. (“Each State must also provide any additional\\n information requested by the Secretary related to . . . any taxes im-\\n posed on, health care providers.”). For another, the way healthcare\\n providers respond to and implement provider taxes isn’t really “in-\\n dependent” behavior. Hospitals and clinics have close, ongoing\\n contractual relationships with Florida’s state healthcare agency.\\n And Florida seems to have freely chosen to adopt its particular\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 33 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n (provider-solicited) healthcare-related tax scheme so as to boost the\\n federal government’s contribution to state Medicaid coffers. “Med-\\n icaid offers States a bargain.” Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl.,\\n 145 S. Ct. 2219, 2226 (2025). Part of the bargain is following the\\n hold-harmless rule.\\n Second, Florida cites the presumption that, under the Spend-\\n ing Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, “Congress must speak ‘un-\\n ambiguously’ and ‘with a clear voice’ when it imposes conditions\\n on federal funds.” West Virginia ex rel. Morrisey v. U.S. Dep’t of the\\n Treasury, 59 F.4th 1124, 1141 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Pennhurst\\n State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). True, inter-\\n preting § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t without its challenges. Even so, we are\\n convinced that CMS’s interpretation in the Bulletin is demonstra-\\n bly superior to Florida’s. Because § 1396b(w)(4) isn’t ambiguous,\\n the limitations imposed by the Spending Clause are satisfied.\\n * * *\\n Because the Bulletin is consistent with the statutory text,\\n Florida is not substantially likely to succeed in its frontal challenge\\n to CMS’s interpretation.\\n B\\n Next up, Florida’s contention that CMS acted arbitrarily and\\n capriciously in adopting the Bulletin. Arbitrary-and-capricious re-\\n view is deferential—an agency’s decisions need only “be reasona-\\n ble and reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592\\n U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Nonetheless, “[a]n agency may not . . . depart\\n from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 34 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n on the books.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515\\n (2009). “[T]he requirement that an agency provide reasoned expla-\\n nation for its action [] ordinarily demand[s] that it display aware-\\n ness that it is changing position.” Id. And “[w]hen an agency\\n changes course, . . . it must be cognizant that longstanding policies\\n may have engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken\\n into account.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,\\n 591 U.S. 1, 31 (2020) (citation modified). Florida asserts that when\\n CMS issued the Bulletin, it changed its position without acknowl-\\n edging as much and, in the process, ignored important reliance in-\\n terests.\\n CMS didn’t change its position in the way that matters—that\\n is, regarding the meaning of (C)(i). Rather, the Bulletin simply ap-\\n plies, using more specific language, an interpretation of (C)(i) that\\n the agency embraced more than a decade and a half ago. In the\\n 2008 Final Rule’s preamble, CMS announced that “[a] direct guar-\\n antee [under (C)(i)] would be found when a State payment is made\\n available to a taxpayer or a party related to the taxpayer . . . in the\\n reasonable expectation that the payment would result in the tax-\\n payer being held harmless for any part of the tax.” 73 Fed. Reg. at\\n 9,686; accord id. at 9,694. Then, in the 2019 proposal, CMS—\\n applying the same interpretation—insisted that “[t]he fact that a\\n private entity makes the redistribution payment does not change\\n the essential nature of the payment.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735. Alt-\\n hough CMS withdrew the 2019 proposed rule, both the proposed\\n rule’s preamble and the rescission notice made clear that CMS’s\\n positions didn’t depend on whether the proposed regulations went\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 35 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n into effect. See id. at 63,735 (explaining that the proposed rule did\\n “not reflect any change in policy or approach, but merely codified\\n currently prohibited practices”); 86 Fed. Reg. at 5,105 (“[T]he with-\\n drawal of this proposed rule does not affect existing federal legal\\n requirements or policy that were merely proposed to be codified\\n in regulation.”). The Bulletin undoubtedly signaled a shift in en-\\n forcement priorities. But “a belief about how an agency is likely to\\n exercise its enforcement discretion is not a serious reliance inter-\\n est.” FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 145 S. Ct. 898, 927\\n (2025)\\n Florida makes much of the fact that CMS withdrew the 2019\\n proposed rule. On Florida’s telling, “the 2019 proposal’s existence\\n proves that the policy it articulated—and that the Bulletin later\\n adopted—was new because, if the policy already existed, the 2019\\n proposal (and the later Bulletin) would have been unnecessary.”\\n Reply Br. at 9. It’s true that a withdrawn proposal probably isn’t\\n evidence of CMS’s official views. Cf. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,\\n 845 (1986) (“It goes without saying that a proposed regulation does\\n not represent an agency’s considered interpretation of its statute.”).\\n But the converse—that the 2019 interpretation can’t be CMS’s\\n view—doesn’t follow. CMS was absolutely clear in 2019 that, as\\n the agency saw it, the hold-harmless arrangements covered by the\\n proposal were already forbidden and that the proposal was exeget-\\n ical, not inventive. See, e.g., 84 Fed. Reg. at 63,735 (describing the\\n proposal as “add[ing] clarifying language to the hold harmless defi-\\n nition” (emphasis added)). Nobody doubts that the 2008 preamble\\n embodied CMS’s official position, and in that document CMS\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 36 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n advanced its reasonable-expectation interpretation of (C)(i). See 73\\n Fed. Reg. at 9,686; id. at 9,694. CMS applied that interpretation in\\n the Bulletin. And never—not in 2008, 2019, 2021, or 2023—did\\n CMS purport to exempt private-only arrangements from the hold-\\n harmless rule.\\n As evidence that CMS harbored views inconsistent with the\\n Bulletin, Florida cites two HHS Office of Inspector General state-\\n ments, a decision of the HHS Departmental Appeals Board, and a\\n brief email exchange about a telephone call that included the Di-\\n rector of CMS’s Financial Management Group. But none of these\\n is a relevant source for identifying CMS’s official views.\\n An agency’s “interpretation must at the least emanate from\\n those actors, using those vehicles, understood to make authorita-\\n tive policy in the relevant context.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558,\\n 577 (2019). Both the Inspector General and the Appeals Board op-\\n erate at some remove from the rest of HHS, and so we can’t as-\\n sume that their views are CMS’s views. Cf. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry\\n of N.J. v. Corrigan, 347 F.3d 57, 60–61 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The Office of\\n Inspector General of HHS, along with inspector generalships for\\n other federal administrative agencies and departments, . . . . are de-\\n signed to be independent and objective units separate from their\\n respective departments and agencies.” (citation modified)); Ariz.\\n Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1248\\n n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The [Appeals Board] is a separate adjudicatory\\n department within HHS that provides independent review of dis-\\n puted decisions for many HHS programs.”). And the curt email\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 37 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n referencing a phone call from the Financial Management Group\\n Director is far too little to establish CMS’s authoritative views.\\n Like our sister circuit, “[w]e would marvel if a few casual commu-\\n nications in the guise of informal calls and a staff email constituted\\n an agency’s formal position.” UnitedHealthcare of N.Y., Inc. v. Lace-\\n well, 967 F.3d 82, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2020); cf. Kisor, 588 U.S. at 577 (in-\\n dicating that “an ‘informal memorandum’ recounting a telephone\\n conversation between employees” is not an “authoritative pro-\\n nouncement” (quoting N.Y. State Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Bowen, 835\\n F.2d 360, 365–366 (D.C. Cir. 1987))).\\n In the end, the documents that do express CMS’s official po-\\n sitions—the 2008 rule, the 2021 rescission, and the Bulletin—are all\\n consistent. So, CMS didn’t sub silentio change its mind. Florida’s\\n arbitrary-and-capricious argument is unlikely to succeed.\\n C\\n Last of all we briefly return, as promised, see supra at 15, to\\n the distinction between “legislative” and “interpretive” rules. Im-\\n portantly here, legislative rules require the promulgating agency to\\n abide by notice-and-comment procedures, while interpretive rules\\n don’t. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). CMS released the Bulletin without no-\\n tice and an opportunity for comment. Accordingly, if the Bulletin\\n was a legislative rule, then it is procedurally invalid. But it wasn’t,\\n and so it isn’t.\\n Legislative rules “create[] new law, rights, or duties,” while\\n interpretive rules “do[] not modify or add to a legal norm based on\\n the agency’s own authority.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337. To\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 38 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 24-10875\\n\\n distinguish a legislative from an interpretive rule, we consider two\\n things. First, we look to “the agency’s characterization of the\\n rule”—though this is “not dispositive.” Id. (citation modified). And\\n second, we consider that an “interpretative” rule should “simply\\n state[] what the administrative agency thinks the statute means,\\n and only remind[] affected parties of existing duties.” Id. (citation\\n modified).\\n The Bulletin is an interpretive rule. For one thing, CMS\\n characterizes the Bulletin as mere interpretation, not an announce-\\n ment of new law. See Bulletin at 1 (saying that “this informational\\n bulletin reiterates our longstanding position”). And for another,\\n because the Bulletin properly and without novelty interprets\\n § 1396b(w)(4)—at least with respect to the topics disputed in this\\n litigation—the Bulletin “simply states what the administrative\\n agency thinks the statute means,” and in fact does “only remind[]\\n affected parties of existing duties.” Warshauer, 577 F.3d at 1337.\\n Of course, the mere fact that the Bulletin’s challenged as-\\n pects are consistent with the statutory text isn’t alone enough to\\n make the Bulletin a valid interpretive rule. Although statutes have\\n a “single, best meaning,” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.\\n 369, 400 (2024), at times “the best reading of a statute is that it del-\\n egates discretionary authority to an agency.” Id. at 395. So here,\\n it’s important that—with respect to the narrow question whether\\n § 1396b(w)(4)(C)(i) can cover private hold-harmless arrange-\\n ments—the statute doesn’t confer on CMS any discretion, CMS\\n doesn’t purport to be exercising any such discretion, and the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 39 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 Opinion of the Court 39\\n\\n Bulletin simply and correctly transcribes a longstanding and accu-\\n rate interpretation.\\n Because the Bulletin does “not have the force and effect of\\n law,” and simply “advise[s] the public of the agency’s construction\\n of the statutes and rules which it administers,” it’s an interpretive\\n rule. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995) (citation\\n modified). Florida’s argument that CMS evaded the notice-and-\\n comment requirement is therefore unlikely to succeed.\\n * * *\\n We are unpersuaded by Florida’s objections to the Bulletin.\\n The state has therefore failed to make the requisite showing on the\\n preliminary-injunction test’s threshold likelihood-of-success prong.\\n So while the district court was wrong to deny Florida’s prelimi-\\n nary-injunction motion on jurisdictional grounds, its bottom line\\n was correct: No preliminary injunction should issue.\\n IV\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Bulletin is final\\n agency action, that Florida’s challenge to it is ripe, and that Florida\\n is unlikely to succeed on the merits. We therefore REVERSE the\\n district court’s decision to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter\\n jurisdiction, but AFFIRM the denial of Florida’s motion for a pre-\\n liminary injunction and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this decision.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 40 of 45\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10875 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30969,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10749215,"string":"10,749,215"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Fairfield Southern Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-08"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10651"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 1 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10651\\n ____________________\\n\\n FAIRFIELD SOUTHERN COMPANY,\\n Petitioner,\\n versus\\n\\n DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’\\n COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\\n BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD,\\n EARLENE BARR,\\n o/b/o Billie Burke Barr, Jr.,\\n Respondents.\\n ____________________\\n Petition for Review of a Decision of the\\n Benefits Review Board\\n Agency No. 23-1080-BLA / 23-1081-BLA / 18-0567-BLA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 2 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n This appeal is from a grant of benefits under the Black Lung\\n Benefits Act. Billie Barr, Jr., developed a disabling respiratory con-\\n dition after transporting coal for U.S. Steel and Fairfield Southern\\n Co. for over fifteen years. For some of that time, he worked at an\\n aboveground preparation plant connected to an underground coal\\n mining site by over five miles of conveyer belts. The Black Lung\\n Benefits Act grants coal miners like Barr a presumption that quali-\\n fies them for benefits if they establish a disabling respiratory or pul-\\n monary impairment after fifteen years of work “in one or more un-\\n derground coal mines.” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).\\n The question for us is whether the Benefits Review Board\\n erred in holding that Barr—as an aboveground transportation\\n worker more than five miles away from where coal was ex-\\n tracted—worked “in one or more underground coal mines.” Be-\\n cause the statutory definition of “coal mine” includes aboveground\\n structures, we join the Tenth Circuit in holding that Barr’s above-\\n ground transportation work does not disqualify him from the pre-\\n sumption. But the statute also defines a “coal mine” to include\\n those facilities on, under, or above a particular “area of land.” 30\\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). Consistent with that statutory definition, the ad-\\n ministrative law judge found that the preparation plant where Barr\\n worked was not part of the underground mine (although it may\\n have been another kind of mine) and declined to apply the pre-\\n sumption in his favor. Because the Benefits Review Board errone-\\n ously reversed the ALJ’s finding, we grant Fairfield’s petition for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 3 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for proceedings\\n consistent with this opinion.\\n I.\\n\\n We start by summarizing the statutory and regulatory\\n framework because it provides context for this dispute. We then\\n turn to Barr’s work history and the procedural history of this ap-\\n peal.\\n A.\\n\\n The Black Lung Benefits Act provides disability benefits to\\n miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis, a “chronic dust disease”\\n of the lung that arises out of coal mine employment. See 30\\n U.S.C. §§ 902(b), 922(a)(1). The Act defines “miner” to include an\\n individual who worked in “transportation in or around a coal\\n mine” to the extent that he “was exposed to coal dust as a result of\\n such employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(d). By regulation, miners are\\n eligible for benefits if they can establish four things: (1) that they\\n suffer from pneumoconiosis (2) that arose out of their coal mine\\n employment (3) and contributed to (4) their total disability. See 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.202(d).\\n Certain categories of miners are entitled to presumptions\\n that establish one or more of these elements. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c).\\n If any miner proves that he has complicated pneumoconiosis, sec-\\n tion 921(c)(3) entitles that miner to an irrebuttable presumption\\n that his disease is totally disabling. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3); Usery\\n v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 7, 10–11 (1976). If a miner\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 4 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n proves that he has a totally disabling respiratory disease and\\n worked for at least fifteen years “in one or more underground coal\\n mines,” section 921(c)(4) entitles that miner to a rebuttable pre-\\n sumption that pneumoconiosis caused his total disability. See 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); Oak Grove Res., LLC v. Dir., OWCP, 920 F.3d\\n 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). Miners who worked “in a coal mine\\n other than an underground mine” can receive the same presump-\\n tion. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). But they must prove that conditions\\n in the mine were “substantially similar” to conditions in an under-\\n ground mine. See id.\\n The Act does not define “underground coal mine.” But it de-\\n fines “coal mine” as “an area of land” where “bituminous coal, lig-\\n nite, or anthracite” is extracted “from its natural deposits in the\\n earth by any means or method.” See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). That\\n mine also includes all “property . . . placed upon, under, or above\\n the surface of such land” that is used to extract or prepare the coal.\\n See id. The Act defines “coal mine” to “include[] custom coal prep-\\n aration facilities” as well. See id.\\n An implementing regulation defines an “[u]nderground coal\\n mine” as “a coal mine in which the earth and other materials which\\n lie above and around the natural deposit of coal (i.e., overburden)\\n are not removed in mining.” See 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). That\\n definition includes all land, buildings, and equipment “appurtenant\\n thereto,” see id., and has done so since 1971, see 20\\n C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971). No implementing regulation defines\\n “appurtenant.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 5 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n B.\\n\\n With this framework in mind, we turn to the facts of this\\n case. Billie Barr, Jr., worked as a railroad engineer for first U.S. Steel\\n and then Fairfield Southern Co. from 1965 to 1997. From 1965 to\\n 1981, Barr transported rail cars for U.S. Steel to the Concord under-\\n ground mine, miners filled those cars with coal, and Barr took the\\n cars to other facilities. He was absent from work for several periods\\n of multiple months during this time. When he was working, his job\\n regularly exposed him to coal dust.\\n Between 1982 and 1984, the Concord underground mine\\n closed, and the site began to operate as a coal preparation plant. A\\n miles-long system of conveyor belts transported coal to that plant\\n from the Oak Grove underground mine, a site at least five miles\\n away. Other than the belts, the land between the Concord prepa-\\n ration plant and the Oak Grove mine was forested and undevel-\\n oped. The Concord preparation plant washed, dried, and stored\\n coal from the Oak Grove Mine. From 1984 to 1987, Barr picked up\\n prepared coal for Fairfield from the Concord preparation plant and\\n transported it by rail to other facilities. In 1987, Barr stopped haul-\\n ing prepared coal from the Concord preparation plant. He contin-\\n ued to work for Fairfield as a rail transport operator until 1997, but\\n he no longer hauled coal.\\n Before his job responsibilities changed, Barr spent years\\n around coal. He also smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes per day\\n for about forty years. He started to experience breathing problems\\n before 1994 and filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 6 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n that year. Three years later, he used oxygen tanks for at least eight\\n hours per day. He died before his administrative proceedings con-\\n cluded, and his widow filed a claim for survivor’s benefits.\\n C.\\n\\n We now turn to the procedural history of Barr’s claim. Be-\\n cause of Barr’s work and medical history, his claim for benefits re-\\n lied heavily on establishing his right to a statutory presumption in\\n his favor.\\n An administrative law judge concluded that Barr was not el-\\n igible for the presumption and denied Barr’s claim for benefits. The\\n ALJ concluded that Barr worked for U.S. Steel “in an underground\\n mine” for fewer than fifteen years between 1965 and 1981 because\\n of absences from work. And he concluded that Barr’s work for Fair-\\n field at the Concord preparation plant did not qualify as work “in\\n an underground mine.” He found that the Concord preparation\\n plant was not “appurtenant” to the Oak Grove mine because they\\n were at least five miles apart. And he concluded that the belt sys-\\n tem that connected the two facilities did not make them part of the\\n same underground mine. The ALJ also found that conditions in the\\n Concord preparation plant were not “substantially similar” to the\\n conditions in an underground mine, so he did not count Barr’s\\n work at that plant towards the section 921(c)(4) presumption.\\n These findings led him to conclude that Barr was ineligible for the\\n presumption.\\n Barr appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review\\n Board, and it reversed the decision. The Board disagreed with the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 7 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n ALJ about whether Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant\\n was work “in an underground coal mine.” It held that the ALJ\\n “erred as a matter of law” when he determined that the Concord\\n preparation plant was not “appurtenant” to—and therefore not\\n part of—the Oak Grove mine. Billie B. Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA\\n & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). The Board recognized that\\n the ALJ did not formally define “appurtenant,” but it reasoned that\\n he implemented a “strictly distanced-based construction of the\\n term.” Id. at 11. The Board held that this construction was a legal\\n error because “appurtenant” relates more to “shared functions and\\n relationships between properties” than their proximity. Id. at 12.\\n Applying that definition, it found that the Concord prepara-\\n tion plant and Oak Grove mine were owned by the same company,\\n physically connected by a conveyor belt, and collectively prepared\\n coal for sale. It concluded that these shared functions and relation-\\n ships made the Concord preparation plant “appurtenant” to the\\n Oak Grove mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Id.\\n at 13. Because it found that the two facilities were “appurtenant,”\\n the Board reversed the ALJ’s finding that Barr’s employment at the\\n plant did not constitute work in an underground mine. Based on\\n Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant and Concord mine,\\n it then held that Barr qualified for benefits under the section\\n 921(c)(4) presumption.\\n The Board explicitly did not reach Barr’s alternative argu-\\n ment that the Concord underground mine retained its status as an\\n underground mine after it became inactive. Id. at 14 n.18. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 8 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n Board explained in a footnote that if it later determined that the\\n Concord site ceased to be an underground mine, it would remand\\n to the ALJ. Id. The ALJ could then reconsider whether conditions\\n at the Concord site were “substantially similar” to conditions in an\\n underground mine. Id.\\n On remand from the Board’s decision, an ALJ determined\\n that Fairfield failed to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption and\\n awarded Barr benefits. Fairfield appealed to the Board, and it af-\\n firmed.\\n Fairfield petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the Benefits Review Board’s determina-\\n tion that the ALJ’s decision was not in accordance with the law,\\n Lollar v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir.\\n 1990), and the Board’s interpretations of the Black Lung Benefits\\n Act and its implementing regulations, see William Bros. v. Pate, 833\\n F.2d 261, 264–65 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).\\n We also review de novo whether the Board adhered to its\\n statutory standard of review for factual determinations. See Lollar,\\n 893 F.2d at 1261. Under that standard, an ALJ’s factual findings are\\n conclusive if they are “supported by substantial evidence” consid-\\n ering the full record. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); see also Lollar, 893 F.2d\\n at 1261. “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a rea-\\n sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 9 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402\\n U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).\\n III.\\n\\n Fairfield argues that Barr is not entitled to benefits for three\\n reasons. First, Fairfield asserts that anyone who works above\\n ground doesn’t qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. Sec-\\n ond, it argues that, even if aboveground work in an underground\\n mine can qualify, the ALJ did not err in determining that Barr’s\\n work did not count because it was in an aboveground processing\\n plant several miles from where coal was extracted. Third, Fairfield\\n contends that, if we agree with its position, we should reinstate the\\n ALJ’s benefits denial instead of remanding for further proceedings.\\n We address each argument in turn.\\n A.\\n\\n We start with Fairfield’s argument that an aboveground\\n worker like Barr does not work “in one or more underground coal\\n mines” as a matter of law. Only one other court, the Tenth Circuit,\\n has addressed this statutory interpretation question.1 And it held\\n\\n 1 Before the Supreme Court changed the degree of deference owed to agency\\n\\n interpretation of statutes in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,\\n 412 (2024), the Sixth and Fourth Circuits each deferred to the agency’s defini-\\n tion of an “underground coal mine” in 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Those\\n courts read it to permit aboveground workers at underground coal mines to\\n qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. See Island Creek Ky. Mining v.\\n Ramage, 737 F.3d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 2013); Kanawha Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of\\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 539 Fed. App’x 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2013).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 10 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n that, for the purposes of the statutory presumption, a miner can\\n work in an underground coal mine even if his job tasks occur above\\n ground. See Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Programs,\\n 112 F.4th 902, 912 (10th Cir. 2024).\\n We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the statute.\\n This is so for three reasons.\\n First, the statutory definition of “coal mine” encompasses all\\n mine-related property, even if it is above ground. The statute de-\\n fines a “coal mine” to include buildings placed “upon, under, or\\n above the surface” of an area of land. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); see\\n Sunnyside, 112 F.4th at 911. An underground coal mine, because it\\n is a “coal mine,” also includes such aboveground property. See\\n Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 19 (2018)\\n (explaining that “[a]ccording to the ordinary understanding of how\\n adjectives work, ‘critical habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’”); Rimini\\n St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 341 (2019) (explaining that\\n “full costs” are still “costs”). Adjectives pick out a subset of the cat-\\n egories that they modify, and subsets necessarily have the charac-\\n teristics common to the larger group. See Weyerhauser, 586 U.S. at\\n 19–20. Here, the adjective “underground” picks out a set of “coal\\n mines” with underground mining operations, see 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30), and those “coal mines” still include build-\\n ings placed above ground.\\n For its part, Fairfield stresses that the phrase “coal mine” is\\n modified by “underground.” But that adjective refers to the type of\\n mine, not the location of an employee in the mine. Fairfield reads\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 11 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n the statute as if it requires work “underground in a coal mine.” But\\n it demands work “in an underground coal mine,” and those mines\\n have aboveground components. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2).\\n Second, this reading is more consistent with how the statute\\n as a whole uses the word “in” and categorizes miners for the pur-\\n poses of presumptions. We must “‘consider the entire text [of a\\n statute]’ . . . when interpreting any particular part of the text.” In re\\n Cumbess, 960 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Regions Bank\\n v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)).\\n Fairfield asserts that “in” an underground coal mine means\\n “inside of” or enclosed within that mine. Appellant’s Br. at 34–35.\\n But that reading gives the word “in” a meaning that is inconsistent\\n with how it is used in the rest of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). That statute\\n says, “in a coal mine other than an underground mine” just two\\n sentences after “in one or more underground coal mines.” 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). “[I]n a coal mine other than an underground\\n mine” cannot mean “enclosed within” or “inside of” that mine be-\\n cause those mines are definitionally above ground. Reading “in” to\\n instead mean “within the boundaries of”—its plain meaning—fits\\n comfortably with both statutory phrases. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1139 (1971) (defining “in” as a\\n function word used “to indicate location or position in space or in\\n some materially bounded object”); Black Lung Benefits Act of\\n 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 154 (adding the fifteen-year pre-\\n sumption to the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972). Under that read-\\n ing, the first part of section 921(c)(4) extends its presumption to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 12 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n qualifying miners who worked within the bounds of an under-\\n ground coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And its second part ex-\\n tends the same presumption to qualifying miners who worked\\n within the bounds of other coal mines. Because “[w]e ordinarily\\n presume that instances of the same word in the same statute will\\n have the same meaning,” see Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc. v. Dir., US\\n Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 143 F.4th 1331, 1345 (11th Cir. 2025),\\n we favor a reading of “in” that harmonizes its usage across section\\n 921(c)(4).\\n Our reading is also more consistent with how section\\n 921(c)(4) categorizes miners than Fairfield’s reading. See In re Cum-\\n bess, 960 F.3d at 1334 (interpreting a statutory provision consider-\\n ing “the physical and logical relation” of its many parts). Fairfield\\n reads “in one or more underground mines” to categorize miners\\n based on where they worked relative to the surface of the earth.\\n But section 921(c)(4) categorizes miners based on the type of mine\\n where they worked—surface or underground—not their locations\\n vis-à-vis the earth’s surface. See 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Our reading of\\n “in one or more underground coal mines” characterizes miners\\n that same way, and it is more consistent with section 921(c)(4)’s\\n structure.\\n Third, the Act’s implementing regulations have long treated\\n aboveground workers at an underground coal mine as employees\\n “in an underground coal mine.” See 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i)–(j)\\n (1971); 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Courts may “seek aid from the\\n interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 13 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n statutes.” Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2024)\\n (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)).\\n “Interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at is-\\n sue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be espe-\\n cially useful.” Id. at 1308 (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394). And\\n the Act’s first implementing regulations, like the current versions,\\n define an “underground coal mine” to include aboveground land,\\n buildings, and equipment. 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971); 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Consistent with that longstanding defini-\\n tion, those first regulations also explain that employees can work\\n “in an underground coal mine . . . above the surface at the mine.”\\n 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(j) (1971). We find those early interpretations of\\n “underground coal mine” persuasive. Together with the Act’s stat-\\n utory scheme and definition of a “coal mine,” they establish that a\\n miner can work “in an underground coal mine” above the surface\\n of the earth.\\n Fairfield makes three counterarguments, but they are not\\n convincing.\\n First, Fairfield argues that the statute’s purpose is defeated if\\n it applies to workers employed above ground. But the best evi-\\n dence of the Act’s purpose is its text. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th\\n 1331, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 145 S.\\n Ct. 545 (2024). The plain meaning of section 921(c)(4)’s text is that\\n all miners employed within the bounds of an underground coal\\n mine, not solely those who work below ground, may qualify for its\\n presumption. And, even if section 921(c)(4) had a different purpose,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 14 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n a “purpose can’t overwrite [that] ordinary understanding.” Gorecki\\n v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 143 F.4th 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2025)\\n (citing Jimenez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 119 F.4th 892, 911 (11th Cir.\\n 2024)).\\n Second, Fairfield asserts that our reading makes section\\n 921(c)(4) redundant with section 921(c)(3) by creating too much\\n overlap between the categories of miners eligible to pursue either\\n section’s presumptions. But the two sections remain distinct. Sec-\\n tion 921(c)(3) requires miners to prove that they have complicated\\n pneumoconiosis, a serious form of the disease, to gain an irrebut-\\n table presumption that their diseases are totally disabling. See Usery,\\n 428 U.S. at 7, 10–11. Section 921(c)(4) requires miners to prove dif-\\n ferent facts. It applies only to miners who submit medical evidence\\n that does not meet section 921(c)(3)’s requirements. See 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And it requires those miners to prove that they\\n are totally disabled and worked for fifteen years in qualifying em-\\n ployment. See id. If satisfied, it assumes the distinct fact that pneu-\\n moconiosis caused their disabilities. See id. Those differences exist\\n irrespective of the meaning of “in one or more underground coal\\n mines.”\\n Third, Fairfield maintains that the Supreme Court inter-\\n preted “in one or more underground coal mines” to require work\\n underground in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1\\n (1976). We disagree. In that case, miners challenged section\\n 921(c)(4)’s presumption for lack of due process. Id. at 30–31. In re-\\n solving that constitutional claim, the Court asked whether there is\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 15 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n “some rational connection” between the evidence required by sec-\\n tion 921(c)(4) and the presumption it provides. Id. at 28 (citations\\n omitted). The Supreme Court held that the two were rationally re-\\n lated, in part, because the Surgeon General told Congress that the\\n prevalence of pneumoconiosis increases linearly after fifteen years\\n underground. See id. at 30–31. But Usery did not consider or decide\\n whether miners “in . . . underground coal mines” must work be-\\n low ground. See id.\\n In short, the Act’s expansive definition of a “coal mine,” sec-\\n tion 921(c)(4)’s statutory scheme, and the Act’s implementing reg-\\n ulations establish that work “in an underground coal mine” may\\n include work above the surface of the earth.\\n B.\\n\\n Having rejected Fairfield’s first argument, we turn to its sec-\\n ond—that the ALJ reasonably concluded that the Concord prepa-\\n ration plant five or more miles from the Oak Grove mine is not a\\n part of that mine. Barr argues that the Board correctly reversed the\\n ALJ’s determination because the Concord preparation plant was\\n functionally connected to the Oak Grove mine by miles of con-\\n veyer belts.\\n We agree with Fairfield. To be sure, the aboveground Con-\\n cord processing facility is a type of “coal mine” because the statute\\n covers “coal preparation facilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But the\\n ALJ determined that the Concord processing facility was not an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 16 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n underground coal mine or part of the Oak Grove mine. We think\\n the Board erred in reversing the ALJ for two reasons.\\n First, the Board erred as a matter of law when it held that\\n the Concord preparation plant could be a part of the Oak Grove\\n coal mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Billie B.\\n Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 13 (Jan. 27, 2021).\\n The statutory definition of a “coal mine” includes property upon,\\n under, or above a particular “area of land.” See 30\\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); Black Lung Benefits Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-\\n 173, 83 Stat. 744 (enacting the current definition of “coal mine”).\\n Areas of land are geographically bounded. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 115 (1971) (defining “area” as a\\n “definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or\\n purpose” or “any particular extent of space”). That statutory defi-\\n nition makes the distance between a coal extraction site and a struc-\\n ture relevant to determining whether the structure is part of the\\n same “coal mine.”\\n The Board reached its contrary conclusion—that physical\\n proximity is largely irrelevant—based on the word “appurtenant”\\n in the regulatory definition of an “underground coal mine.” 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). The Board said that the word “appurte-\\n nant” “more accurately relates to shared functions and relation-\\n ships between properties than . . . their proximity.” Billie B. Barr,\\n BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). We\\n disagree. The Board’s geographically unlimited interpretation of\\n this regulation directly conflicts with the Act’s geographically\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 17 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n limited definition of a particular “coal mine.” See 30 U.S.C.\\n 802(h)(2). And where an interpretation of a regulation conflicts\\n with a statute, the statute controls. See United States v. Marte, 356\\n F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).\\n To be sure, the statutory definition of “coal mine” also in-\\n cludes a functional component. Section 802(h)(2) defines a “coal\\n mine” to include structures that are functionally related to coal ex-\\n traction—those structures “used in[] or resulting from” the work\\n of extracting or preparing the coal, including “coal preparation fa-\\n cilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But, to be a part of a single “coal\\n mine,” a structure must be “upon, under, or above” the same area\\n of land. See id. In short, the Board was wrong to reverse the ALJ\\n based on a definition of coal mine that makes geographical proxim-\\n ity largely irrelevant.\\n Second, given this understanding of the definition of “coal\\n mine,” the ALJ’s factual finding that the plant was insufficiently\\n physically connected to the Oak Grove mine to be a part of that\\n underground coal mine is supported by substantial evidence. See\\n Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). Evi-\\n dence is “substantial” if a reasonable mind might find it “adequate\\n to support a conclusion.” See id. (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).\\n Although coal mines may extend for miles under the earth, there is\\n very little record evidence about the scope of the “area of land” that\\n constituted the Oak Grove coal mine. Instead, the record is une-\\n quivocal that the Oak Grove mining site and the Concord prepara-\\n tion plant were physically separated by miles of conveyor belts and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 18 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n undeveloped land. This evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s\\n conclusion that the two sites were too physically distant to be part\\n of the same mine. See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261 (11th Cir. 1990). On\\n this record, the Board should have deferred to the ALJ’s factfinding\\n on this point.\\n C.\\n\\n Because we agree with Fairfield that Barr’s work at the Con-\\n cord preparation plant was not work “in one or more underground\\n coal mines,” we turn to its argument that we should order the\\n Board to reinstate the ALJ’s initial benefits denial.\\n We disagree. Because the ALJ rejected the presumption for\\n work in an underground coal mine, the ALJ’s denial turned on its\\n factfinding that conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\\n not “substantially similar” to conditions in an underground mine.\\n We cannot reinstate the ALJ’s decision without endorsing that find-\\n ing. The Board’s reversal made that finding irrelevant, but the\\n Board nonetheless explained that, if that fact issue were relevant, it\\n would remand for further factual development. Of course, the\\n Board didn’t remand—its decision on the underground mine pre-\\n sumption made the factual issue a moot point. But, if the Board had\\n remanded, such a remand would not constitute a final decision sub-\\n ject to our review. See Redden v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Pro-\\n grams, 825 F.2d 337, 338 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Jack. Shipyards, Inc.\\n v. Est. of Verderane, 729 F.2d 726, 727 (11th Cir. 1984)) (explaining\\n that Board orders that remand cases to ALJs for further findings are\\n not reviewable, final orders); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Dir., Off. of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 19 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 826 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987) (cita-\\n tions omitted) (same).\\n In any event, the Board did not decide whether the condi-\\n tions of Barr’s employment were comparable to those in an under-\\n ground mine. And we will not pass on that issue without a full ad-\\n judication before the ALJ and Board. “It is the general rule that a\\n federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed on be-\\n low.” United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 2009)\\n (citing first Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); and then Bliss\\n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 620 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir.\\n 1980)); see also Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1303 n.7 (11th\\n Cir. 2004) (declining to address a question not reached by the\\n agency decision under review). Because the Board’s order did not\\n resolve whether conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\\n substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine, we de-\\n cline to make that determination.\\n IV.\\n\\n We GRANT Fairfield’s petition for review, VACATE the\\n Board’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\n with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11215800/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRASHER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRASHER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749215/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Fairfield Southern Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-08\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 1 of 19\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10651\n ____________________\n\n FAIRFIELD SOUTHERN COMPANY,\n Petitioner,\n versus\n\n DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’\n COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\n BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD,\n EARLENE BARR,\n o/b/o Billie Burke Barr, Jr.,\n Respondents.\n ____________________\n Petition for Review of a Decision of the\n Benefits Review Board\n Agency No. 23-1080-BLA / 23-1081-BLA / 18-0567-BLA\n ____________________\n\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 2 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\n This appeal is from a grant of benefits under the Black Lung\n Benefits Act. Billie Barr, Jr., developed a disabling respiratory con-\n dition after transporting coal for U.S. Steel and Fairfield Southern\n Co. for over fifteen years. For some of that time, he worked at an\n aboveground preparation plant connected to an underground coal\n mining site by over five miles of conveyer belts. The Black Lung\n Benefits Act grants coal miners like Barr a presumption that quali-\n fies them for benefits if they establish a disabling respiratory or pul-\n monary impairment after fifteen years of work “in one or more un-\n derground coal mines.” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).\n The question for us is whether the Benefits Review Board\n erred in holding that Barr—as an aboveground transportation\n worker more than five miles away from where coal was ex-\n tracted—worked “in one or more underground coal mines.” Be-\n cause the statutory definition of “coal mine” includes aboveground\n structures, we join the Tenth Circuit in holding that Barr’s above-\n ground transportation work does not disqualify him from the pre-\n sumption. But the statute also defines a “coal mine” to include\n those facilities on, under, or above a particular “area of land.” 30\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). Consistent with that statutory definition, the ad-\n ministrative law judge found that the preparation plant where Barr\n worked was not part of the underground mine (although it may\n have been another kind of mine) and declined to apply the pre-\n sumption in his favor. Because the Benefits Review Board errone-\n ously reversed the ALJ’s finding, we grant Fairfield’s petition for\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 3 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for proceedings\n consistent with this opinion.\n I.\n\n We start by summarizing the statutory and regulatory\n framework because it provides context for this dispute. We then\n turn to Barr’s work history and the procedural history of this ap-\n peal.\n A.\n\n The Black Lung Benefits Act provides disability benefits to\n miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis, a “chronic dust disease”\n of the lung that arises out of coal mine employment. See 30\n U.S.C. §§ 902(b), 922(a)(1). The Act defines “miner” to include an\n individual who worked in “transportation in or around a coal\n mine” to the extent that he “was exposed to coal dust as a result of\n such employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(d). By regulation, miners are\n eligible for benefits if they can establish four things: (1) that they\n suffer from pneumoconiosis (2) that arose out of their coal mine\n employment (3) and contributed to (4) their total disability. See 20\n C.F.R. § 725.202(d).\n Certain categories of miners are entitled to presumptions\n that establish one or more of these elements. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c).\n If any miner proves that he has complicated pneumoconiosis, sec-\n tion 921(c)(3) entitles that miner to an irrebuttable presumption\n that his disease is totally disabling. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3); Usery\n v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 7, 10–11 (1976). If a miner\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 4 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n proves that he has a totally disabling respiratory disease and\n worked for at least fifteen years “in one or more underground coal\n mines,” section 921(c)(4) entitles that miner to a rebuttable pre-\n sumption that pneumoconiosis caused his total disability. See 30\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); Oak Grove Res., LLC v. Dir., OWCP, 920 F.3d\n 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). Miners who worked “in a coal mine\n other than an underground mine” can receive the same presump-\n tion. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). But they must prove that conditions\n in the mine were “substantially similar” to conditions in an under-\n ground mine. See id.\n The Act does not define “underground coal mine.” But it de-\n fines “coal mine” as “an area of land” where “bituminous coal, lig-\n nite, or anthracite” is extracted “from its natural deposits in the\n earth by any means or method.” See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). That\n mine also includes all “property . . . placed upon, under, or above\n the surface of such land” that is used to extract or prepare the coal.\n See id. The Act defines “coal mine” to “include[] custom coal prep-\n aration facilities” as well. See id.\n An implementing regulation defines an “[u]nderground coal\n mine” as “a coal mine in which the earth and other materials which\n lie above and around the natural deposit of coal (i.e., overburden)\n are not removed in mining.” See 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). That\n definition includes all land, buildings, and equipment “appurtenant\n thereto,” see id., and has done so since 1971, see 20\n C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971). No implementing regulation defines\n “appurtenant.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 5 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n B.\n\n With this framework in mind, we turn to the facts of this\n case. Billie Barr, Jr., worked as a railroad engineer for first U.S. Steel\n and then Fairfield Southern Co. from 1965 to 1997. From 1965 to\n 1981, Barr transported rail cars for U.S. Steel to the Concord under-\n ground mine, miners filled those cars with coal, and Barr took the\n cars to other facilities. He was absent from work for several periods\n of multiple months during this time. When he was working, his job\n regularly exposed him to coal dust.\n Between 1982 and 1984, the Concord underground mine\n closed, and the site began to operate as a coal preparation plant. A\n miles-long system of conveyor belts transported coal to that plant\n from the Oak Grove underground mine, a site at least five miles\n away. Other than the belts, the land between the Concord prepa-\n ration plant and the Oak Grove mine was forested and undevel-\n oped. The Concord preparation plant washed, dried, and stored\n coal from the Oak Grove Mine. From 1984 to 1987, Barr picked up\n prepared coal for Fairfield from the Concord preparation plant and\n transported it by rail to other facilities. In 1987, Barr stopped haul-\n ing prepared coal from the Concord preparation plant. He contin-\n ued to work for Fairfield as a rail transport operator until 1997, but\n he no longer hauled coal.\n Before his job responsibilities changed, Barr spent years\n around coal. He also smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes per day\n for about forty years. He started to experience breathing problems\n before 1994 and filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 6 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n that year. Three years later, he used oxygen tanks for at least eight\n hours per day. He died before his administrative proceedings con-\n cluded, and his widow filed a claim for survivor’s benefits.\n C.\n\n We now turn to the procedural history of Barr’s claim. Be-\n cause of Barr’s work and medical history, his claim for benefits re-\n lied heavily on establishing his right to a statutory presumption in\n his favor.\n An administrative law judge concluded that Barr was not el-\n igible for the presumption and denied Barr’s claim for benefits. The\n ALJ concluded that Barr worked for U.S. Steel “in an underground\n mine” for fewer than fifteen years between 1965 and 1981 because\n of absences from work. And he concluded that Barr’s work for Fair-\n field at the Concord preparation plant did not qualify as work “in\n an underground mine.” He found that the Concord preparation\n plant was not “appurtenant” to the Oak Grove mine because they\n were at least five miles apart. And he concluded that the belt sys-\n tem that connected the two facilities did not make them part of the\n same underground mine. The ALJ also found that conditions in the\n Concord preparation plant were not “substantially similar” to the\n conditions in an underground mine, so he did not count Barr’s\n work at that plant towards the section 921(c)(4) presumption.\n These findings led him to conclude that Barr was ineligible for the\n presumption.\n Barr appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review\n Board, and it reversed the decision. The Board disagreed with the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 7 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n ALJ about whether Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant\n was work “in an underground coal mine.” It held that the ALJ\n “erred as a matter of law” when he determined that the Concord\n preparation plant was not “appurtenant” to—and therefore not\n part of—the Oak Grove mine. Billie B. Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA\n & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). The Board recognized that\n the ALJ did not formally define “appurtenant,” but it reasoned that\n he implemented a “strictly distanced-based construction of the\n term.” Id. at 11. The Board held that this construction was a legal\n error because “appurtenant” relates more to “shared functions and\n relationships between properties” than their proximity. Id. at 12.\n Applying that definition, it found that the Concord prepara-\n tion plant and Oak Grove mine were owned by the same company,\n physically connected by a conveyor belt, and collectively prepared\n coal for sale. It concluded that these shared functions and relation-\n ships made the Concord preparation plant “appurtenant” to the\n Oak Grove mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Id.\n at 13. Because it found that the two facilities were “appurtenant,”\n the Board reversed the ALJ’s finding that Barr’s employment at the\n plant did not constitute work in an underground mine. Based on\n Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant and Concord mine,\n it then held that Barr qualified for benefits under the section\n 921(c)(4) presumption.\n The Board explicitly did not reach Barr’s alternative argu-\n ment that the Concord underground mine retained its status as an\n underground mine after it became inactive. Id. at 14 n.18. The\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 8 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n Board explained in a footnote that if it later determined that the\n Concord site ceased to be an underground mine, it would remand\n to the ALJ. Id. The ALJ could then reconsider whether conditions\n at the Concord site were “substantially similar” to conditions in an\n underground mine. Id.\n On remand from the Board’s decision, an ALJ determined\n that Fairfield failed to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption and\n awarded Barr benefits. Fairfield appealed to the Board, and it af-\n firmed.\n Fairfield petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.\n II.\n\n We review de novo the Benefits Review Board’s determina-\n tion that the ALJ’s decision was not in accordance with the law,\n Lollar v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir.\n 1990), and the Board’s interpretations of the Black Lung Benefits\n Act and its implementing regulations, see William Bros. v. Pate, 833\n F.2d 261, 264–65 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).\n We also review de novo whether the Board adhered to its\n statutory standard of review for factual determinations. See Lollar,\n 893 F.2d at 1261. Under that standard, an ALJ’s factual findings are\n conclusive if they are “supported by substantial evidence” consid-\n ering the full record. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); see also Lollar, 893 F.2d\n at 1261. “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a rea-\n sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 9 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402\n U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).\n III.\n\n Fairfield argues that Barr is not entitled to benefits for three\n reasons. First, Fairfield asserts that anyone who works above\n ground doesn’t qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. Sec-\n ond, it argues that, even if aboveground work in an underground\n mine can qualify, the ALJ did not err in determining that Barr’s\n work did not count because it was in an aboveground processing\n plant several miles from where coal was extracted. Third, Fairfield\n contends that, if we agree with its position, we should reinstate the\n ALJ’s benefits denial instead of remanding for further proceedings.\n We address each argument in turn.\n A.\n\n We start with Fairfield’s argument that an aboveground\n worker like Barr does not work “in one or more underground coal\n mines” as a matter of law. Only one other court, the Tenth Circuit,\n has addressed this statutory interpretation question.1 And it held\n\n 1 Before the Supreme Court changed the degree of deference owed to agency\n\n interpretation of statutes in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,\n 412 (2024), the Sixth and Fourth Circuits each deferred to the agency’s defini-\n tion of an “underground coal mine” in 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Those\n courts read it to permit aboveground workers at underground coal mines to\n qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. See Island Creek Ky. Mining v.\n Ramage, 737 F.3d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 2013); Kanawha Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 539 Fed. App’x 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2013).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 10 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n that, for the purposes of the statutory presumption, a miner can\n work in an underground coal mine even if his job tasks occur above\n ground. See Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Programs,\n 112 F.4th 902, 912 (10th Cir. 2024).\n We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the statute.\n This is so for three reasons.\n First, the statutory definition of “coal mine” encompasses all\n mine-related property, even if it is above ground. The statute de-\n fines a “coal mine” to include buildings placed “upon, under, or\n above the surface” of an area of land. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); see\n Sunnyside, 112 F.4th at 911. An underground coal mine, because it\n is a “coal mine,” also includes such aboveground property. See\n Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 19 (2018)\n (explaining that “[a]ccording to the ordinary understanding of how\n adjectives work, ‘critical habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’”); Rimini\n St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 341 (2019) (explaining that\n “full costs” are still “costs”). Adjectives pick out a subset of the cat-\n egories that they modify, and subsets necessarily have the charac-\n teristics common to the larger group. See Weyerhauser, 586 U.S. at\n 19–20. Here, the adjective “underground” picks out a set of “coal\n mines” with underground mining operations, see 20\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30), and those “coal mines” still include build-\n ings placed above ground.\n For its part, Fairfield stresses that the phrase “coal mine” is\n modified by “underground.” But that adjective refers to the type of\n mine, not the location of an employee in the mine. Fairfield reads\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 11 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n the statute as if it requires work “underground in a coal mine.” But\n it demands work “in an underground coal mine,” and those mines\n have aboveground components. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2).\n Second, this reading is more consistent with how the statute\n as a whole uses the word “in” and categorizes miners for the pur-\n poses of presumptions. We must “‘consider the entire text [of a\n statute]’ . . . when interpreting any particular part of the text.” In re\n Cumbess, 960 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Regions Bank\n v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)).\n Fairfield asserts that “in” an underground coal mine means\n “inside of” or enclosed within that mine. Appellant’s Br. at 34–35.\n But that reading gives the word “in” a meaning that is inconsistent\n with how it is used in the rest of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). That statute\n says, “in a coal mine other than an underground mine” just two\n sentences after “in one or more underground coal mines.” 30\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). “[I]n a coal mine other than an underground\n mine” cannot mean “enclosed within” or “inside of” that mine be-\n cause those mines are definitionally above ground. Reading “in” to\n instead mean “within the boundaries of”—its plain meaning—fits\n comfortably with both statutory phrases. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1139 (1971) (defining “in” as a\n function word used “to indicate location or position in space or in\n some materially bounded object”); Black Lung Benefits Act of\n 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 154 (adding the fifteen-year pre-\n sumption to the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972). Under that read-\n ing, the first part of section 921(c)(4) extends its presumption to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 12 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n qualifying miners who worked within the bounds of an under-\n ground coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And its second part ex-\n tends the same presumption to qualifying miners who worked\n within the bounds of other coal mines. Because “[w]e ordinarily\n presume that instances of the same word in the same statute will\n have the same meaning,” see Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc. v. Dir., US\n Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 143 F.4th 1331, 1345 (11th Cir. 2025),\n we favor a reading of “in” that harmonizes its usage across section\n 921(c)(4).\n Our reading is also more consistent with how section\n 921(c)(4) categorizes miners than Fairfield’s reading. See In re Cum-\n bess, 960 F.3d at 1334 (interpreting a statutory provision consider-\n ing “the physical and logical relation” of its many parts). Fairfield\n reads “in one or more underground mines” to categorize miners\n based on where they worked relative to the surface of the earth.\n But section 921(c)(4) categorizes miners based on the type of mine\n where they worked—surface or underground—not their locations\n vis-à-vis the earth’s surface. See 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Our reading of\n “in one or more underground coal mines” characterizes miners\n that same way, and it is more consistent with section 921(c)(4)’s\n structure.\n Third, the Act’s implementing regulations have long treated\n aboveground workers at an underground coal mine as employees\n “in an underground coal mine.” See 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i)–(j)\n (1971); 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Courts may “seek aid from the\n interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 13 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n statutes.” Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2024)\n (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)).\n “Interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at is-\n sue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be espe-\n cially useful.” Id. at 1308 (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394). And\n the Act’s first implementing regulations, like the current versions,\n define an “underground coal mine” to include aboveground land,\n buildings, and equipment. 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971); 20\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Consistent with that longstanding defini-\n tion, those first regulations also explain that employees can work\n “in an underground coal mine . . . above the surface at the mine.”\n 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(j) (1971). We find those early interpretations of\n “underground coal mine” persuasive. Together with the Act’s stat-\n utory scheme and definition of a “coal mine,” they establish that a\n miner can work “in an underground coal mine” above the surface\n of the earth.\n Fairfield makes three counterarguments, but they are not\n convincing.\n First, Fairfield argues that the statute’s purpose is defeated if\n it applies to workers employed above ground. But the best evi-\n dence of the Act’s purpose is its text. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th\n 1331, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 145 S.\n Ct. 545 (2024). The plain meaning of section 921(c)(4)’s text is that\n all miners employed within the bounds of an underground coal\n mine, not solely those who work below ground, may qualify for its\n presumption. And, even if section 921(c)(4) had a different purpose,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 14 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n a “purpose can’t overwrite [that] ordinary understanding.” Gorecki\n v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 143 F.4th 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2025)\n (citing Jimenez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 119 F.4th 892, 911 (11th Cir.\n 2024)).\n Second, Fairfield asserts that our reading makes section\n 921(c)(4) redundant with section 921(c)(3) by creating too much\n overlap between the categories of miners eligible to pursue either\n section’s presumptions. But the two sections remain distinct. Sec-\n tion 921(c)(3) requires miners to prove that they have complicated\n pneumoconiosis, a serious form of the disease, to gain an irrebut-\n table presumption that their diseases are totally disabling. See Usery,\n 428 U.S. at 7, 10–11. Section 921(c)(4) requires miners to prove dif-\n ferent facts. It applies only to miners who submit medical evidence\n that does not meet section 921(c)(3)’s requirements. See 30\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And it requires those miners to prove that they\n are totally disabled and worked for fifteen years in qualifying em-\n ployment. See id. If satisfied, it assumes the distinct fact that pneu-\n moconiosis caused their disabilities. See id. Those differences exist\n irrespective of the meaning of “in one or more underground coal\n mines.”\n Third, Fairfield maintains that the Supreme Court inter-\n preted “in one or more underground coal mines” to require work\n underground in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1\n (1976). We disagree. In that case, miners challenged section\n 921(c)(4)’s presumption for lack of due process. Id. at 30–31. In re-\n solving that constitutional claim, the Court asked whether there is\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 15 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n “some rational connection” between the evidence required by sec-\n tion 921(c)(4) and the presumption it provides. Id. at 28 (citations\n omitted). The Supreme Court held that the two were rationally re-\n lated, in part, because the Surgeon General told Congress that the\n prevalence of pneumoconiosis increases linearly after fifteen years\n underground. See id. at 30–31. But Usery did not consider or decide\n whether miners “in . . . underground coal mines” must work be-\n low ground. See id.\n In short, the Act’s expansive definition of a “coal mine,” sec-\n tion 921(c)(4)’s statutory scheme, and the Act’s implementing reg-\n ulations establish that work “in an underground coal mine” may\n include work above the surface of the earth.\n B.\n\n Having rejected Fairfield’s first argument, we turn to its sec-\n ond—that the ALJ reasonably concluded that the Concord prepa-\n ration plant five or more miles from the Oak Grove mine is not a\n part of that mine. Barr argues that the Board correctly reversed the\n ALJ’s determination because the Concord preparation plant was\n functionally connected to the Oak Grove mine by miles of con-\n veyer belts.\n We agree with Fairfield. To be sure, the aboveground Con-\n cord processing facility is a type of “coal mine” because the statute\n covers “coal preparation facilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But the\n ALJ determined that the Concord processing facility was not an\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 16 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n underground coal mine or part of the Oak Grove mine. We think\n the Board erred in reversing the ALJ for two reasons.\n First, the Board erred as a matter of law when it held that\n the Concord preparation plant could be a part of the Oak Grove\n coal mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Billie B.\n Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 13 (Jan. 27, 2021).\n The statutory definition of a “coal mine” includes property upon,\n under, or above a particular “area of land.” See 30\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); Black Lung Benefits Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-\n 173, 83 Stat. 744 (enacting the current definition of “coal mine”).\n Areas of land are geographically bounded. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 115 (1971) (defining “area” as a\n “definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or\n purpose” or “any particular extent of space”). That statutory defi-\n nition makes the distance between a coal extraction site and a struc-\n ture relevant to determining whether the structure is part of the\n same “coal mine.”\n The Board reached its contrary conclusion—that physical\n proximity is largely irrelevant—based on the word “appurtenant”\n in the regulatory definition of an “underground coal mine.” 20\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). The Board said that the word “appurte-\n nant” “more accurately relates to shared functions and relation-\n ships between properties than . . . their proximity.” Billie B. Barr,\n BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). We\n disagree. The Board’s geographically unlimited interpretation of\n this regulation directly conflicts with the Act’s geographically\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 17 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n limited definition of a particular “coal mine.” See 30 U.S.C.\n 802(h)(2). And where an interpretation of a regulation conflicts\n with a statute, the statute controls. See United States v. Marte, 356\n F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).\n To be sure, the statutory definition of “coal mine” also in-\n cludes a functional component. Section 802(h)(2) defines a “coal\n mine” to include structures that are functionally related to coal ex-\n traction—those structures “used in[] or resulting from” the work\n of extracting or preparing the coal, including “coal preparation fa-\n cilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But, to be a part of a single “coal\n mine,” a structure must be “upon, under, or above” the same area\n of land. See id. In short, the Board was wrong to reverse the ALJ\n based on a definition of coal mine that makes geographical proxim-\n ity largely irrelevant.\n Second, given this understanding of the definition of “coal\n mine,” the ALJ’s factual finding that the plant was insufficiently\n physically connected to the Oak Grove mine to be a part of that\n underground coal mine is supported by substantial evidence. See\n Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). Evi-\n dence is “substantial” if a reasonable mind might find it “adequate\n to support a conclusion.” See id. (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).\n Although coal mines may extend for miles under the earth, there is\n very little record evidence about the scope of the “area of land” that\n constituted the Oak Grove coal mine. Instead, the record is une-\n quivocal that the Oak Grove mining site and the Concord prepara-\n tion plant were physically separated by miles of conveyor belts and\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 18 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\n\n undeveloped land. This evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s\n conclusion that the two sites were too physically distant to be part\n of the same mine. See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261 (11th Cir. 1990). On\n this record, the Board should have deferred to the ALJ’s factfinding\n on this point.\n C.\n\n Because we agree with Fairfield that Barr’s work at the Con-\n cord preparation plant was not work “in one or more underground\n coal mines,” we turn to its argument that we should order the\n Board to reinstate the ALJ’s initial benefits denial.\n We disagree. Because the ALJ rejected the presumption for\n work in an underground coal mine, the ALJ’s denial turned on its\n factfinding that conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\n not “substantially similar” to conditions in an underground mine.\n We cannot reinstate the ALJ’s decision without endorsing that find-\n ing. The Board’s reversal made that finding irrelevant, but the\n Board nonetheless explained that, if that fact issue were relevant, it\n would remand for further factual development. Of course, the\n Board didn’t remand—its decision on the underground mine pre-\n sumption made the factual issue a moot point. But, if the Board had\n remanded, such a remand would not constitute a final decision sub-\n ject to our review. See Redden v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Pro-\n grams, 825 F.2d 337, 338 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Jack. Shipyards, Inc.\n v. Est. of Verderane, 729 F.2d 726, 727 (11th Cir. 1984)) (explaining\n that Board orders that remand cases to ALJs for further findings are\n not reviewable, final orders); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Dir., Off. of\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 19 of 19\n\n\n\n\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 826 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987) (cita-\n tions omitted) (same).\n In any event, the Board did not decide whether the condi-\n tions of Barr’s employment were comparable to those in an under-\n ground mine. And we will not pass on that issue without a full ad-\n judication before the ALJ and Board. “It is the general rule that a\n federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed on be-\n low.” United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 2009)\n (citing first Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); and then Bliss\n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 620 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir.\n 1980)); see also Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1303 n.7 (11th\n Cir. 2004) (declining to address a question not reached by the\n agency decision under review). Because the Board’s order did not\n resolve whether conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\n substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine, we de-\n cline to make that determination.\n IV.\n\n We GRANT Fairfield’s petition for review, VACATE the\n Board’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\n with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Fairfield Southern Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-08\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 1 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10651\\n ____________________\\n\\n FAIRFIELD SOUTHERN COMPANY,\\n Petitioner,\\n versus\\n\\n DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’\\n COMPENSATION PROGRAMS,\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\\n UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,\\n BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD,\\n EARLENE BARR,\\n o/b/o Billie Burke Barr, Jr.,\\n Respondents.\\n ____________________\\n Petition for Review of a Decision of the\\n Benefits Review Board\\n Agency No. 23-1080-BLA / 23-1081-BLA / 18-0567-BLA\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 2 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n This appeal is from a grant of benefits under the Black Lung\\n Benefits Act. Billie Barr, Jr., developed a disabling respiratory con-\\n dition after transporting coal for U.S. Steel and Fairfield Southern\\n Co. for over fifteen years. For some of that time, he worked at an\\n aboveground preparation plant connected to an underground coal\\n mining site by over five miles of conveyer belts. The Black Lung\\n Benefits Act grants coal miners like Barr a presumption that quali-\\n fies them for benefits if they establish a disabling respiratory or pul-\\n monary impairment after fifteen years of work “in one or more un-\\n derground coal mines.” 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).\\n The question for us is whether the Benefits Review Board\\n erred in holding that Barr—as an aboveground transportation\\n worker more than five miles away from where coal was ex-\\n tracted—worked “in one or more underground coal mines.” Be-\\n cause the statutory definition of “coal mine” includes aboveground\\n structures, we join the Tenth Circuit in holding that Barr’s above-\\n ground transportation work does not disqualify him from the pre-\\n sumption. But the statute also defines a “coal mine” to include\\n those facilities on, under, or above a particular “area of land.” 30\\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). Consistent with that statutory definition, the ad-\\n ministrative law judge found that the preparation plant where Barr\\n worked was not part of the underground mine (although it may\\n have been another kind of mine) and declined to apply the pre-\\n sumption in his favor. Because the Benefits Review Board errone-\\n ously reversed the ALJ’s finding, we grant Fairfield’s petition for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 3 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n review, vacate the Board’s decision, and remand for proceedings\\n consistent with this opinion.\\n I.\\n\\n We start by summarizing the statutory and regulatory\\n framework because it provides context for this dispute. We then\\n turn to Barr’s work history and the procedural history of this ap-\\n peal.\\n A.\\n\\n The Black Lung Benefits Act provides disability benefits to\\n miners who suffer from pneumoconiosis, a “chronic dust disease”\\n of the lung that arises out of coal mine employment. See 30\\n U.S.C. §§ 902(b), 922(a)(1). The Act defines “miner” to include an\\n individual who worked in “transportation in or around a coal\\n mine” to the extent that he “was exposed to coal dust as a result of\\n such employment.” 30 U.S.C. § 902(d). By regulation, miners are\\n eligible for benefits if they can establish four things: (1) that they\\n suffer from pneumoconiosis (2) that arose out of their coal mine\\n employment (3) and contributed to (4) their total disability. See 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.202(d).\\n Certain categories of miners are entitled to presumptions\\n that establish one or more of these elements. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c).\\n If any miner proves that he has complicated pneumoconiosis, sec-\\n tion 921(c)(3) entitles that miner to an irrebuttable presumption\\n that his disease is totally disabling. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3); Usery\\n v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 7, 10–11 (1976). If a miner\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 4 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n proves that he has a totally disabling respiratory disease and\\n worked for at least fifteen years “in one or more underground coal\\n mines,” section 921(c)(4) entitles that miner to a rebuttable pre-\\n sumption that pneumoconiosis caused his total disability. See 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4); Oak Grove Res., LLC v. Dir., OWCP, 920 F.3d\\n 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). Miners who worked “in a coal mine\\n other than an underground mine” can receive the same presump-\\n tion. See 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). But they must prove that conditions\\n in the mine were “substantially similar” to conditions in an under-\\n ground mine. See id.\\n The Act does not define “underground coal mine.” But it de-\\n fines “coal mine” as “an area of land” where “bituminous coal, lig-\\n nite, or anthracite” is extracted “from its natural deposits in the\\n earth by any means or method.” See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). That\\n mine also includes all “property . . . placed upon, under, or above\\n the surface of such land” that is used to extract or prepare the coal.\\n See id. The Act defines “coal mine” to “include[] custom coal prep-\\n aration facilities” as well. See id.\\n An implementing regulation defines an “[u]nderground coal\\n mine” as “a coal mine in which the earth and other materials which\\n lie above and around the natural deposit of coal (i.e., overburden)\\n are not removed in mining.” See 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). That\\n definition includes all land, buildings, and equipment “appurtenant\\n thereto,” see id., and has done so since 1971, see 20\\n C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971). No implementing regulation defines\\n “appurtenant.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 5 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n B.\\n\\n With this framework in mind, we turn to the facts of this\\n case. Billie Barr, Jr., worked as a railroad engineer for first U.S. Steel\\n and then Fairfield Southern Co. from 1965 to 1997. From 1965 to\\n 1981, Barr transported rail cars for U.S. Steel to the Concord under-\\n ground mine, miners filled those cars with coal, and Barr took the\\n cars to other facilities. He was absent from work for several periods\\n of multiple months during this time. When he was working, his job\\n regularly exposed him to coal dust.\\n Between 1982 and 1984, the Concord underground mine\\n closed, and the site began to operate as a coal preparation plant. A\\n miles-long system of conveyor belts transported coal to that plant\\n from the Oak Grove underground mine, a site at least five miles\\n away. Other than the belts, the land between the Concord prepa-\\n ration plant and the Oak Grove mine was forested and undevel-\\n oped. The Concord preparation plant washed, dried, and stored\\n coal from the Oak Grove Mine. From 1984 to 1987, Barr picked up\\n prepared coal for Fairfield from the Concord preparation plant and\\n transported it by rail to other facilities. In 1987, Barr stopped haul-\\n ing prepared coal from the Concord preparation plant. He contin-\\n ued to work for Fairfield as a rail transport operator until 1997, but\\n he no longer hauled coal.\\n Before his job responsibilities changed, Barr spent years\\n around coal. He also smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes per day\\n for about forty years. He started to experience breathing problems\\n before 1994 and filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 6 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n that year. Three years later, he used oxygen tanks for at least eight\\n hours per day. He died before his administrative proceedings con-\\n cluded, and his widow filed a claim for survivor’s benefits.\\n C.\\n\\n We now turn to the procedural history of Barr’s claim. Be-\\n cause of Barr’s work and medical history, his claim for benefits re-\\n lied heavily on establishing his right to a statutory presumption in\\n his favor.\\n An administrative law judge concluded that Barr was not el-\\n igible for the presumption and denied Barr’s claim for benefits. The\\n ALJ concluded that Barr worked for U.S. Steel “in an underground\\n mine” for fewer than fifteen years between 1965 and 1981 because\\n of absences from work. And he concluded that Barr’s work for Fair-\\n field at the Concord preparation plant did not qualify as work “in\\n an underground mine.” He found that the Concord preparation\\n plant was not “appurtenant” to the Oak Grove mine because they\\n were at least five miles apart. And he concluded that the belt sys-\\n tem that connected the two facilities did not make them part of the\\n same underground mine. The ALJ also found that conditions in the\\n Concord preparation plant were not “substantially similar” to the\\n conditions in an underground mine, so he did not count Barr’s\\n work at that plant towards the section 921(c)(4) presumption.\\n These findings led him to conclude that Barr was ineligible for the\\n presumption.\\n Barr appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Benefits Review\\n Board, and it reversed the decision. The Board disagreed with the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 7 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n ALJ about whether Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant\\n was work “in an underground coal mine.” It held that the ALJ\\n “erred as a matter of law” when he determined that the Concord\\n preparation plant was not “appurtenant” to—and therefore not\\n part of—the Oak Grove mine. Billie B. Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA\\n & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). The Board recognized that\\n the ALJ did not formally define “appurtenant,” but it reasoned that\\n he implemented a “strictly distanced-based construction of the\\n term.” Id. at 11. The Board held that this construction was a legal\\n error because “appurtenant” relates more to “shared functions and\\n relationships between properties” than their proximity. Id. at 12.\\n Applying that definition, it found that the Concord prepara-\\n tion plant and Oak Grove mine were owned by the same company,\\n physically connected by a conveyor belt, and collectively prepared\\n coal for sale. It concluded that these shared functions and relation-\\n ships made the Concord preparation plant “appurtenant” to the\\n Oak Grove mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Id.\\n at 13. Because it found that the two facilities were “appurtenant,”\\n the Board reversed the ALJ’s finding that Barr’s employment at the\\n plant did not constitute work in an underground mine. Based on\\n Barr’s work at the Concord preparation plant and Concord mine,\\n it then held that Barr qualified for benefits under the section\\n 921(c)(4) presumption.\\n The Board explicitly did not reach Barr’s alternative argu-\\n ment that the Concord underground mine retained its status as an\\n underground mine after it became inactive. Id. at 14 n.18. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 8 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n Board explained in a footnote that if it later determined that the\\n Concord site ceased to be an underground mine, it would remand\\n to the ALJ. Id. The ALJ could then reconsider whether conditions\\n at the Concord site were “substantially similar” to conditions in an\\n underground mine. Id.\\n On remand from the Board’s decision, an ALJ determined\\n that Fairfield failed to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption and\\n awarded Barr benefits. Fairfield appealed to the Board, and it af-\\n firmed.\\n Fairfield petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.\\n II.\\n\\n We review de novo the Benefits Review Board’s determina-\\n tion that the ALJ’s decision was not in accordance with the law,\\n Lollar v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir.\\n 1990), and the Board’s interpretations of the Black Lung Benefits\\n Act and its implementing regulations, see William Bros. v. Pate, 833\\n F.2d 261, 264–65 (11th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).\\n We also review de novo whether the Board adhered to its\\n statutory standard of review for factual determinations. See Lollar,\\n 893 F.2d at 1261. Under that standard, an ALJ’s factual findings are\\n conclusive if they are “supported by substantial evidence” consid-\\n ering the full record. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3); see also Lollar, 893 F.2d\\n at 1261. “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a rea-\\n sonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 9 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402\\n U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).\\n III.\\n\\n Fairfield argues that Barr is not entitled to benefits for three\\n reasons. First, Fairfield asserts that anyone who works above\\n ground doesn’t qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. Sec-\\n ond, it argues that, even if aboveground work in an underground\\n mine can qualify, the ALJ did not err in determining that Barr’s\\n work did not count because it was in an aboveground processing\\n plant several miles from where coal was extracted. Third, Fairfield\\n contends that, if we agree with its position, we should reinstate the\\n ALJ’s benefits denial instead of remanding for further proceedings.\\n We address each argument in turn.\\n A.\\n\\n We start with Fairfield’s argument that an aboveground\\n worker like Barr does not work “in one or more underground coal\\n mines” as a matter of law. Only one other court, the Tenth Circuit,\\n has addressed this statutory interpretation question.1 And it held\\n\\n 1 Before the Supreme Court changed the degree of deference owed to agency\\n\\n interpretation of statutes in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,\\n 412 (2024), the Sixth and Fourth Circuits each deferred to the agency’s defini-\\n tion of an “underground coal mine” in 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Those\\n courts read it to permit aboveground workers at underground coal mines to\\n qualify for the section 921(c)(4) presumption. See Island Creek Ky. Mining v.\\n Ramage, 737 F.3d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 2013); Kanawha Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of\\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 539 Fed. App’x 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2013).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 10 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n that, for the purposes of the statutory presumption, a miner can\\n work in an underground coal mine even if his job tasks occur above\\n ground. See Sunnyside Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. Workers’ Comp. Programs,\\n 112 F.4th 902, 912 (10th Cir. 2024).\\n We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s reading of the statute.\\n This is so for three reasons.\\n First, the statutory definition of “coal mine” encompasses all\\n mine-related property, even if it is above ground. The statute de-\\n fines a “coal mine” to include buildings placed “upon, under, or\\n above the surface” of an area of land. 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); see\\n Sunnyside, 112 F.4th at 911. An underground coal mine, because it\\n is a “coal mine,” also includes such aboveground property. See\\n Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 586 U.S. 9, 19 (2018)\\n (explaining that “[a]ccording to the ordinary understanding of how\\n adjectives work, ‘critical habitat’ must also be ‘habitat.’”); Rimini\\n St., Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S. 334, 341 (2019) (explaining that\\n “full costs” are still “costs”). Adjectives pick out a subset of the cat-\\n egories that they modify, and subsets necessarily have the charac-\\n teristics common to the larger group. See Weyerhauser, 586 U.S. at\\n 19–20. Here, the adjective “underground” picks out a set of “coal\\n mines” with underground mining operations, see 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30), and those “coal mines” still include build-\\n ings placed above ground.\\n For its part, Fairfield stresses that the phrase “coal mine” is\\n modified by “underground.” But that adjective refers to the type of\\n mine, not the location of an employee in the mine. Fairfield reads\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 11 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n the statute as if it requires work “underground in a coal mine.” But\\n it demands work “in an underground coal mine,” and those mines\\n have aboveground components. See 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2).\\n Second, this reading is more consistent with how the statute\\n as a whole uses the word “in” and categorizes miners for the pur-\\n poses of presumptions. We must “‘consider the entire text [of a\\n statute]’ . . . when interpreting any particular part of the text.” In re\\n Cumbess, 960 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Regions Bank\\n v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)).\\n Fairfield asserts that “in” an underground coal mine means\\n “inside of” or enclosed within that mine. Appellant’s Br. at 34–35.\\n But that reading gives the word “in” a meaning that is inconsistent\\n with how it is used in the rest of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). That statute\\n says, “in a coal mine other than an underground mine” just two\\n sentences after “in one or more underground coal mines.” 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). “[I]n a coal mine other than an underground\\n mine” cannot mean “enclosed within” or “inside of” that mine be-\\n cause those mines are definitionally above ground. Reading “in” to\\n instead mean “within the boundaries of”—its plain meaning—fits\\n comfortably with both statutory phrases. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1139 (1971) (defining “in” as a\\n function word used “to indicate location or position in space or in\\n some materially bounded object”); Black Lung Benefits Act of\\n 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 154 (adding the fifteen-year pre-\\n sumption to the Black Lung Benefits Act in 1972). Under that read-\\n ing, the first part of section 921(c)(4) extends its presumption to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 12 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n qualifying miners who worked within the bounds of an under-\\n ground coal mine. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And its second part ex-\\n tends the same presumption to qualifying miners who worked\\n within the bounds of other coal mines. Because “[w]e ordinarily\\n presume that instances of the same word in the same statute will\\n have the same meaning,” see Sunshine State Reg’l Ctr., Inc. v. Dir., US\\n Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 143 F.4th 1331, 1345 (11th Cir. 2025),\\n we favor a reading of “in” that harmonizes its usage across section\\n 921(c)(4).\\n Our reading is also more consistent with how section\\n 921(c)(4) categorizes miners than Fairfield’s reading. See In re Cum-\\n bess, 960 F.3d at 1334 (interpreting a statutory provision consider-\\n ing “the physical and logical relation” of its many parts). Fairfield\\n reads “in one or more underground mines” to categorize miners\\n based on where they worked relative to the surface of the earth.\\n But section 921(c)(4) categorizes miners based on the type of mine\\n where they worked—surface or underground—not their locations\\n vis-à-vis the earth’s surface. See 30 U.S.C. 921(c)(4). Our reading of\\n “in one or more underground coal mines” characterizes miners\\n that same way, and it is more consistent with section 921(c)(4)’s\\n structure.\\n Third, the Act’s implementing regulations have long treated\\n aboveground workers at an underground coal mine as employees\\n “in an underground coal mine.” See 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i)–(j)\\n (1971); 20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Courts may “seek aid from the\\n interpretations of those responsible for implementing particular\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 13 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n statutes.” Perez v. Owl, Inc., 110 F.4th 1296, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2024)\\n (quoting Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024)).\\n “Interpretations issued contemporaneously with the statute at is-\\n sue, and which have remained consistent over time, may be espe-\\n cially useful.” Id. at 1308 (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394). And\\n the Act’s first implementing regulations, like the current versions,\\n define an “underground coal mine” to include aboveground land,\\n buildings, and equipment. 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(i) (1971); 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). Consistent with that longstanding defini-\\n tion, those first regulations also explain that employees can work\\n “in an underground coal mine . . . above the surface at the mine.”\\n 20 C.F.R. § 410.110(j) (1971). We find those early interpretations of\\n “underground coal mine” persuasive. Together with the Act’s stat-\\n utory scheme and definition of a “coal mine,” they establish that a\\n miner can work “in an underground coal mine” above the surface\\n of the earth.\\n Fairfield makes three counterarguments, but they are not\\n convincing.\\n First, Fairfield argues that the statute’s purpose is defeated if\\n it applies to workers employed above ground. But the best evi-\\n dence of the Act’s purpose is its text. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th\\n 1331, 1342 (11th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 145 S.\\n Ct. 545 (2024). The plain meaning of section 921(c)(4)’s text is that\\n all miners employed within the bounds of an underground coal\\n mine, not solely those who work below ground, may qualify for its\\n presumption. And, even if section 921(c)(4) had a different purpose,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 14 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n a “purpose can’t overwrite [that] ordinary understanding.” Gorecki\\n v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 143 F.4th 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2025)\\n (citing Jimenez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 119 F.4th 892, 911 (11th Cir.\\n 2024)).\\n Second, Fairfield asserts that our reading makes section\\n 921(c)(4) redundant with section 921(c)(3) by creating too much\\n overlap between the categories of miners eligible to pursue either\\n section’s presumptions. But the two sections remain distinct. Sec-\\n tion 921(c)(3) requires miners to prove that they have complicated\\n pneumoconiosis, a serious form of the disease, to gain an irrebut-\\n table presumption that their diseases are totally disabling. See Usery,\\n 428 U.S. at 7, 10–11. Section 921(c)(4) requires miners to prove dif-\\n ferent facts. It applies only to miners who submit medical evidence\\n that does not meet section 921(c)(3)’s requirements. See 30\\n U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). And it requires those miners to prove that they\\n are totally disabled and worked for fifteen years in qualifying em-\\n ployment. See id. If satisfied, it assumes the distinct fact that pneu-\\n moconiosis caused their disabilities. See id. Those differences exist\\n irrespective of the meaning of “in one or more underground coal\\n mines.”\\n Third, Fairfield maintains that the Supreme Court inter-\\n preted “in one or more underground coal mines” to require work\\n underground in Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1\\n (1976). We disagree. In that case, miners challenged section\\n 921(c)(4)’s presumption for lack of due process. Id. at 30–31. In re-\\n solving that constitutional claim, the Court asked whether there is\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 15 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n “some rational connection” between the evidence required by sec-\\n tion 921(c)(4) and the presumption it provides. Id. at 28 (citations\\n omitted). The Supreme Court held that the two were rationally re-\\n lated, in part, because the Surgeon General told Congress that the\\n prevalence of pneumoconiosis increases linearly after fifteen years\\n underground. See id. at 30–31. But Usery did not consider or decide\\n whether miners “in . . . underground coal mines” must work be-\\n low ground. See id.\\n In short, the Act’s expansive definition of a “coal mine,” sec-\\n tion 921(c)(4)’s statutory scheme, and the Act’s implementing reg-\\n ulations establish that work “in an underground coal mine” may\\n include work above the surface of the earth.\\n B.\\n\\n Having rejected Fairfield’s first argument, we turn to its sec-\\n ond—that the ALJ reasonably concluded that the Concord prepa-\\n ration plant five or more miles from the Oak Grove mine is not a\\n part of that mine. Barr argues that the Board correctly reversed the\\n ALJ’s determination because the Concord preparation plant was\\n functionally connected to the Oak Grove mine by miles of con-\\n veyer belts.\\n We agree with Fairfield. To be sure, the aboveground Con-\\n cord processing facility is a type of “coal mine” because the statute\\n covers “coal preparation facilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But the\\n ALJ determined that the Concord processing facility was not an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 16 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n underground coal mine or part of the Oak Grove mine. We think\\n the Board erred in reversing the ALJ for two reasons.\\n First, the Board erred as a matter of law when it held that\\n the Concord preparation plant could be a part of the Oak Grove\\n coal mine “regardless of the distance separating them.” Billie B.\\n Barr, BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 13 (Jan. 27, 2021).\\n The statutory definition of a “coal mine” includes property upon,\\n under, or above a particular “area of land.” See 30\\n U.S.C. § 802(h)(2); Black Lung Benefits Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-\\n 173, 83 Stat. 744 (enacting the current definition of “coal mine”).\\n Areas of land are geographically bounded. See WEBSTER’S THIRD\\n NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 115 (1971) (defining “area” as a\\n “definitely bounded piece of ground set aside for a specific use or\\n purpose” or “any particular extent of space”). That statutory defi-\\n nition makes the distance between a coal extraction site and a struc-\\n ture relevant to determining whether the structure is part of the\\n same “coal mine.”\\n The Board reached its contrary conclusion—that physical\\n proximity is largely irrelevant—based on the word “appurtenant”\\n in the regulatory definition of an “underground coal mine.” 20\\n C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(30). The Board said that the word “appurte-\\n nant” “more accurately relates to shared functions and relation-\\n ships between properties than . . . their proximity.” Billie B. Barr,\\n BRB Nos. 18-0567 BLA & 18-0567 BLA-A at 12 (Jan. 27, 2021). We\\n disagree. The Board’s geographically unlimited interpretation of\\n this regulation directly conflicts with the Act’s geographically\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 17 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n limited definition of a particular “coal mine.” See 30 U.S.C.\\n 802(h)(2). And where an interpretation of a regulation conflicts\\n with a statute, the statute controls. See United States v. Marte, 356\\n F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).\\n To be sure, the statutory definition of “coal mine” also in-\\n cludes a functional component. Section 802(h)(2) defines a “coal\\n mine” to include structures that are functionally related to coal ex-\\n traction—those structures “used in[] or resulting from” the work\\n of extracting or preparing the coal, including “coal preparation fa-\\n cilities.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(2). But, to be a part of a single “coal\\n mine,” a structure must be “upon, under, or above” the same area\\n of land. See id. In short, the Board was wrong to reverse the ALJ\\n based on a definition of coal mine that makes geographical proxim-\\n ity largely irrelevant.\\n Second, given this understanding of the definition of “coal\\n mine,” the ALJ’s factual finding that the plant was insufficiently\\n physically connected to the Oak Grove mine to be a part of that\\n underground coal mine is supported by substantial evidence. See\\n Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261–62 (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401). Evi-\\n dence is “substantial” if a reasonable mind might find it “adequate\\n to support a conclusion.” See id. (citing Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).\\n Although coal mines may extend for miles under the earth, there is\\n very little record evidence about the scope of the “area of land” that\\n constituted the Oak Grove coal mine. Instead, the record is une-\\n quivocal that the Oak Grove mining site and the Concord prepara-\\n tion plant were physically separated by miles of conveyor belts and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 18 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10651\\n\\n undeveloped land. This evidence reasonably supports the ALJ’s\\n conclusion that the two sites were too physically distant to be part\\n of the same mine. See Lollar, 893 F.2d at 1261 (11th Cir. 1990). On\\n this record, the Board should have deferred to the ALJ’s factfinding\\n on this point.\\n C.\\n\\n Because we agree with Fairfield that Barr’s work at the Con-\\n cord preparation plant was not work “in one or more underground\\n coal mines,” we turn to its argument that we should order the\\n Board to reinstate the ALJ’s initial benefits denial.\\n We disagree. Because the ALJ rejected the presumption for\\n work in an underground coal mine, the ALJ’s denial turned on its\\n factfinding that conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\\n not “substantially similar” to conditions in an underground mine.\\n We cannot reinstate the ALJ’s decision without endorsing that find-\\n ing. The Board’s reversal made that finding irrelevant, but the\\n Board nonetheless explained that, if that fact issue were relevant, it\\n would remand for further factual development. Of course, the\\n Board didn’t remand—its decision on the underground mine pre-\\n sumption made the factual issue a moot point. But, if the Board had\\n remanded, such a remand would not constitute a final decision sub-\\n ject to our review. See Redden v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Pro-\\n grams, 825 F.2d 337, 338 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Jack. Shipyards, Inc.\\n v. Est. of Verderane, 729 F.2d 726, 727 (11th Cir. 1984)) (explaining\\n that Board orders that remand cases to ALJs for further findings are\\n not reviewable, final orders); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Dir., Off. of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 19 of 19\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10651 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Workers’ Comp. Programs, 826 F.2d 1011, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987) (cita-\\n tions omitted) (same).\\n In any event, the Board did not decide whether the condi-\\n tions of Barr’s employment were comparable to those in an under-\\n ground mine. And we will not pass on that issue without a full ad-\\n judication before the ALJ and Board. “It is the general rule that a\\n federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed on be-\\n low.” United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 2009)\\n (citing first Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976); and then Bliss\\n v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 620 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir.\\n 1980)); see also Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3d 1300, 1303 n.7 (11th\\n Cir. 2004) (declining to address a question not reached by the\\n agency decision under review). Because the Board’s order did not\\n resolve whether conditions at the Concord preparation plant were\\n substantially similar to conditions in an underground mine, we de-\\n cline to make that determination.\\n IV.\\n\\n We GRANT Fairfield’s petition for review, VACATE the\\n Board’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent\\n with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30970,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10749767,"string":"10,749,767"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Kimberley Diane Settle v. David Collier"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-12436"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 1 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12436\\n ____________________\\n\\n KIMBERLEY DIANE SETTLE,\\n A Personal Representative for the Estate of Jacob\\n Joseph Settle Sr,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n DAVID COLLIER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-22688-TKW-HTC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether Officer David Col-\\n lier is entitled to immunity from a suit involving the death of Jacob\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 2 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n Settle. On the evening of November 14, 2020, Collier and his part-\\n ner officer went to Settle’s house to execute arrest warrants for him\\n and his wife. Settle was in his truck when Collier arrived and re-\\n fused to leave the truck when Collier demanded that he do so.\\n Within seconds, the situation escalated as Collier threatened to\\n break open the windows, and Settle then started the engine of the\\n truck and placed the transmission into a gear. Collier was in a tight\\n space in between the truck and the house and feared the truck\\n would hit him and his partner, so he fired his gun into the truck.\\n Settle died on the scene. His estate’s representative sued Collier for\\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and for bat-\\n tery under Florida law. After Collier invoked qualified immunity\\n and state immunity, the district court denied Collier’s motion for\\n summary judgment. We reverse and remand with instructions to\\n grant summary judgment in favor of Collier.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In this appeal of a denial of summary judgment based on\\n qualified immunity, we recount the events viewing the evidence in\\n the light most favorable to the estate as nonmovant. See Baxter v.\\n Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 878 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n On the evening of November 14, 2020, Escambia County of-\\n ficers David Collier and Raymond Hart arrived at 2242 Handy\\n Road to execute arrest warrants for Jacob Settle and his wife,\\n Sophronia Whitehead. Settle had active arrest warrants for driving\\n while his license was suspended, and Whitehead had active arrest\\n warrants for failure to appear, destroying evidence, parole\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 3 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n violations, and driving while her license was suspended. Officers\\n Hart and Collier had never encountered Settle before that night.\\n Although Collier stated that he was aware that Settle had a “nar-\\n cotics violation history,” he had no way of knowing if Settle was\\n under the influence of narcotics at the time.\\n Whitehead and Settle had visited a friend until the early\\n morning hours of November 14, so they slept until around 8:30\\n p.m. When they awakened, they decided to drive to another\\n friend’s house in Settle’s truck. Because the front door was boarded\\n up, Settle left through the back door, which Whitehead then\\n locked, and she exited through the bedroom window.\\n After arriving, the officers made their way to the backyard\\n where the truck was parked. Collier saw the truck parked “parallel”\\n with the porch, the driver’s side facing it. The front end of the truck\\n faced the house and was parked “almost up against” it. There was\\n also an air conditioning unit “sitting right up against” the porch,\\n roughly perpendicular to the truck’s back wheel. The backyard was\\n “pitch black” that night because there were no working porch or\\n backyard lights. The officers’ flashlights were “the only light[s]” in\\n the backyard. The backyard was also filled with “debris and trash\\n in the yard stacked up against the porch.”\\n As the officers approached the truck, Whitehead and Settle\\n saw their flashlights “come around the side of the house.” White-\\n head entered the passenger’s seat and Settle entered the driver’s\\n seat. Whitehead and Settle “duck[ed] down in the truck.” White-\\n head said that they did not know the officers were police “until they\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 4 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n c[a]me around” to the truck. Collier “got right up on the driver’s\\n side” with his flashlight and saw both “slumped over” inside. Hart\\n went up to the passenger’s side. Neither Whitehead nor Settle ex-\\n ited the truck even after realizing the presence of police officers.\\n But Whitehead sat up when she realized it.\\n Worried that Settle might be unconscious, Collier “at-\\n tempted to open up the door,” but it was locked. Settle then sat up\\n straight and looked alert. Collier and Hart announced that they\\n were from the sheriff’s office and asked Settle, by name, to exit the\\n vehicle. After Settle did not exit the vehicle, Collier announced he\\n was there to serve an arrest warrant and yelled, “Open your doors.\\n Unlock your doors or we’re going to bust your windows out.” Set-\\n tle attempted to deceive the officers by telling them that they were\\n trying to arrest the wrong person. His flashlight still shining into\\n the car, Collier then saw Settle “dig and reach around with his\\n hands in the center console” and heard what he thought was the\\n jingle of keys. So he “tried beating on the driver’s side window,\\n trying to break the glass and enter the vehicle to get him out.”\\n Settle started the truck’s engine. Whitehead, Hart, and Col-\\n lier all saw Settle then put the transmission into gear. Collier\\n dropped his flashlight and pushed himself away from the truck.\\n Whitehead testified that the “truck never moved an inch” after Set-\\n tle put it into gear, speculating that he must have only put it in neu-\\n tral.\\n Within a few seconds of Settle putting the truck into gear,\\n Collier fired his gun. At the time of firing, Collier was “eight to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 5 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n [ten] feet” away from the truck. Both bullets went through the\\n driver’s side door window, not through the front window. White-\\n head stated that she “heard two somethings” after Settle put the\\n transmission in gear when she was interviewed in December 2022\\n by criminal investigators. But at her July 2023 deposition, White-\\n head said that she “didn’t hear no gunshots,” because “the truck\\n has got pipes on it.” Instead, she testified that she became aware of\\n the gunshots because her “leg was burning down the side . . . from\\n gunpowder.” According to Whitehead, the gunshots and the start-\\n ing of the engine must have been nearly simultaneous.\\n The two shots struck Settle. Collier opened the truck door\\n and started rendering aid to Settle by applying pressure to his two\\n wounds—both in his arm/shoulder area. Settle stopped breathing,\\n so Collier tried to resuscitate him. But Settle died. Settle’s toxicol-\\n ogy report showed both methamphetamine and THC carboxy in\\n his blood at the time of death.\\n On November 9, 2022, the personal representative of Set-\\n tle’s estate filed this suit in the district court against Collier, Hart,\\n and the sheriff. The district court dismissed the claims against Hart\\n and the sheriff, which left two claims against Collier: one claim for\\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1983, and a claim of battery under Florida law.\\n During discovery, the estate produced one expert, Kelly\\n Timms, a forensic services technician. In her deposition, Timms\\n disputed that Collier was at risk of being struck by the truck when\\n he fired the shots that killed Settle. She opined that Collier was not\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 6 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n standing directly in front of the truck when he fired the deadly\\n shots, but was instead standing in line with the metal part of the\\n truck between the front windshield and the front side doors—oth-\\n erwise known as the “A-pillar.”\\n After Collier moved for summary judgment based on quali-\\n fied immunity and state-agent immunity, the district court denied\\n his motion. The district court ruled that a “reasonable jury could\\n find that [Collier] violated Mr. Settle’s constitutional right to be\\n free from excessive force when he shot into a non-moving truck\\n that did not pose a risk to [Collier] or others.” It denied qualified\\n immunity because it was “clearly established since at least 2013 that\\n when a driver does not use or does not threaten to use his car as a\\n weapon, an officer may not use deadly force against him.” And it\\n ruled that Collier was not entitled to state immunity from the bat-\\n tery claim because a “reasonable jury could find that [Collier] acted\\n with wanton and willful disregard” for Settle’s safety and that Col-\\n lier “did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to use deadly\\n force because Mr. Settle did not use the truck against [Collier] in a\\n threatening way.”\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024). We review de novo whether an officer\\n is entitled to summary judgment based on state law immunity. Eng-\\n lish v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 7 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain\\n that Collier is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not use\\n excessive force. Second, we explain that Collier is entitled to state-\\n agent immunity from the claim of battery.\\n A. Collier Did Not Use Excessive Force in Violation of the\\n Fourth Amendment.\\n When officers raise the defense of qualified immunity, they\\n have “the burden to establish that they were acting within their\\n discretionary authority.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th\\n Cir. 2022). “If the officers satisfy that burden, the burden then shifts\\n to the plaintiff to establish that the officers violated a constitutional\\n right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-\\n tion.” Id. We may review whether there was a violation or whether\\n the violation was clearly established in either order. Id. In this ap-\\n peal, we start and end with whether Collier violated Settle’s consti-\\n tutional rights by using excessive force. The estate does not dispute\\n that Collier was acting “pursuant to his discretionary authority”\\n during the incident. So the burden shifted to the estate to prove\\n that Collier violated Settle’s clearly established constitutional\\n rights.\\n An “excessive force claim [that] arises in the context of an\\n arrest . . . is most properly characterized as one invoking the pro-\\n tections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the\\n right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . sei-\\n zures.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (quoting U.S.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 8 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n CONST. amend. IV). As the text of the Fourth Amendment sug-\\n gests, excessive force claims are governed by an “‘objective reason-\\n ableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. In reviewing the reasonableness of\\n an officer’s use of force, “we look at the fact pattern from the per-\\n spective of a reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the\\n attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily\\n harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer\\n sought to eliminate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206\\n (11th Cir. 2009). “Our inquiry does not employ the 20/20 vision of\\n hindsight.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n The use of deadly force is reasonable when an “officer has\\n probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious\\n physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Gar-\\n ner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). So “if the suspect threatens the officer\\n with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has\\n committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction\\n of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to\\n prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been\\n given.” Id. at 11–12. “This rule covers situations in which (1) an of-\\n ficer believed his life was in danger because a suspect used a vehicle\\n as a weapon against the officer or (2) the suspect’s use of the vehicle\\n otherwise presented an immediate threat of serious physical\\n harm.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888. This Court has “[c]onsistently . . .\\n upheld an officer’s use of deadly force” under this framework. Id.\\n And the Fourth Amendment does not “require officers in a tense\\n and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 9 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d\\n 576, 581 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n The parties dispute whether Collier could have reasonably\\n believed that Settle’s vehicle presented an immediate threat of\\n physical harm warranting the use of deadly force. Collier argues\\n that even under the estate’s version of events, the circumstances\\n were “tense, rapidly evolving, and not within [his] complete con-\\n trol” such that he had an objectively reasonable belief that deadly\\n force was necessary to protect his and Hart’s lives. Settle’s estate\\n argues that “the truck never moved,” so the truck could not have\\n been “used or threatened to be used in a way that indicated it had\\n become a deadly weapon.” We agree with Collier.\\n The estate’s argument ignores that, under the circum-\\n stances, Settle needed not move the car for his actions to be rea-\\n sonably perceived as threatening. The estate admits that Settle\\n “started the truck and moved the gear shift.” Collier saw Settle put\\n the truck into gear. And Whitehead said that Settle put the car into\\n gear before Collier fired. So, even viewing the evidence in the light\\n most favorable to the estate, there was some amount of time be-\\n tween Settle starting the truck and Collier firing the shots. In that\\n short time, Collier recognized Settle’s intent to drive the truck and\\n so convert it into a deadly weapon.\\n Two of our decisions are instructive. First, Long v. Slaton in-\\n volved a mentally unstable man who stole a police vehicle and tried\\n to back it out of a driveway. 508 F.3d at 578–79. The officer at the\\n scene knew of the man’s condition, pointed his pistol at the man,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 10 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n and warned him to comply or else he would shoot. Id. The man\\n put the car in reverse and backed down the driveway; the officer\\n stepped in the middle of the driveway (facing the front of the car)\\n and fired three shots that killed the man. Id. While the car had not\\n yet become a “deadly weapon” at the time of the shooting, the\\n plaintiff’s “unstable frame of mind, energetic evasion of the dep-\\n uty’s physical control, . . . criminal act of stealing a police cruiser,\\n and [his] starting to drive . . . gave the deputy reason to believe that\\n [he] was dangerous.” Id. at 581–82. (footnote omitted). And in Pace\\n v. Capobianco, this Court held that an officer who shot a man after a\\n high-speed chase did not violate the Fourth Amendment “[e]ven\\n when” the man’s “car was stopped,” he “did not try to run over the\\n deputies[,] . . . [and] did not aim the car at the deputies.” 283 F.3d\\n 1275, 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court reached that conclu-\\n sion because “[b]y the time of the shooting, [the man] had used the\\n automobile in a manner to give reasonable policemen probable\\n cause to believe that it had become a deadly weapon.” Id. at 1282.\\n And the man never “left his automobile or even turned the engine\\n off,” establishing that he was still “armed.” Id. at 1281–82.\\n Even if the truck never moved, Collier could reasonably per-\\n ceive that Settle’s vehicle was a deadly weapon. He reasonably in-\\n terpreted Settle’s starting the engine and putting it into gear as es-\\n calatory. Common sense would suggest that Settle’s next step\\n would be to drive—not to remain stationary. Settle had already re-\\n sisted arrest; by starting the truck engine and putting it into gear,\\n Collier reasonably believed that Settle intended to escape in reck-\\n less disregard of the officers’ safety or to evade arrest by injuring\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 11 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n them. By starting the engine and putting the transmission into gear,\\n Settle converted his truck into a “deadly weapon with which [he]\\n was armed.” Id. at 1282. And because Collier had probable cause to\\n believe Settle intended to drive the truck dangerously, he was not\\n “require[d] . . . to wait [to fire] until the moment” that Settle drove\\n it. Long, 508 F.3d at 581.\\n We reject the estate’s attempt to create a categorical rule\\n that officers cannot reasonably perceive that a vehicle has been\\n converted into a deadly weapon either until the vehicle moves or\\n unless the suspect’s behavior before the incident established that\\n he was dangerous. The estate admits that “this Court has [held]\\n that even if a vehicle did not move and an officer was not in its\\n path, the use of deadly force could be reasonable.” Yet it argues\\n that this “principle . . . extends only to situations where the sus-\\n pect’s prior behavior or use of the vehicle gave an officer reason to\\n believe that the vehicle had become a deadly weapon.” But our\\n precedents establish no bright-line rule. After all, “[t]he constitu-\\n tional test for excessive force is necessarily fact specific,”\\n McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1206, and “not capable of precise definition\\n or mechanical application,” Long, 508 F.3d at 580 (citation and in-\\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\\n The estate makes much of one surface-level similarity be-\\n tween this appeal and Morton v. Kirkwood, a decision where we dis-\\n cerned a constitutional violation. 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013). In\\n Morton too the vehicle was “stationary” when the officer fired at its\\n driver. Id. at 1279–80, 1282. The plaintiff was sitting in his car at a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 12 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n park when he saw a police officer walk into the park. Id. at 1279.\\n He then attempted to “coast” out of the park, never seeing anyone\\n in front of his car. Id. At that point, the plaintiff heard an officer\\n shout, so he “shifted his car to park and raised his hands.” Id. at\\n 1279–80. The officer “nonetheless shot at the car.” Id. at 1280. We\\n held that, based on those facts, an officer could not reasonably per-\\n ceive an immediate threat to his safety. Id. at 1281–82. The fact\\n that the vehicle in Morton was stationary is of little importance. In\\n Morton, the vehicle was stationary because the driver complied\\n with the officer’s request to stop the vehicle. Id. at 1279–80. In this\\n appeal, the truck was stationary from the start of the encounter;\\n Settle did not make it stationary at the command of the officer. In-\\n deed, Settle refused to comply with Collier’s lawful order to exit\\n the vehicle, unlike the plaintiff in Morton, who alleged that he\\n promptly complied with the officer’s orders. Id. The plaintiff in\\n Morton deescalated, unlike Settle who escalated the situation by\\n starting the truck and putting the transmission into gear.\\n The estate insists that Collier was unreasonable in firing be-\\n cause he “was not in the path of the truck” and was about eight feet\\n away when he fired. This argument answers the wrong question.\\n Reasonableness hinges on the perspective of the officer, so the\\n more apt question is whether Collier could have reasonably per-\\n ceived that he was in the path of the vehicle and that his safety was\\n in danger. See Tillis v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n And we do not impose on officers “the benefit of hindsight.” Baxter,\\n 121 F.4th at 890. When officers must make split-second judgments,\\n we accept that they “d[o] not have time to calculate angles and\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 13 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n trajectories to determine whether [they are] a few feet outside of\\n harm’s way.” Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299.\\n\\n Two precedents are instructive. In Robinson v. Arrugueta, we\\n declined to hold an officer to the benefit of hindsight that he “per-\\n haps could have escaped unharmed.” 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.\\n 2005). There, the decedent accelerated to just one to two miles per\\n hour toward the officer, but the officer was standing four feet away\\n from the front of the vehicle and was sandwiched between the de-\\n cedent’s vehicle and another. Id. at 1254, 1256. And Tillis involved\\n a high-speed chase that ended with a crash into some bushes. 12\\n F.4th at 1295. The officer pulled behind the vehicle and stepped out\\n of his car to make the arrest. Id. As he stepped out, the vehicle’s\\n “reverse lights turned on” and the officer shot into the vehicle as it\\n drove past him. Id. We held that the officer “had no way of know-\\n ing whether [the vehicle] would continue in a straight line or\\n swerve toward him,” and he did not have time to calculate whether\\n he was in harm’s way. Id. at 1299. “[O]n foot next to [the] vehicle,”\\n the officer was “exposed to danger” which justified firing at the sus-\\n pect. Id.\\n\\n Collier feared for his life when Settle put the truck into gear.\\n Collier could reasonably fear that Settle’s next move was to drive\\n it. Like the officer in Robinson, Collier was in a “narrow space” be-\\n tween the car and the porch—even if more than four feet away.\\n 415 F.4th at 1256. Had Collier tried to escape by rushing directly\\n away from the house toward the back of the truck, the air condi-\\n tioning unit and debris would have obstructed his path. And he\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 14 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n reasonably could have feared being struck if the vehicle went in\\n reverse. Moving the other way would have required him to step in\\n front of the vehicle which had been put into gear. Like the officer\\n in Tillis, he also “had no waying of knowing” what Settle would do\\n next, especially considering that Settle was actively resisting arrest.\\n See 12 F.4th at 1299. And he was standing “on foot next to” Settle’s\\n truck, exposing him to danger from the truck’s movements. See id.\\n Collier had little-to-no visibility in the “pitch black” backyard. And\\n Collier no longer had his flashlight in hand. So even if there were a\\n clear path of escape, Collier would not have been able to see it. We\\n cannot hold Collier to the benefit of hindsight by requiring him to\\n have “calculate[d] angles and trajectories” of the truck’s potential\\n paths or for an escape attempt. Id.\\n Settle’s estate suggests that Collier was not justified in firing\\n because he had no reason to believe that Settle was violent or dan-\\n gerous before the encounter. True, “the severity of the crime\\n prompting [the encounter] can carry weight” in the reasonableness\\n analysis. Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted). But in “circumstances that are\\n tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” we must make “allowance\\n for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second\\n judgments.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Sometimes, an officer\\n does not have time to reflect and consider why the encounter was\\n initiated—whether it was a routine Terry stop or a high-speed\\n chase.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 15 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n We have held that an officer acted reasonably in using\\n deadly force by shooting into a vehicle during a tense situation\\n even when the officer did not have reason to think the driver had\\n committed violent crimes. For example, in Baxter, this Court held\\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of sim-\\n ple car theft. 121 F.4th at 878–91. And in Robinson, this Court held\\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of deal-\\n ing heroin. 415 F.3d at 1253, 1256.\\n The estate faults Collier for neither giving a warning that he\\n was about to fire nor “display[ing] his weapon” before firing the\\n shots. “Officers are required to give a warning before using deadly\\n force if a warning is feasible. The critical inquiry is feasibility.” Davis\\n v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). The feasibility re-\\n quirement is not an “inflexible rule that, in order to avoid civil lia-\\n bility, an officer must always warn his suspect before firing—par-\\n ticularly where . . . such a warning might easily have cost the of-\\n ficer his life.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Settle’s rapid escalation and Collier’s proximity to the truck put\\n Collier in immediate danger, so he was not required to issue a\\n warning before firing.\\n The estate’s reliance on Vaughan v. Cox is unavailing. 343\\n F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). In Vaughan, an officer “traveled along-\\n side” a fleeing stolen vehicle, which had struck a police cruiser, on\\n an interstate highway for 30 to 45 seconds before firing into the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 16 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n vehicle. Id. at 1326–27, 1331. We considered that ample “time and\\n opportunity to warn” the vehicle’s driver before firing. Id at 1331.\\n Here, in contrast, the encounter escalated in the seconds it took\\n Settle to turn on the truck and put it into gear, giving Collier little\\n time or opportunity to issue a warning.\\n The district court relied on Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11\\n F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2021), to hold that Collier could have warned\\n Settle before firing. In Underwood, an officer walked in front of a\\n vehicle as it “coast[ed]” slowly toward the officer “as if to stop,”\\n and the officer began shooting when the vehicle was roughly eight\\n feet away. 11 F.4th at 1322, 1331. True, in Underwood and here, the\\n officer was eight feet away at the time he fired—and at that dis-\\n tance, a warning is in fact more feasible. But the driver in Under-\\n wood was slowing down “as if to stop,” unlike Settle who put the\\n truck in gear as if to drive. In the light of the proximity of the truck\\n to Collier, Collier’s lack of visibility, and Settle’s escalatory actions,\\n Collier could forego a warning. A delay could have put his or Hart’s\\n life in danger. See Waller, 44 F.4th at 1315.\\n B. Collier is Entitled to State Statutory Immunity from\\n the Estate’s Battery Claim.\\n Florida’s self-defense immunity statute provides that a “per-\\n son who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in [sec-\\n tion] 776.012 . . . is justified in such conduct and is immune from\\n . . . civil action for the use or threatened use of such force.” FLA.\\n STAT. § 776.032(1). Section 776.012 also provides that a person who\\n “reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 17 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him-\\n self . . . or another” may use deadly force, and that there is no “duty\\n to retreat” before using or threatening to use such force. Id.\\n § 776.012(2). We have ruled that section 776.012 is at least co-ex-\\n tensive with the Fourth Amendment standard for the use of deadly\\n force. See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 855–56 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n Because Collier’s use of deadly force was not excessive in violation\\n of the Fourth Amendment, Collier was also entitled to immunity\\n from the estate’s claim of battery.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to enter\\n judgment for Collier.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 18 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11216352/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE\"}, {\"author\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:\\n The record in this case presents conflicting evidence regard-\\n ing the material fact of whether Deputy Sheriff David Collier was\\n near or in the path of Jacob Settle, Sr.’s truck, as well as if and how\\n Settle’s truck was moving to justify Collier shooting into it and kill-\\n ing Settle. The district court correctly concluded that these factual\\n disputes, when taken in the light most favorable to Settle’s estate\\n (the “Plaintiff”), could allow a reasonable jury to find that Settle’s\\n vehicle did not present an immediate threat of physical harm,\\n thereby making Collier’s use of deadly force unreasonable.\\n We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de\\n novo, Christmas v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022),\\n viewing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light\\n most favorable to the non-moving party, Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946\\n F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate\\n when the record contains no genuine issues of material fact such\\n that the court may grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of\\n the moving party. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th\\n Cir. 2019). The issue is only material if it could ultimately change\\n the outcome of litigation. Terrell v. Sec’y Dep’t of Veterans Affs, 98\\n F.4th 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 2024). It is only genuine if it could lead\\n the reasonable factfinder to rule in favor of the nonmovant. James\\n River Ins. Co. v. Ultratec Special Effects Inc., 22 F.4th 1246, 1251 (11th\\n Cir. 2022). On de novo review, the district court was correct in con-\\n cluding that Collier did not meet his burden.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 19 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 24-12436\\n\\n A. There Exist Genuine Issues of Material Fact\\n On the night of November 14, 2020, Deputies David Collier\\n and Raymond Hart went to the home of Raymond Settle and\\n Sophronia Whitehead to execute arrest warrants for nonviolent\\n crimes. Both deputies explained that they approached the front\\n door to no avail, so they proceeded to the backyard to continue\\n their search. Settle’s truck was parked in the backyard near the\\n porch and facing his house. Whitehead and Settle had gotten into\\n the truck just as the deputies entered the backyard to continue their\\n search. The parties dispute what happened next.\\n In Collier’s version of events, the backyard was “very dark,”\\n so he and Hart conducted their search using flashlights to illumi-\\n nate their path and avoid being seen by Whitehead and Settle. Col-\\n lier suspected that they were both concerned about being arrested\\n because they had outstanding warrants and feared going to jail.\\n He, therefore, initially thought that the two were hiding from the\\n officers.\\n Collier then explained that he approached the truck to ask\\n Settle and Whitehead to get out of it, but the two refused. He then\\n tried to break through the truck’s driver’s side window to remove\\n Whitehead and Settle from the vehicle. As he did so, Settle report-\\n edly started the truck and put it in reverse, which scared Collier and\\n caused him to step back from the truck. When Collier stepped back\\n from the truck, he tripped over something in the yard, which\\n caused him to fall on the ground. He said that he then regained his\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 20 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 3\\n\\n footing and drew his weapon before firing two shots into the\\n driver’s side window, which ultimately killed Settle.\\n In the days following the shooting, Collier recounted that\\n the truck was “coming at [him]” as if it were approaching him head\\n on. He explained that he was “in [a] corner” and performing eva-\\n sive maneuvers to avoid contact because the truck was “coming at\\n [him],” again, as if it were aimed directly at him.\\n Whitehead’s account differs significantly. She explained that\\n she and Settle did not immediately recognize Hart and Collier as\\n officers when they entered the backyard. She explained that they\\n could not see the officers’ uniforms through the darkness, only\\n their flashlights. Further, she contends the officers did not verbally\\n identify themselves as law enforcement when they approached the\\n truck and attempted to open its doors. It was not until the officers\\n got closer that Settle and Whitehead could make out the deputies’\\n uniforms. Upon learning that the two unidentified men were of-\\n ficers and being told to unlock the door, Whitehead complied with\\n the officers’ commands. However, instead of opening the doors,\\n Collier attempted to break the window with his baton.\\n Whitehead stated that Settle started the truck after Collier\\n threatened to break the driver’s side window. However, she testi-\\n fied that the truck “never moved an inch” after Settle started it. In\\n fact, she maintained that the deputies shot Settle at “almost the ex-\\n act time” that he started the truck. She said that she knows this\\n because she did not hear the gunshots over the truck’s loud igni-\\n tion. She noted that it was only clear that Collier had fired his\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 21 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 24-12436\\n\\n weapon because her leg was burning from the gunpowder and she\\n heard Settle screaming, “Oh my God. Oh, my God.”\\n No one disputes that Collier opened the driver’s side door\\n and rendered aid to Settle while Hart removed Whitehead and\\n placed her in the back of his patrol car.\\n In the aftermath of the shooting, the Plaintiff presented ex-\\n pert testimony from Kelly Timms, a forensics services expert, that\\n Collier was not directly in front of the truck at the time of the\\n shooting. Instead, according to Timms, Collier was in front of the\\n truck’s A-line, meaning the “area that most people think of as the\\n [sic] edge of their door. . . [or] the supportive pillar that holds [the]\\n windshield in place.” In sum, the parties could not agree on: (1)\\n whether the officers identified themselves; (2) whether Settle\\n started the truck and started to drive it; and (3) whether Collier was\\n in front of the truck and, thus, in danger of being struck.\\n B. Material Factual Disputes Regarding Need for Exces-\\n sive Force Foreclose Summary Judgment\\n The district court determined that “a reasonable jury could\\n find that [Collier] did not have probable cause to believe that Mr.\\n Settle posed a threat of serious physical harm,” and denied Collier\\n qualified immunity. In making that determination, the court\\n pointed to two significant factual disputes: (1) Collier’s physical po-\\n sition at the time of the shooting; and (2) the truck’s alleged move-\\n ment. Our jurisprudence, and the longstanding understanding re-\\n garding the important role of juries, requires this Court to affirm\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 22 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 5\\n\\n the district court’s decision and remand the case for further pro-\\n ceedings.\\n Of course, many appeals of summary judgment orders raise\\n questions of both law and fact. They do so because the district\\n court must conduct a two-step factual and legal inquiry. See Koch\\n v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11th Cir. 2000). The first step defines\\n the movant’s conduct based on the record, taking all inferences in\\n favor of the nonmovant. Id. The second step analyzes whether a\\n reasonable official would or should have known that the movant’s\\n actions violated clearly established laws. Id. at 1294-95.\\n Here, the only true issues on appeal are factual disputes,\\n which are defined at the first step. At the district court, Collier ar-\\n gued that his use of deadly force was reasonable at the time that he\\n discharged his weapon because Settle refused to exit his truck, put\\n his keys in the ignition, and placed his hand on the gear. He ex-\\n plained that “whether the vehicle was moving or not [did] not cre-\\n ate a disputed issue of material fact.” The district court disagreed.\\n It explained that the inconsistencies regarding if and how the truck\\n moved were a credibility issue that was improper for summary\\n judgment. In other words, the district court explained that the\\n truck’s movement, whether forward, backward, or not at all, was\\n a factual dispute, not a legal dispute.\\n Collier also argued that his use of force was reasonable be-\\n cause he was trapped. Again, the district court found this was a\\n material factual dispute. It explained that a juror could rely on Set-\\n tle’s expert to find that Collier was standing “closer to the end of\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 23 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 24-12436\\n\\n the porch” rather than entrapped between the house and truck.\\n Accordingly, the court explained that “a reasonable jury could find\\n that the truck did not pose a [reasonable] risk to the defendant” at\\n the time of the shooting. While Collier says that he reasonably\\n feared for his life because he was trapped, his alleged entrapment\\n and subsequent fear are open to a jury’s ultimate determination.\\n In short, the court recognized that a reasonable jury could interpret\\n the events on the night of the shooting differently. More im-\\n portantly, this discrepancy about what the evidence could prove at\\n trial was the basis on which the district court made its decision.\\n The determination of these factual disputes ultimately fac-\\n tors into our analysis of the legal dispute in this case—whether Col-\\n lier’s use of deadly force was reasonable because he reasonably be-\\n lieved that Settle was using or threatened to use his vehicle as a\\n deadly weapon. See Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1181-82\\n (11th Cir. 2015). Indeed, to reach a legal determination, courts\\n must “slosh [their] way through the fact bound morass of reasona-\\n bleness.” Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023)\\n (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007)). Our precedent is\\n instructive regarding what constitutes an immediate threat to law\\n enforcement, and what level of force is reasonable.\\n In Underwood v. City of Bessemer, we held that officers did not\\n have probable cause to think a suspect would use his car as a\\n weapon. 11 F.4th 1317, 1329-31 (11th Cir. 2021). There, the sus-\\n pect was not driving aggressively as if he would harm the officer.\\n Id. at 1330. To the contrary, he was inching forward “so slowly\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 24 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 7\\n\\n that it looked like he would stop.” Id. Just like this case, the car\\n was reportedly about eight feet away from the officer. Id. The\\n Court ultimately concluded that, accepting those facts as true, a\\n reasonable jury could find that Underwood did not pose a threat to\\n the officer’s safety.1 Id. at 1330-31.\\n Similarly, in Morton v. Kirkwood, we held that an officer\\n lacked probable cause to believe that a suspect posed an immediate\\n threat of harm when the suspect was “an unarmed man in a sta-\\n tionary vehicle.” 707 F.3d 1276, 1282 (11th Cir. 2013). There, of-\\n ficers approached an unarmed man who was sitting in his car at a\\n local park. Id. at 1279. As the officers approached the man, he be-\\n gan to slowly drive away from them, coasting at a speed of one\\n mile per hour. Id. At that point, a previously unseen officer\\n stepped in front of the suspect’s car and told him to stop the vehi-\\n cle. Id. at 1279-80. The suspect then placed his hand on the gear to\\n shift it into park and immediately threw his hands in the air before\\n another officer shot the suspect several times and left him para-\\n lyzed. Id. Ultimately, we concluded that a reasonable officer\\n would have no reason to believe that the suspect’s driving put an-\\n yone’s safety in danger. Id. at 1281-82.\\n Both Underwood and Morton underscore the presence and\\n need to resolve factual disputes in the instant case. In Underwood\\n\\n\\n 1 In Underwood v. City of Bessemer, we ultimately affirmed the lower court’s\\n\\n grant of summary judgment because the officer’s alleged violation was not\\n clearly established at the time of the shooting. 11 F.4th 1317, 1332 (11th Cir.\\n 2021).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 25 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 24-12436\\n\\n and Morton, we highlighted the suspect’s driving in our evaluation\\n of whether an officer reasonably feared for his life at the time of the\\n shooting. Similarly, here, there is a factual dispute about how dan-\\n gerous Settle’s driving was at the time of the shooting. As high-\\n lighted above, Whitehead claimed that the truck never moved,\\n while Collier claimed that the truck moved backwards and then\\n possibly forward. Each varying factual account carries a different\\n inference that weighs into the reasonableness of Collier’s actions.\\n Because these factual disputes exist about the direction of the\\n truck’s movement, or if the truck moved at all, then this case is\\n appropriate for a jury, not a panel of judges.\\n Ultimately, this appeal does not present questions of law\\n that are applied to undisputed facts. Even Collier concedes that he\\n could not have reasonably used deadly force had Settle been re-\\n treating from the scene. So, this dispute comes down to Collier’s\\n position at the time of the shooting as well as how and if the truck\\n moved. As the district court explained, these are both factual dis-\\n putes appropriate for a jury.\\n C. Collier is not Entitled to Summary Judgment under\\n Florida’s “Self-Defense” Immunity Provision\\n Florida law allows officers to assert immunity if their actions\\n constitute “self-defense” against a person who uses or threatens to\\n use force, thus endangering the officer’s safety. Fla. Stat.\\n § 776.032(1). In short, an individual may use deadly force when he\\n or she believes it is necessary to prevent death or substantial harm\\n to that person or another. Id. As the majority notes, we have\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 26 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 9\\n\\n previously mirrored our analysis of both Florida’s immunity stat-\\n ute and excessive force claims. See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843,\\n 855-56 (11th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the factual disputes regarding\\n Collier’s use of excessive deadly force also prevent his entitlement\\n to immunity under Section 776.032(1).\\n D. Conclusion\\n For the reasons stated, the district court’s denial of Collier’s\\n motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. I respectfully\\n dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11216352/\", \"author_raw\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge, Dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRANCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"BRANCH\": \", Cir cuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Cir cuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749767/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Kimberley Diane Settle v. David Collier\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 1 of 26\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-12436\n ____________________\n\n KIMBERLEY DIANE SETTLE,\n A Personal Representative for the Estate of Jacob\n Joseph Settle Sr,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n DAVID COLLIER,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-22688-TKW-HTC\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\n cuit Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether Officer David Col-\n lier is entitled to immunity from a suit involving the death of Jacob\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 2 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n Settle. On the evening of November 14, 2020, Collier and his part-\n ner officer went to Settle’s house to execute arrest warrants for him\n and his wife. Settle was in his truck when Collier arrived and re-\n fused to leave the truck when Collier demanded that he do so.\n Within seconds, the situation escalated as Collier threatened to\n break open the windows, and Settle then started the engine of the\n truck and placed the transmission into a gear. Collier was in a tight\n space in between the truck and the house and feared the truck\n would hit him and his partner, so he fired his gun into the truck.\n Settle died on the scene. His estate’s representative sued Collier for\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and for bat-\n tery under Florida law. After Collier invoked qualified immunity\n and state immunity, the district court denied Collier’s motion for\n summary judgment. We reverse and remand with instructions to\n grant summary judgment in favor of Collier.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In this appeal of a denial of summary judgment based on\n qualified immunity, we recount the events viewing the evidence in\n the light most favorable to the estate as nonmovant. See Baxter v.\n Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 878 (11th Cir. 2024).\n On the evening of November 14, 2020, Escambia County of-\n ficers David Collier and Raymond Hart arrived at 2242 Handy\n Road to execute arrest warrants for Jacob Settle and his wife,\n Sophronia Whitehead. Settle had active arrest warrants for driving\n while his license was suspended, and Whitehead had active arrest\n warrants for failure to appear, destroying evidence, parole\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 3 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n violations, and driving while her license was suspended. Officers\n Hart and Collier had never encountered Settle before that night.\n Although Collier stated that he was aware that Settle had a “nar-\n cotics violation history,” he had no way of knowing if Settle was\n under the influence of narcotics at the time.\n Whitehead and Settle had visited a friend until the early\n morning hours of November 14, so they slept until around 8:30\n p.m. When they awakened, they decided to drive to another\n friend’s house in Settle’s truck. Because the front door was boarded\n up, Settle left through the back door, which Whitehead then\n locked, and she exited through the bedroom window.\n After arriving, the officers made their way to the backyard\n where the truck was parked. Collier saw the truck parked “parallel”\n with the porch, the driver’s side facing it. The front end of the truck\n faced the house and was parked “almost up against” it. There was\n also an air conditioning unit “sitting right up against” the porch,\n roughly perpendicular to the truck’s back wheel. The backyard was\n “pitch black” that night because there were no working porch or\n backyard lights. The officers’ flashlights were “the only light[s]” in\n the backyard. The backyard was also filled with “debris and trash\n in the yard stacked up against the porch.”\n As the officers approached the truck, Whitehead and Settle\n saw their flashlights “come around the side of the house.” White-\n head entered the passenger’s seat and Settle entered the driver’s\n seat. Whitehead and Settle “duck[ed] down in the truck.” White-\n head said that they did not know the officers were police “until they\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 4 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n c[a]me around” to the truck. Collier “got right up on the driver’s\n side” with his flashlight and saw both “slumped over” inside. Hart\n went up to the passenger’s side. Neither Whitehead nor Settle ex-\n ited the truck even after realizing the presence of police officers.\n But Whitehead sat up when she realized it.\n Worried that Settle might be unconscious, Collier “at-\n tempted to open up the door,” but it was locked. Settle then sat up\n straight and looked alert. Collier and Hart announced that they\n were from the sheriff’s office and asked Settle, by name, to exit the\n vehicle. After Settle did not exit the vehicle, Collier announced he\n was there to serve an arrest warrant and yelled, “Open your doors.\n Unlock your doors or we’re going to bust your windows out.” Set-\n tle attempted to deceive the officers by telling them that they were\n trying to arrest the wrong person. His flashlight still shining into\n the car, Collier then saw Settle “dig and reach around with his\n hands in the center console” and heard what he thought was the\n jingle of keys. So he “tried beating on the driver’s side window,\n trying to break the glass and enter the vehicle to get him out.”\n Settle started the truck’s engine. Whitehead, Hart, and Col-\n lier all saw Settle then put the transmission into gear. Collier\n dropped his flashlight and pushed himself away from the truck.\n Whitehead testified that the “truck never moved an inch” after Set-\n tle put it into gear, speculating that he must have only put it in neu-\n tral.\n Within a few seconds of Settle putting the truck into gear,\n Collier fired his gun. At the time of firing, Collier was “eight to\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 5 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n [ten] feet” away from the truck. Both bullets went through the\n driver’s side door window, not through the front window. White-\n head stated that she “heard two somethings” after Settle put the\n transmission in gear when she was interviewed in December 2022\n by criminal investigators. But at her July 2023 deposition, White-\n head said that she “didn’t hear no gunshots,” because “the truck\n has got pipes on it.” Instead, she testified that she became aware of\n the gunshots because her “leg was burning down the side . . . from\n gunpowder.” According to Whitehead, the gunshots and the start-\n ing of the engine must have been nearly simultaneous.\n The two shots struck Settle. Collier opened the truck door\n and started rendering aid to Settle by applying pressure to his two\n wounds—both in his arm/shoulder area. Settle stopped breathing,\n so Collier tried to resuscitate him. But Settle died. Settle’s toxicol-\n ogy report showed both methamphetamine and THC carboxy in\n his blood at the time of death.\n On November 9, 2022, the personal representative of Set-\n tle’s estate filed this suit in the district court against Collier, Hart,\n and the sheriff. The district court dismissed the claims against Hart\n and the sheriff, which left two claims against Collier: one claim for\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C.\n § 1983, and a claim of battery under Florida law.\n During discovery, the estate produced one expert, Kelly\n Timms, a forensic services technician. In her deposition, Timms\n disputed that Collier was at risk of being struck by the truck when\n he fired the shots that killed Settle. She opined that Collier was not\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 6 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n standing directly in front of the truck when he fired the deadly\n shots, but was instead standing in line with the metal part of the\n truck between the front windshield and the front side doors—oth-\n erwise known as the “A-pillar.”\n After Collier moved for summary judgment based on quali-\n fied immunity and state-agent immunity, the district court denied\n his motion. The district court ruled that a “reasonable jury could\n find that [Collier] violated Mr. Settle’s constitutional right to be\n free from excessive force when he shot into a non-moving truck\n that did not pose a risk to [Collier] or others.” It denied qualified\n immunity because it was “clearly established since at least 2013 that\n when a driver does not use or does not threaten to use his car as a\n weapon, an officer may not use deadly force against him.” And it\n ruled that Collier was not entitled to state immunity from the bat-\n tery claim because a “reasonable jury could find that [Collier] acted\n with wanton and willful disregard” for Settle’s safety and that Col-\n lier “did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to use deadly\n force because Mr. Settle did not use the truck against [Collier] in a\n threatening way.”\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024). We review de novo whether an officer\n is entitled to summary judgment based on state law immunity. Eng-\n lish v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 7 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain\n that Collier is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not use\n excessive force. Second, we explain that Collier is entitled to state-\n agent immunity from the claim of battery.\n A. Collier Did Not Use Excessive Force in Violation of the\n Fourth Amendment.\n When officers raise the defense of qualified immunity, they\n have “the burden to establish that they were acting within their\n discretionary authority.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th\n Cir. 2022). “If the officers satisfy that burden, the burden then shifts\n to the plaintiff to establish that the officers violated a constitutional\n right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-\n tion.” Id. We may review whether there was a violation or whether\n the violation was clearly established in either order. Id. In this ap-\n peal, we start and end with whether Collier violated Settle’s consti-\n tutional rights by using excessive force. The estate does not dispute\n that Collier was acting “pursuant to his discretionary authority”\n during the incident. So the burden shifted to the estate to prove\n that Collier violated Settle’s clearly established constitutional\n rights.\n An “excessive force claim [that] arises in the context of an\n arrest . . . is most properly characterized as one invoking the pro-\n tections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the\n right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . sei-\n zures.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (quoting U.S.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 8 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n CONST. amend. IV). As the text of the Fourth Amendment sug-\n gests, excessive force claims are governed by an “‘objective reason-\n ableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. In reviewing the reasonableness of\n an officer’s use of force, “we look at the fact pattern from the per-\n spective of a reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the\n attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily\n harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer\n sought to eliminate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206\n (11th Cir. 2009). “Our inquiry does not employ the 20/20 vision of\n hindsight.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888 (citation and internal quotation\n marks omitted).\n The use of deadly force is reasonable when an “officer has\n probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious\n physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Gar-\n ner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). So “if the suspect threatens the officer\n with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has\n committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction\n of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to\n prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been\n given.” Id. at 11–12. “This rule covers situations in which (1) an of-\n ficer believed his life was in danger because a suspect used a vehicle\n as a weapon against the officer or (2) the suspect’s use of the vehicle\n otherwise presented an immediate threat of serious physical\n harm.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888. This Court has “[c]onsistently . . .\n upheld an officer’s use of deadly force” under this framework. Id.\n And the Fourth Amendment does not “require officers in a tense\n and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 9 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d\n 576, 581 (11th Cir. 2007).\n The parties dispute whether Collier could have reasonably\n believed that Settle’s vehicle presented an immediate threat of\n physical harm warranting the use of deadly force. Collier argues\n that even under the estate’s version of events, the circumstances\n were “tense, rapidly evolving, and not within [his] complete con-\n trol” such that he had an objectively reasonable belief that deadly\n force was necessary to protect his and Hart’s lives. Settle’s estate\n argues that “the truck never moved,” so the truck could not have\n been “used or threatened to be used in a way that indicated it had\n become a deadly weapon.” We agree with Collier.\n The estate’s argument ignores that, under the circum-\n stances, Settle needed not move the car for his actions to be rea-\n sonably perceived as threatening. The estate admits that Settle\n “started the truck and moved the gear shift.” Collier saw Settle put\n the truck into gear. And Whitehead said that Settle put the car into\n gear before Collier fired. So, even viewing the evidence in the light\n most favorable to the estate, there was some amount of time be-\n tween Settle starting the truck and Collier firing the shots. In that\n short time, Collier recognized Settle’s intent to drive the truck and\n so convert it into a deadly weapon.\n Two of our decisions are instructive. First, Long v. Slaton in-\n volved a mentally unstable man who stole a police vehicle and tried\n to back it out of a driveway. 508 F.3d at 578–79. The officer at the\n scene knew of the man’s condition, pointed his pistol at the man,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 10 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n and warned him to comply or else he would shoot. Id. The man\n put the car in reverse and backed down the driveway; the officer\n stepped in the middle of the driveway (facing the front of the car)\n and fired three shots that killed the man. Id. While the car had not\n yet become a “deadly weapon” at the time of the shooting, the\n plaintiff’s “unstable frame of mind, energetic evasion of the dep-\n uty’s physical control, . . . criminal act of stealing a police cruiser,\n and [his] starting to drive . . . gave the deputy reason to believe that\n [he] was dangerous.” Id. at 581–82. (footnote omitted). And in Pace\n v. Capobianco, this Court held that an officer who shot a man after a\n high-speed chase did not violate the Fourth Amendment “[e]ven\n when” the man’s “car was stopped,” he “did not try to run over the\n deputies[,] . . . [and] did not aim the car at the deputies.” 283 F.3d\n 1275, 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court reached that conclu-\n sion because “[b]y the time of the shooting, [the man] had used the\n automobile in a manner to give reasonable policemen probable\n cause to believe that it had become a deadly weapon.” Id. at 1282.\n And the man never “left his automobile or even turned the engine\n off,” establishing that he was still “armed.” Id. at 1281–82.\n Even if the truck never moved, Collier could reasonably per-\n ceive that Settle’s vehicle was a deadly weapon. He reasonably in-\n terpreted Settle’s starting the engine and putting it into gear as es-\n calatory. Common sense would suggest that Settle’s next step\n would be to drive—not to remain stationary. Settle had already re-\n sisted arrest; by starting the truck engine and putting it into gear,\n Collier reasonably believed that Settle intended to escape in reck-\n less disregard of the officers’ safety or to evade arrest by injuring\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 11 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n them. By starting the engine and putting the transmission into gear,\n Settle converted his truck into a “deadly weapon with which [he]\n was armed.” Id. at 1282. And because Collier had probable cause to\n believe Settle intended to drive the truck dangerously, he was not\n “require[d] . . . to wait [to fire] until the moment” that Settle drove\n it. Long, 508 F.3d at 581.\n We reject the estate’s attempt to create a categorical rule\n that officers cannot reasonably perceive that a vehicle has been\n converted into a deadly weapon either until the vehicle moves or\n unless the suspect’s behavior before the incident established that\n he was dangerous. The estate admits that “this Court has [held]\n that even if a vehicle did not move and an officer was not in its\n path, the use of deadly force could be reasonable.” Yet it argues\n that this “principle . . . extends only to situations where the sus-\n pect’s prior behavior or use of the vehicle gave an officer reason to\n believe that the vehicle had become a deadly weapon.” But our\n precedents establish no bright-line rule. After all, “[t]he constitu-\n tional test for excessive force is necessarily fact specific,”\n McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1206, and “not capable of precise definition\n or mechanical application,” Long, 508 F.3d at 580 (citation and in-\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\n The estate makes much of one surface-level similarity be-\n tween this appeal and Morton v. Kirkwood, a decision where we dis-\n cerned a constitutional violation. 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013). In\n Morton too the vehicle was “stationary” when the officer fired at its\n driver. Id. at 1279–80, 1282. The plaintiff was sitting in his car at a\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 12 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n park when he saw a police officer walk into the park. Id. at 1279.\n He then attempted to “coast” out of the park, never seeing anyone\n in front of his car. Id. At that point, the plaintiff heard an officer\n shout, so he “shifted his car to park and raised his hands.” Id. at\n 1279–80. The officer “nonetheless shot at the car.” Id. at 1280. We\n held that, based on those facts, an officer could not reasonably per-\n ceive an immediate threat to his safety. Id. at 1281–82. The fact\n that the vehicle in Morton was stationary is of little importance. In\n Morton, the vehicle was stationary because the driver complied\n with the officer’s request to stop the vehicle. Id. at 1279–80. In this\n appeal, the truck was stationary from the start of the encounter;\n Settle did not make it stationary at the command of the officer. In-\n deed, Settle refused to comply with Collier’s lawful order to exit\n the vehicle, unlike the plaintiff in Morton, who alleged that he\n promptly complied with the officer’s orders. Id. The plaintiff in\n Morton deescalated, unlike Settle who escalated the situation by\n starting the truck and putting the transmission into gear.\n The estate insists that Collier was unreasonable in firing be-\n cause he “was not in the path of the truck” and was about eight feet\n away when he fired. This argument answers the wrong question.\n Reasonableness hinges on the perspective of the officer, so the\n more apt question is whether Collier could have reasonably per-\n ceived that he was in the path of the vehicle and that his safety was\n in danger. See Tillis v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2021).\n And we do not impose on officers “the benefit of hindsight.” Baxter,\n 121 F.4th at 890. When officers must make split-second judgments,\n we accept that they “d[o] not have time to calculate angles and\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 13 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n trajectories to determine whether [they are] a few feet outside of\n harm’s way.” Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299.\n\n Two precedents are instructive. In Robinson v. Arrugueta, we\n declined to hold an officer to the benefit of hindsight that he “per-\n haps could have escaped unharmed.” 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.\n 2005). There, the decedent accelerated to just one to two miles per\n hour toward the officer, but the officer was standing four feet away\n from the front of the vehicle and was sandwiched between the de-\n cedent’s vehicle and another. Id. at 1254, 1256. And Tillis involved\n a high-speed chase that ended with a crash into some bushes. 12\n F.4th at 1295. The officer pulled behind the vehicle and stepped out\n of his car to make the arrest. Id. As he stepped out, the vehicle’s\n “reverse lights turned on” and the officer shot into the vehicle as it\n drove past him. Id. We held that the officer “had no way of know-\n ing whether [the vehicle] would continue in a straight line or\n swerve toward him,” and he did not have time to calculate whether\n he was in harm’s way. Id. at 1299. “[O]n foot next to [the] vehicle,”\n the officer was “exposed to danger” which justified firing at the sus-\n pect. Id.\n\n Collier feared for his life when Settle put the truck into gear.\n Collier could reasonably fear that Settle’s next move was to drive\n it. Like the officer in Robinson, Collier was in a “narrow space” be-\n tween the car and the porch—even if more than four feet away.\n 415 F.4th at 1256. Had Collier tried to escape by rushing directly\n away from the house toward the back of the truck, the air condi-\n tioning unit and debris would have obstructed his path. And he\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 14 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n reasonably could have feared being struck if the vehicle went in\n reverse. Moving the other way would have required him to step in\n front of the vehicle which had been put into gear. Like the officer\n in Tillis, he also “had no waying of knowing” what Settle would do\n next, especially considering that Settle was actively resisting arrest.\n See 12 F.4th at 1299. And he was standing “on foot next to” Settle’s\n truck, exposing him to danger from the truck’s movements. See id.\n Collier had little-to-no visibility in the “pitch black” backyard. And\n Collier no longer had his flashlight in hand. So even if there were a\n clear path of escape, Collier would not have been able to see it. We\n cannot hold Collier to the benefit of hindsight by requiring him to\n have “calculate[d] angles and trajectories” of the truck’s potential\n paths or for an escape attempt. Id.\n Settle’s estate suggests that Collier was not justified in firing\n because he had no reason to believe that Settle was violent or dan-\n gerous before the encounter. True, “the severity of the crime\n prompting [the encounter] can carry weight” in the reasonableness\n analysis. Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (citation and\n internal quotation marks omitted). But in “circumstances that are\n tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” we must make “allowance\n for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second\n judgments.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Sometimes, an officer\n does not have time to reflect and consider why the encounter was\n initiated—whether it was a routine Terry stop or a high-speed\n chase.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 15 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n We have held that an officer acted reasonably in using\n deadly force by shooting into a vehicle during a tense situation\n even when the officer did not have reason to think the driver had\n committed violent crimes. For example, in Baxter, this Court held\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of sim-\n ple car theft. 121 F.4th at 878–91. And in Robinson, this Court held\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of deal-\n ing heroin. 415 F.3d at 1253, 1256.\n The estate faults Collier for neither giving a warning that he\n was about to fire nor “display[ing] his weapon” before firing the\n shots. “Officers are required to give a warning before using deadly\n force if a warning is feasible. The critical inquiry is feasibility.” Davis\n v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). The feasibility re-\n quirement is not an “inflexible rule that, in order to avoid civil lia-\n bility, an officer must always warn his suspect before firing—par-\n ticularly where . . . such a warning might easily have cost the of-\n ficer his life.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n Settle’s rapid escalation and Collier’s proximity to the truck put\n Collier in immediate danger, so he was not required to issue a\n warning before firing.\n The estate’s reliance on Vaughan v. Cox is unavailing. 343\n F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). In Vaughan, an officer “traveled along-\n side” a fleeing stolen vehicle, which had struck a police cruiser, on\n an interstate highway for 30 to 45 seconds before firing into the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 16 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\n\n vehicle. Id. at 1326–27, 1331. We considered that ample “time and\n opportunity to warn” the vehicle’s driver before firing. Id at 1331.\n Here, in contrast, the encounter escalated in the seconds it took\n Settle to turn on the truck and put it into gear, giving Collier little\n time or opportunity to issue a warning.\n The district court relied on Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11\n F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2021), to hold that Collier could have warned\n Settle before firing. In Underwood, an officer walked in front of a\n vehicle as it “coast[ed]” slowly toward the officer “as if to stop,”\n and the officer began shooting when the vehicle was roughly eight\n feet away. 11 F.4th at 1322, 1331. True, in Underwood and here, the\n officer was eight feet away at the time he fired—and at that dis-\n tance, a warning is in fact more feasible. But the driver in Under-\n wood was slowing down “as if to stop,” unlike Settle who put the\n truck in gear as if to drive. In the light of the proximity of the truck\n to Collier, Collier’s lack of visibility, and Settle’s escalatory actions,\n Collier could forego a warning. A delay could have put his or Hart’s\n life in danger. See Waller, 44 F.4th at 1315.\n B. Collier is Entitled to State Statutory Immunity from\n the Estate’s Battery Claim.\n Florida’s self-defense immunity statute provides that a “per-\n son who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in [sec-\n tion] 776.012 . . . is justified in such conduct and is immune from\n . . . civil action for the use or threatened use of such force.” FLA.\n STAT. § 776.032(1). Section 776.012 also provides that a person who\n “reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 17 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him-\n self . . . or another” may use deadly force, and that there is no “duty\n to retreat” before using or threatening to use such force. Id.\n § 776.012(2). We have ruled that section 776.012 is at least co-ex-\n tensive with the Fourth Amendment standard for the use of deadly\n force. See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 855–56 (11th Cir. 2010).\n Because Collier’s use of deadly force was not excessive in violation\n of the Fourth Amendment, Collier was also entitled to immunity\n from the estate’s claim of battery.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to enter\n judgment for Collier.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 18 of 26\n\n\n\n\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Kimberley Diane Settle v. David Collier\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 1 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12436\\n ____________________\\n\\n KIMBERLEY DIANE SETTLE,\\n A Personal Representative for the Estate of Jacob\\n Joseph Settle Sr,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n DAVID COLLIER,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-22688-TKW-HTC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir-\\n cuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether Officer David Col-\\n lier is entitled to immunity from a suit involving the death of Jacob\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 2 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n Settle. On the evening of November 14, 2020, Collier and his part-\\n ner officer went to Settle’s house to execute arrest warrants for him\\n and his wife. Settle was in his truck when Collier arrived and re-\\n fused to leave the truck when Collier demanded that he do so.\\n Within seconds, the situation escalated as Collier threatened to\\n break open the windows, and Settle then started the engine of the\\n truck and placed the transmission into a gear. Collier was in a tight\\n space in between the truck and the house and feared the truck\\n would hit him and his partner, so he fired his gun into the truck.\\n Settle died on the scene. His estate’s representative sued Collier for\\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and for bat-\\n tery under Florida law. After Collier invoked qualified immunity\\n and state immunity, the district court denied Collier’s motion for\\n summary judgment. We reverse and remand with instructions to\\n grant summary judgment in favor of Collier.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In this appeal of a denial of summary judgment based on\\n qualified immunity, we recount the events viewing the evidence in\\n the light most favorable to the estate as nonmovant. See Baxter v.\\n Santiago-Miranda, 121 F.4th 873, 878 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n On the evening of November 14, 2020, Escambia County of-\\n ficers David Collier and Raymond Hart arrived at 2242 Handy\\n Road to execute arrest warrants for Jacob Settle and his wife,\\n Sophronia Whitehead. Settle had active arrest warrants for driving\\n while his license was suspended, and Whitehead had active arrest\\n warrants for failure to appear, destroying evidence, parole\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 3 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n violations, and driving while her license was suspended. Officers\\n Hart and Collier had never encountered Settle before that night.\\n Although Collier stated that he was aware that Settle had a “nar-\\n cotics violation history,” he had no way of knowing if Settle was\\n under the influence of narcotics at the time.\\n Whitehead and Settle had visited a friend until the early\\n morning hours of November 14, so they slept until around 8:30\\n p.m. When they awakened, they decided to drive to another\\n friend’s house in Settle’s truck. Because the front door was boarded\\n up, Settle left through the back door, which Whitehead then\\n locked, and she exited through the bedroom window.\\n After arriving, the officers made their way to the backyard\\n where the truck was parked. Collier saw the truck parked “parallel”\\n with the porch, the driver’s side facing it. The front end of the truck\\n faced the house and was parked “almost up against” it. There was\\n also an air conditioning unit “sitting right up against” the porch,\\n roughly perpendicular to the truck’s back wheel. The backyard was\\n “pitch black” that night because there were no working porch or\\n backyard lights. The officers’ flashlights were “the only light[s]” in\\n the backyard. The backyard was also filled with “debris and trash\\n in the yard stacked up against the porch.”\\n As the officers approached the truck, Whitehead and Settle\\n saw their flashlights “come around the side of the house.” White-\\n head entered the passenger’s seat and Settle entered the driver’s\\n seat. Whitehead and Settle “duck[ed] down in the truck.” White-\\n head said that they did not know the officers were police “until they\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 4 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n c[a]me around” to the truck. Collier “got right up on the driver’s\\n side” with his flashlight and saw both “slumped over” inside. Hart\\n went up to the passenger’s side. Neither Whitehead nor Settle ex-\\n ited the truck even after realizing the presence of police officers.\\n But Whitehead sat up when she realized it.\\n Worried that Settle might be unconscious, Collier “at-\\n tempted to open up the door,” but it was locked. Settle then sat up\\n straight and looked alert. Collier and Hart announced that they\\n were from the sheriff’s office and asked Settle, by name, to exit the\\n vehicle. After Settle did not exit the vehicle, Collier announced he\\n was there to serve an arrest warrant and yelled, “Open your doors.\\n Unlock your doors or we’re going to bust your windows out.” Set-\\n tle attempted to deceive the officers by telling them that they were\\n trying to arrest the wrong person. His flashlight still shining into\\n the car, Collier then saw Settle “dig and reach around with his\\n hands in the center console” and heard what he thought was the\\n jingle of keys. So he “tried beating on the driver’s side window,\\n trying to break the glass and enter the vehicle to get him out.”\\n Settle started the truck’s engine. Whitehead, Hart, and Col-\\n lier all saw Settle then put the transmission into gear. Collier\\n dropped his flashlight and pushed himself away from the truck.\\n Whitehead testified that the “truck never moved an inch” after Set-\\n tle put it into gear, speculating that he must have only put it in neu-\\n tral.\\n Within a few seconds of Settle putting the truck into gear,\\n Collier fired his gun. At the time of firing, Collier was “eight to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 5 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n [ten] feet” away from the truck. Both bullets went through the\\n driver’s side door window, not through the front window. White-\\n head stated that she “heard two somethings” after Settle put the\\n transmission in gear when she was interviewed in December 2022\\n by criminal investigators. But at her July 2023 deposition, White-\\n head said that she “didn’t hear no gunshots,” because “the truck\\n has got pipes on it.” Instead, she testified that she became aware of\\n the gunshots because her “leg was burning down the side . . . from\\n gunpowder.” According to Whitehead, the gunshots and the start-\\n ing of the engine must have been nearly simultaneous.\\n The two shots struck Settle. Collier opened the truck door\\n and started rendering aid to Settle by applying pressure to his two\\n wounds—both in his arm/shoulder area. Settle stopped breathing,\\n so Collier tried to resuscitate him. But Settle died. Settle’s toxicol-\\n ogy report showed both methamphetamine and THC carboxy in\\n his blood at the time of death.\\n On November 9, 2022, the personal representative of Set-\\n tle’s estate filed this suit in the district court against Collier, Hart,\\n and the sheriff. The district court dismissed the claims against Hart\\n and the sheriff, which left two claims against Collier: one claim for\\n excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.S.C.\\n § 1983, and a claim of battery under Florida law.\\n During discovery, the estate produced one expert, Kelly\\n Timms, a forensic services technician. In her deposition, Timms\\n disputed that Collier was at risk of being struck by the truck when\\n he fired the shots that killed Settle. She opined that Collier was not\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 6 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n standing directly in front of the truck when he fired the deadly\\n shots, but was instead standing in line with the metal part of the\\n truck between the front windshield and the front side doors—oth-\\n erwise known as the “A-pillar.”\\n After Collier moved for summary judgment based on quali-\\n fied immunity and state-agent immunity, the district court denied\\n his motion. The district court ruled that a “reasonable jury could\\n find that [Collier] violated Mr. Settle’s constitutional right to be\\n free from excessive force when he shot into a non-moving truck\\n that did not pose a risk to [Collier] or others.” It denied qualified\\n immunity because it was “clearly established since at least 2013 that\\n when a driver does not use or does not threaten to use his car as a\\n weapon, an officer may not use deadly force against him.” And it\\n ruled that Collier was not entitled to state immunity from the bat-\\n tery claim because a “reasonable jury could find that [Collier] acted\\n with wanton and willful disregard” for Settle’s safety and that Col-\\n lier “did not reasonably believe that it was necessary to use deadly\\n force because Mr. Settle did not use the truck against [Collier] in a\\n threatening way.”\\n II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024). We review de novo whether an officer\\n is entitled to summary judgment based on state law immunity. Eng-\\n lish v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 7 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion into two parts. First, we explain\\n that Collier is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not use\\n excessive force. Second, we explain that Collier is entitled to state-\\n agent immunity from the claim of battery.\\n A. Collier Did Not Use Excessive Force in Violation of the\\n Fourth Amendment.\\n When officers raise the defense of qualified immunity, they\\n have “the burden to establish that they were acting within their\\n discretionary authority.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th\\n Cir. 2022). “If the officers satisfy that burden, the burden then shifts\\n to the plaintiff to establish that the officers violated a constitutional\\n right that was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-\\n tion.” Id. We may review whether there was a violation or whether\\n the violation was clearly established in either order. Id. In this ap-\\n peal, we start and end with whether Collier violated Settle’s consti-\\n tutional rights by using excessive force. The estate does not dispute\\n that Collier was acting “pursuant to his discretionary authority”\\n during the incident. So the burden shifted to the estate to prove\\n that Collier violated Settle’s clearly established constitutional\\n rights.\\n An “excessive force claim [that] arises in the context of an\\n arrest . . . is most properly characterized as one invoking the pro-\\n tections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the\\n right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . sei-\\n zures.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (quoting U.S.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 8 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n CONST. amend. IV). As the text of the Fourth Amendment sug-\\n gests, excessive force claims are governed by an “‘objective reason-\\n ableness’ standard.” Id. at 388. In reviewing the reasonableness of\\n an officer’s use of force, “we look at the fact pattern from the per-\\n spective of a reasonable officer on the scene with knowledge of the\\n attendant circumstances and facts, and balance the risk of bodily\\n harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer\\n sought to eliminate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1206\\n (11th Cir. 2009). “Our inquiry does not employ the 20/20 vision of\\n hindsight.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n The use of deadly force is reasonable when an “officer has\\n probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious\\n physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Gar-\\n ner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). So “if the suspect threatens the officer\\n with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has\\n committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction\\n of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to\\n prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been\\n given.” Id. at 11–12. “This rule covers situations in which (1) an of-\\n ficer believed his life was in danger because a suspect used a vehicle\\n as a weapon against the officer or (2) the suspect’s use of the vehicle\\n otherwise presented an immediate threat of serious physical\\n harm.” Baxter, 121 F.4th at 888. This Court has “[c]onsistently . . .\\n upheld an officer’s use of deadly force” under this framework. Id.\\n And the Fourth Amendment does not “require officers in a tense\\n and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 9 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.” Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d\\n 576, 581 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n The parties dispute whether Collier could have reasonably\\n believed that Settle’s vehicle presented an immediate threat of\\n physical harm warranting the use of deadly force. Collier argues\\n that even under the estate’s version of events, the circumstances\\n were “tense, rapidly evolving, and not within [his] complete con-\\n trol” such that he had an objectively reasonable belief that deadly\\n force was necessary to protect his and Hart’s lives. Settle’s estate\\n argues that “the truck never moved,” so the truck could not have\\n been “used or threatened to be used in a way that indicated it had\\n become a deadly weapon.” We agree with Collier.\\n The estate’s argument ignores that, under the circum-\\n stances, Settle needed not move the car for his actions to be rea-\\n sonably perceived as threatening. The estate admits that Settle\\n “started the truck and moved the gear shift.” Collier saw Settle put\\n the truck into gear. And Whitehead said that Settle put the car into\\n gear before Collier fired. So, even viewing the evidence in the light\\n most favorable to the estate, there was some amount of time be-\\n tween Settle starting the truck and Collier firing the shots. In that\\n short time, Collier recognized Settle’s intent to drive the truck and\\n so convert it into a deadly weapon.\\n Two of our decisions are instructive. First, Long v. Slaton in-\\n volved a mentally unstable man who stole a police vehicle and tried\\n to back it out of a driveway. 508 F.3d at 578–79. The officer at the\\n scene knew of the man’s condition, pointed his pistol at the man,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 10 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n and warned him to comply or else he would shoot. Id. The man\\n put the car in reverse and backed down the driveway; the officer\\n stepped in the middle of the driveway (facing the front of the car)\\n and fired three shots that killed the man. Id. While the car had not\\n yet become a “deadly weapon” at the time of the shooting, the\\n plaintiff’s “unstable frame of mind, energetic evasion of the dep-\\n uty’s physical control, . . . criminal act of stealing a police cruiser,\\n and [his] starting to drive . . . gave the deputy reason to believe that\\n [he] was dangerous.” Id. at 581–82. (footnote omitted). And in Pace\\n v. Capobianco, this Court held that an officer who shot a man after a\\n high-speed chase did not violate the Fourth Amendment “[e]ven\\n when” the man’s “car was stopped,” he “did not try to run over the\\n deputies[,] . . . [and] did not aim the car at the deputies.” 283 F.3d\\n 1275, 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court reached that conclu-\\n sion because “[b]y the time of the shooting, [the man] had used the\\n automobile in a manner to give reasonable policemen probable\\n cause to believe that it had become a deadly weapon.” Id. at 1282.\\n And the man never “left his automobile or even turned the engine\\n off,” establishing that he was still “armed.” Id. at 1281–82.\\n Even if the truck never moved, Collier could reasonably per-\\n ceive that Settle’s vehicle was a deadly weapon. He reasonably in-\\n terpreted Settle’s starting the engine and putting it into gear as es-\\n calatory. Common sense would suggest that Settle’s next step\\n would be to drive—not to remain stationary. Settle had already re-\\n sisted arrest; by starting the truck engine and putting it into gear,\\n Collier reasonably believed that Settle intended to escape in reck-\\n less disregard of the officers’ safety or to evade arrest by injuring\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 11 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n them. By starting the engine and putting the transmission into gear,\\n Settle converted his truck into a “deadly weapon with which [he]\\n was armed.” Id. at 1282. And because Collier had probable cause to\\n believe Settle intended to drive the truck dangerously, he was not\\n “require[d] . . . to wait [to fire] until the moment” that Settle drove\\n it. Long, 508 F.3d at 581.\\n We reject the estate’s attempt to create a categorical rule\\n that officers cannot reasonably perceive that a vehicle has been\\n converted into a deadly weapon either until the vehicle moves or\\n unless the suspect’s behavior before the incident established that\\n he was dangerous. The estate admits that “this Court has [held]\\n that even if a vehicle did not move and an officer was not in its\\n path, the use of deadly force could be reasonable.” Yet it argues\\n that this “principle . . . extends only to situations where the sus-\\n pect’s prior behavior or use of the vehicle gave an officer reason to\\n believe that the vehicle had become a deadly weapon.” But our\\n precedents establish no bright-line rule. After all, “[t]he constitu-\\n tional test for excessive force is necessarily fact specific,”\\n McCullough, 559 F.3d at 1206, and “not capable of precise definition\\n or mechanical application,” Long, 508 F.3d at 580 (citation and in-\\n ternal quotation marks omitted).\\n The estate makes much of one surface-level similarity be-\\n tween this appeal and Morton v. Kirkwood, a decision where we dis-\\n cerned a constitutional violation. 707 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2013). In\\n Morton too the vehicle was “stationary” when the officer fired at its\\n driver. Id. at 1279–80, 1282. The plaintiff was sitting in his car at a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 12 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n park when he saw a police officer walk into the park. Id. at 1279.\\n He then attempted to “coast” out of the park, never seeing anyone\\n in front of his car. Id. At that point, the plaintiff heard an officer\\n shout, so he “shifted his car to park and raised his hands.” Id. at\\n 1279–80. The officer “nonetheless shot at the car.” Id. at 1280. We\\n held that, based on those facts, an officer could not reasonably per-\\n ceive an immediate threat to his safety. Id. at 1281–82. The fact\\n that the vehicle in Morton was stationary is of little importance. In\\n Morton, the vehicle was stationary because the driver complied\\n with the officer’s request to stop the vehicle. Id. at 1279–80. In this\\n appeal, the truck was stationary from the start of the encounter;\\n Settle did not make it stationary at the command of the officer. In-\\n deed, Settle refused to comply with Collier’s lawful order to exit\\n the vehicle, unlike the plaintiff in Morton, who alleged that he\\n promptly complied with the officer’s orders. Id. The plaintiff in\\n Morton deescalated, unlike Settle who escalated the situation by\\n starting the truck and putting the transmission into gear.\\n The estate insists that Collier was unreasonable in firing be-\\n cause he “was not in the path of the truck” and was about eight feet\\n away when he fired. This argument answers the wrong question.\\n Reasonableness hinges on the perspective of the officer, so the\\n more apt question is whether Collier could have reasonably per-\\n ceived that he was in the path of the vehicle and that his safety was\\n in danger. See Tillis v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n And we do not impose on officers “the benefit of hindsight.” Baxter,\\n 121 F.4th at 890. When officers must make split-second judgments,\\n we accept that they “d[o] not have time to calculate angles and\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 13 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n trajectories to determine whether [they are] a few feet outside of\\n harm’s way.” Tillis, 12 F.4th at 1299.\\n\\n Two precedents are instructive. In Robinson v. Arrugueta, we\\n declined to hold an officer to the benefit of hindsight that he “per-\\n haps could have escaped unharmed.” 415 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir.\\n 2005). There, the decedent accelerated to just one to two miles per\\n hour toward the officer, but the officer was standing four feet away\\n from the front of the vehicle and was sandwiched between the de-\\n cedent’s vehicle and another. Id. at 1254, 1256. And Tillis involved\\n a high-speed chase that ended with a crash into some bushes. 12\\n F.4th at 1295. The officer pulled behind the vehicle and stepped out\\n of his car to make the arrest. Id. As he stepped out, the vehicle’s\\n “reverse lights turned on” and the officer shot into the vehicle as it\\n drove past him. Id. We held that the officer “had no way of know-\\n ing whether [the vehicle] would continue in a straight line or\\n swerve toward him,” and he did not have time to calculate whether\\n he was in harm’s way. Id. at 1299. “[O]n foot next to [the] vehicle,”\\n the officer was “exposed to danger” which justified firing at the sus-\\n pect. Id.\\n\\n Collier feared for his life when Settle put the truck into gear.\\n Collier could reasonably fear that Settle’s next move was to drive\\n it. Like the officer in Robinson, Collier was in a “narrow space” be-\\n tween the car and the porch—even if more than four feet away.\\n 415 F.4th at 1256. Had Collier tried to escape by rushing directly\\n away from the house toward the back of the truck, the air condi-\\n tioning unit and debris would have obstructed his path. And he\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 14 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n reasonably could have feared being struck if the vehicle went in\\n reverse. Moving the other way would have required him to step in\\n front of the vehicle which had been put into gear. Like the officer\\n in Tillis, he also “had no waying of knowing” what Settle would do\\n next, especially considering that Settle was actively resisting arrest.\\n See 12 F.4th at 1299. And he was standing “on foot next to” Settle’s\\n truck, exposing him to danger from the truck’s movements. See id.\\n Collier had little-to-no visibility in the “pitch black” backyard. And\\n Collier no longer had his flashlight in hand. So even if there were a\\n clear path of escape, Collier would not have been able to see it. We\\n cannot hold Collier to the benefit of hindsight by requiring him to\\n have “calculate[d] angles and trajectories” of the truck’s potential\\n paths or for an escape attempt. Id.\\n Settle’s estate suggests that Collier was not justified in firing\\n because he had no reason to believe that Settle was violent or dan-\\n gerous before the encounter. True, “the severity of the crime\\n prompting [the encounter] can carry weight” in the reasonableness\\n analysis. Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted). But in “circumstances that are\\n tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” we must make “allowance\\n for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second\\n judgments.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. Sometimes, an officer\\n does not have time to reflect and consider why the encounter was\\n initiated—whether it was a routine Terry stop or a high-speed\\n chase.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 15 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n We have held that an officer acted reasonably in using\\n deadly force by shooting into a vehicle during a tense situation\\n even when the officer did not have reason to think the driver had\\n committed violent crimes. For example, in Baxter, this Court held\\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of sim-\\n ple car theft. 121 F.4th at 878–91. And in Robinson, this Court held\\n that an officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he\\n fired shots into a vehicle being driven by a person suspected of deal-\\n ing heroin. 415 F.3d at 1253, 1256.\\n The estate faults Collier for neither giving a warning that he\\n was about to fire nor “display[ing] his weapon” before firing the\\n shots. “Officers are required to give a warning before using deadly\\n force if a warning is feasible. The critical inquiry is feasibility.” Davis\\n v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022). The feasibility re-\\n quirement is not an “inflexible rule that, in order to avoid civil lia-\\n bility, an officer must always warn his suspect before firing—par-\\n ticularly where . . . such a warning might easily have cost the of-\\n ficer his life.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Settle’s rapid escalation and Collier’s proximity to the truck put\\n Collier in immediate danger, so he was not required to issue a\\n warning before firing.\\n The estate’s reliance on Vaughan v. Cox is unavailing. 343\\n F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003). In Vaughan, an officer “traveled along-\\n side” a fleeing stolen vehicle, which had struck a police cruiser, on\\n an interstate highway for 30 to 45 seconds before firing into the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 16 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-12436\\n\\n vehicle. Id. at 1326–27, 1331. We considered that ample “time and\\n opportunity to warn” the vehicle’s driver before firing. Id at 1331.\\n Here, in contrast, the encounter escalated in the seconds it took\\n Settle to turn on the truck and put it into gear, giving Collier little\\n time or opportunity to issue a warning.\\n The district court relied on Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11\\n F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2021), to hold that Collier could have warned\\n Settle before firing. In Underwood, an officer walked in front of a\\n vehicle as it “coast[ed]” slowly toward the officer “as if to stop,”\\n and the officer began shooting when the vehicle was roughly eight\\n feet away. 11 F.4th at 1322, 1331. True, in Underwood and here, the\\n officer was eight feet away at the time he fired—and at that dis-\\n tance, a warning is in fact more feasible. But the driver in Under-\\n wood was slowing down “as if to stop,” unlike Settle who put the\\n truck in gear as if to drive. In the light of the proximity of the truck\\n to Collier, Collier’s lack of visibility, and Settle’s escalatory actions,\\n Collier could forego a warning. A delay could have put his or Hart’s\\n life in danger. See Waller, 44 F.4th at 1315.\\n B. Collier is Entitled to State Statutory Immunity from\\n the Estate’s Battery Claim.\\n Florida’s self-defense immunity statute provides that a “per-\\n son who uses or threatens to use force as permitted in [sec-\\n tion] 776.012 . . . is justified in such conduct and is immune from\\n . . . civil action for the use or threatened use of such force.” FLA.\\n STAT. § 776.032(1). Section 776.012 also provides that a person who\\n “reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 17 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to him-\\n self . . . or another” may use deadly force, and that there is no “duty\\n to retreat” before using or threatening to use such force. Id.\\n § 776.012(2). We have ruled that section 776.012 is at least co-ex-\\n tensive with the Fourth Amendment standard for the use of deadly\\n force. See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 855–56 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n Because Collier’s use of deadly force was not excessive in violation\\n of the Fourth Amendment, Collier was also entitled to immunity\\n from the estate’s claim of battery.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to enter\\n judgment for Collier.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 18 of 26\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12436 ABUDU, J., Dissenting 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30971,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10754576,"string":"10,754,576"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Victor Cremades"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10284"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10284\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n VICTOR YOEL PEREZ CREMADES,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00221-TPB-SPF-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.\\n ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:\\n A jury found Victor Cremades guilty of two drug distribu-\\n tion crimes in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846.\\n The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n each count to run concurrently. Cremades appeals both convic-\\n tions arguing that the district court: 1) erred in denying his motion\\n for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evi-\\n dence to support either conviction and 2) abused its discretion at\\n trial when it admitted a “drug ledger” into evidence. We are not\\n persuaded.\\n I.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Cremades for conspiracy to\\n possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of metham-\\n phetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21\\n U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count I), and possession with intent\\n to distribute those drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),\\n (b)(1)(A) (Count II).\\n At trial the government presented the following evidence.\\n In September 2021, law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package\\n addressed to “Oliver Holme” at 4813 North MacDill Avenue,\\n Tampa, Florida 33614. The package contained almost four pounds\\n of methamphetamine and more than 1,200 pills laced with fentanyl\\n — approximately $40,000 worth of drugs. Further investigation re-\\n vealed that there was no Oliver Holme residing in Florida, and alt-\\n hough the shipping label listed a Miami return address, the package\\n was actually shipped from Nogales, Arizona. Nogales is a city bor-\\n dering Mexico that drug-trafficking organizations often use for\\n smuggling drugs into the United States. The package’s shipping ad-\\n dress was linked to a registered utility holder in Florida, Victor Yoel\\n Perez Cremades.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n After removing the narcotics, law enforcement repackaged\\n the FedEx box with non-narcotic items, and an undercover officer\\n delivered it to 4813 North MacDill Avenue in Tampa, the original\\n destination address. Cremades’ 14-year-old daughter answered the\\n door and accepted the package. Shortly after the delivery, members\\n of the local police department and the FBI executed a search war-\\n rant at the residence.\\n Cremades was not there. But inside the rented, single-family\\n home, the agents found mail addressed to him and saw that the\\n delivered FedEx box had been placed on a bed in one of the bed-\\n rooms. In that same room, in the nightstand there was a stack of\\n thirteen $100 bills, and the closet contained men’s clothing, identi-\\n fication belonging to Cremades, and a purple duffel bag. Inside the\\n purple bag were six vacuum-sealed plastic bags containing a total\\n of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine, circumstances ev-\\n idencing that the drugs were meant for distribution. See United\\n States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1071 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (discuss-\\n ing that a jury could infer intent to distribute from the fact that the\\n methamphetamine in question was individually packaged in plastic\\n bags). Also inside the purple bag was a pair of jeans with $3,500\\n cash in the pocket and a Ziplock bag with more than 7,000 blue\\n pills containing a total of 831 grams of fentanyl. Those fentanyl-\\n laced blue pills inside the purple bag resembled the 1,200 blue pills\\n found inside the intercepted FedEx box. Also inside the closet the\\n agents found a Western Union receipt bearing Cremades’ name,\\n which revealed that on August 5, 2021 he had transferred $1,500 to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n Jose Romero Espinosa in Nogales — the origin city of the inter-\\n cepted FedEx package.\\n When the agents searched the kitchen (sometimes referred\\n to in the record as the dining area), they found on the kitchen table\\n another receipt with Cremades’ name, also dated August 5, 2021,\\n and showing the same transfer of $1,500. With that copy of the re-\\n ceipt was a note that had “Jose Romero Espinosa,” “1500,” and\\n “Nogales” handwritten on it. And inside of a black trash bag under\\n the kitchen table, the agents found more methamphetamine —\\n 145.1 grams of 98% purity.\\n The agents also found in the kitchen three other Western\\n Union receipts for transactions in early August 2021. While none\\n of those three receipts contained Cremades’ name, the sender\\n listed on all three of them was someone from Tampa, Florida, and\\n the recipient on one of them was again Jose Romero Espinoza (this\\n time with a slight variation in spelling) in Nogales. The listed recip-\\n ient for the other two transactions was someone in Culiacan, Sina-\\n loa, the operation site of the Sinaloa Cartel.\\n At trial, Jamie Walker, FBI agent and member of an investi-\\n gative task force on drugs and violent gangs, testified that the Sina-\\n loa Cartel is “one of the most prolific drug organizations in the\\n world.” And other law enforcement officers testified that it is un-\\n likely that an individual would ship a package containing $40,000\\n worth of drugs to someone who was not expecting to receive the\\n package. See generally United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719,\\n 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[a] reasonable jury could infer\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not\\n likely to entrust” valuable contraband “to an innocent person with-\\n out that person’s knowledge”). Investigating officers testified that\\n Cremades and his daughter were the only two people known to\\n live in that house, and Cremades had been seen outside of it on the\\n morning of the search.\\n FBI Special Agent Melissa Montoya testified that during the\\n search of Cremades’ house, she oversaw the intake and handling of\\n seized evidence. The government asked her if she recognized a\\n photograph of a spiral notebook opened to a page that contained a\\n handwritten list of names with numbers next to each. Montoya\\n confirmed that she had collected as evidence the handwritten list\\n shown in the photograph. When the government offered the pho-\\n tograph into evidence, Cremades objected. He argued that the\\n prosecution would probably call the notebook a “ledger,” but there\\n was no proof of that, no one had laid a foundation as to its signifi-\\n cance, and it was irrelevant because there was nothing to suggest\\n what the list was. The court overruled the objection.\\n Montoya then testified that she had cataloged the notebook\\n as a ledger, and it was found near the black trash bag in the kitchen\\n that contained methamphetamine. She explained that a ledger is “a\\n book or a piece of paper . . . that has either names, nicknames,\\n phone numbers, money, orders, et cetera” that is “commonly used\\n in the distribution of narcotics.” On cross-examination, Montoya\\n testified that her FBI experience with ledgers led her to believe the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n notebook in the photograph was a ledger used in drug distribution,\\n although she did not know whose handwriting was on it.\\n Another FBI agent also testified that “[i]n drug trafficking in\\n general, if you see names with dollar amounts next to it, it possibly\\n could be a drug ledger. It’s a way of keeping track of how much\\n money is either owed or given to somebody.” He also told the jury\\n that when he and other agents entered the house, Cremades’ 14-\\n year-old daughter and a man named Eugene Fields were the only\\n people present. The officers interviewed Fields and searched his\\n phone with his consent, but they found nothing to connect him to\\n the FedEx package or any drugs. And there was no mail in the\\n house addressed to anyone other than Cremades.\\n At the close of the government’s case, Cremades moved for\\n a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insuf-\\n 1\\n ficient to support a conviction. The court took the motion under\\n advisement, and then Cremades moved to admit a single exhibit\\n into evidence — a picture of his living room — which the court\\n admitted. Cremades rested, choosing to present no further evi-\\n dence in his defense. The jury found him guilty on both counts,\\n and the court denied Cremades’ earlier motion for judgment of ac-\\n quittal. The court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\\n each count to run concurrently. He appeals both convictions.\\n\\n\\n 1 Defense counsel did not specify as to which count his motion was directed.\\n\\n In context, however, the implication is that the motion was directed at both\\n counts.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n II.\\n Cremades contends that the evidence was circumstantial\\n and insufficient to convict him of either the possession with intent\\n to distribute or the conspiracy charge. He argues that “no reasona-\\n ble trier of fact should have relied [o]n the government’s evidence.”\\n We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-\\n dence to “determine whether a reasonable jury could have found\\n the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mercer, 541 F.3d\\n at 1074. We view all “evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n verdict and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in\\n the verdict’s favor.” United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344, 1348 (11th\\n Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). We will not overturn a guilty\\n verdict if “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Iriele,\\n 977 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). It\\n does not matter if the evidence “leaves room for innocent explana-\\n tions for the defendant’s conduct.” Bird, 79 F.4th at 1348. The evi-\\n dence does not have to completely foreclose the defendant’s inno-\\n cent explanations, nor does it have to “exclude every reasonable hy-\\n pothesis” because “a jury is free to choose among the reasonable\\n constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d\\n 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n And, of course, the law does not look down on circumstan-\\n tial evidence. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003)\\n (“[W]e have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial ev-\\n idence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”); United States v. Kennedy,\\n 146 F.4th 1054, 1064 (11th Cir. 2025) (“As to his complaint about\\n circumstantial evidence, ‘in determining the sufficiency of the pros-\\n ecution’s case, we make no distinction between circumstantial and\\n direct evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945\\n (11th Cir. 2009).\\n A.\\n We begin with Count II. To convict Cremades under\\n § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl, the government had to “prove three elements: (1)\\n knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute.” United\\n States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1989). Circumstantial\\n evidence can prove all of those elements. Id. at 1391–92. Possession\\n may be established through actual or constructive possession.\\n United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998). Con-\\n structive possession exists when a defendant has “dominion or con-\\n trol over the premises” in which the object is kept. Id. And\\n “[i]ntent to distribute may be inferred from the amount of the drug\\n involved.” United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.\\n 2005) (alteration adopted) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n In our Cochran decision we affirmed the defendant’s convic-\\n tion under § 841(a)(1), rejecting his contention that there was insuf-\\n ficient evidence to link him to drugs found in a residence that he\\n asserted was not his home. See United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d\\n 1314, 1317–18, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012). In that case, the defendant ar-\\n gued that the evidence did not establish his dominion and control\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n over the drugs, that there was nothing to link him to the drugs in-\\n side the house, and that his mere presence near the drugs was not\\n enough to establish possession. See id. at 1322. But the government\\n presented evidence that: he was found standing in the driveway of\\n the home where the drugs were found with a key to the house in\\n his pocket; an officer saw him enter and exit the house before it was\\n searched; the drugs were found in common areas of the house; a\\n letter addressed to the defendant was found in the house; and his\\n daughter stated that he “frequented” the house. Id. at 1317–18,\\n 1322. We held the evidence sufficient to sustain the defendant’s\\n convictions under § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute\\n cocaine and cocaine base. Id. at 1316, 1322–23. As much or even\\n more evidence supports Cremades’ conviction under § 841(a) than\\n supported the conviction in Cochran.\\n\\n Cremades’ actual knowledge and possession of the drugs\\n was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine and fen-\\n tanyl found in a bedroom and in the kitchen of the 800-square-foot\\n rented house he occupied, which was also the shipping destination\\n of the drug-filled FedEx package. He and his daughter were the\\n only people known to live in the house; the utilities for it were reg-\\n istered to him; and his Social Security card, passport, and mail ad-\\n dressed to him were all found inside the house. And he was seen\\n outside the house on the morning of the search. To top it off, ex-\\n perienced officers testified about the unlikelihood that the recipient\\n of a package containing $40,000 worth of drugs would not know\\n of its contents. All told, there was more than enough evidence for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n the jury to find, as it did, that Cremades had actual knowledge of\\n the drugs and possessed them.\\n\\n As for Cremades’ intent to distribute some or all of the\\n drugs, it was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl that were found in his house and the additional quan-\\n tities of those drugs in the package that had been addressed to his\\n house and shipped from Nogales, Arizona using a fake return ad-\\n dress. Not only that, but also found in the house were: a receipt that\\n showed Cremades’ recent transfer of $1,500 to Jose Romero Espi-\\n nosa in Nogales; an accompanying handwritten note with the same\\n information; $4,800 cash; and six vacuum-sealed plastic bags con-\\n taining a total of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine and\\n a Ziplock bag holding more than 7,000 blue pills that contained\\n 831 grams of fentanyl.\\n Here’s the thing, given the brevity of life and the danger that\\n inevitably arises from consuming large quantities of virtually pure\\n methamphetamine and large numbers of fentanyl pills, there is no\\n chance that Cremades intended to personally consume all of the\\n more than 3,000 grams of high purity methamphetamine or all of\\n those more than 7,000 pills of fentanyl. And if he didn’t intend to\\n personally consume the large quantity of drugs, the only other pos-\\n sibility is that he intended to distribute them to someone else,\\n whether to large numbers of end consumers or to other criminals\\n in the distribution chain. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909 n.3 (conclud-\\n ing that nine kilograms of cocaine was “far more than that involved\\n in personal use and enough to support an inference of intent to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n distribute”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497,\\n 499 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that two kilograms of cocaine was\\n “far more” than an amount for personal use and was evidence to\\n support an intent to distribute the drugs); United States v. Tamargo,\\n 672 F.2d 887, 890 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The jury reasonably could have\\n inferred that one in possession of 2,000 methaqualone tablets in-\\n tended to distribute the tablets rather than use them for personal\\n consumption.”).\\n The overwhelming evidence presented at trial is more than\\n sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the jury’s finding that\\n Cremades violated § 841(a) by possessing with intent to distribute\\n the charged quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. See Mer-\\n cer, 541 F.3d at 1074. The jury’s guilty verdict as to Count II stands.\\n B.\\n So does the jury’s guilty verdict as to Count I. To convict\\n Cremades of the drug conspiracy crime under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the\\n government was required to prove: 1) an illegal agreement existed\\n to possess with intent to distribute the drugs; 2) Cremades knew of\\n the agreement; and 3) he knowingly and voluntarily joined it. See\\n United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).\\n Because conspiracy, like other crimes, may be proven by cir-\\n cumstantial evidence, United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th\\n Cir. 1983), for the reasons already discussed, see supra at 9–11, a rea-\\n sonable jury could find that there was an agreement to possess\\n methamphetamine and fentanyl with the intent to distribute it, as\\n well as that Cremades knew the scheme was unlawful. That leaves\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n the question whether Cremades entered the illegal agreement\\n knowingly and voluntarily. Both the evidence and common sense\\n show that he did. Given the large quantities of methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl pills throughout his home and the large amount of\\n cash in his bedroom and closet, and the receipts showing money\\n transfers that occurred a month before the FedEx package’s arrival,\\n the jury did not have to work very hard to find beyond a reasonable\\n doubt that Cremades knowingly and voluntarily entered an illegal\\n agreement to distribute drugs. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100.\\n Thus, a “reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Cremades con-\\n spired to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of\\n methamphetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation\\n of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1168.\\n III.\\n Cremades contends that the district court’s admission of the\\n “drug ledger” over his objection is reversible because the ledger\\n was irrelevant and no foundation was laid for admitting it.\\n We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling only for abuse\\n of discretion. United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir.\\n 2013). This standard “affords the district court considerable leeway\\n in evidentiary rulings.” United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330\\n (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Under this standard we\\n will reverse only if the evidentiary ruling constitutes manifest er-\\n ror. Id. Cremades argues that admitting the drug ledger was man-\\n ifest error both because it constituted a “clear error of judgment,”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n and it involved the application of “the wrong legal standard.” Id.\\n (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n Even if a district court abuses its discretion in an evidentiary\\n ruling, if the error is harmless, we won’t reverse on the basis of it.\\n See United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1197 (11th Cir. 2012). A\\n nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless and “must be disre-\\n garded” unless it affected the defendant’s “substantial rights” at\\n trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); House, 684 F.3d at 1197; see United States\\n v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A district court’s\\n erroneous admission of evidence does not warrant reversal if the\\n purported error had no substantial influence on the outcome and\\n sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.”); cf.\\n United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1135, 1142–43, 1188 (11th Cir.\\n 2017) (en banc) (explaining, in a case involving constitutional error,\\n that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not an errorless one,\\n and reversal for an error that had no influence over the jury’s ver-\\n dict runs afoul of several “vital interests of[] our judicial system,”\\n such as promoting public respect for the judicial process by focus-\\n ing on the “underlying fairness” of the trial; avoiding a “regime of\\n gotcha review”; avoiding litigant abuse of the judicial process; and\\n “conserving scarce judicial resources”) (citation omitted).\\n It is the government’s burden to show an error’s harmless-\\n ness. United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020); see\\n United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). And, of course, “[o]ver-\\n whelming evidence of guilt” may render an erroneous ruling harm-\\n less. United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999);\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n see also United States v. Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2015)\\n (concluding that in light of the evidence presented over eleven days\\n at trial establishing defendant’s guilt, “it is inconceivable that the\\n jury would have returned a different verdict based on two answers\\n to two allegedly improper questions”).\\n Cremades argues that what he contends is the erroneous ad-\\n mission of the drug ledger had a substantial prejudicial effect on the\\n outcome of his trial because “it allowed the government and its FBI\\n witness to make purely speculative assumptions before the jury\\n that the piece of paper was a ‘drug ledger’ written by [] Cremades,\\n when . . . there was . . . no evidence to support th[ose] conclusions.”\\n Cremades points to our Stephens decision, where we held that the\\n exclusion of “potentially exculpatory” testimony about a confiden-\\n tial informant’s access to methamphetamine “more likely than\\n not” influenced the verdict because the testimony could have\\n “played a fairly important role in the jury’s deliberations” had it\\n been admitted. United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967, 980 (11th Cir.\\n 2004). In that case, however, we observed that the government’s\\n case against the defendant, Kenneth Stephens, “suffer[ed] from a\\n wide range of disturbing flaws.” Id. at 977. Despite extensive sur-\\n veillance, there was no evidence that law enforcement ever saw or\\n heard any drug transaction between Stephens and the informant.\\n Id. The government’s entire theory of the case in Stephens was that\\n officers had searched their informant so thoroughly before his in-\\n teractions with Stephens that the methamphetamine in the inform-\\n ant’s possession could only have come from Stephens. Id. at 979.\\n This was the theory that the defense sought to rebut with the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n excluded testimony. Id. Because it was clear that law enforcement\\n did not search their informant thoroughly or keep him under sur-\\n veillance, see id. at 978–79, we concluded that “additional testimony\\n that [the informant] actually had access to methamphetamine from\\n sources other than Stephens[] and possessed and sold it while he\\n was ostensibly working as [an informant], could have been quite\\n probative to the jury.” Id. at 980. The erroneous exclusion of “quite\\n probative” evidence favoring the defendant that would have\\n helped him refute the entire theory of the government’s case is not\\n harmless error.\\n But this case is not like Stephens. As the government points\\n out, even assuming without deciding that admitting evidence of\\n the drug ledger was an abuse of discretion, it “had no substantial\\n influence on the outcome.” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722. We’ve re-\\n counted the overwhelming evidence supporting both convictions\\n in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence discussion. See supra at 9–12.\\n And we did that without even mentioning anything about the drug\\n ledger. We could leave it out of the sufficiency discussion because\\n the “[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt,” Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1353,\\n was “uninfected by the [purported] error,” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at\\n 722, in admitting the ledger. Any error in the ledger’s admission\\n was harmless given all the other evidence presented at trial; “it is\\n inconceivable that the jury would have returned a different ver-\\n dict,” Hough, 803 F.3d at 1193, if the ledger had been excluded.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11221161/\", \"author_raw\": \"ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ED CARNES"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"ED CARNES\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754576/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Victor Cremades\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10284\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n VICTOR YOEL PEREZ CREMADES,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00221-TPB-SPF-1\n ____________________\n\n Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.\n ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:\n A jury found Victor Cremades guilty of two drug distribu-\n tion crimes in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846.\n The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 2 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n each count to run concurrently. Cremades appeals both convic-\n tions arguing that the district court: 1) erred in denying his motion\n for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evi-\n dence to support either conviction and 2) abused its discretion at\n trial when it admitted a “drug ledger” into evidence. We are not\n persuaded.\n I.\n A federal grand jury indicted Cremades for conspiracy to\n possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of metham-\n phetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21\n U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count I), and possession with intent\n to distribute those drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),\n (b)(1)(A) (Count II).\n At trial the government presented the following evidence.\n In September 2021, law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package\n addressed to “Oliver Holme” at 4813 North MacDill Avenue,\n Tampa, Florida 33614. The package contained almost four pounds\n of methamphetamine and more than 1,200 pills laced with fentanyl\n — approximately $40,000 worth of drugs. Further investigation re-\n vealed that there was no Oliver Holme residing in Florida, and alt-\n hough the shipping label listed a Miami return address, the package\n was actually shipped from Nogales, Arizona. Nogales is a city bor-\n dering Mexico that drug-trafficking organizations often use for\n smuggling drugs into the United States. The package’s shipping ad-\n dress was linked to a registered utility holder in Florida, Victor Yoel\n Perez Cremades.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 3 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n After removing the narcotics, law enforcement repackaged\n the FedEx box with non-narcotic items, and an undercover officer\n delivered it to 4813 North MacDill Avenue in Tampa, the original\n destination address. Cremades’ 14-year-old daughter answered the\n door and accepted the package. Shortly after the delivery, members\n of the local police department and the FBI executed a search war-\n rant at the residence.\n Cremades was not there. But inside the rented, single-family\n home, the agents found mail addressed to him and saw that the\n delivered FedEx box had been placed on a bed in one of the bed-\n rooms. In that same room, in the nightstand there was a stack of\n thirteen $100 bills, and the closet contained men’s clothing, identi-\n fication belonging to Cremades, and a purple duffel bag. Inside the\n purple bag were six vacuum-sealed plastic bags containing a total\n of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine, circumstances ev-\n idencing that the drugs were meant for distribution. See United\n States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1071 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (discuss-\n ing that a jury could infer intent to distribute from the fact that the\n methamphetamine in question was individually packaged in plastic\n bags). Also inside the purple bag was a pair of jeans with $3,500\n cash in the pocket and a Ziplock bag with more than 7,000 blue\n pills containing a total of 831 grams of fentanyl. Those fentanyl-\n laced blue pills inside the purple bag resembled the 1,200 blue pills\n found inside the intercepted FedEx box. Also inside the closet the\n agents found a Western Union receipt bearing Cremades’ name,\n which revealed that on August 5, 2021 he had transferred $1,500 to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 4 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n Jose Romero Espinosa in Nogales — the origin city of the inter-\n cepted FedEx package.\n When the agents searched the kitchen (sometimes referred\n to in the record as the dining area), they found on the kitchen table\n another receipt with Cremades’ name, also dated August 5, 2021,\n and showing the same transfer of $1,500. With that copy of the re-\n ceipt was a note that had “Jose Romero Espinosa,” “1500,” and\n “Nogales” handwritten on it. And inside of a black trash bag under\n the kitchen table, the agents found more methamphetamine —\n 145.1 grams of 98% purity.\n The agents also found in the kitchen three other Western\n Union receipts for transactions in early August 2021. While none\n of those three receipts contained Cremades’ name, the sender\n listed on all three of them was someone from Tampa, Florida, and\n the recipient on one of them was again Jose Romero Espinoza (this\n time with a slight variation in spelling) in Nogales. The listed recip-\n ient for the other two transactions was someone in Culiacan, Sina-\n loa, the operation site of the Sinaloa Cartel.\n At trial, Jamie Walker, FBI agent and member of an investi-\n gative task force on drugs and violent gangs, testified that the Sina-\n loa Cartel is “one of the most prolific drug organizations in the\n world.” And other law enforcement officers testified that it is un-\n likely that an individual would ship a package containing $40,000\n worth of drugs to someone who was not expecting to receive the\n package. See generally United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719,\n 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[a] reasonable jury could infer\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 5 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not\n likely to entrust” valuable contraband “to an innocent person with-\n out that person’s knowledge”). Investigating officers testified that\n Cremades and his daughter were the only two people known to\n live in that house, and Cremades had been seen outside of it on the\n morning of the search.\n FBI Special Agent Melissa Montoya testified that during the\n search of Cremades’ house, she oversaw the intake and handling of\n seized evidence. The government asked her if she recognized a\n photograph of a spiral notebook opened to a page that contained a\n handwritten list of names with numbers next to each. Montoya\n confirmed that she had collected as evidence the handwritten list\n shown in the photograph. When the government offered the pho-\n tograph into evidence, Cremades objected. He argued that the\n prosecution would probably call the notebook a “ledger,” but there\n was no proof of that, no one had laid a foundation as to its signifi-\n cance, and it was irrelevant because there was nothing to suggest\n what the list was. The court overruled the objection.\n Montoya then testified that she had cataloged the notebook\n as a ledger, and it was found near the black trash bag in the kitchen\n that contained methamphetamine. She explained that a ledger is “a\n book or a piece of paper . . . that has either names, nicknames,\n phone numbers, money, orders, et cetera” that is “commonly used\n in the distribution of narcotics.” On cross-examination, Montoya\n testified that her FBI experience with ledgers led her to believe the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 6 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n notebook in the photograph was a ledger used in drug distribution,\n although she did not know whose handwriting was on it.\n Another FBI agent also testified that “[i]n drug trafficking in\n general, if you see names with dollar amounts next to it, it possibly\n could be a drug ledger. It’s a way of keeping track of how much\n money is either owed or given to somebody.” He also told the jury\n that when he and other agents entered the house, Cremades’ 14-\n year-old daughter and a man named Eugene Fields were the only\n people present. The officers interviewed Fields and searched his\n phone with his consent, but they found nothing to connect him to\n the FedEx package or any drugs. And there was no mail in the\n house addressed to anyone other than Cremades.\n At the close of the government’s case, Cremades moved for\n a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insuf-\n 1\n ficient to support a conviction. The court took the motion under\n advisement, and then Cremades moved to admit a single exhibit\n into evidence — a picture of his living room — which the court\n admitted. Cremades rested, choosing to present no further evi-\n dence in his defense. The jury found him guilty on both counts,\n and the court denied Cremades’ earlier motion for judgment of ac-\n quittal. The court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\n each count to run concurrently. He appeals both convictions.\n\n\n 1 Defense counsel did not specify as to which count his motion was directed.\n\n In context, however, the implication is that the motion was directed at both\n counts.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 7 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n II.\n Cremades contends that the evidence was circumstantial\n and insufficient to convict him of either the possession with intent\n to distribute or the conspiracy charge. He argues that “no reasona-\n ble trier of fact should have relied [o]n the government’s evidence.”\n We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-\n dence to “determine whether a reasonable jury could have found\n the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mercer, 541 F.3d\n at 1074. We view all “evidence in the light most favorable to the\n verdict and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in\n the verdict’s favor.” United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344, 1348 (11th\n Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). We will not overturn a guilty\n verdict if “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Iriele,\n 977 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). It\n does not matter if the evidence “leaves room for innocent explana-\n tions for the defendant’s conduct.” Bird, 79 F.4th at 1348. The evi-\n dence does not have to completely foreclose the defendant’s inno-\n cent explanations, nor does it have to “exclude every reasonable hy-\n pothesis” because “a jury is free to choose among the reasonable\n constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d\n 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\n And, of course, the law does not look down on circumstan-\n tial evidence. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003)\n (“[W]e have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial ev-\n idence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 8 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”); United States v. Kennedy,\n 146 F.4th 1054, 1064 (11th Cir. 2025) (“As to his complaint about\n circumstantial evidence, ‘in determining the sufficiency of the pros-\n ecution’s case, we make no distinction between circumstantial and\n direct evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945\n (11th Cir. 2009).\n A.\n We begin with Count II. To convict Cremades under\n § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine\n and fentanyl, the government had to “prove three elements: (1)\n knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute.” United\n States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1989). Circumstantial\n evidence can prove all of those elements. Id. at 1391–92. Possession\n may be established through actual or constructive possession.\n United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998). Con-\n structive possession exists when a defendant has “dominion or con-\n trol over the premises” in which the object is kept. Id. And\n “[i]ntent to distribute may be inferred from the amount of the drug\n involved.” United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.\n 2005) (alteration adopted) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\n In our Cochran decision we affirmed the defendant’s convic-\n tion under § 841(a)(1), rejecting his contention that there was insuf-\n ficient evidence to link him to drugs found in a residence that he\n asserted was not his home. See United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d\n 1314, 1317–18, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012). In that case, the defendant ar-\n gued that the evidence did not establish his dominion and control\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 9 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n over the drugs, that there was nothing to link him to the drugs in-\n side the house, and that his mere presence near the drugs was not\n enough to establish possession. See id. at 1322. But the government\n presented evidence that: he was found standing in the driveway of\n the home where the drugs were found with a key to the house in\n his pocket; an officer saw him enter and exit the house before it was\n searched; the drugs were found in common areas of the house; a\n letter addressed to the defendant was found in the house; and his\n daughter stated that he “frequented” the house. Id. at 1317–18,\n 1322. We held the evidence sufficient to sustain the defendant’s\n convictions under § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute\n cocaine and cocaine base. Id. at 1316, 1322–23. As much or even\n more evidence supports Cremades’ conviction under § 841(a) than\n supported the conviction in Cochran.\n\n Cremades’ actual knowledge and possession of the drugs\n was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine and fen-\n tanyl found in a bedroom and in the kitchen of the 800-square-foot\n rented house he occupied, which was also the shipping destination\n of the drug-filled FedEx package. He and his daughter were the\n only people known to live in the house; the utilities for it were reg-\n istered to him; and his Social Security card, passport, and mail ad-\n dressed to him were all found inside the house. And he was seen\n outside the house on the morning of the search. To top it off, ex-\n perienced officers testified about the unlikelihood that the recipient\n of a package containing $40,000 worth of drugs would not know\n of its contents. All told, there was more than enough evidence for\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 10 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n the jury to find, as it did, that Cremades had actual knowledge of\n the drugs and possessed them.\n\n As for Cremades’ intent to distribute some or all of the\n drugs, it was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine\n and fentanyl that were found in his house and the additional quan-\n tities of those drugs in the package that had been addressed to his\n house and shipped from Nogales, Arizona using a fake return ad-\n dress. Not only that, but also found in the house were: a receipt that\n showed Cremades’ recent transfer of $1,500 to Jose Romero Espi-\n nosa in Nogales; an accompanying handwritten note with the same\n information; $4,800 cash; and six vacuum-sealed plastic bags con-\n taining a total of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine and\n a Ziplock bag holding more than 7,000 blue pills that contained\n 831 grams of fentanyl.\n Here’s the thing, given the brevity of life and the danger that\n inevitably arises from consuming large quantities of virtually pure\n methamphetamine and large numbers of fentanyl pills, there is no\n chance that Cremades intended to personally consume all of the\n more than 3,000 grams of high purity methamphetamine or all of\n those more than 7,000 pills of fentanyl. And if he didn’t intend to\n personally consume the large quantity of drugs, the only other pos-\n sibility is that he intended to distribute them to someone else,\n whether to large numbers of end consumers or to other criminals\n in the distribution chain. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909 n.3 (conclud-\n ing that nine kilograms of cocaine was “far more than that involved\n in personal use and enough to support an inference of intent to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 11 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n distribute”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497,\n 499 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that two kilograms of cocaine was\n “far more” than an amount for personal use and was evidence to\n support an intent to distribute the drugs); United States v. Tamargo,\n 672 F.2d 887, 890 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The jury reasonably could have\n inferred that one in possession of 2,000 methaqualone tablets in-\n tended to distribute the tablets rather than use them for personal\n consumption.”).\n The overwhelming evidence presented at trial is more than\n sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the jury’s finding that\n Cremades violated § 841(a) by possessing with intent to distribute\n the charged quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. See Mer-\n cer, 541 F.3d at 1074. The jury’s guilty verdict as to Count II stands.\n B.\n So does the jury’s guilty verdict as to Count I. To convict\n Cremades of the drug conspiracy crime under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the\n government was required to prove: 1) an illegal agreement existed\n to possess with intent to distribute the drugs; 2) Cremades knew of\n the agreement; and 3) he knowingly and voluntarily joined it. See\n United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).\n Because conspiracy, like other crimes, may be proven by cir-\n cumstantial evidence, United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th\n Cir. 1983), for the reasons already discussed, see supra at 9–11, a rea-\n sonable jury could find that there was an agreement to possess\n methamphetamine and fentanyl with the intent to distribute it, as\n well as that Cremades knew the scheme was unlawful. That leaves\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 12 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n the question whether Cremades entered the illegal agreement\n knowingly and voluntarily. Both the evidence and common sense\n show that he did. Given the large quantities of methamphetamine\n and fentanyl pills throughout his home and the large amount of\n cash in his bedroom and closet, and the receipts showing money\n transfers that occurred a month before the FedEx package’s arrival,\n the jury did not have to work very hard to find beyond a reasonable\n doubt that Cremades knowingly and voluntarily entered an illegal\n agreement to distribute drugs. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100.\n Thus, a “reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Cremades con-\n spired to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of\n methamphetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation\n of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1168.\n III.\n Cremades contends that the district court’s admission of the\n “drug ledger” over his objection is reversible because the ledger\n was irrelevant and no foundation was laid for admitting it.\n We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling only for abuse\n of discretion. United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir.\n 2013). This standard “affords the district court considerable leeway\n in evidentiary rulings.” United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330\n (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Under this standard we\n will reverse only if the evidentiary ruling constitutes manifest er-\n ror. Id. Cremades argues that admitting the drug ledger was man-\n ifest error both because it constituted a “clear error of judgment,”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 13 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n and it involved the application of “the wrong legal standard.” Id.\n (quotation marks and citation omitted).\n Even if a district court abuses its discretion in an evidentiary\n ruling, if the error is harmless, we won’t reverse on the basis of it.\n See United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1197 (11th Cir. 2012). A\n nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless and “must be disre-\n garded” unless it affected the defendant’s “substantial rights” at\n trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); House, 684 F.3d at 1197; see United States\n v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A district court’s\n erroneous admission of evidence does not warrant reversal if the\n purported error had no substantial influence on the outcome and\n sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.”); cf.\n United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1135, 1142–43, 1188 (11th Cir.\n 2017) (en banc) (explaining, in a case involving constitutional error,\n that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not an errorless one,\n and reversal for an error that had no influence over the jury’s ver-\n dict runs afoul of several “vital interests of[] our judicial system,”\n such as promoting public respect for the judicial process by focus-\n ing on the “underlying fairness” of the trial; avoiding a “regime of\n gotcha review”; avoiding litigant abuse of the judicial process; and\n “conserving scarce judicial resources”) (citation omitted).\n It is the government’s burden to show an error’s harmless-\n ness. United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020); see\n United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). And, of course, “[o]ver-\n whelming evidence of guilt” may render an erroneous ruling harm-\n less. United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999);\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 14 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\n\n see also United States v. Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2015)\n (concluding that in light of the evidence presented over eleven days\n at trial establishing defendant’s guilt, “it is inconceivable that the\n jury would have returned a different verdict based on two answers\n to two allegedly improper questions”).\n Cremades argues that what he contends is the erroneous ad-\n mission of the drug ledger had a substantial prejudicial effect on the\n outcome of his trial because “it allowed the government and its FBI\n witness to make purely speculative assumptions before the jury\n that the piece of paper was a ‘drug ledger’ written by [] Cremades,\n when . . . there was . . . no evidence to support th[ose] conclusions.”\n Cremades points to our Stephens decision, where we held that the\n exclusion of “potentially exculpatory” testimony about a confiden-\n tial informant’s access to methamphetamine “more likely than\n not” influenced the verdict because the testimony could have\n “played a fairly important role in the jury’s deliberations” had it\n been admitted. United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967, 980 (11th Cir.\n 2004). In that case, however, we observed that the government’s\n case against the defendant, Kenneth Stephens, “suffer[ed] from a\n wide range of disturbing flaws.” Id. at 977. Despite extensive sur-\n veillance, there was no evidence that law enforcement ever saw or\n heard any drug transaction between Stephens and the informant.\n Id. The government’s entire theory of the case in Stephens was that\n officers had searched their informant so thoroughly before his in-\n teractions with Stephens that the methamphetamine in the inform-\n ant’s possession could only have come from Stephens. Id. at 979.\n This was the theory that the defense sought to rebut with the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 15 of 15\n\n\n\n\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n excluded testimony. Id. Because it was clear that law enforcement\n did not search their informant thoroughly or keep him under sur-\n veillance, see id. at 978–79, we concluded that “additional testimony\n that [the informant] actually had access to methamphetamine from\n sources other than Stephens[] and possessed and sold it while he\n was ostensibly working as [an informant], could have been quite\n probative to the jury.” Id. at 980. The erroneous exclusion of “quite\n probative” evidence favoring the defendant that would have\n helped him refute the entire theory of the government’s case is not\n harmless error.\n But this case is not like Stephens. As the government points\n out, even assuming without deciding that admitting evidence of\n the drug ledger was an abuse of discretion, it “had no substantial\n influence on the outcome.” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722. We’ve re-\n counted the overwhelming evidence supporting both convictions\n in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence discussion. See supra at 9–12.\n And we did that without even mentioning anything about the drug\n ledger. We could leave it out of the sufficiency discussion because\n the “[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt,” Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1353,\n was “uninfected by the [purported] error,” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at\n 722, in admitting the ledger. Any error in the ledger’s admission\n was harmless given all the other evidence presented at trial; “it is\n inconceivable that the jury would have returned a different ver-\n dict,” Hough, 803 F.3d at 1193, if the ledger had been excluded.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Victor Cremades\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 1 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10284\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n VICTOR YOEL PEREZ CREMADES,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00221-TPB-SPF-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.\\n ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:\\n A jury found Victor Cremades guilty of two drug distribu-\\n tion crimes in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846.\\n The district court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 2 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n each count to run concurrently. Cremades appeals both convic-\\n tions arguing that the district court: 1) erred in denying his motion\\n for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evi-\\n dence to support either conviction and 2) abused its discretion at\\n trial when it admitted a “drug ledger” into evidence. We are not\\n persuaded.\\n I.\\n A federal grand jury indicted Cremades for conspiracy to\\n possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of metham-\\n phetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21\\n U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (Count I), and possession with intent\\n to distribute those drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),\\n (b)(1)(A) (Count II).\\n At trial the government presented the following evidence.\\n In September 2021, law enforcement intercepted a FedEx package\\n addressed to “Oliver Holme” at 4813 North MacDill Avenue,\\n Tampa, Florida 33614. The package contained almost four pounds\\n of methamphetamine and more than 1,200 pills laced with fentanyl\\n — approximately $40,000 worth of drugs. Further investigation re-\\n vealed that there was no Oliver Holme residing in Florida, and alt-\\n hough the shipping label listed a Miami return address, the package\\n was actually shipped from Nogales, Arizona. Nogales is a city bor-\\n dering Mexico that drug-trafficking organizations often use for\\n smuggling drugs into the United States. The package’s shipping ad-\\n dress was linked to a registered utility holder in Florida, Victor Yoel\\n Perez Cremades.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 3 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n After removing the narcotics, law enforcement repackaged\\n the FedEx box with non-narcotic items, and an undercover officer\\n delivered it to 4813 North MacDill Avenue in Tampa, the original\\n destination address. Cremades’ 14-year-old daughter answered the\\n door and accepted the package. Shortly after the delivery, members\\n of the local police department and the FBI executed a search war-\\n rant at the residence.\\n Cremades was not there. But inside the rented, single-family\\n home, the agents found mail addressed to him and saw that the\\n delivered FedEx box had been placed on a bed in one of the bed-\\n rooms. In that same room, in the nightstand there was a stack of\\n thirteen $100 bills, and the closet contained men’s clothing, identi-\\n fication belonging to Cremades, and a purple duffel bag. Inside the\\n purple bag were six vacuum-sealed plastic bags containing a total\\n of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine, circumstances ev-\\n idencing that the drugs were meant for distribution. See United\\n States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1071 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (discuss-\\n ing that a jury could infer intent to distribute from the fact that the\\n methamphetamine in question was individually packaged in plastic\\n bags). Also inside the purple bag was a pair of jeans with $3,500\\n cash in the pocket and a Ziplock bag with more than 7,000 blue\\n pills containing a total of 831 grams of fentanyl. Those fentanyl-\\n laced blue pills inside the purple bag resembled the 1,200 blue pills\\n found inside the intercepted FedEx box. Also inside the closet the\\n agents found a Western Union receipt bearing Cremades’ name,\\n which revealed that on August 5, 2021 he had transferred $1,500 to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 4 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n Jose Romero Espinosa in Nogales — the origin city of the inter-\\n cepted FedEx package.\\n When the agents searched the kitchen (sometimes referred\\n to in the record as the dining area), they found on the kitchen table\\n another receipt with Cremades’ name, also dated August 5, 2021,\\n and showing the same transfer of $1,500. With that copy of the re-\\n ceipt was a note that had “Jose Romero Espinosa,” “1500,” and\\n “Nogales” handwritten on it. And inside of a black trash bag under\\n the kitchen table, the agents found more methamphetamine —\\n 145.1 grams of 98% purity.\\n The agents also found in the kitchen three other Western\\n Union receipts for transactions in early August 2021. While none\\n of those three receipts contained Cremades’ name, the sender\\n listed on all three of them was someone from Tampa, Florida, and\\n the recipient on one of them was again Jose Romero Espinoza (this\\n time with a slight variation in spelling) in Nogales. The listed recip-\\n ient for the other two transactions was someone in Culiacan, Sina-\\n loa, the operation site of the Sinaloa Cartel.\\n At trial, Jamie Walker, FBI agent and member of an investi-\\n gative task force on drugs and violent gangs, testified that the Sina-\\n loa Cartel is “one of the most prolific drug organizations in the\\n world.” And other law enforcement officers testified that it is un-\\n likely that an individual would ship a package containing $40,000\\n worth of drugs to someone who was not expecting to receive the\\n package. See generally United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719,\\n 722 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[a] reasonable jury could infer\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 5 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n from the quantity of drugs seized that a ‘prudent smuggler’ is not\\n likely to entrust” valuable contraband “to an innocent person with-\\n out that person’s knowledge”). Investigating officers testified that\\n Cremades and his daughter were the only two people known to\\n live in that house, and Cremades had been seen outside of it on the\\n morning of the search.\\n FBI Special Agent Melissa Montoya testified that during the\\n search of Cremades’ house, she oversaw the intake and handling of\\n seized evidence. The government asked her if she recognized a\\n photograph of a spiral notebook opened to a page that contained a\\n handwritten list of names with numbers next to each. Montoya\\n confirmed that she had collected as evidence the handwritten list\\n shown in the photograph. When the government offered the pho-\\n tograph into evidence, Cremades objected. He argued that the\\n prosecution would probably call the notebook a “ledger,” but there\\n was no proof of that, no one had laid a foundation as to its signifi-\\n cance, and it was irrelevant because there was nothing to suggest\\n what the list was. The court overruled the objection.\\n Montoya then testified that she had cataloged the notebook\\n as a ledger, and it was found near the black trash bag in the kitchen\\n that contained methamphetamine. She explained that a ledger is “a\\n book or a piece of paper . . . that has either names, nicknames,\\n phone numbers, money, orders, et cetera” that is “commonly used\\n in the distribution of narcotics.” On cross-examination, Montoya\\n testified that her FBI experience with ledgers led her to believe the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 6 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n notebook in the photograph was a ledger used in drug distribution,\\n although she did not know whose handwriting was on it.\\n Another FBI agent also testified that “[i]n drug trafficking in\\n general, if you see names with dollar amounts next to it, it possibly\\n could be a drug ledger. It’s a way of keeping track of how much\\n money is either owed or given to somebody.” He also told the jury\\n that when he and other agents entered the house, Cremades’ 14-\\n year-old daughter and a man named Eugene Fields were the only\\n people present. The officers interviewed Fields and searched his\\n phone with his consent, but they found nothing to connect him to\\n the FedEx package or any drugs. And there was no mail in the\\n house addressed to anyone other than Cremades.\\n At the close of the government’s case, Cremades moved for\\n a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insuf-\\n 1\\n ficient to support a conviction. The court took the motion under\\n advisement, and then Cremades moved to admit a single exhibit\\n into evidence — a picture of his living room — which the court\\n admitted. Cremades rested, choosing to present no further evi-\\n dence in his defense. The jury found him guilty on both counts,\\n and the court denied Cremades’ earlier motion for judgment of ac-\\n quittal. The court sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment on\\n each count to run concurrently. He appeals both convictions.\\n\\n\\n 1 Defense counsel did not specify as to which count his motion was directed.\\n\\n In context, however, the implication is that the motion was directed at both\\n counts.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 7 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n II.\\n Cremades contends that the evidence was circumstantial\\n and insufficient to convict him of either the possession with intent\\n to distribute or the conspiracy charge. He argues that “no reasona-\\n ble trier of fact should have relied [o]n the government’s evidence.”\\n We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-\\n dence to “determine whether a reasonable jury could have found\\n the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mercer, 541 F.3d\\n at 1074. We view all “evidence in the light most favorable to the\\n verdict and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in\\n the verdict’s favor.” United States v. Bird, 79 F.4th 1344, 1348 (11th\\n Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). We will not overturn a guilty\\n verdict if “any reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Iriele,\\n 977 F.3d 1155, 1168 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). It\\n does not matter if the evidence “leaves room for innocent explana-\\n tions for the defendant’s conduct.” Bird, 79 F.4th at 1348. The evi-\\n dence does not have to completely foreclose the defendant’s inno-\\n cent explanations, nor does it have to “exclude every reasonable hy-\\n pothesis” because “a jury is free to choose among the reasonable\\n constructions of the evidence.” United States v. Godwin, 765 F.3d\\n 1306, 1320 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).\\n And, of course, the law does not look down on circumstan-\\n tial evidence. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003)\\n (“[W]e have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial ev-\\n idence in support of a criminal conviction, even though proof\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 8 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”); United States v. Kennedy,\\n 146 F.4th 1054, 1064 (11th Cir. 2025) (“As to his complaint about\\n circumstantial evidence, ‘in determining the sufficiency of the pros-\\n ecution’s case, we make no distinction between circumstantial and\\n direct evidence.’”) (quoting United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945\\n (11th Cir. 2009).\\n A.\\n We begin with Count II. To convict Cremades under\\n § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl, the government had to “prove three elements: (1)\\n knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute.” United\\n States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11th Cir. 1989). Circumstantial\\n evidence can prove all of those elements. Id. at 1391–92. Possession\\n may be established through actual or constructive possession.\\n United States v. Leonard, 138 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1998). Con-\\n structive possession exists when a defendant has “dominion or con-\\n trol over the premises” in which the object is kept. Id. And\\n “[i]ntent to distribute may be inferred from the amount of the drug\\n involved.” United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.\\n 2005) (alteration adopted) (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n In our Cochran decision we affirmed the defendant’s convic-\\n tion under § 841(a)(1), rejecting his contention that there was insuf-\\n ficient evidence to link him to drugs found in a residence that he\\n asserted was not his home. See United States v. Cochran, 683 F.3d\\n 1314, 1317–18, 1322 (11th Cir. 2012). In that case, the defendant ar-\\n gued that the evidence did not establish his dominion and control\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 9 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n over the drugs, that there was nothing to link him to the drugs in-\\n side the house, and that his mere presence near the drugs was not\\n enough to establish possession. See id. at 1322. But the government\\n presented evidence that: he was found standing in the driveway of\\n the home where the drugs were found with a key to the house in\\n his pocket; an officer saw him enter and exit the house before it was\\n searched; the drugs were found in common areas of the house; a\\n letter addressed to the defendant was found in the house; and his\\n daughter stated that he “frequented” the house. Id. at 1317–18,\\n 1322. We held the evidence sufficient to sustain the defendant’s\\n convictions under § 841(a) for possession with intent to distribute\\n cocaine and cocaine base. Id. at 1316, 1322–23. As much or even\\n more evidence supports Cremades’ conviction under § 841(a) than\\n supported the conviction in Cochran.\\n\\n Cremades’ actual knowledge and possession of the drugs\\n was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine and fen-\\n tanyl found in a bedroom and in the kitchen of the 800-square-foot\\n rented house he occupied, which was also the shipping destination\\n of the drug-filled FedEx package. He and his daughter were the\\n only people known to live in the house; the utilities for it were reg-\\n istered to him; and his Social Security card, passport, and mail ad-\\n dressed to him were all found inside the house. And he was seen\\n outside the house on the morning of the search. To top it off, ex-\\n perienced officers testified about the unlikelihood that the recipient\\n of a package containing $40,000 worth of drugs would not know\\n of its contents. All told, there was more than enough evidence for\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 10 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n the jury to find, as it did, that Cremades had actual knowledge of\\n the drugs and possessed them.\\n\\n As for Cremades’ intent to distribute some or all of the\\n drugs, it was proven by the large quantities of methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl that were found in his house and the additional quan-\\n tities of those drugs in the package that had been addressed to his\\n house and shipped from Nogales, Arizona using a fake return ad-\\n dress. Not only that, but also found in the house were: a receipt that\\n showed Cremades’ recent transfer of $1,500 to Jose Romero Espi-\\n nosa in Nogales; an accompanying handwritten note with the same\\n information; $4,800 cash; and six vacuum-sealed plastic bags con-\\n taining a total of 3,068 grams of 99% pure methamphetamine and\\n a Ziplock bag holding more than 7,000 blue pills that contained\\n 831 grams of fentanyl.\\n Here’s the thing, given the brevity of life and the danger that\\n inevitably arises from consuming large quantities of virtually pure\\n methamphetamine and large numbers of fentanyl pills, there is no\\n chance that Cremades intended to personally consume all of the\\n more than 3,000 grams of high purity methamphetamine or all of\\n those more than 7,000 pills of fentanyl. And if he didn’t intend to\\n personally consume the large quantity of drugs, the only other pos-\\n sibility is that he intended to distribute them to someone else,\\n whether to large numbers of end consumers or to other criminals\\n in the distribution chain. See Leonard, 138 F.3d at 909 n.3 (conclud-\\n ing that nine kilograms of cocaine was “far more than that involved\\n in personal use and enough to support an inference of intent to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 11 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n distribute”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497,\\n 499 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that two kilograms of cocaine was\\n “far more” than an amount for personal use and was evidence to\\n support an intent to distribute the drugs); United States v. Tamargo,\\n 672 F.2d 887, 890 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The jury reasonably could have\\n inferred that one in possession of 2,000 methaqualone tablets in-\\n tended to distribute the tablets rather than use them for personal\\n consumption.”).\\n The overwhelming evidence presented at trial is more than\\n sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the jury’s finding that\\n Cremades violated § 841(a) by possessing with intent to distribute\\n the charged quantities of methamphetamine and fentanyl. See Mer-\\n cer, 541 F.3d at 1074. The jury’s guilty verdict as to Count II stands.\\n B.\\n So does the jury’s guilty verdict as to Count I. To convict\\n Cremades of the drug conspiracy crime under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the\\n government was required to prove: 1) an illegal agreement existed\\n to possess with intent to distribute the drugs; 2) Cremades knew of\\n the agreement; and 3) he knowingly and voluntarily joined it. See\\n United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002).\\n Because conspiracy, like other crimes, may be proven by cir-\\n cumstantial evidence, United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545, 549 (11th\\n Cir. 1983), for the reasons already discussed, see supra at 9–11, a rea-\\n sonable jury could find that there was an agreement to possess\\n methamphetamine and fentanyl with the intent to distribute it, as\\n well as that Cremades knew the scheme was unlawful. That leaves\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 12 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n the question whether Cremades entered the illegal agreement\\n knowingly and voluntarily. Both the evidence and common sense\\n show that he did. Given the large quantities of methamphetamine\\n and fentanyl pills throughout his home and the large amount of\\n cash in his bedroom and closet, and the receipts showing money\\n transfers that occurred a month before the FedEx package’s arrival,\\n the jury did not have to work very hard to find beyond a reasonable\\n doubt that Cremades knowingly and voluntarily entered an illegal\\n agreement to distribute drugs. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 100.\\n Thus, a “reasonable construction of the evidence” supports\\n the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Cremades con-\\n spired to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of\\n methamphetamine and 400 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation\\n of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Iriele, 977 F.3d at 1168.\\n III.\\n Cremades contends that the district court’s admission of the\\n “drug ledger” over his objection is reversible because the ledger\\n was irrelevant and no foundation was laid for admitting it.\\n We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling only for abuse\\n of discretion. United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir.\\n 2013). This standard “affords the district court considerable leeway\\n in evidentiary rulings.” United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330\\n (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Under this standard we\\n will reverse only if the evidentiary ruling constitutes manifest er-\\n ror. Id. Cremades argues that admitting the drug ledger was man-\\n ifest error both because it constituted a “clear error of judgment,”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 13 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n and it involved the application of “the wrong legal standard.” Id.\\n (quotation marks and citation omitted).\\n Even if a district court abuses its discretion in an evidentiary\\n ruling, if the error is harmless, we won’t reverse on the basis of it.\\n See United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1197 (11th Cir. 2012). A\\n nonconstitutional evidentiary error is harmless and “must be disre-\\n garded” unless it affected the defendant’s “substantial rights” at\\n trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); House, 684 F.3d at 1197; see United States\\n v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A district court’s\\n erroneous admission of evidence does not warrant reversal if the\\n purported error had no substantial influence on the outcome and\\n sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.”); cf.\\n United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1135, 1142–43, 1188 (11th Cir.\\n 2017) (en banc) (explaining, in a case involving constitutional error,\\n that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not an errorless one,\\n and reversal for an error that had no influence over the jury’s ver-\\n dict runs afoul of several “vital interests of[] our judicial system,”\\n such as promoting public respect for the judicial process by focus-\\n ing on the “underlying fairness” of the trial; avoiding a “regime of\\n gotcha review”; avoiding litigant abuse of the judicial process; and\\n “conserving scarce judicial resources”) (citation omitted).\\n It is the government’s burden to show an error’s harmless-\\n ness. United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020); see\\n United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 62 (2002). And, of course, “[o]ver-\\n whelming evidence of guilt” may render an erroneous ruling harm-\\n less. United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999);\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 14 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10284\\n\\n see also United States v. Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1193 (11th Cir. 2015)\\n (concluding that in light of the evidence presented over eleven days\\n at trial establishing defendant’s guilt, “it is inconceivable that the\\n jury would have returned a different verdict based on two answers\\n to two allegedly improper questions”).\\n Cremades argues that what he contends is the erroneous ad-\\n mission of the drug ledger had a substantial prejudicial effect on the\\n outcome of his trial because “it allowed the government and its FBI\\n witness to make purely speculative assumptions before the jury\\n that the piece of paper was a ‘drug ledger’ written by [] Cremades,\\n when . . . there was . . . no evidence to support th[ose] conclusions.”\\n Cremades points to our Stephens decision, where we held that the\\n exclusion of “potentially exculpatory” testimony about a confiden-\\n tial informant’s access to methamphetamine “more likely than\\n not” influenced the verdict because the testimony could have\\n “played a fairly important role in the jury’s deliberations” had it\\n been admitted. United States v. Stephens, 365 F.3d 967, 980 (11th Cir.\\n 2004). In that case, however, we observed that the government’s\\n case against the defendant, Kenneth Stephens, “suffer[ed] from a\\n wide range of disturbing flaws.” Id. at 977. Despite extensive sur-\\n veillance, there was no evidence that law enforcement ever saw or\\n heard any drug transaction between Stephens and the informant.\\n Id. The government’s entire theory of the case in Stephens was that\\n officers had searched their informant so thoroughly before his in-\\n teractions with Stephens that the methamphetamine in the inform-\\n ant’s possession could only have come from Stephens. Id. at 979.\\n This was the theory that the defense sought to rebut with the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 15 of 15\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10284 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n excluded testimony. Id. Because it was clear that law enforcement\\n did not search their informant thoroughly or keep him under sur-\\n veillance, see id. at 978–79, we concluded that “additional testimony\\n that [the informant] actually had access to methamphetamine from\\n sources other than Stephens[] and possessed and sold it while he\\n was ostensibly working as [an informant], could have been quite\\n probative to the jury.” Id. at 980. The erroneous exclusion of “quite\\n probative” evidence favoring the defendant that would have\\n helped him refute the entire theory of the government’s case is not\\n harmless error.\\n But this case is not like Stephens. As the government points\\n out, even assuming without deciding that admitting evidence of\\n the drug ledger was an abuse of discretion, it “had no substantial\\n influence on the outcome.” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722. We’ve re-\\n counted the overwhelming evidence supporting both convictions\\n in our sufficiency-of-the-evidence discussion. See supra at 9–12.\\n And we did that without even mentioning anything about the drug\\n ledger. We could leave it out of the sufficiency discussion because\\n the “[o]verwhelming evidence of guilt,” Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1353,\\n was “uninfected by the [purported] error,” Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at\\n 722, in admitting the ledger. Any error in the ledger’s admission\\n was harmless given all the other evidence presented at trial; “it is\\n inconceivable that the jury would have returned a different ver-\\n dict,” Hough, 803 F.3d at 1193, if the ledger had been excluded.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30972,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10757325,"string":"10,757,325"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Frank A. Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-13"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-14302"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 1 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-14302\\n ____________________\\n\\n FRANK A. WALLS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,\\n WARDEN, FLORIDA STATE PRISON,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 4:25-cv-00488-MW-MAF\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and JILL\\n PRYOR, Circuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n In 1987, Frank A. Walls shot and killed Edward Alger and\\n Ann Peterson in Alger’s home. A jury found him guilty of murder,\\n and the trial court sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme\\n Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal in 1994, and multiple\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 2 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n state and federal courts later declined to disturb it on collateral re-\\n view after rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\n and mental disability. The Governor of Florida signed Walls’s\\n death warrant on November 18, 2025. A warden scheduled him to\\n be executed on December 18, 2025. On November 26, Walls sued\\n in the district court, alleging that his lethal injection would cause\\n severe and unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment\\n to the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A week later, he moved\\n the district court to stay his execution. The district court denied his\\n motion. After Walls filed an appeal, he moved this Court for a stay.\\n Because Walls has not established that he is likely to succeed in his\\n appeal, we deny his motion.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In July 1987, Walls murdered Edward Alger and Ann\\n Peterson during a burglary of Alger’s home. See Walls v. State, 926\\n So. 2d 1156, 1161 (Fla. 2006). A Jackson County jury found Walls\\n guilty of two counts each of first-degree murder and kidnapping, as\\n well as burglary and petit theft. Id. at 1162. The jury unanimously\\n recommended a sentence of death for Peterson’s murder, which\\n the trial court entered. Id. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the\\n convictions and death sentence on direct appeal, see Walls v. State,\\n 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994), and the Supreme Court of the\\n United States denied Walls’s petition for a writ of certiorari, see\\n Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). Walls later unsuccessfully\\n moved for postconviction relief in Florida courts. See Walls, 926 So.\\n 2d at 1163; Walls v. State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008); Walls v. State,\\n 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023). And he unsuccessfully sought\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 3 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 3\\n\\n postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Walls\\n v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Walls, No. 23-10982\\n (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023). He has been eligible to be executed since\\n at least 2023.\\n On November 18, 2025, Governor Ron DeSantis signed\\n Walls’s death warrant. The same day, a prison warden scheduled\\n Walls’s execution for December 18, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. On\\n November 26, 2025, Walls filed a complaint in the district court\\n against the warden and the Secretary of the Department of\\n Corrections for declaratory and injunctive relief. Walls alleged that\\n Florida’s lethal injection protocol created a substantial risk that, in\\n the light of his health conditions, he would experience severe pain\\n and suffering from pulmonary edema in violation of the Eighth\\n Amendment. He also alleged that recent executions have been “rife\\n with error,” exposing him to more risk of pain. And he identified\\n execution by firing squad as a readily available alternative.\\n Walls did not move for a stay of his execution in the district\\n court until December 3. He then argued that he qualified for a stay\\n because his claim “hinge[d] on complex questions concerning [his]\\n cardiopulmonary health, his susceptibility to the torturous\\n condition of pulmonary edema, [Florida’s] ability to comply with\\n [its] protocol, and the substantial risk of superadded pain,” none of\\n which were resolvable by his execution date. The State responded\\n that Walls sought relief “dilator[ily].” Specifically, it argued that\\n Walls’s “medical records . . . prove he could have brought his\\n current lethal injection challenge years ago.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 4 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n The district court denied Walls’s motion on December 9.\\n Based on our decision in Long v. Secretary, Department of Corrections,\\n 924 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2019), it ruled that “Walls’s delay in seeking\\n a stay of execution until over two weeks after his death warrant\\n was signed [was] fatal to his requested relief.” It found that the risks\\n to Walls from the lethal injection protocol were apparent for years.\\n And even if his doctor concluded that his health conditions recently\\n worsened, Walls still “waited several months” after the doctor’s\\n report to file suit. Moreover, the district court faulted Walls for\\n waiting an additional week after he filed suit to seek a stay.\\n Walls appealed the order denying a stay the same day the\\n district court entered it. And he moved this Court to stay his\\n execution pending his appeal.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Powell\\n v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). We may grant a stay\\n of execution only if the inmate establishes that he has a substantial\\n likelihood of success on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable\\n injury without a stay, that a stay would not substantially harm the\\n State, and that a stay would not be adverse to the public interest.\\n Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect\\n legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect\\n manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination,\\n or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States\\n v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 5 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 5\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Walls argues that “[t]he stay factors weigh in favor of grant-\\n ing a stay of execution.” He maintains that the order denying a stay\\n is likely to be reversed on appeal because it “completely ignore[d]\\n . . . serious allegations and evidence in the complaint” and meas-\\n ured his delay from too early a starting point. Walls also asserts\\n that, absent a stay, he will suffer irreparable injury in the form of\\n “superadded” pain and suffering during his execution. And he con-\\n tends that neither the State nor the public has an interest in execut-\\n ing him with unnecessary pain.\\n Walls faces a difficult burden in establishing that the district\\n court likely abused its discretion. We examine “not only the likeli-\\n hood of success on the merits and the relative harms to the parties,\\n but also the extent to which the inmate has delayed unnecessarily\\n in bringing the claim.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649–50\\n (2004). We employ a “strong equitable presumption against the\\n grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a\\n time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring en-\\n try of a stay.” Id. at 650. The Supreme Court has explained that\\n “[l]ast-minute stays” of execution “should be the extreme excep-\\n tion, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019).\\n We agree with the district court that our decision in Long is\\n instructive. There, a prisoner also filed a complaint alleging that the\\n administration of the Florida lethal injection protocol would vio-\\n late his Eighth Amendment rights. 924 F.3d at 1174–75. The trial\\n court sentenced the inmate to death in 1985. Id. at 1173–74. After a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 6 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n string of failed challenges to his sentence in state and federal courts,\\n the governor signed his death warrant on April 23, 2019, and the\\n warden set his execution for May 23, 2019. Id. at 1174. But the in-\\n mate waited until May 8, 2019, to file his complaint in the district\\n court. Id. He attached to his complaint emergency motions for a\\n stay, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction.\\n Id. at 1174–75. The district court denied the stay, and the inmate\\n filed an expedited appeal. Id. at 1175.\\n We denied the motion for a stay for “two independently ad-\\n equate reasons.” Id. at 1176. First, we held that the prisoner’s case\\n was “within ‘the norm’ where the ‘strong equitable presumption\\n against the grant of a stay’ applies.” Id. at 1177 (quoting Bucklew,\\n 139 S. Ct. at 1134). And we rejected his argument that evidence of\\n complications from recent executions excused his delayed chal-\\n lenge. Id. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that three recent execu-\\n tions—on November 8, 2017, February 22, 2018, and December 13,\\n 2018— inflicted severe pain on the executed. Id. We held that even\\n the “delay of five months” between the last execution and the pris-\\n oner’s challenge was “too long.” Id. As to the prisoner’s as-applied\\n challenge to the protocol premised on his own “serious medical\\n conditions,” we ruled that the inmate “ha[d] known about his med-\\n ical conditions for decades.” Id. Florida instituted the protocol he\\n (and now Walls) challenged in January 2017. Id. We held that “two\\n years and four months” between the new protocol and the inmate’s\\n lawsuit constituted inexcusable delay. Id. at 1177–78. Second, we\\n concluded that “[e]ven if ” the prisoner had not unduly delayed, his\\n claims were still “barred by the doctrine of res judicata” because\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 7 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 7\\n\\n they “were raised, or could have been raised,” in his rejected peti-\\n tions for postconviction relief. Id. at 1178.\\n Walls’s suit suffers from similar flaws. As his complaint al-\\n leges, complications arising from drugs used in Florida’s protocol\\n have been well-documented for years. For example, Walls alleges\\n that the post-execution autopsies of four Florida inmates in Febru-\\n ary 2018, May 2023, August 2024, and April 2025, suggested that\\n they suffered from pulmonary edema during their execution. Even\\n viewing the April execution as an acceptable reference point, Walls\\n waited seven months to file his complaint. See id. at 1177 (“A delay\\n of five months . . . is too long.”). And since at least 2017, Walls has\\n suffered from several chronic health conditions—obstructive sleep\\n apnea, hypertension, low blood oxygenation, and obesity—that he\\n now alleges put him at risk of painful pulmonary edema. See id.\\n (finding undue delay where the inmate had “known about his med-\\n ical conditions” underlying his method of execution claim for years\\n prior to filing suit). Walls’s case is “not one of the ‘extreme excep-\\n tions’ in which a last-minute stay should be entered.” Id. (alteration\\n adopted) (quoting Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1134).\\n Walls argues that the district court erred by focusing only on\\n his delay. But his argument misunderstands settled precedent. The\\n Supreme Court explained in Nelson that district courts “must con-\\n sider not only the likelihood of success on the merits and the rela-\\n tive harm to the parties, but also the extent to which the inmate has\\n delayed unnecessarily in bringing the claim.” 541 U.S. at 649–50. It\\n explained that a district court must consider both of those issues\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 8 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n “before granting a stay,” not before denying one. Id. at 649 (emphasis\\n added). And we held in Long that the motion for a stay failed for\\n “two independently adequate reasons”: first, for inexcusable delay,\\n and second, based on res judicata. 924 F.3d at 1176 (emphasis\\n added).\\n Walls also asserts that the district court failed to consider\\n that his claim relies on two recent events. Specifically, he argues that\\n the district court should have measured his delay from either a ref-\\n erence point of late July, when “a significant change in his medical\\n condition [was] uncovered,” or October 28, when he obtained “spe-\\n cific drug log records” establishing Florida’s recent maladministra-\\n tion of its protocol. With those events as a reference point, Walls\\n contends, he filed his complaint about four months after discover-\\n ing that his execution “would implicate a constitutionally unac-\\n ceptable risk of needless suffering.” And during that four-month\\n delay, he says, his counsel exercised “due diligence that led to the\\n discovery” of the drug logs.\\n Like the district court, we doubt Walls’s suit could have\\n been filed only as early as July. The record establishes that Walls\\n has suffered for at least eight years from the same conditions he\\n now alleges will cause him severe pain and suffering. But in any\\n event, Walls’s admission that his suit could have been filed four\\n months earlier dooms his motion. We ordinarily do not grant a\\n motion for a stay when it “could have been brought at such a time\\n as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of\\n a stay.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650. And we cannot say that the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 9 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 9\\n\\n court likely abused its discretion by extending Long “in an unrea-\\n sonable or incorrect manner.” Toll, 804 F.3d at 1353. (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted). We held in Long that a five-\\n month delay was “too long.” 924 F.3d at 1177. And Walls admits\\n that he waited nearly four and a half months to move for a stay.\\n\\n Walls also faults the district court for ruling that he unduly\\n delayed even though he sued before the two-year statute of limita-\\n tions expired. Yet, Walls’s argument answers the wrong question.\\n Because “a stay of execution is an equitable remedy,” the “rules of\\n equity apply.” Id. at 1176. One of those rules is that courts ordinar-\\n ily do not grant a stay when the movant created the need for it. See\\n In re Hutcherson, 468 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying stay of\\n execution where inmate’s “need for a stay of execution [was] di-\\n rectly attributable to his own failure to bring his claims to court in\\n a timely fashion”). The purpose of that equitable rule would be de-\\n feated were we to rule that no undue delay occurs whenever a chal-\\n lenge is not barred by the statute of limitations. Suppose, for exam-\\n ple, that Walls could have sued twenty months ago but filed his\\n complaint and motion for a stay the day before his execution. That\\n delay would plainly be inequitable under both Supreme Court and\\n our precedent, even if Walls filed it within the limitations period.\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We DENY Walls’s motion for a stay of his execution.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11223910/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"JILL PRYOR"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"JILL PRYOR\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10757325/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Frank A. Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-13\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 1 of 9\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 25-14302\n ____________________\n\n FRANK A. WALLS,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,\n WARDEN, FLORIDA STATE PRISON,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 4:25-cv-00488-MW-MAF\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and JILL\n PRYOR, Circuit Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n In 1987, Frank A. Walls shot and killed Edward Alger and\n Ann Peterson in Alger’s home. A jury found him guilty of murder,\n and the trial court sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme\n Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal in 1994, and multiple\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 2 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14302\n\n state and federal courts later declined to disturb it on collateral re-\n view after rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\n and mental disability. The Governor of Florida signed Walls’s\n death warrant on November 18, 2025. A warden scheduled him to\n be executed on December 18, 2025. On November 26, Walls sued\n in the district court, alleging that his lethal injection would cause\n severe and unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment\n to the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A week later, he moved\n the district court to stay his execution. The district court denied his\n motion. After Walls filed an appeal, he moved this Court for a stay.\n Because Walls has not established that he is likely to succeed in his\n appeal, we deny his motion.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In July 1987, Walls murdered Edward Alger and Ann\n Peterson during a burglary of Alger’s home. See Walls v. State, 926\n So. 2d 1156, 1161 (Fla. 2006). A Jackson County jury found Walls\n guilty of two counts each of first-degree murder and kidnapping, as\n well as burglary and petit theft. Id. at 1162. The jury unanimously\n recommended a sentence of death for Peterson’s murder, which\n the trial court entered. Id. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the\n convictions and death sentence on direct appeal, see Walls v. State,\n 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994), and the Supreme Court of the\n United States denied Walls’s petition for a writ of certiorari, see\n Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). Walls later unsuccessfully\n moved for postconviction relief in Florida courts. See Walls, 926 So.\n 2d at 1163; Walls v. State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008); Walls v. State,\n 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023). And he unsuccessfully sought\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 3 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 3\n\n postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Walls\n v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Walls, No. 23-10982\n (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023). He has been eligible to be executed since\n at least 2023.\n On November 18, 2025, Governor Ron DeSantis signed\n Walls’s death warrant. The same day, a prison warden scheduled\n Walls’s execution for December 18, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. On\n November 26, 2025, Walls filed a complaint in the district court\n against the warden and the Secretary of the Department of\n Corrections for declaratory and injunctive relief. Walls alleged that\n Florida’s lethal injection protocol created a substantial risk that, in\n the light of his health conditions, he would experience severe pain\n and suffering from pulmonary edema in violation of the Eighth\n Amendment. He also alleged that recent executions have been “rife\n with error,” exposing him to more risk of pain. And he identified\n execution by firing squad as a readily available alternative.\n Walls did not move for a stay of his execution in the district\n court until December 3. He then argued that he qualified for a stay\n because his claim “hinge[d] on complex questions concerning [his]\n cardiopulmonary health, his susceptibility to the torturous\n condition of pulmonary edema, [Florida’s] ability to comply with\n [its] protocol, and the substantial risk of superadded pain,” none of\n which were resolvable by his execution date. The State responded\n that Walls sought relief “dilator[ily].” Specifically, it argued that\n Walls’s “medical records . . . prove he could have brought his\n current lethal injection challenge years ago.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 4 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14302\n\n The district court denied Walls’s motion on December 9.\n Based on our decision in Long v. Secretary, Department of Corrections,\n 924 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2019), it ruled that “Walls’s delay in seeking\n a stay of execution until over two weeks after his death warrant\n was signed [was] fatal to his requested relief.” It found that the risks\n to Walls from the lethal injection protocol were apparent for years.\n And even if his doctor concluded that his health conditions recently\n worsened, Walls still “waited several months” after the doctor’s\n report to file suit. Moreover, the district court faulted Walls for\n waiting an additional week after he filed suit to seek a stay.\n Walls appealed the order denying a stay the same day the\n district court entered it. And he moved this Court to stay his\n execution pending his appeal.\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n We review the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Powell\n v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). We may grant a stay\n of execution only if the inmate establishes that he has a substantial\n likelihood of success on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable\n injury without a stay, that a stay would not substantially harm the\n State, and that a stay would not be adverse to the public interest.\n Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect\n legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect\n manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination,\n or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States\n v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal\n quotation marks omitted).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 5 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 5\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n Walls argues that “[t]he stay factors weigh in favor of grant-\n ing a stay of execution.” He maintains that the order denying a stay\n is likely to be reversed on appeal because it “completely ignore[d]\n . . . serious allegations and evidence in the complaint” and meas-\n ured his delay from too early a starting point. Walls also asserts\n that, absent a stay, he will suffer irreparable injury in the form of\n “superadded” pain and suffering during his execution. And he con-\n tends that neither the State nor the public has an interest in execut-\n ing him with unnecessary pain.\n Walls faces a difficult burden in establishing that the district\n court likely abused its discretion. We examine “not only the likeli-\n hood of success on the merits and the relative harms to the parties,\n but also the extent to which the inmate has delayed unnecessarily\n in bringing the claim.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649–50\n (2004). We employ a “strong equitable presumption against the\n grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a\n time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring en-\n try of a stay.” Id. at 650. The Supreme Court has explained that\n “[l]ast-minute stays” of execution “should be the extreme excep-\n tion, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019).\n We agree with the district court that our decision in Long is\n instructive. There, a prisoner also filed a complaint alleging that the\n administration of the Florida lethal injection protocol would vio-\n late his Eighth Amendment rights. 924 F.3d at 1174–75. The trial\n court sentenced the inmate to death in 1985. Id. at 1173–74. After a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 6 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14302\n\n string of failed challenges to his sentence in state and federal courts,\n the governor signed his death warrant on April 23, 2019, and the\n warden set his execution for May 23, 2019. Id. at 1174. But the in-\n mate waited until May 8, 2019, to file his complaint in the district\n court. Id. He attached to his complaint emergency motions for a\n stay, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction.\n Id. at 1174–75. The district court denied the stay, and the inmate\n filed an expedited appeal. Id. at 1175.\n We denied the motion for a stay for “two independently ad-\n equate reasons.” Id. at 1176. First, we held that the prisoner’s case\n was “within ‘the norm’ where the ‘strong equitable presumption\n against the grant of a stay’ applies.” Id. at 1177 (quoting Bucklew,\n 139 S. Ct. at 1134). And we rejected his argument that evidence of\n complications from recent executions excused his delayed chal-\n lenge. Id. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that three recent execu-\n tions—on November 8, 2017, February 22, 2018, and December 13,\n 2018— inflicted severe pain on the executed. Id. We held that even\n the “delay of five months” between the last execution and the pris-\n oner’s challenge was “too long.” Id. As to the prisoner’s as-applied\n challenge to the protocol premised on his own “serious medical\n conditions,” we ruled that the inmate “ha[d] known about his med-\n ical conditions for decades.” Id. Florida instituted the protocol he\n (and now Walls) challenged in January 2017. Id. We held that “two\n years and four months” between the new protocol and the inmate’s\n lawsuit constituted inexcusable delay. Id. at 1177–78. Second, we\n concluded that “[e]ven if ” the prisoner had not unduly delayed, his\n claims were still “barred by the doctrine of res judicata” because\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 7 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 7\n\n they “were raised, or could have been raised,” in his rejected peti-\n tions for postconviction relief. Id. at 1178.\n Walls’s suit suffers from similar flaws. As his complaint al-\n leges, complications arising from drugs used in Florida’s protocol\n have been well-documented for years. For example, Walls alleges\n that the post-execution autopsies of four Florida inmates in Febru-\n ary 2018, May 2023, August 2024, and April 2025, suggested that\n they suffered from pulmonary edema during their execution. Even\n viewing the April execution as an acceptable reference point, Walls\n waited seven months to file his complaint. See id. at 1177 (“A delay\n of five months . . . is too long.”). And since at least 2017, Walls has\n suffered from several chronic health conditions—obstructive sleep\n apnea, hypertension, low blood oxygenation, and obesity—that he\n now alleges put him at risk of painful pulmonary edema. See id.\n (finding undue delay where the inmate had “known about his med-\n ical conditions” underlying his method of execution claim for years\n prior to filing suit). Walls’s case is “not one of the ‘extreme excep-\n tions’ in which a last-minute stay should be entered.” Id. (alteration\n adopted) (quoting Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1134).\n Walls argues that the district court erred by focusing only on\n his delay. But his argument misunderstands settled precedent. The\n Supreme Court explained in Nelson that district courts “must con-\n sider not only the likelihood of success on the merits and the rela-\n tive harm to the parties, but also the extent to which the inmate has\n delayed unnecessarily in bringing the claim.” 541 U.S. at 649–50. It\n explained that a district court must consider both of those issues\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 8 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14302\n\n “before granting a stay,” not before denying one. Id. at 649 (emphasis\n added). And we held in Long that the motion for a stay failed for\n “two independently adequate reasons”: first, for inexcusable delay,\n and second, based on res judicata. 924 F.3d at 1176 (emphasis\n added).\n Walls also asserts that the district court failed to consider\n that his claim relies on two recent events. Specifically, he argues that\n the district court should have measured his delay from either a ref-\n erence point of late July, when “a significant change in his medical\n condition [was] uncovered,” or October 28, when he obtained “spe-\n cific drug log records” establishing Florida’s recent maladministra-\n tion of its protocol. With those events as a reference point, Walls\n contends, he filed his complaint about four months after discover-\n ing that his execution “would implicate a constitutionally unac-\n ceptable risk of needless suffering.” And during that four-month\n delay, he says, his counsel exercised “due diligence that led to the\n discovery” of the drug logs.\n Like the district court, we doubt Walls’s suit could have\n been filed only as early as July. The record establishes that Walls\n has suffered for at least eight years from the same conditions he\n now alleges will cause him severe pain and suffering. But in any\n event, Walls’s admission that his suit could have been filed four\n months earlier dooms his motion. We ordinarily do not grant a\n motion for a stay when it “could have been brought at such a time\n as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of\n a stay.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650. And we cannot say that the district\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 9 of 9\n\n\n\n\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 9\n\n court likely abused its discretion by extending Long “in an unrea-\n sonable or incorrect manner.” Toll, 804 F.3d at 1353. (citation and\n internal quotation marks omitted). We held in Long that a five-\n month delay was “too long.” 924 F.3d at 1177. And Walls admits\n that he waited nearly four and a half months to move for a stay.\n\n Walls also faults the district court for ruling that he unduly\n delayed even though he sued before the two-year statute of limita-\n tions expired. Yet, Walls’s argument answers the wrong question.\n Because “a stay of execution is an equitable remedy,” the “rules of\n equity apply.” Id. at 1176. One of those rules is that courts ordinar-\n ily do not grant a stay when the movant created the need for it. See\n In re Hutcherson, 468 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying stay of\n execution where inmate’s “need for a stay of execution [was] di-\n rectly attributable to his own failure to bring his claims to court in\n a timely fashion”). The purpose of that equitable rule would be de-\n feated were we to rule that no undue delay occurs whenever a chal-\n lenge is not barred by the statute of limitations. Suppose, for exam-\n ple, that Walls could have sued twenty months ago but filed his\n complaint and motion for a stay the day before his execution. That\n delay would plainly be inequitable under both Supreme Court and\n our precedent, even if Walls filed it within the limitations period.\n\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We DENY Walls’s motion for a stay of his execution.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Frank A. Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-13\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 1 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-14302\\n ____________________\\n\\n FRANK A. WALLS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,\\n WARDEN, FLORIDA STATE PRISON,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 4:25-cv-00488-MW-MAF\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and JILL\\n PRYOR, Circuit Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n In 1987, Frank A. Walls shot and killed Edward Alger and\\n Ann Peterson in Alger’s home. A jury found him guilty of murder,\\n and the trial court sentenced him to death. The Florida Supreme\\n Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal in 1994, and multiple\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 2 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n state and federal courts later declined to disturb it on collateral re-\\n view after rejecting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel\\n and mental disability. The Governor of Florida signed Walls’s\\n death warrant on November 18, 2025. A warden scheduled him to\\n be executed on December 18, 2025. On November 26, Walls sued\\n in the district court, alleging that his lethal injection would cause\\n severe and unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment\\n to the Constitution. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A week later, he moved\\n the district court to stay his execution. The district court denied his\\n motion. After Walls filed an appeal, he moved this Court for a stay.\\n Because Walls has not established that he is likely to succeed in his\\n appeal, we deny his motion.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In July 1987, Walls murdered Edward Alger and Ann\\n Peterson during a burglary of Alger’s home. See Walls v. State, 926\\n So. 2d 1156, 1161 (Fla. 2006). A Jackson County jury found Walls\\n guilty of two counts each of first-degree murder and kidnapping, as\\n well as burglary and petit theft. Id. at 1162. The jury unanimously\\n recommended a sentence of death for Peterson’s murder, which\\n the trial court entered. Id. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the\\n convictions and death sentence on direct appeal, see Walls v. State,\\n 641 So. 2d 381, 391 (Fla. 1994), and the Supreme Court of the\\n United States denied Walls’s petition for a writ of certiorari, see\\n Walls v. Florida, 513 U.S. 1130 (1995). Walls later unsuccessfully\\n moved for postconviction relief in Florida courts. See Walls, 926 So.\\n 2d at 1163; Walls v. State, 3 So. 3d 1248 (Fla. 2008); Walls v. State,\\n 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla. 2023). And he unsuccessfully sought\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 3 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 3\\n\\n postconviction relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Walls\\n v. Buss, 658 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2011); In re Walls, No. 23-10982\\n (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2023). He has been eligible to be executed since\\n at least 2023.\\n On November 18, 2025, Governor Ron DeSantis signed\\n Walls’s death warrant. The same day, a prison warden scheduled\\n Walls’s execution for December 18, 2025, at 6:00 p.m. On\\n November 26, 2025, Walls filed a complaint in the district court\\n against the warden and the Secretary of the Department of\\n Corrections for declaratory and injunctive relief. Walls alleged that\\n Florida’s lethal injection protocol created a substantial risk that, in\\n the light of his health conditions, he would experience severe pain\\n and suffering from pulmonary edema in violation of the Eighth\\n Amendment. He also alleged that recent executions have been “rife\\n with error,” exposing him to more risk of pain. And he identified\\n execution by firing squad as a readily available alternative.\\n Walls did not move for a stay of his execution in the district\\n court until December 3. He then argued that he qualified for a stay\\n because his claim “hinge[d] on complex questions concerning [his]\\n cardiopulmonary health, his susceptibility to the torturous\\n condition of pulmonary edema, [Florida’s] ability to comply with\\n [its] protocol, and the substantial risk of superadded pain,” none of\\n which were resolvable by his execution date. The State responded\\n that Walls sought relief “dilator[ily].” Specifically, it argued that\\n Walls’s “medical records . . . prove he could have brought his\\n current lethal injection challenge years ago.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 4 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n The district court denied Walls’s motion on December 9.\\n Based on our decision in Long v. Secretary, Department of Corrections,\\n 924 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2019), it ruled that “Walls’s delay in seeking\\n a stay of execution until over two weeks after his death warrant\\n was signed [was] fatal to his requested relief.” It found that the risks\\n to Walls from the lethal injection protocol were apparent for years.\\n And even if his doctor concluded that his health conditions recently\\n worsened, Walls still “waited several months” after the doctor’s\\n report to file suit. Moreover, the district court faulted Walls for\\n waiting an additional week after he filed suit to seek a stay.\\n Walls appealed the order denying a stay the same day the\\n district court entered it. And he moved this Court to stay his\\n execution pending his appeal.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Powell\\n v. Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). We may grant a stay\\n of execution only if the inmate establishes that he has a substantial\\n likelihood of success on the merits, that he will suffer irreparable\\n injury without a stay, that a stay would not substantially harm the\\n State, and that a stay would not be adverse to the public interest.\\n Id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect\\n legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect\\n manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination,\\n or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States\\n v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 5 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 5\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Walls argues that “[t]he stay factors weigh in favor of grant-\\n ing a stay of execution.” He maintains that the order denying a stay\\n is likely to be reversed on appeal because it “completely ignore[d]\\n . . . serious allegations and evidence in the complaint” and meas-\\n ured his delay from too early a starting point. Walls also asserts\\n that, absent a stay, he will suffer irreparable injury in the form of\\n “superadded” pain and suffering during his execution. And he con-\\n tends that neither the State nor the public has an interest in execut-\\n ing him with unnecessary pain.\\n Walls faces a difficult burden in establishing that the district\\n court likely abused its discretion. We examine “not only the likeli-\\n hood of success on the merits and the relative harms to the parties,\\n but also the extent to which the inmate has delayed unnecessarily\\n in bringing the claim.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649–50\\n (2004). We employ a “strong equitable presumption against the\\n grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a\\n time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring en-\\n try of a stay.” Id. at 650. The Supreme Court has explained that\\n “[l]ast-minute stays” of execution “should be the extreme excep-\\n tion, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1134 (2019).\\n We agree with the district court that our decision in Long is\\n instructive. There, a prisoner also filed a complaint alleging that the\\n administration of the Florida lethal injection protocol would vio-\\n late his Eighth Amendment rights. 924 F.3d at 1174–75. The trial\\n court sentenced the inmate to death in 1985. Id. at 1173–74. After a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 6 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n string of failed challenges to his sentence in state and federal courts,\\n the governor signed his death warrant on April 23, 2019, and the\\n warden set his execution for May 23, 2019. Id. at 1174. But the in-\\n mate waited until May 8, 2019, to file his complaint in the district\\n court. Id. He attached to his complaint emergency motions for a\\n stay, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction.\\n Id. at 1174–75. The district court denied the stay, and the inmate\\n filed an expedited appeal. Id. at 1175.\\n We denied the motion for a stay for “two independently ad-\\n equate reasons.” Id. at 1176. First, we held that the prisoner’s case\\n was “within ‘the norm’ where the ‘strong equitable presumption\\n against the grant of a stay’ applies.” Id. at 1177 (quoting Bucklew,\\n 139 S. Ct. at 1134). And we rejected his argument that evidence of\\n complications from recent executions excused his delayed chal-\\n lenge. Id. Specifically, the prisoner alleged that three recent execu-\\n tions—on November 8, 2017, February 22, 2018, and December 13,\\n 2018— inflicted severe pain on the executed. Id. We held that even\\n the “delay of five months” between the last execution and the pris-\\n oner’s challenge was “too long.” Id. As to the prisoner’s as-applied\\n challenge to the protocol premised on his own “serious medical\\n conditions,” we ruled that the inmate “ha[d] known about his med-\\n ical conditions for decades.” Id. Florida instituted the protocol he\\n (and now Walls) challenged in January 2017. Id. We held that “two\\n years and four months” between the new protocol and the inmate’s\\n lawsuit constituted inexcusable delay. Id. at 1177–78. Second, we\\n concluded that “[e]ven if ” the prisoner had not unduly delayed, his\\n claims were still “barred by the doctrine of res judicata” because\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 7 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 7\\n\\n they “were raised, or could have been raised,” in his rejected peti-\\n tions for postconviction relief. Id. at 1178.\\n Walls’s suit suffers from similar flaws. As his complaint al-\\n leges, complications arising from drugs used in Florida’s protocol\\n have been well-documented for years. For example, Walls alleges\\n that the post-execution autopsies of four Florida inmates in Febru-\\n ary 2018, May 2023, August 2024, and April 2025, suggested that\\n they suffered from pulmonary edema during their execution. Even\\n viewing the April execution as an acceptable reference point, Walls\\n waited seven months to file his complaint. See id. at 1177 (“A delay\\n of five months . . . is too long.”). And since at least 2017, Walls has\\n suffered from several chronic health conditions—obstructive sleep\\n apnea, hypertension, low blood oxygenation, and obesity—that he\\n now alleges put him at risk of painful pulmonary edema. See id.\\n (finding undue delay where the inmate had “known about his med-\\n ical conditions” underlying his method of execution claim for years\\n prior to filing suit). Walls’s case is “not one of the ‘extreme excep-\\n tions’ in which a last-minute stay should be entered.” Id. (alteration\\n adopted) (quoting Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1134).\\n Walls argues that the district court erred by focusing only on\\n his delay. But his argument misunderstands settled precedent. The\\n Supreme Court explained in Nelson that district courts “must con-\\n sider not only the likelihood of success on the merits and the rela-\\n tive harm to the parties, but also the extent to which the inmate has\\n delayed unnecessarily in bringing the claim.” 541 U.S. at 649–50. It\\n explained that a district court must consider both of those issues\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 8 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14302\\n\\n “before granting a stay,” not before denying one. Id. at 649 (emphasis\\n added). And we held in Long that the motion for a stay failed for\\n “two independently adequate reasons”: first, for inexcusable delay,\\n and second, based on res judicata. 924 F.3d at 1176 (emphasis\\n added).\\n Walls also asserts that the district court failed to consider\\n that his claim relies on two recent events. Specifically, he argues that\\n the district court should have measured his delay from either a ref-\\n erence point of late July, when “a significant change in his medical\\n condition [was] uncovered,” or October 28, when he obtained “spe-\\n cific drug log records” establishing Florida’s recent maladministra-\\n tion of its protocol. With those events as a reference point, Walls\\n contends, he filed his complaint about four months after discover-\\n ing that his execution “would implicate a constitutionally unac-\\n ceptable risk of needless suffering.” And during that four-month\\n delay, he says, his counsel exercised “due diligence that led to the\\n discovery” of the drug logs.\\n Like the district court, we doubt Walls’s suit could have\\n been filed only as early as July. The record establishes that Walls\\n has suffered for at least eight years from the same conditions he\\n now alleges will cause him severe pain and suffering. But in any\\n event, Walls’s admission that his suit could have been filed four\\n months earlier dooms his motion. We ordinarily do not grant a\\n motion for a stay when it “could have been brought at such a time\\n as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of\\n a stay.” Nelson, 541 U.S. at 650. And we cannot say that the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 9 of 9\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14302 Order of the Court 9\\n\\n court likely abused its discretion by extending Long “in an unrea-\\n sonable or incorrect manner.” Toll, 804 F.3d at 1353. (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted). We held in Long that a five-\\n month delay was “too long.” 924 F.3d at 1177. And Walls admits\\n that he waited nearly four and a half months to move for a stay.\\n\\n Walls also faults the district court for ruling that he unduly\\n delayed even though he sued before the two-year statute of limita-\\n tions expired. Yet, Walls’s argument answers the wrong question.\\n Because “a stay of execution is an equitable remedy,” the “rules of\\n equity apply.” Id. at 1176. One of those rules is that courts ordinar-\\n ily do not grant a stay when the movant created the need for it. See\\n In re Hutcherson, 468 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2006) (denying stay of\\n execution where inmate’s “need for a stay of execution [was] di-\\n rectly attributable to his own failure to bring his claims to court in\\n a timely fashion”). The purpose of that equitable rule would be de-\\n feated were we to rule that no undue delay occurs whenever a chal-\\n lenge is not barred by the statute of limitations. Suppose, for exam-\\n ple, that Walls could have sued twenty months ago but filed his\\n complaint and motion for a stay the day before his execution. That\\n delay would plainly be inequitable under both Supreme Court and\\n our precedent, even if Walls filed it within the limitations period.\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We DENY Walls’s motion for a stay of his execution.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30973,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10758268,"string":"10,758,268"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Attorney General, State of Alabama"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-13111"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13111\\n ____________________\\n\\n ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP,\\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA,\\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA\\n EDUCATION FUND,\\n GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES,\\n ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n WILLIAM R. ADAIR, et al.,\\n Defendants.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-00420-RDP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n In 2024, Alabama enacted SB1. That statute makes it unlaw-\\n ful to give a third party, and for a third party to receive, payment or\\n a gift for several forms of absentee-ballot-application assistance.\\n See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The law also prohibits a\\n person from submitting an absentee-ballot application, other than\\n his own, to a county Absentee Election Manager. Id. § 17-11-\\n 4(c)(2).\\n Plaintiffs are organizations that fear they will be prosecuted\\n under SB1 for absentee-ballot-application assistance they provide\\n to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters. They contend that Section\\n 208 of the Voting Rights Act preempts SB1. Section 208 states that\\n “[a]ny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness,\\n disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a\\n person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” 52\\n U.S.C. § 10508. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and prelim-\\n inarily enjoined the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the\\n challenged provisions of SB1 with respect to blind, disabled, and\\n illiterate voters. Now, the Alabama Attorney General appeals that\\n order.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n But SB1 is not a very clear law. It contains several vague and\\n undefined terms, as well as what seem to be conflicting provisions.\\n Those include a provision that repeats nearly verbatim the text of\\n Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Without a single decision\\n from an Alabama state court interpreting the scope of the law, we\\n aren’t sure what conduct it criminalizes—though penalties for vio-\\n lating SB1 can be stiff: up to twenty years in prison and a $30,000\\n fine. But if the correct interpretation of the law creates no liability\\n for Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs may lack an injury-in fact to establish stand-\\n ing.\\n So with respect for comity and federalism, we certify several\\n questions to the Alabama Supreme Court. These questions seek to\\n determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged that they seek to engage\\n in any conduct that SB1 prohibits. Because the Alabama Supreme\\n Court is the ultimate arbiter of state law—and its interpretation of\\n SB1 may resolve this election-law case—we respectfully certify the\\n questions below to the Alabama Supreme Court.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A. Statutory Background\\n\\n Alabama law generally permits absentee voting in only eight\\n limited scenarios. A voter must (1) be absent from her county on\\n Election Day; (2) be ill or have a physical disability that prevents her\\n from going to the polls; (3) be working a required shift of at least\\n ten hours during polling hours; (4) be a student at a school outside\\n her residential county, which prevents her from going to the polls;\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n (5) be a member of, or spouse or dependent of a member of, the\\n Armed Forces of the United States or similarly qualified to vote ab-\\n sentee under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\\n ing Act; (6) be an appointed election officer or poll watcher at a\\n polling place other than her regular polling place; (7) be a caregiver\\n for a family member, to the second degree of kinship, who is con-\\n fined to his home; or (8) be incarcerated in prison or jail, but not\\n convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude. ALA. CODE § 17-\\n 11-3(a) (2025).\\n Those who qualify to vote absentee, in general, must follow\\n several steps to apply to do so. First, a voter must obtain the absen-\\n tee-ballot application form, which they can (1) download online\\n and print, (2) receive in hard copy from the voter’s county Absentee\\n Election Manager; or (3) receive by mail after mailing a written re-\\n quest to the Absentee Election Manager. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absen-\\n tee Voting Information, https://perma.cc/TN8U-BRBG (last ac-\\n cessed Oct. 5, 2025). Second, after acquiring the absentee-ballot\\n application form, a voter must complete it and return it in hard\\n copy. See id. That requires filling out the form and providing a\\n printed copy of the voter’s photo ID. See id. And, finally, third, the\\n voter must submit the physical application packet to their Absentee\\n Election Manager in person or by mail or commercial carrier. ALA.\\n CODE § 17-11-4(c)(1) (2025). Once the Absentee Election Manager\\n approves the application, that Manager either mails or hands in per-\\n son the absentee ballot to the voter. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absentee\\n Voting Information, supra.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n In March 2024, the Alabama Legislature enacted SB1, codi-\\n fied at Alabama Code Section 17-11-4 (2025). The act, which the\\n Alabama Attorney General asserts “seeks to protect voters from\\n self-interested ballot harvesters . . . ,” places restrictions on the how\\n assistance on absentee-ballot applications may be provided. Plain-\\n tiffs challenge three subsections of SB1 here.\\n The first two are the Payment and Gift Provisions. Under\\n Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d)(1), it is “unlawful for a third party\\n to knowingly receive a payment or gift for distributing, ordering,\\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\\n ing a voter’s absentee ballot application.” This provision defines a\\n Class C Felony, so it carries a sentence of between one-year-and-\\n one-day’s and ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $15,000.\\n ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-6(a)(3), 13A-5-11(a)(3), 17-11-4(d)(1) (2025).\\n For its part, Section 17-11-4(d)(2) separately makes it “unlawful for\\n a person to knowingly pay or provide a gift to a third party to dis-\\n tribute, order, request, collect, prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver\\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” It is a Class B felony, exposing\\n the offender to a sentence of between two and twenty years’ im-\\n prisonment and a fine of up to $30,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-6(a)(2), 13A-5-\\n 11(a)(2), 17-11-4(d)(2).\\n The third provision is the Submission Restriction. The Sub-\\n mission Restriction makes it “unlawful for an individual to submit\\n a completed absentee ballot application to the absentee election\\n manager other than his or her own application . . . .” Id. § 17-11-\\n 4(c)(2). But it allows “an application for a voter who requires\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n emergency treatment by a licensed physician within five days be-\\n fore an election . . . [to] be submitted to the absentee election man-\\n ager by an individual designated by the applicant.” Id. Violation\\n of the Submission Restriction is a Class A Misdemeanor, subject to\\n penalties of imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to\\n $6,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1); 2024 ALA. LAWS 33, § 2.\\n The Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Re-\\n striction have two additional exceptions. First, none applies in sit-\\n uations when Alabama Code Section 17-11-3(f ), which governs\\n states of emergencies, does. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (d)(1)–(2).\\n And second, under Section 17-11-4(f ), “[v]oters voting by absentee\\n ballot through the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\\n ing Act are not subject to” the provisions.\\n SB1 also contains a provision to protect the rights of blind,\\n disabled, and illiterate voters. 1 Under Section 17-11-4(e), “[a]ny\\n voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disa-\\n bility, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by an\\n individual of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.”\\n This provision takes its cue directly from Section 208 of the Voting\\n Rights Act, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10508, which has identical lan-\\n guage except the term “an individual” is “a person” in that statute.\\n\\n\\n 1 As this paragraph explains, both Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(e) and Sec-\\n\\n tion 208 of the Voting Rights Act grant a right to assistance to a voter with an\\n “inability to read or write.” For ease of writing, this opinion sometimes refers\\n to those voters by the shorthand “illiterate.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n To date, we are unaware of any decision by an Alabama state\\n court interpreting any provision of SB1.\\n B. Plaintiffs\\n\\n The case before us began with an action that five non-profit,\\n non-partisan organizations brought. These organizations have of-\\n ten assisted blind, disabled, and illiterate voters with absentee-bal-\\n lot applications (collectively “Plaintiffs”). They include the Greater\\n Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), the Alabama State Conference of\\n the NAACP (“Alabama NAACP”), the League of Women Voters of\\n Alabama and League of Women Voters of Alabama Education\\n Fund (together “LWVAL”), and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy\\n Program (“ADAP”). We offer a brief explanation of the work of\\n each.\\n GBM describes itself as “a multi-faith, multi-racial, non-\\n profit membership organization that provides emergency services\\n to people in need and engages people to build a strong, supportive,\\n and engaged community and to build a more just society for all\\n people.” Established in 1969 during the Civil Rights Movement,\\n the organization primarily serves Birmingham and Jefferson Coun-\\n ties. There, it engages in voter education and assistance, including\\n around absentee-ballot applications. The organization does a lot\\n of work with eligible incarcerated voters who must vote by absen-\\n tee ballot.\\n The Alabama NAACP is the state conference of the Na-\\n tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.\\n (“NAACP”), with members who include Black registered voters\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n who are senior citizens, disabled, and undereducated. The organi-\\n zation describes itself as “the oldest and most significant civil rights\\n organization in Alabama” with a “mission . . . to ensure the politi-\\n cal, educational, social, and economic equality of Black Americans\\n and all other Americans and to eliminate racial discrimination in\\n the democratic process.” The Alabama NAACP characterizes “vot-\\n ing and encouraging voting” as “foundational values,” so it engages\\n in absentee-ballot application assistance for blind, disabled, and il-\\n literate voters.\\n Founded in 1920 out of the Alabama Equal Suffrage Associ-\\n ation, LWVAL consists of a membership organization (and its edu-\\n cation fund) that “seek[s] to encourage the informed and active par-\\n ticipation of citizens in Alabama government through participation\\n in public policy and voting.” It views its work as “build[ing] on the\\n history of the women’s suffrage movement, which spurred [its] cre-\\n ation.” LWVAL’s members include voters who are over the age of\\n 65 and disabled, and its work includes assisting these voters with\\n absentee-ballot applications.\\n Finally, ADAP is Alabama’s federally funded Protection and\\n Advocacy agency for people with disabilities. Part of a federal net-\\n work of these agencies established in 1974, its mission is to “pro-\\n vide legal advocacy services to protect and promote the civil rights,\\n well-being, and equality of opportunity for individuals with disabil-\\n ities, including in voting.” Every disabled Alabamian is a constitu-\\n ent of ADAP.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n For their work on voting, ADAP receives a federal grant\\n called the Protection and Advocacy for Voting Accessibility grant,\\n under Section 291 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L.\\n No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1702–03. Because many disabled vot-\\n ers rely on absentee voting, ADAP uses these grant funds in large\\n part to assist individuals with absentee-ballot applications. ADAP\\n also works with staff at residential facilities and mental-health hos-\\n pitals that take care of individuals with disabilities.\\n Collectively, Plaintiffs assist blind, disabled, and illiterate vot-\\n ers with absentee ballots in several ways. On a broader scale, they\\n hold events to teach on the availability and rules for absentee vot-\\n ing, and they train individuals to assist voters with applications.\\n They also create and disseminate physical and online materials on\\n the availability and rules for absentee ballot.\\n On the individual level, Plaintiffs assist at every point in the\\n application process. When in contact with a voter, Plaintiffs inform\\n them about the option of absentee voting and answer any ques-\\n tions the voter has. When a voter decides to vote absentee, Plain-\\n tiffs help the voter obtain an absentee-ballot application. In this\\n respect, Plaintiffs send voters links to download the application and\\n help them access the internet as needed. And when offering in-\\n person assistance, Plaintiffs print applications and hand-out readily\\n available forms.\\n Once a voter has an absentee-ballot application, Plaintiffs\\n help them fill out the application if the voter needs assistance.\\n Plaintiffs provide voters with supplies to complete an application,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n including pens and envelopes and stamps for later mailing. They\\n also give instructions on the mechanics of filling out the applica-\\n tion.\\n Besides these functions, Plaintiffs offer more involved assis-\\n tance. If a voter is unable to read the application, for example, be-\\n cause they are blind or have intellectual disabilities, Plaintiffs may\\n read the application out loud to the voter. Plaintiffs also explain the\\n meaning of any terms in the application that require a high level of\\n reading comprehension. And Plaintiffs walk the voter through the\\n application section by section to ensure they fill it out properly.\\n If the voter is physically unable to fill out the application,\\n sometimes because of mobility or dexterity issues, Plaintiffs pre-\\n pare the application at the voter’s direction. They also review the\\n completed application to ensure it contains no errors that would\\n prevent its acceptance.\\n Once an application form has been filled out, Plaintiffs assist\\n with the remainder of the submission process. They make photo-\\n copies of IDs that a voter must include with an application and\\n serve as witnesses for voters who sign the application with a mark.\\n also ensure proper submission to an Absentee Election Manager,\\n including by placing completed applications in the mail. And if\\n Plaintiffs are concerned that the voter’s legal rights have been vio-\\n lated at any point in this process, Plaintiffs may refer the voter to a\\n voting-rights attorney.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Plaintiffs have both paid staff and volunteers who perform\\n these forms of assistance.2 Plaintiffs often provide snacks, other\\n food, and water to volunteers to sustain them during their work.\\n They have also given their volunteers gas stipends and branded ma-\\n terials for or in connection with their work. These items include t-\\n shirts, pens, buttons, bracelets, stickers, and voter educational ma-\\n terials. To further their mission, Plaintiffs train volunteers and give\\n them access to supplies necessary to assist voters, including enve-\\n lopes, pens, stamps, paper, printed absentee-ballot applications,\\n tents, tables, clipboards, printers, and postage.\\n Plaintiffs provide access to many of these listed things of\\n value to voters and individuals accompanying them when they re-\\n ceive assistance. And they have assisted with absentee-ballot appli-\\n cations in connection with other charitable services, including giv-\\n ing food, financial, and clothing assistance; providing donated ma-\\n terials for health and wellness, such as oxygen machines, walkers,\\n wheelchairs, and compression socks; and offering life assistance, in-\\n cluding help applying for jobs, expunging records, and treating\\n drug addiction.\\n C. The Lawsuit\\n\\n In April 2024, Plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General,\\n the Alabama Secretary of State, and 42 Alabama District Attorneys\\n in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Al-\\n abama. They sought to secure preliminary and permanent\\n\\n 2 LWVAL has no paid employees or staff, but the remainder of Plaintiffs do.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n injunctions against enforcement of the Payment and Gift Provi-\\n sions and Submission Restriction. 3\\n Plaintiffs alleged that SB1 violates the First and Fourteenth\\n Amendments, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments\\n of 1982, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. With respect to\\n their Section 208 claim, Plaintiffs asserted that although Alabama\\n Code Section 17-11-4(e) “repeats the text of Section 208, it does not\\n obviate the unlawful restrictions placed by SB1 on the right of dis-\\n abled, blind, or illiterate voters . . . .” Specifically, Plaintiffs contend\\n that SB1 (1) doesn’t expressly state that engaging in conduct to as-\\n sist blind, disabled, or illiterate voters removes liability under the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions and Submission Restriction and (2)\\n doesn’t cite Section 208 or expressly incorporate its protections and\\n definitions. 4\\n In April 2024, the district court dismissed the District Attor-\\n neys for purposes of streamlining the action by agreement of the\\n parties. But the dismissal order provides that the District Attorneys\\n shall be bound by any injunctive, declaratory, or other non-\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Plaintiffs also challenged Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(b)(2). That provi-\\n sion makes it “unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute an absentee\\n ballot application to a voter which is prefilled with the voter’s name or any\\n other information required on the application form.” The district court dis-\\n missed all claims against this provision, and it is not at issue in this appeal.\\n 4 The complaint asserts that Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d) repeats the text\\n\\n of Section 208. This appears to be a clerical error, as only Alabama Code Sec-\\n tion 17-11-4(e) does so (though not identically).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n monetary relief against the Alabama Attorney General and Secre-\\n tary of State.\\n Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction in early May,\\n and the Alabama Attorney General and Secretary of State moved\\n to dismiss later that month.\\n To support their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plain-\\n tiffs presented a transcript of Alabama legislative committee pro-\\n ceedings and declarations from representatives of their organiza-\\n tions. The declarations explained that Plaintiffs’ organizations,\\n their paid staff, and their volunteers risk criminal exposure from\\n SB1 and will have to forego their efforts to assist voters with their\\n absentee-ballot applications, including suspending the activities\\n we’ve mentioned. See Part I.B., supra. They also worried that dis-\\n abled Alabamians, all of whom are constituents of ADAP, may not\\n be able to obtain assistance because of criminal exposure for the\\n paid health aides and healthcare workers who treat them. And,\\n they said, eligible incarcerated voters may not be able to vote ab-\\n sentee if paid prison and jail officials and chaplains face criminal\\n liability.\\n Besides these materials, Plaintiffs also submitted declara-\\n tions by four disabled voters explaining how SB1 would interfere\\n with their ability to vote by absentee ballot. Louis G. Courie and\\n Terry Michael McKee, respectively, signed the first two. Courie is\\n an 83-year-old voter who had two strokes. His partner, McKee, is\\n 76 years old and has Parkinson’s Disease. Their conditions have\\n rendered them homebound and have severely limited their\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n mobility and ability to perform major life activities. Courie and\\n McKee would have liked assistance from their neighbor of nearly\\n 25 years who is a member of LWVAL and has assisted them in the\\n past. But they believed that neighbor was at risk of criminal liabil-\\n ity from SB1 because LWVAL has given her pens and t-shirts. They\\n thought that counted as a “gift” to assist with an absentee-ballot\\n application. Courie and McKee also believed their paid caregivers\\n could not help because the caregivers are “paid” to generally assist\\n them.\\n Lauren Faraino also submitted a declaration. Faraino has ar-\\n throgryposis multiplex congenita, a condition which has deprived\\n her of use of her arms. She can write with difficulty with her feet,\\n but it is impossible for her to put an absentee-ballot application in\\n an envelope or open a mailbox to send it. She would have liked\\n assistance from her mother to complete and submit the form, but\\n she planned not to vote absentee for fear of criminal exposure for\\n her mother. In the past, she has hired health aides and may again\\n in the future. And she expects they would assist her with an absen-\\n tee-ballot application if she did.\\n Eric Peebles provided the final declaration. Peebles has cer-\\n ebral palsy and quadriplegia. As a result, his control of his motor\\n skills is equivalent to that of an average nine-to-sixteen-month-old.\\n Peebles can’t hold a pen or physically complete a paper application.\\n In the past, ADAP has assisted him by sending him a link to the\\n application and helping him complete it. Peebles also requires as-\\n sistance to place the application in an envelope, seal it, affix a stamp,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n and mail it. At the time of his declaration, he would have liked\\n ADAP to have assisted him with his absentee-ballot application.\\n And he would not ask his paid health attendants because he doesn’t\\n want to create criminal exposure for them.\\n On August 21, 2024, after a hearing and supplemental brief-\\n ing, the district court issued an order granting in part and denying\\n in part the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court granted the\\n motion to dismiss as to all counts but Plaintiffs’ Section 208 claim.\\n As part of its ruling, the court also concluded that the Alabama At-\\n torney General was the only proper party defendant and dismissed\\n the Secretary of State.\\n The court offered an extensive analysis of the Section 208\\n claim in its order addressing the motion to dismiss. Characterizing\\n Plaintiffs’ Section 208 challenge as a “classic conflict preemption\\n claim,” the court concluded that a presumption exists against\\n preemption of state laws in “areas of traditional state responsibil-\\n ity . . . such as the regulation of parties, elections, and bal-\\n lots . . . absent a clear statement to the contrary.” The Court relied\\n on a Senate Judiciary Committee Report that provides that “[s]tate\\n provisions would be preempted only to the extent that they unduly\\n burden the right recognized in this section, with that determination\\n being a practical one dependent upon the facts.” S. Rep. No. 97-417\\n at 63.\\n Turning to the provisions of SB1 at issue, the court found\\n that Section 208 preempted the Submission Restriction because the\\n Submission Restriction unduly burdened the right by\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n “criminaliz[ing] the act of returning anyone else’s absentee ballot\\n application,” with “no exception made for blind, disabled, or illit-\\n erate voters” and thereby unduly burdening their right to voting\\n assistance. Then, the court also found that the Plaintiffs plausibly\\n alleged that the Payment and Gift Provisions unduly burden a\\n voter’s right to “assistance by a person of their choice.” These pro-\\n visions do so, the court reasoned, by, among other things, restrict-\\n ing the ability of organizations with paid employees and volunteers\\n who receive things of value to assist blind, disabled, and illiterate\\n absentee voters.\\n About a month after ruling on the motion to dismiss and\\n one-and-a-half months before the 2024 election, the district court\\n entered an order preliminarily enjoining the Alabama Attorney\\n General from enforcing the Payment and Gift Provisions and the\\n Submission Restriction with respect to blind, disabled, and illiterate\\n voters.\\n The Alabama Attorney General now appeals the grant of\\n the preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs.5\\n\\n\\n 5 The same day the district granted the motion for a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay pending appeal. The district\\n court denied that motion, and the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay\\n pending appeal in our court. We similarly denied that motion, holding that\\n the Alabama Attorney General “ha[d] not made a strong showing that he [was]\\n likely to succeed on the merits, . . . [the Alabama Attorney General] w[ould]\\n not be irreparably harmed if a stay [were] denied, the issuance of a stay would\\n injure the plaintiffs (and other Section 208 voters), and the public interest d[id]\\n not weigh in favor of a stay.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n The Alabama Attorney General challenges the district\\n court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. He argues that Plaintiffs\\n have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of\\n their claim that Section 208 preempts the Payment and Gift Provi-\\n sions and the Submission Restriction. Nor, the Alabama Attorney\\n General contends, have Plaintiffs shown they will suffer an irrepa-\\n rable harm without an injunction. Ordinarily, we would review\\n that challenge to the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunc-\\n tion for abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d\\n 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020).\\n\\n But we decline to reach those questions at this stage of the\\n appeal for two reasons.\\n\\n First, we first seek to confirm that we, in fact, have authority\\n to answer them. After listening to the parties’ positions at oral ar-\\n gument, we’re unclear about whether SB1 precludes Plaintiffs\\n from engaging in any of their desired activities. If it doesn’t, we\\n lack jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit in its\\n current form. And we have an independent duty to figure this issue\\n out before reaching the merits, even if no party raises it. See\\n FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990) (“Alt-\\n hough neither side raises the issue here, we are required to address\\n [standing] even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even\\n if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are\\n under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n and standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional\\n doctrines.” (cleaned up)).\\n\\n Second, we cannot assess the district court’s conclusion that\\n that SB1 “unduly burdens” the right provided by Section 208 with-\\n out first understanding what SB1 prohibits as a matter of state law.\\n For their part, the parties strongly disagree on the scope of SB1’s\\n prohibitions. The Attorney General argues that SB1 is a limited\\n measure that, among other things, includes an exception to the\\n Submission Restriction for disabled voters, allows a disabled voter\\n to “choose and receive assistance from his paid caregivers,” and\\n does not prohibit a voter from paying anyone for help or giving a\\n gift to a helper. The Plaintiffs argue that SB1 is a far-reaching re-\\n striction and the Attorney General’s limited reading is not con-\\n sistent with the text of the statute.\\n\\n Based on the parties’ arguments, we’re not sure whether and\\n how SB1 creates criminal exposure for any of Plaintiff’s conduct or\\n any other form of assistance to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters.\\n Several disputed points stand out about the text of SB1, and we\\n have no decision from any Alabama court clarifying them. So in\\n this discussion, we first explain our concerns about the meaning of\\n SB1. Then, we certify several questions to the Alabama Supreme\\n Court.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n A. Ambiguity in SB1\\n\\n In reviewing the text of SB1, four major points stand out. As\\n a result of these sticking points, we are not sure what conduct SB1\\n actually criminalizes.\\n\\n 1. The Meaning of Section 17-11-4(e)\\n\\n First, it’s not clear what effect Section 17-11-4(e), which\\n guarantees that blind, disabled, and illiterate voters may receive as-\\n sistance from an individual of their choice, has on the scope of the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Restriction. The\\n Alabama Attorney General argues that Section 17-11-4(e) implicitly\\n exempts assistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters from crim-\\n inal liability from the Submission Restriction. But he still reads as-\\n sistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters to be subject to crim-\\n inal liability if they violate the Payment and Gift Provisions. And\\n it’s not clear how or why Section 17-11-4(e) would carve out an\\n exemption from one part of SB1 and not the other if either stood\\n as an obstacle to a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter receiving their\\n right to assistance.\\n\\n We may be able to read Section 17-11-4(e) as a catch-all term\\n to ensure blind, disabled, and illiterate voters have access to the as-\\n sistor of their choice. But we think it would have to apply to all\\n three provisions at issue. That reading would avoid even an inkling\\n of conflict between the Payment and Gift Provisions and the Sub-\\n mission Restriction, on one hand, and Section 17-11-4(e), on the\\n other. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012) (“[T]here can be no\\n justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they\\n can be interpreted harmoniously.”).\\n\\n On the flip side, Plaintiffs argue Section 17-11-4(e) does not\\n create an exemption from either the Payment and Gift Provisions\\n or the Submission Restriction. To begin, Section 17-11-4(e) guar-\\n antees a right of assistance to “any [blind, disabled, or illiterate]\\n voter,” but not any right to a person to assist. So the provision\\n might exempt the voter who receives assistance from prosecution\\n for that assistance. But it does not expressly say anything about\\n liability for the “assistor” himself. So an “assistor” could be liable\\n for helping a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter, even if that assistor\\n is the assistor of the voter’s choice. After all, presumably, an assis-\\n tor could not violate another part of Alabama law to “assist” a\\n blind, disabled, or illiterate voter. An incarcerated person does not\\n get to break out of jail to assist a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter.\\n And the Payment and Gift Provisions separately criminalize paying\\n someone for assistance (an action a voter would take) and receiving\\n payment for assistance (an action an assistor would take). See ALA.\\n CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025).\\n\\n Plus, the Submission Restriction and Payment and Gift Pro-\\n visions have undisputed exceptions that look very different from\\n Section 17-11-4(e). The Submission Restriction contains three ex-\\n press exceptions: it does not apply in states of emergency, to voters\\n subject to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting\\n Act, and for voters who require emergency treatment within five\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n days of an election. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (f). The former two\\n exceptions apply to the Payment and Gift Provisions as well. See\\n id. §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) & (f). But Section 17-11-4(e) does not ex-\\n pressly exempt anyone from any part of SB1.\\n\\n 2. The Meaning of “Distributing, Ordering, Requesting, Collect-\\n ing, Completing, Prefilling, Obtaining, or Delivering”\\n\\n A second point about the text of SB1 warrants clarification:\\n SB1 does not criminalize all forms of absentee-ballot application\\n “assistance,” only a subset of conduct. The Submission Restriction\\n bars only “submit[ting] a completed absentee ballot application to\\n the absentee election manager other than [one’s] own application.”\\n At the same time, the Payment and Gift Provisions prohibit only\\n giving or receiving payment or gifts for “distributing, ordering, re-\\n questing, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering\\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-\\n 4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The statute defines none of these verbs, and it’s\\n not clear whether they encompass the full gamut of absentee-ballot\\n application “assistance.”\\n\\n Plaintiffs express concern that all their conduct—from hold-\\n ing events informing voters about absentee voting to filling out ap-\\n plications at a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter’s direction to plac-\\n ing completed applications in the mail—runs headfirst into the Pay-\\n ment and Gift Provisions. And certainly the district court shared\\n their concern. But it’s not clear to us whether any or all of Plain-\\n tiffs’ intended conduct counts as “distributing, ordering,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\\n ing” an application.\\n\\n 3. The Meaning of “Payment” and “Gift”\\n\\n We are similarly uncertain about a third point about the\\n text: we have substantial doubt as to what counts as “knowingly\\n receiv[ing] a payment or gift for” engaging or “knowingly pay[ing]\\n or provid[ing] a gift to” engage in this prohibited conduct. See id.\\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). For example, the parties dispute whether the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions categorically bar a paid health aide or\\n healthcare worker from assisting his patient with an absentee-bal-\\n lot application. Such an aide generally receives a wage or salary for\\n assisting his charge in many ways. One way might include assisting\\n the voter with an absentee-ballot application. If so, under SB1, that\\n health aide may then receive money “for” the absentee-ballot-ap-\\n plication assistance he provides.\\n\\n That the statute attaches criminal liability for “knowingly”\\n providing or receiving a payment tends to support that reading.\\n Under Alabama law, “[a] person acts knowingly with respect to\\n conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an of-\\n fense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the\\n circumstance exists.” Id. § 13A-2-2(2) (emphasis added). So a per-\\n son who pays or receives a wage may act “knowingly” if he is aware\\n that the duties that wage encompasses include application assis-\\n tance.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n At the same time, the Alabama Attorney General argues that\\n a paid health aide may assist a patient with an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication, as long as she doesn’t receive a “bonus” for that assis-\\n tance. If he’s right about that, then only when the voter or some-\\n one on his behalf makes a separate payment to the health aide for\\n the specific purpose of compensating assistance in the absentee-bal-\\n lot application process does a person act “knowingly” and a pay-\\n ment is considered “for” assistance.\\n\\n We have similar questions about the meaning of giving or\\n receiving a “gift for” absentee-ballot application assistance. See id.\\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). The statute offers no definition of the term\\n “gift,” and we are aware of no Alabama authority identifying the\\n word as a term of art. Plaintiffs list several different things of\\n value—from food and water to branded t-shirts to the very supplies\\n an assistor uses to assist with an absentee-ballot application—that\\n could plausibly be construed as “gifts.” And if these items can be\\n “gifts,” we are not certain what counts as having given or received\\n them “for” assistance or “to” assist with an absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion. For example, the parties dispute whether Courie and McKee\\n may lawfully obtain assistance from their neighbor who has previ-\\n ously received t-shirts and pens from LWVAL.\\n 4. The Meaning of “Third Party”\\n Fourth and finally, the Payment and Gift Provisions don’t\\n criminalize giving a “person,” or a “person[’s]” receiving, payment\\n or a gift for absentee-ballot-application assistance. Instead, they\\n criminalize only activities where a “third party” receives the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n payment or gift. See id. But the statute doesn’t define the meaning\\n of “third party,” and we’re not sure what it encompasses. We have\\n questions about whether paid health aides and healthcare workers,\\n staff and volunteers of Plaintiffs’ organizations, and prison or jail\\n officials count as “third part[ies]” subject to the Payment and Gift\\n Provisions’ prohibitions.\\n ***\\n All these points of ambiguity in the text leave us uncertain\\n of the scope of SB1. And as we’ve noted, no Alabama state court\\n decisions elucidate any of these areas of concern. As for the Ala-\\n bama Attorney General’s position, that may help us reach the right\\n answer, but “an [Alabama] attorney general’s opinion is only advi-\\n sory; it is not binding on [the Alabama Supreme] Court and does\\n not have the effect of law.” Health Care Auth. for Baptist Health v.\\n Cent. Ala. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 292 So. 3d 623, 635 (Ala. 2019)\\n (citation omitted). So we have no binding authority to guide us on\\n the meaning of this major piece of Alabama election law.\\n\\n B. Certified Questions\\n\\n Rather than stumble around in the dark, we humbly ask the\\n Alabama Supreme Court to turn on the lights. “When faced with\\n substantial doubt on a dispositive state law issue, our ‘better option\\n is to certify the question to the state supreme court.’” WM Mobile\\n Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Auth., 972 F.3d 1240,\\n 1251 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Mooney, 812 F.3d 1276, 1283\\n (11th Cir. 2016)). “[A]s a matter of federalism and comity,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n dispositive issues of Alabama law should be first presented to the\\n Alabama Supreme Court to decide.” Id.\\n\\n So we certify the following four questions to the Alabama\\n Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18:\\n\\n 1) The meaning of Subsection (e): Does Alabama Code\\n Section 17-11-4(e) create an exception to the prohibitions\\n in Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(c) and/or (d)? More\\n specifically, for each of the provisions, does Section 17-\\n 11-4(3) immunize from criminal liability (1) a person who\\n gives assistance to a blind, illiterate, or disabled person;\\n (2) a person who receives assistance; and/or (3) the per-\\n son who pays or gives a gift to a person who gives assis-\\n tance? If so, what is the extent of that exception?\\n\\n 2) The scope of prohibited conduct: Does any of the following\\n count as “distributing, ordering, requesting, collecting, com-\\n pleting, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering” an absentee bal-\\n lot application under the Payment and Gift Provisions:\\n a) Giving the voter a copy of an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication\\n\\n b) Providing the voter with a pen, envelope, or\\n stamps to fill out and submit an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication\\n\\n c) Informing the voter about the option of and rules\\n for absentee voting\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n d) Answering questions on the availability of and\\n rules for absentee voting\\n\\n e) Creating or giving to (or both) the voter physical\\n materials that include information on applying for\\n and voting by absentee ballot\\n\\n f) Creating or sending to (or both) the voter online\\n materials that provide information on applying for\\n and voting by absentee ballot\\n\\n g) Printing an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n h) Sending to the voter a link to an absentee-ballot\\n application\\n\\n i) Helping the voter access the internet to download\\n an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n j) Providing instructions to the voter for how to fill\\n out an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n k) Reading out loud to the voter the absentee-ballot-\\n application requirements\\n\\n l) Helping the voter fill out their absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication, including but not limited to by walking\\n the voter through the application section by sec-\\n tion to ensure they are completing the form accu-\\n rately\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n m) Physically filling out an absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion for the voter at the voter’s direction\\n\\n n) Explaining the meaning of complex terms in an\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n o) Serving as a witness for the voter submitting an\\n absentee-ballot application signed with a mark\\n\\n p) Making a copy of the voter’s ID to complete their\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n q) Looking over the voter’s absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion to correct any errors\\n\\n r) Submitting an absentee-ballot application on the\\n voter’s behalf to an Absentee Election Manager\\n\\n s) Putting the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\\n an envelope, sealing it, and adding postage.\\n\\n t) Placing the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\\n the mailbox\\n\\n u) Referring the voter to a voting-rights attorney\\n when it appears their right to vote absentee has\\n been violated\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n v) Holding an event to educate on the availability\\n and rules for absentee voting and assist with ab-\\n sentee-ballot applications\\n\\n w) Training individuals to assist the voter with their\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n 3) The meaning of “payment” and “third party”: The Attor-\\n ney General argues that employees who are paid to assist\\n voters generally, such as healthcare workers, may assist vot-\\n ers in filling out absentee ballot applications or delivering\\n those applications despite the prohibitions in (c) and (d)\\n “[u]nless they get a bonus for absentee ballot application ser-\\n vices.” Does an employee with GBM, the Alabama NAACP,\\n or ADAP, a voter’s health aide or healthcare worker, or a\\n prison or jail official, face criminal liability if they assist a\\n voter in completing or delivering an absentee ballot applica-\\n tion as part of their job? Does the person or organization\\n who pays them, including the voter herself, face criminal li-\\n ability if the person knows that the employee, health\\n worker, or prison/jail official is likely to assist the voter in\\n completing or delivering the absentee ballot application?\\n Does the ADAP federal grant create criminal liability under\\n these provisions?\\n\\n 4) The meaning of “gift”: Does a volunteer with GBM, the\\n Alabama NAACP, LWVAL, or ADAP, who receives snacks,\\n other food, or water; gas stipends; branded items or supplies\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n that may be useful for their volunteer work, in exchange for,\\n in connection with, or during their volunteer work, face\\n criminal liability if they “distribute, order, request, collect,\\n prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver” an absentee ballot appli-\\n cation? Does the person or organization who provides the\\n individuals with these items face criminal liability?\\n Depending on the answer to these questions, one or more\\n of the Plaintiffs may have failed to establish that they face a credible\\n threat of prosecution from SB1. If the Alabama Supreme Court\\n elects to exercise its discretion and answer our questions, its hold-\\n ing will be “conclusive” on these points. Edwards v. Kia Motors of\\n Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 943, 945 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n Still, as always when we certify questions to the Alabama Su-\\n preme Court, these questions are “intended only as a guide.” United\\n States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). “We do not\\n mean to restrict the Alabama Supreme Court's consideration of the\\n issues or its scope of inquiry.” W.M. Mobile Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc., 972\\n F.3d at 1251. And, of course, “[t]he Alabama Supreme Court may,\\n as it perceives them, restate the issues and modify the manner in\\n which the answers are given.” Id. We hope that “if we have over-\\n looked or mischaracterized any state law issues or inartfully stated\\n any of the questions we have posed . . . the Alabama Supreme\\n Court will feel free to make the necessary corrections.” Spain v.\\n Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir.\\n 2000).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we defer our decision in this case\\n until the Alabama Supreme Court has had the opportunity to con-\\n sider our certified questions and determine whether to exercise its\\n discretion in answering them. The entire record of this case, in-\\n cluding the parties’ briefs, is transmitted to the Alabama Supreme\\n Court.\\n QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11224853/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRASHER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"BRASHER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758268/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Attorney General, State of Alabama\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-13111\n ____________________\n\n ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP,\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA,\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA\n EDUCATION FUND,\n GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES,\n ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n versus\n\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,\n Defendant-Appellant,\n WILLIAM R. ADAIR, et al.,\n Defendants.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-00420-RDP\n ____________________\n\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n In 2024, Alabama enacted SB1. That statute makes it unlaw-\n ful to give a third party, and for a third party to receive, payment or\n a gift for several forms of absentee-ballot-application assistance.\n See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The law also prohibits a\n person from submitting an absentee-ballot application, other than\n his own, to a county Absentee Election Manager. Id. § 17-11-\n 4(c)(2).\n Plaintiffs are organizations that fear they will be prosecuted\n under SB1 for absentee-ballot-application assistance they provide\n to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters. They contend that Section\n 208 of the Voting Rights Act preempts SB1. Section 208 states that\n “[a]ny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness,\n disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a\n person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” 52\n U.S.C. § 10508. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and prelim-\n inarily enjoined the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the\n challenged provisions of SB1 with respect to blind, disabled, and\n illiterate voters. Now, the Alabama Attorney General appeals that\n order.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n But SB1 is not a very clear law. It contains several vague and\n undefined terms, as well as what seem to be conflicting provisions.\n Those include a provision that repeats nearly verbatim the text of\n Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Without a single decision\n from an Alabama state court interpreting the scope of the law, we\n aren’t sure what conduct it criminalizes—though penalties for vio-\n lating SB1 can be stiff: up to twenty years in prison and a $30,000\n fine. But if the correct interpretation of the law creates no liability\n for Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs may lack an injury-in fact to establish stand-\n ing.\n So with respect for comity and federalism, we certify several\n questions to the Alabama Supreme Court. These questions seek to\n determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged that they seek to engage\n in any conduct that SB1 prohibits. Because the Alabama Supreme\n Court is the ultimate arbiter of state law—and its interpretation of\n SB1 may resolve this election-law case—we respectfully certify the\n questions below to the Alabama Supreme Court.\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n A. Statutory Background\n\n Alabama law generally permits absentee voting in only eight\n limited scenarios. A voter must (1) be absent from her county on\n Election Day; (2) be ill or have a physical disability that prevents her\n from going to the polls; (3) be working a required shift of at least\n ten hours during polling hours; (4) be a student at a school outside\n her residential county, which prevents her from going to the polls;\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n (5) be a member of, or spouse or dependent of a member of, the\n Armed Forces of the United States or similarly qualified to vote ab-\n sentee under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\n ing Act; (6) be an appointed election officer or poll watcher at a\n polling place other than her regular polling place; (7) be a caregiver\n for a family member, to the second degree of kinship, who is con-\n fined to his home; or (8) be incarcerated in prison or jail, but not\n convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude. ALA. CODE § 17-\n 11-3(a) (2025).\n Those who qualify to vote absentee, in general, must follow\n several steps to apply to do so. First, a voter must obtain the absen-\n tee-ballot application form, which they can (1) download online\n and print, (2) receive in hard copy from the voter’s county Absentee\n Election Manager; or (3) receive by mail after mailing a written re-\n quest to the Absentee Election Manager. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absen-\n tee Voting Information, https://perma.cc/TN8U-BRBG (last ac-\n cessed Oct. 5, 2025). Second, after acquiring the absentee-ballot\n application form, a voter must complete it and return it in hard\n copy. See id. That requires filling out the form and providing a\n printed copy of the voter’s photo ID. See id. And, finally, third, the\n voter must submit the physical application packet to their Absentee\n Election Manager in person or by mail or commercial carrier. ALA.\n CODE § 17-11-4(c)(1) (2025). Once the Absentee Election Manager\n approves the application, that Manager either mails or hands in per-\n son the absentee ballot to the voter. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absentee\n Voting Information, supra.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n In March 2024, the Alabama Legislature enacted SB1, codi-\n fied at Alabama Code Section 17-11-4 (2025). The act, which the\n Alabama Attorney General asserts “seeks to protect voters from\n self-interested ballot harvesters . . . ,” places restrictions on the how\n assistance on absentee-ballot applications may be provided. Plain-\n tiffs challenge three subsections of SB1 here.\n The first two are the Payment and Gift Provisions. Under\n Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d)(1), it is “unlawful for a third party\n to knowingly receive a payment or gift for distributing, ordering,\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\n ing a voter’s absentee ballot application.” This provision defines a\n Class C Felony, so it carries a sentence of between one-year-and-\n one-day’s and ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $15,000.\n ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-6(a)(3), 13A-5-11(a)(3), 17-11-4(d)(1) (2025).\n For its part, Section 17-11-4(d)(2) separately makes it “unlawful for\n a person to knowingly pay or provide a gift to a third party to dis-\n tribute, order, request, collect, prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” It is a Class B felony, exposing\n the offender to a sentence of between two and twenty years’ im-\n prisonment and a fine of up to $30,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-6(a)(2), 13A-5-\n 11(a)(2), 17-11-4(d)(2).\n The third provision is the Submission Restriction. The Sub-\n mission Restriction makes it “unlawful for an individual to submit\n a completed absentee ballot application to the absentee election\n manager other than his or her own application . . . .” Id. § 17-11-\n 4(c)(2). But it allows “an application for a voter who requires\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n emergency treatment by a licensed physician within five days be-\n fore an election . . . [to] be submitted to the absentee election man-\n ager by an individual designated by the applicant.” Id. Violation\n of the Submission Restriction is a Class A Misdemeanor, subject to\n penalties of imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to\n $6,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1); 2024 ALA. LAWS 33, § 2.\n The Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Re-\n striction have two additional exceptions. First, none applies in sit-\n uations when Alabama Code Section 17-11-3(f ), which governs\n states of emergencies, does. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (d)(1)–(2).\n And second, under Section 17-11-4(f ), “[v]oters voting by absentee\n ballot through the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\n ing Act are not subject to” the provisions.\n SB1 also contains a provision to protect the rights of blind,\n disabled, and illiterate voters. 1 Under Section 17-11-4(e), “[a]ny\n voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disa-\n bility, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by an\n individual of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.”\n This provision takes its cue directly from Section 208 of the Voting\n Rights Act, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10508, which has identical lan-\n guage except the term “an individual” is “a person” in that statute.\n\n\n 1 As this paragraph explains, both Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(e) and Sec-\n\n tion 208 of the Voting Rights Act grant a right to assistance to a voter with an\n “inability to read or write.” For ease of writing, this opinion sometimes refers\n to those voters by the shorthand “illiterate.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n To date, we are unaware of any decision by an Alabama state\n court interpreting any provision of SB1.\n B. Plaintiffs\n\n The case before us began with an action that five non-profit,\n non-partisan organizations brought. These organizations have of-\n ten assisted blind, disabled, and illiterate voters with absentee-bal-\n lot applications (collectively “Plaintiffs”). They include the Greater\n Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), the Alabama State Conference of\n the NAACP (“Alabama NAACP”), the League of Women Voters of\n Alabama and League of Women Voters of Alabama Education\n Fund (together “LWVAL”), and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy\n Program (“ADAP”). We offer a brief explanation of the work of\n each.\n GBM describes itself as “a multi-faith, multi-racial, non-\n profit membership organization that provides emergency services\n to people in need and engages people to build a strong, supportive,\n and engaged community and to build a more just society for all\n people.” Established in 1969 during the Civil Rights Movement,\n the organization primarily serves Birmingham and Jefferson Coun-\n ties. There, it engages in voter education and assistance, including\n around absentee-ballot applications. The organization does a lot\n of work with eligible incarcerated voters who must vote by absen-\n tee ballot.\n The Alabama NAACP is the state conference of the Na-\n tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.\n (“NAACP”), with members who include Black registered voters\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n who are senior citizens, disabled, and undereducated. The organi-\n zation describes itself as “the oldest and most significant civil rights\n organization in Alabama” with a “mission . . . to ensure the politi-\n cal, educational, social, and economic equality of Black Americans\n and all other Americans and to eliminate racial discrimination in\n the democratic process.” The Alabama NAACP characterizes “vot-\n ing and encouraging voting” as “foundational values,” so it engages\n in absentee-ballot application assistance for blind, disabled, and il-\n literate voters.\n Founded in 1920 out of the Alabama Equal Suffrage Associ-\n ation, LWVAL consists of a membership organization (and its edu-\n cation fund) that “seek[s] to encourage the informed and active par-\n ticipation of citizens in Alabama government through participation\n in public policy and voting.” It views its work as “build[ing] on the\n history of the women’s suffrage movement, which spurred [its] cre-\n ation.” LWVAL’s members include voters who are over the age of\n 65 and disabled, and its work includes assisting these voters with\n absentee-ballot applications.\n Finally, ADAP is Alabama’s federally funded Protection and\n Advocacy agency for people with disabilities. Part of a federal net-\n work of these agencies established in 1974, its mission is to “pro-\n vide legal advocacy services to protect and promote the civil rights,\n well-being, and equality of opportunity for individuals with disabil-\n ities, including in voting.” Every disabled Alabamian is a constitu-\n ent of ADAP.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n For their work on voting, ADAP receives a federal grant\n called the Protection and Advocacy for Voting Accessibility grant,\n under Section 291 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L.\n No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1702–03. Because many disabled vot-\n ers rely on absentee voting, ADAP uses these grant funds in large\n part to assist individuals with absentee-ballot applications. ADAP\n also works with staff at residential facilities and mental-health hos-\n pitals that take care of individuals with disabilities.\n Collectively, Plaintiffs assist blind, disabled, and illiterate vot-\n ers with absentee ballots in several ways. On a broader scale, they\n hold events to teach on the availability and rules for absentee vot-\n ing, and they train individuals to assist voters with applications.\n They also create and disseminate physical and online materials on\n the availability and rules for absentee ballot.\n On the individual level, Plaintiffs assist at every point in the\n application process. When in contact with a voter, Plaintiffs inform\n them about the option of absentee voting and answer any ques-\n tions the voter has. When a voter decides to vote absentee, Plain-\n tiffs help the voter obtain an absentee-ballot application. In this\n respect, Plaintiffs send voters links to download the application and\n help them access the internet as needed. And when offering in-\n person assistance, Plaintiffs print applications and hand-out readily\n available forms.\n Once a voter has an absentee-ballot application, Plaintiffs\n help them fill out the application if the voter needs assistance.\n Plaintiffs provide voters with supplies to complete an application,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n including pens and envelopes and stamps for later mailing. They\n also give instructions on the mechanics of filling out the applica-\n tion.\n Besides these functions, Plaintiffs offer more involved assis-\n tance. If a voter is unable to read the application, for example, be-\n cause they are blind or have intellectual disabilities, Plaintiffs may\n read the application out loud to the voter. Plaintiffs also explain the\n meaning of any terms in the application that require a high level of\n reading comprehension. And Plaintiffs walk the voter through the\n application section by section to ensure they fill it out properly.\n If the voter is physically unable to fill out the application,\n sometimes because of mobility or dexterity issues, Plaintiffs pre-\n pare the application at the voter’s direction. They also review the\n completed application to ensure it contains no errors that would\n prevent its acceptance.\n Once an application form has been filled out, Plaintiffs assist\n with the remainder of the submission process. They make photo-\n copies of IDs that a voter must include with an application and\n serve as witnesses for voters who sign the application with a mark.\n also ensure proper submission to an Absentee Election Manager,\n including by placing completed applications in the mail. And if\n Plaintiffs are concerned that the voter’s legal rights have been vio-\n lated at any point in this process, Plaintiffs may refer the voter to a\n voting-rights attorney.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n Plaintiffs have both paid staff and volunteers who perform\n these forms of assistance.2 Plaintiffs often provide snacks, other\n food, and water to volunteers to sustain them during their work.\n They have also given their volunteers gas stipends and branded ma-\n terials for or in connection with their work. These items include t-\n shirts, pens, buttons, bracelets, stickers, and voter educational ma-\n terials. To further their mission, Plaintiffs train volunteers and give\n them access to supplies necessary to assist voters, including enve-\n lopes, pens, stamps, paper, printed absentee-ballot applications,\n tents, tables, clipboards, printers, and postage.\n Plaintiffs provide access to many of these listed things of\n value to voters and individuals accompanying them when they re-\n ceive assistance. And they have assisted with absentee-ballot appli-\n cations in connection with other charitable services, including giv-\n ing food, financial, and clothing assistance; providing donated ma-\n terials for health and wellness, such as oxygen machines, walkers,\n wheelchairs, and compression socks; and offering life assistance, in-\n cluding help applying for jobs, expunging records, and treating\n drug addiction.\n C. The Lawsuit\n\n In April 2024, Plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General,\n the Alabama Secretary of State, and 42 Alabama District Attorneys\n in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Al-\n abama. They sought to secure preliminary and permanent\n\n 2 LWVAL has no paid employees or staff, but the remainder of Plaintiffs do.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n injunctions against enforcement of the Payment and Gift Provi-\n sions and Submission Restriction. 3\n Plaintiffs alleged that SB1 violates the First and Fourteenth\n Amendments, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments\n of 1982, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. With respect to\n their Section 208 claim, Plaintiffs asserted that although Alabama\n Code Section 17-11-4(e) “repeats the text of Section 208, it does not\n obviate the unlawful restrictions placed by SB1 on the right of dis-\n abled, blind, or illiterate voters . . . .” Specifically, Plaintiffs contend\n that SB1 (1) doesn’t expressly state that engaging in conduct to as-\n sist blind, disabled, or illiterate voters removes liability under the\n Payment and Gift Provisions and Submission Restriction and (2)\n doesn’t cite Section 208 or expressly incorporate its protections and\n definitions. 4\n In April 2024, the district court dismissed the District Attor-\n neys for purposes of streamlining the action by agreement of the\n parties. But the dismissal order provides that the District Attorneys\n shall be bound by any injunctive, declaratory, or other non-\n\n\n\n 3 Plaintiffs also challenged Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(b)(2). That provi-\n sion makes it “unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute an absentee\n ballot application to a voter which is prefilled with the voter’s name or any\n other information required on the application form.” The district court dis-\n missed all claims against this provision, and it is not at issue in this appeal.\n 4 The complaint asserts that Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d) repeats the text\n\n of Section 208. This appears to be a clerical error, as only Alabama Code Sec-\n tion 17-11-4(e) does so (though not identically).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n monetary relief against the Alabama Attorney General and Secre-\n tary of State.\n Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction in early May,\n and the Alabama Attorney General and Secretary of State moved\n to dismiss later that month.\n To support their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plain-\n tiffs presented a transcript of Alabama legislative committee pro-\n ceedings and declarations from representatives of their organiza-\n tions. The declarations explained that Plaintiffs’ organizations,\n their paid staff, and their volunteers risk criminal exposure from\n SB1 and will have to forego their efforts to assist voters with their\n absentee-ballot applications, including suspending the activities\n we’ve mentioned. See Part I.B., supra. They also worried that dis-\n abled Alabamians, all of whom are constituents of ADAP, may not\n be able to obtain assistance because of criminal exposure for the\n paid health aides and healthcare workers who treat them. And,\n they said, eligible incarcerated voters may not be able to vote ab-\n sentee if paid prison and jail officials and chaplains face criminal\n liability.\n Besides these materials, Plaintiffs also submitted declara-\n tions by four disabled voters explaining how SB1 would interfere\n with their ability to vote by absentee ballot. Louis G. Courie and\n Terry Michael McKee, respectively, signed the first two. Courie is\n an 83-year-old voter who had two strokes. His partner, McKee, is\n 76 years old and has Parkinson’s Disease. Their conditions have\n rendered them homebound and have severely limited their\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n mobility and ability to perform major life activities. Courie and\n McKee would have liked assistance from their neighbor of nearly\n 25 years who is a member of LWVAL and has assisted them in the\n past. But they believed that neighbor was at risk of criminal liabil-\n ity from SB1 because LWVAL has given her pens and t-shirts. They\n thought that counted as a “gift” to assist with an absentee-ballot\n application. Courie and McKee also believed their paid caregivers\n could not help because the caregivers are “paid” to generally assist\n them.\n Lauren Faraino also submitted a declaration. Faraino has ar-\n throgryposis multiplex congenita, a condition which has deprived\n her of use of her arms. She can write with difficulty with her feet,\n but it is impossible for her to put an absentee-ballot application in\n an envelope or open a mailbox to send it. She would have liked\n assistance from her mother to complete and submit the form, but\n she planned not to vote absentee for fear of criminal exposure for\n her mother. In the past, she has hired health aides and may again\n in the future. And she expects they would assist her with an absen-\n tee-ballot application if she did.\n Eric Peebles provided the final declaration. Peebles has cer-\n ebral palsy and quadriplegia. As a result, his control of his motor\n skills is equivalent to that of an average nine-to-sixteen-month-old.\n Peebles can’t hold a pen or physically complete a paper application.\n In the past, ADAP has assisted him by sending him a link to the\n application and helping him complete it. Peebles also requires as-\n sistance to place the application in an envelope, seal it, affix a stamp,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n and mail it. At the time of his declaration, he would have liked\n ADAP to have assisted him with his absentee-ballot application.\n And he would not ask his paid health attendants because he doesn’t\n want to create criminal exposure for them.\n On August 21, 2024, after a hearing and supplemental brief-\n ing, the district court issued an order granting in part and denying\n in part the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court granted the\n motion to dismiss as to all counts but Plaintiffs’ Section 208 claim.\n As part of its ruling, the court also concluded that the Alabama At-\n torney General was the only proper party defendant and dismissed\n the Secretary of State.\n The court offered an extensive analysis of the Section 208\n claim in its order addressing the motion to dismiss. Characterizing\n Plaintiffs’ Section 208 challenge as a “classic conflict preemption\n claim,” the court concluded that a presumption exists against\n preemption of state laws in “areas of traditional state responsibil-\n ity . . . such as the regulation of parties, elections, and bal-\n lots . . . absent a clear statement to the contrary.” The Court relied\n on a Senate Judiciary Committee Report that provides that “[s]tate\n provisions would be preempted only to the extent that they unduly\n burden the right recognized in this section, with that determination\n being a practical one dependent upon the facts.” S. Rep. No. 97-417\n at 63.\n Turning to the provisions of SB1 at issue, the court found\n that Section 208 preempted the Submission Restriction because the\n Submission Restriction unduly burdened the right by\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n “criminaliz[ing] the act of returning anyone else’s absentee ballot\n application,” with “no exception made for blind, disabled, or illit-\n erate voters” and thereby unduly burdening their right to voting\n assistance. Then, the court also found that the Plaintiffs plausibly\n alleged that the Payment and Gift Provisions unduly burden a\n voter’s right to “assistance by a person of their choice.” These pro-\n visions do so, the court reasoned, by, among other things, restrict-\n ing the ability of organizations with paid employees and volunteers\n who receive things of value to assist blind, disabled, and illiterate\n absentee voters.\n About a month after ruling on the motion to dismiss and\n one-and-a-half months before the 2024 election, the district court\n entered an order preliminarily enjoining the Alabama Attorney\n General from enforcing the Payment and Gift Provisions and the\n Submission Restriction with respect to blind, disabled, and illiterate\n voters.\n The Alabama Attorney General now appeals the grant of\n the preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs.5\n\n\n 5 The same day the district granted the motion for a preliminary injunction,\n\n the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay pending appeal. The district\n court denied that motion, and the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay\n pending appeal in our court. We similarly denied that motion, holding that\n the Alabama Attorney General “ha[d] not made a strong showing that he [was]\n likely to succeed on the merits, . . . [the Alabama Attorney General] w[ould]\n not be irreparably harmed if a stay [were] denied, the issuance of a stay would\n injure the plaintiffs (and other Section 208 voters), and the public interest d[id]\n not weigh in favor of a stay.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n II. DISCUSSION\n\n The Alabama Attorney General challenges the district\n court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. He argues that Plaintiffs\n have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of\n their claim that Section 208 preempts the Payment and Gift Provi-\n sions and the Submission Restriction. Nor, the Alabama Attorney\n General contends, have Plaintiffs shown they will suffer an irrepa-\n rable harm without an injunction. Ordinarily, we would review\n that challenge to the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunc-\n tion for abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d\n 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020).\n\n But we decline to reach those questions at this stage of the\n appeal for two reasons.\n\n First, we first seek to confirm that we, in fact, have authority\n to answer them. After listening to the parties’ positions at oral ar-\n gument, we’re unclear about whether SB1 precludes Plaintiffs\n from engaging in any of their desired activities. If it doesn’t, we\n lack jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit in its\n current form. And we have an independent duty to figure this issue\n out before reaching the merits, even if no party raises it. See\n FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990) (“Alt-\n hough neither side raises the issue here, we are required to address\n [standing] even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even\n if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are\n under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n and standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional\n doctrines.” (cleaned up)).\n\n Second, we cannot assess the district court’s conclusion that\n that SB1 “unduly burdens” the right provided by Section 208 with-\n out first understanding what SB1 prohibits as a matter of state law.\n For their part, the parties strongly disagree on the scope of SB1’s\n prohibitions. The Attorney General argues that SB1 is a limited\n measure that, among other things, includes an exception to the\n Submission Restriction for disabled voters, allows a disabled voter\n to “choose and receive assistance from his paid caregivers,” and\n does not prohibit a voter from paying anyone for help or giving a\n gift to a helper. The Plaintiffs argue that SB1 is a far-reaching re-\n striction and the Attorney General’s limited reading is not con-\n sistent with the text of the statute.\n\n Based on the parties’ arguments, we’re not sure whether and\n how SB1 creates criminal exposure for any of Plaintiff’s conduct or\n any other form of assistance to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters.\n Several disputed points stand out about the text of SB1, and we\n have no decision from any Alabama court clarifying them. So in\n this discussion, we first explain our concerns about the meaning of\n SB1. Then, we certify several questions to the Alabama Supreme\n Court.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 19 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n A. Ambiguity in SB1\n\n In reviewing the text of SB1, four major points stand out. As\n a result of these sticking points, we are not sure what conduct SB1\n actually criminalizes.\n\n 1. The Meaning of Section 17-11-4(e)\n\n First, it’s not clear what effect Section 17-11-4(e), which\n guarantees that blind, disabled, and illiterate voters may receive as-\n sistance from an individual of their choice, has on the scope of the\n Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Restriction. The\n Alabama Attorney General argues that Section 17-11-4(e) implicitly\n exempts assistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters from crim-\n inal liability from the Submission Restriction. But he still reads as-\n sistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters to be subject to crim-\n inal liability if they violate the Payment and Gift Provisions. And\n it’s not clear how or why Section 17-11-4(e) would carve out an\n exemption from one part of SB1 and not the other if either stood\n as an obstacle to a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter receiving their\n right to assistance.\n\n We may be able to read Section 17-11-4(e) as a catch-all term\n to ensure blind, disabled, and illiterate voters have access to the as-\n sistor of their choice. But we think it would have to apply to all\n three provisions at issue. That reading would avoid even an inkling\n of conflict between the Payment and Gift Provisions and the Sub-\n mission Restriction, on one hand, and Section 17-11-4(e), on the\n other. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 20 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012) (“[T]here can be no\n justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they\n can be interpreted harmoniously.”).\n\n On the flip side, Plaintiffs argue Section 17-11-4(e) does not\n create an exemption from either the Payment and Gift Provisions\n or the Submission Restriction. To begin, Section 17-11-4(e) guar-\n antees a right of assistance to “any [blind, disabled, or illiterate]\n voter,” but not any right to a person to assist. So the provision\n might exempt the voter who receives assistance from prosecution\n for that assistance. But it does not expressly say anything about\n liability for the “assistor” himself. So an “assistor” could be liable\n for helping a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter, even if that assistor\n is the assistor of the voter’s choice. After all, presumably, an assis-\n tor could not violate another part of Alabama law to “assist” a\n blind, disabled, or illiterate voter. An incarcerated person does not\n get to break out of jail to assist a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter.\n And the Payment and Gift Provisions separately criminalize paying\n someone for assistance (an action a voter would take) and receiving\n payment for assistance (an action an assistor would take). See ALA.\n CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025).\n\n Plus, the Submission Restriction and Payment and Gift Pro-\n visions have undisputed exceptions that look very different from\n Section 17-11-4(e). The Submission Restriction contains three ex-\n press exceptions: it does not apply in states of emergency, to voters\n subject to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting\n Act, and for voters who require emergency treatment within five\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 21 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n days of an election. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (f). The former two\n exceptions apply to the Payment and Gift Provisions as well. See\n id. §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) & (f). But Section 17-11-4(e) does not ex-\n pressly exempt anyone from any part of SB1.\n\n 2. The Meaning of “Distributing, Ordering, Requesting, Collect-\n ing, Completing, Prefilling, Obtaining, or Delivering”\n\n A second point about the text of SB1 warrants clarification:\n SB1 does not criminalize all forms of absentee-ballot application\n “assistance,” only a subset of conduct. The Submission Restriction\n bars only “submit[ting] a completed absentee ballot application to\n the absentee election manager other than [one’s] own application.”\n At the same time, the Payment and Gift Provisions prohibit only\n giving or receiving payment or gifts for “distributing, ordering, re-\n questing, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-\n 4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The statute defines none of these verbs, and it’s\n not clear whether they encompass the full gamut of absentee-ballot\n application “assistance.”\n\n Plaintiffs express concern that all their conduct—from hold-\n ing events informing voters about absentee voting to filling out ap-\n plications at a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter’s direction to plac-\n ing completed applications in the mail—runs headfirst into the Pay-\n ment and Gift Provisions. And certainly the district court shared\n their concern. But it’s not clear to us whether any or all of Plain-\n tiffs’ intended conduct counts as “distributing, ordering,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 22 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\n ing” an application.\n\n 3. The Meaning of “Payment” and “Gift”\n\n We are similarly uncertain about a third point about the\n text: we have substantial doubt as to what counts as “knowingly\n receiv[ing] a payment or gift for” engaging or “knowingly pay[ing]\n or provid[ing] a gift to” engage in this prohibited conduct. See id.\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). For example, the parties dispute whether the\n Payment and Gift Provisions categorically bar a paid health aide or\n healthcare worker from assisting his patient with an absentee-bal-\n lot application. Such an aide generally receives a wage or salary for\n assisting his charge in many ways. One way might include assisting\n the voter with an absentee-ballot application. If so, under SB1, that\n health aide may then receive money “for” the absentee-ballot-ap-\n plication assistance he provides.\n\n That the statute attaches criminal liability for “knowingly”\n providing or receiving a payment tends to support that reading.\n Under Alabama law, “[a] person acts knowingly with respect to\n conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an of-\n fense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the\n circumstance exists.” Id. § 13A-2-2(2) (emphasis added). So a per-\n son who pays or receives a wage may act “knowingly” if he is aware\n that the duties that wage encompasses include application assis-\n tance.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 23 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n At the same time, the Alabama Attorney General argues that\n a paid health aide may assist a patient with an absentee-ballot ap-\n plication, as long as she doesn’t receive a “bonus” for that assis-\n tance. If he’s right about that, then only when the voter or some-\n one on his behalf makes a separate payment to the health aide for\n the specific purpose of compensating assistance in the absentee-bal-\n lot application process does a person act “knowingly” and a pay-\n ment is considered “for” assistance.\n\n We have similar questions about the meaning of giving or\n receiving a “gift for” absentee-ballot application assistance. See id.\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). The statute offers no definition of the term\n “gift,” and we are aware of no Alabama authority identifying the\n word as a term of art. Plaintiffs list several different things of\n value—from food and water to branded t-shirts to the very supplies\n an assistor uses to assist with an absentee-ballot application—that\n could plausibly be construed as “gifts.” And if these items can be\n “gifts,” we are not certain what counts as having given or received\n them “for” assistance or “to” assist with an absentee-ballot applica-\n tion. For example, the parties dispute whether Courie and McKee\n may lawfully obtain assistance from their neighbor who has previ-\n ously received t-shirts and pens from LWVAL.\n 4. The Meaning of “Third Party”\n Fourth and finally, the Payment and Gift Provisions don’t\n criminalize giving a “person,” or a “person[’s]” receiving, payment\n or a gift for absentee-ballot-application assistance. Instead, they\n criminalize only activities where a “third party” receives the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 24 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n payment or gift. See id. But the statute doesn’t define the meaning\n of “third party,” and we’re not sure what it encompasses. We have\n questions about whether paid health aides and healthcare workers,\n staff and volunteers of Plaintiffs’ organizations, and prison or jail\n officials count as “third part[ies]” subject to the Payment and Gift\n Provisions’ prohibitions.\n ***\n All these points of ambiguity in the text leave us uncertain\n of the scope of SB1. And as we’ve noted, no Alabama state court\n decisions elucidate any of these areas of concern. As for the Ala-\n bama Attorney General’s position, that may help us reach the right\n answer, but “an [Alabama] attorney general’s opinion is only advi-\n sory; it is not binding on [the Alabama Supreme] Court and does\n not have the effect of law.” Health Care Auth. for Baptist Health v.\n Cent. Ala. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 292 So. 3d 623, 635 (Ala. 2019)\n (citation omitted). So we have no binding authority to guide us on\n the meaning of this major piece of Alabama election law.\n\n B. Certified Questions\n\n Rather than stumble around in the dark, we humbly ask the\n Alabama Supreme Court to turn on the lights. “When faced with\n substantial doubt on a dispositive state law issue, our ‘better option\n is to certify the question to the state supreme court.’” WM Mobile\n Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Auth., 972 F.3d 1240,\n 1251 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Mooney, 812 F.3d 1276, 1283\n (11th Cir. 2016)). “[A]s a matter of federalism and comity,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 25 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n dispositive issues of Alabama law should be first presented to the\n Alabama Supreme Court to decide.” Id.\n\n So we certify the following four questions to the Alabama\n Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18:\n\n 1) The meaning of Subsection (e): Does Alabama Code\n Section 17-11-4(e) create an exception to the prohibitions\n in Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(c) and/or (d)? More\n specifically, for each of the provisions, does Section 17-\n 11-4(3) immunize from criminal liability (1) a person who\n gives assistance to a blind, illiterate, or disabled person;\n (2) a person who receives assistance; and/or (3) the per-\n son who pays or gives a gift to a person who gives assis-\n tance? If so, what is the extent of that exception?\n\n 2) The scope of prohibited conduct: Does any of the following\n count as “distributing, ordering, requesting, collecting, com-\n pleting, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering” an absentee bal-\n lot application under the Payment and Gift Provisions:\n a) Giving the voter a copy of an absentee-ballot ap-\n plication\n\n b) Providing the voter with a pen, envelope, or\n stamps to fill out and submit an absentee-ballot ap-\n plication\n\n c) Informing the voter about the option of and rules\n for absentee voting\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 26 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n d) Answering questions on the availability of and\n rules for absentee voting\n\n e) Creating or giving to (or both) the voter physical\n materials that include information on applying for\n and voting by absentee ballot\n\n f) Creating or sending to (or both) the voter online\n materials that provide information on applying for\n and voting by absentee ballot\n\n g) Printing an absentee-ballot application\n\n h) Sending to the voter a link to an absentee-ballot\n application\n\n i) Helping the voter access the internet to download\n an absentee-ballot application\n\n j) Providing instructions to the voter for how to fill\n out an absentee-ballot application\n\n k) Reading out loud to the voter the absentee-ballot-\n application requirements\n\n l) Helping the voter fill out their absentee-ballot ap-\n plication, including but not limited to by walking\n the voter through the application section by sec-\n tion to ensure they are completing the form accu-\n rately\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 27 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n m) Physically filling out an absentee-ballot applica-\n tion for the voter at the voter’s direction\n\n n) Explaining the meaning of complex terms in an\n absentee-ballot application\n\n o) Serving as a witness for the voter submitting an\n absentee-ballot application signed with a mark\n\n p) Making a copy of the voter’s ID to complete their\n absentee-ballot application\n\n q) Looking over the voter’s absentee-ballot applica-\n tion to correct any errors\n\n r) Submitting an absentee-ballot application on the\n voter’s behalf to an Absentee Election Manager\n\n s) Putting the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\n an envelope, sealing it, and adding postage.\n\n t) Placing the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\n the mailbox\n\n u) Referring the voter to a voting-rights attorney\n when it appears their right to vote absentee has\n been violated\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 28 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n v) Holding an event to educate on the availability\n and rules for absentee voting and assist with ab-\n sentee-ballot applications\n\n w) Training individuals to assist the voter with their\n absentee-ballot application\n\n 3) The meaning of “payment” and “third party”: The Attor-\n ney General argues that employees who are paid to assist\n voters generally, such as healthcare workers, may assist vot-\n ers in filling out absentee ballot applications or delivering\n those applications despite the prohibitions in (c) and (d)\n “[u]nless they get a bonus for absentee ballot application ser-\n vices.” Does an employee with GBM, the Alabama NAACP,\n or ADAP, a voter’s health aide or healthcare worker, or a\n prison or jail official, face criminal liability if they assist a\n voter in completing or delivering an absentee ballot applica-\n tion as part of their job? Does the person or organization\n who pays them, including the voter herself, face criminal li-\n ability if the person knows that the employee, health\n worker, or prison/jail official is likely to assist the voter in\n completing or delivering the absentee ballot application?\n Does the ADAP federal grant create criminal liability under\n these provisions?\n\n 4) The meaning of “gift”: Does a volunteer with GBM, the\n Alabama NAACP, LWVAL, or ADAP, who receives snacks,\n other food, or water; gas stipends; branded items or supplies\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 29 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n that may be useful for their volunteer work, in exchange for,\n in connection with, or during their volunteer work, face\n criminal liability if they “distribute, order, request, collect,\n prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver” an absentee ballot appli-\n cation? Does the person or organization who provides the\n individuals with these items face criminal liability?\n Depending on the answer to these questions, one or more\n of the Plaintiffs may have failed to establish that they face a credible\n threat of prosecution from SB1. If the Alabama Supreme Court\n elects to exercise its discretion and answer our questions, its hold-\n ing will be “conclusive” on these points. Edwards v. Kia Motors of\n Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 943, 945 (11th Cir. 2009).\n Still, as always when we certify questions to the Alabama Su-\n preme Court, these questions are “intended only as a guide.” United\n States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). “We do not\n mean to restrict the Alabama Supreme Court's consideration of the\n issues or its scope of inquiry.” W.M. Mobile Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc., 972\n F.3d at 1251. And, of course, “[t]he Alabama Supreme Court may,\n as it perceives them, restate the issues and modify the manner in\n which the answers are given.” Id. We hope that “if we have over-\n looked or mischaracterized any state law issues or inartfully stated\n any of the questions we have posed . . . the Alabama Supreme\n Court will feel free to make the necessary corrections.” Spain v.\n Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir.\n 2000).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 30 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\n\n III. CONCLUSION\n\n For the foregoing reasons, we defer our decision in this case\n until the Alabama Supreme Court has had the opportunity to con-\n sider our certified questions and determine whether to exercise its\n discretion in answering them. The entire record of this case, in-\n cluding the parties’ briefs, is transmitted to the Alabama Supreme\n Court.\n QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Attorney General, State of Alabama\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13111\\n ____________________\\n\\n ALABAMA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP,\\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA,\\n LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ALABAMA\\n EDUCATION FUND,\\n GREATER BIRMINGHAM MINISTRIES,\\n ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY PROGRAM,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,\\n Defendant-Appellant,\\n WILLIAM R. ADAIR, et al.,\\n Defendants.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-00420-RDP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n In 2024, Alabama enacted SB1. That statute makes it unlaw-\\n ful to give a third party, and for a third party to receive, payment or\\n a gift for several forms of absentee-ballot-application assistance.\\n See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The law also prohibits a\\n person from submitting an absentee-ballot application, other than\\n his own, to a county Absentee Election Manager. Id. § 17-11-\\n 4(c)(2).\\n Plaintiffs are organizations that fear they will be prosecuted\\n under SB1 for absentee-ballot-application assistance they provide\\n to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters. They contend that Section\\n 208 of the Voting Rights Act preempts SB1. Section 208 states that\\n “[a]ny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness,\\n disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a\\n person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” 52\\n U.S.C. § 10508. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and prelim-\\n inarily enjoined the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the\\n challenged provisions of SB1 with respect to blind, disabled, and\\n illiterate voters. Now, the Alabama Attorney General appeals that\\n order.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n But SB1 is not a very clear law. It contains several vague and\\n undefined terms, as well as what seem to be conflicting provisions.\\n Those include a provision that repeats nearly verbatim the text of\\n Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. Without a single decision\\n from an Alabama state court interpreting the scope of the law, we\\n aren’t sure what conduct it criminalizes—though penalties for vio-\\n lating SB1 can be stiff: up to twenty years in prison and a $30,000\\n fine. But if the correct interpretation of the law creates no liability\\n for Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs may lack an injury-in fact to establish stand-\\n ing.\\n So with respect for comity and federalism, we certify several\\n questions to the Alabama Supreme Court. These questions seek to\\n determine whether Plaintiffs have alleged that they seek to engage\\n in any conduct that SB1 prohibits. Because the Alabama Supreme\\n Court is the ultimate arbiter of state law—and its interpretation of\\n SB1 may resolve this election-law case—we respectfully certify the\\n questions below to the Alabama Supreme Court.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n A. Statutory Background\\n\\n Alabama law generally permits absentee voting in only eight\\n limited scenarios. A voter must (1) be absent from her county on\\n Election Day; (2) be ill or have a physical disability that prevents her\\n from going to the polls; (3) be working a required shift of at least\\n ten hours during polling hours; (4) be a student at a school outside\\n her residential county, which prevents her from going to the polls;\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n (5) be a member of, or spouse or dependent of a member of, the\\n Armed Forces of the United States or similarly qualified to vote ab-\\n sentee under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\\n ing Act; (6) be an appointed election officer or poll watcher at a\\n polling place other than her regular polling place; (7) be a caregiver\\n for a family member, to the second degree of kinship, who is con-\\n fined to his home; or (8) be incarcerated in prison or jail, but not\\n convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude. ALA. CODE § 17-\\n 11-3(a) (2025).\\n Those who qualify to vote absentee, in general, must follow\\n several steps to apply to do so. First, a voter must obtain the absen-\\n tee-ballot application form, which they can (1) download online\\n and print, (2) receive in hard copy from the voter’s county Absentee\\n Election Manager; or (3) receive by mail after mailing a written re-\\n quest to the Absentee Election Manager. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absen-\\n tee Voting Information, https://perma.cc/TN8U-BRBG (last ac-\\n cessed Oct. 5, 2025). Second, after acquiring the absentee-ballot\\n application form, a voter must complete it and return it in hard\\n copy. See id. That requires filling out the form and providing a\\n printed copy of the voter’s photo ID. See id. And, finally, third, the\\n voter must submit the physical application packet to their Absentee\\n Election Manager in person or by mail or commercial carrier. ALA.\\n CODE § 17-11-4(c)(1) (2025). Once the Absentee Election Manager\\n approves the application, that Manager either mails or hands in per-\\n son the absentee ballot to the voter. Ala. Sec’y of State, Absentee\\n Voting Information, supra.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n In March 2024, the Alabama Legislature enacted SB1, codi-\\n fied at Alabama Code Section 17-11-4 (2025). The act, which the\\n Alabama Attorney General asserts “seeks to protect voters from\\n self-interested ballot harvesters . . . ,” places restrictions on the how\\n assistance on absentee-ballot applications may be provided. Plain-\\n tiffs challenge three subsections of SB1 here.\\n The first two are the Payment and Gift Provisions. Under\\n Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d)(1), it is “unlawful for a third party\\n to knowingly receive a payment or gift for distributing, ordering,\\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\\n ing a voter’s absentee ballot application.” This provision defines a\\n Class C Felony, so it carries a sentence of between one-year-and-\\n one-day’s and ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $15,000.\\n ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-6(a)(3), 13A-5-11(a)(3), 17-11-4(d)(1) (2025).\\n For its part, Section 17-11-4(d)(2) separately makes it “unlawful for\\n a person to knowingly pay or provide a gift to a third party to dis-\\n tribute, order, request, collect, prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver\\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” It is a Class B felony, exposing\\n the offender to a sentence of between two and twenty years’ im-\\n prisonment and a fine of up to $30,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-6(a)(2), 13A-5-\\n 11(a)(2), 17-11-4(d)(2).\\n The third provision is the Submission Restriction. The Sub-\\n mission Restriction makes it “unlawful for an individual to submit\\n a completed absentee ballot application to the absentee election\\n manager other than his or her own application . . . .” Id. § 17-11-\\n 4(c)(2). But it allows “an application for a voter who requires\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n emergency treatment by a licensed physician within five days be-\\n fore an election . . . [to] be submitted to the absentee election man-\\n ager by an individual designated by the applicant.” Id. Violation\\n of the Submission Restriction is a Class A Misdemeanor, subject to\\n penalties of imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to\\n $6,000. Id. §§ 13A-5-7(a)(1), 13A-5-12(a)(1); 2024 ALA. LAWS 33, § 2.\\n The Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Re-\\n striction have two additional exceptions. First, none applies in sit-\\n uations when Alabama Code Section 17-11-3(f ), which governs\\n states of emergencies, does. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (d)(1)–(2).\\n And second, under Section 17-11-4(f ), “[v]oters voting by absentee\\n ballot through the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Vot-\\n ing Act are not subject to” the provisions.\\n SB1 also contains a provision to protect the rights of blind,\\n disabled, and illiterate voters. 1 Under Section 17-11-4(e), “[a]ny\\n voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disa-\\n bility, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by an\\n individual of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or\\n agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.”\\n This provision takes its cue directly from Section 208 of the Voting\\n Rights Act, codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10508, which has identical lan-\\n guage except the term “an individual” is “a person” in that statute.\\n\\n\\n 1 As this paragraph explains, both Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(e) and Sec-\\n\\n tion 208 of the Voting Rights Act grant a right to assistance to a voter with an\\n “inability to read or write.” For ease of writing, this opinion sometimes refers\\n to those voters by the shorthand “illiterate.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n To date, we are unaware of any decision by an Alabama state\\n court interpreting any provision of SB1.\\n B. Plaintiffs\\n\\n The case before us began with an action that five non-profit,\\n non-partisan organizations brought. These organizations have of-\\n ten assisted blind, disabled, and illiterate voters with absentee-bal-\\n lot applications (collectively “Plaintiffs”). They include the Greater\\n Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), the Alabama State Conference of\\n the NAACP (“Alabama NAACP”), the League of Women Voters of\\n Alabama and League of Women Voters of Alabama Education\\n Fund (together “LWVAL”), and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy\\n Program (“ADAP”). We offer a brief explanation of the work of\\n each.\\n GBM describes itself as “a multi-faith, multi-racial, non-\\n profit membership organization that provides emergency services\\n to people in need and engages people to build a strong, supportive,\\n and engaged community and to build a more just society for all\\n people.” Established in 1969 during the Civil Rights Movement,\\n the organization primarily serves Birmingham and Jefferson Coun-\\n ties. There, it engages in voter education and assistance, including\\n around absentee-ballot applications. The organization does a lot\\n of work with eligible incarcerated voters who must vote by absen-\\n tee ballot.\\n The Alabama NAACP is the state conference of the Na-\\n tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.\\n (“NAACP”), with members who include Black registered voters\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n who are senior citizens, disabled, and undereducated. The organi-\\n zation describes itself as “the oldest and most significant civil rights\\n organization in Alabama” with a “mission . . . to ensure the politi-\\n cal, educational, social, and economic equality of Black Americans\\n and all other Americans and to eliminate racial discrimination in\\n the democratic process.” The Alabama NAACP characterizes “vot-\\n ing and encouraging voting” as “foundational values,” so it engages\\n in absentee-ballot application assistance for blind, disabled, and il-\\n literate voters.\\n Founded in 1920 out of the Alabama Equal Suffrage Associ-\\n ation, LWVAL consists of a membership organization (and its edu-\\n cation fund) that “seek[s] to encourage the informed and active par-\\n ticipation of citizens in Alabama government through participation\\n in public policy and voting.” It views its work as “build[ing] on the\\n history of the women’s suffrage movement, which spurred [its] cre-\\n ation.” LWVAL’s members include voters who are over the age of\\n 65 and disabled, and its work includes assisting these voters with\\n absentee-ballot applications.\\n Finally, ADAP is Alabama’s federally funded Protection and\\n Advocacy agency for people with disabilities. Part of a federal net-\\n work of these agencies established in 1974, its mission is to “pro-\\n vide legal advocacy services to protect and promote the civil rights,\\n well-being, and equality of opportunity for individuals with disabil-\\n ities, including in voting.” Every disabled Alabamian is a constitu-\\n ent of ADAP.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n For their work on voting, ADAP receives a federal grant\\n called the Protection and Advocacy for Voting Accessibility grant,\\n under Section 291 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L.\\n No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1702–03. Because many disabled vot-\\n ers rely on absentee voting, ADAP uses these grant funds in large\\n part to assist individuals with absentee-ballot applications. ADAP\\n also works with staff at residential facilities and mental-health hos-\\n pitals that take care of individuals with disabilities.\\n Collectively, Plaintiffs assist blind, disabled, and illiterate vot-\\n ers with absentee ballots in several ways. On a broader scale, they\\n hold events to teach on the availability and rules for absentee vot-\\n ing, and they train individuals to assist voters with applications.\\n They also create and disseminate physical and online materials on\\n the availability and rules for absentee ballot.\\n On the individual level, Plaintiffs assist at every point in the\\n application process. When in contact with a voter, Plaintiffs inform\\n them about the option of absentee voting and answer any ques-\\n tions the voter has. When a voter decides to vote absentee, Plain-\\n tiffs help the voter obtain an absentee-ballot application. In this\\n respect, Plaintiffs send voters links to download the application and\\n help them access the internet as needed. And when offering in-\\n person assistance, Plaintiffs print applications and hand-out readily\\n available forms.\\n Once a voter has an absentee-ballot application, Plaintiffs\\n help them fill out the application if the voter needs assistance.\\n Plaintiffs provide voters with supplies to complete an application,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n including pens and envelopes and stamps for later mailing. They\\n also give instructions on the mechanics of filling out the applica-\\n tion.\\n Besides these functions, Plaintiffs offer more involved assis-\\n tance. If a voter is unable to read the application, for example, be-\\n cause they are blind or have intellectual disabilities, Plaintiffs may\\n read the application out loud to the voter. Plaintiffs also explain the\\n meaning of any terms in the application that require a high level of\\n reading comprehension. And Plaintiffs walk the voter through the\\n application section by section to ensure they fill it out properly.\\n If the voter is physically unable to fill out the application,\\n sometimes because of mobility or dexterity issues, Plaintiffs pre-\\n pare the application at the voter’s direction. They also review the\\n completed application to ensure it contains no errors that would\\n prevent its acceptance.\\n Once an application form has been filled out, Plaintiffs assist\\n with the remainder of the submission process. They make photo-\\n copies of IDs that a voter must include with an application and\\n serve as witnesses for voters who sign the application with a mark.\\n also ensure proper submission to an Absentee Election Manager,\\n including by placing completed applications in the mail. And if\\n Plaintiffs are concerned that the voter’s legal rights have been vio-\\n lated at any point in this process, Plaintiffs may refer the voter to a\\n voting-rights attorney.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Plaintiffs have both paid staff and volunteers who perform\\n these forms of assistance.2 Plaintiffs often provide snacks, other\\n food, and water to volunteers to sustain them during their work.\\n They have also given their volunteers gas stipends and branded ma-\\n terials for or in connection with their work. These items include t-\\n shirts, pens, buttons, bracelets, stickers, and voter educational ma-\\n terials. To further their mission, Plaintiffs train volunteers and give\\n them access to supplies necessary to assist voters, including enve-\\n lopes, pens, stamps, paper, printed absentee-ballot applications,\\n tents, tables, clipboards, printers, and postage.\\n Plaintiffs provide access to many of these listed things of\\n value to voters and individuals accompanying them when they re-\\n ceive assistance. And they have assisted with absentee-ballot appli-\\n cations in connection with other charitable services, including giv-\\n ing food, financial, and clothing assistance; providing donated ma-\\n terials for health and wellness, such as oxygen machines, walkers,\\n wheelchairs, and compression socks; and offering life assistance, in-\\n cluding help applying for jobs, expunging records, and treating\\n drug addiction.\\n C. The Lawsuit\\n\\n In April 2024, Plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General,\\n the Alabama Secretary of State, and 42 Alabama District Attorneys\\n in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Al-\\n abama. They sought to secure preliminary and permanent\\n\\n 2 LWVAL has no paid employees or staff, but the remainder of Plaintiffs do.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n injunctions against enforcement of the Payment and Gift Provi-\\n sions and Submission Restriction. 3\\n Plaintiffs alleged that SB1 violates the First and Fourteenth\\n Amendments, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments\\n of 1982, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. With respect to\\n their Section 208 claim, Plaintiffs asserted that although Alabama\\n Code Section 17-11-4(e) “repeats the text of Section 208, it does not\\n obviate the unlawful restrictions placed by SB1 on the right of dis-\\n abled, blind, or illiterate voters . . . .” Specifically, Plaintiffs contend\\n that SB1 (1) doesn’t expressly state that engaging in conduct to as-\\n sist blind, disabled, or illiterate voters removes liability under the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions and Submission Restriction and (2)\\n doesn’t cite Section 208 or expressly incorporate its protections and\\n definitions. 4\\n In April 2024, the district court dismissed the District Attor-\\n neys for purposes of streamlining the action by agreement of the\\n parties. But the dismissal order provides that the District Attorneys\\n shall be bound by any injunctive, declaratory, or other non-\\n\\n\\n\\n 3 Plaintiffs also challenged Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(b)(2). That provi-\\n sion makes it “unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute an absentee\\n ballot application to a voter which is prefilled with the voter’s name or any\\n other information required on the application form.” The district court dis-\\n missed all claims against this provision, and it is not at issue in this appeal.\\n 4 The complaint asserts that Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(d) repeats the text\\n\\n of Section 208. This appears to be a clerical error, as only Alabama Code Sec-\\n tion 17-11-4(e) does so (though not identically).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n monetary relief against the Alabama Attorney General and Secre-\\n tary of State.\\n Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction in early May,\\n and the Alabama Attorney General and Secretary of State moved\\n to dismiss later that month.\\n To support their motion for a preliminary injunction, Plain-\\n tiffs presented a transcript of Alabama legislative committee pro-\\n ceedings and declarations from representatives of their organiza-\\n tions. The declarations explained that Plaintiffs’ organizations,\\n their paid staff, and their volunteers risk criminal exposure from\\n SB1 and will have to forego their efforts to assist voters with their\\n absentee-ballot applications, including suspending the activities\\n we’ve mentioned. See Part I.B., supra. They also worried that dis-\\n abled Alabamians, all of whom are constituents of ADAP, may not\\n be able to obtain assistance because of criminal exposure for the\\n paid health aides and healthcare workers who treat them. And,\\n they said, eligible incarcerated voters may not be able to vote ab-\\n sentee if paid prison and jail officials and chaplains face criminal\\n liability.\\n Besides these materials, Plaintiffs also submitted declara-\\n tions by four disabled voters explaining how SB1 would interfere\\n with their ability to vote by absentee ballot. Louis G. Courie and\\n Terry Michael McKee, respectively, signed the first two. Courie is\\n an 83-year-old voter who had two strokes. His partner, McKee, is\\n 76 years old and has Parkinson’s Disease. Their conditions have\\n rendered them homebound and have severely limited their\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n mobility and ability to perform major life activities. Courie and\\n McKee would have liked assistance from their neighbor of nearly\\n 25 years who is a member of LWVAL and has assisted them in the\\n past. But they believed that neighbor was at risk of criminal liabil-\\n ity from SB1 because LWVAL has given her pens and t-shirts. They\\n thought that counted as a “gift” to assist with an absentee-ballot\\n application. Courie and McKee also believed their paid caregivers\\n could not help because the caregivers are “paid” to generally assist\\n them.\\n Lauren Faraino also submitted a declaration. Faraino has ar-\\n throgryposis multiplex congenita, a condition which has deprived\\n her of use of her arms. She can write with difficulty with her feet,\\n but it is impossible for her to put an absentee-ballot application in\\n an envelope or open a mailbox to send it. She would have liked\\n assistance from her mother to complete and submit the form, but\\n she planned not to vote absentee for fear of criminal exposure for\\n her mother. In the past, she has hired health aides and may again\\n in the future. And she expects they would assist her with an absen-\\n tee-ballot application if she did.\\n Eric Peebles provided the final declaration. Peebles has cer-\\n ebral palsy and quadriplegia. As a result, his control of his motor\\n skills is equivalent to that of an average nine-to-sixteen-month-old.\\n Peebles can’t hold a pen or physically complete a paper application.\\n In the past, ADAP has assisted him by sending him a link to the\\n application and helping him complete it. Peebles also requires as-\\n sistance to place the application in an envelope, seal it, affix a stamp,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n and mail it. At the time of his declaration, he would have liked\\n ADAP to have assisted him with his absentee-ballot application.\\n And he would not ask his paid health attendants because he doesn’t\\n want to create criminal exposure for them.\\n On August 21, 2024, after a hearing and supplemental brief-\\n ing, the district court issued an order granting in part and denying\\n in part the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court granted the\\n motion to dismiss as to all counts but Plaintiffs’ Section 208 claim.\\n As part of its ruling, the court also concluded that the Alabama At-\\n torney General was the only proper party defendant and dismissed\\n the Secretary of State.\\n The court offered an extensive analysis of the Section 208\\n claim in its order addressing the motion to dismiss. Characterizing\\n Plaintiffs’ Section 208 challenge as a “classic conflict preemption\\n claim,” the court concluded that a presumption exists against\\n preemption of state laws in “areas of traditional state responsibil-\\n ity . . . such as the regulation of parties, elections, and bal-\\n lots . . . absent a clear statement to the contrary.” The Court relied\\n on a Senate Judiciary Committee Report that provides that “[s]tate\\n provisions would be preempted only to the extent that they unduly\\n burden the right recognized in this section, with that determination\\n being a practical one dependent upon the facts.” S. Rep. No. 97-417\\n at 63.\\n Turning to the provisions of SB1 at issue, the court found\\n that Section 208 preempted the Submission Restriction because the\\n Submission Restriction unduly burdened the right by\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n “criminaliz[ing] the act of returning anyone else’s absentee ballot\\n application,” with “no exception made for blind, disabled, or illit-\\n erate voters” and thereby unduly burdening their right to voting\\n assistance. Then, the court also found that the Plaintiffs plausibly\\n alleged that the Payment and Gift Provisions unduly burden a\\n voter’s right to “assistance by a person of their choice.” These pro-\\n visions do so, the court reasoned, by, among other things, restrict-\\n ing the ability of organizations with paid employees and volunteers\\n who receive things of value to assist blind, disabled, and illiterate\\n absentee voters.\\n About a month after ruling on the motion to dismiss and\\n one-and-a-half months before the 2024 election, the district court\\n entered an order preliminarily enjoining the Alabama Attorney\\n General from enforcing the Payment and Gift Provisions and the\\n Submission Restriction with respect to blind, disabled, and illiterate\\n voters.\\n The Alabama Attorney General now appeals the grant of\\n the preliminary injunction to Plaintiffs.5\\n\\n\\n 5 The same day the district granted the motion for a preliminary injunction,\\n\\n the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay pending appeal. The district\\n court denied that motion, and the Alabama Attorney General moved for a stay\\n pending appeal in our court. We similarly denied that motion, holding that\\n the Alabama Attorney General “ha[d] not made a strong showing that he [was]\\n likely to succeed on the merits, . . . [the Alabama Attorney General] w[ould]\\n not be irreparably harmed if a stay [were] denied, the issuance of a stay would\\n injure the plaintiffs (and other Section 208 voters), and the public interest d[id]\\n not weigh in favor of a stay.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n II. DISCUSSION\\n\\n The Alabama Attorney General challenges the district\\n court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. He argues that Plaintiffs\\n have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of\\n their claim that Section 208 preempts the Payment and Gift Provi-\\n sions and the Submission Restriction. Nor, the Alabama Attorney\\n General contends, have Plaintiffs shown they will suffer an irrepa-\\n rable harm without an injunction. Ordinarily, we would review\\n that challenge to the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunc-\\n tion for abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. Governor of Ga., 978 F.3d\\n 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020).\\n\\n But we decline to reach those questions at this stage of the\\n appeal for two reasons.\\n\\n First, we first seek to confirm that we, in fact, have authority\\n to answer them. After listening to the parties’ positions at oral ar-\\n gument, we’re unclear about whether SB1 precludes Plaintiffs\\n from engaging in any of their desired activities. If it doesn’t, we\\n lack jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit in its\\n current form. And we have an independent duty to figure this issue\\n out before reaching the merits, even if no party raises it. See\\n FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–31 (1990) (“Alt-\\n hough neither side raises the issue here, we are required to address\\n [standing] even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even\\n if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are\\n under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n and standing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional\\n doctrines.” (cleaned up)).\\n\\n Second, we cannot assess the district court’s conclusion that\\n that SB1 “unduly burdens” the right provided by Section 208 with-\\n out first understanding what SB1 prohibits as a matter of state law.\\n For their part, the parties strongly disagree on the scope of SB1’s\\n prohibitions. The Attorney General argues that SB1 is a limited\\n measure that, among other things, includes an exception to the\\n Submission Restriction for disabled voters, allows a disabled voter\\n to “choose and receive assistance from his paid caregivers,” and\\n does not prohibit a voter from paying anyone for help or giving a\\n gift to a helper. The Plaintiffs argue that SB1 is a far-reaching re-\\n striction and the Attorney General’s limited reading is not con-\\n sistent with the text of the statute.\\n\\n Based on the parties’ arguments, we’re not sure whether and\\n how SB1 creates criminal exposure for any of Plaintiff’s conduct or\\n any other form of assistance to blind, disabled, and illiterate voters.\\n Several disputed points stand out about the text of SB1, and we\\n have no decision from any Alabama court clarifying them. So in\\n this discussion, we first explain our concerns about the meaning of\\n SB1. Then, we certify several questions to the Alabama Supreme\\n Court.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n A. Ambiguity in SB1\\n\\n In reviewing the text of SB1, four major points stand out. As\\n a result of these sticking points, we are not sure what conduct SB1\\n actually criminalizes.\\n\\n 1. The Meaning of Section 17-11-4(e)\\n\\n First, it’s not clear what effect Section 17-11-4(e), which\\n guarantees that blind, disabled, and illiterate voters may receive as-\\n sistance from an individual of their choice, has on the scope of the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions and the Submission Restriction. The\\n Alabama Attorney General argues that Section 17-11-4(e) implicitly\\n exempts assistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters from crim-\\n inal liability from the Submission Restriction. But he still reads as-\\n sistors of blind, disabled, and illiterate voters to be subject to crim-\\n inal liability if they violate the Payment and Gift Provisions. And\\n it’s not clear how or why Section 17-11-4(e) would carve out an\\n exemption from one part of SB1 and not the other if either stood\\n as an obstacle to a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter receiving their\\n right to assistance.\\n\\n We may be able to read Section 17-11-4(e) as a catch-all term\\n to ensure blind, disabled, and illiterate voters have access to the as-\\n sistor of their choice. But we think it would have to apply to all\\n three provisions at issue. That reading would avoid even an inkling\\n of conflict between the Payment and Gift Provisions and the Sub-\\n mission Restriction, on one hand, and Section 17-11-4(e), on the\\n other. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 180 (2012) (“[T]here can be no\\n justification for needlessly rendering provisions in conflict if they\\n can be interpreted harmoniously.”).\\n\\n On the flip side, Plaintiffs argue Section 17-11-4(e) does not\\n create an exemption from either the Payment and Gift Provisions\\n or the Submission Restriction. To begin, Section 17-11-4(e) guar-\\n antees a right of assistance to “any [blind, disabled, or illiterate]\\n voter,” but not any right to a person to assist. So the provision\\n might exempt the voter who receives assistance from prosecution\\n for that assistance. But it does not expressly say anything about\\n liability for the “assistor” himself. So an “assistor” could be liable\\n for helping a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter, even if that assistor\\n is the assistor of the voter’s choice. After all, presumably, an assis-\\n tor could not violate another part of Alabama law to “assist” a\\n blind, disabled, or illiterate voter. An incarcerated person does not\\n get to break out of jail to assist a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter.\\n And the Payment and Gift Provisions separately criminalize paying\\n someone for assistance (an action a voter would take) and receiving\\n payment for assistance (an action an assistor would take). See ALA.\\n CODE §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) (2025).\\n\\n Plus, the Submission Restriction and Payment and Gift Pro-\\n visions have undisputed exceptions that look very different from\\n Section 17-11-4(e). The Submission Restriction contains three ex-\\n press exceptions: it does not apply in states of emergency, to voters\\n subject to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting\\n Act, and for voters who require emergency treatment within five\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n days of an election. See id. §§ 17-11-4(c)(2) & (f). The former two\\n exceptions apply to the Payment and Gift Provisions as well. See\\n id. §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2) & (f). But Section 17-11-4(e) does not ex-\\n pressly exempt anyone from any part of SB1.\\n\\n 2. The Meaning of “Distributing, Ordering, Requesting, Collect-\\n ing, Completing, Prefilling, Obtaining, or Delivering”\\n\\n A second point about the text of SB1 warrants clarification:\\n SB1 does not criminalize all forms of absentee-ballot application\\n “assistance,” only a subset of conduct. The Submission Restriction\\n bars only “submit[ting] a completed absentee ballot application to\\n the absentee election manager other than [one’s] own application.”\\n At the same time, the Payment and Gift Provisions prohibit only\\n giving or receiving payment or gifts for “distributing, ordering, re-\\n questing, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering\\n a voter’s absentee ballot application.” See ALA. CODE §§ 17-11-\\n 4(d)(1)–(2) (2025). The statute defines none of these verbs, and it’s\\n not clear whether they encompass the full gamut of absentee-ballot\\n application “assistance.”\\n\\n Plaintiffs express concern that all their conduct—from hold-\\n ing events informing voters about absentee voting to filling out ap-\\n plications at a blind, disabled, or illiterate voter’s direction to plac-\\n ing completed applications in the mail—runs headfirst into the Pay-\\n ment and Gift Provisions. And certainly the district court shared\\n their concern. But it’s not clear to us whether any or all of Plain-\\n tiffs’ intended conduct counts as “distributing, ordering,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n requesting, collecting, completing, prefilling, obtaining, or deliver-\\n ing” an application.\\n\\n 3. The Meaning of “Payment” and “Gift”\\n\\n We are similarly uncertain about a third point about the\\n text: we have substantial doubt as to what counts as “knowingly\\n receiv[ing] a payment or gift for” engaging or “knowingly pay[ing]\\n or provid[ing] a gift to” engage in this prohibited conduct. See id.\\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). For example, the parties dispute whether the\\n Payment and Gift Provisions categorically bar a paid health aide or\\n healthcare worker from assisting his patient with an absentee-bal-\\n lot application. Such an aide generally receives a wage or salary for\\n assisting his charge in many ways. One way might include assisting\\n the voter with an absentee-ballot application. If so, under SB1, that\\n health aide may then receive money “for” the absentee-ballot-ap-\\n plication assistance he provides.\\n\\n That the statute attaches criminal liability for “knowingly”\\n providing or receiving a payment tends to support that reading.\\n Under Alabama law, “[a] person acts knowingly with respect to\\n conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an of-\\n fense when he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that the\\n circumstance exists.” Id. § 13A-2-2(2) (emphasis added). So a per-\\n son who pays or receives a wage may act “knowingly” if he is aware\\n that the duties that wage encompasses include application assis-\\n tance.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n At the same time, the Alabama Attorney General argues that\\n a paid health aide may assist a patient with an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication, as long as she doesn’t receive a “bonus” for that assis-\\n tance. If he’s right about that, then only when the voter or some-\\n one on his behalf makes a separate payment to the health aide for\\n the specific purpose of compensating assistance in the absentee-bal-\\n lot application process does a person act “knowingly” and a pay-\\n ment is considered “for” assistance.\\n\\n We have similar questions about the meaning of giving or\\n receiving a “gift for” absentee-ballot application assistance. See id.\\n §§ 17-11-4(d)(1)–(2). The statute offers no definition of the term\\n “gift,” and we are aware of no Alabama authority identifying the\\n word as a term of art. Plaintiffs list several different things of\\n value—from food and water to branded t-shirts to the very supplies\\n an assistor uses to assist with an absentee-ballot application—that\\n could plausibly be construed as “gifts.” And if these items can be\\n “gifts,” we are not certain what counts as having given or received\\n them “for” assistance or “to” assist with an absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion. For example, the parties dispute whether Courie and McKee\\n may lawfully obtain assistance from their neighbor who has previ-\\n ously received t-shirts and pens from LWVAL.\\n 4. The Meaning of “Third Party”\\n Fourth and finally, the Payment and Gift Provisions don’t\\n criminalize giving a “person,” or a “person[’s]” receiving, payment\\n or a gift for absentee-ballot-application assistance. Instead, they\\n criminalize only activities where a “third party” receives the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n payment or gift. See id. But the statute doesn’t define the meaning\\n of “third party,” and we’re not sure what it encompasses. We have\\n questions about whether paid health aides and healthcare workers,\\n staff and volunteers of Plaintiffs’ organizations, and prison or jail\\n officials count as “third part[ies]” subject to the Payment and Gift\\n Provisions’ prohibitions.\\n ***\\n All these points of ambiguity in the text leave us uncertain\\n of the scope of SB1. And as we’ve noted, no Alabama state court\\n decisions elucidate any of these areas of concern. As for the Ala-\\n bama Attorney General’s position, that may help us reach the right\\n answer, but “an [Alabama] attorney general’s opinion is only advi-\\n sory; it is not binding on [the Alabama Supreme] Court and does\\n not have the effect of law.” Health Care Auth. for Baptist Health v.\\n Cent. Ala. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 292 So. 3d 623, 635 (Ala. 2019)\\n (citation omitted). So we have no binding authority to guide us on\\n the meaning of this major piece of Alabama election law.\\n\\n B. Certified Questions\\n\\n Rather than stumble around in the dark, we humbly ask the\\n Alabama Supreme Court to turn on the lights. “When faced with\\n substantial doubt on a dispositive state law issue, our ‘better option\\n is to certify the question to the state supreme court.’” WM Mobile\\n Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc. v. City of Mobile Solid Waste Auth., 972 F.3d 1240,\\n 1251 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Mooney, 812 F.3d 1276, 1283\\n (11th Cir. 2016)). “[A]s a matter of federalism and comity,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n dispositive issues of Alabama law should be first presented to the\\n Alabama Supreme Court to decide.” Id.\\n\\n So we certify the following four questions to the Alabama\\n Supreme Court under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 18:\\n\\n 1) The meaning of Subsection (e): Does Alabama Code\\n Section 17-11-4(e) create an exception to the prohibitions\\n in Alabama Code Section 17-11-4(c) and/or (d)? More\\n specifically, for each of the provisions, does Section 17-\\n 11-4(3) immunize from criminal liability (1) a person who\\n gives assistance to a blind, illiterate, or disabled person;\\n (2) a person who receives assistance; and/or (3) the per-\\n son who pays or gives a gift to a person who gives assis-\\n tance? If so, what is the extent of that exception?\\n\\n 2) The scope of prohibited conduct: Does any of the following\\n count as “distributing, ordering, requesting, collecting, com-\\n pleting, prefilling, obtaining, or delivering” an absentee bal-\\n lot application under the Payment and Gift Provisions:\\n a) Giving the voter a copy of an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication\\n\\n b) Providing the voter with a pen, envelope, or\\n stamps to fill out and submit an absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication\\n\\n c) Informing the voter about the option of and rules\\n for absentee voting\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n d) Answering questions on the availability of and\\n rules for absentee voting\\n\\n e) Creating or giving to (or both) the voter physical\\n materials that include information on applying for\\n and voting by absentee ballot\\n\\n f) Creating or sending to (or both) the voter online\\n materials that provide information on applying for\\n and voting by absentee ballot\\n\\n g) Printing an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n h) Sending to the voter a link to an absentee-ballot\\n application\\n\\n i) Helping the voter access the internet to download\\n an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n j) Providing instructions to the voter for how to fill\\n out an absentee-ballot application\\n\\n k) Reading out loud to the voter the absentee-ballot-\\n application requirements\\n\\n l) Helping the voter fill out their absentee-ballot ap-\\n plication, including but not limited to by walking\\n the voter through the application section by sec-\\n tion to ensure they are completing the form accu-\\n rately\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n m) Physically filling out an absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion for the voter at the voter’s direction\\n\\n n) Explaining the meaning of complex terms in an\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n o) Serving as a witness for the voter submitting an\\n absentee-ballot application signed with a mark\\n\\n p) Making a copy of the voter’s ID to complete their\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n q) Looking over the voter’s absentee-ballot applica-\\n tion to correct any errors\\n\\n r) Submitting an absentee-ballot application on the\\n voter’s behalf to an Absentee Election Manager\\n\\n s) Putting the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\\n an envelope, sealing it, and adding postage.\\n\\n t) Placing the voter’s absentee-ballot application in\\n the mailbox\\n\\n u) Referring the voter to a voting-rights attorney\\n when it appears their right to vote absentee has\\n been violated\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n v) Holding an event to educate on the availability\\n and rules for absentee voting and assist with ab-\\n sentee-ballot applications\\n\\n w) Training individuals to assist the voter with their\\n absentee-ballot application\\n\\n 3) The meaning of “payment” and “third party”: The Attor-\\n ney General argues that employees who are paid to assist\\n voters generally, such as healthcare workers, may assist vot-\\n ers in filling out absentee ballot applications or delivering\\n those applications despite the prohibitions in (c) and (d)\\n “[u]nless they get a bonus for absentee ballot application ser-\\n vices.” Does an employee with GBM, the Alabama NAACP,\\n or ADAP, a voter’s health aide or healthcare worker, or a\\n prison or jail official, face criminal liability if they assist a\\n voter in completing or delivering an absentee ballot applica-\\n tion as part of their job? Does the person or organization\\n who pays them, including the voter herself, face criminal li-\\n ability if the person knows that the employee, health\\n worker, or prison/jail official is likely to assist the voter in\\n completing or delivering the absentee ballot application?\\n Does the ADAP federal grant create criminal liability under\\n these provisions?\\n\\n 4) The meaning of “gift”: Does a volunteer with GBM, the\\n Alabama NAACP, LWVAL, or ADAP, who receives snacks,\\n other food, or water; gas stipends; branded items or supplies\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13111 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n that may be useful for their volunteer work, in exchange for,\\n in connection with, or during their volunteer work, face\\n criminal liability if they “distribute, order, request, collect,\\n prefill, complete, obtain, or deliver” an absentee ballot appli-\\n cation? Does the person or organization who provides the\\n individuals with these items face criminal liability?\\n Depending on the answer to these questions, one or more\\n of the Plaintiffs may have failed to establish that they face a credible\\n threat of prosecution from SB1. If the Alabama Supreme Court\\n elects to exercise its discretion and answer our questions, its hold-\\n ing will be “conclusive” on these points. Edwards v. Kia Motors of\\n Am., Inc., 554 F.3d 943, 945 (11th Cir. 2009).\\n Still, as always when we certify questions to the Alabama Su-\\n preme Court, these questions are “intended only as a guide.” United\\n States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). “We do not\\n mean to restrict the Alabama Supreme Court's consideration of the\\n issues or its scope of inquiry.” W.M. Mobile Bay Env’t Ctr., Inc., 972\\n F.3d at 1251. And, of course, “[t]he Alabama Supreme Court may,\\n as it perceives them, restate the issues and modify the manner in\\n which the answers are given.” Id. We hope that “if we have over-\\n looked or mischaracterized any state law issues or inartfully stated\\n any of the questions we have posed . . . the Alabama Supreme\\n Court will feel free to make the necessary corrections.” Spain v.\\n Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir.\\n 2000).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 24-13111\\n\\n III. CONCLUSION\\n\\n For the foregoing reasons, we defer our decision in this case\\n until the Alabama Supreme Court has had the opportunity to con-\\n sider our certified questions and determine whether to exercise its\\n discretion in answering them. The entire record of this case, in-\\n cluding the parties’ briefs, is transmitted to the Alabama Supreme\\n Court.\\n QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30974,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10758304,"string":"10,758,304"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Stacey Humphreys v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-14325"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-14325\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n STACEY IAN HUMPHREYS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF\\n CORRECTIONS,\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,\\n WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION\\n PRISON,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-06100-LMM\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n BY THE COURT:\\n In 2006, a Cobb County Superior Court jury found Plaintiff-\\n Appellant Stacey Ian Humphreys guilty of two counts of malice\\n murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated\\n assault, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, and two\\n counts of armed robbery. The same jury found several statutory\\n aggravating circumstances applied and recommended a sentence\\n of death.\\n The trial court agreed and imposed a death sentence for\\n each murder, along with sentences of imprisonment for Hum-\\n phreys’s other convictions. Humphreys then exhausted his direct\\n appeals and collateral review. Given the status of Humphreys’s\\n challenges to his convictions and sentences, the State of Georgia\\n obtained a warrant on December 1, 2025, for Humphreys’s execu-\\n tion. His execution is scheduled for December 17, 2025.\\n Meanwhile, before the execution warrant issued, Hum-\\n phreys filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his execution\\n would violate his equal-protection and due-process rights under\\n the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He based his claims on\\n Georgia’s written agreement with, among others, the Federal De-\\n fender Program, Inc. (“Federal Defender”), to not resume execu-\\n tions until after certain conditions related to the COVID-19 pan-\\n demic are satisfied. And Georgia courts have held that the agree-\\n ment likely hasn’t been fully satisfied.\\n But there’s a catch. By its terms, the agreement applies to\\n only those inmates whose final appeal in the Eleventh Circuit\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 3\\n\\n concluded during Georgia’s COVID-19 judicial emergency. Hum-\\n phreys falls outside that group. We denied Humphreys’s last peti-\\n tion for rehearing more than three years after the Chief Justice of\\n the Georgia Supreme Court lifted the final COVID-19 judicial\\n emergency order.\\n In Humphreys’s view, the agreement’s classification of\\n which inmates are covered and which are not violates the Equal\\n Protection and Due Process Clauses. So in the district court, Hum-\\n phreys moved to enjoin his execution based on those constitutional\\n concerns. Humphreys also sought a temporary restraining order\\n or preliminary injunction enjoining his execution until his claims\\n were resolved. The district court held a hearing on Humphreys’s\\n claims and denied them.\\n Now, Humphreys seeks an emergency stay of his execution\\n pending resolution of his appeal of the district court’s order dis-\\n missing his § 1983 claims. Because Humphreys has not established\\n that he is substantially likely to succeed on his appeal, we deny his\\n motion.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n We have previously set forth the facts on Humphreys’s\\n crimes, convictions, and appeal history. See Humphreys v. Warden,\\n Ga. Diagnostic Prison, No. 21-10387, 2024 WL 2945070, *1–9 (11th\\n Cir. June 11, 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Humphreys v. Emmons, 607\\n U.S. ___, 2025 WL 2906475 (Mem.) (Oct. 14, 2025). Because they\\n are not directly relevant to the legal challenge before us and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n because of time constraints, we do not repeat them here. Rather,\\n we focus on the background underlying Humphreys’s § 1983\\n claims.\\n\\n A. The Agreement\\n\\n In May 2020, the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme\\n Court established a task force on “measures to address the chal-\\n lenges facing the courts and affected parties as a result of the\\n COVID-19 pandemic.” State v. Fed. Def. Program, Inc., 882 S.E.2d\\n 257, 265 (Ga. 2022). Among other issues, the task force set out to\\n address “the capital defense bar’s concerns about how the re-\\n strictions necessitated by COVID-19 had resulted in a backlog of\\n execution-eligible inmates.” Id. 1 As the defense bar explained, the\\n significant backlog had both “hindered capital defense counsel’s\\n ability to prioritize clemency investigations for a growing number\\n of inmates eligible for execution” and had “impaired counsel’s abil-\\n ity to meet with their clients and conduct investigations in order to\\n prepare for clemency proceedings and adequately represent their\\n clients.” Id.\\n To address this concern, Georgia’s Deputy Attorney Gen-\\n eral of its Criminal Justice Division agreed with the capital-defense\\n\\n\\n 1 The Georgia Supreme Court explained that a death-sentenced prisoner be-\\n\\n comes “execution-eligible” when he has exhausted his appeals upon the U.S.\\n Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on his federal habeas appeal. Fed. Def.\\n Prog., 882 S.E.2d at 266 n.4. The State may then seek a judicial order, com-\\n monly called an “execution warrant,” authorizing the prisoner’s execution.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 5\\n\\n bar not to seek execution warrants for certain execution-eligible\\n defendants until three conditions were satisfied. An email from the\\n State (“Agreement”) set out those conditions:\\n [The Criminal Justice Division] will not pursue an ex-\\n ecution warrant from the District Attorney in the be-\\n low defined cases before: 1) the final COVID19 judi-\\n cial emergency order entered by the Chief Justice of\\n the Supreme Court of Georgia expires; 2) the Georgia\\n Department of Corrections lifts its suspension of legal\\n visitation, and normal visitation resumes; and 3) a\\n vaccination against COVID19 is readily available to\\n all members of the public.\\n Id. at 266 (brackets omitted). The Attorney General’s Office also\\n generally agreed “not [to] pursue an execution warrant of any pris-\\n oner . . . before a total of at least six months after” all three condi-\\n tions in the Agreement were satisfied. Id.\\n But this Agreement applied to only “death-sentenced pris-\\n oners whose petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied\\n by the Eleventh Circuit while the State of Georgia remained under\\n judicial emergency order.” Id. And that period lasted from March\\n 14, 2020, through June 30, 2021 (“COVID-19 Emergency Period”).\\n Id. at 265 n.3.\\n\\n B. State v. Federal Defender Program, 882 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 2022)\\n\\n In 2022, Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Virgil\\n Presnell, an execution-eligible prisoner whose petition the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n Eleventh Circuit denied during the COVID-19 Emergency Period.\\n Id. at 266, 279 n.15. The Federal Defender responded by filing a\\n complaint against Georgia alleging a breach of the Agreement. Id.\\n at 267. Georgia courts, including the Georgia Supreme Court on\\n review, determined that the Federal Defender had shown a substan-\\n tial likelihood that the Agreement was valid and binding. See id. at\\n 269–81. They also held that the second and third conditions of the\\n Agreement—that the Georgia Department of Corrections re-\\n sumes its normal visitation and that a COVID-19 vaccine is “readily\\n available to all members of the public” 2—were likely not satisfied\\n when Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Presnell. See id.\\n at 285–86. And because the Eleventh Circuit denied Presnell’s peti-\\n tion during the COVID-19 Emergency Period, the courts con-\\n cluded, the Agreement bound the State with respect to his execu-\\n tion. See id. at 267, 279 n.15.\\n Then, in May 2025, a Georgia trial court permanently en-\\n joined State officials from seeking execution warrants against Cov-\\n ered Inmates. Order, Fed. Def. Program, Inc. v. State of Georgia, No.\\n 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 29, 2025). The court concluded\\n that, at a minimum, the vaccination condition is not satisfied be-\\n cause the COVID-19 vaccine is not readily available for children\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 “[C]hildren under the age of five still were not eligible for any COVID-19\\n\\n vaccine.” Fed. Def. Program, 882 S.E.2d at 285.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 7\\n\\n under six months old. Id. at 10. 3 The State has appealed that deci-\\n sion to the Georgia Supreme Court. 4\\n\\n C. Proceedings in the District Court\\n\\n On October 24, 2025, Humphreys filed this action in the dis-\\n trict court. As we’ve explained, he alleged that Georgia cannot ex-\\n ecute him without violating his rights to equal protection and due\\n process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hum-\\n phreys’s view, with the Agreement, the State has created two clas-\\n ses of execution-eligible prisoners: those who are subject to the\\n Agreement and those who aren’t, and the only difference between\\n the situations of the two is when the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the\\n prisoners’ collateral-review petitions. Humphreys argued that clas-\\n sification is arbitrary. He also contended that the State’s failure to\\n provide him with the same protections as those covered by the\\n Agreement violates due process.\\n Soon after filing his complaint, Humphreys moved for a stay\\n of proceedings pending the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Pace v. Oli-\\n ver, another case that raised the same claims on behalf of other\\n prisoners sentenced to death. The district court hearing that case\\n dismissed it after determining the plaintiffs lacked standing because\\n\\n\\n 3 Based on bifurcation of the case, the trial court did not reach the question of\\n\\n whether the second condition is satisfied. Order at 2 n.1, Fed. Def. Program,\\n No. 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 30, 2025).\\n 4 Georgia doesn’t argue in the instant case that the second and third conditions\\n\\n of the Agreement have since been satisfied.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n they hadn’t yet had warrants for their executions issued. Pace v. Ol-\\n iver, 749 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1316–17 (N.D. Ga. 2024). The Pace plain-\\n tiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in that\\n case, which remains pending.\\n While Humphreys’s motion to stay proceedings until the\\n resolution of Pace was pending, the State moved to dismiss Hum-\\n phreys’s case for failure to state a claim. Then, on December 1,\\n 2025, the State obtained a warrant for Humphreys’s execution. So\\n on December 5, Humphreys moved for a temporary restraining or-\\n der or preliminary injunction preventing his execution. He based\\n his motion on the same premises as his original complaint: that the\\n State had violated his rights to equal protection and due process\\n under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\\n On December 10, The district court heard argument on the\\n State’s motion to dismiss and Humphreys’s motion for a temporary\\n restraining order or preliminary injunction. Later that same day,\\n the district court issued an order denying Humphreys’s motions for\\n stay and for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-\\n tion and granting the State’s motion to dismiss. And the next day,\\n the court entered judgment dismissing the case.\\n Humphreys appealed.\\n On December 12, 2025, he filed an emergency motion for an\\n order staying execution pending appeal. In support of his motion,\\n Humphreys argues he is substantially likely to succeed on the mer-\\n its of his appeal. That is, he asserts that the State has violated his\\n equal-protection and due-process rights under the Fifth and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 9\\n\\n Fourteenth Amendments. He also contends that the other stay fac-\\n tors—irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, no substantial\\n harm to the State, and a lack of adversity to the public interest—\\n favor him. We consider Humphreys’s emergency motion below.\\n\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n\\n To obtain a stay of his execution pending appeal, Hum-\\n phreys must show that “(1) he has a substantial likelihood of suc-\\n cess on the merits” of his appeal, “(2) he will suffer irreparable in-\\n jury unless the injunction issues; (3) the stay would not substan-\\n tially harm the other litigant; and (4) if issued, the injunction would\\n not be adverse to the public interest.” James v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,\\n 130 F.4th 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d\\n 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied sub nom. James v. Dixon, 145\\n S. Ct. 1351 (2025).\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Humphreys argues that he has shown a substantial likeli-\\n hood of success on his appeal of the district court’s rulings on both\\n his Equal Protection and Due Process Clause claims. We address\\n each claim in turn.\\n Then, we briefly assess Humphreys’s showing on the other\\n three stay factors: whether Humphreys will suffer irreparable harm\\n absent a stay, the balance of harms, and the public interest.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n A. Equal Protection\\n\\n Humphreys contends that the State’s disparate treatment of\\n two sets of death row prisoners violates the Equal Protection\\n Clause. [Br. at 5.] The first set is death-sentenced prisoners for\\n whom the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing on their final habeas\\n appeal during Georgia’s COVID-19 Emergency Period, which\\n ended on June 30, 2021 (the “Covered Inmates”). The second set,\\n which includes Humphreys, consists of the inmates whose final ap-\\n peals in the Eleventh Circuit finished after June 30, 2021 (the “Non-\\n covered Inmates).\\n In considering Humphreys’s claim, we engage in a two-step\\n analysis. Humphreys “must first show that ‘the State will treat him\\n disparately from other similarly situated persons.’” Price v. Comm’r,\\n Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arthur\\n v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012)). If he does, at the\\n second step, we determine and apply the appropriate tier of scru-\\n tiny. Courts subject a classification to heightened scrutiny only if\\n it implicates a fundamental right or targets a suspect or quasi-sus-\\n pect class. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir.\\n 2020) (en banc). If heightened scrutiny doesn’t apply, Humphreys\\n “must show that the disparate treatment is not rationally related to\\n a legitimate government interest.” Price, 920 F.3d at 1323 (quoting\\n DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011)).\\n 1. Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Persons\\n To start with, Humphreys has shown that the State is treat-\\n ing similarly situated people dissimilarly. Prisoners in both classes\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 11\\n\\n are execution-eligible, in that they have completed their postcon-\\n viction appeals. So but for the Agreement at issue in this case, then,\\n the State is equally entitled to move forward with obtaining an ex-\\n ecution warrant for prisoners in either group.\\n Despite that similarity, the State has agreed not to seek exe-\\n cution warrants for the Covered Inmates. But it has obtained an\\n execution warrant for Humphreys and executed at least one other\\n member of the Non-covered Inmates. 5\\n Equal-protection analysis applies to this disparate treatment.\\n To explain why, two points bear emphasis.\\n First, Humphreys and the Covered Inmates are similarly sit-\\n uated. The State contends that Humphreys’s circumstances are dis-\\n similar to those of the Covered Inmates because he is “excluded as\\n a party to the Agreement by its plain terms.” But that circular rea-\\n soning misses the point. The equal-protection question asks\\n whether the distinction between the two classes rationally relates\\n to a legitimate government interest. In other words, the whole\\n\\n\\n 5 The state obtained an execution warrant for William James Pye on February\\n\\n 29, 2024, and executed him on March 20, 2024. Shortly before his execution,\\n Pye sued a collection of state officials in federal district court based on similar\\n constitutional arguments to the ones Humphreys asserts in this case. See Pye\\n v. Oliver, No. 3:24-CV-48-TCB, 2024 WL 1173742, at *3–9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15,\\n 2024). The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a\\n claim. Id. at *10. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits\\n of Pye’s claims, relying on alternative grounds of res judicata because Pye had\\n already litigated similar claims in state court. See Pye v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep't of\\n Corr., No. 24-10793, 2024 WL 1201741, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n point is to decide whether the date a prisoner’s appeal concludes is\\n a valid reason to exclude him from the Agreement’s procedural\\n guarantees. The distinction the State draws can’t be its own justifi-\\n cation.\\n And second, we are talking about a governmental distinction\\n between the two classes of prisoners. The State writes at length\\n about how capital defense attorneys participated in the negotia-\\n tions leading to the Agreement. But so what? To be sure, Hum-\\n phreys must allege that “through state action, similarly situated per-\\n sons have been treated disparately.” Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d\\n 1270, 1278 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added and quotation\\n marks omitted)). But the fact that the State’s compliance with the\\n Agreement it voluntarily entered serves as the basis for its disparate\\n treatment of the Covered and Non-covered Inmates makes no dif-\\n ference to the bottom line: the State is treating similarly situated\\n people differently. And the State chose to bind itself in the Agree-\\n ment to engage in and to refrain from engaging in particular ac-\\n tions.\\n The Equal Protection Clause has no per se exception for con-\\n tractual agreements with private entities. See, e.g., Price v. City of\\n Chicago, 251 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (analyzing, under the\\n Equal Protection Clause, the “City’s practice of using date of birth\\n to determine seniority[, which] is memorialized in a collective bar-\\n gaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of\\n Police”); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Ed., 473 F.2d 629, 633, 636 (2d Cir.\\n 1973) (holding that a contractual term mandating maternity leave\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 13\\n\\n without pay for pregnant workers, contained in a collective-bar-\\n gaining agreement between town school board and a labor organ-\\n ization, violated the Equal Protection Clause).\\n And our conclusion remains the same even if we assume\\n that acquiescing to a private party’s contractual demands can, in\\n some circumstances, make disparate treatment not attributable to\\n state action. Here, the State proposed the key distinction. Its April\\n 14, 2021, email was the first to limit the entire contract’s reach\\n “only to death-sentenced prisoners whose petition for rehearing or\\n rehearing en banc was denied by the Eleventh Circuit while the\\n State of Georgia remained under judicial emergency order.” The\\n draft memorandum of understanding that a capital defense bar at-\\n torney had previously circulated was broader. It would have barred\\n the State from seeking an execution warrant for any prisoner until\\n all three conditions were met. Only one provision, which required\\n the State to wait a minimum period between seeking each execu-\\n tion warrant, applied to the narrower set.\\n Without more, the government cannot avoid the Equal Pro-\\n tection Clause’s guarantees simply by creating a classification with\\n a contract.\\n 2. Rational-basis Review\\n Next, we determine and apply the appropriate level of scru-\\n tiny. Rational-basis review applies in this case, and the State satisfies\\n that deferential standard.\\n Humphreys asserts that heightened scrutiny applies for one\\n of two reasons, but neither is convincing. Humphreys first argues\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n that the classification infringes his “fundamental right to life” and\\n thereby triggers strict scrutiny.\\n We determine whether an asserted right is fundamental—\\n and therefore merits strict scrutiny—in two steps. “[W]e must\\n begin with a ‘careful description of the asserted right.’” Morrissey v.\\n United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe v.\\n Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005)). Then, we must deter-\\n mine whether that right “is one of ‘those fundamental rights and\\n liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-\\n tory and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”\\n Id. (quoting Doe, 410 F.3d at 1343).\\n Humphreys has not advanced a carefully defined, funda-\\n mental right. He contends that, as a death-sentenced prisoner, his\\n “right to continue living” for even one additional day warrants\\n strict scrutiny. Yet he provides no authority for that view. To be\\n sure, he invokes Justice O’Connor’s precedential opinion in Ohio\\n Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard. 6 But that opinion states only that\\n a death-sentenced prisoner has “an interest in his life” that warrants\\n “some minimal procedural safeguards” in clemency proceedings.\\n Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Con-\"}, {\"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"nor, J., concurring in part). Nothing in Justice O’Connor’s opinion\\n suggests this right is a fundamental one that calls for strict scrutiny.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion provided the holding in Woodard.\\n\\n Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2015).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 15\\n\\n The logical conclusion of Humphreys’s position proves the\\n point. Under his theory, every scheduling order or denial of a mo-\\n tion for a continuance in a death-penalty case would implicate a\\n fundamental right and warrant strict scrutiny. That is not the law.\\n Humphreys’s second argument for heightened scrutiny also\\n fails. It rests on M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). In that case, the\\n Supreme Court considered mandatory fees a parent had to pay to\\n challenge termination of her parental rights over her minor chil-\\n dren. Id. at 107. The Court concluded that parental rights are\\n among the “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbring-\\n ing of children” that are of such “basic importance” to society that\\n they deserve heightened scrutiny. Id. at 116. This case is quite dif-\\n ferent. Humphreys lacks any authority that calls for extending\\n M.L.B. beyond the context of “family association.”\\n Because Humphreys’s claims do not warrant heightened\\n scrutiny, we apply the rational-basis test. Morrissey, 871 F.3d at\\n 1268. To survive rational-basis review, a classification must be only\\n “rationally related to some legitimate government interest.” Jones,\\n 975 F.3d at 1034. And we sustain the government’s action if “there\\n is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a ra-\\n tional basis” for it. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313\\n (1993). This is a deferential standard, but it’s not “toothless.” Deen\\n v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n The State asserts that treating the two sets of inmates differ-\\n ently rationally relates to two governmental interests. Those are,\\n first, ensuring that death-row prisoners and their counsel could\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n adequately prepare for clemency proceedings and, second, ensur-\\n ing that the State can carry out criminal penalties in a timely man-\\n ner.\\n Both are legitimate government interests. We agree that as-\\n suring fair procedures for citizens’ dealings with the government is\\n a legitimate interest, particularly in the criminal legal system. Cf.\\n J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.8 (1994) (“The State’s\\n interest in every trial is to see that the proceedings are carried out\\n in a fair, impartial, and nondiscriminatory manner.”). And the State\\n “obviously has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws,”\\n which encompasses its “ability to implement a lawfully imposed\\n death sentence.” Jordan v. Comm’r, Mississippi Dep't of Corr., 947 F.3d\\n 1322, 1340 (11th Cir. 2020).\\n The State’s disparate treatment of Humphreys and the Cov-\\n ered Inmates rationally relates to these two interests. Particularly\\n at the time the State entered into the Agreement, it was more than\\n reasonable to think that the inmates whose appeals finished during\\n the COVID-19 Emergency Period would face the greatest risk of\\n impaired clemency proceedings and pre-execution litigation. Ex-\\n tending additional notice and procedural guarantees to those pris-\\n oners addressed the greatest need. 7\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 The draft memorandum of understanding also recognized that the parties\\n\\n “d[id] not wish to be overwhelmed with protracted litigation concerning\\n counsel’s inability to prepare for clemency proceedings.” The State could sen-\\n sibly have believed that litigation by prisoners whose clemency hearings came\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 17\\n\\n But meanwhile, the State’s interest in carrying out criminal\\n penalties, including death sentences, is also legitimate. And the line\\n the State drew in the Agreement helped to further that interest.\\n The parties were addressing the severe restrictions prisoners and\\n their counsel faced at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. But\\n in 2021, the State couldn’t know precisely when a court would con-\\n sider the Agreement’s visitation and vaccination conditions to be\\n satisfied. (Indeed, the State may be surprised that it is still litigating\\n the issue in state court four-and-a-half years later.) Restricting the\\n Agreement to inmates who exhausted their appeals during the\\n COVID-19 Emergency Period put a rational limit on the potential\\n unexpected effects of the Agreement.\\n Today’s circumstances bear out the rationality of that\\n choice. Over four years after the COVID-19 Emergency Period\\n ended, life has returned to a more normal state. Even so, Georgia\\n courts have determined that there’s a likelihood that the Covered\\n Inmates could establish that two of the conditions of the Agree-\\n ment have not yet been satisfied.\\n Still, the State has a legitimate interest in carrying out its le-\\n gally imposed criminal sentences, especially when they have been\\n pending for so long. Without the distinction in the Agreement,\\n that interest would be completely frustrated, as to all death-sen-\\n tenced prisoners. If that were a risk of entering the Agreement,\\n the State might reasonably have refused to make any guarantee of\\n\\n at the height of COVID-19-related restrictions could be particularly conten-\\n tious.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n procedural adequacy. So the State may proceed with executions of\\n individuals whose appeals were exhausted after the COVID-19 Ju-\\n dicial Emergency, whose executions the Agreement does not pur-\\n port to prohibit.\\n Ultimately, then, the Agreement’s classification rationally re-\\n lates to both legitimate government interests. A State official could\\n believe that the classification promoted the State’s interests in en-\\n suring procedural fairness (and avoiding litigation about inade-\\n quate procedure) while minimizing the possible threat to its inter-\\n est in expeditiously carrying out death sentences. The rational ba-\\n sis test requires no more.\\n\\n B. Due Process\\n\\n Humphreys also makes a procedural-due-process claim. He\\n contends that the State’s efforts to execute him without the proce-\\n dural guarantees the Agreement offers to Covered Inmates violates\\n the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. But Hum-\\n phreys doesn’t allege constitutionally inadequate process. So this\\n claim cannot succeed. As a result, Humphreys hasn’t shown a sub-\\n stantial likelihood of success on his appeal of this claim, either.\\n To succeed on a procedural-due-process claim, a plaintiff\\n must show “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty\\n or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inade-\\n quate process.” Howard v. Coonrod, 134 F.4th 1136, 1149 (11th Cir.\\n 2025) (quoting Resnick v. KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028, 1035 (11th\\n Cir. 2022)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 19 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 19\\n\\n Humphreys asserts two liberty interests. We consider each,\\n in turn, under the procedural-due-process framework.\\n First, Humphreys invokes a federally protected liberty inter-\\n est in his clemency proceedings. That interest finds support in Jus-\\n tice O’Connor’s binding opinion in Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289\\n (O’Connor, J., concurring). Her opinion recognizes “a due process\\n interest in the context of state clemency proceedings for death row\\n inmates.” Gissendaner v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 794 F.3d 1327,\\n 1331 (11th Cir. 2015). And to the extent that Humphreys feels he\\n had inadequate time to prepare for clemency or pre-execution liti-\\n gation, it was state action that so deprived him.\\n But the interest Woodard recognizes requires only “some\\n minimal procedural safeguards.” Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Con-\", \"author\": \"nor\"}, {\"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"nor, J., concurring); see Gissendaner, 794 F.3d at 1331. For that rea-\\n son, Humphreys hasn’t satisfied the third element of his proce-\\n dural-due-process claim. He hasn’t shown how the clemency pro-\\n ceedings available to him are constitutionally inadequate.\\n Woodard is instructive. There, the prisoner received just\\n three days’ notice of his clemency interview, and his attorney was\\n excluded from the interview. Woodard, 523 U.S. at 289 (O’Connor,\\n J., concurring). The prisoner also received only ten days’ notice of\\n his clemency hearing and was “precluded from testifying or sub-\\n mitting documentary evidence.” Id. None of those facts posed a\\n constitutional problem. Gissendaner, 794 F.3d at 1331 (11th Cir.\\n 2015) (discussing Woodard).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 20 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n Here, Humphreys had at least fourteen days’ notice of his\\n clemency hearing, which is scheduled for December 16, 2025. He\\n hasn’t presented this Court with any reason why he can’t fully\\n make his case for clemency on that date. 8\\n Second, Humphreys contends that he has a state-created lib-\\n erty interest in adequate representation for clemency proceedings\\n and pre-execution litigation. He asserts that the Agreement cre-\\n ated a state liberty interest in adequate representation for all death-\\n row prisoners.\\n Even assuming without deciding that Humphreys has a lib-\\n erty interest in the Agreement’s procedural guarantees, his claim\\n fails. Again, the third element of a procedural-due-process claim\\n requires a showing of constitutionally inadequate process. Hum-\\n phreys’s brief recognizes this requirement. But neither his com-\\n plaint nor his submission to this Court identifies any impediment\\n to his ability to pursue clemency or pre-execution litigation. His\\n allegation that “[l]egal visitation to death row prisoners remains se-\\n verely restricted, as compared to the pre-pandemic conditions” isn’t\\n\\n\\n 8 In district court, Humphreys submitted an affidavit from a prior counsel, Jill\\n\\n Benton, suggesting that the timing of his clemency hearing would prevent the\\n “ideal advocate” for Humphreys from participating. Benton asserted that this\\n ideal advocate, the trial counsel for Humphreys’s original hearing, is inti-\\n mately familiar with the alleged jury misconduct in Humphreys’s trial, which\\n led several Justices to dissent from denial of certiorari. Humphreys v. Emmons,\\n No. 24-826, 607 U.S. ___, 2025 WL 2906475, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 14, 2025) (So-\", \"author\": \"nor\"}, {\"type\": \"dissent\", \"author\": \"tomayor\", \"text\": \"tomayor, J., dissenting). Humphreys hasn’t made any argument to this Court\\n about his trial counsel’s inability to participate.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 21 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 21\\n\\n enough. He doesn’t explain how limited visitation has affected his\\n preparation for clemency or pre-execution litigation.\\n The Due Process Clause mandates “fundamental fairness.”\\n Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987). We cannot say that\\n the process available to Humphreys falls below that line.\\n\\n C. Additional Stay Factors\\n\\n 1. Irreparable Injury\\n As Humphreys emphasized, it is “self-evident” that a death-\\n sentenced inmate will suffer an irreparable injury if the State car-\\n ries out his execution. See In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1177 (11th\\n Cir. 2003). But that is true of every motion for a stay of execution.\\n Humphreys must show how he will be irreparably injured by the\\n denial of the procedures in the Agreement, not injured as a conse-\\n quence of his original criminal conviction and sentence. The irre-\\n versible nature of the death penalty cannot, on its own, justify a\\n stay.\\n 2. Balance of Harms\\n Neither of Humphreys’s arguments about the balance of\\n harms tips this factor in his favor. Humphreys argues that refrain-\\n ing from an unconstitutional execution cannot harm the State. But\\n that argument relies on the strength of Humphreys’s merits argu-\\n ments. And as we’ve discussed, he’s failed to make a showing on\\n the substantial-likelihood-of-success factor. So a stay would harm\\n the State’s interest in timely enforcement of its criminal sentences.\\n See Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 22 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n Humphreys also asserts that he should not be penalized for\\n waiting until the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiori on his habeas\\n appeal before filing this litigation. He notes that another court in\\n the Northern District of Georgia had ruled a prisoner lacked stand-\\n ing when he filed nearly identical litigation while his petition for\\n certiorari was pending. 9 Still, this argument can’t help Humphreys\\n tip this factor in his direction. Even assuming he acted with the\\n utmost diligence, he hasn’t given any reason that the balance of\\n harms favors him.\\n 3. Adversity to the Public Interest\\n On the public-interest factor, too, Humphreys’s failure on\\n the merits undermines his argument. Humphreys invokes the pub-\\n lic’s interest in ensuring that government officials comply with the\\n U.S. Constitution. That’s surely a weighty interest. But Hum-\\n phreys hasn’t made a meaningful showing that his execution would\\n violate the Constitution. And the U.S. Supreme Court instructs\\n that, besides the State, “the victims of crime have an important in-\\n terest in the timely enforcement of a sentence.” Hill, 547 U.S. at\\n 584. That is enough for the public interest to weigh against a stay.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 Our Court is weighing an appeal of that decision. See Pace v. Comm’r, Ga.\\n Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-13973 (11th Cir. argued Oct. 20, 2025).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 23 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 23\\n\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n\\n Humphreys has failed to show a substantial likelihood of\\n success on his appeal. He also hasn’t established that the second,\\n third, or fourth stay factors support a stay.\\n For these reasons, Humphreys’s emergency motion for stay\\n of execution pending appeal is DENIED.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":4,"string":"4"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758304/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Stacey Humphreys v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 25-14325\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n STACEY IAN HUMPHREYS,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF\n CORRECTIONS,\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,\n WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION\n PRISON,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-06100-LMM\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n BY THE COURT:\n In 2006, a Cobb County Superior Court jury found Plaintiff-\n Appellant Stacey Ian Humphreys guilty of two counts of malice\n murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated\n assault, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, and two\n counts of armed robbery. The same jury found several statutory\n aggravating circumstances applied and recommended a sentence\n of death.\n The trial court agreed and imposed a death sentence for\n each murder, along with sentences of imprisonment for Hum-\n phreys’s other convictions. Humphreys then exhausted his direct\n appeals and collateral review. Given the status of Humphreys’s\n challenges to his convictions and sentences, the State of Georgia\n obtained a warrant on December 1, 2025, for Humphreys’s execu-\n tion. His execution is scheduled for December 17, 2025.\n Meanwhile, before the execution warrant issued, Hum-\n phreys filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his execution\n would violate his equal-protection and due-process rights under\n the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He based his claims on\n Georgia’s written agreement with, among others, the Federal De-\n fender Program, Inc. (“Federal Defender”), to not resume execu-\n tions until after certain conditions related to the COVID-19 pan-\n demic are satisfied. And Georgia courts have held that the agree-\n ment likely hasn’t been fully satisfied.\n But there’s a catch. By its terms, the agreement applies to\n only those inmates whose final appeal in the Eleventh Circuit\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 3\n\n concluded during Georgia’s COVID-19 judicial emergency. Hum-\n phreys falls outside that group. We denied Humphreys’s last peti-\n tion for rehearing more than three years after the Chief Justice of\n the Georgia Supreme Court lifted the final COVID-19 judicial\n emergency order.\n In Humphreys’s view, the agreement’s classification of\n which inmates are covered and which are not violates the Equal\n Protection and Due Process Clauses. So in the district court, Hum-\n phreys moved to enjoin his execution based on those constitutional\n concerns. Humphreys also sought a temporary restraining order\n or preliminary injunction enjoining his execution until his claims\n were resolved. The district court held a hearing on Humphreys’s\n claims and denied them.\n Now, Humphreys seeks an emergency stay of his execution\n pending resolution of his appeal of the district court’s order dis-\n missing his § 1983 claims. Because Humphreys has not established\n that he is substantially likely to succeed on his appeal, we deny his\n motion.\n\n I. BACKGROUND\n\n We have previously set forth the facts on Humphreys’s\n crimes, convictions, and appeal history. See Humphreys v. Warden,\n Ga. Diagnostic Prison, No. 21-10387, 2024 WL 2945070, *1–9 (11th\n Cir. June 11, 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Humphreys v. Emmons, 607\n U.S. ___, 2025 WL 2906475 (Mem.) (Oct. 14, 2025). Because they\n are not directly relevant to the legal challenge before us and\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n because of time constraints, we do not repeat them here. Rather,\n we focus on the background underlying Humphreys’s § 1983\n claims.\n\n A. The Agreement\n\n In May 2020, the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme\n Court established a task force on “measures to address the chal-\n lenges facing the courts and affected parties as a result of the\n COVID-19 pandemic.” State v. Fed. Def. Program, Inc., 882 S.E.2d\n 257, 265 (Ga. 2022). Among other issues, the task force set out to\n address “the capital defense bar’s concerns about how the re-\n strictions necessitated by COVID-19 had resulted in a backlog of\n execution-eligible inmates.” Id. 1 As the defense bar explained, the\n significant backlog had both “hindered capital defense counsel’s\n ability to prioritize clemency investigations for a growing number\n of inmates eligible for execution” and had “impaired counsel’s abil-\n ity to meet with their clients and conduct investigations in order to\n prepare for clemency proceedings and adequately represent their\n clients.” Id.\n To address this concern, Georgia’s Deputy Attorney Gen-\n eral of its Criminal Justice Division agreed with the capital-defense\n\n\n 1 The Georgia Supreme Court explained that a death-sentenced prisoner be-\n\n comes “execution-eligible” when he has exhausted his appeals upon the U.S.\n Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on his federal habeas appeal. Fed. Def.\n Prog., 882 S.E.2d at 266 n.4. The State may then seek a judicial order, com-\n monly called an “execution warrant,” authorizing the prisoner’s execution.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 5\n\n bar not to seek execution warrants for certain execution-eligible\n defendants until three conditions were satisfied. An email from the\n State (“Agreement”) set out those conditions:\n [The Criminal Justice Division] will not pursue an ex-\n ecution warrant from the District Attorney in the be-\n low defined cases before: 1) the final COVID19 judi-\n cial emergency order entered by the Chief Justice of\n the Supreme Court of Georgia expires; 2) the Georgia\n Department of Corrections lifts its suspension of legal\n visitation, and normal visitation resumes; and 3) a\n vaccination against COVID19 is readily available to\n all members of the public.\n Id. at 266 (brackets omitted). The Attorney General’s Office also\n generally agreed “not [to] pursue an execution warrant of any pris-\n oner . . . before a total of at least six months after” all three condi-\n tions in the Agreement were satisfied. Id.\n But this Agreement applied to only “death-sentenced pris-\n oners whose petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied\n by the Eleventh Circuit while the State of Georgia remained under\n judicial emergency order.” Id. And that period lasted from March\n 14, 2020, through June 30, 2021 (“COVID-19 Emergency Period”).\n Id. at 265 n.3.\n\n B. State v. Federal Defender Program, 882 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 2022)\n\n In 2022, Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Virgil\n Presnell, an execution-eligible prisoner whose petition the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n Eleventh Circuit denied during the COVID-19 Emergency Period.\n Id. at 266, 279 n.15. The Federal Defender responded by filing a\n complaint against Georgia alleging a breach of the Agreement. Id.\n at 267. Georgia courts, including the Georgia Supreme Court on\n review, determined that the Federal Defender had shown a substan-\n tial likelihood that the Agreement was valid and binding. See id. at\n 269–81. They also held that the second and third conditions of the\n Agreement—that the Georgia Department of Corrections re-\n sumes its normal visitation and that a COVID-19 vaccine is “readily\n available to all members of the public” 2—were likely not satisfied\n when Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Presnell. See id.\n at 285–86. And because the Eleventh Circuit denied Presnell’s peti-\n tion during the COVID-19 Emergency Period, the courts con-\n cluded, the Agreement bound the State with respect to his execu-\n tion. See id. at 267, 279 n.15.\n Then, in May 2025, a Georgia trial court permanently en-\n joined State officials from seeking execution warrants against Cov-\n ered Inmates. Order, Fed. Def. Program, Inc. v. State of Georgia, No.\n 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 29, 2025). The court concluded\n that, at a minimum, the vaccination condition is not satisfied be-\n cause the COVID-19 vaccine is not readily available for children\n\n\n\n\n 2 “[C]hildren under the age of five still were not eligible for any COVID-19\n\n vaccine.” Fed. Def. Program, 882 S.E.2d at 285.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 7\n\n under six months old. Id. at 10. 3 The State has appealed that deci-\n sion to the Georgia Supreme Court. 4\n\n C. Proceedings in the District Court\n\n On October 24, 2025, Humphreys filed this action in the dis-\n trict court. As we’ve explained, he alleged that Georgia cannot ex-\n ecute him without violating his rights to equal protection and due\n process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hum-\n phreys’s view, with the Agreement, the State has created two clas-\n ses of execution-eligible prisoners: those who are subject to the\n Agreement and those who aren’t, and the only difference between\n the situations of the two is when the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the\n prisoners’ collateral-review petitions. Humphreys argued that clas-\n sification is arbitrary. He also contended that the State’s failure to\n provide him with the same protections as those covered by the\n Agreement violates due process.\n Soon after filing his complaint, Humphreys moved for a stay\n of proceedings pending the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Pace v. Oli-\n ver, another case that raised the same claims on behalf of other\n prisoners sentenced to death. The district court hearing that case\n dismissed it after determining the plaintiffs lacked standing because\n\n\n 3 Based on bifurcation of the case, the trial court did not reach the question of\n\n whether the second condition is satisfied. Order at 2 n.1, Fed. Def. Program,\n No. 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 30, 2025).\n 4 Georgia doesn’t argue in the instant case that the second and third conditions\n\n of the Agreement have since been satisfied.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n they hadn’t yet had warrants for their executions issued. Pace v. Ol-\n iver, 749 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1316–17 (N.D. Ga. 2024). The Pace plain-\n tiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in that\n case, which remains pending.\n While Humphreys’s motion to stay proceedings until the\n resolution of Pace was pending, the State moved to dismiss Hum-\n phreys’s case for failure to state a claim. Then, on December 1,\n 2025, the State obtained a warrant for Humphreys’s execution. So\n on December 5, Humphreys moved for a temporary restraining or-\n der or preliminary injunction preventing his execution. He based\n his motion on the same premises as his original complaint: that the\n State had violated his rights to equal protection and due process\n under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\n On December 10, The district court heard argument on the\n State’s motion to dismiss and Humphreys’s motion for a temporary\n restraining order or preliminary injunction. Later that same day,\n the district court issued an order denying Humphreys’s motions for\n stay and for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-\n tion and granting the State’s motion to dismiss. And the next day,\n the court entered judgment dismissing the case.\n Humphreys appealed.\n On December 12, 2025, he filed an emergency motion for an\n order staying execution pending appeal. In support of his motion,\n Humphreys argues he is substantially likely to succeed on the mer-\n its of his appeal. That is, he asserts that the State has violated his\n equal-protection and due-process rights under the Fifth and\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 9\n\n Fourteenth Amendments. He also contends that the other stay fac-\n tors—irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, no substantial\n harm to the State, and a lack of adversity to the public interest—\n favor him. We consider Humphreys’s emergency motion below.\n\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\n\n To obtain a stay of his execution pending appeal, Hum-\n phreys must show that “(1) he has a substantial likelihood of suc-\n cess on the merits” of his appeal, “(2) he will suffer irreparable in-\n jury unless the injunction issues; (3) the stay would not substan-\n tially harm the other litigant; and (4) if issued, the injunction would\n not be adverse to the public interest.” James v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,\n 130 F.4th 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d\n 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied sub nom. James v. Dixon, 145\n S. Ct. 1351 (2025).\n\n III. DISCUSSION\n\n Humphreys argues that he has shown a substantial likeli-\n hood of success on his appeal of the district court’s rulings on both\n his Equal Protection and Due Process Clause claims. We address\n each claim in turn.\n Then, we briefly assess Humphreys’s showing on the other\n three stay factors: whether Humphreys will suffer irreparable harm\n absent a stay, the balance of harms, and the public interest.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 10 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n A. Equal Protection\n\n Humphreys contends that the State’s disparate treatment of\n two sets of death row prisoners violates the Equal Protection\n Clause. [Br. at 5.] The first set is death-sentenced prisoners for\n whom the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing on their final habeas\n appeal during Georgia’s COVID-19 Emergency Period, which\n ended on June 30, 2021 (the “Covered Inmates”). The second set,\n which includes Humphreys, consists of the inmates whose final ap-\n peals in the Eleventh Circuit finished after June 30, 2021 (the “Non-\n covered Inmates).\n In considering Humphreys’s claim, we engage in a two-step\n analysis. Humphreys “must first show that ‘the State will treat him\n disparately from other similarly situated persons.’” Price v. Comm’r,\n Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arthur\n v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012)). If he does, at the\n second step, we determine and apply the appropriate tier of scru-\n tiny. Courts subject a classification to heightened scrutiny only if\n it implicates a fundamental right or targets a suspect or quasi-sus-\n pect class. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir.\n 2020) (en banc). If heightened scrutiny doesn’t apply, Humphreys\n “must show that the disparate treatment is not rationally related to\n a legitimate government interest.” Price, 920 F.3d at 1323 (quoting\n DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011)).\n 1. Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Persons\n To start with, Humphreys has shown that the State is treat-\n ing similarly situated people dissimilarly. Prisoners in both classes\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 11\n\n are execution-eligible, in that they have completed their postcon-\n viction appeals. So but for the Agreement at issue in this case, then,\n the State is equally entitled to move forward with obtaining an ex-\n ecution warrant for prisoners in either group.\n Despite that similarity, the State has agreed not to seek exe-\n cution warrants for the Covered Inmates. But it has obtained an\n execution warrant for Humphreys and executed at least one other\n member of the Non-covered Inmates. 5\n Equal-protection analysis applies to this disparate treatment.\n To explain why, two points bear emphasis.\n First, Humphreys and the Covered Inmates are similarly sit-\n uated. The State contends that Humphreys’s circumstances are dis-\n similar to those of the Covered Inmates because he is “excluded as\n a party to the Agreement by its plain terms.” But that circular rea-\n soning misses the point. The equal-protection question asks\n whether the distinction between the two classes rationally relates\n to a legitimate government interest. In other words, the whole\n\n\n 5 The state obtained an execution warrant for William James Pye on February\n\n 29, 2024, and executed him on March 20, 2024. Shortly before his execution,\n Pye sued a collection of state officials in federal district court based on similar\n constitutional arguments to the ones Humphreys asserts in this case. See Pye\n v. Oliver, No. 3:24-CV-48-TCB, 2024 WL 1173742, at *3–9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15,\n 2024). The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a\n claim. Id. at *10. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits\n of Pye’s claims, relying on alternative grounds of res judicata because Pye had\n already litigated similar claims in state court. See Pye v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep't of\n Corr., No. 24-10793, 2024 WL 1201741, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 12 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n point is to decide whether the date a prisoner’s appeal concludes is\n a valid reason to exclude him from the Agreement’s procedural\n guarantees. The distinction the State draws can’t be its own justifi-\n cation.\n And second, we are talking about a governmental distinction\n between the two classes of prisoners. The State writes at length\n about how capital defense attorneys participated in the negotia-\n tions leading to the Agreement. But so what? To be sure, Hum-\n phreys must allege that “through state action, similarly situated per-\n sons have been treated disparately.” Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d\n 1270, 1278 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added and quotation\n marks omitted)). But the fact that the State’s compliance with the\n Agreement it voluntarily entered serves as the basis for its disparate\n treatment of the Covered and Non-covered Inmates makes no dif-\n ference to the bottom line: the State is treating similarly situated\n people differently. And the State chose to bind itself in the Agree-\n ment to engage in and to refrain from engaging in particular ac-\n tions.\n The Equal Protection Clause has no per se exception for con-\n tractual agreements with private entities. See, e.g., Price v. City of\n Chicago, 251 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (analyzing, under the\n Equal Protection Clause, the “City’s practice of using date of birth\n to determine seniority[, which] is memorialized in a collective bar-\n gaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of\n Police”); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Ed., 473 F.2d 629, 633, 636 (2d Cir.\n 1973) (holding that a contractual term mandating maternity leave\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 13\n\n without pay for pregnant workers, contained in a collective-bar-\n gaining agreement between town school board and a labor organ-\n ization, violated the Equal Protection Clause).\n And our conclusion remains the same even if we assume\n that acquiescing to a private party’s contractual demands can, in\n some circumstances, make disparate treatment not attributable to\n state action. Here, the State proposed the key distinction. Its April\n 14, 2021, email was the first to limit the entire contract’s reach\n “only to death-sentenced prisoners whose petition for rehearing or\n rehearing en banc was denied by the Eleventh Circuit while the\n State of Georgia remained under judicial emergency order.” The\n draft memorandum of understanding that a capital defense bar at-\n torney had previously circulated was broader. It would have barred\n the State from seeking an execution warrant for any prisoner until\n all three conditions were met. Only one provision, which required\n the State to wait a minimum period between seeking each execu-\n tion warrant, applied to the narrower set.\n Without more, the government cannot avoid the Equal Pro-\n tection Clause’s guarantees simply by creating a classification with\n a contract.\n 2. Rational-basis Review\n Next, we determine and apply the appropriate level of scru-\n tiny. Rational-basis review applies in this case, and the State satisfies\n that deferential standard.\n Humphreys asserts that heightened scrutiny applies for one\n of two reasons, but neither is convincing. Humphreys first argues\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 14 Order of the Court 25-14325\n\n that the classification infringes his “fundamental right to life” and\n thereby triggers strict scrutiny.\n We determine whether an asserted right is fundamental—\n and therefore merits strict scrutiny—in two steps. “[W]e must\n begin with a ‘careful description of the asserted right.’” Morrissey v.\n United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe v.\n Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005)). Then, we must deter-\n mine whether that right “is one of ‘those fundamental rights and\n liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-\n tory and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”\n Id. (quoting Doe, 410 F.3d at 1343).\n Humphreys has not advanced a carefully defined, funda-\n mental right. He contends that, as a death-sentenced prisoner, his\n “right to continue living” for even one additional day warrants\n strict scrutiny. Yet he provides no authority for that view. To be\n sure, he invokes Justice O’Connor’s precedential opinion in Ohio\n Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard. 6 But that opinion states only that\n a death-sentenced prisoner has “an interest in his life” that warrants\n “some minimal procedural safeguards” in clemency proceedings.\n Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Con-\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Stacey Humphreys v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-14325\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n STACEY IAN HUMPHREYS,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF\\n CORRECTIONS,\\n ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF GEORGIA,\\n WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION\\n PRISON,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-06100-LMM\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n BY THE COURT:\\n In 2006, a Cobb County Superior Court jury found Plaintiff-\\n Appellant Stacey Ian Humphreys guilty of two counts of malice\\n murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated\\n assault, two counts of kidnapping with bodily injury, and two\\n counts of armed robbery. The same jury found several statutory\\n aggravating circumstances applied and recommended a sentence\\n of death.\\n The trial court agreed and imposed a death sentence for\\n each murder, along with sentences of imprisonment for Hum-\\n phreys’s other convictions. Humphreys then exhausted his direct\\n appeals and collateral review. Given the status of Humphreys’s\\n challenges to his convictions and sentences, the State of Georgia\\n obtained a warrant on December 1, 2025, for Humphreys’s execu-\\n tion. His execution is scheduled for December 17, 2025.\\n Meanwhile, before the execution warrant issued, Hum-\\n phreys filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging his execution\\n would violate his equal-protection and due-process rights under\\n the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He based his claims on\\n Georgia’s written agreement with, among others, the Federal De-\\n fender Program, Inc. (“Federal Defender”), to not resume execu-\\n tions until after certain conditions related to the COVID-19 pan-\\n demic are satisfied. And Georgia courts have held that the agree-\\n ment likely hasn’t been fully satisfied.\\n But there’s a catch. By its terms, the agreement applies to\\n only those inmates whose final appeal in the Eleventh Circuit\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 3\\n\\n concluded during Georgia’s COVID-19 judicial emergency. Hum-\\n phreys falls outside that group. We denied Humphreys’s last peti-\\n tion for rehearing more than three years after the Chief Justice of\\n the Georgia Supreme Court lifted the final COVID-19 judicial\\n emergency order.\\n In Humphreys’s view, the agreement’s classification of\\n which inmates are covered and which are not violates the Equal\\n Protection and Due Process Clauses. So in the district court, Hum-\\n phreys moved to enjoin his execution based on those constitutional\\n concerns. Humphreys also sought a temporary restraining order\\n or preliminary injunction enjoining his execution until his claims\\n were resolved. The district court held a hearing on Humphreys’s\\n claims and denied them.\\n Now, Humphreys seeks an emergency stay of his execution\\n pending resolution of his appeal of the district court’s order dis-\\n missing his § 1983 claims. Because Humphreys has not established\\n that he is substantially likely to succeed on his appeal, we deny his\\n motion.\\n\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n\\n We have previously set forth the facts on Humphreys’s\\n crimes, convictions, and appeal history. See Humphreys v. Warden,\\n Ga. Diagnostic Prison, No. 21-10387, 2024 WL 2945070, *1–9 (11th\\n Cir. June 11, 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Humphreys v. Emmons, 607\\n U.S. ___, 2025 WL 2906475 (Mem.) (Oct. 14, 2025). Because they\\n are not directly relevant to the legal challenge before us and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n because of time constraints, we do not repeat them here. Rather,\\n we focus on the background underlying Humphreys’s § 1983\\n claims.\\n\\n A. The Agreement\\n\\n In May 2020, the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme\\n Court established a task force on “measures to address the chal-\\n lenges facing the courts and affected parties as a result of the\\n COVID-19 pandemic.” State v. Fed. Def. Program, Inc., 882 S.E.2d\\n 257, 265 (Ga. 2022). Among other issues, the task force set out to\\n address “the capital defense bar’s concerns about how the re-\\n strictions necessitated by COVID-19 had resulted in a backlog of\\n execution-eligible inmates.” Id. 1 As the defense bar explained, the\\n significant backlog had both “hindered capital defense counsel’s\\n ability to prioritize clemency investigations for a growing number\\n of inmates eligible for execution” and had “impaired counsel’s abil-\\n ity to meet with their clients and conduct investigations in order to\\n prepare for clemency proceedings and adequately represent their\\n clients.” Id.\\n To address this concern, Georgia’s Deputy Attorney Gen-\\n eral of its Criminal Justice Division agreed with the capital-defense\\n\\n\\n 1 The Georgia Supreme Court explained that a death-sentenced prisoner be-\\n\\n comes “execution-eligible” when he has exhausted his appeals upon the U.S.\\n Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on his federal habeas appeal. Fed. Def.\\n Prog., 882 S.E.2d at 266 n.4. The State may then seek a judicial order, com-\\n monly called an “execution warrant,” authorizing the prisoner’s execution.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 5\\n\\n bar not to seek execution warrants for certain execution-eligible\\n defendants until three conditions were satisfied. An email from the\\n State (“Agreement”) set out those conditions:\\n [The Criminal Justice Division] will not pursue an ex-\\n ecution warrant from the District Attorney in the be-\\n low defined cases before: 1) the final COVID19 judi-\\n cial emergency order entered by the Chief Justice of\\n the Supreme Court of Georgia expires; 2) the Georgia\\n Department of Corrections lifts its suspension of legal\\n visitation, and normal visitation resumes; and 3) a\\n vaccination against COVID19 is readily available to\\n all members of the public.\\n Id. at 266 (brackets omitted). The Attorney General’s Office also\\n generally agreed “not [to] pursue an execution warrant of any pris-\\n oner . . . before a total of at least six months after” all three condi-\\n tions in the Agreement were satisfied. Id.\\n But this Agreement applied to only “death-sentenced pris-\\n oners whose petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied\\n by the Eleventh Circuit while the State of Georgia remained under\\n judicial emergency order.” Id. And that period lasted from March\\n 14, 2020, through June 30, 2021 (“COVID-19 Emergency Period”).\\n Id. at 265 n.3.\\n\\n B. State v. Federal Defender Program, 882 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. 2022)\\n\\n In 2022, Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Virgil\\n Presnell, an execution-eligible prisoner whose petition the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n Eleventh Circuit denied during the COVID-19 Emergency Period.\\n Id. at 266, 279 n.15. The Federal Defender responded by filing a\\n complaint against Georgia alleging a breach of the Agreement. Id.\\n at 267. Georgia courts, including the Georgia Supreme Court on\\n review, determined that the Federal Defender had shown a substan-\\n tial likelihood that the Agreement was valid and binding. See id. at\\n 269–81. They also held that the second and third conditions of the\\n Agreement—that the Georgia Department of Corrections re-\\n sumes its normal visitation and that a COVID-19 vaccine is “readily\\n available to all members of the public” 2—were likely not satisfied\\n when Georgia obtained an execution warrant for Presnell. See id.\\n at 285–86. And because the Eleventh Circuit denied Presnell’s peti-\\n tion during the COVID-19 Emergency Period, the courts con-\\n cluded, the Agreement bound the State with respect to his execu-\\n tion. See id. at 267, 279 n.15.\\n Then, in May 2025, a Georgia trial court permanently en-\\n joined State officials from seeking execution warrants against Cov-\\n ered Inmates. Order, Fed. Def. Program, Inc. v. State of Georgia, No.\\n 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 29, 2025). The court concluded\\n that, at a minimum, the vaccination condition is not satisfied be-\\n cause the COVID-19 vaccine is not readily available for children\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 “[C]hildren under the age of five still were not eligible for any COVID-19\\n\\n vaccine.” Fed. Def. Program, 882 S.E.2d at 285.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 7\\n\\n under six months old. Id. at 10. 3 The State has appealed that deci-\\n sion to the Georgia Supreme Court. 4\\n\\n C. Proceedings in the District Court\\n\\n On October 24, 2025, Humphreys filed this action in the dis-\\n trict court. As we’ve explained, he alleged that Georgia cannot ex-\\n ecute him without violating his rights to equal protection and due\\n process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Hum-\\n phreys’s view, with the Agreement, the State has created two clas-\\n ses of execution-eligible prisoners: those who are subject to the\\n Agreement and those who aren’t, and the only difference between\\n the situations of the two is when the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the\\n prisoners’ collateral-review petitions. Humphreys argued that clas-\\n sification is arbitrary. He also contended that the State’s failure to\\n provide him with the same protections as those covered by the\\n Agreement violates due process.\\n Soon after filing his complaint, Humphreys moved for a stay\\n of proceedings pending the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Pace v. Oli-\\n ver, another case that raised the same claims on behalf of other\\n prisoners sentenced to death. The district court hearing that case\\n dismissed it after determining the plaintiffs lacked standing because\\n\\n\\n 3 Based on bifurcation of the case, the trial court did not reach the question of\\n\\n whether the second condition is satisfied. Order at 2 n.1, Fed. Def. Program,\\n No. 2022CV364429 (Ga. Super. Ct. May 30, 2025).\\n 4 Georgia doesn’t argue in the instant case that the second and third conditions\\n\\n of the Agreement have since been satisfied.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n they hadn’t yet had warrants for their executions issued. Pace v. Ol-\\n iver, 749 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1316–17 (N.D. Ga. 2024). The Pace plain-\\n tiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in that\\n case, which remains pending.\\n While Humphreys’s motion to stay proceedings until the\\n resolution of Pace was pending, the State moved to dismiss Hum-\\n phreys’s case for failure to state a claim. Then, on December 1,\\n 2025, the State obtained a warrant for Humphreys’s execution. So\\n on December 5, Humphreys moved for a temporary restraining or-\\n der or preliminary injunction preventing his execution. He based\\n his motion on the same premises as his original complaint: that the\\n State had violated his rights to equal protection and due process\\n under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.\\n On December 10, The district court heard argument on the\\n State’s motion to dismiss and Humphreys’s motion for a temporary\\n restraining order or preliminary injunction. Later that same day,\\n the district court issued an order denying Humphreys’s motions for\\n stay and for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunc-\\n tion and granting the State’s motion to dismiss. And the next day,\\n the court entered judgment dismissing the case.\\n Humphreys appealed.\\n On December 12, 2025, he filed an emergency motion for an\\n order staying execution pending appeal. In support of his motion,\\n Humphreys argues he is substantially likely to succeed on the mer-\\n its of his appeal. That is, he asserts that the State has violated his\\n equal-protection and due-process rights under the Fifth and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 9\\n\\n Fourteenth Amendments. He also contends that the other stay fac-\\n tors—irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, no substantial\\n harm to the State, and a lack of adversity to the public interest—\\n favor him. We consider Humphreys’s emergency motion below.\\n\\n II. LEGAL STANDARD\\n\\n To obtain a stay of his execution pending appeal, Hum-\\n phreys must show that “(1) he has a substantial likelihood of suc-\\n cess on the merits” of his appeal, “(2) he will suffer irreparable in-\\n jury unless the injunction issues; (3) the stay would not substan-\\n tially harm the other litigant; and (4) if issued, the injunction would\\n not be adverse to the public interest.” James v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,\\n 130 F.4th 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting Valle v. Singer, 655 F.3d\\n 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2011)), cert. denied sub nom. James v. Dixon, 145\\n S. Ct. 1351 (2025).\\n\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n\\n Humphreys argues that he has shown a substantial likeli-\\n hood of success on his appeal of the district court’s rulings on both\\n his Equal Protection and Due Process Clause claims. We address\\n each claim in turn.\\n Then, we briefly assess Humphreys’s showing on the other\\n three stay factors: whether Humphreys will suffer irreparable harm\\n absent a stay, the balance of harms, and the public interest.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n A. Equal Protection\\n\\n Humphreys contends that the State’s disparate treatment of\\n two sets of death row prisoners violates the Equal Protection\\n Clause. [Br. at 5.] The first set is death-sentenced prisoners for\\n whom the Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing on their final habeas\\n appeal during Georgia’s COVID-19 Emergency Period, which\\n ended on June 30, 2021 (the “Covered Inmates”). The second set,\\n which includes Humphreys, consists of the inmates whose final ap-\\n peals in the Eleventh Circuit finished after June 30, 2021 (the “Non-\\n covered Inmates).\\n In considering Humphreys’s claim, we engage in a two-step\\n analysis. Humphreys “must first show that ‘the State will treat him\\n disparately from other similarly situated persons.’” Price v. Comm’r,\\n Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Arthur\\n v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012)). If he does, at the\\n second step, we determine and apply the appropriate tier of scru-\\n tiny. Courts subject a classification to heightened scrutiny only if\\n it implicates a fundamental right or targets a suspect or quasi-sus-\\n pect class. See Jones v. Governor of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1029 (11th Cir.\\n 2020) (en banc). If heightened scrutiny doesn’t apply, Humphreys\\n “must show that the disparate treatment is not rationally related to\\n a legitimate government interest.” Price, 920 F.3d at 1323 (quoting\\n DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (11th Cir. 2011)).\\n 1. Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated Persons\\n To start with, Humphreys has shown that the State is treat-\\n ing similarly situated people dissimilarly. Prisoners in both classes\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 11\\n\\n are execution-eligible, in that they have completed their postcon-\\n viction appeals. So but for the Agreement at issue in this case, then,\\n the State is equally entitled to move forward with obtaining an ex-\\n ecution warrant for prisoners in either group.\\n Despite that similarity, the State has agreed not to seek exe-\\n cution warrants for the Covered Inmates. But it has obtained an\\n execution warrant for Humphreys and executed at least one other\\n member of the Non-covered Inmates. 5\\n Equal-protection analysis applies to this disparate treatment.\\n To explain why, two points bear emphasis.\\n First, Humphreys and the Covered Inmates are similarly sit-\\n uated. The State contends that Humphreys’s circumstances are dis-\\n similar to those of the Covered Inmates because he is “excluded as\\n a party to the Agreement by its plain terms.” But that circular rea-\\n soning misses the point. The equal-protection question asks\\n whether the distinction between the two classes rationally relates\\n to a legitimate government interest. In other words, the whole\\n\\n\\n 5 The state obtained an execution warrant for William James Pye on February\\n\\n 29, 2024, and executed him on March 20, 2024. Shortly before his execution,\\n Pye sued a collection of state officials in federal district court based on similar\\n constitutional arguments to the ones Humphreys asserts in this case. See Pye\\n v. Oliver, No. 3:24-CV-48-TCB, 2024 WL 1173742, at *3–9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15,\\n 2024). The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to state a\\n claim. Id. at *10. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed without reaching the merits\\n of Pye’s claims, relying on alternative grounds of res judicata because Pye had\\n already litigated similar claims in state court. See Pye v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep't of\\n Corr., No. 24-10793, 2024 WL 1201741, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n point is to decide whether the date a prisoner’s appeal concludes is\\n a valid reason to exclude him from the Agreement’s procedural\\n guarantees. The distinction the State draws can’t be its own justifi-\\n cation.\\n And second, we are talking about a governmental distinction\\n between the two classes of prisoners. The State writes at length\\n about how capital defense attorneys participated in the negotia-\\n tions leading to the Agreement. But so what? To be sure, Hum-\\n phreys must allege that “through state action, similarly situated per-\\n sons have been treated disparately.” Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d\\n 1270, 1278 n.14 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added and quotation\\n marks omitted)). But the fact that the State’s compliance with the\\n Agreement it voluntarily entered serves as the basis for its disparate\\n treatment of the Covered and Non-covered Inmates makes no dif-\\n ference to the bottom line: the State is treating similarly situated\\n people differently. And the State chose to bind itself in the Agree-\\n ment to engage in and to refrain from engaging in particular ac-\\n tions.\\n The Equal Protection Clause has no per se exception for con-\\n tractual agreements with private entities. See, e.g., Price v. City of\\n Chicago, 251 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2001) (analyzing, under the\\n Equal Protection Clause, the “City’s practice of using date of birth\\n to determine seniority[, which] is memorialized in a collective bar-\\n gaining agreement between the City and the Fraternal Order of\\n Police”); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Ed., 473 F.2d 629, 633, 636 (2d Cir.\\n 1973) (holding that a contractual term mandating maternity leave\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-14325 Order of the Court 13\\n\\n without pay for pregnant workers, contained in a collective-bar-\\n gaining agreement between town school board and a labor organ-\\n ization, violated the Equal Protection Clause).\\n And our conclusion remains the same even if we assume\\n that acquiescing to a private party’s contractual demands can, in\\n some circumstances, make disparate treatment not attributable to\\n state action. Here, the State proposed the key distinction. Its April\\n 14, 2021, email was the first to limit the entire contract’s reach\\n “only to death-sentenced prisoners whose petition for rehearing or\\n rehearing en banc was denied by the Eleventh Circuit while the\\n State of Georgia remained under judicial emergency order.” The\\n draft memorandum of understanding that a capital defense bar at-\\n torney had previously circulated was broader. It would have barred\\n the State from seeking an execution warrant for any prisoner until\\n all three conditions were met. Only one provision, which required\\n the State to wait a minimum period between seeking each execu-\\n tion warrant, applied to the narrower set.\\n Without more, the government cannot avoid the Equal Pro-\\n tection Clause’s guarantees simply by creating a classification with\\n a contract.\\n 2. Rational-basis Review\\n Next, we determine and apply the appropriate level of scru-\\n tiny. Rational-basis review applies in this case, and the State satisfies\\n that deferential standard.\\n Humphreys asserts that heightened scrutiny applies for one\\n of two reasons, but neither is convincing. Humphreys first argues\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Order of the Court 25-14325\\n\\n that the classification infringes his “fundamental right to life” and\\n thereby triggers strict scrutiny.\\n We determine whether an asserted right is fundamental—\\n and therefore merits strict scrutiny—in two steps. “[W]e must\\n begin with a ‘careful description of the asserted right.’” Morrissey v.\\n United States, 871 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe v.\\n Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005)). Then, we must deter-\\n mine whether that right “is one of ‘those fundamental rights and\\n liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-\\n tory and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”\\n Id. (quoting Doe, 410 F.3d at 1343).\\n Humphreys has not advanced a carefully defined, funda-\\n mental right. He contends that, as a death-sentenced prisoner, his\\n “right to continue living” for even one additional day warrants\\n strict scrutiny. Yet he provides no authority for that view. To be\\n sure, he invokes Justice O’Connor’s precedential opinion in Ohio\\n Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard. 6 But that opinion states only that\\n a death-sentenced prisoner has “an interest in his life” that warrants\\n “some minimal procedural safeguards” in clemency proceedings.\\n Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Con-\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30975,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10758392,"string":"10,758,392"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Eboni Williams v. Gerald Shapiro"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-11192"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis- trict Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11192\\n ____________________\\n\\n EBONI WILLIAMS,\\n DEBBIE SHOEMAKER,\\n PAULA MAYS,\\n TINA KOVELESKY,\\n SHADRIN HERRING,\\n as representatives of a class of similarly\\n situated persons, and on behalf of the\\n A360, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan f.k.a.\\n A360, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n GERALD SHAPIRO,\\n SCOTT BRINKLEY,\\n ARGENT TRUST ARGENT TRUST COMPANY,\\n A360 HOLDINGS LLC,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03236-VMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis-\\n trict Judge. *\\n JORDAN, Circuit Judge:\\n This action involves claims under the Employee Retirement\\n Income Security Act asserted by participants in a terminated em-\\n ployee stock ownership plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Before us\\n is the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to compel\\n arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) (“An appeal may be taken\\n from . . . an order . . . denying an application under [§] 206 of this\\n title to compel arbitration[.]”). Following review of the record, and\\n with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm because the arbitra-\\n tion provision forbids the plaintiffs from asserting substantive\\n rights (like plan-wide relief ) under ERISA.\\n I\\n In 1971, Gerald Shapiro started his own law firm specializing\\n in mortgage foreclosure. Mr. Shapiro also built a consulting, ad-\\n ministration, technology, and data services business to support his\\n law firm, mortgage investment firms, real estate firms, and other\\n law firms. In November of 2016, he created a new entity, A360, Inc.,\\n\\n * Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for\\n\\n the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n to consolidate his interests in his non-legal services enterprise.\\n Scott Brinkley served as A360’s CEO.\\n A360 established an employee stock ownership plan to help\\n its employees save for retirement. An employee stock ownership\\n plan invests primarily in the company’s own stock.\\n The plan was a “defined contribution plan” under ERISA. A\\n defined contribution plan, as opposed to a defined benefit plan, is\\n “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each\\n participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contrib-\\n uted to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains\\n and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants\\n which may be allocated to such participant’s account.” 29 U.S.C.\\n § 1002(34). Employees contributed to the plan to accumulate allo-\\n cated shares; they then had the option to “sell their shares upon\\n retirement for a nice nest egg.” D.E. 69 ¶ 8.\\n In January of 2017, the plan purchased 1,000,000 shares of\\n A360 stock for $30 million, making the plan the company’s sole\\n owner. In September of 2019, A360 and its trustee, Argent Trust\\n Company, sold the plan’s A360 shares to A360 Holdings, LLC for\\n approximately $34.6 million.\\n Simultaneously, A360 amended the plan document by add-\\n ing an arbitration clause. The amendment, entitled “ERISA Arbi-\\n tration and Class Action Waiver,” provides that “all Covered Claims\\n must be resolved exclusively pursuant to the provisions of this Sec-\\n tion [i.e., the ‘Arbitration Procedure’].” D.E. 44-1 at 70. Covered\\n claims include “[a]ny claim made by or on behalf of a current or\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n former Employee, a current or former Participant or current or for-\\n mer Beneficiary or by or on behalf of the Plan, the Trust or under\\n the Trust Agreement (a “Claimant”) . . . including without limita-\\n tion claims for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The Arbitration Pro-\\n cedure prohibits “Group, Class, or Representative Arbitrations.” Id.\\n at 71.\\n The Arbitration Procedure bears quoting in full, and reads\\n as follows:\\n All Covered Claims must be brought solely in the\\n Claimant’s individual capacity and not in a repre-\\n sentative capacity or on a class, collective, or group\\n basis. Each arbitration shall be limited solely to one\\n Claimant’s Covered Claims, and that Claimant may\\n not seek or receive any remedy which has the purpose\\n or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary\\n or other relief to any individual or entity other than\\n the Claimant. For instance, with respect to any claim\\n brought under ERISA § 502(a)(2) to seek appropriate\\n relief under ERISA § 409, the Claimant’s remedy, if\\n any, shall be limited to (i) the alleged losses to the\\n Claimant’s individual Account resulting from the al-\\n leged breach of fiduciary duty, (ii) a pro-rated portion\\n of any profits allegedly made by a fiduciary through\\n the use of Plan assets where such pro-rated amount\\n is intended to provide a remedy solely to Claimant’s\\n individual Account, and/or (iii) such other remedial\\n or equitable relief as the arbitrator(s) deem(s) proper\\n so long as such remedial or equitable relief does not\\n include or result in the provision of additional\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n benefits or monetary relief to any individual or entity\\n other than the Claimant, and is not binding on the\\n Committee or Trustee with respect to any individual\\n or entity other than the Claimant.\\n Id. It further states that “[i]n the event a court of competent juris-\\n diction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or in-\\n valid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Section\\n [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.” Id. at 71–72. 1\\n Five days after making this amendment to the plan docu-\\n ment, A360 terminated the plan. From October of 2019 to Decem-\\n ber of 2021, the plan distributed the proceeds from the stock sale\\n to the plan’s participants. Today, the plan has no assets.\\n In September of 2022, a number of plan participants—Eboni\\n Williams, Debbie Shoemaker, Paula Mays, Tina Kovelesky, and\\n Shadrin Herring—filed this action in federal district court under\\n ERISA and sought to represent a class of approximately 280 plan\\n participants. They alleged that the defendants—Messrs. Shapiro\\n and Brinkley, Argent, and A360 Holdings—unlawfully caused the\\n plan to be terminated and “its ‘unallocated’ shares to be redeemed\\n by the company for less than fair market value.” D.E. 69 ¶ 1. Spe-\\n cifically, they asserted that the plan lost $35.4 million when the de-\\n fendants schemed to sell the stock for $34.6 million because, in ac-\\n tuality, the stock was worth approximately $70 million.\\n\\n\\n 1 The addition of the Arbitration Procedure was the third amendment to the\\n\\n plan document, and we therefore sometimes refer to it as the third amend-\\n ment.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n A month later, A360 again amended the plan document with\\n the following language: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing\\n in this provision [the Arbitration Procedure] shall be construed to\\n preclude a Claimant from seeking injunctive relief, including, for\\n example, seeking an injunction to remove or replace a Plan fiduci-\\n ary even if such injunctive relief has an incidental impact on an in-\\n dividual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-1 at 76. This\\n was the fourth amendment to the plan document.\\n The plaintiffs then amended their complaint and asserted\\n the following claims under ERISA: (1) causing prohibited transac-\\n tions in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a); (2) engaging in prohibited\\n transactions between the plan and a fiduciary in violation of\\n § 1106(b); (3) breaching the fiduciary duties of prudence and loy-\\n alty in violation of § 1104(a)(1); (4) knowingly participating in the\\n breach, giving rise to co-fiduciary liability under § 1105(a);\\n (5) knowingly participating in prohibited transactions in violation\\n of § 1132(a)(3); (6) knowingly participating in breaches of the du-\\n ties of prudence and loyalty, also in violation of § 1132(a)(3); and\\n (7) breaching the terms of the plan in violation of § 1132(a)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs sought recovery for injuries to the plan “sustained as\\n a result of prohibited transactions and fiduciary breaches during\\n the statutory period,” as well as “equitable relief on behalf of the\\n [plan] as a whole.” D.E. 69 ¶ 108. They specifically requested dis-\\n gorgement of profits and restitution for losses to the plan. And they\\n sought to reform the plan document to eliminate the third and\\n fourth amendments, and to rescind the plan’s stock purchase agree-\\n ment.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Fed-\\n eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., based on the two amend-\\n ments to the plan document. The district court ruled that the indi-\\n vidual plan participants “gave no assent” to arbitrate their claims\\n for rescission and restitution. See Williams v. Shapiro, 724 F. Supp. 3d\\n 1295, 1307–08 (N.D. Ga. 2024) (noting that “[c]ourts have rigidly\\n adhered to the distinction between claims brought individually and\\n claims brought on behalf of plans in determining whether an oth-\\n erwise valid arbitration clause covers a given claim”). The court\\n held, however, that the plan itself “maintained a legal existence\\n such that it could assent to arbitration” through the third and\\n fourth amendments to the plan document. See id. at 1308.\\n The district court nevertheless denied the defendants’ mo-\\n tion to compel arbitration and invalidated the Arbitration Proce-\\n dure because ERISA authorizes plan-wide relief, and the Arbitra-\\n tion Procedure specifically prohibits such relief. See id. at 1309–14.\\n Because the Arbitration Procedure is by its own terms non-severa-\\n ble, the court held that it was entirely unenforceable. See id. at 1314.\\n On appeal, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ substan-\\n tive statutory right is to assert claims relating to their individual\\n plan accounts, and that this right is sufficiently vindicated in indi-\\n vidual arbitration as required by the Arbitration Procedure. The\\n defendants also contend that the district court erred in ruling that\\n the individual plaintiffs did not assent to arbitration because their\\n participation in the plan constituted their assent to be bound by the\\n plan document, including the Arbitration Procedure.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n II\\n “We review de novo a denial of a motion to compel arbitra-\\n tion as well as a district court’s interpretation of an arbitration\\n agreement.” Hearn v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 992 F.3d 1209,\\n 1212 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d\\n 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017)).\\n III\\n ERISA “obligates private employers offering pension plans\\n to adhere to an array of rules designed to ensure plan solvency and\\n protect plan participants.” Advoc. Health Care Network v. Stapleton,\\n 581 U.S. 468, 472 (2017) (citation omitted). We assume without de-\\n ciding that “ERISA claims are generally arbitrable.” Smith v. Bd. of\\n Dirs. of Triad Mfg., Inc., 13 F.4th 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[j]oining\\n every other circuit to consider the issue”). See generally CompuCredit\\n Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (explaining that “federal\\n statutory claims” are arbitrable “unless the FAA’s mandate has been\\n overridden by a contrary congressional command”) (internal quo-\\n tation marks and citation omitted); Anders v. Hometown Mortg.\\n Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Federal statutory\\n claims are as a rule arbitrable[.]”) (citation omitted).\\n The Supreme Court has explained that the FAA “is a con-\\n gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration\\n agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural\\n policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Con-\\n str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). It “establishes that, as a matter of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues\\n should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” Id. at 24–25.\\n Significantly, however, “the FAA does not require courts to\\n enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and remedies.” Vi-\\n king River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 653 (2022). Accord-\\n ingly, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not\\n forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits\\n to their resolution in an arbitral forum.” Id. (quoting Preston v. Fer-\\n rer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008)) (alterations adopted).\\n The effective vindication doctrine invalidates arbitration\\n provisions that prospectively waive “a party’s right to pursue statu-\\n tory remedies.” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,\\n 235 (2013) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-\\n outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)). The key question is\\n whether “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its stat-\\n utory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Id. (internal quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n A\\n The defendants argue that the district court erred by em-\\n bracing the effective vindication doctrine because it is judge-made\\n and rooted in Supreme Court dicta. It is true that neither we nor\\n the Supreme Court have applied the doctrine to strike down an oth-\\n erwise enforceable arbitration provision. Yet whether we think\\n judge-made doctrines are generally appropriate or wise is of little\\n importance when the United States Supreme Court repeatedly\\n acknowledges a doctrine’s existence. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at\\n 235–36 (“[Our] cases have similarly asserted the existence of an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n ‘effective vindication’ exception but have similarly declined to apply\\n it to invalidate the arbitration agreement at issue. . . . And we do so\\n again here.”) (internal citations and footnote omitted).\\n “[T]he holding of a case is, as the Supreme Court observed,\\n comprised both of the result of the case and ‘those portions of the\\n opinion necessary to that result . . . .’’’ United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d\\n 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.\\n Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996)). The relevant holding in Italian\\n Colors was that the effective vindication doctrine did not invalidate\\n a certain arbitration clause. See 570 U.S. at 238–39. To reach that\\n result, the Supreme Court had to set out the parameters of the doc-\\n trine. See id. at 236 (explaining that the doctrine finds its origin in\\n the desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue\\n statutory remedies,” and would “certainly cover a provision in an\\n arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory\\n rights”) (emphasis added). It seems to us, therefore, that the discus-\\n sion of the doctrine in Italian Colors cannot be passed off as mere\\n dicta. See Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279,\\n 1291 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that in Italian Colors “the Supreme\\n Court acknowledged the effective vindication doctrine,” which had\\n “originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors”).\\n Moreover, even if the discussion of the effective vindication\\n doctrine in several Supreme Court cases were in dicta, “dicta from\\n the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Peter-\\n son v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). See\\n also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here\\n is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is Supreme Court\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n dicta. This is not subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-\\n analysis, throw-away kind of dicta.”). So, in Gilmore v. Georgia De-\\n partment of Corrections, 144 F.4th 1259, 1259–63 (11th Cir. 2025) (en\\n banc), we considered and gave some effect to a legal principle artic-\\n ulated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases even though the\\n Court had not yet found the principle to be satisfied. For the rea-\\n sons which follow, we adopt and apply the effective vindication\\n doctrine today.\\n In the ERISA context, federal common law is interstitial but\\n essential. As the Fifth Circuit has put it, “our power to create fed-\\n eral common law is premised on congressional authorization to fill\\n interstitial gaps in the text of federal legislation, here, ERISA.”\\n Coop. Ben. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2004). Cf.\\n United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)\\n (“[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation\\n means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of\\n the federal courts.”).\\n As noted, our own cases recognize the existence of the ef-\\n fective vindication doctrine. See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1291. See also\\n Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016)\\n (quoting Italian Colors and explaining that the “‘effective vindica-\\n tion doctrine’ is one defense that the federal courts have recognized\\n in the context of domestic arbitration”). And commentators do as\\n well. See 13D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3569 (3d\\n ed. 2015 & Sept. 2025 supp.) (“The Supreme Court has held that\\n statutory claims can be submitted to arbitration. . . . It must be\\n clear, however, that the arbitration procedure does not impose such\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n burdens as to deny effective vindication of the statutory relief.”)\\n (footnotes omitted); Lauren K. Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, 41 Ga.\\n St. U. L. Rev. 257, 315 (2025) (“[F]ederal courts have not shied away\\n from applying [the effective vindication doctrine] to invalidate ar-\\n bitration provisions in the ERISA breach of fiduciary duty con-\\n text.”).\\n The effective vindication doctrine has been applied to the\\n waiver of ERISA statutory rights by six of our sister circuits in the\\n last five years. See, e.g., Parker v. Tenneco, Inc., 114 F.4th 786, 793 (6th\\n Cir. 2024) (citing cases). And no circuits have rejected the doctrine.\\n Thus, we elect to apply the doctrine in this case. See, e.g., State Farm\\n Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 91\\n (2d Cir. 2024) (“Bearing in mind a healthy regard for the federal\\n policy in favor of enforcing valid arbitration agreements, we recog-\\n nize that the effective vindication exception applies in rare cases\\n where an arbitration agreement prevents parties from effectively\\n vindicating their statutory rights.”) (internal quotation marks and\\n citation omitted and alterations adopted). 2\\n\\n 2 We have held that a public policy defense, under 9 U.S.C. § 207, “applies at\\n\\n the award-enforcement stage, not the initial arbitration-enforcement stage,”\\n pursuant to Article V of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and\\n Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). See\\n Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing\\n Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 636). But our decision in Lindo was driven\\n by Article V of the New York Convention, which addresses the recognition\\n and enforcement of certain arbitral awards. See id. at 1263. This ERISA action\\n is not an international arbitration case under the Convention, so Article V does\\n not govern. Nor does this case involve a public policy defense to the recogni-\\n tion and/or enforcement of an arbitration award. We therefore do not view\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n B\\n We turn, then, to whether the Arbitration Procedure at issue\\n here constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights granted by\\n ERISA. The statutory remedies sought by the plaintiffs include\\n ERISA’s plan-wide relief for breaches of fiduciary duty.\\n As relevant here, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) establishes liability for\\n breaches of fiduciary duty, and states as follows:\\n Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan\\n who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations,\\n or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter\\n shall be personally liable to make good to such plan\\n any losses to the plan resulting from each such\\n breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such\\n fiduciary which have been made through use of assets\\n of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to\\n such other equitable or remedial relief as the court\\n may deem appropriate, including removal of such fi-\\n duciary.\\n (emphasis added).\\n ERISA expressly provides that plan participants may bring a\\n civil action for relief under § 1109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Inter-\\n preting this statutory framework, the Supreme Court has stated\\n\\n\\n the discussion of Mitsubishi Motors in Lindo as informing the issue here. Indeed,\\n the six circuits that have applied the effective vindication doctrine have done\\n so at the arbitration enforcement stage. And the Supreme Court has referred\\n to the effective vindication doctrine as a public policy ground on which an\\n arbitration agreement can be “invalidate[d].” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n that § 1109(a)’s “draftsmen were primarily concerned with the pos-\\n sible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect\\n the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual benefi-\\n ciary.” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985).\\n Thus, ERISA provides for “‘plan-related’ relief.” Id.\\n As noted, six circuits have held that “arbitration provisions\\n preventing individuals from obtaining the plan-wide relief available\\n under [§ 1109(a)] violate the effective vindication doctrine.” Platt v.\\n Sodexo, S.A., 148 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).\\n See also Parker, 114 F.4th at 798; Smith, 13 F.4th at 615; Cedeno v. Sas-\\n son, 100 F.4th 386, 400–06 (2d Cir. 2024); Henry ex rel. BSC Ventures\\n Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr. NA, 72\\n F.4th 499, 507–08 (3d Cir. 2023); Harrison v. Envision Mgmt. Holding,\\n Inc. Bd. of Dirs., 59 F.4th 1090, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2023). We join\\n them today and affirm the district court’s ruling that the Arbitra-\\n tion Procedure here is unenforceable.3\\n We do so because § 1109(a) “provides relief ‘singularly to the\\n plan’ rather than an individual plaintiff,” and § 1132(a)(2) “claims\\n are understood as claims ‘brought in a representative capacity on\\n behalf of the plan as a whole.’” Platt, 148 F.4th at 721 (first quoting\\n Mass. Mut., 473 U.S. at 142 & n.9, and then citing Hawkins v. Cintas\\n Corp., 32 F.4th 625, 635 (6th Cir. 2022)). See also, e.g., Cedeno, 100\\n F.4th at 403 (“[A § 1132(a)(2)] claim is inherently representational.”)\\n (citation omitted); Henry, 72 F.4th at 506 (“Actions for breach of fi-\\n duciary duty under § 1132(a) are brought in a representative\\n\\n 3 No circuit has reached a contrary conclusion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (alterations adopted\\n and internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Su-\\n preme Court recently reinforced the substantive nature of the right\\n to bring representative actions. See Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\\n 657 (“Non-class representative actions in which a single agent liti-\\n gates on behalf of a single principal are part of the basic architec-\\n ture of much of substantive law.”). The Arbitration Procedure here\\n plainly disallows claims brought “in a representative capacity,” as\\n well as claims that “seek or receive any remedy which has the pur-\\n pose or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other\\n relief to any individual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-\\n 1 at 71. 4\\n Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, just because a plan\\n participant may obtain individualized relief under § 1109(a) does\\n not mean that she somehow waives the right to bring representa-\\n tive-capacity claims that seek relief on behalf of the plan. See LaRue\\n v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (“We therefore\\n hold that although [§ 1132(a)(2)] does not provide a remedy for in-\\n dividual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does au-\\n thorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of\\n\\n\\n 4 We “endeavor to be clear about how we are using the term ‘representative,’”\\n\\n and reject the defendants’ argument that §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) are merely\\n “claim joinder” mechanisms analogous to the state law statute at issue in Vi-\\n king River Cruises, 596 U.S. at 649, 659. The federal statutory right under ERISA\\n to seek plan-wide relief constitutes “a single claim”—here, the breach of fidu-\\n ciary duty—arising from a “common transaction”—here, the stock sale. See id.\\n at 654.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”). See also Parker,\\n 114 F.4th at 796 (“LaRue did not overrule Russell or abrogate its fun-\\n damental precept that [§ 1132(a)(2)] suits are brought in a repre-\\n sentative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (internal quo-\\n tation marks and citation omitted). Our conclusion is bolstered by\\n the fact that the stock ownership plan here was a defined contribu-\\n tion plan. “Because a defined contribution plan is essentially the\\n sum of its parts, losses attributable to the account of an individual\\n participant are necessarily ‘losses to the plan’ for purposes of\\n [§ 1109(a)].” LaRue, 552 U.S. at 262–63 (Thomas, J., concurring). In\\n sum, §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) create a statutory cause of action “in\\n which a single agent [i.e., a plan participant] litigates on behalf of\\n a single principal [i.e., the plan,]” Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\\n 657, under § 1109(a) for “any losses to the plan[.]”\\n The defendants’ reliance on Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 590 U.S.\\n 538, 544 (2020), is misplaced. First, Thole involved a defined benefit\\n plan, and not a defined contribution plan, and the Supreme Court\\n said that distinction was of “decisive importance” to the result. See\\n id. at 540. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court in Thole did\\n not state (or even hint) that an ERISA § 1132(a)(2) claimant cannot\\n be an agent or proxy of the plan in a representative action. See gen-\\n erally id. Thole instead applied familiar Article III principles to con-\\n clude that the two plan participants who sued lacked standing be-\\n cause the alleged plan mismanagement did not affect their pension\\n benefits. See id. at 540–41. Thole did not hold that plan participants\\n could never have Article III representational standing, but, rather,\\n ruled that plan participants themselves must suffer a concrete\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n injury to claim the interests of the plan. See id. at 543 (quoting Hol-\\n lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013)). We therefore reject the\\n defendants’ reading of Thole.\\n We conclude that the Arbitration Procedure’s preclusion of\\n ERISA statutory claims brought “in a representative capacity,” for\\n relief which benefits anyone other than the individual claimant,\\n prevents the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating §§ 1109(a) and\\n 1132(a)(2) in the arbitral forum. See D.E. 44-1 at 71. Although the\\n fourth amendment to the plan purported to allow a claimant to\\n seek certain forms of injunctive relief, it still did not permit repre-\\n sentative capacity claims for relief such as disgorgement of profits\\n and restitution to the plan—relief that the plaintiffs sought here.\\n See Parker, 114 F.4th at 801 (“That the individual arbitration provi-\\n sion here still allows plan-wide injunctive relief [e.g., seeking an in-\\n junction to remove or replace a plan fiduciary] has no bearing on\\n the fact that it eliminates statutorily created plan-wide monetary\\n relief.”). The Arbitration Procedure is thus unenforceable as a pro-\\n spective waiver of a statutory right under ERISA.\\n This leads to the matter of severability. Whether or not a\\n severability provision in an arbitration agreement “is to be given\\n effect is a question of state law.” Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs.,\\n Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003). And Georgia law looks to\\n the “intent of the parties” in “determin[ing] whether a contract is\\n severable such that the remaining contract provisions will survive\\n even if one or more provisions of the contract are void.” Early v.\\n MiMedx Grp., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 823, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n Based on the express language of the Arbitration Procedure,\\n the problematic language in the Arbitration Procedure is not sever-\\n able. See D.E. 44-1 at 71–72 (“In the event a court of competent ju-\\n risdiction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or\\n invalid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Sec-\\n tion [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.”). We there-\\n fore must invalidate the Arbitration Procedure entirely. 5\\n IV\\n We join our sister circuits in holding that arbitration provi-\\n sions with near-identical language eliminate the right to pursue\\n substantive plan-wide remedies under ERISA and therefore violate\\n the effective vindication doctrine. See, e.g., Parker, 114 F.4th at 801.\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s invalidation of the plan’s\\n Arbitration Procedure and denial of the defendants’ motion to\\n compel arbitration.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Given our resolution, we need not address the district court’s ruling that the\\n\\n individual plaintiffs did not assent to the third and fourth amendments to the\\n plan.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11224977/\", \"author_raw\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"HONEYWELL"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"HONEYWELL\": \", Dis trict\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758392/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Eboni Williams v. Gerald Shapiro\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 18\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-11192\n ____________________\n\n EBONI WILLIAMS,\n DEBBIE SHOEMAKER,\n PAULA MAYS,\n TINA KOVELESKY,\n SHADRIN HERRING,\n as representatives of a class of similarly\n situated persons, and on behalf of the\n A360, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan f.k.a.\n A360, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n versus\n\n GERALD SHAPIRO,\n SCOTT BRINKLEY,\n ARGENT TRUST ARGENT TRUST COMPANY,\n A360 HOLDINGS LLC,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03236-VMC\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis-\n trict Judge. *\n JORDAN, Circuit Judge:\n This action involves claims under the Employee Retirement\n Income Security Act asserted by participants in a terminated em-\n ployee stock ownership plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Before us\n is the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to compel\n arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) (“An appeal may be taken\n from . . . an order . . . denying an application under [§] 206 of this\n title to compel arbitration[.]”). Following review of the record, and\n with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm because the arbitra-\n tion provision forbids the plaintiffs from asserting substantive\n rights (like plan-wide relief ) under ERISA.\n I\n In 1971, Gerald Shapiro started his own law firm specializing\n in mortgage foreclosure. Mr. Shapiro also built a consulting, ad-\n ministration, technology, and data services business to support his\n law firm, mortgage investment firms, real estate firms, and other\n law firms. In November of 2016, he created a new entity, A360, Inc.,\n\n * Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for\n\n the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n to consolidate his interests in his non-legal services enterprise.\n Scott Brinkley served as A360’s CEO.\n A360 established an employee stock ownership plan to help\n its employees save for retirement. An employee stock ownership\n plan invests primarily in the company’s own stock.\n The plan was a “defined contribution plan” under ERISA. A\n defined contribution plan, as opposed to a defined benefit plan, is\n “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each\n participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contrib-\n uted to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains\n and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants\n which may be allocated to such participant’s account.” 29 U.S.C.\n § 1002(34). Employees contributed to the plan to accumulate allo-\n cated shares; they then had the option to “sell their shares upon\n retirement for a nice nest egg.” D.E. 69 ¶ 8.\n In January of 2017, the plan purchased 1,000,000 shares of\n A360 stock for $30 million, making the plan the company’s sole\n owner. In September of 2019, A360 and its trustee, Argent Trust\n Company, sold the plan’s A360 shares to A360 Holdings, LLC for\n approximately $34.6 million.\n Simultaneously, A360 amended the plan document by add-\n ing an arbitration clause. The amendment, entitled “ERISA Arbi-\n tration and Class Action Waiver,” provides that “all Covered Claims\n must be resolved exclusively pursuant to the provisions of this Sec-\n tion [i.e., the ‘Arbitration Procedure’].” D.E. 44-1 at 70. Covered\n claims include “[a]ny claim made by or on behalf of a current or\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n former Employee, a current or former Participant or current or for-\n mer Beneficiary or by or on behalf of the Plan, the Trust or under\n the Trust Agreement (a “Claimant”) . . . including without limita-\n tion claims for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The Arbitration Pro-\n cedure prohibits “Group, Class, or Representative Arbitrations.” Id.\n at 71.\n The Arbitration Procedure bears quoting in full, and reads\n as follows:\n All Covered Claims must be brought solely in the\n Claimant’s individual capacity and not in a repre-\n sentative capacity or on a class, collective, or group\n basis. Each arbitration shall be limited solely to one\n Claimant’s Covered Claims, and that Claimant may\n not seek or receive any remedy which has the purpose\n or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary\n or other relief to any individual or entity other than\n the Claimant. For instance, with respect to any claim\n brought under ERISA § 502(a)(2) to seek appropriate\n relief under ERISA § 409, the Claimant’s remedy, if\n any, shall be limited to (i) the alleged losses to the\n Claimant’s individual Account resulting from the al-\n leged breach of fiduciary duty, (ii) a pro-rated portion\n of any profits allegedly made by a fiduciary through\n the use of Plan assets where such pro-rated amount\n is intended to provide a remedy solely to Claimant’s\n individual Account, and/or (iii) such other remedial\n or equitable relief as the arbitrator(s) deem(s) proper\n so long as such remedial or equitable relief does not\n include or result in the provision of additional\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n benefits or monetary relief to any individual or entity\n other than the Claimant, and is not binding on the\n Committee or Trustee with respect to any individual\n or entity other than the Claimant.\n Id. It further states that “[i]n the event a court of competent juris-\n diction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or in-\n valid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Section\n [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.” Id. at 71–72. 1\n Five days after making this amendment to the plan docu-\n ment, A360 terminated the plan. From October of 2019 to Decem-\n ber of 2021, the plan distributed the proceeds from the stock sale\n to the plan’s participants. Today, the plan has no assets.\n In September of 2022, a number of plan participants—Eboni\n Williams, Debbie Shoemaker, Paula Mays, Tina Kovelesky, and\n Shadrin Herring—filed this action in federal district court under\n ERISA and sought to represent a class of approximately 280 plan\n participants. They alleged that the defendants—Messrs. Shapiro\n and Brinkley, Argent, and A360 Holdings—unlawfully caused the\n plan to be terminated and “its ‘unallocated’ shares to be redeemed\n by the company for less than fair market value.” D.E. 69 ¶ 1. Spe-\n cifically, they asserted that the plan lost $35.4 million when the de-\n fendants schemed to sell the stock for $34.6 million because, in ac-\n tuality, the stock was worth approximately $70 million.\n\n\n 1 The addition of the Arbitration Procedure was the third amendment to the\n\n plan document, and we therefore sometimes refer to it as the third amend-\n ment.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n A month later, A360 again amended the plan document with\n the following language: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing\n in this provision [the Arbitration Procedure] shall be construed to\n preclude a Claimant from seeking injunctive relief, including, for\n example, seeking an injunction to remove or replace a Plan fiduci-\n ary even if such injunctive relief has an incidental impact on an in-\n dividual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-1 at 76. This\n was the fourth amendment to the plan document.\n The plaintiffs then amended their complaint and asserted\n the following claims under ERISA: (1) causing prohibited transac-\n tions in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a); (2) engaging in prohibited\n transactions between the plan and a fiduciary in violation of\n § 1106(b); (3) breaching the fiduciary duties of prudence and loy-\n alty in violation of § 1104(a)(1); (4) knowingly participating in the\n breach, giving rise to co-fiduciary liability under § 1105(a);\n (5) knowingly participating in prohibited transactions in violation\n of § 1132(a)(3); (6) knowingly participating in breaches of the du-\n ties of prudence and loyalty, also in violation of § 1132(a)(3); and\n (7) breaching the terms of the plan in violation of § 1132(a)(3)(A).\n The plaintiffs sought recovery for injuries to the plan “sustained as\n a result of prohibited transactions and fiduciary breaches during\n the statutory period,” as well as “equitable relief on behalf of the\n [plan] as a whole.” D.E. 69 ¶ 108. They specifically requested dis-\n gorgement of profits and restitution for losses to the plan. And they\n sought to reform the plan document to eliminate the third and\n fourth amendments, and to rescind the plan’s stock purchase agree-\n ment.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Fed-\n eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., based on the two amend-\n ments to the plan document. The district court ruled that the indi-\n vidual plan participants “gave no assent” to arbitrate their claims\n for rescission and restitution. See Williams v. Shapiro, 724 F. Supp. 3d\n 1295, 1307–08 (N.D. Ga. 2024) (noting that “[c]ourts have rigidly\n adhered to the distinction between claims brought individually and\n claims brought on behalf of plans in determining whether an oth-\n erwise valid arbitration clause covers a given claim”). The court\n held, however, that the plan itself “maintained a legal existence\n such that it could assent to arbitration” through the third and\n fourth amendments to the plan document. See id. at 1308.\n The district court nevertheless denied the defendants’ mo-\n tion to compel arbitration and invalidated the Arbitration Proce-\n dure because ERISA authorizes plan-wide relief, and the Arbitra-\n tion Procedure specifically prohibits such relief. See id. at 1309–14.\n Because the Arbitration Procedure is by its own terms non-severa-\n ble, the court held that it was entirely unenforceable. See id. at 1314.\n On appeal, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ substan-\n tive statutory right is to assert claims relating to their individual\n plan accounts, and that this right is sufficiently vindicated in indi-\n vidual arbitration as required by the Arbitration Procedure. The\n defendants also contend that the district court erred in ruling that\n the individual plaintiffs did not assent to arbitration because their\n participation in the plan constituted their assent to be bound by the\n plan document, including the Arbitration Procedure.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n II\n “We review de novo a denial of a motion to compel arbitra-\n tion as well as a district court’s interpretation of an arbitration\n agreement.” Hearn v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 992 F.3d 1209,\n 1212 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d\n 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017)).\n III\n ERISA “obligates private employers offering pension plans\n to adhere to an array of rules designed to ensure plan solvency and\n protect plan participants.” Advoc. Health Care Network v. Stapleton,\n 581 U.S. 468, 472 (2017) (citation omitted). We assume without de-\n ciding that “ERISA claims are generally arbitrable.” Smith v. Bd. of\n Dirs. of Triad Mfg., Inc., 13 F.4th 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[j]oining\n every other circuit to consider the issue”). See generally CompuCredit\n Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (explaining that “federal\n statutory claims” are arbitrable “unless the FAA’s mandate has been\n overridden by a contrary congressional command”) (internal quo-\n tation marks and citation omitted); Anders v. Hometown Mortg.\n Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Federal statutory\n claims are as a rule arbitrable[.]”) (citation omitted).\n The Supreme Court has explained that the FAA “is a con-\n gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration\n agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural\n policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Con-\n str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). It “establishes that, as a matter of\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues\n should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” Id. at 24–25.\n Significantly, however, “the FAA does not require courts to\n enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and remedies.” Vi-\n king River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 653 (2022). Accord-\n ingly, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not\n forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits\n to their resolution in an arbitral forum.” Id. (quoting Preston v. Fer-\n rer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008)) (alterations adopted).\n The effective vindication doctrine invalidates arbitration\n provisions that prospectively waive “a party’s right to pursue statu-\n tory remedies.” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,\n 235 (2013) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-\n outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)). The key question is\n whether “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its stat-\n utory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Id. (internal quotation\n marks omitted).\n A\n The defendants argue that the district court erred by em-\n bracing the effective vindication doctrine because it is judge-made\n and rooted in Supreme Court dicta. It is true that neither we nor\n the Supreme Court have applied the doctrine to strike down an oth-\n erwise enforceable arbitration provision. Yet whether we think\n judge-made doctrines are generally appropriate or wise is of little\n importance when the United States Supreme Court repeatedly\n acknowledges a doctrine’s existence. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at\n 235–36 (“[Our] cases have similarly asserted the existence of an\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n ‘effective vindication’ exception but have similarly declined to apply\n it to invalidate the arbitration agreement at issue. . . . And we do so\n again here.”) (internal citations and footnote omitted).\n “[T]he holding of a case is, as the Supreme Court observed,\n comprised both of the result of the case and ‘those portions of the\n opinion necessary to that result . . . .’’’ United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d\n 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.\n Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996)). The relevant holding in Italian\n Colors was that the effective vindication doctrine did not invalidate\n a certain arbitration clause. See 570 U.S. at 238–39. To reach that\n result, the Supreme Court had to set out the parameters of the doc-\n trine. See id. at 236 (explaining that the doctrine finds its origin in\n the desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue\n statutory remedies,” and would “certainly cover a provision in an\n arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory\n rights”) (emphasis added). It seems to us, therefore, that the discus-\n sion of the doctrine in Italian Colors cannot be passed off as mere\n dicta. See Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279,\n 1291 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that in Italian Colors “the Supreme\n Court acknowledged the effective vindication doctrine,” which had\n “originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors”).\n Moreover, even if the discussion of the effective vindication\n doctrine in several Supreme Court cases were in dicta, “dicta from\n the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Peter-\n son v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). See\n also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here\n is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is Supreme Court\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n dicta. This is not subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-\n analysis, throw-away kind of dicta.”). So, in Gilmore v. Georgia De-\n partment of Corrections, 144 F.4th 1259, 1259–63 (11th Cir. 2025) (en\n banc), we considered and gave some effect to a legal principle artic-\n ulated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases even though the\n Court had not yet found the principle to be satisfied. For the rea-\n sons which follow, we adopt and apply the effective vindication\n doctrine today.\n In the ERISA context, federal common law is interstitial but\n essential. As the Fifth Circuit has put it, “our power to create fed-\n eral common law is premised on congressional authorization to fill\n interstitial gaps in the text of federal legislation, here, ERISA.”\n Coop. Ben. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2004). Cf.\n United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)\n (“[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation\n means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of\n the federal courts.”).\n As noted, our own cases recognize the existence of the ef-\n fective vindication doctrine. See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1291. See also\n Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016)\n (quoting Italian Colors and explaining that the “‘effective vindica-\n tion doctrine’ is one defense that the federal courts have recognized\n in the context of domestic arbitration”). And commentators do as\n well. See 13D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3569 (3d\n ed. 2015 & Sept. 2025 supp.) (“The Supreme Court has held that\n statutory claims can be submitted to arbitration. . . . It must be\n clear, however, that the arbitration procedure does not impose such\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n burdens as to deny effective vindication of the statutory relief.”)\n (footnotes omitted); Lauren K. Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, 41 Ga.\n St. U. L. Rev. 257, 315 (2025) (“[F]ederal courts have not shied away\n from applying [the effective vindication doctrine] to invalidate ar-\n bitration provisions in the ERISA breach of fiduciary duty con-\n text.”).\n The effective vindication doctrine has been applied to the\n waiver of ERISA statutory rights by six of our sister circuits in the\n last five years. See, e.g., Parker v. Tenneco, Inc., 114 F.4th 786, 793 (6th\n Cir. 2024) (citing cases). And no circuits have rejected the doctrine.\n Thus, we elect to apply the doctrine in this case. See, e.g., State Farm\n Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 91\n (2d Cir. 2024) (“Bearing in mind a healthy regard for the federal\n policy in favor of enforcing valid arbitration agreements, we recog-\n nize that the effective vindication exception applies in rare cases\n where an arbitration agreement prevents parties from effectively\n vindicating their statutory rights.”) (internal quotation marks and\n citation omitted and alterations adopted). 2\n\n 2 We have held that a public policy defense, under 9 U.S.C. § 207, “applies at\n\n the award-enforcement stage, not the initial arbitration-enforcement stage,”\n pursuant to Article V of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and\n Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). See\n Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing\n Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 636). But our decision in Lindo was driven\n by Article V of the New York Convention, which addresses the recognition\n and enforcement of certain arbitral awards. See id. at 1263. This ERISA action\n is not an international arbitration case under the Convention, so Article V does\n not govern. Nor does this case involve a public policy defense to the recogni-\n tion and/or enforcement of an arbitration award. We therefore do not view\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n B\n We turn, then, to whether the Arbitration Procedure at issue\n here constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights granted by\n ERISA. The statutory remedies sought by the plaintiffs include\n ERISA’s plan-wide relief for breaches of fiduciary duty.\n As relevant here, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) establishes liability for\n breaches of fiduciary duty, and states as follows:\n Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan\n who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations,\n or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter\n shall be personally liable to make good to such plan\n any losses to the plan resulting from each such\n breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such\n fiduciary which have been made through use of assets\n of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to\n such other equitable or remedial relief as the court\n may deem appropriate, including removal of such fi-\n duciary.\n (emphasis added).\n ERISA expressly provides that plan participants may bring a\n civil action for relief under § 1109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Inter-\n preting this statutory framework, the Supreme Court has stated\n\n\n the discussion of Mitsubishi Motors in Lindo as informing the issue here. Indeed,\n the six circuits that have applied the effective vindication doctrine have done\n so at the arbitration enforcement stage. And the Supreme Court has referred\n to the effective vindication doctrine as a public policy ground on which an\n arbitration agreement can be “invalidate[d].” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n that § 1109(a)’s “draftsmen were primarily concerned with the pos-\n sible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect\n the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual benefi-\n ciary.” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985).\n Thus, ERISA provides for “‘plan-related’ relief.” Id.\n As noted, six circuits have held that “arbitration provisions\n preventing individuals from obtaining the plan-wide relief available\n under [§ 1109(a)] violate the effective vindication doctrine.” Platt v.\n Sodexo, S.A., 148 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).\n See also Parker, 114 F.4th at 798; Smith, 13 F.4th at 615; Cedeno v. Sas-\n son, 100 F.4th 386, 400–06 (2d Cir. 2024); Henry ex rel. BSC Ventures\n Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr. NA, 72\n F.4th 499, 507–08 (3d Cir. 2023); Harrison v. Envision Mgmt. Holding,\n Inc. Bd. of Dirs., 59 F.4th 1090, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2023). We join\n them today and affirm the district court’s ruling that the Arbitra-\n tion Procedure here is unenforceable.3\n We do so because § 1109(a) “provides relief ‘singularly to the\n plan’ rather than an individual plaintiff,” and § 1132(a)(2) “claims\n are understood as claims ‘brought in a representative capacity on\n behalf of the plan as a whole.’” Platt, 148 F.4th at 721 (first quoting\n Mass. Mut., 473 U.S. at 142 & n.9, and then citing Hawkins v. Cintas\n Corp., 32 F.4th 625, 635 (6th Cir. 2022)). See also, e.g., Cedeno, 100\n F.4th at 403 (“[A § 1132(a)(2)] claim is inherently representational.”)\n (citation omitted); Henry, 72 F.4th at 506 (“Actions for breach of fi-\n duciary duty under § 1132(a) are brought in a representative\n\n 3 No circuit has reached a contrary conclusion.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (alterations adopted\n and internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Su-\n preme Court recently reinforced the substantive nature of the right\n to bring representative actions. See Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\n 657 (“Non-class representative actions in which a single agent liti-\n gates on behalf of a single principal are part of the basic architec-\n ture of much of substantive law.”). The Arbitration Procedure here\n plainly disallows claims brought “in a representative capacity,” as\n well as claims that “seek or receive any remedy which has the pur-\n pose or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other\n relief to any individual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-\n 1 at 71. 4\n Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, just because a plan\n participant may obtain individualized relief under § 1109(a) does\n not mean that she somehow waives the right to bring representa-\n tive-capacity claims that seek relief on behalf of the plan. See LaRue\n v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (“We therefore\n hold that although [§ 1132(a)(2)] does not provide a remedy for in-\n dividual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does au-\n thorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of\n\n\n 4 We “endeavor to be clear about how we are using the term ‘representative,’”\n\n and reject the defendants’ argument that §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) are merely\n “claim joinder” mechanisms analogous to the state law statute at issue in Vi-\n king River Cruises, 596 U.S. at 649, 659. The federal statutory right under ERISA\n to seek plan-wide relief constitutes “a single claim”—here, the breach of fidu-\n ciary duty—arising from a “common transaction”—here, the stock sale. See id.\n at 654.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”). See also Parker,\n 114 F.4th at 796 (“LaRue did not overrule Russell or abrogate its fun-\n damental precept that [§ 1132(a)(2)] suits are brought in a repre-\n sentative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (internal quo-\n tation marks and citation omitted). Our conclusion is bolstered by\n the fact that the stock ownership plan here was a defined contribu-\n tion plan. “Because a defined contribution plan is essentially the\n sum of its parts, losses attributable to the account of an individual\n participant are necessarily ‘losses to the plan’ for purposes of\n [§ 1109(a)].” LaRue, 552 U.S. at 262–63 (Thomas, J., concurring). In\n sum, §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) create a statutory cause of action “in\n which a single agent [i.e., a plan participant] litigates on behalf of\n a single principal [i.e., the plan,]” Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\n 657, under § 1109(a) for “any losses to the plan[.]”\n The defendants’ reliance on Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 590 U.S.\n 538, 544 (2020), is misplaced. First, Thole involved a defined benefit\n plan, and not a defined contribution plan, and the Supreme Court\n said that distinction was of “decisive importance” to the result. See\n id. at 540. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court in Thole did\n not state (or even hint) that an ERISA § 1132(a)(2) claimant cannot\n be an agent or proxy of the plan in a representative action. See gen-\n erally id. Thole instead applied familiar Article III principles to con-\n clude that the two plan participants who sued lacked standing be-\n cause the alleged plan mismanagement did not affect their pension\n benefits. See id. at 540–41. Thole did not hold that plan participants\n could never have Article III representational standing, but, rather,\n ruled that plan participants themselves must suffer a concrete\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n injury to claim the interests of the plan. See id. at 543 (quoting Hol-\n lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013)). We therefore reject the\n defendants’ reading of Thole.\n We conclude that the Arbitration Procedure’s preclusion of\n ERISA statutory claims brought “in a representative capacity,” for\n relief which benefits anyone other than the individual claimant,\n prevents the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating §§ 1109(a) and\n 1132(a)(2) in the arbitral forum. See D.E. 44-1 at 71. Although the\n fourth amendment to the plan purported to allow a claimant to\n seek certain forms of injunctive relief, it still did not permit repre-\n sentative capacity claims for relief such as disgorgement of profits\n and restitution to the plan—relief that the plaintiffs sought here.\n See Parker, 114 F.4th at 801 (“That the individual arbitration provi-\n sion here still allows plan-wide injunctive relief [e.g., seeking an in-\n junction to remove or replace a plan fiduciary] has no bearing on\n the fact that it eliminates statutorily created plan-wide monetary\n relief.”). The Arbitration Procedure is thus unenforceable as a pro-\n spective waiver of a statutory right under ERISA.\n This leads to the matter of severability. Whether or not a\n severability provision in an arbitration agreement “is to be given\n effect is a question of state law.” Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs.,\n Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003). And Georgia law looks to\n the “intent of the parties” in “determin[ing] whether a contract is\n severable such that the remaining contract provisions will survive\n even if one or more provisions of the contract are void.” Early v.\n MiMedx Grp., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 823, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 18\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\n\n Based on the express language of the Arbitration Procedure,\n the problematic language in the Arbitration Procedure is not sever-\n able. See D.E. 44-1 at 71–72 (“In the event a court of competent ju-\n risdiction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or\n invalid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Sec-\n tion [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.”). We there-\n fore must invalidate the Arbitration Procedure entirely. 5\n IV\n We join our sister circuits in holding that arbitration provi-\n sions with near-identical language eliminate the right to pursue\n substantive plan-wide remedies under ERISA and therefore violate\n the effective vindication doctrine. See, e.g., Parker, 114 F.4th at 801.\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s invalidation of the plan’s\n Arbitration Procedure and denial of the defendants’ motion to\n compel arbitration.\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n 5 Given our resolution, we need not address the district court’s ruling that the\n\n individual plaintiffs did not assent to the third and fourth amendments to the\n plan.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Eboni Williams v. Gerald Shapiro\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11192\\n ____________________\\n\\n EBONI WILLIAMS,\\n DEBBIE SHOEMAKER,\\n PAULA MAYS,\\n TINA KOVELESKY,\\n SHADRIN HERRING,\\n as representatives of a class of similarly\\n situated persons, and on behalf of the\\n A360, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan f.k.a.\\n A360, Inc. Employee Stock Ownership Plan,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n GERALD SHAPIRO,\\n SCOTT BRINKLEY,\\n ARGENT TRUST ARGENT TRUST COMPANY,\\n A360 HOLDINGS LLC,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 2 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-03236-VMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis-\\n trict Judge. *\\n JORDAN, Circuit Judge:\\n This action involves claims under the Employee Retirement\\n Income Security Act asserted by participants in a terminated em-\\n ployee stock ownership plan. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. Before us\\n is the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to compel\\n arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) (“An appeal may be taken\\n from . . . an order . . . denying an application under [§] 206 of this\\n title to compel arbitration[.]”). Following review of the record, and\\n with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm because the arbitra-\\n tion provision forbids the plaintiffs from asserting substantive\\n rights (like plan-wide relief ) under ERISA.\\n I\\n In 1971, Gerald Shapiro started his own law firm specializing\\n in mortgage foreclosure. Mr. Shapiro also built a consulting, ad-\\n ministration, technology, and data services business to support his\\n law firm, mortgage investment firms, real estate firms, and other\\n law firms. In November of 2016, he created a new entity, A360, Inc.,\\n\\n * Honorable Charlene Edwards Honeywell, United States District Judge for\\n\\n the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 3 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n to consolidate his interests in his non-legal services enterprise.\\n Scott Brinkley served as A360’s CEO.\\n A360 established an employee stock ownership plan to help\\n its employees save for retirement. An employee stock ownership\\n plan invests primarily in the company’s own stock.\\n The plan was a “defined contribution plan” under ERISA. A\\n defined contribution plan, as opposed to a defined benefit plan, is\\n “a pension plan which provides for an individual account for each\\n participant and for benefits based solely upon the amount contrib-\\n uted to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains\\n and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants\\n which may be allocated to such participant’s account.” 29 U.S.C.\\n § 1002(34). Employees contributed to the plan to accumulate allo-\\n cated shares; they then had the option to “sell their shares upon\\n retirement for a nice nest egg.” D.E. 69 ¶ 8.\\n In January of 2017, the plan purchased 1,000,000 shares of\\n A360 stock for $30 million, making the plan the company’s sole\\n owner. In September of 2019, A360 and its trustee, Argent Trust\\n Company, sold the plan’s A360 shares to A360 Holdings, LLC for\\n approximately $34.6 million.\\n Simultaneously, A360 amended the plan document by add-\\n ing an arbitration clause. The amendment, entitled “ERISA Arbi-\\n tration and Class Action Waiver,” provides that “all Covered Claims\\n must be resolved exclusively pursuant to the provisions of this Sec-\\n tion [i.e., the ‘Arbitration Procedure’].” D.E. 44-1 at 70. Covered\\n claims include “[a]ny claim made by or on behalf of a current or\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 4 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n former Employee, a current or former Participant or current or for-\\n mer Beneficiary or by or on behalf of the Plan, the Trust or under\\n the Trust Agreement (a “Claimant”) . . . including without limita-\\n tion claims for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The Arbitration Pro-\\n cedure prohibits “Group, Class, or Representative Arbitrations.” Id.\\n at 71.\\n The Arbitration Procedure bears quoting in full, and reads\\n as follows:\\n All Covered Claims must be brought solely in the\\n Claimant’s individual capacity and not in a repre-\\n sentative capacity or on a class, collective, or group\\n basis. Each arbitration shall be limited solely to one\\n Claimant’s Covered Claims, and that Claimant may\\n not seek or receive any remedy which has the purpose\\n or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary\\n or other relief to any individual or entity other than\\n the Claimant. For instance, with respect to any claim\\n brought under ERISA § 502(a)(2) to seek appropriate\\n relief under ERISA § 409, the Claimant’s remedy, if\\n any, shall be limited to (i) the alleged losses to the\\n Claimant’s individual Account resulting from the al-\\n leged breach of fiduciary duty, (ii) a pro-rated portion\\n of any profits allegedly made by a fiduciary through\\n the use of Plan assets where such pro-rated amount\\n is intended to provide a remedy solely to Claimant’s\\n individual Account, and/or (iii) such other remedial\\n or equitable relief as the arbitrator(s) deem(s) proper\\n so long as such remedial or equitable relief does not\\n include or result in the provision of additional\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 5 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n benefits or monetary relief to any individual or entity\\n other than the Claimant, and is not binding on the\\n Committee or Trustee with respect to any individual\\n or entity other than the Claimant.\\n Id. It further states that “[i]n the event a court of competent juris-\\n diction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or in-\\n valid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Section\\n [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.” Id. at 71–72. 1\\n Five days after making this amendment to the plan docu-\\n ment, A360 terminated the plan. From October of 2019 to Decem-\\n ber of 2021, the plan distributed the proceeds from the stock sale\\n to the plan’s participants. Today, the plan has no assets.\\n In September of 2022, a number of plan participants—Eboni\\n Williams, Debbie Shoemaker, Paula Mays, Tina Kovelesky, and\\n Shadrin Herring—filed this action in federal district court under\\n ERISA and sought to represent a class of approximately 280 plan\\n participants. They alleged that the defendants—Messrs. Shapiro\\n and Brinkley, Argent, and A360 Holdings—unlawfully caused the\\n plan to be terminated and “its ‘unallocated’ shares to be redeemed\\n by the company for less than fair market value.” D.E. 69 ¶ 1. Spe-\\n cifically, they asserted that the plan lost $35.4 million when the de-\\n fendants schemed to sell the stock for $34.6 million because, in ac-\\n tuality, the stock was worth approximately $70 million.\\n\\n\\n 1 The addition of the Arbitration Procedure was the third amendment to the\\n\\n plan document, and we therefore sometimes refer to it as the third amend-\\n ment.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 6 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n A month later, A360 again amended the plan document with\\n the following language: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing\\n in this provision [the Arbitration Procedure] shall be construed to\\n preclude a Claimant from seeking injunctive relief, including, for\\n example, seeking an injunction to remove or replace a Plan fiduci-\\n ary even if such injunctive relief has an incidental impact on an in-\\n dividual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-1 at 76. This\\n was the fourth amendment to the plan document.\\n The plaintiffs then amended their complaint and asserted\\n the following claims under ERISA: (1) causing prohibited transac-\\n tions in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a); (2) engaging in prohibited\\n transactions between the plan and a fiduciary in violation of\\n § 1106(b); (3) breaching the fiduciary duties of prudence and loy-\\n alty in violation of § 1104(a)(1); (4) knowingly participating in the\\n breach, giving rise to co-fiduciary liability under § 1105(a);\\n (5) knowingly participating in prohibited transactions in violation\\n of § 1132(a)(3); (6) knowingly participating in breaches of the du-\\n ties of prudence and loyalty, also in violation of § 1132(a)(3); and\\n (7) breaching the terms of the plan in violation of § 1132(a)(3)(A).\\n The plaintiffs sought recovery for injuries to the plan “sustained as\\n a result of prohibited transactions and fiduciary breaches during\\n the statutory period,” as well as “equitable relief on behalf of the\\n [plan] as a whole.” D.E. 69 ¶ 108. They specifically requested dis-\\n gorgement of profits and restitution for losses to the plan. And they\\n sought to reform the plan document to eliminate the third and\\n fourth amendments, and to rescind the plan’s stock purchase agree-\\n ment.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 7 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Fed-\\n eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., based on the two amend-\\n ments to the plan document. The district court ruled that the indi-\\n vidual plan participants “gave no assent” to arbitrate their claims\\n for rescission and restitution. See Williams v. Shapiro, 724 F. Supp. 3d\\n 1295, 1307–08 (N.D. Ga. 2024) (noting that “[c]ourts have rigidly\\n adhered to the distinction between claims brought individually and\\n claims brought on behalf of plans in determining whether an oth-\\n erwise valid arbitration clause covers a given claim”). The court\\n held, however, that the plan itself “maintained a legal existence\\n such that it could assent to arbitration” through the third and\\n fourth amendments to the plan document. See id. at 1308.\\n The district court nevertheless denied the defendants’ mo-\\n tion to compel arbitration and invalidated the Arbitration Proce-\\n dure because ERISA authorizes plan-wide relief, and the Arbitra-\\n tion Procedure specifically prohibits such relief. See id. at 1309–14.\\n Because the Arbitration Procedure is by its own terms non-severa-\\n ble, the court held that it was entirely unenforceable. See id. at 1314.\\n On appeal, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ substan-\\n tive statutory right is to assert claims relating to their individual\\n plan accounts, and that this right is sufficiently vindicated in indi-\\n vidual arbitration as required by the Arbitration Procedure. The\\n defendants also contend that the district court erred in ruling that\\n the individual plaintiffs did not assent to arbitration because their\\n participation in the plan constituted their assent to be bound by the\\n plan document, including the Arbitration Procedure.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 8 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n II\\n “We review de novo a denial of a motion to compel arbitra-\\n tion as well as a district court’s interpretation of an arbitration\\n agreement.” Hearn v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 992 F.3d 1209,\\n 1212 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Jones v. Waffle House, Inc., 866 F.3d\\n 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2017)).\\n III\\n ERISA “obligates private employers offering pension plans\\n to adhere to an array of rules designed to ensure plan solvency and\\n protect plan participants.” Advoc. Health Care Network v. Stapleton,\\n 581 U.S. 468, 472 (2017) (citation omitted). We assume without de-\\n ciding that “ERISA claims are generally arbitrable.” Smith v. Bd. of\\n Dirs. of Triad Mfg., Inc., 13 F.4th 613, 620 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[j]oining\\n every other circuit to consider the issue”). See generally CompuCredit\\n Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (explaining that “federal\\n statutory claims” are arbitrable “unless the FAA’s mandate has been\\n overridden by a contrary congressional command”) (internal quo-\\n tation marks and citation omitted); Anders v. Hometown Mortg.\\n Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Federal statutory\\n claims are as a rule arbitrable[.]”) (citation omitted).\\n The Supreme Court has explained that the FAA “is a con-\\n gressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration\\n agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural\\n policies to the contrary.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Con-\\n str. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). It “establishes that, as a matter of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 9 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues\\n should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” Id. at 24–25.\\n Significantly, however, “the FAA does not require courts to\\n enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and remedies.” Vi-\\n king River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 653 (2022). Accord-\\n ingly, “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not\\n forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits\\n to their resolution in an arbitral forum.” Id. (quoting Preston v. Fer-\\n rer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008)) (alterations adopted).\\n The effective vindication doctrine invalidates arbitration\\n provisions that prospectively waive “a party’s right to pursue statu-\\n tory remedies.” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228,\\n 235 (2013) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plym-\\n outh, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)). The key question is\\n whether “the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its stat-\\n utory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Id. (internal quotation\\n marks omitted).\\n A\\n The defendants argue that the district court erred by em-\\n bracing the effective vindication doctrine because it is judge-made\\n and rooted in Supreme Court dicta. It is true that neither we nor\\n the Supreme Court have applied the doctrine to strike down an oth-\\n erwise enforceable arbitration provision. Yet whether we think\\n judge-made doctrines are generally appropriate or wise is of little\\n importance when the United States Supreme Court repeatedly\\n acknowledges a doctrine’s existence. See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at\\n 235–36 (“[Our] cases have similarly asserted the existence of an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 10 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n ‘effective vindication’ exception but have similarly declined to apply\\n it to invalidate the arbitration agreement at issue. . . . And we do so\\n again here.”) (internal citations and footnote omitted).\\n “[T]he holding of a case is, as the Supreme Court observed,\\n comprised both of the result of the case and ‘those portions of the\\n opinion necessary to that result . . . .’’’ United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d\\n 1246, 1253 n.10 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.\\n Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66–67 (1996)). The relevant holding in Italian\\n Colors was that the effective vindication doctrine did not invalidate\\n a certain arbitration clause. See 570 U.S. at 238–39. To reach that\\n result, the Supreme Court had to set out the parameters of the doc-\\n trine. See id. at 236 (explaining that the doctrine finds its origin in\\n the desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue\\n statutory remedies,” and would “certainly cover a provision in an\\n arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory\\n rights”) (emphasis added). It seems to us, therefore, that the discus-\\n sion of the doctrine in Italian Colors cannot be passed off as mere\\n dicta. See Escobar v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 805 F.3d 1279,\\n 1291 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that in Italian Colors “the Supreme\\n Court acknowledged the effective vindication doctrine,” which had\\n “originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors”).\\n Moreover, even if the discussion of the effective vindication\\n doctrine in several Supreme Court cases were in dicta, “dicta from\\n the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside.” Peter-\\n son v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997). See\\n also Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here\\n is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is Supreme Court\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 11 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n dicta. This is not subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-\\n analysis, throw-away kind of dicta.”). So, in Gilmore v. Georgia De-\\n partment of Corrections, 144 F.4th 1259, 1259–63 (11th Cir. 2025) (en\\n banc), we considered and gave some effect to a legal principle artic-\\n ulated by the Supreme Court in a number of cases even though the\\n Court had not yet found the principle to be satisfied. For the rea-\\n sons which follow, we adopt and apply the effective vindication\\n doctrine today.\\n In the ERISA context, federal common law is interstitial but\\n essential. As the Fifth Circuit has put it, “our power to create fed-\\n eral common law is premised on congressional authorization to fill\\n interstitial gaps in the text of federal legislation, here, ERISA.”\\n Coop. Ben. Adm’rs, Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2004). Cf.\\n United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)\\n (“[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation\\n means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of\\n the federal courts.”).\\n As noted, our own cases recognize the existence of the ef-\\n fective vindication doctrine. See Escobar, 805 F.3d at 1291. See also\\n Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016)\\n (quoting Italian Colors and explaining that the “‘effective vindica-\\n tion doctrine’ is one defense that the federal courts have recognized\\n in the context of domestic arbitration”). And commentators do as\\n well. See 13D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3569 (3d\\n ed. 2015 & Sept. 2025 supp.) (“The Supreme Court has held that\\n statutory claims can be submitted to arbitration. . . . It must be\\n clear, however, that the arbitration procedure does not impose such\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 12 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n burdens as to deny effective vindication of the statutory relief.”)\\n (footnotes omitted); Lauren K. Valastro, Vindicating Retirees, 41 Ga.\\n St. U. L. Rev. 257, 315 (2025) (“[F]ederal courts have not shied away\\n from applying [the effective vindication doctrine] to invalidate ar-\\n bitration provisions in the ERISA breach of fiduciary duty con-\\n text.”).\\n The effective vindication doctrine has been applied to the\\n waiver of ERISA statutory rights by six of our sister circuits in the\\n last five years. See, e.g., Parker v. Tenneco, Inc., 114 F.4th 786, 793 (6th\\n Cir. 2024) (citing cases). And no circuits have rejected the doctrine.\\n Thus, we elect to apply the doctrine in this case. See, e.g., State Farm\\n Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Tri-Borough NY Med. Prac. P.C., 120 F.4th 59, 91\\n (2d Cir. 2024) (“Bearing in mind a healthy regard for the federal\\n policy in favor of enforcing valid arbitration agreements, we recog-\\n nize that the effective vindication exception applies in rare cases\\n where an arbitration agreement prevents parties from effectively\\n vindicating their statutory rights.”) (internal quotation marks and\\n citation omitted and alterations adopted). 2\\n\\n 2 We have held that a public policy defense, under 9 U.S.C. § 207, “applies at\\n\\n the award-enforcement stage, not the initial arbitration-enforcement stage,”\\n pursuant to Article V of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and\\n Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). See\\n Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing\\n Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 636). But our decision in Lindo was driven\\n by Article V of the New York Convention, which addresses the recognition\\n and enforcement of certain arbitral awards. See id. at 1263. This ERISA action\\n is not an international arbitration case under the Convention, so Article V does\\n not govern. Nor does this case involve a public policy defense to the recogni-\\n tion and/or enforcement of an arbitration award. We therefore do not view\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 13 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n B\\n We turn, then, to whether the Arbitration Procedure at issue\\n here constitutes a prospective waiver of statutory rights granted by\\n ERISA. The statutory remedies sought by the plaintiffs include\\n ERISA’s plan-wide relief for breaches of fiduciary duty.\\n As relevant here, 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) establishes liability for\\n breaches of fiduciary duty, and states as follows:\\n Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan\\n who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations,\\n or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter\\n shall be personally liable to make good to such plan\\n any losses to the plan resulting from each such\\n breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such\\n fiduciary which have been made through use of assets\\n of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to\\n such other equitable or remedial relief as the court\\n may deem appropriate, including removal of such fi-\\n duciary.\\n (emphasis added).\\n ERISA expressly provides that plan participants may bring a\\n civil action for relief under § 1109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2). Inter-\\n preting this statutory framework, the Supreme Court has stated\\n\\n\\n the discussion of Mitsubishi Motors in Lindo as informing the issue here. Indeed,\\n the six circuits that have applied the effective vindication doctrine have done\\n so at the arbitration enforcement stage. And the Supreme Court has referred\\n to the effective vindication doctrine as a public policy ground on which an\\n arbitration agreement can be “invalidate[d].” Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 235.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 14 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n that § 1109(a)’s “draftsmen were primarily concerned with the pos-\\n sible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that would protect\\n the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual benefi-\\n ciary.” Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985).\\n Thus, ERISA provides for “‘plan-related’ relief.” Id.\\n As noted, six circuits have held that “arbitration provisions\\n preventing individuals from obtaining the plan-wide relief available\\n under [§ 1109(a)] violate the effective vindication doctrine.” Platt v.\\n Sodexo, S.A., 148 F.4th 709, 721 (9th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted).\\n See also Parker, 114 F.4th at 798; Smith, 13 F.4th at 615; Cedeno v. Sas-\\n son, 100 F.4th 386, 400–06 (2d Cir. 2024); Henry ex rel. BSC Ventures\\n Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan v. Wilmington Tr. NA, 72\\n F.4th 499, 507–08 (3d Cir. 2023); Harrison v. Envision Mgmt. Holding,\\n Inc. Bd. of Dirs., 59 F.4th 1090, 1106–07 (10th Cir. 2023). We join\\n them today and affirm the district court’s ruling that the Arbitra-\\n tion Procedure here is unenforceable.3\\n We do so because § 1109(a) “provides relief ‘singularly to the\\n plan’ rather than an individual plaintiff,” and § 1132(a)(2) “claims\\n are understood as claims ‘brought in a representative capacity on\\n behalf of the plan as a whole.’” Platt, 148 F.4th at 721 (first quoting\\n Mass. Mut., 473 U.S. at 142 & n.9, and then citing Hawkins v. Cintas\\n Corp., 32 F.4th 625, 635 (6th Cir. 2022)). See also, e.g., Cedeno, 100\\n F.4th at 403 (“[A § 1132(a)(2)] claim is inherently representational.”)\\n (citation omitted); Henry, 72 F.4th at 506 (“Actions for breach of fi-\\n duciary duty under § 1132(a) are brought in a representative\\n\\n 3 No circuit has reached a contrary conclusion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 15 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (alterations adopted\\n and internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And the Su-\\n preme Court recently reinforced the substantive nature of the right\\n to bring representative actions. See Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\\n 657 (“Non-class representative actions in which a single agent liti-\\n gates on behalf of a single principal are part of the basic architec-\\n ture of much of substantive law.”). The Arbitration Procedure here\\n plainly disallows claims brought “in a representative capacity,” as\\n well as claims that “seek or receive any remedy which has the pur-\\n pose or effect of providing additional benefits or monetary or other\\n relief to any individual or entity other than the Claimant.” D.E. 44-\\n 1 at 71. 4\\n Contrary to the defendants’ assertion, just because a plan\\n participant may obtain individualized relief under § 1109(a) does\\n not mean that she somehow waives the right to bring representa-\\n tive-capacity claims that seek relief on behalf of the plan. See LaRue\\n v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (“We therefore\\n hold that although [§ 1132(a)(2)] does not provide a remedy for in-\\n dividual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does au-\\n thorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of\\n\\n\\n 4 We “endeavor to be clear about how we are using the term ‘representative,’”\\n\\n and reject the defendants’ argument that §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) are merely\\n “claim joinder” mechanisms analogous to the state law statute at issue in Vi-\\n king River Cruises, 596 U.S. at 649, 659. The federal statutory right under ERISA\\n to seek plan-wide relief constitutes “a single claim”—here, the breach of fidu-\\n ciary duty—arising from a “common transaction”—here, the stock sale. See id.\\n at 654.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 16 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n plan assets in a participant’s individual account.”). See also Parker,\\n 114 F.4th at 796 (“LaRue did not overrule Russell or abrogate its fun-\\n damental precept that [§ 1132(a)(2)] suits are brought in a repre-\\n sentative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole.”) (internal quo-\\n tation marks and citation omitted). Our conclusion is bolstered by\\n the fact that the stock ownership plan here was a defined contribu-\\n tion plan. “Because a defined contribution plan is essentially the\\n sum of its parts, losses attributable to the account of an individual\\n participant are necessarily ‘losses to the plan’ for purposes of\\n [§ 1109(a)].” LaRue, 552 U.S. at 262–63 (Thomas, J., concurring). In\\n sum, §§ 1109(a) and 1132(a)(2) create a statutory cause of action “in\\n which a single agent [i.e., a plan participant] litigates on behalf of\\n a single principal [i.e., the plan,]” Viking River Cruises, 596 U.S. at\\n 657, under § 1109(a) for “any losses to the plan[.]”\\n The defendants’ reliance on Thole v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 590 U.S.\\n 538, 544 (2020), is misplaced. First, Thole involved a defined benefit\\n plan, and not a defined contribution plan, and the Supreme Court\\n said that distinction was of “decisive importance” to the result. See\\n id. at 540. Second, and more fundamentally, the Court in Thole did\\n not state (or even hint) that an ERISA § 1132(a)(2) claimant cannot\\n be an agent or proxy of the plan in a representative action. See gen-\\n erally id. Thole instead applied familiar Article III principles to con-\\n clude that the two plan participants who sued lacked standing be-\\n cause the alleged plan mismanagement did not affect their pension\\n benefits. See id. at 540–41. Thole did not hold that plan participants\\n could never have Article III representational standing, but, rather,\\n ruled that plan participants themselves must suffer a concrete\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 17 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11192 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n injury to claim the interests of the plan. See id. at 543 (quoting Hol-\\n lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013)). We therefore reject the\\n defendants’ reading of Thole.\\n We conclude that the Arbitration Procedure’s preclusion of\\n ERISA statutory claims brought “in a representative capacity,” for\\n relief which benefits anyone other than the individual claimant,\\n prevents the plaintiffs from effectively vindicating §§ 1109(a) and\\n 1132(a)(2) in the arbitral forum. See D.E. 44-1 at 71. Although the\\n fourth amendment to the plan purported to allow a claimant to\\n seek certain forms of injunctive relief, it still did not permit repre-\\n sentative capacity claims for relief such as disgorgement of profits\\n and restitution to the plan—relief that the plaintiffs sought here.\\n See Parker, 114 F.4th at 801 (“That the individual arbitration provi-\\n sion here still allows plan-wide injunctive relief [e.g., seeking an in-\\n junction to remove or replace a plan fiduciary] has no bearing on\\n the fact that it eliminates statutorily created plan-wide monetary\\n relief.”). The Arbitration Procedure is thus unenforceable as a pro-\\n spective waiver of a statutory right under ERISA.\\n This leads to the matter of severability. Whether or not a\\n severability provision in an arbitration agreement “is to be given\\n effect is a question of state law.” Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs.,\\n Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003). And Georgia law looks to\\n the “intent of the parties” in “determin[ing] whether a contract is\\n severable such that the remaining contract provisions will survive\\n even if one or more provisions of the contract are void.” Early v.\\n MiMedx Grp., Inc., 768 S.E.2d 823, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 18 of 18\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-11192\\n\\n Based on the express language of the Arbitration Procedure,\\n the problematic language in the Arbitration Procedure is not sever-\\n able. See D.E. 44-1 at 71–72 (“In the event a court of competent ju-\\n risdiction were to find these requirements to be unenforceable or\\n invalid, then the entire Arbitration Procedure (i.e., all of this Sec-\\n tion [ ]) shall be rendered null and void in all respects.”). We there-\\n fore must invalidate the Arbitration Procedure entirely. 5\\n IV\\n We join our sister circuits in holding that arbitration provi-\\n sions with near-identical language eliminate the right to pursue\\n substantive plan-wide remedies under ERISA and therefore violate\\n the effective vindication doctrine. See, e.g., Parker, 114 F.4th at 801.\\n Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s invalidation of the plan’s\\n Arbitration Procedure and denial of the defendants’ motion to\\n compel arbitration.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Given our resolution, we need not address the district court’s ruling that the\\n\\n individual plaintiffs did not assent to the third and fourth amendments to the\\n plan.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30976,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10759426,"string":"10,759,426"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC v. Mg Affordable Master, Llc"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-10198"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10197\\n ____________________\\n\\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXX, LLC,\\n a Florida limited liability company,\\n f.k.a. Creative Choice Homes XXX, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n AMTAX HOLDINGS 690, LLC,\\n a foreign limited liability company,\\n PROTECH 2005-C, LLC,\\n a foreign limited liability company,\\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01903-TPB-AAS\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10198\\n ____________________\\n\\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXXI, LLC,\\n A Florida corporation formerly known as\\n Creative Choice Homes XXXI, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n MG AFFORDABLEMASTER, LLC,\\n MG GTC MIDDLE TIER I, LLC,\\n MG GTC FUND I, LLC,\\n Foreign limited liability companies,\\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\\n NAIMISHA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01910-TPB-AAS\\n ____________________\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n ABUDU, Circuit Judge:\\n This consolidated appeal involves a dispute among several\\n business entities engaged in two limited partnerships for building,\\n managing, and selling affordable housing complexes. At the center\\n of these partnerships are two affiliates of Creative Choice Homes,\\n Inc. (“Creative Choice”)—Creative Choice Homes XXX, LLC\\n (“Creative Choice XXX”) and Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC\\n (“Creative Choice XXXI”), which each served as a “general part-\\n ner” for one of the limited partnerships. After a series of financial\\n transactions that even the general partners admitted violated the\\n partnership agreements, the limited partners had the general part-\\n ners removed from their positions. The general partners sued, ar-\\n guing that their actions did not materially breach the agreements\\n and that, in any event, they cured any deficiency. They also con-\\n tended that the reason given for their ouster was just a pretext for\\n trying to deprive the general partners of financial interests to which\\n they otherwise were entitled under the partnership agreements.\\n The district court rejected all their arguments and ruled in the lim-\\n ited partners’ favor, thus enforcing the general partners’ removal.\\n On appeal, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI\\n (collectively, the “general partners”), 1 challenge the district court’s\\n decision on the grounds that the court’s findings regarding their\\n\\n\\n 1 AMTAX, Protech, MG GTC, and MG Affordable are collectively referred to\\n\\n as the “limited partners.”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n curative acts and the materiality of the alleged breaches were\\n clearly erroneous. They also assert that their removal resulted in\\n an unlawful forfeiture and windfall of earnings for the limited part-\\n ners. Finally, they argue that, by accepting their curative measures,\\n the limited partners waived the option to remove them from office\\n and, therefore, should have been estopped from enforcing that pro-\\n vision as a remedy to any breach.\\n After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs,\\n and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.\\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\\n Relying on the district court’s uncontested findings of fact,\\n the testimony given during the three-day bench trial, the accompa-\\n nying trial exhibits, and the two partnership agreements, we out-\\n line the structure of the two partnerships, recount the relevant fac-\\n tual background that led to the underlying dispute, and walk\\n through the district court’s proceedings.\\n A. Structure of the Limited Partnerships\\n Creative Choice, founded and operated by Dilip Barot, de-\\n velops affordable housing through limited partnership structures.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI created the Foun-\\n tainview and Park Terrace partnerships, respectively, around 2002\\n to develop two affordable apartment complexes in Tampa, Florida.\\n Creative Choice XXX served as the general partner for the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, and Creative Choice XXXI served as the gen-\\n eral partner for the Park Terrace partnership. For the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, AMTAX Holdings 690, LLC (“AMTAX”) was\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n the investor limited partner, and Protech 2005-C, LLC (“Protech”)\\n was the special limited partner. For the Park Terrace partnership,\\n MG GTC Middle Tier I, LLC (“MG GTC”) was the investor limited\\n partner, and MG Affordable Master, LLC (“MG Affordable”) was\\n the special limited partner.\\n Both the Fountainview and Park Terrace partnership agree-\\n ments authorized the general partners to select a management\\n company and to make other decisions related to the properties’\\n daily operations. The general partners hired Impro Synergies, LLC\\n (“Impro”) to manage both developments. Both partnership agree-\\n ments also created a pay structure in which the general partners\\n would be entitled to an annual incentive management fee, but\\n those payments could only be distributed in accordance with the\\n agreements’ cash distribution or “waterfall” provisions. Pursuant\\n to the waterfall provisions, the limited partners had to receive their\\n share of the profits first, and then the general partners could be paid\\n their management fee. The Fountainview agreement expressly\\n prohibited Creative Choice XXX from borrowing any funds from\\n the partnership accounts. In addition, given the multiple compa-\\n nies the general partners either owned or with which they were\\n associated, both agreements also forbid them from commingling\\n funds with other entities or individuals.\\n Both Agreements contemplated the general partner’s re-\\n moval from the partnership under certain circumstances. The rel-\\n evant portions of the Fountainview Agreement’s removal provi-\\n sion stated:\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n (a) The Investor Limited Partner and/or Special Limited Partner\\n shall have the right to remove the General Partner:\\n (i) for any intentional misconduct, malfeasance, fraud,\\n act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its fi-\\n duciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable\\n care with respect to any material matter in the dis-\\n charge of its duties and obligations as General Partner\\n (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to\\n result in, a material detriment to or an impairment of\\n the Partnership, the Limited Partners, the Project, or\\n the assets of the Partnership), or\\n (ii) upon the occurrence of any of the follow-\\n ing: . . . .\\n\\n (B) The General Partner shall have violated any ma-\\n terial provision of this Agreement including, without\\n limitation, any of its guarantees pursuant to Section\\n 5.1(d) or 8.8, or violated any material provision of ap-\\n plicable law (provided that such violation results in,\\n or is likely to result in, a material detriment to or an\\n impairment of the Partnership, the Limited Partners,\\n the Project, or the assets of the Partnership).\\n The agreement required the Fountainview limited partners to give\\n the general partner notice and an opportunity to cure before the\\n removal took effect. The applicable period was either 30 days after\\n the day of notice, or 60 days if the general partner diligently and\\n consistently began to cure within the 30-day period.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n The Park Terrace Agreement also permitted the limited\\n partners to remove the general partner for any “Material Default”\\n as defined in the Agreement, which included:\\n (i) a breach by any General Partner (or any of its\\n Affiliates) . . . in the performance of any of its obliga-\\n tions under this Agreement . . . and which has, or\\n may reasonably be expected to have, a material ad-\\n verse effect on the Partnership, the Apartment Com-\\n plex, or the Investor Limited Partner; [or] . . .\\n\\n (iv) gross negligence, fraud, willful misconduct,\\n misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\\n fiduciary duty by a General Partner or any Affiliate of\\n a General Partner providing services to or in connec-\\n tion with the Partnership or the Apartment Com-\\n plex. 2\\n\\n For removal to be effective, the Park Terrace limited partners must\\n have given the general partner notice of the cause for its removal.\\n However, only “material defaults” under subsection (i) were sub-\\n ject to a right to a cure which, for monetary defaults, is 30 days\\n from the notice of removal. Removals for material defects under\\n\\n\\n 2 The parties dispute whether both partnership agreements required a material\\n\\n detriment in order to remove a general partner for the reasons presented here.\\n The district court did not decide whether materiality was required in each\\n agreement because it found the general partners’ conduct caused a material\\n detriment. Similarly, we find the general partners’ breaches material and do\\n not need to decide whether both agreements required material harm for the\\n violations here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n subsection (iv) took effect on the date of notice. Under both agree-\\n ments, if the general partner remained in the partnership until the\\n end of the tax credit compliance period, it had the right to purchase\\n the properties, or the limited partners’ interest in the properties.\\n B. Limited Partnerships’ Allegations of Malfeasance\\n Dating back to 2008, on the partnerships’ audited financial\\n statements, Baker Tilly, an auditing firm responsible for producing\\n the audited financial statements, documented sums of money that\\n the general partners took from the partnership through advances\\n made to undisclosed general partners’ affiliates. This was marked\\n as “due from affiliate” balances. At least twice in 2012, the limited\\n partners notified the general partners that these distributions vio-\\n lated the partnership agreements and demanded the funds be re-\\n turned. 3\\n The accounting and consulting firm Baker Tilly was hired to\\n produce audited financial statements for the properties, and\\n worked directly with the general partners in preparing those re-\\n ports. Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Fountainview partnership\\n indicated that the partnership loaned an unspecified affiliate of Cre-\\n ative Choice XXX $140,577 and that, as of December 31, 2016, that\\n loan was still outstanding. In its report, Baker Tilly notified the\\n\\n\\n 3 Neither Creative Choice XXX nor Creative Choice XXXI objected to or oth-\\n\\n erwise contested the admissibility of this evidence. Although only two email\\n exhibits were shown at trial to demonstrate that the limited partners opposed\\n the unauthorized affiliate payments before Hunt took control, a representa-\\n tive testified that the limited partners raised objections for years.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n general partners that the loan violated the partnership agreement,\\n specifically the waterfall provision.\\n Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Park Terrace partnership\\n similarly showed a loan to an affiliate of Creative Choice XXXI for\\n the amount of $81,198 and that, as of December 31, 2016, the loan\\n had not been paid. This audit also notified the general partners that\\n the payment violated the partnership agreement’s waterfall provi-\\n sion.\\n In March 2018, Baker Tilly circulated a draft of its 2017 au-\\n dits. It advised that the 2016 “due from affiliate” balances had to be\\n treated as “contra-equity” because it was atypical to have such a\\n significant balance due, and there was nothing in writing docu-\\n menting the advances the general partners made to their affiliates,\\n the terms for repayment, or anything showing that at least some\\n repayment was made. The contra-equity designation would re-\\n duce the general partners’ account balance and was a red flag to the\\n limited partners. Therefore, the general partners insisted that the\\n loaned amounts be reflected as “due from affiliate,” which would\\n instead suggest the amounts due involved a non-suspect transac-\\n tion and were still expected to be paid back. Baker Tilly declined\\n to do so.\\n As a solution, the general partners produced written notes\\n with defined repayment terms payable to the partnership from\\n Naimisha, which Barot co-owned. In August 2018, the general\\n partners forwarded Baker Tilly two promissory notes from\\n Naimisha to the respective general partners, agreeing to pay\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n $100,000 to the general partners to “develop a detailed scope and\\n repair cost plan” for both properties.\\n Baker Tilly accepted the promissory notes as satisfactory and\\n completed its 2017 audits in September 2018. The 2017 audits for\\n both partnerships indicated that Naimisha pledged the general\\n partners $100,000. Of that amount, Naimisha still owed $87,883 to\\n the Fountainview partnership and all $100,000 to the Park Terrace\\n partnership. Even though Naimisha had not completed its pay-\\n ments, Baker Tilly listed the 2016 amounts due as “due from affili-\\n ate” balances, and did not reduce the partnerships’ equity based on\\n their unpaid status. Park Terrace’s 2017 audited financial state-\\n ment also disclosed that the partnership made new advances dur-\\n ing the year in the amount of $3,261 to undisclosed affiliates of Cre-\\n ative Choice XXXI, and that amount was due as of December 31,\\n 2017.\\n In January 2019, the limited partners hired Hunt Capital\\n Partners (“Hunt”) to represent their interests in the limited part-\\n nerships, namely to protect their assets. On March 25, Hunt wrote\\n to the respective general partners regarding improper advances\\n and unauthorized use of partnership funds, but the general partners\\n did not respond. On April 9, Hunt emailed the general partners\\n again and requested an immediate response and repayment.\\n Again, the general partners did not respond. Six days later, the lim-\\n ited partners’ legal representative contacted the general partners\\n regarding the general partners’ failure to address the concerns out-\\n lined in the March 25 letter. The limited partners gave the general\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n partners until April 26, 2019, to reimburse the partnerships for the\\n unauthorized financial distributions, including those that Baker\\n Tilly identified, and to provide accurate records regarding the part-\\n nerships’ financial status. Failure to do so, the limited partners\\n stated, would result in the general partners being removed from\\n their positions.\\n The general partners did not respond to the March letter.\\n So, on May 3, 2019, the limited partners notified the general part-\\n ners that they would have until June 3, 2019, to address all of the\\n violations, particularly in misappropriation of funds and prohibited\\n advances, outlined in the letter. The general partners responded by\\n the June 3 deadline, asking for more time to repay the amounts\\n owed. However, even with the additional time, the general part-\\n ners never satisfied those payments. By this point, more than thirty\\n days had passed since the limited partners first notified the general\\n partners of their need to either resolve the breaches or leave office.\\n On June 18, 2019, the limited partners informed the general\\n partners that they were being removed from their positions. The\\n next day, the general partners offered to send a wire transfer to cure\\n all their defaults in exchange for the limited partners rescinding\\n their notices of removal. On June 21, the general partners issued a\\n check to Park Terrace in the amount of $141,235, and a check to\\n Fountainview Apartments in the amount of $105,994.\\n The limited partners confirmed receipt of the checks on June\\n 28, but they did not consider the payments as remedying the viola-\\n tions. In particular, the checks arrived without any explanation as\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n to what specific debts were being repaid and, moreover, did not\\n fully satisfy the total amounts owed. Additionally, the limited part-\\n ners maintained that payments should have included penalties for\\n failing to timely report the financial irregularities as required under\\n the partnership agreements. The general partners, in response,\\n sent a letter on July 5, arguing the payments were sufficient to re-\\n turn the parties to the status quo.\\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n The general partners sued the limited partners in state court\\n for breaching the partnership agreements, and for a declaratory\\n judgment that their removal was unauthorized. 4 The limited part-\\n ners removed the case to federal court 5 and counterclaimed against\\n the general partners and Impro,6 asserting breach of contract and\\n seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their authority to remove\\n the general partners.\\n At trial, the general partners maintained that they did not\\n materially breach the partnership agreements because the limited\\n\\n 4 The general partners sued the Fountainview and Park Terrace limited part-\\n\\n ners separately in state court. The limited partners removed the actions to\\n federal court, and the cases were tried together.\\n 5 The limited partners removed based on diversity jurisdiction. The general\\n partners moved to remand because they alleged that the limited partners failed\\n to establish complete diversity of citizenship. The district court held that the\\n limited partners established complete diversity of citizenship and denied the\\n motion to remand.\\n 6 Impro was not originally a party to the case but was joined as a counter-\\n\\n defendant in the limited partners’ counterclaim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n partners still received the substantial benefit of their bargain,\\n namely tax credits in exchange for their initial capital contributions.\\n They further argued that the limited partners had been fully aware\\n of their actions for a significant period of time and yet had done\\n nothing. It was only now, they contended, that the limited part-\\n ners were trying to exercise a right that would actually result in\\n them gaining a “windfall” of economic benefits from their removal.\\n The limited partners responded that, while for years the gen-\\n eral partners had been improperly taking money from the partner-\\n ships, the amounts had become exorbitant which is why they de-\\n cided to remove the general partners. They maintained that the\\n misappropriation of funds constituted a material breach that signif-\\n icantly reduced the expected returns on their investments. The\\n limited partners further claimed that, instead of curing the\\n breaches, the general partners tried to conceal their actions by cre-\\n ating fraudulent financial notes and submitting late, improperly\\n funded checks. Finally, they argued that removing the general\\n partners was a remedy outlined in the partnership agreements, so\\n it did not result in improper forfeiture.\\n On the stand, Barot admitted that the payments to the gen-\\n eral partners’ affiliates were improper because the payments in-\\n cluded money that should have been paid to the limited partners\\n and did not comply with the Agreements’ waterfall provisions. Ba-\\n rot also admitted that he and his wife owned Naimisha Construc-\\n tion, Inc. Yet, he maintained that the limited partners did not ob-\\n ject to the payments until Hunt gained control. He also alleged\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n that the limited partners suggested creating the Naimisha note be-\\n cause they wanted to formalize the amounts due as a partnership\\n asset, as opposed to a “due from affiliate” balance.\\n The district court ruled in favor of the limited partners. The\\n court concluded that the general partners materially breached the\\n agreements and failed to timely remedy those violations. It specif-\\n ically found that, while the amounts of improper withdrawals were\\n a small fraction of the limited partners’ overall expectations regard-\\n ing tax credits and savings, the general partners withdrew a sub-\\n stantial portion of the partnerships’ available cash for some years,\\n meaning that they reduced the cash flow otherwise due to the lim-\\n ited partners and reduced the financial security of the partnership.\\n The court determined that both Baker Tilly and Barot considered\\n the amounts to be significant, and that the funds were important\\n to the limited partners in case of emergencies and other unexpected\\n events. Furthermore, the court found that the diversion of funds\\n materially affected the relationship between the partners, ruptur-\\n ing any mutual trust and their ability to work together. The\\n breach, thus, deprived the limited partners of substantial, bar-\\n gained-for benefits.\\n As to Park Terrace, the court found that the general partners\\n continued to make improper advances even after receiving the no-\\n tice of the default, that they did not resolve the unauthorized with-\\n drawals until months after they received their removal letter, and\\n that they directed that those deposits be recorded as being made\\n months earlier. Additionally, the district court determined that the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n funds the general partners deposited in the partnership accounts\\n were insufficient to remedy the violations because the money was\\n comprised in part from loans to the partnerships, which the part-\\n nership agreement also prohibited. Therefore, the general part-\\n ners’ payments still failed to cure the breaches.\\n The court also found that the limited partners did not waive\\n their right to remove the general partners, and were not otherwise\\n estopped from doing so, because the limited partners complained\\n on multiple occasions that the general partners’ conduct violated\\n the partnership agreements and properly requested that the gen-\\n eral partners return improperly distributed funds. Therefore, the\\n court ordered that the general partners be removed in accordance\\n with the partnership agreements.\\n III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n On appeal following a bench trial, we review a district\\n court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear\\n error. A.I.G. Uru. Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper Transp.,\\n 334 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 2003). A finding of fact is clearly erro-\\n neous “when although there is evidence to support it, the review-\\n ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm\\n conviction that a mistake has been committed.” OHI Asset (VA)\\n Martinsville SNF, LLC, et al. v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 115 F.4th 1296,\\n 1303 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470\\n U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). When “there are two permissible views of\\n the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be\\n clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574). We\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n review a district court’s decision to grant or deny equitable relief\\n for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings supporting its deci-\\n sion for clear error. Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d\\n 1210, 1220 (11th Cir. 2002).\\n IV. DISCUSSION\\n On appeal, the general partners raise four arguments: (1)\\n that the district court clearly erred in determining that the breaches\\n caused material damage, (2) that the district court clearly erred in\\n finding that their breaches were not fully cured, (3) that their re-\\n moval constituted an impermissible forfeiture and windfall for the\\n limited partners, and (4) that the district court should have applied\\n waiver or estoppel to prevent their removal. We find that the dis-\\n trict court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that its\\n conclusions of law were correct.\\n A. Materiality\\n The general partners argue that the district court erred in\\n concluding that their actions were material and detrimental. Spe-\\n cifically, they assert that, regardless of their own actions, the lim-\\n ited partners received their essential, bargained-for tax and other\\n benefits. If anything, they maintain, the advances constituted a\\n small amount of the partnerships’ overall monetary value and had\\n no negative impact on the partnerships’ financial stability.\\n Some of the provisions in the partnership agreements re-\\n quired that the prohibited conduct materially harm the limited\\n partners in order to justify a general partner’s removal. Specifi-\\n cally, the Fountainview partnership agreement allowed for the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n removal of a general partner “for any intentional misconduct, mal-\\n feasance, fraud, act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its\\n fiduciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable care with re-\\n spect to any material matter in the discharge of its duties” and\\n when the general partner “violated any material provision of appli-\\n cable law (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to re-\\n sult in, a material detriment to or an impairment of the Partner-\\n ship, the Limited Partners, the Project, or the assets of the Partner-\\n ship).” The Park Terrace partnership agreement allowed for the\\n removal of a general partner for a “material default,” which in-\\n cluded a breach by the general partner of any obligation “which\\n has, or may reasonably be expected to have, a material adverse ef-\\n fect on the Partnership, the Apartment Complex, or the Investor\\n Limited Partner,” and included “gross negligence, fraud, willful\\n misconduct, misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\\n fiduciary duty” by the general partner.\\n The partnership agreements do not define what constitutes\\n a “material” breach. Therefore, we turn to Florida law for guid-\\n ance as to the best way to interpret the contractual requirement of\\n materiality. 7 See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Constr.,\\n Inc., 130 F.4th 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2025). The parties’ intent when\\n entering the contract serves as an important starting point. Massey\\n\\n\\n 7 Both agreements contained a choice of law provision providing that Florida\\n\\n law governs, and the parties agree that Florida law applies. See Walls v. Quick\\n & Reilly, 824 So. 2d 1016, 1018–19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Default Proof Credit Card\\n Sys. v. Friedland, 992 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n Servs., Inc. v. Sanders, 312 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We\\n can determine a party’s intent by looking at the use of terms within\\n the four corners of the contract, taking into consideration the de-\\n bated provision within the context of the entire agreement. Id.;\\n Hand v. Grow Const., Inc., 983 So. 2d 684, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008);\\n 16205 Captiva Drive, LLC v. Levinson, 418 So. 3d 751, 755 (Fla. 6th\\n DCA 2025). A word is presumed to have the same meaning\\n throughout the contract. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. State, 301 So.\\n 3d 269, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (applying the presumption of con-\\n sistent usage to contract); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012)\\n (presumption of consistent usage). Further, every word in a con-\\n tract should be given effect and treated consistently, such that it is\\n not redundant. Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr.\\n Co., 215 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (citing Fla. E. Coast Ry.\\n Co. v. City of Miami, 79 So. 682, 683 (Fla. 1918)) (applying the sur-\\n plusage canon to a contract); SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW 174\\n (surplusage canon).\\n When the meaning of a term is unambiguous, we apply the\\n term’s plain meaning. Massey Servs., Inc., 312 So. 3d at 214 (quoting\\n Waverly 1 & 2, LLC v. Waverly at Las Olas Condo. Ass’n, 242 So. 3d\\n 425, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). There are multiple sources for in-\\n terpreting otherwise undefined terms, and dictionaries are just one\\n source. See Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 356 So. 3d 771, 776\\n (Fla. 2023). Importantly, a term’s context in the contract may indi-\\n cate that the parties intended to give it a meaning other than the\\n one ascribed in general usage. See id. at 774.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Here, to remove a general partner, the agreements required\\n that the violation at issue result in a “material detriment” or have\\n a “material adverse effect.” The Fountainview agreements de-\\n scribed only two instances in which a “material detriment” could\\n trigger the limited partners’ right to remove the general partner.\\n The first reference allowed the limited partners to remove the gen-\\n eral partner for intentional misconduct or malfeasance in the dis-\\n charge of the general partner’s duty when such violation results in\\n a material detriment to the partnership. The second relevant pro-\\n vision allowed for removal when the general partner violated a ma-\\n terial provision of the agreement, provided that such a violation\\n resulted in a material detriment to the partnership. The Foun-\\n tainview agreement also used “material” to describe other circum-\\n stances. As stated, it referred to “material provisions” in the con-\\n text of removing a general partner, but elsewhere it simply referred\\n to “provisions.” For instance, in describing the duties of the limited\\n partners, the contract required them to “comply with the provi-\\n sions of this Agreement expressly applicable.” The agreement also\\n used “material adverse effect” and “adverse effect” on different oc-\\n casions. In one spot, the agreement confirmed that general part-\\n ners would not apply for grant funding unless the grant would not\\n “materially adversely affect the tax benefits” of the limited partners.\\n In another, however, the contract described that the limited part-\\n ners had no obligation to consent to an amendment that could “ad-\\n versely affect the timing or amount of the allocation of [their] tax\\n credits” or income.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n The contexts in which the Fountainview agreement used\\n “material” indicate that it was intended to heighten the level of sig-\\n nificance or seriousness of the detriment, provision, or effect being\\n described. The agreement connected “material provisions” to the\\n serious consequence of removal from the partnership. By contrast,\\n the contract merely required compliance with “provisions” when\\n describing the limited partners’ duties to perform under the agree-\\n ment, which is subject to less severe penalties than removal. Simi-\\n larly, the general partner was prohibited from materially affecting\\n the tax benefits of the limited partners through grant funding, the\\n phrasing of which tolerated minor negative effects, while the lim-\\n ited partners were free to decline any change that would adversely\\n affect their credits or income, granting them authority to refuse\\n any alteration that would marginally impact their benefits. This\\n wording was intentional, as both increased the latitude given to the\\n parties—allowing general partners to apply for grants that might\\n have a marginal impact on the limited partners’ benefits and per-\\n mitting the limited partners to reject any alteration that would\\n even minimally impact them—while still largely protecting the tax\\n credit benefit.\\n The Park Terrace agreement contained a similar distinction\\n between phrases that used “material.” The section on removal\\n contemplated the removal of a general partner when the breach\\n had a “material adverse effect.” There is only one place in the con-\\n tract in which “adverse effect” is used without “material,” and\\n there it states that the general partner will take all actions necessary\\n to classify the partnership as a partnership for federal income tax\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n purposes and will refrain from taking any action “which would ad-\\n versely affect such treatment.” The agreement used “material” in\\n other circumstances. In one provision, the contract stated that the\\n general partner had no authority to “materially” amend or modify\\n any mortgage loan or project documents without the consent of\\n the limited partners. In another, the agreement stated that it did\\n not “permit any party . . . to alter, modify or amend any term” in\\n the agreement. These comparisons demonstrate a similar under-\\n standing of “material” as in the Fountainview contract. While the\\n general partner could not substantially amend mortgage loans or\\n project documents, some minor alterations were apparently al-\\n lowed; however, no party was allowed to modify any term of the\\n partnership agreement, regardless of the alteration’s materiality.\\n Similarly, while the general partner must have engaged in conduct\\n that had a material adverse effect to enact removal, it was required\\n to undergo all actions necessary to maintain its federal tax status,\\n because even a minor change there could be detrimental.\\n This internally consistent understanding of “material”\\n gleaned from the four corners of each of the contracts aligns with\\n the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “material.” Looking\\n at dictionary definitions, Merriam-Webster defines “material” as\\n “having real importance or great consequences.” Material,\\n MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-web-\\n ster.com/dictionary/material. Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary\\n defines “material” as “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item\\n would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.”\\n Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Taken together,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 22 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n “material” means having real importance or being significant. This\\n fits with the discussed context of “material” in the contracts, which\\n permitted removal of general partners for more significant\\n breaches in circumstances that held greater consequence and could\\n result in meaningful harm to the partnership. Therefore, to effec-\\n tuate the general partners’ removal under the agreements, the\\n harm faced by the limited partners must have been real and signif-\\n icant.\\n The district court found the detriment to the limited part-\\n ners to be significant. It found that the general partners “repeat-\\n edly, intentionally, and willfully diverted thousands of dollars to\\n non-partnership uses, over the objection of the [l]imited [p]artners,\\n in violation of their duties as [g]eneral [p]artners.” Order at 27,\\n Dkt. 173. It determined that this “conduct by its nature is likely to\\n have or could reasonably be expected to have a materially adverse\\n or detrimental effect on the partnerships because it affects the rela-\\n tionship of the partners.” Id. The court found that the general\\n partners conduct had deprived the limited partners of their owed\\n distributions. It found unconvincing the general partners’ argu-\\n ments that the breaches were not material because the overall\\n value of the misappropriated amounts was small in comparison\\n with the value of the project and the limited partners still received\\n the bargained-for tax benefit.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI raise simi-\\n lar arguments on appeal. However, we agree with the district\\n court that the harm faced by the limited partners was material. The\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 23 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n owner of the general partners, the chief financial officer of Hunt,\\n and the general partners’ auditing firm all stated that the amounts\\n misappropriated were material. The misappropriated cash com-\\n prised a significant portion of the partnerships’ cash on hand, and\\n in some cases, it was as much as a month’s worth of operating ex-\\n penses. This was a significant issue for the limited partners, who\\n sought to ensure that there was adequate funding in the partner-\\n ship should needs arise, such as property improvements, mainte-\\n nance, or upkeep. The general partners’ conduct also made it so\\n that the limited partners were unable to trust and do business with\\n them. Further, the limited partners ultimately received less money\\n because there was less money in the partnership for the year-end\\n waterfall distribution.\\n In their brief, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice\\n XXXI argue that the standard for materiality is whether the injured\\n party received substantially what it bargained for, which is the\\n standard used in breach of contract cases. They cite cases that dis-\\n cuss materiality as used to measure breach of contract. See, e.g.,\\n Ron Matusalem & Matusa of Fla., Inc. v. Ron Matusalem, Inc., 872 F.2d\\n 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989). In Florida, a material breach is when\\n non-compliance with the contract goes “to the essence of the con-\\n tract,” JF & LN, LLC v. Royal Oldsmobile-GMC Trucks Co., 292 So. 3d\\n 500, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), such as when the contract would not\\n have been made without the covenant not performed, Seawatch at\\n Marathon Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am., 286 So. 3d 823,\\n 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The general partners state that relevant\\n considerations include the extent to which the injured party can be\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 24 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n compensated for its injury, to what degree the breaching party will\\n suffer a forfeiture, and whether the breaching party performed\\n with good faith and fair dealing.\\n Considering this “contract law” definition of materiality, the\\n district court still found that the breach was material. It found that\\n the general partners deprived the limited partners of substantial,\\n bargained-for benefits, such as a working relationship between the\\n parties, their core fiduciary duties, and the diverted cash flow.\\n Applying the general partners’ breach of contract standard,\\n we agree with the district court. The general partners acted in clear\\n disregard of vital terms of the contract, including the cash distribu-\\n tion order, and continually violated their fiduciary duties and did\\n not act in good faith. The general partners refused to cease violat-\\n ing the partnership agreements despite repeated warnings, contin-\\n ued to do so after the notice of removal, failed to timely cure, and\\n then attempted to fraudulently cover up that failure. While the\\n general partners argue that the essential benefits were the tax cred-\\n its, those credits are not the only important bargained-for benefit\\n in the contract, and in fact, the limited partners received less overall\\n money because of Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice\\n XXXI’s actions. Additionally, as discussed above, the limited part-\\n ners were validly concerned about the financial health and stability\\n of the partnership, and that was put in jeopardy by the general part-\\n ners’ malfeasance. Though we discuss forfeiture later, the general\\n partners’ removal is not an impermissible forfeiture, and here, it is\\n not outweighed by the other factors, given their blatant and\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 25 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n continuous disregard for the partnership agreements and breaches\\n of their fiduciary duties.\\n In summary, the general partners’ improper withdrawal of\\n thousands of dollars from the partnership to use on non-partner-\\n ship purposes caused material harm. It violated the terms of the\\n agreement, reduced the financial security of the partnership, dete-\\n riorated trust, and resulted in less funds available to be distributed\\n to the limited partners.\\n B. Cure\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\\n the district court clearly erred in finding that the checks the general\\n partners sent in June 2019—made out for $141,235 to the Park Ter-\\n race partnership and for $105,994 to the Fountainview partner-\\n ship—were insufficient to satisfy the outstanding balances.\\n The dispute over whether the general partners adequately\\n cured is contractual, and Florida law applies because this case pro-\\n ceeded under diversity jurisdiction. See Endurance Am. Specialty Ins.\\n Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 F.4th 978, 983 (11th Cir. 2022). When\\n determining whether a party has cured a contractual breach, Flor-\\n ida courts look to the language of the contract as a whole, including\\n the contractual cure requirements, and the facts surrounding the\\n breach. See Jones v. Warmack, 967 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st DCA\\n 2007) (interpreting the cure obligation through the language of the\\n whole contract); cf. Sun Bank of Miami v. Lester, 404 So. 2d 141, 143\\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (attempt to cure insufficient when the cure was\\n inadequate to fully address other contract terms).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 26 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n Under the Fountainview partnership agreement, Creative\\n Choice XXX was required to cure any defect within thirty days after\\n the limited partners gave notice. However, if Creative Choice XXX\\n began diligently and consistently repaying the debt within the\\n thirty-day period, it would have sixty days to fully cure the\\n breaches. Under the Park Terrace partnership agreement, Creative\\n Choice XXXI had thirty days to remedy its violations upon receiv-\\n ing notice.\\n The general partners received said notice that their affiliate\\n transactions were improper. The limited partners sent multiple\\n communications notifying the general partners of their objection\\n to the unauthorized use of partnership funds. On May 3, 2019, the\\n limited partners wrote letters to each of the general partners\\n providing “formal notice” of defaults and warning the general part-\\n ners that they had thirty days to remedy the misappropriation of\\n partnership funds and prohibited advances to their affiliates.\\n The district court found that the May 3 letter formally noti-\\n fied the general partners that they were in default for any improper\\n cash advances that took place until May 3, 2019. Creative Choice\\n XXXI contends that it was only on notice for amounts owed to the\\n Park Terrace partnership for the 2017 and 2018 improper transac-\\n tions, not for improper transactions that occurred in 2019. This is\\n incorrect. The May 3 letter stated that the limited partners had not\\n completed their investigation of the partnership’s records because\\n the general partner had not provided them with the most up-to-\\n date financial statements. However, it clarified that additional\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 27 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n violations may surface as the limited partners receive and review\\n the complete records, and that the limited partners reserved their\\n right to challenge any such additional violations. While the letter\\n specifically denoted the advances from 2017 and 2018, it high-\\n lighted that the ultimate concern was that Creative Choice XXXI\\n was making unauthorized payments to its affiliates. Based on the\\n letter’s language, the district court’s finding that Creative Choice\\n XXXI was formally notified of its default involving the affiliate ad-\\n vances before May 3, 2019, is not clearly erroneous. 8 See generally\\n Hous. Inv. Corp. v. Am. Bancshares Mortg. Co., 367 So. 2d 645, 646\\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (a default letter may explain default in general\\n terms and is not required to particularize all defaults).\\n Additionally, the district court’s factual findings regarding\\n the nature and impact of the general partners’ breaches were not\\n clearly erroneous. The record supports that Creative Choice XXX\\n used an improper loan to the Fountainview partnership to fund its\\n June 21 remedial check, as the district court found. The evidence\\n showed Impro loaned money to the partnership to cover the\\n\\n 8 To the extent that the district court found that Creative Choice XXXI was on\\n\\n notice for the events that occurred after the limited partners sent the default\\n letters, that would be clearly erroneous. Creative Choice XXXI could not have\\n cured its transactions that occurred two months after May 3, 2019, within 30\\n days of the letter. However, that does not alter the conclusion that Creative\\n Choice XXXI failed to timely cure as discussed in this Section. By Creative\\n Choice XXXI’s own admission, it did not cure the early 2019 transactions until\\n November 2019. November 2019 was well beyond the contractual cure pe-\\n riod for the impermissible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019\\n to May 3, 2019.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 28 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n breaches which, in and of itself, violated the partnership agree-\\n ments. The agreements expressly prohibited unauthorized loans.\\n Additionally, a loan to the partnership would not satisfy the cure\\n provision because, instead of being made whole, the partnership\\n would still be indebted to a lender.\\n The general partners’ June 3 email, explaining how they\\n planned to remedy the default, stated that they “intend[ed] to make\\n the necessary loan(s) to the respective partnership to correct any\\n underpayments.” Indeed, the checks’ funds appeared to be sourced\\n from loans. Barot testified about the funds for the checks. The\\n funds came from Creative Choice, which transferred the necessary\\n money to the partnership accounts before the checks were written.\\n Part of that transferred funding included a $77,000 deposit, a man-\\n ager of the general partners described as a loan, and which a July 3,\\n 2019, communication between two general partners’ representa-\\n tives referred to as a loan to cover the Fountainview check balance.\\n Furthermore, Creative Choice XXX’s sworn interrogatory indi-\\n cated that funds used to issue the check to Fountainview came\\n from the management company Impro. In auditing the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, Baker Tilly’s ledger listed a $54,500 “short\\n term loan” from Impro “to cover outstanding distributions made\\n to [limited partners].” This language was provided to Baker Tilly\\n by a representative of the general partnerships. 9\\n\\n\\n 9 The general partners argue that Baker Tilly’s ledger contained improper\\n\\n hearsay evidence. However, the general partners did not object to this evi-\\n dence’s admission at trial, and it was offered as part of the parties’ joint\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 29 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n Regarding Creative Choice XXXI, the district court deter-\\n mined that its June 21 check to the Park Terrace partnership did\\n not resolve the default because the general partners continued to\\n make improper cash advances after receiving notice and did not\\n pay back the necessary funds until after the deadline to cure. The\\n evidence shows that there were improper payments to Creative\\n Choice XXXI’s affiliates as late as July 2019, two months after the\\n limited partners notified it of its default, and Creative Choice XXXI\\n does not dispute this. Creative Choice XXXI also admits that it at-\\n tempted to cure all the improper 2019 Park Terrace payments in\\n November 2019, but it sought to backdate the payment to Septem-\\n ber 2019 to disguise the otherwise late reimbursement, even\\n though September was well beyond the appropriate deadline.\\n Therefore, by its own admission, it failed to timely cure the imper-\\n missible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019 to\\n May 3, 2019. 10 See Tim Hortons USA, Inc. v. Singh, No. 16-23041-CIV,\\n\\n\\n exhibits. Absent plain error, an alleged hearsay statement that is not objected\\n to at trial is generally admissible for any relevant purpose. United States v.\\n Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983). The writing on the ledger did\\n not lead to plain error even if it constituted impermissible hearsay. The dis-\\n trict court could have reached the same ultimate conclusion, i.e., that the\\n check to Fountainview included funds that the general partners borrowed\\n from the partnership, based on the Creative Choice XXX’s representative’s\\n email stating that a loan was necessary to cure, the internal email between two\\n of Creative Choice XXX’s representatives referring to $77,000 as a loan, and a\\n Creative Choice XXX manager’s testimony confirming that there was a loan\\n to the partnership of $77,000.\\n 10 Creative Choice XXXI does not dispute that it attempted to backdate the\\n\\n repayment or that it continued advancing funds to its affiliates well into 2019.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 30 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n 2017 WL 4837552, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2017) (applying Florida\\n law, holding that a belated offer to cure is insufficient); Hufcor/Gulf-\\n stream, Inc. v. Homestead Concrete & Drainage, Inc., 831 So. 2d 767,\\n 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that a late payment does not cure\\n a default when there was an agreement for payment on or before\\n a specified date); see generally KRG Oldsmar Project Co., LLC v. CWI,\\n Inc., 358 So. 3d 464, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“When a contract is\\n clear and unambiguous, the court’s role is to enforce the contract\\n as written, not to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable\\n for one of the parties.”).\\n Finally, the general partners argue the limited partners im-\\n peded their efforts to cure the breach by not accepting the checks\\n as full payment and by not identifying what other steps had to be\\n taken in order to satisfy the debts. Putting aside the general part-\\n ners’ efforts to hold the limited partners responsible for the unpaid\\n debts the general partners themselves created and owed, their at-\\n tempts to repay a loan by taking out another loan were ineffective\\n for the reasons already stated.\\n Additionally, the general partners’ legal arguments do not\\n match the facts of this case. They quote Blackhawk Heating &\\n Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., for the proposition that,\\n\\n\\n Instead, it argues that it took time for its external accounting firm to cease the\\n practice of improper advances. That does not undermine the district court’s\\n core findings that it continued to make improper cash advances at least seven\\n months into 2019 and sent the check after the due date, failing to timely cure\\n the impermissible transactions for which it was on notice.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 31 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n “[w]hen a party stipulates that another shall do a certain thing, he\\n thereby impliedly promises that he will himself do nothing which\\n will hinder or obstruct that other in doing that thing.” 302 So. 2d\\n 404, 410 (Fla. 1974). In Blackhawk, a plaintiff had an option contract\\n to acquire a portion of bank stock at an amount computed by a\\n complex mathematical formula set by the contract. Id. at 406. The\\n Supreme Court of Florida found that the defendant made it impos-\\n sible for the plaintiff to exercise the option because the defendant\\n refused to allow the plaintiff to access its books and records, so\\n there was no way for the plaintiff to compute the purchase price.\\n Id. The general partners also cite a similar case, PL Lake Worth Corp.\\n v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC, in which a party was unable to\\n exercise a purchase option because the other party did not provide\\n the amount due. 11 949 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).\\n\\n\\n 11 The general partners also rely upon two other cases which, likewise, are\\n\\n inapplicable. In Paul v. Hurley, 315 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), the court\\n found that the plaintiff’s repayment of her loan was frustrated by the defend-\\n ants, who diverted her loan payments for their own interest, and reversed a\\n judgment in the defendants’ favor. That is not the case here because the lim-\\n ited partners did not divert the general partners’ payments for inappropriate\\n personal purposes; the general partners tried to reimburse the partnerships\\n with funds from an improper source. The general partners also quote Cox v.\\n CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) for the proposition\\n that a party has a duty to act in good faith even when the contractual terms\\n afford them discretion to promote their self-interest. This case is unrelated,\\n too. The contracts here did not provide the limited partners discretion to pro-\\n mote their self-interest in the cure process—in fact, the limited partners had\\n no contractual responsibilities after they provided notice. The contracts stated\\n that the general partners shall have thirty days after receiving notice to cure any\\n defaults. We address the appellants’ arguments that the limited partners acted\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 32 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n There, a retailer had the option to renew their leased space, which\\n it could exercise if it paid an unspecified amount based on mainte-\\n nance fees and taxes, but the owner of the shopping center refused\\n to provide the amount owed. Id. The court held that the owner\\n had an implied duty to provide the amount due. Id. at 1202. The\\n owner’s good-faith cooperation was necessary for the optionee to\\n exercise his option. Id.\\n A few things differentiate those cases from the matter at\\n hand. First, here, the general partners had a contractual duty to\\n cure, and the contracts at issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth\\n dealt with purchase options, a separate matter entirely. While both\\n involve the transfer of money, cure under the contracts is the gen-\\n eral partners’ duty to remedy any default that they caused. An op-\\n tion contract, on the other hand, involves an agreement to keep a\\n contract open so the optionee may accept later, should they desire.\\n See, e.g., Polk v. BHRGU Avon Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla.\\n 2d DCA 2006). The issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth was that\\n when the optionee attempted to exercise their option, the optionor\\n refused to tender the information necessary to do so. In those\\n cases, the optionor was the only entity that knew the amounts to\\n be paid to exercise the options. Blackhawk, 302 So. 2d at 410; PL\\n Lake Worth, 949 So. 2d at 1200–01. Here, however, the general\\n partners were aware of the amounts borrowed, the amounts still\\n owed, and to whom the payments were due. Once the limited\\n\\n\\n in their own self-interest in removing them as general partners, resulting in a\\n “windfall,” in the forfeiture and waiver section of this Opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 33 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n partners notified the general partners of the cause for removal, the\\n general partners should have acted within the allotted time frame\\n to cure the breaches. They did not.\\n Given the district court’s factual findings, we agree that the\\n general partners failed to remedy, or otherwise cure, the violations\\n for which they were responsible.\\n C. Forfeiture and Waiver\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\\n their removal resulted in an “extreme forfeiture” that is prohibited\\n under Florida law, and that, as a result of their removal, the limited\\n partners will gain a large windfall. We agree with the district court\\n that their removal was permissible.\\n Florida courts have recognized an impermissible forfeiture\\n when a party loses a vested property interest or right as a penalty\\n for breaching a contract or violating a law. Howard Cole & Co. v.\\n Williams, 27 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. 1946). Pertinent here, “[w]hile\\n forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is\\n clear that the parties intended such a result.” Stoltz v. Truitt, 940\\n So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Nelson v. Hansard, 197\\n So. 513, 513–514 (Fla. 1940)). A court should not relieve a party\\n when the forfeiture is due to its own negligence or willful and per-\\n sistent violations of the contract. Id.\\n “Under Florida law, every contract provision should be given\\n meaning and effect.” Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.\\n Brickell Bldg. 1 Holding Co., 923 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1991). The\\n partnership agreements expressly allowed for the limited partners\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 34 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n to remove the general partners under certain circumstances, in-\\n cluding the circumstances that the district court found to have oc-\\n curred and that we affirmed. Under long-established Florida law,\\n while forfeitures may not be favored, a party can legally make a\\n contract that includes a forfeiture provision, and a court should en-\\n force that provision when it is clear that the parties so agreed. Nel-\\n son, 197 So. at 513–514.\\n Forfeiture is inequitable when the breaching party substan-\\n tially complied with the contract’s terms. Stoltz, 940 So. 2d at 523.\\n However, when the terms are clear and certain actions are pro-\\n scribed, the court will enforce the contract as written, even if it re-\\n sults in a forfeiture. Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla.\\n 1st DCA 2005).\\n As the district court found, the general partners did not ex-\\n ercise good faith in managing their partnerships, and they willfully\\n and persistently breached their fiduciary and contractual duties.\\n Therefore, the general partners did not substantially comply with\\n the terms of the agreement by breaching pertinent contractual con-\\n ditions that were clearly expressed. Forfeiture is not improper\\n here.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI’s argu-\\n ments to the contrary are unavailing. First, they argue that the lim-\\n ited partners delayed bringing their claim, and thus waived their\\n ability to enforce the removal provision. They assert that the lim-\\n ited partners waived this right because of their established course\\n of conduct breaching the partnership agreements in this way.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 35 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n A party may waive a right that they are legally entitled to,\\n including forfeiture, either expressly or by their actions. See Pala-\\n cios v. Lawson, 381 So. 3d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); Rader v.\\n Prather, 130 So. 15, 17 (Fla. 1930). Florida courts define waiver as\\n “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or\\n conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquish-\\n ment of a known right.” Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Saldukas, 896\\n So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005). The district court found that the limited\\n partners did not waive their rights here, which is generally a ques-\\n tion of fact. Echo v. MGA Ins. Co., 157 So. 3d 507, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA\\n 2015) (collecting cases to demonstrate that the existence or absence\\n of waiver is a question of fact).\\n We agree that the limited partners did not waive their con-\\n tractual rights. The general partners’ conduct did not consist of a\\n one-time breach that occurred years before the suit was brought.\\n The general partners were continually breaching the agreement,\\n including after they received notice of the default. The limited\\n partners’ representative testified that he objected to improper part-\\n nership fund withdrawals every year dating back to 2011. Further,\\n the transactions that this suit stemmed from came to light in the\\n 2017 audited financial statements, issued in September 2018. Hunt\\n assumed control of the limited partners’ interests in January 2019,\\n and Hunt first corresponded regarding the improper advances in\\n March 2019. Therefore, Hunt raised this issue within a couple of\\n months of beginning to manage the limited partners and a handful\\n of months after the audit was finalized. Fla. State Dep’t of Env’tl.\\n Regul. v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 988, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 36 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n (“[I]n order for waiver to be applied based on the passage of time,\\n we consider it essential for a showing to be made that the party\\n against whom waiver is asserted has received notice sufficient to\\n commence the running of the time period within which the re-\\n sponse is required.”); MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc.,\\n 720 F.3d 833, 852 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]aiver does not arise merely\\n from forbearance for a reasonable time.” (quoting Am. Somax Ven-\\n tures v. Touma, 547 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989))), certified\\n question answered, 143 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2014). Taken together, the\\n limited partners continually objected to this practice and timely\\n raised the issue once they discovered the most recent violations.\\n There is no evidence of unreasonable delay, and the general part-\\n ners fail to establish that the limited partners intended to relinquish\\n their rights. Waiver does not apply in this case.\\n Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice XXXI’s second\\n and third arguments are related. They argue that the limited part-\\n ners were not substantially prejudiced because the general part-\\n ners’ breach did not cause any harm. Additionally, they argue that\\n the limited partners will receive a windfall by the general partners’\\n removal. We have already stated the substantial harm that the gen-\\n eral partners caused. Here, because the general partners caused\\n harm and failed to cure, there would not be a windfall in enforcing\\n the negotiated terms of the partnership agreements. Contra Fowler\\n v. Resash Corp., 469 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (affirming a\\n denial of forfeiture because it would be a windfall when the plain-\\n tiffs suffered no actual damages and admitted that defendants cured\\n any and all violations). Additionally, as stated, a forfeiture is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 37 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n allowed when the cause is due to a party’s own willful and persis-\\n tent violations of the contract, as is present here. The general part-\\n ners admit they have a long history of violating the agreements,\\n and those actions were in willful and blatant disregard of the agree-\\n ments’ terms and to the limited partners’ objections. The general\\n partners willingly entered into these agreements, then decided to\\n breach the terms of their contracts, resulting in their removal.\\n We affirm the district court and find that the enforcement of\\n the contractual provisions removing the general partners does not\\n result in an impermissible forfeiture.\\n D. Estoppel\\n Finally, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI ar-\\n gue that the district court should have estopped the limited part-\\n ners from removing them. They contend that the limited partners\\n continually chose not to exercise their contractual rights of re-\\n moval, and never treated the breaches as material, leading them to\\n reasonably believe removal would never occur. The district court\\n found that no such estoppel applied. We agree with the district\\n court.\\n A court applies equitable estoppel when one party’s decep-\\n tive conduct leads another party to taking an unfavorable legal po-\\n sition. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.\\n 2001). This occurs when (1) the instigating party makes “a repre-\\n sentation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted po-\\n sition;” (2) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied on that\\n representation; and (3) that party detrimentally changed its\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 38 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n position because of the representation and its reliance. Progressive\\n Exp. Ins. Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 401–02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI establish\\n none of those elements. First, they do not point to any representa-\\n tion by the limited partners that is contradictory to a later asserted\\n position. In fact, the record demonstrates, and the district court\\n found, that the limited partners did raise issues with the general\\n partners’ conduct prior to 2019. Second, the general partners pro-\\n vide no example of how they relied on the limited partners’ alleged\\n representation. Finally, the general partners do not argue that they\\n changed their position in any way. Finding none of the elements\\n of estoppel satisfied, we decline to apply it here and affirm the dis-\\n trict court’s decision.\\n V. CONCLUSION\\n For the reasons stated above, the district court’s findings\\n were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were proper, and\\n we affirm its decision.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 39 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Newsom, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226011/\", \"author_raw\": \"ABUDU, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n I concur in the Court’s decision and join its opinion. I write\\n separately merely to express a different interpretation of the Foun-\\n tainview Partnership Agreement from the one the Court adopts—\\n albeit one that leads to the same result that the Court reaches.\\n Warning: This may seem a little weedsy.\\n Section 8.15(a)(i) of the Fountainview agreement states that\\n a Limited Partner can remove a General Partner:\\n for any intentional misconduct, malfeasance, fraud,\\n act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its fi-\\n duciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable care\\n with respect to any material matter in the discharge\\n of its duties and obligations as General Partner (pro-\\n vided that such violation results in, or is likely to re-\\n sult in, a material detriment to or an impairment of\\n the Partnership, the Limited Partners, the Project, or\\n the assets of the Partnership)[.]\\n\\n On the Court’s reading of that provision, in order “to re-\\n move the [G]eneral [P]artner for intentional misconduct or malfea-\\n sance,” a Limited Partner must first prove that “such violation re-\\n sult[ed] in a material detriment to the partnership.” Maj. Op. at 20.\\n Because the Limited Partners here demonstrated the requisite “ma-\\n terial detriment,” the Court concludes, the Fountainview agree-\\n ment empowered them to remove the General Partners. See id. at\\n 23–26.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 40 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Newsom, J., Concurring 23-10197\\n\\n Although the question is close, I don’t think the Foun-\\n tainview agreement requires a Limited Partner to prove “material\\n detriment” as a prerequisite to removal for the sort of intentional\\n misconduct or malfeasance at issue here. As I read § 8.15(a)(i), the\\n “material detriment” proviso applies only to the “failure to exercise\\n reasonable care” ground for removal, not to the other specified\\n grounds. Here’s why.\\n I begin with the traditional “rule of the last antecedent,”\\n which specifies that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinar-\\n ily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immedi-\\n ately follows.” Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. 347, 351 (2016)\\n (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). The rule em-\\n bodies a “commonsense principle of grammar,” Antonin Scalia &\\n Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 144\\n (2012), and “reflects the basic intuition that when a modifier ap-\\n pears at the end of a list, it is easier to apply that modifier only to\\n the item directly before it,” Lockhart, 577 U.S. at 351.\\n Now, to be sure, there is an oft-competing principle of inter-\\n pretation, the “series-qualifier canon,” which instructs that\\n “‘[w]hen there is a straightforward, parallel construction that in-\\n volves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the\\n list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’” Id. at 364 (Kagan, J.,\\n dissenting) (quoting Scalia & Garner, supra, at 147). Here, though,\\n I don’t think there is a “straightforward, parallel construction that\\n involves all nouns . . . in [the] series” that § 8.15(a)(i) lays out. I say\\n so for two reasons.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 41 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Newsom, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n First, the provision comprises two distinct “any” clauses.\\n The first authorizes a Limited Partner to remove a General Partner\\n for “any” of several things: “intentional misconduct,” “malfea-\\n sance,” “fraud,” “act outside the scope of its authority,” or “breach\\n of its fiduciary duty.” The second authorizes removal for “any fail-\\n ure to exercise reasonable care with respect to any material matter\\n in the discharge of its duties and obligations as General Partner.”\\n To my eye, that second “any” separates a General Partner’s “failure\\n to exercise reasonable care” from the types of wrongdoing enu-\\n merated in the first clause. If the second “any” didn’t exist, I think\\n it’d be relatively easy to treat all the forms of wrongdoing to-\\n gether—as an unbroken series, so to speak. But the second “any”\\n does exist, and, on balance, I think it serves to bifurcate the provi-\\n sion into two separate categories. And the parenthetical “material\\n detriment” proviso is attached to—and thus applies only to—the\\n second of the two.\\n Second, and perhaps relatedly, there is a discernible differ-\\n ence, in terms of severity, between the acts enumerated in the first\\n and second “any” clauses. The first clause catalogues various forms\\n of purposeful wrongdoing—again, “intentional misconduct,”\\n “malfeasance,” “fraud,” an “act outside the scope of [the Limited\\n Partner’s] authority,” and a “breach of its fiduciary duty.” The sec-\\n ond, by contrast, refers to simple negligence—the “failure to exer-\\n cise reasonable care.” By itself, the conduct targeted by the second\\n clause just isn’t as bad as that targeted by the first. And so, it makes\\n sense that the agreement would require something “extra” before\\n a second-category violation warrants a Limited Partner’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 42 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Newsom, J., Concurring 23-10197\\n\\n removal—and that something, it seems to me, is a showing of “ma-\\n terial detriment.”\\n Anyway, none of this much matters here, because we all\\n land in the same place: For one reason or another, the Limited\\n Partners had ample authority under the Fountainview agreement\\n to remove the General Partners in this case. The purist in me just\\n needed to clarify what I take to be the better reading of § 8.15(a)(i).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226011/\", \"author_raw\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759426/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC v. Mg Affordable Master, Llc\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 42\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-10197\n ____________________\n\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXX, LLC,\n a Florida limited liability company,\n f.k.a. Creative Choice Homes XXX, Inc.,\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\n versus\n\n AMTAX HOLDINGS 690, LLC,\n a foreign limited liability company,\n PROTECH 2005-C, LLC,\n a foreign limited liability company,\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01903-TPB-AAS\n ____________________\n ____________________\n No. 23-10198\n ____________________\n\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXXI, LLC,\n A Florida corporation formerly known as\n Creative Choice Homes XXXI, Inc.,\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\n versus\n\n MG AFFORDABLEMASTER, LLC,\n MG GTC MIDDLE TIER I, LLC,\n MG GTC FUND I, LLC,\n Foreign limited liability companies,\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\n NAIMISHA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellee,\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01910-TPB-AAS\n ____________________\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\n ABUDU, Circuit Judge:\n This consolidated appeal involves a dispute among several\n business entities engaged in two limited partnerships for building,\n managing, and selling affordable housing complexes. At the center\n of these partnerships are two affiliates of Creative Choice Homes,\n Inc. (“Creative Choice”)—Creative Choice Homes XXX, LLC\n (“Creative Choice XXX”) and Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC\n (“Creative Choice XXXI”), which each served as a “general part-\n ner” for one of the limited partnerships. After a series of financial\n transactions that even the general partners admitted violated the\n partnership agreements, the limited partners had the general part-\n ners removed from their positions. The general partners sued, ar-\n guing that their actions did not materially breach the agreements\n and that, in any event, they cured any deficiency. They also con-\n tended that the reason given for their ouster was just a pretext for\n trying to deprive the general partners of financial interests to which\n they otherwise were entitled under the partnership agreements.\n The district court rejected all their arguments and ruled in the lim-\n ited partners’ favor, thus enforcing the general partners’ removal.\n On appeal, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI\n (collectively, the “general partners”), 1 challenge the district court’s\n decision on the grounds that the court’s findings regarding their\n\n\n 1 AMTAX, Protech, MG GTC, and MG Affordable are collectively referred to\n\n as the “limited partners.”\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n curative acts and the materiality of the alleged breaches were\n clearly erroneous. They also assert that their removal resulted in\n an unlawful forfeiture and windfall of earnings for the limited part-\n ners. Finally, they argue that, by accepting their curative measures,\n the limited partners waived the option to remove them from office\n and, therefore, should have been estopped from enforcing that pro-\n vision as a remedy to any breach.\n After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs,\n and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\n Relying on the district court’s uncontested findings of fact,\n the testimony given during the three-day bench trial, the accompa-\n nying trial exhibits, and the two partnership agreements, we out-\n line the structure of the two partnerships, recount the relevant fac-\n tual background that led to the underlying dispute, and walk\n through the district court’s proceedings.\n A. Structure of the Limited Partnerships\n Creative Choice, founded and operated by Dilip Barot, de-\n velops affordable housing through limited partnership structures.\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI created the Foun-\n tainview and Park Terrace partnerships, respectively, around 2002\n to develop two affordable apartment complexes in Tampa, Florida.\n Creative Choice XXX served as the general partner for the Foun-\n tainview partnership, and Creative Choice XXXI served as the gen-\n eral partner for the Park Terrace partnership. For the Foun-\n tainview partnership, AMTAX Holdings 690, LLC (“AMTAX”) was\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n the investor limited partner, and Protech 2005-C, LLC (“Protech”)\n was the special limited partner. For the Park Terrace partnership,\n MG GTC Middle Tier I, LLC (“MG GTC”) was the investor limited\n partner, and MG Affordable Master, LLC (“MG Affordable”) was\n the special limited partner.\n Both the Fountainview and Park Terrace partnership agree-\n ments authorized the general partners to select a management\n company and to make other decisions related to the properties’\n daily operations. The general partners hired Impro Synergies, LLC\n (“Impro”) to manage both developments. Both partnership agree-\n ments also created a pay structure in which the general partners\n would be entitled to an annual incentive management fee, but\n those payments could only be distributed in accordance with the\n agreements’ cash distribution or “waterfall” provisions. Pursuant\n to the waterfall provisions, the limited partners had to receive their\n share of the profits first, and then the general partners could be paid\n their management fee. The Fountainview agreement expressly\n prohibited Creative Choice XXX from borrowing any funds from\n the partnership accounts. In addition, given the multiple compa-\n nies the general partners either owned or with which they were\n associated, both agreements also forbid them from commingling\n funds with other entities or individuals.\n Both Agreements contemplated the general partner’s re-\n moval from the partnership under certain circumstances. The rel-\n evant portions of the Fountainview Agreement’s removal provi-\n sion stated:\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n (a) The Investor Limited Partner and/or Special Limited Partner\n shall have the right to remove the General Partner:\n (i) for any intentional misconduct, malfeasance, fraud,\n act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its fi-\n duciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable\n care with respect to any material matter in the dis-\n charge of its duties and obligations as General Partner\n (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to\n result in, a material detriment to or an impairment of\n the Partnership, the Limited Partners, the Project, or\n the assets of the Partnership), or\n (ii) upon the occurrence of any of the follow-\n ing: . . . .\n\n (B) The General Partner shall have violated any ma-\n terial provision of this Agreement including, without\n limitation, any of its guarantees pursuant to Section\n 5.1(d) or 8.8, or violated any material provision of ap-\n plicable law (provided that such violation results in,\n or is likely to result in, a material detriment to or an\n impairment of the Partnership, the Limited Partners,\n the Project, or the assets of the Partnership).\n The agreement required the Fountainview limited partners to give\n the general partner notice and an opportunity to cure before the\n removal took effect. The applicable period was either 30 days after\n the day of notice, or 60 days if the general partner diligently and\n consistently began to cure within the 30-day period.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n The Park Terrace Agreement also permitted the limited\n partners to remove the general partner for any “Material Default”\n as defined in the Agreement, which included:\n (i) a breach by any General Partner (or any of its\n Affiliates) . . . in the performance of any of its obliga-\n tions under this Agreement . . . and which has, or\n may reasonably be expected to have, a material ad-\n verse effect on the Partnership, the Apartment Com-\n plex, or the Investor Limited Partner; [or] . . .\n\n (iv) gross negligence, fraud, willful misconduct,\n misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\n fiduciary duty by a General Partner or any Affiliate of\n a General Partner providing services to or in connec-\n tion with the Partnership or the Apartment Com-\n plex. 2\n\n For removal to be effective, the Park Terrace limited partners must\n have given the general partner notice of the cause for its removal.\n However, only “material defaults” under subsection (i) were sub-\n ject to a right to a cure which, for monetary defaults, is 30 days\n from the notice of removal. Removals for material defects under\n\n\n 2 The parties dispute whether both partnership agreements required a material\n\n detriment in order to remove a general partner for the reasons presented here.\n The district court did not decide whether materiality was required in each\n agreement because it found the general partners’ conduct caused a material\n detriment. Similarly, we find the general partners’ breaches material and do\n not need to decide whether both agreements required material harm for the\n violations here.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n subsection (iv) took effect on the date of notice. Under both agree-\n ments, if the general partner remained in the partnership until the\n end of the tax credit compliance period, it had the right to purchase\n the properties, or the limited partners’ interest in the properties.\n B. Limited Partnerships’ Allegations of Malfeasance\n Dating back to 2008, on the partnerships’ audited financial\n statements, Baker Tilly, an auditing firm responsible for producing\n the audited financial statements, documented sums of money that\n the general partners took from the partnership through advances\n made to undisclosed general partners’ affiliates. This was marked\n as “due from affiliate” balances. At least twice in 2012, the limited\n partners notified the general partners that these distributions vio-\n lated the partnership agreements and demanded the funds be re-\n turned. 3\n The accounting and consulting firm Baker Tilly was hired to\n produce audited financial statements for the properties, and\n worked directly with the general partners in preparing those re-\n ports. Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Fountainview partnership\n indicated that the partnership loaned an unspecified affiliate of Cre-\n ative Choice XXX $140,577 and that, as of December 31, 2016, that\n loan was still outstanding. In its report, Baker Tilly notified the\n\n\n 3 Neither Creative Choice XXX nor Creative Choice XXXI objected to or oth-\n\n erwise contested the admissibility of this evidence. Although only two email\n exhibits were shown at trial to demonstrate that the limited partners opposed\n the unauthorized affiliate payments before Hunt took control, a representa-\n tive testified that the limited partners raised objections for years.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n general partners that the loan violated the partnership agreement,\n specifically the waterfall provision.\n Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Park Terrace partnership\n similarly showed a loan to an affiliate of Creative Choice XXXI for\n the amount of $81,198 and that, as of December 31, 2016, the loan\n had not been paid. This audit also notified the general partners that\n the payment violated the partnership agreement’s waterfall provi-\n sion.\n In March 2018, Baker Tilly circulated a draft of its 2017 au-\n dits. It advised that the 2016 “due from affiliate” balances had to be\n treated as “contra-equity” because it was atypical to have such a\n significant balance due, and there was nothing in writing docu-\n menting the advances the general partners made to their affiliates,\n the terms for repayment, or anything showing that at least some\n repayment was made. The contra-equity designation would re-\n duce the general partners’ account balance and was a red flag to the\n limited partners. Therefore, the general partners insisted that the\n loaned amounts be reflected as “due from affiliate,” which would\n instead suggest the amounts due involved a non-suspect transac-\n tion and were still expected to be paid back. Baker Tilly declined\n to do so.\n As a solution, the general partners produced written notes\n with defined repayment terms payable to the partnership from\n Naimisha, which Barot co-owned. In August 2018, the general\n partners forwarded Baker Tilly two promissory notes from\n Naimisha to the respective general partners, agreeing to pay\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n $100,000 to the general partners to “develop a detailed scope and\n repair cost plan” for both properties.\n Baker Tilly accepted the promissory notes as satisfactory and\n completed its 2017 audits in September 2018. The 2017 audits for\n both partnerships indicated that Naimisha pledged the general\n partners $100,000. Of that amount, Naimisha still owed $87,883 to\n the Fountainview partnership and all $100,000 to the Park Terrace\n partnership. Even though Naimisha had not completed its pay-\n ments, Baker Tilly listed the 2016 amounts due as “due from affili-\n ate” balances, and did not reduce the partnerships’ equity based on\n their unpaid status. Park Terrace’s 2017 audited financial state-\n ment also disclosed that the partnership made new advances dur-\n ing the year in the amount of $3,261 to undisclosed affiliates of Cre-\n ative Choice XXXI, and that amount was due as of December 31,\n 2017.\n In January 2019, the limited partners hired Hunt Capital\n Partners (“Hunt”) to represent their interests in the limited part-\n nerships, namely to protect their assets. On March 25, Hunt wrote\n to the respective general partners regarding improper advances\n and unauthorized use of partnership funds, but the general partners\n did not respond. On April 9, Hunt emailed the general partners\n again and requested an immediate response and repayment.\n Again, the general partners did not respond. Six days later, the lim-\n ited partners’ legal representative contacted the general partners\n regarding the general partners’ failure to address the concerns out-\n lined in the March 25 letter. The limited partners gave the general\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n partners until April 26, 2019, to reimburse the partnerships for the\n unauthorized financial distributions, including those that Baker\n Tilly identified, and to provide accurate records regarding the part-\n nerships’ financial status. Failure to do so, the limited partners\n stated, would result in the general partners being removed from\n their positions.\n The general partners did not respond to the March letter.\n So, on May 3, 2019, the limited partners notified the general part-\n ners that they would have until June 3, 2019, to address all of the\n violations, particularly in misappropriation of funds and prohibited\n advances, outlined in the letter. The general partners responded by\n the June 3 deadline, asking for more time to repay the amounts\n owed. However, even with the additional time, the general part-\n ners never satisfied those payments. By this point, more than thirty\n days had passed since the limited partners first notified the general\n partners of their need to either resolve the breaches or leave office.\n On June 18, 2019, the limited partners informed the general\n partners that they were being removed from their positions. The\n next day, the general partners offered to send a wire transfer to cure\n all their defaults in exchange for the limited partners rescinding\n their notices of removal. On June 21, the general partners issued a\n check to Park Terrace in the amount of $141,235, and a check to\n Fountainview Apartments in the amount of $105,994.\n The limited partners confirmed receipt of the checks on June\n 28, but they did not consider the payments as remedying the viola-\n tions. In particular, the checks arrived without any explanation as\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n to what specific debts were being repaid and, moreover, did not\n fully satisfy the total amounts owed. Additionally, the limited part-\n ners maintained that payments should have included penalties for\n failing to timely report the financial irregularities as required under\n the partnership agreements. The general partners, in response,\n sent a letter on July 5, arguing the payments were sufficient to re-\n turn the parties to the status quo.\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\n The general partners sued the limited partners in state court\n for breaching the partnership agreements, and for a declaratory\n judgment that their removal was unauthorized. 4 The limited part-\n ners removed the case to federal court 5 and counterclaimed against\n the general partners and Impro,6 asserting breach of contract and\n seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their authority to remove\n the general partners.\n At trial, the general partners maintained that they did not\n materially breach the partnership agreements because the limited\n\n 4 The general partners sued the Fountainview and Park Terrace limited part-\n\n ners separately in state court. The limited partners removed the actions to\n federal court, and the cases were tried together.\n 5 The limited partners removed based on diversity jurisdiction. The general\n partners moved to remand because they alleged that the limited partners failed\n to establish complete diversity of citizenship. The district court held that the\n limited partners established complete diversity of citizenship and denied the\n motion to remand.\n 6 Impro was not originally a party to the case but was joined as a counter-\n\n defendant in the limited partners’ counterclaim.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n partners still received the substantial benefit of their bargain,\n namely tax credits in exchange for their initial capital contributions.\n They further argued that the limited partners had been fully aware\n of their actions for a significant period of time and yet had done\n nothing. It was only now, they contended, that the limited part-\n ners were trying to exercise a right that would actually result in\n them gaining a “windfall” of economic benefits from their removal.\n The limited partners responded that, while for years the gen-\n eral partners had been improperly taking money from the partner-\n ships, the amounts had become exorbitant which is why they de-\n cided to remove the general partners. They maintained that the\n misappropriation of funds constituted a material breach that signif-\n icantly reduced the expected returns on their investments. The\n limited partners further claimed that, instead of curing the\n breaches, the general partners tried to conceal their actions by cre-\n ating fraudulent financial notes and submitting late, improperly\n funded checks. Finally, they argued that removing the general\n partners was a remedy outlined in the partnership agreements, so\n it did not result in improper forfeiture.\n On the stand, Barot admitted that the payments to the gen-\n eral partners’ affiliates were improper because the payments in-\n cluded money that should have been paid to the limited partners\n and did not comply with the Agreements’ waterfall provisions. Ba-\n rot also admitted that he and his wife owned Naimisha Construc-\n tion, Inc. Yet, he maintained that the limited partners did not ob-\n ject to the payments until Hunt gained control. He also alleged\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n that the limited partners suggested creating the Naimisha note be-\n cause they wanted to formalize the amounts due as a partnership\n asset, as opposed to a “due from affiliate” balance.\n The district court ruled in favor of the limited partners. The\n court concluded that the general partners materially breached the\n agreements and failed to timely remedy those violations. It specif-\n ically found that, while the amounts of improper withdrawals were\n a small fraction of the limited partners’ overall expectations regard-\n ing tax credits and savings, the general partners withdrew a sub-\n stantial portion of the partnerships’ available cash for some years,\n meaning that they reduced the cash flow otherwise due to the lim-\n ited partners and reduced the financial security of the partnership.\n The court determined that both Baker Tilly and Barot considered\n the amounts to be significant, and that the funds were important\n to the limited partners in case of emergencies and other unexpected\n events. Furthermore, the court found that the diversion of funds\n materially affected the relationship between the partners, ruptur-\n ing any mutual trust and their ability to work together. The\n breach, thus, deprived the limited partners of substantial, bar-\n gained-for benefits.\n As to Park Terrace, the court found that the general partners\n continued to make improper advances even after receiving the no-\n tice of the default, that they did not resolve the unauthorized with-\n drawals until months after they received their removal letter, and\n that they directed that those deposits be recorded as being made\n months earlier. Additionally, the district court determined that the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n funds the general partners deposited in the partnership accounts\n were insufficient to remedy the violations because the money was\n comprised in part from loans to the partnerships, which the part-\n nership agreement also prohibited. Therefore, the general part-\n ners’ payments still failed to cure the breaches.\n The court also found that the limited partners did not waive\n their right to remove the general partners, and were not otherwise\n estopped from doing so, because the limited partners complained\n on multiple occasions that the general partners’ conduct violated\n the partnership agreements and properly requested that the gen-\n eral partners return improperly distributed funds. Therefore, the\n court ordered that the general partners be removed in accordance\n with the partnership agreements.\n III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\n On appeal following a bench trial, we review a district\n court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear\n error. A.I.G. Uru. Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper Transp.,\n 334 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 2003). A finding of fact is clearly erro-\n neous “when although there is evidence to support it, the review-\n ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm\n conviction that a mistake has been committed.” OHI Asset (VA)\n Martinsville SNF, LLC, et al. v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 115 F.4th 1296,\n 1303 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470\n U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). When “there are two permissible views of\n the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be\n clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574). We\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n review a district court’s decision to grant or deny equitable relief\n for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings supporting its deci-\n sion for clear error. Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d\n 1210, 1220 (11th Cir. 2002).\n IV. DISCUSSION\n On appeal, the general partners raise four arguments: (1)\n that the district court clearly erred in determining that the breaches\n caused material damage, (2) that the district court clearly erred in\n finding that their breaches were not fully cured, (3) that their re-\n moval constituted an impermissible forfeiture and windfall for the\n limited partners, and (4) that the district court should have applied\n waiver or estoppel to prevent their removal. We find that the dis-\n trict court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that its\n conclusions of law were correct.\n A. Materiality\n The general partners argue that the district court erred in\n concluding that their actions were material and detrimental. Spe-\n cifically, they assert that, regardless of their own actions, the lim-\n ited partners received their essential, bargained-for tax and other\n benefits. If anything, they maintain, the advances constituted a\n small amount of the partnerships’ overall monetary value and had\n no negative impact on the partnerships’ financial stability.\n Some of the provisions in the partnership agreements re-\n quired that the prohibited conduct materially harm the limited\n partners in order to justify a general partner’s removal. Specifi-\n cally, the Fountainview partnership agreement allowed for the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n removal of a general partner “for any intentional misconduct, mal-\n feasance, fraud, act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its\n fiduciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable care with re-\n spect to any material matter in the discharge of its duties” and\n when the general partner “violated any material provision of appli-\n cable law (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to re-\n sult in, a material detriment to or an impairment of the Partner-\n ship, the Limited Partners, the Project, or the assets of the Partner-\n ship).” The Park Terrace partnership agreement allowed for the\n removal of a general partner for a “material default,” which in-\n cluded a breach by the general partner of any obligation “which\n has, or may reasonably be expected to have, a material adverse ef-\n fect on the Partnership, the Apartment Complex, or the Investor\n Limited Partner,” and included “gross negligence, fraud, willful\n misconduct, misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\n fiduciary duty” by the general partner.\n The partnership agreements do not define what constitutes\n a “material” breach. Therefore, we turn to Florida law for guid-\n ance as to the best way to interpret the contractual requirement of\n materiality. 7 See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Constr.,\n Inc., 130 F.4th 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2025). The parties’ intent when\n entering the contract serves as an important starting point. Massey\n\n\n 7 Both agreements contained a choice of law provision providing that Florida\n\n law governs, and the parties agree that Florida law applies. See Walls v. Quick\n & Reilly, 824 So. 2d 1016, 1018–19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Default Proof Credit Card\n Sys. v. Friedland, 992 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n Servs., Inc. v. Sanders, 312 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We\n can determine a party’s intent by looking at the use of terms within\n the four corners of the contract, taking into consideration the de-\n bated provision within the context of the entire agreement. Id.;\n Hand v. Grow Const., Inc., 983 So. 2d 684, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008);\n 16205 Captiva Drive, LLC v. Levinson, 418 So. 3d 751, 755 (Fla. 6th\n DCA 2025). A word is presumed to have the same meaning\n throughout the contract. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. State, 301 So.\n 3d 269, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (applying the presumption of con-\n sistent usage to contract); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,\n READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012)\n (presumption of consistent usage). Further, every word in a con-\n tract should be given effect and treated consistently, such that it is\n not redundant. Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr.\n Co., 215 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (citing Fla. E. Coast Ry.\n Co. v. City of Miami, 79 So. 682, 683 (Fla. 1918)) (applying the sur-\n plusage canon to a contract); SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW 174\n (surplusage canon).\n When the meaning of a term is unambiguous, we apply the\n term’s plain meaning. Massey Servs., Inc., 312 So. 3d at 214 (quoting\n Waverly 1 & 2, LLC v. Waverly at Las Olas Condo. Ass’n, 242 So. 3d\n 425, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). There are multiple sources for in-\n terpreting otherwise undefined terms, and dictionaries are just one\n source. See Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 356 So. 3d 771, 776\n (Fla. 2023). Importantly, a term’s context in the contract may indi-\n cate that the parties intended to give it a meaning other than the\n one ascribed in general usage. See id. at 774.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n Here, to remove a general partner, the agreements required\n that the violation at issue result in a “material detriment” or have\n a “material adverse effect.” The Fountainview agreements de-\n scribed only two instances in which a “material detriment” could\n trigger the limited partners’ right to remove the general partner.\n The first reference allowed the limited partners to remove the gen-\n eral partner for intentional misconduct or malfeasance in the dis-\n charge of the general partner’s duty when such violation results in\n a material detriment to the partnership. The second relevant pro-\n vision allowed for removal when the general partner violated a ma-\n terial provision of the agreement, provided that such a violation\n resulted in a material detriment to the partnership. The Foun-\n tainview agreement also used “material” to describe other circum-\n stances. As stated, it referred to “material provisions” in the con-\n text of removing a general partner, but elsewhere it simply referred\n to “provisions.” For instance, in describing the duties of the limited\n partners, the contract required them to “comply with the provi-\n sions of this Agreement expressly applicable.” The agreement also\n used “material adverse effect” and “adverse effect” on different oc-\n casions. In one spot, the agreement confirmed that general part-\n ners would not apply for grant funding unless the grant would not\n “materially adversely affect the tax benefits” of the limited partners.\n In another, however, the contract described that the limited part-\n ners had no obligation to consent to an amendment that could “ad-\n versely affect the timing or amount of the allocation of [their] tax\n credits” or income.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n The contexts in which the Fountainview agreement used\n “material” indicate that it was intended to heighten the level of sig-\n nificance or seriousness of the detriment, provision, or effect being\n described. The agreement connected “material provisions” to the\n serious consequence of removal from the partnership. By contrast,\n the contract merely required compliance with “provisions” when\n describing the limited partners’ duties to perform under the agree-\n ment, which is subject to less severe penalties than removal. Simi-\n larly, the general partner was prohibited from materially affecting\n the tax benefits of the limited partners through grant funding, the\n phrasing of which tolerated minor negative effects, while the lim-\n ited partners were free to decline any change that would adversely\n affect their credits or income, granting them authority to refuse\n any alteration that would marginally impact their benefits. This\n wording was intentional, as both increased the latitude given to the\n parties—allowing general partners to apply for grants that might\n have a marginal impact on the limited partners’ benefits and per-\n mitting the limited partners to reject any alteration that would\n even minimally impact them—while still largely protecting the tax\n credit benefit.\n The Park Terrace agreement contained a similar distinction\n between phrases that used “material.” The section on removal\n contemplated the removal of a general partner when the breach\n had a “material adverse effect.” There is only one place in the con-\n tract in which “adverse effect” is used without “material,” and\n there it states that the general partner will take all actions necessary\n to classify the partnership as a partnership for federal income tax\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n purposes and will refrain from taking any action “which would ad-\n versely affect such treatment.” The agreement used “material” in\n other circumstances. In one provision, the contract stated that the\n general partner had no authority to “materially” amend or modify\n any mortgage loan or project documents without the consent of\n the limited partners. In another, the agreement stated that it did\n not “permit any party . . . to alter, modify or amend any term” in\n the agreement. These comparisons demonstrate a similar under-\n standing of “material” as in the Fountainview contract. While the\n general partner could not substantially amend mortgage loans or\n project documents, some minor alterations were apparently al-\n lowed; however, no party was allowed to modify any term of the\n partnership agreement, regardless of the alteration’s materiality.\n Similarly, while the general partner must have engaged in conduct\n that had a material adverse effect to enact removal, it was required\n to undergo all actions necessary to maintain its federal tax status,\n because even a minor change there could be detrimental.\n This internally consistent understanding of “material”\n gleaned from the four corners of each of the contracts aligns with\n the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “material.” Looking\n at dictionary definitions, Merriam-Webster defines “material” as\n “having real importance or great consequences.” Material,\n MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-web-\n ster.com/dictionary/material. Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary\n defines “material” as “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item\n would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.”\n Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Taken together,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 22 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n “material” means having real importance or being significant. This\n fits with the discussed context of “material” in the contracts, which\n permitted removal of general partners for more significant\n breaches in circumstances that held greater consequence and could\n result in meaningful harm to the partnership. Therefore, to effec-\n tuate the general partners’ removal under the agreements, the\n harm faced by the limited partners must have been real and signif-\n icant.\n The district court found the detriment to the limited part-\n ners to be significant. It found that the general partners “repeat-\n edly, intentionally, and willfully diverted thousands of dollars to\n non-partnership uses, over the objection of the [l]imited [p]artners,\n in violation of their duties as [g]eneral [p]artners.” Order at 27,\n Dkt. 173. It determined that this “conduct by its nature is likely to\n have or could reasonably be expected to have a materially adverse\n or detrimental effect on the partnerships because it affects the rela-\n tionship of the partners.” Id. The court found that the general\n partners conduct had deprived the limited partners of their owed\n distributions. It found unconvincing the general partners’ argu-\n ments that the breaches were not material because the overall\n value of the misappropriated amounts was small in comparison\n with the value of the project and the limited partners still received\n the bargained-for tax benefit.\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI raise simi-\n lar arguments on appeal. However, we agree with the district\n court that the harm faced by the limited partners was material. The\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 23 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n owner of the general partners, the chief financial officer of Hunt,\n and the general partners’ auditing firm all stated that the amounts\n misappropriated were material. The misappropriated cash com-\n prised a significant portion of the partnerships’ cash on hand, and\n in some cases, it was as much as a month’s worth of operating ex-\n penses. This was a significant issue for the limited partners, who\n sought to ensure that there was adequate funding in the partner-\n ship should needs arise, such as property improvements, mainte-\n nance, or upkeep. The general partners’ conduct also made it so\n that the limited partners were unable to trust and do business with\n them. Further, the limited partners ultimately received less money\n because there was less money in the partnership for the year-end\n waterfall distribution.\n In their brief, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice\n XXXI argue that the standard for materiality is whether the injured\n party received substantially what it bargained for, which is the\n standard used in breach of contract cases. They cite cases that dis-\n cuss materiality as used to measure breach of contract. See, e.g.,\n Ron Matusalem & Matusa of Fla., Inc. v. Ron Matusalem, Inc., 872 F.2d\n 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989). In Florida, a material breach is when\n non-compliance with the contract goes “to the essence of the con-\n tract,” JF & LN, LLC v. Royal Oldsmobile-GMC Trucks Co., 292 So. 3d\n 500, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), such as when the contract would not\n have been made without the covenant not performed, Seawatch at\n Marathon Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am., 286 So. 3d 823,\n 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The general partners state that relevant\n considerations include the extent to which the injured party can be\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 24 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n compensated for its injury, to what degree the breaching party will\n suffer a forfeiture, and whether the breaching party performed\n with good faith and fair dealing.\n Considering this “contract law” definition of materiality, the\n district court still found that the breach was material. It found that\n the general partners deprived the limited partners of substantial,\n bargained-for benefits, such as a working relationship between the\n parties, their core fiduciary duties, and the diverted cash flow.\n Applying the general partners’ breach of contract standard,\n we agree with the district court. The general partners acted in clear\n disregard of vital terms of the contract, including the cash distribu-\n tion order, and continually violated their fiduciary duties and did\n not act in good faith. The general partners refused to cease violat-\n ing the partnership agreements despite repeated warnings, contin-\n ued to do so after the notice of removal, failed to timely cure, and\n then attempted to fraudulently cover up that failure. While the\n general partners argue that the essential benefits were the tax cred-\n its, those credits are not the only important bargained-for benefit\n in the contract, and in fact, the limited partners received less overall\n money because of Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice\n XXXI’s actions. Additionally, as discussed above, the limited part-\n ners were validly concerned about the financial health and stability\n of the partnership, and that was put in jeopardy by the general part-\n ners’ malfeasance. Though we discuss forfeiture later, the general\n partners’ removal is not an impermissible forfeiture, and here, it is\n not outweighed by the other factors, given their blatant and\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 25 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n continuous disregard for the partnership agreements and breaches\n of their fiduciary duties.\n In summary, the general partners’ improper withdrawal of\n thousands of dollars from the partnership to use on non-partner-\n ship purposes caused material harm. It violated the terms of the\n agreement, reduced the financial security of the partnership, dete-\n riorated trust, and resulted in less funds available to be distributed\n to the limited partners.\n B. Cure\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\n the district court clearly erred in finding that the checks the general\n partners sent in June 2019—made out for $141,235 to the Park Ter-\n race partnership and for $105,994 to the Fountainview partner-\n ship—were insufficient to satisfy the outstanding balances.\n The dispute over whether the general partners adequately\n cured is contractual, and Florida law applies because this case pro-\n ceeded under diversity jurisdiction. See Endurance Am. Specialty Ins.\n Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 F.4th 978, 983 (11th Cir. 2022). When\n determining whether a party has cured a contractual breach, Flor-\n ida courts look to the language of the contract as a whole, including\n the contractual cure requirements, and the facts surrounding the\n breach. See Jones v. Warmack, 967 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st DCA\n 2007) (interpreting the cure obligation through the language of the\n whole contract); cf. Sun Bank of Miami v. Lester, 404 So. 2d 141, 143\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (attempt to cure insufficient when the cure was\n inadequate to fully address other contract terms).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 26 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n Under the Fountainview partnership agreement, Creative\n Choice XXX was required to cure any defect within thirty days after\n the limited partners gave notice. However, if Creative Choice XXX\n began diligently and consistently repaying the debt within the\n thirty-day period, it would have sixty days to fully cure the\n breaches. Under the Park Terrace partnership agreement, Creative\n Choice XXXI had thirty days to remedy its violations upon receiv-\n ing notice.\n The general partners received said notice that their affiliate\n transactions were improper. The limited partners sent multiple\n communications notifying the general partners of their objection\n to the unauthorized use of partnership funds. On May 3, 2019, the\n limited partners wrote letters to each of the general partners\n providing “formal notice” of defaults and warning the general part-\n ners that they had thirty days to remedy the misappropriation of\n partnership funds and prohibited advances to their affiliates.\n The district court found that the May 3 letter formally noti-\n fied the general partners that they were in default for any improper\n cash advances that took place until May 3, 2019. Creative Choice\n XXXI contends that it was only on notice for amounts owed to the\n Park Terrace partnership for the 2017 and 2018 improper transac-\n tions, not for improper transactions that occurred in 2019. This is\n incorrect. The May 3 letter stated that the limited partners had not\n completed their investigation of the partnership’s records because\n the general partner had not provided them with the most up-to-\n date financial statements. However, it clarified that additional\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 27 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n violations may surface as the limited partners receive and review\n the complete records, and that the limited partners reserved their\n right to challenge any such additional violations. While the letter\n specifically denoted the advances from 2017 and 2018, it high-\n lighted that the ultimate concern was that Creative Choice XXXI\n was making unauthorized payments to its affiliates. Based on the\n letter’s language, the district court’s finding that Creative Choice\n XXXI was formally notified of its default involving the affiliate ad-\n vances before May 3, 2019, is not clearly erroneous. 8 See generally\n Hous. Inv. Corp. v. Am. Bancshares Mortg. Co., 367 So. 2d 645, 646\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (a default letter may explain default in general\n terms and is not required to particularize all defaults).\n Additionally, the district court’s factual findings regarding\n the nature and impact of the general partners’ breaches were not\n clearly erroneous. The record supports that Creative Choice XXX\n used an improper loan to the Fountainview partnership to fund its\n June 21 remedial check, as the district court found. The evidence\n showed Impro loaned money to the partnership to cover the\n\n 8 To the extent that the district court found that Creative Choice XXXI was on\n\n notice for the events that occurred after the limited partners sent the default\n letters, that would be clearly erroneous. Creative Choice XXXI could not have\n cured its transactions that occurred two months after May 3, 2019, within 30\n days of the letter. However, that does not alter the conclusion that Creative\n Choice XXXI failed to timely cure as discussed in this Section. By Creative\n Choice XXXI’s own admission, it did not cure the early 2019 transactions until\n November 2019. November 2019 was well beyond the contractual cure pe-\n riod for the impermissible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019\n to May 3, 2019.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 28 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n breaches which, in and of itself, violated the partnership agree-\n ments. The agreements expressly prohibited unauthorized loans.\n Additionally, a loan to the partnership would not satisfy the cure\n provision because, instead of being made whole, the partnership\n would still be indebted to a lender.\n The general partners’ June 3 email, explaining how they\n planned to remedy the default, stated that they “intend[ed] to make\n the necessary loan(s) to the respective partnership to correct any\n underpayments.” Indeed, the checks’ funds appeared to be sourced\n from loans. Barot testified about the funds for the checks. The\n funds came from Creative Choice, which transferred the necessary\n money to the partnership accounts before the checks were written.\n Part of that transferred funding included a $77,000 deposit, a man-\n ager of the general partners described as a loan, and which a July 3,\n 2019, communication between two general partners’ representa-\n tives referred to as a loan to cover the Fountainview check balance.\n Furthermore, Creative Choice XXX’s sworn interrogatory indi-\n cated that funds used to issue the check to Fountainview came\n from the management company Impro. In auditing the Foun-\n tainview partnership, Baker Tilly’s ledger listed a $54,500 “short\n term loan” from Impro “to cover outstanding distributions made\n to [limited partners].” This language was provided to Baker Tilly\n by a representative of the general partnerships. 9\n\n\n 9 The general partners argue that Baker Tilly’s ledger contained improper\n\n hearsay evidence. However, the general partners did not object to this evi-\n dence’s admission at trial, and it was offered as part of the parties’ joint\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 29 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n Regarding Creative Choice XXXI, the district court deter-\n mined that its June 21 check to the Park Terrace partnership did\n not resolve the default because the general partners continued to\n make improper cash advances after receiving notice and did not\n pay back the necessary funds until after the deadline to cure. The\n evidence shows that there were improper payments to Creative\n Choice XXXI’s affiliates as late as July 2019, two months after the\n limited partners notified it of its default, and Creative Choice XXXI\n does not dispute this. Creative Choice XXXI also admits that it at-\n tempted to cure all the improper 2019 Park Terrace payments in\n November 2019, but it sought to backdate the payment to Septem-\n ber 2019 to disguise the otherwise late reimbursement, even\n though September was well beyond the appropriate deadline.\n Therefore, by its own admission, it failed to timely cure the imper-\n missible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019 to\n May 3, 2019. 10 See Tim Hortons USA, Inc. v. Singh, No. 16-23041-CIV,\n\n\n exhibits. Absent plain error, an alleged hearsay statement that is not objected\n to at trial is generally admissible for any relevant purpose. United States v.\n Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983). The writing on the ledger did\n not lead to plain error even if it constituted impermissible hearsay. The dis-\n trict court could have reached the same ultimate conclusion, i.e., that the\n check to Fountainview included funds that the general partners borrowed\n from the partnership, based on the Creative Choice XXX’s representative’s\n email stating that a loan was necessary to cure, the internal email between two\n of Creative Choice XXX’s representatives referring to $77,000 as a loan, and a\n Creative Choice XXX manager’s testimony confirming that there was a loan\n to the partnership of $77,000.\n 10 Creative Choice XXXI does not dispute that it attempted to backdate the\n\n repayment or that it continued advancing funds to its affiliates well into 2019.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 30 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n 2017 WL 4837552, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2017) (applying Florida\n law, holding that a belated offer to cure is insufficient); Hufcor/Gulf-\n stream, Inc. v. Homestead Concrete & Drainage, Inc., 831 So. 2d 767,\n 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that a late payment does not cure\n a default when there was an agreement for payment on or before\n a specified date); see generally KRG Oldsmar Project Co., LLC v. CWI,\n Inc., 358 So. 3d 464, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“When a contract is\n clear and unambiguous, the court’s role is to enforce the contract\n as written, not to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable\n for one of the parties.”).\n Finally, the general partners argue the limited partners im-\n peded their efforts to cure the breach by not accepting the checks\n as full payment and by not identifying what other steps had to be\n taken in order to satisfy the debts. Putting aside the general part-\n ners’ efforts to hold the limited partners responsible for the unpaid\n debts the general partners themselves created and owed, their at-\n tempts to repay a loan by taking out another loan were ineffective\n for the reasons already stated.\n Additionally, the general partners’ legal arguments do not\n match the facts of this case. They quote Blackhawk Heating &\n Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., for the proposition that,\n\n\n Instead, it argues that it took time for its external accounting firm to cease the\n practice of improper advances. That does not undermine the district court’s\n core findings that it continued to make improper cash advances at least seven\n months into 2019 and sent the check after the due date, failing to timely cure\n the impermissible transactions for which it was on notice.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 31 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 31\n\n “[w]hen a party stipulates that another shall do a certain thing, he\n thereby impliedly promises that he will himself do nothing which\n will hinder or obstruct that other in doing that thing.” 302 So. 2d\n 404, 410 (Fla. 1974). In Blackhawk, a plaintiff had an option contract\n to acquire a portion of bank stock at an amount computed by a\n complex mathematical formula set by the contract. Id. at 406. The\n Supreme Court of Florida found that the defendant made it impos-\n sible for the plaintiff to exercise the option because the defendant\n refused to allow the plaintiff to access its books and records, so\n there was no way for the plaintiff to compute the purchase price.\n Id. The general partners also cite a similar case, PL Lake Worth Corp.\n v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC, in which a party was unable to\n exercise a purchase option because the other party did not provide\n the amount due. 11 949 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).\n\n\n 11 The general partners also rely upon two other cases which, likewise, are\n\n inapplicable. In Paul v. Hurley, 315 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), the court\n found that the plaintiff’s repayment of her loan was frustrated by the defend-\n ants, who diverted her loan payments for their own interest, and reversed a\n judgment in the defendants’ favor. That is not the case here because the lim-\n ited partners did not divert the general partners’ payments for inappropriate\n personal purposes; the general partners tried to reimburse the partnerships\n with funds from an improper source. The general partners also quote Cox v.\n CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) for the proposition\n that a party has a duty to act in good faith even when the contractual terms\n afford them discretion to promote their self-interest. This case is unrelated,\n too. The contracts here did not provide the limited partners discretion to pro-\n mote their self-interest in the cure process—in fact, the limited partners had\n no contractual responsibilities after they provided notice. The contracts stated\n that the general partners shall have thirty days after receiving notice to cure any\n defaults. We address the appellants’ arguments that the limited partners acted\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 32 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 32 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n There, a retailer had the option to renew their leased space, which\n it could exercise if it paid an unspecified amount based on mainte-\n nance fees and taxes, but the owner of the shopping center refused\n to provide the amount owed. Id. The court held that the owner\n had an implied duty to provide the amount due. Id. at 1202. The\n owner’s good-faith cooperation was necessary for the optionee to\n exercise his option. Id.\n A few things differentiate those cases from the matter at\n hand. First, here, the general partners had a contractual duty to\n cure, and the contracts at issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth\n dealt with purchase options, a separate matter entirely. While both\n involve the transfer of money, cure under the contracts is the gen-\n eral partners’ duty to remedy any default that they caused. An op-\n tion contract, on the other hand, involves an agreement to keep a\n contract open so the optionee may accept later, should they desire.\n See, e.g., Polk v. BHRGU Avon Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla.\n 2d DCA 2006). The issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth was that\n when the optionee attempted to exercise their option, the optionor\n refused to tender the information necessary to do so. In those\n cases, the optionor was the only entity that knew the amounts to\n be paid to exercise the options. Blackhawk, 302 So. 2d at 410; PL\n Lake Worth, 949 So. 2d at 1200–01. Here, however, the general\n partners were aware of the amounts borrowed, the amounts still\n owed, and to whom the payments were due. Once the limited\n\n\n in their own self-interest in removing them as general partners, resulting in a\n “windfall,” in the forfeiture and waiver section of this Opinion.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 33 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 33\n\n partners notified the general partners of the cause for removal, the\n general partners should have acted within the allotted time frame\n to cure the breaches. They did not.\n Given the district court’s factual findings, we agree that the\n general partners failed to remedy, or otherwise cure, the violations\n for which they were responsible.\n C. Forfeiture and Waiver\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\n their removal resulted in an “extreme forfeiture” that is prohibited\n under Florida law, and that, as a result of their removal, the limited\n partners will gain a large windfall. We agree with the district court\n that their removal was permissible.\n Florida courts have recognized an impermissible forfeiture\n when a party loses a vested property interest or right as a penalty\n for breaching a contract or violating a law. Howard Cole & Co. v.\n Williams, 27 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. 1946). Pertinent here, “[w]hile\n forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is\n clear that the parties intended such a result.” Stoltz v. Truitt, 940\n So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Nelson v. Hansard, 197\n So. 513, 513–514 (Fla. 1940)). A court should not relieve a party\n when the forfeiture is due to its own negligence or willful and per-\n sistent violations of the contract. Id.\n “Under Florida law, every contract provision should be given\n meaning and effect.” Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.\n Brickell Bldg. 1 Holding Co., 923 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1991). The\n partnership agreements expressly allowed for the limited partners\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 34 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 34 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n to remove the general partners under certain circumstances, in-\n cluding the circumstances that the district court found to have oc-\n curred and that we affirmed. Under long-established Florida law,\n while forfeitures may not be favored, a party can legally make a\n contract that includes a forfeiture provision, and a court should en-\n force that provision when it is clear that the parties so agreed. Nel-\n son, 197 So. at 513–514.\n Forfeiture is inequitable when the breaching party substan-\n tially complied with the contract’s terms. Stoltz, 940 So. 2d at 523.\n However, when the terms are clear and certain actions are pro-\n scribed, the court will enforce the contract as written, even if it re-\n sults in a forfeiture. Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla.\n 1st DCA 2005).\n As the district court found, the general partners did not ex-\n ercise good faith in managing their partnerships, and they willfully\n and persistently breached their fiduciary and contractual duties.\n Therefore, the general partners did not substantially comply with\n the terms of the agreement by breaching pertinent contractual con-\n ditions that were clearly expressed. Forfeiture is not improper\n here.\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI’s argu-\n ments to the contrary are unavailing. First, they argue that the lim-\n ited partners delayed bringing their claim, and thus waived their\n ability to enforce the removal provision. They assert that the lim-\n ited partners waived this right because of their established course\n of conduct breaching the partnership agreements in this way.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 35 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 35\n\n A party may waive a right that they are legally entitled to,\n including forfeiture, either expressly or by their actions. See Pala-\n cios v. Lawson, 381 So. 3d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); Rader v.\n Prather, 130 So. 15, 17 (Fla. 1930). Florida courts define waiver as\n “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or\n conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquish-\n ment of a known right.” Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Saldukas, 896\n So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005). The district court found that the limited\n partners did not waive their rights here, which is generally a ques-\n tion of fact. Echo v. MGA Ins. Co., 157 So. 3d 507, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA\n 2015) (collecting cases to demonstrate that the existence or absence\n of waiver is a question of fact).\n We agree that the limited partners did not waive their con-\n tractual rights. The general partners’ conduct did not consist of a\n one-time breach that occurred years before the suit was brought.\n The general partners were continually breaching the agreement,\n including after they received notice of the default. The limited\n partners’ representative testified that he objected to improper part-\n nership fund withdrawals every year dating back to 2011. Further,\n the transactions that this suit stemmed from came to light in the\n 2017 audited financial statements, issued in September 2018. Hunt\n assumed control of the limited partners’ interests in January 2019,\n and Hunt first corresponded regarding the improper advances in\n March 2019. Therefore, Hunt raised this issue within a couple of\n months of beginning to manage the limited partners and a handful\n of months after the audit was finalized. Fla. State Dep’t of Env’tl.\n Regul. v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 988, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 36 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 36 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n (“[I]n order for waiver to be applied based on the passage of time,\n we consider it essential for a showing to be made that the party\n against whom waiver is asserted has received notice sufficient to\n commence the running of the time period within which the re-\n sponse is required.”); MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc.,\n 720 F.3d 833, 852 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]aiver does not arise merely\n from forbearance for a reasonable time.” (quoting Am. Somax Ven-\n tures v. Touma, 547 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989))), certified\n question answered, 143 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2014). Taken together, the\n limited partners continually objected to this practice and timely\n raised the issue once they discovered the most recent violations.\n There is no evidence of unreasonable delay, and the general part-\n ners fail to establish that the limited partners intended to relinquish\n their rights. Waiver does not apply in this case.\n Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice XXXI’s second\n and third arguments are related. They argue that the limited part-\n ners were not substantially prejudiced because the general part-\n ners’ breach did not cause any harm. Additionally, they argue that\n the limited partners will receive a windfall by the general partners’\n removal. We have already stated the substantial harm that the gen-\n eral partners caused. Here, because the general partners caused\n harm and failed to cure, there would not be a windfall in enforcing\n the negotiated terms of the partnership agreements. Contra Fowler\n v. Resash Corp., 469 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (affirming a\n denial of forfeiture because it would be a windfall when the plain-\n tiffs suffered no actual damages and admitted that defendants cured\n any and all violations). Additionally, as stated, a forfeiture is\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 37 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 37\n\n allowed when the cause is due to a party’s own willful and persis-\n tent violations of the contract, as is present here. The general part-\n ners admit they have a long history of violating the agreements,\n and those actions were in willful and blatant disregard of the agree-\n ments’ terms and to the limited partners’ objections. The general\n partners willingly entered into these agreements, then decided to\n breach the terms of their contracts, resulting in their removal.\n We affirm the district court and find that the enforcement of\n the contractual provisions removing the general partners does not\n result in an impermissible forfeiture.\n D. Estoppel\n Finally, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI ar-\n gue that the district court should have estopped the limited part-\n ners from removing them. They contend that the limited partners\n continually chose not to exercise their contractual rights of re-\n moval, and never treated the breaches as material, leading them to\n reasonably believe removal would never occur. The district court\n found that no such estoppel applied. We agree with the district\n court.\n A court applies equitable estoppel when one party’s decep-\n tive conduct leads another party to taking an unfavorable legal po-\n sition. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.\n 2001). This occurs when (1) the instigating party makes “a repre-\n sentation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted po-\n sition;” (2) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied on that\n representation; and (3) that party detrimentally changed its\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 38 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 38 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\n\n position because of the representation and its reliance. Progressive\n Exp. Ins. Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 401–02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI establish\n none of those elements. First, they do not point to any representa-\n tion by the limited partners that is contradictory to a later asserted\n position. In fact, the record demonstrates, and the district court\n found, that the limited partners did raise issues with the general\n partners’ conduct prior to 2019. Second, the general partners pro-\n vide no example of how they relied on the limited partners’ alleged\n representation. Finally, the general partners do not argue that they\n changed their position in any way. Finding none of the elements\n of estoppel satisfied, we decline to apply it here and affirm the dis-\n trict court’s decision.\n V. CONCLUSION\n For the reasons stated above, the district court’s findings\n were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were proper, and\n we affirm its decision.\n AFFIRMED.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 39 of 42\n\n\n\n\n 23-10197 Newsom, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC v. Mg Affordable Master, Llc\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10197\\n ____________________\\n\\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXX, LLC,\\n a Florida limited liability company,\\n f.k.a. Creative Choice Homes XXX, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n AMTAX HOLDINGS 690, LLC,\\n a foreign limited liability company,\\n PROTECH 2005-C, LLC,\\n a foreign limited liability company,\\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01903-TPB-AAS\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-10198\\n ____________________\\n\\n CREATIVE CHOICE HOMES XXXI, LLC,\\n A Florida corporation formerly known as\\n Creative Choice Homes XXXI, Inc.,\\n Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n MG AFFORDABLEMASTER, LLC,\\n MG GTC MIDDLE TIER I, LLC,\\n MG GTC FUND I, LLC,\\n Foreign limited liability companies,\\n Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,\\n NAIMISHA CONSTRUCTION, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee,\\n IMPRO SYNERGIES LLC,\\n Counter Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01910-TPB-AAS\\n ____________________\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n ABUDU, Circuit Judge:\\n This consolidated appeal involves a dispute among several\\n business entities engaged in two limited partnerships for building,\\n managing, and selling affordable housing complexes. At the center\\n of these partnerships are two affiliates of Creative Choice Homes,\\n Inc. (“Creative Choice”)—Creative Choice Homes XXX, LLC\\n (“Creative Choice XXX”) and Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC\\n (“Creative Choice XXXI”), which each served as a “general part-\\n ner” for one of the limited partnerships. After a series of financial\\n transactions that even the general partners admitted violated the\\n partnership agreements, the limited partners had the general part-\\n ners removed from their positions. The general partners sued, ar-\\n guing that their actions did not materially breach the agreements\\n and that, in any event, they cured any deficiency. They also con-\\n tended that the reason given for their ouster was just a pretext for\\n trying to deprive the general partners of financial interests to which\\n they otherwise were entitled under the partnership agreements.\\n The district court rejected all their arguments and ruled in the lim-\\n ited partners’ favor, thus enforcing the general partners’ removal.\\n On appeal, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI\\n (collectively, the “general partners”), 1 challenge the district court’s\\n decision on the grounds that the court’s findings regarding their\\n\\n\\n 1 AMTAX, Protech, MG GTC, and MG Affordable are collectively referred to\\n\\n as the “limited partners.”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n curative acts and the materiality of the alleged breaches were\\n clearly erroneous. They also assert that their removal resulted in\\n an unlawful forfeiture and windfall of earnings for the limited part-\\n ners. Finally, they argue that, by accepting their curative measures,\\n the limited partners waived the option to remove them from office\\n and, therefore, should have been estopped from enforcing that pro-\\n vision as a remedy to any breach.\\n After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs,\\n and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.\\n I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND\\n Relying on the district court’s uncontested findings of fact,\\n the testimony given during the three-day bench trial, the accompa-\\n nying trial exhibits, and the two partnership agreements, we out-\\n line the structure of the two partnerships, recount the relevant fac-\\n tual background that led to the underlying dispute, and walk\\n through the district court’s proceedings.\\n A. Structure of the Limited Partnerships\\n Creative Choice, founded and operated by Dilip Barot, de-\\n velops affordable housing through limited partnership structures.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI created the Foun-\\n tainview and Park Terrace partnerships, respectively, around 2002\\n to develop two affordable apartment complexes in Tampa, Florida.\\n Creative Choice XXX served as the general partner for the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, and Creative Choice XXXI served as the gen-\\n eral partner for the Park Terrace partnership. For the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, AMTAX Holdings 690, LLC (“AMTAX”) was\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n the investor limited partner, and Protech 2005-C, LLC (“Protech”)\\n was the special limited partner. For the Park Terrace partnership,\\n MG GTC Middle Tier I, LLC (“MG GTC”) was the investor limited\\n partner, and MG Affordable Master, LLC (“MG Affordable”) was\\n the special limited partner.\\n Both the Fountainview and Park Terrace partnership agree-\\n ments authorized the general partners to select a management\\n company and to make other decisions related to the properties’\\n daily operations. The general partners hired Impro Synergies, LLC\\n (“Impro”) to manage both developments. Both partnership agree-\\n ments also created a pay structure in which the general partners\\n would be entitled to an annual incentive management fee, but\\n those payments could only be distributed in accordance with the\\n agreements’ cash distribution or “waterfall” provisions. Pursuant\\n to the waterfall provisions, the limited partners had to receive their\\n share of the profits first, and then the general partners could be paid\\n their management fee. The Fountainview agreement expressly\\n prohibited Creative Choice XXX from borrowing any funds from\\n the partnership accounts. In addition, given the multiple compa-\\n nies the general partners either owned or with which they were\\n associated, both agreements also forbid them from commingling\\n funds with other entities or individuals.\\n Both Agreements contemplated the general partner’s re-\\n moval from the partnership under certain circumstances. The rel-\\n evant portions of the Fountainview Agreement’s removal provi-\\n sion stated:\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n (a) The Investor Limited Partner and/or Special Limited Partner\\n shall have the right to remove the General Partner:\\n (i) for any intentional misconduct, malfeasance, fraud,\\n act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its fi-\\n duciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable\\n care with respect to any material matter in the dis-\\n charge of its duties and obligations as General Partner\\n (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to\\n result in, a material detriment to or an impairment of\\n the Partnership, the Limited Partners, the Project, or\\n the assets of the Partnership), or\\n (ii) upon the occurrence of any of the follow-\\n ing: . . . .\\n\\n (B) The General Partner shall have violated any ma-\\n terial provision of this Agreement including, without\\n limitation, any of its guarantees pursuant to Section\\n 5.1(d) or 8.8, or violated any material provision of ap-\\n plicable law (provided that such violation results in,\\n or is likely to result in, a material detriment to or an\\n impairment of the Partnership, the Limited Partners,\\n the Project, or the assets of the Partnership).\\n The agreement required the Fountainview limited partners to give\\n the general partner notice and an opportunity to cure before the\\n removal took effect. The applicable period was either 30 days after\\n the day of notice, or 60 days if the general partner diligently and\\n consistently began to cure within the 30-day period.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n The Park Terrace Agreement also permitted the limited\\n partners to remove the general partner for any “Material Default”\\n as defined in the Agreement, which included:\\n (i) a breach by any General Partner (or any of its\\n Affiliates) . . . in the performance of any of its obliga-\\n tions under this Agreement . . . and which has, or\\n may reasonably be expected to have, a material ad-\\n verse effect on the Partnership, the Apartment Com-\\n plex, or the Investor Limited Partner; [or] . . .\\n\\n (iv) gross negligence, fraud, willful misconduct,\\n misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\\n fiduciary duty by a General Partner or any Affiliate of\\n a General Partner providing services to or in connec-\\n tion with the Partnership or the Apartment Com-\\n plex. 2\\n\\n For removal to be effective, the Park Terrace limited partners must\\n have given the general partner notice of the cause for its removal.\\n However, only “material defaults” under subsection (i) were sub-\\n ject to a right to a cure which, for monetary defaults, is 30 days\\n from the notice of removal. Removals for material defects under\\n\\n\\n 2 The parties dispute whether both partnership agreements required a material\\n\\n detriment in order to remove a general partner for the reasons presented here.\\n The district court did not decide whether materiality was required in each\\n agreement because it found the general partners’ conduct caused a material\\n detriment. Similarly, we find the general partners’ breaches material and do\\n not need to decide whether both agreements required material harm for the\\n violations here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n subsection (iv) took effect on the date of notice. Under both agree-\\n ments, if the general partner remained in the partnership until the\\n end of the tax credit compliance period, it had the right to purchase\\n the properties, or the limited partners’ interest in the properties.\\n B. Limited Partnerships’ Allegations of Malfeasance\\n Dating back to 2008, on the partnerships’ audited financial\\n statements, Baker Tilly, an auditing firm responsible for producing\\n the audited financial statements, documented sums of money that\\n the general partners took from the partnership through advances\\n made to undisclosed general partners’ affiliates. This was marked\\n as “due from affiliate” balances. At least twice in 2012, the limited\\n partners notified the general partners that these distributions vio-\\n lated the partnership agreements and demanded the funds be re-\\n turned. 3\\n The accounting and consulting firm Baker Tilly was hired to\\n produce audited financial statements for the properties, and\\n worked directly with the general partners in preparing those re-\\n ports. Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Fountainview partnership\\n indicated that the partnership loaned an unspecified affiliate of Cre-\\n ative Choice XXX $140,577 and that, as of December 31, 2016, that\\n loan was still outstanding. In its report, Baker Tilly notified the\\n\\n\\n 3 Neither Creative Choice XXX nor Creative Choice XXXI objected to or oth-\\n\\n erwise contested the admissibility of this evidence. Although only two email\\n exhibits were shown at trial to demonstrate that the limited partners opposed\\n the unauthorized affiliate payments before Hunt took control, a representa-\\n tive testified that the limited partners raised objections for years.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n general partners that the loan violated the partnership agreement,\\n specifically the waterfall provision.\\n Baker Tilly’s 2016 audit for the Park Terrace partnership\\n similarly showed a loan to an affiliate of Creative Choice XXXI for\\n the amount of $81,198 and that, as of December 31, 2016, the loan\\n had not been paid. This audit also notified the general partners that\\n the payment violated the partnership agreement’s waterfall provi-\\n sion.\\n In March 2018, Baker Tilly circulated a draft of its 2017 au-\\n dits. It advised that the 2016 “due from affiliate” balances had to be\\n treated as “contra-equity” because it was atypical to have such a\\n significant balance due, and there was nothing in writing docu-\\n menting the advances the general partners made to their affiliates,\\n the terms for repayment, or anything showing that at least some\\n repayment was made. The contra-equity designation would re-\\n duce the general partners’ account balance and was a red flag to the\\n limited partners. Therefore, the general partners insisted that the\\n loaned amounts be reflected as “due from affiliate,” which would\\n instead suggest the amounts due involved a non-suspect transac-\\n tion and were still expected to be paid back. Baker Tilly declined\\n to do so.\\n As a solution, the general partners produced written notes\\n with defined repayment terms payable to the partnership from\\n Naimisha, which Barot co-owned. In August 2018, the general\\n partners forwarded Baker Tilly two promissory notes from\\n Naimisha to the respective general partners, agreeing to pay\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n $100,000 to the general partners to “develop a detailed scope and\\n repair cost plan” for both properties.\\n Baker Tilly accepted the promissory notes as satisfactory and\\n completed its 2017 audits in September 2018. The 2017 audits for\\n both partnerships indicated that Naimisha pledged the general\\n partners $100,000. Of that amount, Naimisha still owed $87,883 to\\n the Fountainview partnership and all $100,000 to the Park Terrace\\n partnership. Even though Naimisha had not completed its pay-\\n ments, Baker Tilly listed the 2016 amounts due as “due from affili-\\n ate” balances, and did not reduce the partnerships’ equity based on\\n their unpaid status. Park Terrace’s 2017 audited financial state-\\n ment also disclosed that the partnership made new advances dur-\\n ing the year in the amount of $3,261 to undisclosed affiliates of Cre-\\n ative Choice XXXI, and that amount was due as of December 31,\\n 2017.\\n In January 2019, the limited partners hired Hunt Capital\\n Partners (“Hunt”) to represent their interests in the limited part-\\n nerships, namely to protect their assets. On March 25, Hunt wrote\\n to the respective general partners regarding improper advances\\n and unauthorized use of partnership funds, but the general partners\\n did not respond. On April 9, Hunt emailed the general partners\\n again and requested an immediate response and repayment.\\n Again, the general partners did not respond. Six days later, the lim-\\n ited partners’ legal representative contacted the general partners\\n regarding the general partners’ failure to address the concerns out-\\n lined in the March 25 letter. The limited partners gave the general\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n partners until April 26, 2019, to reimburse the partnerships for the\\n unauthorized financial distributions, including those that Baker\\n Tilly identified, and to provide accurate records regarding the part-\\n nerships’ financial status. Failure to do so, the limited partners\\n stated, would result in the general partners being removed from\\n their positions.\\n The general partners did not respond to the March letter.\\n So, on May 3, 2019, the limited partners notified the general part-\\n ners that they would have until June 3, 2019, to address all of the\\n violations, particularly in misappropriation of funds and prohibited\\n advances, outlined in the letter. The general partners responded by\\n the June 3 deadline, asking for more time to repay the amounts\\n owed. However, even with the additional time, the general part-\\n ners never satisfied those payments. By this point, more than thirty\\n days had passed since the limited partners first notified the general\\n partners of their need to either resolve the breaches or leave office.\\n On June 18, 2019, the limited partners informed the general\\n partners that they were being removed from their positions. The\\n next day, the general partners offered to send a wire transfer to cure\\n all their defaults in exchange for the limited partners rescinding\\n their notices of removal. On June 21, the general partners issued a\\n check to Park Terrace in the amount of $141,235, and a check to\\n Fountainview Apartments in the amount of $105,994.\\n The limited partners confirmed receipt of the checks on June\\n 28, but they did not consider the payments as remedying the viola-\\n tions. In particular, the checks arrived without any explanation as\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n to what specific debts were being repaid and, moreover, did not\\n fully satisfy the total amounts owed. Additionally, the limited part-\\n ners maintained that payments should have included penalties for\\n failing to timely report the financial irregularities as required under\\n the partnership agreements. The general partners, in response,\\n sent a letter on July 5, arguing the payments were sufficient to re-\\n turn the parties to the status quo.\\n II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\\n The general partners sued the limited partners in state court\\n for breaching the partnership agreements, and for a declaratory\\n judgment that their removal was unauthorized. 4 The limited part-\\n ners removed the case to federal court 5 and counterclaimed against\\n the general partners and Impro,6 asserting breach of contract and\\n seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their authority to remove\\n the general partners.\\n At trial, the general partners maintained that they did not\\n materially breach the partnership agreements because the limited\\n\\n 4 The general partners sued the Fountainview and Park Terrace limited part-\\n\\n ners separately in state court. The limited partners removed the actions to\\n federal court, and the cases were tried together.\\n 5 The limited partners removed based on diversity jurisdiction. The general\\n partners moved to remand because they alleged that the limited partners failed\\n to establish complete diversity of citizenship. The district court held that the\\n limited partners established complete diversity of citizenship and denied the\\n motion to remand.\\n 6 Impro was not originally a party to the case but was joined as a counter-\\n\\n defendant in the limited partners’ counterclaim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n partners still received the substantial benefit of their bargain,\\n namely tax credits in exchange for their initial capital contributions.\\n They further argued that the limited partners had been fully aware\\n of their actions for a significant period of time and yet had done\\n nothing. It was only now, they contended, that the limited part-\\n ners were trying to exercise a right that would actually result in\\n them gaining a “windfall” of economic benefits from their removal.\\n The limited partners responded that, while for years the gen-\\n eral partners had been improperly taking money from the partner-\\n ships, the amounts had become exorbitant which is why they de-\\n cided to remove the general partners. They maintained that the\\n misappropriation of funds constituted a material breach that signif-\\n icantly reduced the expected returns on their investments. The\\n limited partners further claimed that, instead of curing the\\n breaches, the general partners tried to conceal their actions by cre-\\n ating fraudulent financial notes and submitting late, improperly\\n funded checks. Finally, they argued that removing the general\\n partners was a remedy outlined in the partnership agreements, so\\n it did not result in improper forfeiture.\\n On the stand, Barot admitted that the payments to the gen-\\n eral partners’ affiliates were improper because the payments in-\\n cluded money that should have been paid to the limited partners\\n and did not comply with the Agreements’ waterfall provisions. Ba-\\n rot also admitted that he and his wife owned Naimisha Construc-\\n tion, Inc. Yet, he maintained that the limited partners did not ob-\\n ject to the payments until Hunt gained control. He also alleged\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n that the limited partners suggested creating the Naimisha note be-\\n cause they wanted to formalize the amounts due as a partnership\\n asset, as opposed to a “due from affiliate” balance.\\n The district court ruled in favor of the limited partners. The\\n court concluded that the general partners materially breached the\\n agreements and failed to timely remedy those violations. It specif-\\n ically found that, while the amounts of improper withdrawals were\\n a small fraction of the limited partners’ overall expectations regard-\\n ing tax credits and savings, the general partners withdrew a sub-\\n stantial portion of the partnerships’ available cash for some years,\\n meaning that they reduced the cash flow otherwise due to the lim-\\n ited partners and reduced the financial security of the partnership.\\n The court determined that both Baker Tilly and Barot considered\\n the amounts to be significant, and that the funds were important\\n to the limited partners in case of emergencies and other unexpected\\n events. Furthermore, the court found that the diversion of funds\\n materially affected the relationship between the partners, ruptur-\\n ing any mutual trust and their ability to work together. The\\n breach, thus, deprived the limited partners of substantial, bar-\\n gained-for benefits.\\n As to Park Terrace, the court found that the general partners\\n continued to make improper advances even after receiving the no-\\n tice of the default, that they did not resolve the unauthorized with-\\n drawals until months after they received their removal letter, and\\n that they directed that those deposits be recorded as being made\\n months earlier. Additionally, the district court determined that the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n funds the general partners deposited in the partnership accounts\\n were insufficient to remedy the violations because the money was\\n comprised in part from loans to the partnerships, which the part-\\n nership agreement also prohibited. Therefore, the general part-\\n ners’ payments still failed to cure the breaches.\\n The court also found that the limited partners did not waive\\n their right to remove the general partners, and were not otherwise\\n estopped from doing so, because the limited partners complained\\n on multiple occasions that the general partners’ conduct violated\\n the partnership agreements and properly requested that the gen-\\n eral partners return improperly distributed funds. Therefore, the\\n court ordered that the general partners be removed in accordance\\n with the partnership agreements.\\n III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW\\n On appeal following a bench trial, we review a district\\n court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear\\n error. A.I.G. Uru. Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper Transp.,\\n 334 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 2003). A finding of fact is clearly erro-\\n neous “when although there is evidence to support it, the review-\\n ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm\\n conviction that a mistake has been committed.” OHI Asset (VA)\\n Martinsville SNF, LLC, et al. v. Wagner (In re Wagner), 115 F.4th 1296,\\n 1303 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470\\n U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). When “there are two permissible views of\\n the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be\\n clearly erroneous.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574). We\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n review a district court’s decision to grant or deny equitable relief\\n for abuse of discretion, and any factual findings supporting its deci-\\n sion for clear error. Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup County, 296 F.3d\\n 1210, 1220 (11th Cir. 2002).\\n IV. DISCUSSION\\n On appeal, the general partners raise four arguments: (1)\\n that the district court clearly erred in determining that the breaches\\n caused material damage, (2) that the district court clearly erred in\\n finding that their breaches were not fully cured, (3) that their re-\\n moval constituted an impermissible forfeiture and windfall for the\\n limited partners, and (4) that the district court should have applied\\n waiver or estoppel to prevent their removal. We find that the dis-\\n trict court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that its\\n conclusions of law were correct.\\n A. Materiality\\n The general partners argue that the district court erred in\\n concluding that their actions were material and detrimental. Spe-\\n cifically, they assert that, regardless of their own actions, the lim-\\n ited partners received their essential, bargained-for tax and other\\n benefits. If anything, they maintain, the advances constituted a\\n small amount of the partnerships’ overall monetary value and had\\n no negative impact on the partnerships’ financial stability.\\n Some of the provisions in the partnership agreements re-\\n quired that the prohibited conduct materially harm the limited\\n partners in order to justify a general partner’s removal. Specifi-\\n cally, the Fountainview partnership agreement allowed for the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n removal of a general partner “for any intentional misconduct, mal-\\n feasance, fraud, act outside the scope of its authority, breach of its\\n fiduciary duty, or any failure to exercise reasonable care with re-\\n spect to any material matter in the discharge of its duties” and\\n when the general partner “violated any material provision of appli-\\n cable law (provided that such violation results in, or is likely to re-\\n sult in, a material detriment to or an impairment of the Partner-\\n ship, the Limited Partners, the Project, or the assets of the Partner-\\n ship).” The Park Terrace partnership agreement allowed for the\\n removal of a general partner for a “material default,” which in-\\n cluded a breach by the general partner of any obligation “which\\n has, or may reasonably be expected to have, a material adverse ef-\\n fect on the Partnership, the Apartment Complex, or the Investor\\n Limited Partner,” and included “gross negligence, fraud, willful\\n misconduct, misappropriation of Partnership funds, or a breach of\\n fiduciary duty” by the general partner.\\n The partnership agreements do not define what constitutes\\n a “material” breach. Therefore, we turn to Florida law for guid-\\n ance as to the best way to interpret the contractual requirement of\\n materiality. 7 See Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Constr.,\\n Inc., 130 F.4th 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2025). The parties’ intent when\\n entering the contract serves as an important starting point. Massey\\n\\n\\n 7 Both agreements contained a choice of law provision providing that Florida\\n\\n law governs, and the parties agree that Florida law applies. See Walls v. Quick\\n & Reilly, 824 So. 2d 1016, 1018–19 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Default Proof Credit Card\\n Sys. v. Friedland, 992 So. 2d 442, 444 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n Servs., Inc. v. Sanders, 312 So. 3d 209, 214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We\\n can determine a party’s intent by looking at the use of terms within\\n the four corners of the contract, taking into consideration the de-\\n bated provision within the context of the entire agreement. Id.;\\n Hand v. Grow Const., Inc., 983 So. 2d 684, 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008);\\n 16205 Captiva Drive, LLC v. Levinson, 418 So. 3d 751, 755 (Fla. 6th\\n DCA 2025). A word is presumed to have the same meaning\\n throughout the contract. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. State, 301 So.\\n 3d 269, 275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (applying the presumption of con-\\n sistent usage to contract); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,\\n READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012)\\n (presumption of consistent usage). Further, every word in a con-\\n tract should be given effect and treated consistently, such that it is\\n not redundant. Royal Am. Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Palm Beach & Tr.\\n Co., 215 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (citing Fla. E. Coast Ry.\\n Co. v. City of Miami, 79 So. 682, 683 (Fla. 1918)) (applying the sur-\\n plusage canon to a contract); SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW 174\\n (surplusage canon).\\n When the meaning of a term is unambiguous, we apply the\\n term’s plain meaning. Massey Servs., Inc., 312 So. 3d at 214 (quoting\\n Waverly 1 & 2, LLC v. Waverly at Las Olas Condo. Ass’n, 242 So. 3d\\n 425, 428 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). There are multiple sources for in-\\n terpreting otherwise undefined terms, and dictionaries are just one\\n source. See Parrish v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 356 So. 3d 771, 776\\n (Fla. 2023). Importantly, a term’s context in the contract may indi-\\n cate that the parties intended to give it a meaning other than the\\n one ascribed in general usage. See id. at 774.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n Here, to remove a general partner, the agreements required\\n that the violation at issue result in a “material detriment” or have\\n a “material adverse effect.” The Fountainview agreements de-\\n scribed only two instances in which a “material detriment” could\\n trigger the limited partners’ right to remove the general partner.\\n The first reference allowed the limited partners to remove the gen-\\n eral partner for intentional misconduct or malfeasance in the dis-\\n charge of the general partner’s duty when such violation results in\\n a material detriment to the partnership. The second relevant pro-\\n vision allowed for removal when the general partner violated a ma-\\n terial provision of the agreement, provided that such a violation\\n resulted in a material detriment to the partnership. The Foun-\\n tainview agreement also used “material” to describe other circum-\\n stances. As stated, it referred to “material provisions” in the con-\\n text of removing a general partner, but elsewhere it simply referred\\n to “provisions.” For instance, in describing the duties of the limited\\n partners, the contract required them to “comply with the provi-\\n sions of this Agreement expressly applicable.” The agreement also\\n used “material adverse effect” and “adverse effect” on different oc-\\n casions. In one spot, the agreement confirmed that general part-\\n ners would not apply for grant funding unless the grant would not\\n “materially adversely affect the tax benefits” of the limited partners.\\n In another, however, the contract described that the limited part-\\n ners had no obligation to consent to an amendment that could “ad-\\n versely affect the timing or amount of the allocation of [their] tax\\n credits” or income.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n The contexts in which the Fountainview agreement used\\n “material” indicate that it was intended to heighten the level of sig-\\n nificance or seriousness of the detriment, provision, or effect being\\n described. The agreement connected “material provisions” to the\\n serious consequence of removal from the partnership. By contrast,\\n the contract merely required compliance with “provisions” when\\n describing the limited partners’ duties to perform under the agree-\\n ment, which is subject to less severe penalties than removal. Simi-\\n larly, the general partner was prohibited from materially affecting\\n the tax benefits of the limited partners through grant funding, the\\n phrasing of which tolerated minor negative effects, while the lim-\\n ited partners were free to decline any change that would adversely\\n affect their credits or income, granting them authority to refuse\\n any alteration that would marginally impact their benefits. This\\n wording was intentional, as both increased the latitude given to the\\n parties—allowing general partners to apply for grants that might\\n have a marginal impact on the limited partners’ benefits and per-\\n mitting the limited partners to reject any alteration that would\\n even minimally impact them—while still largely protecting the tax\\n credit benefit.\\n The Park Terrace agreement contained a similar distinction\\n between phrases that used “material.” The section on removal\\n contemplated the removal of a general partner when the breach\\n had a “material adverse effect.” There is only one place in the con-\\n tract in which “adverse effect” is used without “material,” and\\n there it states that the general partner will take all actions necessary\\n to classify the partnership as a partnership for federal income tax\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n purposes and will refrain from taking any action “which would ad-\\n versely affect such treatment.” The agreement used “material” in\\n other circumstances. In one provision, the contract stated that the\\n general partner had no authority to “materially” amend or modify\\n any mortgage loan or project documents without the consent of\\n the limited partners. In another, the agreement stated that it did\\n not “permit any party . . . to alter, modify or amend any term” in\\n the agreement. These comparisons demonstrate a similar under-\\n standing of “material” as in the Fountainview contract. While the\\n general partner could not substantially amend mortgage loans or\\n project documents, some minor alterations were apparently al-\\n lowed; however, no party was allowed to modify any term of the\\n partnership agreement, regardless of the alteration’s materiality.\\n Similarly, while the general partner must have engaged in conduct\\n that had a material adverse effect to enact removal, it was required\\n to undergo all actions necessary to maintain its federal tax status,\\n because even a minor change there could be detrimental.\\n This internally consistent understanding of “material”\\n gleaned from the four corners of each of the contracts aligns with\\n the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “material.” Looking\\n at dictionary definitions, Merriam-Webster defines “material” as\\n “having real importance or great consequences.” Material,\\n MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-web-\\n ster.com/dictionary/material. Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary\\n defines “material” as “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item\\n would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential.”\\n Material, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Taken together,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 22 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n “material” means having real importance or being significant. This\\n fits with the discussed context of “material” in the contracts, which\\n permitted removal of general partners for more significant\\n breaches in circumstances that held greater consequence and could\\n result in meaningful harm to the partnership. Therefore, to effec-\\n tuate the general partners’ removal under the agreements, the\\n harm faced by the limited partners must have been real and signif-\\n icant.\\n The district court found the detriment to the limited part-\\n ners to be significant. It found that the general partners “repeat-\\n edly, intentionally, and willfully diverted thousands of dollars to\\n non-partnership uses, over the objection of the [l]imited [p]artners,\\n in violation of their duties as [g]eneral [p]artners.” Order at 27,\\n Dkt. 173. It determined that this “conduct by its nature is likely to\\n have or could reasonably be expected to have a materially adverse\\n or detrimental effect on the partnerships because it affects the rela-\\n tionship of the partners.” Id. The court found that the general\\n partners conduct had deprived the limited partners of their owed\\n distributions. It found unconvincing the general partners’ argu-\\n ments that the breaches were not material because the overall\\n value of the misappropriated amounts was small in comparison\\n with the value of the project and the limited partners still received\\n the bargained-for tax benefit.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI raise simi-\\n lar arguments on appeal. However, we agree with the district\\n court that the harm faced by the limited partners was material. The\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 23 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n owner of the general partners, the chief financial officer of Hunt,\\n and the general partners’ auditing firm all stated that the amounts\\n misappropriated were material. The misappropriated cash com-\\n prised a significant portion of the partnerships’ cash on hand, and\\n in some cases, it was as much as a month’s worth of operating ex-\\n penses. This was a significant issue for the limited partners, who\\n sought to ensure that there was adequate funding in the partner-\\n ship should needs arise, such as property improvements, mainte-\\n nance, or upkeep. The general partners’ conduct also made it so\\n that the limited partners were unable to trust and do business with\\n them. Further, the limited partners ultimately received less money\\n because there was less money in the partnership for the year-end\\n waterfall distribution.\\n In their brief, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice\\n XXXI argue that the standard for materiality is whether the injured\\n party received substantially what it bargained for, which is the\\n standard used in breach of contract cases. They cite cases that dis-\\n cuss materiality as used to measure breach of contract. See, e.g.,\\n Ron Matusalem & Matusa of Fla., Inc. v. Ron Matusalem, Inc., 872 F.2d\\n 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1989). In Florida, a material breach is when\\n non-compliance with the contract goes “to the essence of the con-\\n tract,” JF & LN, LLC v. Royal Oldsmobile-GMC Trucks Co., 292 So. 3d\\n 500, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020), such as when the contract would not\\n have been made without the covenant not performed, Seawatch at\\n Marathon Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Guarantee Co. of N. Am., 286 So. 3d 823,\\n 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). The general partners state that relevant\\n considerations include the extent to which the injured party can be\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 24 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n compensated for its injury, to what degree the breaching party will\\n suffer a forfeiture, and whether the breaching party performed\\n with good faith and fair dealing.\\n Considering this “contract law” definition of materiality, the\\n district court still found that the breach was material. It found that\\n the general partners deprived the limited partners of substantial,\\n bargained-for benefits, such as a working relationship between the\\n parties, their core fiduciary duties, and the diverted cash flow.\\n Applying the general partners’ breach of contract standard,\\n we agree with the district court. The general partners acted in clear\\n disregard of vital terms of the contract, including the cash distribu-\\n tion order, and continually violated their fiduciary duties and did\\n not act in good faith. The general partners refused to cease violat-\\n ing the partnership agreements despite repeated warnings, contin-\\n ued to do so after the notice of removal, failed to timely cure, and\\n then attempted to fraudulently cover up that failure. While the\\n general partners argue that the essential benefits were the tax cred-\\n its, those credits are not the only important bargained-for benefit\\n in the contract, and in fact, the limited partners received less overall\\n money because of Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice\\n XXXI’s actions. Additionally, as discussed above, the limited part-\\n ners were validly concerned about the financial health and stability\\n of the partnership, and that was put in jeopardy by the general part-\\n ners’ malfeasance. Though we discuss forfeiture later, the general\\n partners’ removal is not an impermissible forfeiture, and here, it is\\n not outweighed by the other factors, given their blatant and\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 25 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n continuous disregard for the partnership agreements and breaches\\n of their fiduciary duties.\\n In summary, the general partners’ improper withdrawal of\\n thousands of dollars from the partnership to use on non-partner-\\n ship purposes caused material harm. It violated the terms of the\\n agreement, reduced the financial security of the partnership, dete-\\n riorated trust, and resulted in less funds available to be distributed\\n to the limited partners.\\n B. Cure\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\\n the district court clearly erred in finding that the checks the general\\n partners sent in June 2019—made out for $141,235 to the Park Ter-\\n race partnership and for $105,994 to the Fountainview partner-\\n ship—were insufficient to satisfy the outstanding balances.\\n The dispute over whether the general partners adequately\\n cured is contractual, and Florida law applies because this case pro-\\n ceeded under diversity jurisdiction. See Endurance Am. Specialty Ins.\\n Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 34 F.4th 978, 983 (11th Cir. 2022). When\\n determining whether a party has cured a contractual breach, Flor-\\n ida courts look to the language of the contract as a whole, including\\n the contractual cure requirements, and the facts surrounding the\\n breach. See Jones v. Warmack, 967 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 1st DCA\\n 2007) (interpreting the cure obligation through the language of the\\n whole contract); cf. Sun Bank of Miami v. Lester, 404 So. 2d 141, 143\\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (attempt to cure insufficient when the cure was\\n inadequate to fully address other contract terms).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 26 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n Under the Fountainview partnership agreement, Creative\\n Choice XXX was required to cure any defect within thirty days after\\n the limited partners gave notice. However, if Creative Choice XXX\\n began diligently and consistently repaying the debt within the\\n thirty-day period, it would have sixty days to fully cure the\\n breaches. Under the Park Terrace partnership agreement, Creative\\n Choice XXXI had thirty days to remedy its violations upon receiv-\\n ing notice.\\n The general partners received said notice that their affiliate\\n transactions were improper. The limited partners sent multiple\\n communications notifying the general partners of their objection\\n to the unauthorized use of partnership funds. On May 3, 2019, the\\n limited partners wrote letters to each of the general partners\\n providing “formal notice” of defaults and warning the general part-\\n ners that they had thirty days to remedy the misappropriation of\\n partnership funds and prohibited advances to their affiliates.\\n The district court found that the May 3 letter formally noti-\\n fied the general partners that they were in default for any improper\\n cash advances that took place until May 3, 2019. Creative Choice\\n XXXI contends that it was only on notice for amounts owed to the\\n Park Terrace partnership for the 2017 and 2018 improper transac-\\n tions, not for improper transactions that occurred in 2019. This is\\n incorrect. The May 3 letter stated that the limited partners had not\\n completed their investigation of the partnership’s records because\\n the general partner had not provided them with the most up-to-\\n date financial statements. However, it clarified that additional\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 27 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n violations may surface as the limited partners receive and review\\n the complete records, and that the limited partners reserved their\\n right to challenge any such additional violations. While the letter\\n specifically denoted the advances from 2017 and 2018, it high-\\n lighted that the ultimate concern was that Creative Choice XXXI\\n was making unauthorized payments to its affiliates. Based on the\\n letter’s language, the district court’s finding that Creative Choice\\n XXXI was formally notified of its default involving the affiliate ad-\\n vances before May 3, 2019, is not clearly erroneous. 8 See generally\\n Hous. Inv. Corp. v. Am. Bancshares Mortg. Co., 367 So. 2d 645, 646\\n (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (a default letter may explain default in general\\n terms and is not required to particularize all defaults).\\n Additionally, the district court’s factual findings regarding\\n the nature and impact of the general partners’ breaches were not\\n clearly erroneous. The record supports that Creative Choice XXX\\n used an improper loan to the Fountainview partnership to fund its\\n June 21 remedial check, as the district court found. The evidence\\n showed Impro loaned money to the partnership to cover the\\n\\n 8 To the extent that the district court found that Creative Choice XXXI was on\\n\\n notice for the events that occurred after the limited partners sent the default\\n letters, that would be clearly erroneous. Creative Choice XXXI could not have\\n cured its transactions that occurred two months after May 3, 2019, within 30\\n days of the letter. However, that does not alter the conclusion that Creative\\n Choice XXXI failed to timely cure as discussed in this Section. By Creative\\n Choice XXXI’s own admission, it did not cure the early 2019 transactions until\\n November 2019. November 2019 was well beyond the contractual cure pe-\\n riod for the impermissible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019\\n to May 3, 2019.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 28 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n breaches which, in and of itself, violated the partnership agree-\\n ments. The agreements expressly prohibited unauthorized loans.\\n Additionally, a loan to the partnership would not satisfy the cure\\n provision because, instead of being made whole, the partnership\\n would still be indebted to a lender.\\n The general partners’ June 3 email, explaining how they\\n planned to remedy the default, stated that they “intend[ed] to make\\n the necessary loan(s) to the respective partnership to correct any\\n underpayments.” Indeed, the checks’ funds appeared to be sourced\\n from loans. Barot testified about the funds for the checks. The\\n funds came from Creative Choice, which transferred the necessary\\n money to the partnership accounts before the checks were written.\\n Part of that transferred funding included a $77,000 deposit, a man-\\n ager of the general partners described as a loan, and which a July 3,\\n 2019, communication between two general partners’ representa-\\n tives referred to as a loan to cover the Fountainview check balance.\\n Furthermore, Creative Choice XXX’s sworn interrogatory indi-\\n cated that funds used to issue the check to Fountainview came\\n from the management company Impro. In auditing the Foun-\\n tainview partnership, Baker Tilly’s ledger listed a $54,500 “short\\n term loan” from Impro “to cover outstanding distributions made\\n to [limited partners].” This language was provided to Baker Tilly\\n by a representative of the general partnerships. 9\\n\\n\\n 9 The general partners argue that Baker Tilly’s ledger contained improper\\n\\n hearsay evidence. However, the general partners did not object to this evi-\\n dence’s admission at trial, and it was offered as part of the parties’ joint\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 29 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n Regarding Creative Choice XXXI, the district court deter-\\n mined that its June 21 check to the Park Terrace partnership did\\n not resolve the default because the general partners continued to\\n make improper cash advances after receiving notice and did not\\n pay back the necessary funds until after the deadline to cure. The\\n evidence shows that there were improper payments to Creative\\n Choice XXXI’s affiliates as late as July 2019, two months after the\\n limited partners notified it of its default, and Creative Choice XXXI\\n does not dispute this. Creative Choice XXXI also admits that it at-\\n tempted to cure all the improper 2019 Park Terrace payments in\\n November 2019, but it sought to backdate the payment to Septem-\\n ber 2019 to disguise the otherwise late reimbursement, even\\n though September was well beyond the appropriate deadline.\\n Therefore, by its own admission, it failed to timely cure the imper-\\n missible 2019 transactions that took place from January 2019 to\\n May 3, 2019. 10 See Tim Hortons USA, Inc. v. Singh, No. 16-23041-CIV,\\n\\n\\n exhibits. Absent plain error, an alleged hearsay statement that is not objected\\n to at trial is generally admissible for any relevant purpose. United States v.\\n Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1536 (11th Cir. 1983). The writing on the ledger did\\n not lead to plain error even if it constituted impermissible hearsay. The dis-\\n trict court could have reached the same ultimate conclusion, i.e., that the\\n check to Fountainview included funds that the general partners borrowed\\n from the partnership, based on the Creative Choice XXX’s representative’s\\n email stating that a loan was necessary to cure, the internal email between two\\n of Creative Choice XXX’s representatives referring to $77,000 as a loan, and a\\n Creative Choice XXX manager’s testimony confirming that there was a loan\\n to the partnership of $77,000.\\n 10 Creative Choice XXXI does not dispute that it attempted to backdate the\\n\\n repayment or that it continued advancing funds to its affiliates well into 2019.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 30 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n 2017 WL 4837552, at *10 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2017) (applying Florida\\n law, holding that a belated offer to cure is insufficient); Hufcor/Gulf-\\n stream, Inc. v. Homestead Concrete & Drainage, Inc., 831 So. 2d 767,\\n 769 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (holding that a late payment does not cure\\n a default when there was an agreement for payment on or before\\n a specified date); see generally KRG Oldsmar Project Co., LLC v. CWI,\\n Inc., 358 So. 3d 464, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“When a contract is\\n clear and unambiguous, the court’s role is to enforce the contract\\n as written, not to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable\\n for one of the parties.”).\\n Finally, the general partners argue the limited partners im-\\n peded their efforts to cure the breach by not accepting the checks\\n as full payment and by not identifying what other steps had to be\\n taken in order to satisfy the debts. Putting aside the general part-\\n ners’ efforts to hold the limited partners responsible for the unpaid\\n debts the general partners themselves created and owed, their at-\\n tempts to repay a loan by taking out another loan were ineffective\\n for the reasons already stated.\\n Additionally, the general partners’ legal arguments do not\\n match the facts of this case. They quote Blackhawk Heating &\\n Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Financial Corp., for the proposition that,\\n\\n\\n Instead, it argues that it took time for its external accounting firm to cease the\\n practice of improper advances. That does not undermine the district court’s\\n core findings that it continued to make improper cash advances at least seven\\n months into 2019 and sent the check after the due date, failing to timely cure\\n the impermissible transactions for which it was on notice.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 31 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n “[w]hen a party stipulates that another shall do a certain thing, he\\n thereby impliedly promises that he will himself do nothing which\\n will hinder or obstruct that other in doing that thing.” 302 So. 2d\\n 404, 410 (Fla. 1974). In Blackhawk, a plaintiff had an option contract\\n to acquire a portion of bank stock at an amount computed by a\\n complex mathematical formula set by the contract. Id. at 406. The\\n Supreme Court of Florida found that the defendant made it impos-\\n sible for the plaintiff to exercise the option because the defendant\\n refused to allow the plaintiff to access its books and records, so\\n there was no way for the plaintiff to compute the purchase price.\\n Id. The general partners also cite a similar case, PL Lake Worth Corp.\\n v. 99Cent Stuff-Palm Springs, LLC, in which a party was unable to\\n exercise a purchase option because the other party did not provide\\n the amount due. 11 949 So. 2d 1199, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).\\n\\n\\n 11 The general partners also rely upon two other cases which, likewise, are\\n\\n inapplicable. In Paul v. Hurley, 315 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), the court\\n found that the plaintiff’s repayment of her loan was frustrated by the defend-\\n ants, who diverted her loan payments for their own interest, and reversed a\\n judgment in the defendants’ favor. That is not the case here because the lim-\\n ited partners did not divert the general partners’ payments for inappropriate\\n personal purposes; the general partners tried to reimburse the partnerships\\n with funds from an improper source. The general partners also quote Cox v.\\n CSX Intermodal, Inc., 732 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) for the proposition\\n that a party has a duty to act in good faith even when the contractual terms\\n afford them discretion to promote their self-interest. This case is unrelated,\\n too. The contracts here did not provide the limited partners discretion to pro-\\n mote their self-interest in the cure process—in fact, the limited partners had\\n no contractual responsibilities after they provided notice. The contracts stated\\n that the general partners shall have thirty days after receiving notice to cure any\\n defaults. We address the appellants’ arguments that the limited partners acted\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 32 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n There, a retailer had the option to renew their leased space, which\\n it could exercise if it paid an unspecified amount based on mainte-\\n nance fees and taxes, but the owner of the shopping center refused\\n to provide the amount owed. Id. The court held that the owner\\n had an implied duty to provide the amount due. Id. at 1202. The\\n owner’s good-faith cooperation was necessary for the optionee to\\n exercise his option. Id.\\n A few things differentiate those cases from the matter at\\n hand. First, here, the general partners had a contractual duty to\\n cure, and the contracts at issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth\\n dealt with purchase options, a separate matter entirely. While both\\n involve the transfer of money, cure under the contracts is the gen-\\n eral partners’ duty to remedy any default that they caused. An op-\\n tion contract, on the other hand, involves an agreement to keep a\\n contract open so the optionee may accept later, should they desire.\\n See, e.g., Polk v. BHRGU Avon Props., LLC, 946 So. 2d 1120, 1122 (Fla.\\n 2d DCA 2006). The issue in Blackhawk and PL Lake Worth was that\\n when the optionee attempted to exercise their option, the optionor\\n refused to tender the information necessary to do so. In those\\n cases, the optionor was the only entity that knew the amounts to\\n be paid to exercise the options. Blackhawk, 302 So. 2d at 410; PL\\n Lake Worth, 949 So. 2d at 1200–01. Here, however, the general\\n partners were aware of the amounts borrowed, the amounts still\\n owed, and to whom the payments were due. Once the limited\\n\\n\\n in their own self-interest in removing them as general partners, resulting in a\\n “windfall,” in the forfeiture and waiver section of this Opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 33 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n partners notified the general partners of the cause for removal, the\\n general partners should have acted within the allotted time frame\\n to cure the breaches. They did not.\\n Given the district court’s factual findings, we agree that the\\n general partners failed to remedy, or otherwise cure, the violations\\n for which they were responsible.\\n C. Forfeiture and Waiver\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI argue that\\n their removal resulted in an “extreme forfeiture” that is prohibited\\n under Florida law, and that, as a result of their removal, the limited\\n partners will gain a large windfall. We agree with the district court\\n that their removal was permissible.\\n Florida courts have recognized an impermissible forfeiture\\n when a party loses a vested property interest or right as a penalty\\n for breaching a contract or violating a law. Howard Cole & Co. v.\\n Williams, 27 So. 2d 352, 356 (Fla. 1946). Pertinent here, “[w]hile\\n forfeitures are not favored, a forfeiture will be enforced where it is\\n clear that the parties intended such a result.” Stoltz v. Truitt, 940\\n So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (citing Nelson v. Hansard, 197\\n So. 513, 513–514 (Fla. 1940)). A court should not relieve a party\\n when the forfeiture is due to its own negligence or willful and per-\\n sistent violations of the contract. Id.\\n “Under Florida law, every contract provision should be given\\n meaning and effect.” Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.\\n Brickell Bldg. 1 Holding Co., 923 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1991). The\\n partnership agreements expressly allowed for the limited partners\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 34 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n to remove the general partners under certain circumstances, in-\\n cluding the circumstances that the district court found to have oc-\\n curred and that we affirmed. Under long-established Florida law,\\n while forfeitures may not be favored, a party can legally make a\\n contract that includes a forfeiture provision, and a court should en-\\n force that provision when it is clear that the parties so agreed. Nel-\\n son, 197 So. at 513–514.\\n Forfeiture is inequitable when the breaching party substan-\\n tially complied with the contract’s terms. Stoltz, 940 So. 2d at 523.\\n However, when the terms are clear and certain actions are pro-\\n scribed, the court will enforce the contract as written, even if it re-\\n sults in a forfeiture. Jenkins v. Eckerd Corp., 913 So. 2d 43, 54 (Fla.\\n 1st DCA 2005).\\n As the district court found, the general partners did not ex-\\n ercise good faith in managing their partnerships, and they willfully\\n and persistently breached their fiduciary and contractual duties.\\n Therefore, the general partners did not substantially comply with\\n the terms of the agreement by breaching pertinent contractual con-\\n ditions that were clearly expressed. Forfeiture is not improper\\n here.\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI’s argu-\\n ments to the contrary are unavailing. First, they argue that the lim-\\n ited partners delayed bringing their claim, and thus waived their\\n ability to enforce the removal provision. They assert that the lim-\\n ited partners waived this right because of their established course\\n of conduct breaching the partnership agreements in this way.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 35 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n A party may waive a right that they are legally entitled to,\\n including forfeiture, either expressly or by their actions. See Pala-\\n cios v. Lawson, 381 So. 3d 623, 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024); Rader v.\\n Prather, 130 So. 15, 17 (Fla. 1930). Florida courts define waiver as\\n “the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right or\\n conduct which implies the voluntary and intentional relinquish-\\n ment of a known right.” Raymond James Fin. Servs. v. Saldukas, 896\\n So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005). The district court found that the limited\\n partners did not waive their rights here, which is generally a ques-\\n tion of fact. Echo v. MGA Ins. Co., 157 So. 3d 507, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA\\n 2015) (collecting cases to demonstrate that the existence or absence\\n of waiver is a question of fact).\\n We agree that the limited partners did not waive their con-\\n tractual rights. The general partners’ conduct did not consist of a\\n one-time breach that occurred years before the suit was brought.\\n The general partners were continually breaching the agreement,\\n including after they received notice of the default. The limited\\n partners’ representative testified that he objected to improper part-\\n nership fund withdrawals every year dating back to 2011. Further,\\n the transactions that this suit stemmed from came to light in the\\n 2017 audited financial statements, issued in September 2018. Hunt\\n assumed control of the limited partners’ interests in January 2019,\\n and Hunt first corresponded regarding the improper advances in\\n March 2019. Therefore, Hunt raised this issue within a couple of\\n months of beginning to manage the limited partners and a handful\\n of months after the audit was finalized. Fla. State Dep’t of Env’tl.\\n Regul. v. Puckett Oil Co., 577 So. 2d 988, 993 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 36 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n (“[I]n order for waiver to be applied based on the passage of time,\\n we consider it essential for a showing to be made that the party\\n against whom waiver is asserted has received notice sufficient to\\n commence the running of the time period within which the re-\\n sponse is required.”); MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc.,\\n 720 F.3d 833, 852 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]aiver does not arise merely\\n from forbearance for a reasonable time.” (quoting Am. Somax Ven-\\n tures v. Touma, 547 So. 2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989))), certified\\n question answered, 143 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2014). Taken together, the\\n limited partners continually objected to this practice and timely\\n raised the issue once they discovered the most recent violations.\\n There is no evidence of unreasonable delay, and the general part-\\n ners fail to establish that the limited partners intended to relinquish\\n their rights. Waiver does not apply in this case.\\n Creative Choice XXX’s and Creative Choice XXXI’s second\\n and third arguments are related. They argue that the limited part-\\n ners were not substantially prejudiced because the general part-\\n ners’ breach did not cause any harm. Additionally, they argue that\\n the limited partners will receive a windfall by the general partners’\\n removal. We have already stated the substantial harm that the gen-\\n eral partners caused. Here, because the general partners caused\\n harm and failed to cure, there would not be a windfall in enforcing\\n the negotiated terms of the partnership agreements. Contra Fowler\\n v. Resash Corp., 469 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (affirming a\\n denial of forfeiture because it would be a windfall when the plain-\\n tiffs suffered no actual damages and admitted that defendants cured\\n any and all violations). Additionally, as stated, a forfeiture is\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 37 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n allowed when the cause is due to a party’s own willful and persis-\\n tent violations of the contract, as is present here. The general part-\\n ners admit they have a long history of violating the agreements,\\n and those actions were in willful and blatant disregard of the agree-\\n ments’ terms and to the limited partners’ objections. The general\\n partners willingly entered into these agreements, then decided to\\n breach the terms of their contracts, resulting in their removal.\\n We affirm the district court and find that the enforcement of\\n the contractual provisions removing the general partners does not\\n result in an impermissible forfeiture.\\n D. Estoppel\\n Finally, Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI ar-\\n gue that the district court should have estopped the limited part-\\n ners from removing them. They contend that the limited partners\\n continually chose not to exercise their contractual rights of re-\\n moval, and never treated the breaches as material, leading them to\\n reasonably believe removal would never occur. The district court\\n found that no such estoppel applied. We agree with the district\\n court.\\n A court applies equitable estoppel when one party’s decep-\\n tive conduct leads another party to taking an unfavorable legal po-\\n sition. Major League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla.\\n 2001). This occurs when (1) the instigating party makes “a repre-\\n sentation as to a material fact that is contrary to a later-asserted po-\\n sition;” (2) the party claiming estoppel reasonably relied on that\\n representation; and (3) that party detrimentally changed its\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 38 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 23-10197\\n\\n position because of the representation and its reliance. Progressive\\n Exp. Ins. Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 401–02 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).\\n Creative Choice XXX and Creative Choice XXXI establish\\n none of those elements. First, they do not point to any representa-\\n tion by the limited partners that is contradictory to a later asserted\\n position. In fact, the record demonstrates, and the district court\\n found, that the limited partners did raise issues with the general\\n partners’ conduct prior to 2019. Second, the general partners pro-\\n vide no example of how they relied on the limited partners’ alleged\\n representation. Finally, the general partners do not argue that they\\n changed their position in any way. Finding none of the elements\\n of estoppel satisfied, we decline to apply it here and affirm the dis-\\n trict court’s decision.\\n V. CONCLUSION\\n For the reasons stated above, the district court’s findings\\n were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were proper, and\\n we affirm its decision.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 39 of 42\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-10197 Newsom, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30977,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10760279,"string":"10,760,279"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"National Small Business United v. U.S. Department of the Treasury"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-16"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10736"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10736\\n ____________________\\n\\n NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS UNITED,\\n d.b.a. National Small Business Association,\\n ISAAC WINKLES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,\\n ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FINANCIAL CRIMES\\n ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE\\n TREASURY,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n The question in this appeal is whether a federal law requir-\\n ing corporations to report information about their owners is con-\\n stitutional. Congress found that bad actors have been using the an-\\n onymity of the corporate form to commit financial crimes, such as\\n money laundering and financing terrorism. To prevent these anon-\\n ymous business dealings, Congress passed the Corporate Transpar-\\n ency Act as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Pub.\\n L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4604 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336). The\\n CTA requires certain corporate entities to report their “beneficial\\n owners”—i.e., the actual people who exercise control over the en-\\n tity—to the Department of the Treasury.\\n To be constitutional, every federal law must, first, be con-\\n sistent with one of Congress’s enumerated powers and, second, not\\n violate any of the Constitution’s individual rights guarantees. Na-\\n tional Small Business United, a business association, and Isaac Win-\\n kles, a real-estate manager, argue that the CTA fails on both counts.\\n As relevant here, they say that the CTA is not an appropriate exer-\\n cise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and is\\n therefore facially unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n In the alternative, they say that the CTA violates the Fourth\\n Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and is facially\\n unconstitutional for that reason. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.\\n The district court concluded that the CTA did not regulate\\n economic activity and, on that basis, granted the plaintiffs sum-\\n mary judgment. We disagree. We believe that, by effectively\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n prohibiting anonymous business dealings, the CTA facially regu-\\n lates economic activities having a substantial aggregate impact on\\n interstate commerce. Moreover, as a uniform and limited report-\\n ing requirement, the CTA does not facially violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.\\n I.\\n\\n Financial crime is a serious problem. According to one re-\\n cent estimate, money laundering costs the government billions of\\n dollars every year. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY\\n LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT 3 & n.1 (2024). Financial criminals\\n often use shell companies to conceal their fraud and their identities.\\n Id. at 53. Because most states do not require businesses to report\\n information about their owners, law enforcement has long suffered\\n from an information gap when fighting financial crime. H.R. REP.\\n NO. 116-227, at 2 (2019).\\n To combat this problem, Congress passed the CTA. In doing\\n so, it made a series of findings. It found that more than 2,000,000\\n corporations and limited liability companies are formed each year,\\n mostly in states that do not require beneficial ownership infor-\\n mation. Id. These anonymous companies sometimes abuse the cor-\\n porate form to commit crimes “affecting interstate and interna-\\n tional commerce.” Id. Congress therefore concluded that the CTA\\n was necessary to combat securities and financial fraud. Id. Congress\\n also found that uniform reporting laws would support “national se-\\n curity, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to counter money\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activity.”\\n Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5)(D), 134 Stat. 4604.\\n The CTA provides for the “collection of beneficial owner-\\n ship information” of designated reporting companies. Id. § 6402(5),\\n 134 Stat. 4604. Under the law, those companies must disclose infor-\\n mation about “each beneficial owner” and “each applicant” to the\\n Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-\\n work. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). A “reporting company”\\n is a corporation, LLC, or other similar entity incorporated under\\n the laws of a state, or formed under the law of a foreign country\\n and registered to do business in the United States. Id. § 5336(a)(11).\\n “Beneficial owner” is defined as an individual who exercises sub-\\n stantial control over an entity or otherwise controls at least twenty-\\n five percent of its ownership interests. Id. § 5336(a)(3)(A). “Appli-\\n cant” refers to an individual who files an application to form an en-\\n tity. Id. § 5336(a)(2). Reporting companies must provide FinCEN\\n with their beneficial owners’ and applicants’ full legal name, date\\n of birth, home or business address, and government ID. Id. §\\n 5336(b)(2)(A).\\n The CTA applies differently depending on when the report-\\n ing company incorporates. Under the CTA and subsequent Treas-\\n ury regulations, businesses created before March 26, 2025, were re-\\n quired to comply with the CTA by April 25, 2025. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(a)(1)(ii); U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B). Companies formed after\\n that date must file a report within thirty days of registration. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(1)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(C). The reporting\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n requirement is an ongoing obligation. If there is any change with\\n respect to required information previously submitted to FinCEN,\\n the company must file an updated report within thirty days. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(2)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D).\\n The CTA contains numerous exceptions. Excluded from the\\n definition of “reporting company” are banks, credit unions, bro-\\n kers, investment companies, insurance companies, accounting\\n firms, and 501(c) nonprofits. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B). Also ex-\\n cluded are entities that employ more than twenty employees and\\n make more than $5,000,000 in annual gross sales. Id.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi). Entities in existence on or before January 1,\\n 2020, that are not engaged in active business, are not owned by a\\n foreign person, have not experienced a recent change in owner-\\n ship, do not hold assets, and have not sent or received funds in an\\n amount greater than $1,000 in the past year are likewise exempt.\\n 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii).\\n The CTA also permits the Secretary of the Treasury to pass\\n regulations exempting other groups from the reporting require-\\n ment. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv). After passage, FinCEN is-\\n sued an interim final rule exempting domestic companies from the\\n CTA’s requirements. The interim final rule still requires foreign\\n companies to report ownership information except as to American\\n owners. 1 See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting\\n\\n 1 The parties agree that this rulemaking does not render this case moot. We\\n\\n believe they are correct. See Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th\\n Cir. 1992).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 Fed. Reg. 13688,\\n 13690 (Mar. 26, 2025) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).\\n The CTA was controversial from the start. See Kate Kelly,\\n On Eve of Money Laundering Law’s Activation, a Lobby Cries Foul, N.Y.\\n TIMES, Dec. 18, 2023, at B4. After it was enacted, NSBU and Win-\\n kles sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Department of the\\n Treasury, and FinCEN’s Acting Director, seeking declaratory and\\n injunctive relief. NSBU represents “over 65,000 businesses and en-\\n trepreneurs located in all 50 states. [Its] members come from every\\n sector of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, retail, food\\n service, and professional services.” McCracken Decl. at 2. Winkles\\n owns a small business with three full-time employees and “annual\\n turnover of under $20 million.” Winkles Decl. at 1-2.\\n NSBU and Winkles claimed that the CTA is facially uncon-\\n stitutional and that it violates the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\\n Tenth Amendments. The parties agreed that the case could be re-\\n solved on dispositive motions without discovery. They then cross-\\n moved for summary judgment.\\n The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-\\n mary judgment and denied the defendants’ cross-motion for sum-\\n mary judgment. The court held that neither the Commerce, Tax-\\n ing, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, nor Congress’s foreign af-\\n fairs and national security powers, justified the CTA. Regarding the\\n Commerce Clause, the court ruled that the CTA primarily regu-\\n lates the non-commercial act of incorporation and that the connec-\\n tion between the act of incorporation and the activities Congress\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n sought to curb was too attenuated. The court also emphasized the\\n CTA’s lack of any jurisdictional hook limiting its reach to interstate\\n commerce. Because it held that the CTA exceeded Congress’s enu-\\n merated powers, the court did not address whether it violated the\\n First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.\\n The government timely appealed.\\n II.\\n\\n This Court reviews de novo the district court’s disposition of\\n a motion for summary judgment. See Lowery v. AmGuard Ins. Co.,\\n 90 F.4th 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 2024). We also review de novo the\\n constitutionality of a challenged statute. United States v. Paige, 604\\n F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n III.\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles advance two main arguments against\\n the facial constitutionality of the CTA. First, they argue that Con-\\n gress did not have the power, under the Commerce Clause or oth-\\n erwise, to enact the CTA. Second, in the alternative, they argue\\n that the CTA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on un-\\n reasonable searches. We address each argument in turn.\\n A.\\n\\n Turning to the Commerce Clause, we start with first princi-\\n ples. Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more\\n of its constitutionally enumerated powers. See Marbury v. Madison,\\n 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). One of those\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n enumerated powers is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with\\n foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian\\n Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n To preserve a “distinction between what is truly national\\n and what is truly local,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68\\n (1995), the Supreme Court has identified three categories of activ-\\n ity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power:\\n (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of inter-\\n state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and\\n (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at\\n 558-59. The district court held, and the parties do not dispute, that\\n the CTA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of\\n commerce. Therefore, the question is whether the CTA passes\\n muster under the third category: the “substantial effects” test.\\n Under the substantial effects test, the Court has distin-\\n guished between laws having “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or\\n any sort of economic enterprise,” id. at 561, and those laws regu-\\n lating “quintessentially economic” activities, Gonzales v. Raich, 545\\n U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The substantial effects test is ordinarily met only\\n when the underlying activity is economic in nature or where the\\n statute contains a jurisdictional element linked to interstate com-\\n merce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; United States v. Morrison, 529\\n U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[O]ur cases have upheld Commerce Clause\\n regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-\\n nomic in nature.”); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511\\n (11th Cir. 1997) (“have an economic character”). In short, for a law\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n to be facially constitutional under the substantial effects test in the\\n absence of a jurisdictional element, the law ordinarily must be di-\\n rected at some kind of commercial or economic activity and Con-\\n gress must have rationally concluded that the regulated activity in\\n the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n Applying the substantial effects test, we hold that the CTA\\n is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com-\\n merce Clause. First, on its face, the CTA regulates activity that is\\n economic in nature. It effectively prohibits anonymous corporate\\n dealings, regulates commercial entities that are active in the stream\\n of commerce, and requires them to report information related to\\n their ownership. Second, Congress rationally concluded that anon-\\n ymous corporate dealings have a substantial aggregate effect on in-\\n terstate commerce. We address each point below.\\n 1.\\n\\n We will start with whether the CTA regulates economic ac-\\n tivity. The Supreme Court has held that run-of-the-mill criminal\\n laws flunk this test. For example, criminal statutes prohibiting fire-\\n arms in school zones and gender-motivated violence are not di-\\n rected at economic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529\\n U.S. at 613, 617. But a law can regulate economic activity even if\\n the connection between the challenged law and commerce isn’t\\n airtight. It is enough that the regulated activity involves “some sort\\n of economic endeavor” with “an apparent commercial character.”\\n Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n We think the CTA is sufficiently connected to economic ac-\\n tivity to meet the first part of the substantial effects test. The law\\n applies to “corporation[s], limited liability compan[ies], or other\\n similar entit[ies].” 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11). Corporations are formed\\n when prospective shareholders exchange money, property, or\\n both, in return for stock. A corporation conducts business, realizes\\n losses or gains, pays taxes, and distributes dividends to its share-\\n holders. HOLGER SPAMANN, SCOTT HIRST & GABRIEL RAUTERBERG,\\n CORPORATIONS IN 100 PAGES 1-12 (2020); RICHARD D. FREER &\\n DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 194-96\\n (2d ed. 2018). Like corporations, LLCs offer owners protection\\n from personal liability, although profits are passed through to a\\n member’s personal income without facing corporate taxes.\\n FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 4-6 (3d ed. 2021);\\n STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP & LLCS 269 (4th\\n ed. 2024).\\n These entities are commercial by their very nature. As the\\n Supreme Court has long recognized, a corporation is never created\\n “for its own sake,” but instead exists “for the purpose of effecting\\n something else.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411\\n (1819). For-profit business entities are a means to an economic end.\\n They exist primarily to “use [their] resources and engage in activi-\\n ties designed to increase [their] profits.” MILTON FRIEDMAN,\\n CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,\\n CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419-29 (2002) (traditional fidu-\\n ciary duties require corporations to maximize profits). Aside from\\n being profit maximizers, business entities also exist to efficiently\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n pool capital and allow creditors and shareholders to invest without\\n disclosing their identities. William J. Moon, Anonymous Companies,\\n 71 DUKE L.J. 1425, 1429-32 (2022). For all these reasons, the corpo-\\n rate form is understood to be “the foundation of the modern mar-\\n ket economy.” Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost\\n Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33\\n J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 225 (2017).\\n Considering the nature of the corporate form and modern\\n business, we can safely say that the CTA facially regulates eco-\\n nomic activity. The statute is specifically directed at domestic com-\\n panies created under the laws of a state and foreign companies reg-\\n istered to do business in the United States. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A). By requiring these corporate entities to provide\\n beneficial ownership information, the CTA regulates how they op-\\n erate and the level of secrecy with which they do business. The\\n maintenance and operation of a separate corporate entity is com-\\n parable to other regulated activities the Supreme Court has found\\n commercial in nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\\n (consumption of home-grown wheat); Perez v. United States, 402\\n U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate intrastate credit transactions).\\n NSBU’s and Winkles’s own declarations emphasize the\\n point. NSBU represents tens of thousands of businesses in every\\n sector of the economy. According to NSBU, eighty percent of its\\n members fall under the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n Winkles co-owns two corporations that “manage and lease real\\n property” and generate “annual turnover of under $20 million.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Winkles Decl. at 1-2. Winkles’s two companies earn approximately\\n $8 million and $5 million in annual gross sales. Neither NSBU nor\\n Winkles has identified any reporting companies that do not engage\\n in commercial activity. That both plaintiffs are clearly economi-\\n cally active and failed to provide evidence of a non-commercial en-\\n tity regulated by the CTA is strong evidence that the statute regu-\\n lates commerce.\\n Moreover, to the extent a corporate entity is not involved in\\n commerce, the CTA’s many carveouts will likely exempt it. The\\n statute excludes trusts, banks, government agencies, public utili-\\n ties, political organizations, and nonprofits. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also exempts inactive businesses that\\n are created on or before January 1, 2020, hold no assets, and have\\n not sent or received funds exceeding $1,000 in a year. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii). Congress’s\\n decision to tailor the CTA to active businesses is further evidence\\n the statute regulates commerce on its face.\\n NSBU and Winkles make three arguments to resist this con-\\n clusion. None works.\\n First, they argue, like the district court, that the CTA regu-\\n lates the noneconomic “isolated, discrete act” of incorporation.\\n We’ll assume without deciding that this “isolated, discrete act” is\\n not itself commercial in character. Even indulging that assumption,\\n we believe the CTA’s text establishes that it does not regulate the\\n act of incorporation. Instead, the CTA regulates entities after they\\n have been incorporated. Even though the statute defines\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n “reporting company” as one “created by the filing of a document,”\\n this provision serves only to identify those entities that must com-\\n ply with the statute’s reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i). The statute in no way affects how businesses in-\\n corporate. It does not alter any relevant state law. It addresses only\\n what entities must do after they are registered to do business—pro-\\n vide beneficial owner information to the Treasury Secretary.\\n Other parts of the text confirm that the CTA is not regulat-\\n ing the act of incorporation. The statute requires existing busi-\\n nesses that have already incorporated to continue reporting\\n changes in ownership. Id. § 5336(b)(1)(D). Foreign entities regis-\\n tered to do business in the United States, but that were incorpo-\\n rated abroad, are also subject to the CTA. Id. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(ii).\\n And, as we’ve already explained above, the CTA exempts busi-\\n nesses that are not actively engaged in commerce from the report-\\n ing requirement.\\n Second, NSBU and Winkles argue that the CTA is constitu-\\n tionally infirm because it lacks a jurisdictional element. Again, we\\n disagree. A jurisdictional element “ensure[s], through case-by-case\\n inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce.”\\n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. We have held that a jurisdictional element—\\n because it allows a case-by-case assessment—immunizes criminal\\n statutes from facial challenges. United States v. Pugh, 90 F.4th 1318,\\n 1326 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 236 (2024). See also United\\n States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional\\n hook defeated facial challenge to statute prohibiting a felon from\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n possessing a firearm). But neither we nor the Supreme Court has\\n ever suggested that a jurisdictional element is necessary for an eco-\\n nomic regulation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,\\n 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a jurisdictional element was\\n unnecessary where the statute regulated economic activities hav-\\n ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In Lopez and Mor-\\n rison, for example, a case-by-case jurisdictional assessment was nec-\\n essary because the statutes facially regulated non-economic activ-\\n ity. “The absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means\\n that courts must determine independently whether the statute reg-\\n ulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commer-\\n cial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect\\n interstate commerce.” Id. (citation modified).\\n Finally, citing National Federation of Independent Business v.\\n Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), NSBU and Winkles say that the CTA\\n regulates inactivity. But the CTA does not “compel [entities] not\\n engaged in commerce” to do so. Id. at 549. Because of the tailored\\n scope of the act, it regulates entities that are active in commerce.\\n See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B), (b)(1)(B). The CTA does not regulate\\n based on an entity’s anticipated future conduct. Instead, the CTA\\n anticipates the effects on commerce of active businesses not report-\\n ing ownership information. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 557.\\n In sum, the CTA regulates economic activity on its face. Ac-\\n cordingly, the only question for its facial constitutionality under the\\n Commerce Clause is whether the intrastate economic activity it\\n regulates substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n We turn now to that second question: did Congress ration-\\n ally conclude that the regulated conduct has a substantial aggregate\\n effect on interstate commerce? We believe that it did.\\n Apart from its scope, the CTA is a routine federal law. Fed-\\n eral reporting requirements are very common. See Cal. Bankers\\n Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47 (1974) (“[P]rovisions requiring re-\\n porting or recordkeeping . . . are by no means unique.”). The\\n United States Code is replete with them. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5313\\n (requiring banks to file reports with the Secretary of the Treasury\\n whenever they are involved in cash transactions exceeding a cer-\\n tain amount); 52 U.S.C § 30104 (requiring political committees to\\n file reports of receipts and disbursements); 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (requir-\\n ing registered lobbyists to file reports with Congress that include\\n their name, a list of lobbying activities, and a list of employees). So\\n the CTA is hardly based on a “new conception[] of federal power.”\\n NFIB, 567 U.S. at 550.\\n This particular reporting requirement is an effort to curtail\\n abuses of the corporate form. In its report accompanying the CTA,\\n the House Committee on Financial Services found that anony-\\n mous ownership and the corporate form were contributing to\\n fraud. The Committee concluded that anonymous shell companies\\n “afford a high level of secrecy” to money launderers. H.R. REP. NO.\\n 116-227, at 10 (2019). The report also found that the United States\\n was not meeting international standards regarding disclosure re-\\n quirements, making it a target for money laundering. Id. at 2,11.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n In reaching these conclusions, Congress relied on input from\\n numerous national security and law enforcement experts about\\n how anonymous shell companies affect interstate and international\\n commerce. Congress held a hearing on the CTA, during which the\\n former Director of the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operation Section\\n testified that the CTA was “necessary and long overdue.” Promoting\\n Corporate Transparency: Examining Legislative Proposals to Detect and\\n Deter Financial Crimes: Hearing on H.R. 2513 Before the Subcomm. on\\n Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev., & Monetary Pol’y of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,\\n 116th Cong. 49 (2019) (statement of Dennis M. Lormel). Lormel\\n also stated that he believed reporting requirements would help re-\\n duce drug trafficking. Id. at 28. Congress heard additional testi-\\n mony in support of the CTA from law enforcement associations\\n such as the Fraternal Order of Police. The Fraternal Order said that\\n collecting beneficial ownership information would help combat\\n the threat posed by “[t]ransnational criminal organizations and ter-\\n rorist operations.” Id. at 69. Finally, an array of industry represent-\\n atives concluded the CTA would protect financial institutions of all\\n stripes from financial crime. Id. at 75-76.\\n Congress could rationally conclude that the freedom of ben-\\n eficial owners to operate anonymously through shell companies\\n had a substantial aggregate impact on interstate commerce. Con-\\n gress found that 2,000,000 corporations and LLCs are formed an-\\n nually. Congress reasonably concluded that failing to require busi-\\n nesses to report beneficial ownership information would undercut\\n its goal of regulating interstate financial crime. Indeed, it explicitly\\n found that the CTA was necessary to prevent the use of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n corporate form to commit fraud. Anti-Money Laundering Act of\\n 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5), 134 Stat. 4547, 4604 (2021).\\n Although congressional findings are not necessary, Katzen-\\n bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299, 304 (1964), and alone cannot\\n sustain Commerce Clause legislation, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614,\\n such findings may better “enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-\\n ment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate\\n commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Congress’s findings here are en-\\n titled to deference. See United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1371\\n (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “explicit findings that the proscribed\\n activity in issue substantially affected interstate commerce” are ac-\\n corded “substantial deference”). Here the connection between the\\n thing being regulated—the anonymous ownership and operation\\n of businesses—and its effect on interstate commerce is direct and\\n straightforward. Congress had a rational basis for believing that, in\\n the aggregate, the anonymous operation of businesses substan-\\n tially affected interstate commerce.\\n NSBU and Winkles resist this conclusion by citing examples\\n of hypothetical entities that engage in purely intrastate activity but\\n may still be regulated by the CTA. The existence of some edge\\n cases doesn’t help in this facial challenge. “[W]here a general regu-\\n latory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de min-\\n imis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of\\n no consequence.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz,\\n 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) (citation modified), overruled on other\\n grounds by, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). This\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n argument about corporations that are uniquely focused on intra-\\n state activity is the stuff of an as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Gonzales\\n v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Because Congress reasonably deter-\\n mined that this cumulative activity would substantially affect com-\\n merce, the existence of some purely intrastate entities does not in-\\n validate the CTA as a facial matter.\\n * * *\\n In short, the CTA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s\\n enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. Because it is\\n directed at the ownership and maintenance of corporations, it is a\\n regulation of economic activity. And Congress rationally con-\\n cluded that this activity has a substantial aggregate impact on inter-\\n state commerce.\\n B.\\n\\n Having determined that Congress had the power to enact\\n the CTA, we now ask whether the CTA facially violates any indi-\\n vidual rights amendment. A facial challenge under an individual\\n rights amendment is “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603\\n U.S. 707, 723 (2024). A plaintiff cannot succeed on such a facial chal-\\n lenge unless he “‘establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists\\n under which the [law] would be valid,’ or he shows that the law\\n lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sa-\\n lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and Washington State Grange v. Wash-\\n ington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–451 (2008)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles urge us to affirm on the ground that the\\n CTA facially violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-\\n ment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-\\n sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\\n seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. NSBU and Winkles argue that\\n the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it permits\\n suspicionless searches for general law enforcement purposes. 2 We\\n disagree.\\n The Supreme Court has previously considered Fourth\\n Amendment challenges to uniform reporting requirements. In\\n Shultz, the Court addressed a statute requiring banks to report do-\\n mestic currency transactions above a certain amount. 416 U.S. 21\\n (1974). The reports contained the “name, address, business or pro-\\n fession and social security number of the person conducting the\\n transaction,” as well as a description of the transaction itself. Id. at\\n 39 n.15. The Court upheld the statute against a Fourth Amendment\\n challenge, concluding that the regulations “do not impose unrea-\\n sonable reporting requirements on the banks.” Id. at 67. Even\\n though the law required banks to obtain information “simply be-\\n cause the Government want[ed] it,” the information was limited in\\n nature and “sufficiently related to a tenable congressional\\n\\n\\n 2 NSBU and Winkles vaguely reference First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-\\n\\n ment claims but make no argument in support of them. These arguments are\\n abandoned for purposes of appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739\\n F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (a party fails to adequately brief a claim when it\\n fails to clearly present it or refers to it only in passing).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in in-\\n terstate commerce.” Id.\\n Under this precedent, the CTA does not violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. It is a uniform reporting requirement applied to all\\n businesses that meet the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n There is nothing arbitrary or discretionary about its application. See\\n Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., Elec. & Space Div., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2\\n (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a “uniform statutory or regulatory\\n reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern re-\\n garding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy”). The infor-\\n mation it requires is “sufficiently described and limited in nature”\\n and is no more detailed than the reports in Shultz. 416 U.S. at 67.\\n The CTA also has several privacy guarantees. It permits dis-\\n closure of beneficial ownership information only upon request by\\n discrete categories of agencies under certain circumstances. 31\\n U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2). The statute requires the Secretary of the Treas-\\n ury to protect ownership information and prevent breaches of con-\\n fidentiality. Id. § 5336(c)(8). And the Comptroller General must\\n conduct periodic audits to ensure the Department of the Treasury\\n is using beneficial ownership information appropriately. Id.\\n § 5336(c)(10).\\n In support of their argument, NSBU and Winkles cite a se-\\n ries of decisions involving substantial arbitrary privacy intrusions\\n in which the government collected an array of detailed and sensi-\\n tive information. But these decisions bear no resemblance to the\\n facts of this case. Here, “[t]he inquiry is within the authority of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information\\n sought is reasonably relevant.” Shultz, 416 U.S. at 67 (quoting\\n United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). Because\\n the CTA’s disclosure requirement is reasonable, there is no Fourth\\n Amendment issue. See id.\\n IV.\\n\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226864/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10736\\n ____________________\\n\\n NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS UNITED,\\n d.b.a. National Small Business Association,\\n ISAAC WINKLES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,\\n ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FINANCIAL CRIMES\\n ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE\\n TREASURY,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n The question in this appeal is whether a federal law requir-\\n ing corporations to report information about their owners is con-\\n stitutional. Congress found that bad actors have been using the an-\\n onymity of the corporate form to commit financial crimes, such as\\n money laundering and financing terrorism. To prevent these anon-\\n ymous business dealings, Congress passed the Corporate Transpar-\\n ency Act as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Pub.\\n L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4604 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336). The\\n CTA requires certain corporate entities to report their “beneficial\\n owners”—i.e., the actual people who exercise control over the en-\\n tity—to the Department of the Treasury.\\n To be constitutional, every federal law must, first, be con-\\n sistent with one of Congress’s enumerated powers and, second, not\\n violate any of the Constitution’s individual rights guarantees. Na-\\n tional Small Business United, a business association, and Isaac Win-\\n kles, a real-estate manager, argue that the CTA fails on both counts.\\n As relevant here, they say that the CTA is not an appropriate exer-\\n cise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and is\\n therefore facially unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n In the alternative, they say that the CTA violates the Fourth\\n Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and is facially\\n unconstitutional for that reason. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.\\n The district court concluded that the CTA did not regulate\\n economic activity and, on that basis, granted the plaintiffs sum-\\n mary judgment. We disagree. We believe that, by effectively\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n prohibiting anonymous business dealings, the CTA facially regu-\\n lates economic activities having a substantial aggregate impact on\\n interstate commerce. Moreover, as a uniform and limited report-\\n ing requirement, the CTA does not facially violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.\\n I.\\n\\n Financial crime is a serious problem. According to one re-\\n cent estimate, money laundering costs the government billions of\\n dollars every year. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY\\n LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT 3 & n.1 (2024). Financial criminals\\n often use shell companies to conceal their fraud and their identities.\\n Id. at 53. Because most states do not require businesses to report\\n information about their owners, law enforcement has long suffered\\n from an information gap when fighting financial crime. H.R. REP.\\n NO. 116-227, at 2 (2019).\\n To combat this problem, Congress passed the CTA. In doing\\n so, it made a series of findings. It found that more than 2,000,000\\n corporations and limited liability companies are formed each year,\\n mostly in states that do not require beneficial ownership infor-\\n mation. Id. These anonymous companies sometimes abuse the cor-\\n porate form to commit crimes “affecting interstate and interna-\\n tional commerce.” Id. Congress therefore concluded that the CTA\\n was necessary to combat securities and financial fraud. Id. Congress\\n also found that uniform reporting laws would support “national se-\\n curity, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to counter money\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activity.”\\n Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5)(D), 134 Stat. 4604.\\n The CTA provides for the “collection of beneficial owner-\\n ship information” of designated reporting companies. Id. § 6402(5),\\n 134 Stat. 4604. Under the law, those companies must disclose infor-\\n mation about “each beneficial owner” and “each applicant” to the\\n Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-\\n work. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). A “reporting company”\\n is a corporation, LLC, or other similar entity incorporated under\\n the laws of a state, or formed under the law of a foreign country\\n and registered to do business in the United States. Id. § 5336(a)(11).\\n “Beneficial owner” is defined as an individual who exercises sub-\\n stantial control over an entity or otherwise controls at least twenty-\\n five percent of its ownership interests. Id. § 5336(a)(3)(A). “Appli-\\n cant” refers to an individual who files an application to form an en-\\n tity. Id. § 5336(a)(2). Reporting companies must provide FinCEN\\n with their beneficial owners’ and applicants’ full legal name, date\\n of birth, home or business address, and government ID. Id. §\\n 5336(b)(2)(A).\\n The CTA applies differently depending on when the report-\\n ing company incorporates. Under the CTA and subsequent Treas-\\n ury regulations, businesses created before March 26, 2025, were re-\\n quired to comply with the CTA by April 25, 2025. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(a)(1)(ii); U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B). Companies formed after\\n that date must file a report within thirty days of registration. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(1)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(C). The reporting\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n requirement is an ongoing obligation. If there is any change with\\n respect to required information previously submitted to FinCEN,\\n the company must file an updated report within thirty days. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(2)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D).\\n The CTA contains numerous exceptions. Excluded from the\\n definition of “reporting company” are banks, credit unions, bro-\\n kers, investment companies, insurance companies, accounting\\n firms, and 501(c) nonprofits. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B). Also ex-\\n cluded are entities that employ more than twenty employees and\\n make more than $5,000,000 in annual gross sales. Id.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi). Entities in existence on or before January 1,\\n 2020, that are not engaged in active business, are not owned by a\\n foreign person, have not experienced a recent change in owner-\\n ship, do not hold assets, and have not sent or received funds in an\\n amount greater than $1,000 in the past year are likewise exempt.\\n 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii).\\n The CTA also permits the Secretary of the Treasury to pass\\n regulations exempting other groups from the reporting require-\\n ment. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv). After passage, FinCEN is-\\n sued an interim final rule exempting domestic companies from the\\n CTA’s requirements. The interim final rule still requires foreign\\n companies to report ownership information except as to American\\n owners. 1 See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting\\n\\n 1 The parties agree that this rulemaking does not render this case moot. We\\n\\n believe they are correct. See Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th\\n Cir. 1992).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 Fed. Reg. 13688,\\n 13690 (Mar. 26, 2025) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).\\n The CTA was controversial from the start. See Kate Kelly,\\n On Eve of Money Laundering Law’s Activation, a Lobby Cries Foul, N.Y.\\n TIMES, Dec. 18, 2023, at B4. After it was enacted, NSBU and Win-\\n kles sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Department of the\\n Treasury, and FinCEN’s Acting Director, seeking declaratory and\\n injunctive relief. NSBU represents “over 65,000 businesses and en-\\n trepreneurs located in all 50 states. [Its] members come from every\\n sector of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, retail, food\\n service, and professional services.” McCracken Decl. at 2. Winkles\\n owns a small business with three full-time employees and “annual\\n turnover of under $20 million.” Winkles Decl. at 1-2.\\n NSBU and Winkles claimed that the CTA is facially uncon-\\n stitutional and that it violates the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\\n Tenth Amendments. The parties agreed that the case could be re-\\n solved on dispositive motions without discovery. They then cross-\\n moved for summary judgment.\\n The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-\\n mary judgment and denied the defendants’ cross-motion for sum-\\n mary judgment. The court held that neither the Commerce, Tax-\\n ing, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, nor Congress’s foreign af-\\n fairs and national security powers, justified the CTA. Regarding the\\n Commerce Clause, the court ruled that the CTA primarily regu-\\n lates the non-commercial act of incorporation and that the connec-\\n tion between the act of incorporation and the activities Congress\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n sought to curb was too attenuated. The court also emphasized the\\n CTA’s lack of any jurisdictional hook limiting its reach to interstate\\n commerce. Because it held that the CTA exceeded Congress’s enu-\\n merated powers, the court did not address whether it violated the\\n First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.\\n The government timely appealed.\\n II.\\n\\n This Court reviews de novo the district court’s disposition of\\n a motion for summary judgment. See Lowery v. AmGuard Ins. Co.,\\n 90 F.4th 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 2024). We also review de novo the\\n constitutionality of a challenged statute. United States v. Paige, 604\\n F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n III.\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles advance two main arguments against\\n the facial constitutionality of the CTA. First, they argue that Con-\\n gress did not have the power, under the Commerce Clause or oth-\\n erwise, to enact the CTA. Second, in the alternative, they argue\\n that the CTA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on un-\\n reasonable searches. We address each argument in turn.\\n A.\\n\\n Turning to the Commerce Clause, we start with first princi-\\n ples. Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more\\n of its constitutionally enumerated powers. See Marbury v. Madison,\\n 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). One of those\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n enumerated powers is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with\\n foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian\\n Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n To preserve a “distinction between what is truly national\\n and what is truly local,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68\\n (1995), the Supreme Court has identified three categories of activ-\\n ity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power:\\n (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of inter-\\n state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and\\n (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at\\n 558-59. The district court held, and the parties do not dispute, that\\n the CTA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of\\n commerce. Therefore, the question is whether the CTA passes\\n muster under the third category: the “substantial effects” test.\\n Under the substantial effects test, the Court has distin-\\n guished between laws having “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or\\n any sort of economic enterprise,” id. at 561, and those laws regu-\\n lating “quintessentially economic” activities, Gonzales v. Raich, 545\\n U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The substantial effects test is ordinarily met only\\n when the underlying activity is economic in nature or where the\\n statute contains a jurisdictional element linked to interstate com-\\n merce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; United States v. Morrison, 529\\n U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[O]ur cases have upheld Commerce Clause\\n regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-\\n nomic in nature.”); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511\\n (11th Cir. 1997) (“have an economic character”). In short, for a law\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n to be facially constitutional under the substantial effects test in the\\n absence of a jurisdictional element, the law ordinarily must be di-\\n rected at some kind of commercial or economic activity and Con-\\n gress must have rationally concluded that the regulated activity in\\n the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n Applying the substantial effects test, we hold that the CTA\\n is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com-\\n merce Clause. First, on its face, the CTA regulates activity that is\\n economic in nature. It effectively prohibits anonymous corporate\\n dealings, regulates commercial entities that are active in the stream\\n of commerce, and requires them to report information related to\\n their ownership. Second, Congress rationally concluded that anon-\\n ymous corporate dealings have a substantial aggregate effect on in-\\n terstate commerce. We address each point below.\\n 1.\\n\\n We will start with whether the CTA regulates economic ac-\\n tivity. The Supreme Court has held that run-of-the-mill criminal\\n laws flunk this test. For example, criminal statutes prohibiting fire-\\n arms in school zones and gender-motivated violence are not di-\\n rected at economic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529\\n U.S. at 613, 617. But a law can regulate economic activity even if\\n the connection between the challenged law and commerce isn’t\\n airtight. It is enough that the regulated activity involves “some sort\\n of economic endeavor” with “an apparent commercial character.”\\n Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n We think the CTA is sufficiently connected to economic ac-\\n tivity to meet the first part of the substantial effects test. The law\\n applies to “corporation[s], limited liability compan[ies], or other\\n similar entit[ies].” 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11). Corporations are formed\\n when prospective shareholders exchange money, property, or\\n both, in return for stock. A corporation conducts business, realizes\\n losses or gains, pays taxes, and distributes dividends to its share-\\n holders. HOLGER SPAMANN, SCOTT HIRST & GABRIEL RAUTERBERG,\\n CORPORATIONS IN 100 PAGES 1-12 (2020); RICHARD D. FREER &\\n DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 194-96\\n (2d ed. 2018). Like corporations, LLCs offer owners protection\\n from personal liability, although profits are passed through to a\\n member’s personal income without facing corporate taxes.\\n FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 4-6 (3d ed. 2021);\\n STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP & LLCS 269 (4th\\n ed. 2024).\\n These entities are commercial by their very nature. As the\\n Supreme Court has long recognized, a corporation is never created\\n “for its own sake,” but instead exists “for the purpose of effecting\\n something else.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411\\n (1819). For-profit business entities are a means to an economic end.\\n They exist primarily to “use [their] resources and engage in activi-\\n ties designed to increase [their] profits.” MILTON FRIEDMAN,\\n CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,\\n CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419-29 (2002) (traditional fidu-\\n ciary duties require corporations to maximize profits). Aside from\\n being profit maximizers, business entities also exist to efficiently\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n pool capital and allow creditors and shareholders to invest without\\n disclosing their identities. William J. Moon, Anonymous Companies,\\n 71 DUKE L.J. 1425, 1429-32 (2022). For all these reasons, the corpo-\\n rate form is understood to be “the foundation of the modern mar-\\n ket economy.” Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost\\n Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33\\n J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 225 (2017).\\n Considering the nature of the corporate form and modern\\n business, we can safely say that the CTA facially regulates eco-\\n nomic activity. The statute is specifically directed at domestic com-\\n panies created under the laws of a state and foreign companies reg-\\n istered to do business in the United States. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A). By requiring these corporate entities to provide\\n beneficial ownership information, the CTA regulates how they op-\\n erate and the level of secrecy with which they do business. The\\n maintenance and operation of a separate corporate entity is com-\\n parable to other regulated activities the Supreme Court has found\\n commercial in nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\\n (consumption of home-grown wheat); Perez v. United States, 402\\n U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate intrastate credit transactions).\\n NSBU’s and Winkles’s own declarations emphasize the\\n point. NSBU represents tens of thousands of businesses in every\\n sector of the economy. According to NSBU, eighty percent of its\\n members fall under the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n Winkles co-owns two corporations that “manage and lease real\\n property” and generate “annual turnover of under $20 million.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Winkles Decl. at 1-2. Winkles’s two companies earn approximately\\n $8 million and $5 million in annual gross sales. Neither NSBU nor\\n Winkles has identified any reporting companies that do not engage\\n in commercial activity. That both plaintiffs are clearly economi-\\n cally active and failed to provide evidence of a non-commercial en-\\n tity regulated by the CTA is strong evidence that the statute regu-\\n lates commerce.\\n Moreover, to the extent a corporate entity is not involved in\\n commerce, the CTA’s many carveouts will likely exempt it. The\\n statute excludes trusts, banks, government agencies, public utili-\\n ties, political organizations, and nonprofits. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also exempts inactive businesses that\\n are created on or before January 1, 2020, hold no assets, and have\\n not sent or received funds exceeding $1,000 in a year. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii). Congress’s\\n decision to tailor the CTA to active businesses is further evidence\\n the statute regulates commerce on its face.\\n NSBU and Winkles make three arguments to resist this con-\\n clusion. None works.\\n First, they argue, like the district court, that the CTA regu-\\n lates the noneconomic “isolated, discrete act” of incorporation.\\n We’ll assume without deciding that this “isolated, discrete act” is\\n not itself commercial in character. Even indulging that assumption,\\n we believe the CTA’s text establishes that it does not regulate the\\n act of incorporation. Instead, the CTA regulates entities after they\\n have been incorporated. Even though the statute defines\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n “reporting company” as one “created by the filing of a document,”\\n this provision serves only to identify those entities that must com-\\n ply with the statute’s reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i). The statute in no way affects how businesses in-\\n corporate. It does not alter any relevant state law. It addresses only\\n what entities must do after they are registered to do business—pro-\\n vide beneficial owner information to the Treasury Secretary.\\n Other parts of the text confirm that the CTA is not regulat-\\n ing the act of incorporation. The statute requires existing busi-\\n nesses that have already incorporated to continue reporting\\n changes in ownership. Id. § 5336(b)(1)(D). Foreign entities regis-\\n tered to do business in the United States, but that were incorpo-\\n rated abroad, are also subject to the CTA. Id. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(ii).\\n And, as we’ve already explained above, the CTA exempts busi-\\n nesses that are not actively engaged in commerce from the report-\\n ing requirement.\\n Second, NSBU and Winkles argue that the CTA is constitu-\\n tionally infirm because it lacks a jurisdictional element. Again, we\\n disagree. A jurisdictional element “ensure[s], through case-by-case\\n inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce.”\\n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. We have held that a jurisdictional element—\\n because it allows a case-by-case assessment—immunizes criminal\\n statutes from facial challenges. United States v. Pugh, 90 F.4th 1318,\\n 1326 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 236 (2024). See also United\\n States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional\\n hook defeated facial challenge to statute prohibiting a felon from\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n possessing a firearm). But neither we nor the Supreme Court has\\n ever suggested that a jurisdictional element is necessary for an eco-\\n nomic regulation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,\\n 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a jurisdictional element was\\n unnecessary where the statute regulated economic activities hav-\\n ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In Lopez and Mor-\\n rison, for example, a case-by-case jurisdictional assessment was nec-\\n essary because the statutes facially regulated non-economic activ-\\n ity. “The absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means\\n that courts must determine independently whether the statute reg-\\n ulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commer-\\n cial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect\\n interstate commerce.” Id. (citation modified).\\n Finally, citing National Federation of Independent Business v.\\n Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), NSBU and Winkles say that the CTA\\n regulates inactivity. But the CTA does not “compel [entities] not\\n engaged in commerce” to do so. Id. at 549. Because of the tailored\\n scope of the act, it regulates entities that are active in commerce.\\n See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B), (b)(1)(B). The CTA does not regulate\\n based on an entity’s anticipated future conduct. Instead, the CTA\\n anticipates the effects on commerce of active businesses not report-\\n ing ownership information. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 557.\\n In sum, the CTA regulates economic activity on its face. Ac-\\n cordingly, the only question for its facial constitutionality under the\\n Commerce Clause is whether the intrastate economic activity it\\n regulates substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n We turn now to that second question: did Congress ration-\\n ally conclude that the regulated conduct has a substantial aggregate\\n effect on interstate commerce? We believe that it did.\\n Apart from its scope, the CTA is a routine federal law. Fed-\\n eral reporting requirements are very common. See Cal. Bankers\\n Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47 (1974) (“[P]rovisions requiring re-\\n porting or recordkeeping . . . are by no means unique.”). The\\n United States Code is replete with them. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5313\\n (requiring banks to file reports with the Secretary of the Treasury\\n whenever they are involved in cash transactions exceeding a cer-\\n tain amount); 52 U.S.C § 30104 (requiring political committees to\\n file reports of receipts and disbursements); 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (requir-\\n ing registered lobbyists to file reports with Congress that include\\n their name, a list of lobbying activities, and a list of employees). So\\n the CTA is hardly based on a “new conception[] of federal power.”\\n NFIB, 567 U.S. at 550.\\n This particular reporting requirement is an effort to curtail\\n abuses of the corporate form. In its report accompanying the CTA,\\n the House Committee on Financial Services found that anony-\\n mous ownership and the corporate form were contributing to\\n fraud. The Committee concluded that anonymous shell companies\\n “afford a high level of secrecy” to money launderers. H.R. REP. NO.\\n 116-227, at 10 (2019). The report also found that the United States\\n was not meeting international standards regarding disclosure re-\\n quirements, making it a target for money laundering. Id. at 2,11.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n In reaching these conclusions, Congress relied on input from\\n numerous national security and law enforcement experts about\\n how anonymous shell companies affect interstate and international\\n commerce. Congress held a hearing on the CTA, during which the\\n former Director of the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operation Section\\n testified that the CTA was “necessary and long overdue.” Promoting\\n Corporate Transparency: Examining Legislative Proposals to Detect and\\n Deter Financial Crimes: Hearing on H.R. 2513 Before the Subcomm. on\\n Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev., & Monetary Pol’y of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,\\n 116th Cong. 49 (2019) (statement of Dennis M. Lormel). Lormel\\n also stated that he believed reporting requirements would help re-\\n duce drug trafficking. Id. at 28. Congress heard additional testi-\\n mony in support of the CTA from law enforcement associations\\n such as the Fraternal Order of Police. The Fraternal Order said that\\n collecting beneficial ownership information would help combat\\n the threat posed by “[t]ransnational criminal organizations and ter-\\n rorist operations.” Id. at 69. Finally, an array of industry represent-\\n atives concluded the CTA would protect financial institutions of all\\n stripes from financial crime. Id. at 75-76.\\n Congress could rationally conclude that the freedom of ben-\\n eficial owners to operate anonymously through shell companies\\n had a substantial aggregate impact on interstate commerce. Con-\\n gress found that 2,000,000 corporations and LLCs are formed an-\\n nually. Congress reasonably concluded that failing to require busi-\\n nesses to report beneficial ownership information would undercut\\n its goal of regulating interstate financial crime. Indeed, it explicitly\\n found that the CTA was necessary to prevent the use of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n corporate form to commit fraud. Anti-Money Laundering Act of\\n 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5), 134 Stat. 4547, 4604 (2021).\\n Although congressional findings are not necessary, Katzen-\\n bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299, 304 (1964), and alone cannot\\n sustain Commerce Clause legislation, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614,\\n such findings may better “enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-\\n ment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate\\n commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Congress’s findings here are en-\\n titled to deference. See United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1371\\n (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “explicit findings that the proscribed\\n activity in issue substantially affected interstate commerce” are ac-\\n corded “substantial deference”). Here the connection between the\\n thing being regulated—the anonymous ownership and operation\\n of businesses—and its effect on interstate commerce is direct and\\n straightforward. Congress had a rational basis for believing that, in\\n the aggregate, the anonymous operation of businesses substan-\\n tially affected interstate commerce.\\n NSBU and Winkles resist this conclusion by citing examples\\n of hypothetical entities that engage in purely intrastate activity but\\n may still be regulated by the CTA. The existence of some edge\\n cases doesn’t help in this facial challenge. “[W]here a general regu-\\n latory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de min-\\n imis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of\\n no consequence.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz,\\n 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) (citation modified), overruled on other\\n grounds by, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). This\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n argument about corporations that are uniquely focused on intra-\\n state activity is the stuff of an as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Gonzales\\n v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Because Congress reasonably deter-\\n mined that this cumulative activity would substantially affect com-\\n merce, the existence of some purely intrastate entities does not in-\\n validate the CTA as a facial matter.\\n * * *\\n In short, the CTA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s\\n enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. Because it is\\n directed at the ownership and maintenance of corporations, it is a\\n regulation of economic activity. And Congress rationally con-\\n cluded that this activity has a substantial aggregate impact on inter-\\n state commerce.\\n B.\\n\\n Having determined that Congress had the power to enact\\n the CTA, we now ask whether the CTA facially violates any indi-\\n vidual rights amendment. A facial challenge under an individual\\n rights amendment is “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603\\n U.S. 707, 723 (2024). A plaintiff cannot succeed on such a facial chal-\\n lenge unless he “‘establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists\\n under which the [law] would be valid,’ or he shows that the law\\n lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sa-\\n lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and Washington State Grange v. Wash-\\n ington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–451 (2008)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles urge us to affirm on the ground that the\\n CTA facially violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-\\n ment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-\\n sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\\n seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. NSBU and Winkles argue that\\n the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it permits\\n suspicionless searches for general law enforcement purposes. 2 We\\n disagree.\\n The Supreme Court has previously considered Fourth\\n Amendment challenges to uniform reporting requirements. In\\n Shultz, the Court addressed a statute requiring banks to report do-\\n mestic currency transactions above a certain amount. 416 U.S. 21\\n (1974). The reports contained the “name, address, business or pro-\\n fession and social security number of the person conducting the\\n transaction,” as well as a description of the transaction itself. Id. at\\n 39 n.15. The Court upheld the statute against a Fourth Amendment\\n challenge, concluding that the regulations “do not impose unrea-\\n sonable reporting requirements on the banks.” Id. at 67. Even\\n though the law required banks to obtain information “simply be-\\n cause the Government want[ed] it,” the information was limited in\\n nature and “sufficiently related to a tenable congressional\\n\\n\\n 2 NSBU and Winkles vaguely reference First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-\\n\\n ment claims but make no argument in support of them. These arguments are\\n abandoned for purposes of appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739\\n F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (a party fails to adequately brief a claim when it\\n fails to clearly present it or refers to it only in passing).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in in-\\n terstate commerce.” Id.\\n Under this precedent, the CTA does not violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. It is a uniform reporting requirement applied to all\\n businesses that meet the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n There is nothing arbitrary or discretionary about its application. See\\n Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., Elec. & Space Div., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2\\n (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a “uniform statutory or regulatory\\n reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern re-\\n garding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy”). The infor-\\n mation it requires is “sufficiently described and limited in nature”\\n and is no more detailed than the reports in Shultz. 416 U.S. at 67.\\n The CTA also has several privacy guarantees. It permits dis-\\n closure of beneficial ownership information only upon request by\\n discrete categories of agencies under certain circumstances. 31\\n U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2). The statute requires the Secretary of the Treas-\\n ury to protect ownership information and prevent breaches of con-\\n fidentiality. Id. § 5336(c)(8). And the Comptroller General must\\n conduct periodic audits to ensure the Department of the Treasury\\n is using beneficial ownership information appropriately. Id.\\n § 5336(c)(10).\\n In support of their argument, NSBU and Winkles cite a se-\\n ries of decisions involving substantial arbitrary privacy intrusions\\n in which the government collected an array of detailed and sensi-\\n tive information. But these decisions bear no resemblance to the\\n facts of this case. Here, “[t]he inquiry is within the authority of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information\\n sought is reasonably relevant.” Shultz, 416 U.S. at 67 (quoting\\n United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). Because\\n the CTA’s disclosure requirement is reasonable, there is no Fourth\\n Amendment issue. See id.\\n IV.\\n\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226864/\", \"author_raw\": \"BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"BRASHER"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"BRASHER\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10760279/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: National Small Business United v. U.S. Department of the Treasury\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-16\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 21\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10736\n ____________________\n\n NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS UNITED,\n d.b.a. National Small Business Association,\n ISAAC WINKLES,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n versus\n\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,\n ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FINANCIAL CRIMES\n ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE\n TREASURY,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\n The question in this appeal is whether a federal law requir-\n ing corporations to report information about their owners is con-\n stitutional. Congress found that bad actors have been using the an-\n onymity of the corporate form to commit financial crimes, such as\n money laundering and financing terrorism. To prevent these anon-\n ymous business dealings, Congress passed the Corporate Transpar-\n ency Act as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Pub.\n L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4604 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336). The\n CTA requires certain corporate entities to report their “beneficial\n owners”—i.e., the actual people who exercise control over the en-\n tity—to the Department of the Treasury.\n To be constitutional, every federal law must, first, be con-\n sistent with one of Congress’s enumerated powers and, second, not\n violate any of the Constitution’s individual rights guarantees. Na-\n tional Small Business United, a business association, and Isaac Win-\n kles, a real-estate manager, argue that the CTA fails on both counts.\n As relevant here, they say that the CTA is not an appropriate exer-\n cise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and is\n therefore facially unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\n In the alternative, they say that the CTA violates the Fourth\n Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and is facially\n unconstitutional for that reason. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.\n The district court concluded that the CTA did not regulate\n economic activity and, on that basis, granted the plaintiffs sum-\n mary judgment. We disagree. We believe that, by effectively\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n prohibiting anonymous business dealings, the CTA facially regu-\n lates economic activities having a substantial aggregate impact on\n interstate commerce. Moreover, as a uniform and limited report-\n ing requirement, the CTA does not facially violate the Fourth\n Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.\n I.\n\n Financial crime is a serious problem. According to one re-\n cent estimate, money laundering costs the government billions of\n dollars every year. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY\n LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT 3 & n.1 (2024). Financial criminals\n often use shell companies to conceal their fraud and their identities.\n Id. at 53. Because most states do not require businesses to report\n information about their owners, law enforcement has long suffered\n from an information gap when fighting financial crime. H.R. REP.\n NO. 116-227, at 2 (2019).\n To combat this problem, Congress passed the CTA. In doing\n so, it made a series of findings. It found that more than 2,000,000\n corporations and limited liability companies are formed each year,\n mostly in states that do not require beneficial ownership infor-\n mation. Id. These anonymous companies sometimes abuse the cor-\n porate form to commit crimes “affecting interstate and interna-\n tional commerce.” Id. Congress therefore concluded that the CTA\n was necessary to combat securities and financial fraud. Id. Congress\n also found that uniform reporting laws would support “national se-\n curity, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to counter money\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activity.”\n Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5)(D), 134 Stat. 4604.\n The CTA provides for the “collection of beneficial owner-\n ship information” of designated reporting companies. Id. § 6402(5),\n 134 Stat. 4604. Under the law, those companies must disclose infor-\n mation about “each beneficial owner” and “each applicant” to the\n Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-\n work. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). A “reporting company”\n is a corporation, LLC, or other similar entity incorporated under\n the laws of a state, or formed under the law of a foreign country\n and registered to do business in the United States. Id. § 5336(a)(11).\n “Beneficial owner” is defined as an individual who exercises sub-\n stantial control over an entity or otherwise controls at least twenty-\n five percent of its ownership interests. Id. § 5336(a)(3)(A). “Appli-\n cant” refers to an individual who files an application to form an en-\n tity. Id. § 5336(a)(2). Reporting companies must provide FinCEN\n with their beneficial owners’ and applicants’ full legal name, date\n of birth, home or business address, and government ID. Id. §\n 5336(b)(2)(A).\n The CTA applies differently depending on when the report-\n ing company incorporates. Under the CTA and subsequent Treas-\n ury regulations, businesses created before March 26, 2025, were re-\n quired to comply with the CTA by April 25, 2025. 31 C.F.R.\n § 1010.380(a)(1)(ii); U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B). Companies formed after\n that date must file a report within thirty days of registration. 31\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(1)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(C). The reporting\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n requirement is an ongoing obligation. If there is any change with\n respect to required information previously submitted to FinCEN,\n the company must file an updated report within thirty days. 31\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(2)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D).\n The CTA contains numerous exceptions. Excluded from the\n definition of “reporting company” are banks, credit unions, bro-\n kers, investment companies, insurance companies, accounting\n firms, and 501(c) nonprofits. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B). Also ex-\n cluded are entities that employ more than twenty employees and\n make more than $5,000,000 in annual gross sales. Id.\n § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi). Entities in existence on or before January 1,\n 2020, that are not engaged in active business, are not owned by a\n foreign person, have not experienced a recent change in owner-\n ship, do not hold assets, and have not sent or received funds in an\n amount greater than $1,000 in the past year are likewise exempt.\n 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii).\n The CTA also permits the Secretary of the Treasury to pass\n regulations exempting other groups from the reporting require-\n ment. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv). After passage, FinCEN is-\n sued an interim final rule exempting domestic companies from the\n CTA’s requirements. The interim final rule still requires foreign\n companies to report ownership information except as to American\n owners. 1 See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting\n\n 1 The parties agree that this rulemaking does not render this case moot. We\n\n believe they are correct. See Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th\n Cir. 1992).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 Fed. Reg. 13688,\n 13690 (Mar. 26, 2025) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).\n The CTA was controversial from the start. See Kate Kelly,\n On Eve of Money Laundering Law’s Activation, a Lobby Cries Foul, N.Y.\n TIMES, Dec. 18, 2023, at B4. After it was enacted, NSBU and Win-\n kles sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Department of the\n Treasury, and FinCEN’s Acting Director, seeking declaratory and\n injunctive relief. NSBU represents “over 65,000 businesses and en-\n trepreneurs located in all 50 states. [Its] members come from every\n sector of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, retail, food\n service, and professional services.” McCracken Decl. at 2. Winkles\n owns a small business with three full-time employees and “annual\n turnover of under $20 million.” Winkles Decl. at 1-2.\n NSBU and Winkles claimed that the CTA is facially uncon-\n stitutional and that it violates the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\n Tenth Amendments. The parties agreed that the case could be re-\n solved on dispositive motions without discovery. They then cross-\n moved for summary judgment.\n The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-\n mary judgment and denied the defendants’ cross-motion for sum-\n mary judgment. The court held that neither the Commerce, Tax-\n ing, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, nor Congress’s foreign af-\n fairs and national security powers, justified the CTA. Regarding the\n Commerce Clause, the court ruled that the CTA primarily regu-\n lates the non-commercial act of incorporation and that the connec-\n tion between the act of incorporation and the activities Congress\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n sought to curb was too attenuated. The court also emphasized the\n CTA’s lack of any jurisdictional hook limiting its reach to interstate\n commerce. Because it held that the CTA exceeded Congress’s enu-\n merated powers, the court did not address whether it violated the\n First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.\n The government timely appealed.\n II.\n\n This Court reviews de novo the district court’s disposition of\n a motion for summary judgment. See Lowery v. AmGuard Ins. Co.,\n 90 F.4th 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 2024). We also review de novo the\n constitutionality of a challenged statute. United States v. Paige, 604\n F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2010).\n III.\n\n NSBU and Winkles advance two main arguments against\n the facial constitutionality of the CTA. First, they argue that Con-\n gress did not have the power, under the Commerce Clause or oth-\n erwise, to enact the CTA. Second, in the alternative, they argue\n that the CTA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on un-\n reasonable searches. We address each argument in turn.\n A.\n\n Turning to the Commerce Clause, we start with first princi-\n ples. Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more\n of its constitutionally enumerated powers. See Marbury v. Madison,\n 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). One of those\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n enumerated powers is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with\n foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian\n Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\n To preserve a “distinction between what is truly national\n and what is truly local,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68\n (1995), the Supreme Court has identified three categories of activ-\n ity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power:\n (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of inter-\n state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and\n (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at\n 558-59. The district court held, and the parties do not dispute, that\n the CTA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of\n commerce. Therefore, the question is whether the CTA passes\n muster under the third category: the “substantial effects” test.\n Under the substantial effects test, the Court has distin-\n guished between laws having “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or\n any sort of economic enterprise,” id. at 561, and those laws regu-\n lating “quintessentially economic” activities, Gonzales v. Raich, 545\n U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The substantial effects test is ordinarily met only\n when the underlying activity is economic in nature or where the\n statute contains a jurisdictional element linked to interstate com-\n merce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; United States v. Morrison, 529\n U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[O]ur cases have upheld Commerce Clause\n regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-\n nomic in nature.”); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511\n (11th Cir. 1997) (“have an economic character”). In short, for a law\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n to be facially constitutional under the substantial effects test in the\n absence of a jurisdictional element, the law ordinarily must be di-\n rected at some kind of commercial or economic activity and Con-\n gress must have rationally concluded that the regulated activity in\n the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce.\n Applying the substantial effects test, we hold that the CTA\n is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com-\n merce Clause. First, on its face, the CTA regulates activity that is\n economic in nature. It effectively prohibits anonymous corporate\n dealings, regulates commercial entities that are active in the stream\n of commerce, and requires them to report information related to\n their ownership. Second, Congress rationally concluded that anon-\n ymous corporate dealings have a substantial aggregate effect on in-\n terstate commerce. We address each point below.\n 1.\n\n We will start with whether the CTA regulates economic ac-\n tivity. The Supreme Court has held that run-of-the-mill criminal\n laws flunk this test. For example, criminal statutes prohibiting fire-\n arms in school zones and gender-motivated violence are not di-\n rected at economic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529\n U.S. at 613, 617. But a law can regulate economic activity even if\n the connection between the challenged law and commerce isn’t\n airtight. It is enough that the regulated activity involves “some sort\n of economic endeavor” with “an apparent commercial character.”\n Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n We think the CTA is sufficiently connected to economic ac-\n tivity to meet the first part of the substantial effects test. The law\n applies to “corporation[s], limited liability compan[ies], or other\n similar entit[ies].” 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11). Corporations are formed\n when prospective shareholders exchange money, property, or\n both, in return for stock. A corporation conducts business, realizes\n losses or gains, pays taxes, and distributes dividends to its share-\n holders. HOLGER SPAMANN, SCOTT HIRST & GABRIEL RAUTERBERG,\n CORPORATIONS IN 100 PAGES 1-12 (2020); RICHARD D. FREER &\n DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 194-96\n (2d ed. 2018). Like corporations, LLCs offer owners protection\n from personal liability, although profits are passed through to a\n member’s personal income without facing corporate taxes.\n FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 4-6 (3d ed. 2021);\n STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP & LLCS 269 (4th\n ed. 2024).\n These entities are commercial by their very nature. As the\n Supreme Court has long recognized, a corporation is never created\n “for its own sake,” but instead exists “for the purpose of effecting\n something else.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411\n (1819). For-profit business entities are a means to an economic end.\n They exist primarily to “use [their] resources and engage in activi-\n ties designed to increase [their] profits.” MILTON FRIEDMAN,\n CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,\n CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419-29 (2002) (traditional fidu-\n ciary duties require corporations to maximize profits). Aside from\n being profit maximizers, business entities also exist to efficiently\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n pool capital and allow creditors and shareholders to invest without\n disclosing their identities. William J. Moon, Anonymous Companies,\n 71 DUKE L.J. 1425, 1429-32 (2022). For all these reasons, the corpo-\n rate form is understood to be “the foundation of the modern mar-\n ket economy.” Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost\n Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33\n J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 225 (2017).\n Considering the nature of the corporate form and modern\n business, we can safely say that the CTA facially regulates eco-\n nomic activity. The statute is specifically directed at domestic com-\n panies created under the laws of a state and foreign companies reg-\n istered to do business in the United States. 31 U.S.C.\n § 5336(a)(11)(A). By requiring these corporate entities to provide\n beneficial ownership information, the CTA regulates how they op-\n erate and the level of secrecy with which they do business. The\n maintenance and operation of a separate corporate entity is com-\n parable to other regulated activities the Supreme Court has found\n commercial in nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\n (consumption of home-grown wheat); Perez v. United States, 402\n U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate intrastate credit transactions).\n NSBU’s and Winkles’s own declarations emphasize the\n point. NSBU represents tens of thousands of businesses in every\n sector of the economy. According to NSBU, eighty percent of its\n members fall under the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\n Winkles co-owns two corporations that “manage and lease real\n property” and generate “annual turnover of under $20 million.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n Winkles Decl. at 1-2. Winkles’s two companies earn approximately\n $8 million and $5 million in annual gross sales. Neither NSBU nor\n Winkles has identified any reporting companies that do not engage\n in commercial activity. That both plaintiffs are clearly economi-\n cally active and failed to provide evidence of a non-commercial en-\n tity regulated by the CTA is strong evidence that the statute regu-\n lates commerce.\n Moreover, to the extent a corporate entity is not involved in\n commerce, the CTA’s many carveouts will likely exempt it. The\n statute excludes trusts, banks, government agencies, public utili-\n ties, political organizations, and nonprofits. 31 U.S.C.\n § 5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also exempts inactive businesses that\n are created on or before January 1, 2020, hold no assets, and have\n not sent or received funds exceeding $1,000 in a year. 31 C.F.R.\n § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii). Congress’s\n decision to tailor the CTA to active businesses is further evidence\n the statute regulates commerce on its face.\n NSBU and Winkles make three arguments to resist this con-\n clusion. None works.\n First, they argue, like the district court, that the CTA regu-\n lates the noneconomic “isolated, discrete act” of incorporation.\n We’ll assume without deciding that this “isolated, discrete act” is\n not itself commercial in character. Even indulging that assumption,\n we believe the CTA’s text establishes that it does not regulate the\n act of incorporation. Instead, the CTA regulates entities after they\n have been incorporated. Even though the statute defines\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n “reporting company” as one “created by the filing of a document,”\n this provision serves only to identify those entities that must com-\n ply with the statute’s reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C.\n § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i). The statute in no way affects how businesses in-\n corporate. It does not alter any relevant state law. It addresses only\n what entities must do after they are registered to do business—pro-\n vide beneficial owner information to the Treasury Secretary.\n Other parts of the text confirm that the CTA is not regulat-\n ing the act of incorporation. The statute requires existing busi-\n nesses that have already incorporated to continue reporting\n changes in ownership. Id. § 5336(b)(1)(D). Foreign entities regis-\n tered to do business in the United States, but that were incorpo-\n rated abroad, are also subject to the CTA. Id. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(ii).\n And, as we’ve already explained above, the CTA exempts busi-\n nesses that are not actively engaged in commerce from the report-\n ing requirement.\n Second, NSBU and Winkles argue that the CTA is constitu-\n tionally infirm because it lacks a jurisdictional element. Again, we\n disagree. A jurisdictional element “ensure[s], through case-by-case\n inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce.”\n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. We have held that a jurisdictional element—\n because it allows a case-by-case assessment—immunizes criminal\n statutes from facial challenges. United States v. Pugh, 90 F.4th 1318,\n 1326 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 236 (2024). See also United\n States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional\n hook defeated facial challenge to statute prohibiting a felon from\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n possessing a firearm). But neither we nor the Supreme Court has\n ever suggested that a jurisdictional element is necessary for an eco-\n nomic regulation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,\n 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a jurisdictional element was\n unnecessary where the statute regulated economic activities hav-\n ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In Lopez and Mor-\n rison, for example, a case-by-case jurisdictional assessment was nec-\n essary because the statutes facially regulated non-economic activ-\n ity. “The absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means\n that courts must determine independently whether the statute reg-\n ulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commer-\n cial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect\n interstate commerce.” Id. (citation modified).\n Finally, citing National Federation of Independent Business v.\n Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), NSBU and Winkles say that the CTA\n regulates inactivity. But the CTA does not “compel [entities] not\n engaged in commerce” to do so. Id. at 549. Because of the tailored\n scope of the act, it regulates entities that are active in commerce.\n See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B), (b)(1)(B). The CTA does not regulate\n based on an entity’s anticipated future conduct. Instead, the CTA\n anticipates the effects on commerce of active businesses not report-\n ing ownership information. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 557.\n In sum, the CTA regulates economic activity on its face. Ac-\n cordingly, the only question for its facial constitutionality under the\n Commerce Clause is whether the intrastate economic activity it\n regulates substantially affects interstate commerce.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n 2.\n\n We turn now to that second question: did Congress ration-\n ally conclude that the regulated conduct has a substantial aggregate\n effect on interstate commerce? We believe that it did.\n Apart from its scope, the CTA is a routine federal law. Fed-\n eral reporting requirements are very common. See Cal. Bankers\n Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47 (1974) (“[P]rovisions requiring re-\n porting or recordkeeping . . . are by no means unique.”). The\n United States Code is replete with them. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5313\n (requiring banks to file reports with the Secretary of the Treasury\n whenever they are involved in cash transactions exceeding a cer-\n tain amount); 52 U.S.C § 30104 (requiring political committees to\n file reports of receipts and disbursements); 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (requir-\n ing registered lobbyists to file reports with Congress that include\n their name, a list of lobbying activities, and a list of employees). So\n the CTA is hardly based on a “new conception[] of federal power.”\n NFIB, 567 U.S. at 550.\n This particular reporting requirement is an effort to curtail\n abuses of the corporate form. In its report accompanying the CTA,\n the House Committee on Financial Services found that anony-\n mous ownership and the corporate form were contributing to\n fraud. The Committee concluded that anonymous shell companies\n “afford a high level of secrecy” to money launderers. H.R. REP. NO.\n 116-227, at 10 (2019). The report also found that the United States\n was not meeting international standards regarding disclosure re-\n quirements, making it a target for money laundering. Id. at 2,11.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n In reaching these conclusions, Congress relied on input from\n numerous national security and law enforcement experts about\n how anonymous shell companies affect interstate and international\n commerce. Congress held a hearing on the CTA, during which the\n former Director of the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operation Section\n testified that the CTA was “necessary and long overdue.” Promoting\n Corporate Transparency: Examining Legislative Proposals to Detect and\n Deter Financial Crimes: Hearing on H.R. 2513 Before the Subcomm. on\n Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev., & Monetary Pol’y of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,\n 116th Cong. 49 (2019) (statement of Dennis M. Lormel). Lormel\n also stated that he believed reporting requirements would help re-\n duce drug trafficking. Id. at 28. Congress heard additional testi-\n mony in support of the CTA from law enforcement associations\n such as the Fraternal Order of Police. The Fraternal Order said that\n collecting beneficial ownership information would help combat\n the threat posed by “[t]ransnational criminal organizations and ter-\n rorist operations.” Id. at 69. Finally, an array of industry represent-\n atives concluded the CTA would protect financial institutions of all\n stripes from financial crime. Id. at 75-76.\n Congress could rationally conclude that the freedom of ben-\n eficial owners to operate anonymously through shell companies\n had a substantial aggregate impact on interstate commerce. Con-\n gress found that 2,000,000 corporations and LLCs are formed an-\n nually. Congress reasonably concluded that failing to require busi-\n nesses to report beneficial ownership information would undercut\n its goal of regulating interstate financial crime. Indeed, it explicitly\n found that the CTA was necessary to prevent the use of the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n corporate form to commit fraud. Anti-Money Laundering Act of\n 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5), 134 Stat. 4547, 4604 (2021).\n Although congressional findings are not necessary, Katzen-\n bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299, 304 (1964), and alone cannot\n sustain Commerce Clause legislation, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614,\n such findings may better “enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-\n ment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate\n commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Congress’s findings here are en-\n titled to deference. See United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1371\n (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “explicit findings that the proscribed\n activity in issue substantially affected interstate commerce” are ac-\n corded “substantial deference”). Here the connection between the\n thing being regulated—the anonymous ownership and operation\n of businesses—and its effect on interstate commerce is direct and\n straightforward. Congress had a rational basis for believing that, in\n the aggregate, the anonymous operation of businesses substan-\n tially affected interstate commerce.\n NSBU and Winkles resist this conclusion by citing examples\n of hypothetical entities that engage in purely intrastate activity but\n may still be regulated by the CTA. The existence of some edge\n cases doesn’t help in this facial challenge. “[W]here a general regu-\n latory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de min-\n imis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of\n no consequence.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz,\n 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) (citation modified), overruled on other\n grounds by, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). This\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n argument about corporations that are uniquely focused on intra-\n state activity is the stuff of an as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Gonzales\n v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Because Congress reasonably deter-\n mined that this cumulative activity would substantially affect com-\n merce, the existence of some purely intrastate entities does not in-\n validate the CTA as a facial matter.\n * * *\n In short, the CTA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s\n enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. Because it is\n directed at the ownership and maintenance of corporations, it is a\n regulation of economic activity. And Congress rationally con-\n cluded that this activity has a substantial aggregate impact on inter-\n state commerce.\n B.\n\n Having determined that Congress had the power to enact\n the CTA, we now ask whether the CTA facially violates any indi-\n vidual rights amendment. A facial challenge under an individual\n rights amendment is “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603\n U.S. 707, 723 (2024). A plaintiff cannot succeed on such a facial chal-\n lenge unless he “‘establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists\n under which the [law] would be valid,’ or he shows that the law\n lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sa-\n lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and Washington State Grange v. Wash-\n ington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–451 (2008)).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n NSBU and Winkles urge us to affirm on the ground that the\n CTA facially violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-\n ment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-\n sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\n seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. NSBU and Winkles argue that\n the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it permits\n suspicionless searches for general law enforcement purposes. 2 We\n disagree.\n The Supreme Court has previously considered Fourth\n Amendment challenges to uniform reporting requirements. In\n Shultz, the Court addressed a statute requiring banks to report do-\n mestic currency transactions above a certain amount. 416 U.S. 21\n (1974). The reports contained the “name, address, business or pro-\n fession and social security number of the person conducting the\n transaction,” as well as a description of the transaction itself. Id. at\n 39 n.15. The Court upheld the statute against a Fourth Amendment\n challenge, concluding that the regulations “do not impose unrea-\n sonable reporting requirements on the banks.” Id. at 67. Even\n though the law required banks to obtain information “simply be-\n cause the Government want[ed] it,” the information was limited in\n nature and “sufficiently related to a tenable congressional\n\n\n 2 NSBU and Winkles vaguely reference First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-\n\n ment claims but make no argument in support of them. These arguments are\n abandoned for purposes of appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739\n F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (a party fails to adequately brief a claim when it\n fails to clearly present it or refers to it only in passing).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\n\n determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in in-\n terstate commerce.” Id.\n Under this precedent, the CTA does not violate the Fourth\n Amendment. It is a uniform reporting requirement applied to all\n businesses that meet the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\n There is nothing arbitrary or discretionary about its application. See\n Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., Elec. & Space Div., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2\n (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a “uniform statutory or regulatory\n reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern re-\n garding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy”). The infor-\n mation it requires is “sufficiently described and limited in nature”\n and is no more detailed than the reports in Shultz. 416 U.S. at 67.\n The CTA also has several privacy guarantees. It permits dis-\n closure of beneficial ownership information only upon request by\n discrete categories of agencies under certain circumstances. 31\n U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2). The statute requires the Secretary of the Treas-\n ury to protect ownership information and prevent breaches of con-\n fidentiality. Id. § 5336(c)(8). And the Comptroller General must\n conduct periodic audits to ensure the Department of the Treasury\n is using beneficial ownership information appropriately. Id.\n § 5336(c)(10).\n In support of their argument, NSBU and Winkles cite a se-\n ries of decisions involving substantial arbitrary privacy intrusions\n in which the government collected an array of detailed and sensi-\n tive information. But these decisions bear no resemblance to the\n facts of this case. Here, “[t]he inquiry is within the authority of the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 21\n\n\n\n\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information\n sought is reasonably relevant.” Shultz, 416 U.S. at 67 (quoting\n United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). Because\n the CTA’s disclosure requirement is reasonable, there is no Fourth\n Amendment issue. See id.\n IV.\n\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings con-\n sistent with this opinion.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: National Small Business United v. U.S. Department of the Treasury\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-16\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10736\\n ____________________\\n\\n NATIONAL SMALL BUSINESS UNITED,\\n d.b.a. National Small Business Association,\\n ISAAC WINKLES,\\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\\n versus\\n\\n U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,\\n ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE FINANCIAL CRIMES\\n ENFORCEMENT NETWORK,\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE\\n TREASURY,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-01448-LCB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 2 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n BRASHER, Circuit Judge:\\n The question in this appeal is whether a federal law requir-\\n ing corporations to report information about their owners is con-\\n stitutional. Congress found that bad actors have been using the an-\\n onymity of the corporate form to commit financial crimes, such as\\n money laundering and financing terrorism. To prevent these anon-\\n ymous business dealings, Congress passed the Corporate Transpar-\\n ency Act as part of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020. Pub.\\n L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4604 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5336). The\\n CTA requires certain corporate entities to report their “beneficial\\n owners”—i.e., the actual people who exercise control over the en-\\n tity—to the Department of the Treasury.\\n To be constitutional, every federal law must, first, be con-\\n sistent with one of Congress’s enumerated powers and, second, not\\n violate any of the Constitution’s individual rights guarantees. Na-\\n tional Small Business United, a business association, and Isaac Win-\\n kles, a real-estate manager, argue that the CTA fails on both counts.\\n As relevant here, they say that the CTA is not an appropriate exer-\\n cise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce and is\\n therefore facially unconstitutional. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n In the alternative, they say that the CTA violates the Fourth\\n Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and is facially\\n unconstitutional for that reason. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.\\n The district court concluded that the CTA did not regulate\\n economic activity and, on that basis, granted the plaintiffs sum-\\n mary judgment. We disagree. We believe that, by effectively\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 3 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n prohibiting anonymous business dealings, the CTA facially regu-\\n lates economic activities having a substantial aggregate impact on\\n interstate commerce. Moreover, as a uniform and limited report-\\n ing requirement, the CTA does not facially violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse.\\n I.\\n\\n Financial crime is a serious problem. According to one re-\\n cent estimate, money laundering costs the government billions of\\n dollars every year. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NATIONAL MONEY\\n LAUNDERING RISK ASSESSMENT 3 & n.1 (2024). Financial criminals\\n often use shell companies to conceal their fraud and their identities.\\n Id. at 53. Because most states do not require businesses to report\\n information about their owners, law enforcement has long suffered\\n from an information gap when fighting financial crime. H.R. REP.\\n NO. 116-227, at 2 (2019).\\n To combat this problem, Congress passed the CTA. In doing\\n so, it made a series of findings. It found that more than 2,000,000\\n corporations and limited liability companies are formed each year,\\n mostly in states that do not require beneficial ownership infor-\\n mation. Id. These anonymous companies sometimes abuse the cor-\\n porate form to commit crimes “affecting interstate and interna-\\n tional commerce.” Id. Congress therefore concluded that the CTA\\n was necessary to combat securities and financial fraud. Id. Congress\\n also found that uniform reporting laws would support “national se-\\n curity, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts to counter money\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 4 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n laundering, the financing of terrorism, and other illicit activity.”\\n Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5)(D), 134 Stat. 4604.\\n The CTA provides for the “collection of beneficial owner-\\n ship information” of designated reporting companies. Id. § 6402(5),\\n 134 Stat. 4604. Under the law, those companies must disclose infor-\\n mation about “each beneficial owner” and “each applicant” to the\\n Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-\\n work. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A). A “reporting company”\\n is a corporation, LLC, or other similar entity incorporated under\\n the laws of a state, or formed under the law of a foreign country\\n and registered to do business in the United States. Id. § 5336(a)(11).\\n “Beneficial owner” is defined as an individual who exercises sub-\\n stantial control over an entity or otherwise controls at least twenty-\\n five percent of its ownership interests. Id. § 5336(a)(3)(A). “Appli-\\n cant” refers to an individual who files an application to form an en-\\n tity. Id. § 5336(a)(2). Reporting companies must provide FinCEN\\n with their beneficial owners’ and applicants’ full legal name, date\\n of birth, home or business address, and government ID. Id. §\\n 5336(b)(2)(A).\\n The CTA applies differently depending on when the report-\\n ing company incorporates. Under the CTA and subsequent Treas-\\n ury regulations, businesses created before March 26, 2025, were re-\\n quired to comply with the CTA by April 25, 2025. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(a)(1)(ii); U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(B). Companies formed after\\n that date must file a report within thirty days of registration. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(1)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(C). The reporting\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 5 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n requirement is an ongoing obligation. If there is any change with\\n respect to required information previously submitted to FinCEN,\\n the company must file an updated report within thirty days. 31\\n C.F.R. § 1010.380(a)(2)(i); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(b)(1)(D).\\n The CTA contains numerous exceptions. Excluded from the\\n definition of “reporting company” are banks, credit unions, bro-\\n kers, investment companies, insurance companies, accounting\\n firms, and 501(c) nonprofits. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B). Also ex-\\n cluded are entities that employ more than twenty employees and\\n make more than $5,000,000 in annual gross sales. Id.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxi). Entities in existence on or before January 1,\\n 2020, that are not engaged in active business, are not owned by a\\n foreign person, have not experienced a recent change in owner-\\n ship, do not hold assets, and have not sent or received funds in an\\n amount greater than $1,000 in the past year are likewise exempt.\\n 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii).\\n The CTA also permits the Secretary of the Treasury to pass\\n regulations exempting other groups from the reporting require-\\n ment. 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiv). After passage, FinCEN is-\\n sued an interim final rule exempting domestic companies from the\\n CTA’s requirements. The interim final rule still requires foreign\\n companies to report ownership information except as to American\\n owners. 1 See Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting\\n\\n 1 The parties agree that this rulemaking does not render this case moot. We\\n\\n believe they are correct. See Naturist Soc’y v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th\\n Cir. 1992).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 6 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Requirement Revision and Deadline Extension, 90 Fed. Reg. 13688,\\n 13690 (Mar. 26, 2025) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).\\n The CTA was controversial from the start. See Kate Kelly,\\n On Eve of Money Laundering Law’s Activation, a Lobby Cries Foul, N.Y.\\n TIMES, Dec. 18, 2023, at B4. After it was enacted, NSBU and Win-\\n kles sued the Secretary of the Treasury, the Department of the\\n Treasury, and FinCEN’s Acting Director, seeking declaratory and\\n injunctive relief. NSBU represents “over 65,000 businesses and en-\\n trepreneurs located in all 50 states. [Its] members come from every\\n sector of the U.S. economy, including manufacturing, retail, food\\n service, and professional services.” McCracken Decl. at 2. Winkles\\n owns a small business with three full-time employees and “annual\\n turnover of under $20 million.” Winkles Decl. at 1-2.\\n NSBU and Winkles claimed that the CTA is facially uncon-\\n stitutional and that it violates the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and\\n Tenth Amendments. The parties agreed that the case could be re-\\n solved on dispositive motions without discovery. They then cross-\\n moved for summary judgment.\\n The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-\\n mary judgment and denied the defendants’ cross-motion for sum-\\n mary judgment. The court held that neither the Commerce, Tax-\\n ing, and Necessary and Proper Clauses, nor Congress’s foreign af-\\n fairs and national security powers, justified the CTA. Regarding the\\n Commerce Clause, the court ruled that the CTA primarily regu-\\n lates the non-commercial act of incorporation and that the connec-\\n tion between the act of incorporation and the activities Congress\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 7 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n sought to curb was too attenuated. The court also emphasized the\\n CTA’s lack of any jurisdictional hook limiting its reach to interstate\\n commerce. Because it held that the CTA exceeded Congress’s enu-\\n merated powers, the court did not address whether it violated the\\n First, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments.\\n The government timely appealed.\\n II.\\n\\n This Court reviews de novo the district court’s disposition of\\n a motion for summary judgment. See Lowery v. AmGuard Ins. Co.,\\n 90 F.4th 1098, 1103 (11th Cir. 2024). We also review de novo the\\n constitutionality of a challenged statute. United States v. Paige, 604\\n F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n III.\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles advance two main arguments against\\n the facial constitutionality of the CTA. First, they argue that Con-\\n gress did not have the power, under the Commerce Clause or oth-\\n erwise, to enact the CTA. Second, in the alternative, they argue\\n that the CTA violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on un-\\n reasonable searches. We address each argument in turn.\\n A.\\n\\n Turning to the Commerce Clause, we start with first princi-\\n ples. Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more\\n of its constitutionally enumerated powers. See Marbury v. Madison,\\n 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). One of those\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 8 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n enumerated powers is the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with\\n foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian\\n Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.\\n To preserve a “distinction between what is truly national\\n and what is truly local,” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68\\n (1995), the Supreme Court has identified three categories of activ-\\n ity that Congress may regulate under its Commerce Clause power:\\n (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of inter-\\n state commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and\\n (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at\\n 558-59. The district court held, and the parties do not dispute, that\\n the CTA does not regulate the channels or instrumentalities of\\n commerce. Therefore, the question is whether the CTA passes\\n muster under the third category: the “substantial effects” test.\\n Under the substantial effects test, the Court has distin-\\n guished between laws having “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or\\n any sort of economic enterprise,” id. at 561, and those laws regu-\\n lating “quintessentially economic” activities, Gonzales v. Raich, 545\\n U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The substantial effects test is ordinarily met only\\n when the underlying activity is economic in nature or where the\\n statute contains a jurisdictional element linked to interstate com-\\n merce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61; United States v. Morrison, 529\\n U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“[O]ur cases have upheld Commerce Clause\\n regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is eco-\\n nomic in nature.”); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1511\\n (11th Cir. 1997) (“have an economic character”). In short, for a law\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 9 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n to be facially constitutional under the substantial effects test in the\\n absence of a jurisdictional element, the law ordinarily must be di-\\n rected at some kind of commercial or economic activity and Con-\\n gress must have rationally concluded that the regulated activity in\\n the aggregate substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n Applying the substantial effects test, we hold that the CTA\\n is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com-\\n merce Clause. First, on its face, the CTA regulates activity that is\\n economic in nature. It effectively prohibits anonymous corporate\\n dealings, regulates commercial entities that are active in the stream\\n of commerce, and requires them to report information related to\\n their ownership. Second, Congress rationally concluded that anon-\\n ymous corporate dealings have a substantial aggregate effect on in-\\n terstate commerce. We address each point below.\\n 1.\\n\\n We will start with whether the CTA regulates economic ac-\\n tivity. The Supreme Court has held that run-of-the-mill criminal\\n laws flunk this test. For example, criminal statutes prohibiting fire-\\n arms in school zones and gender-motivated violence are not di-\\n rected at economic activity. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; Morrison, 529\\n U.S. at 613, 617. But a law can regulate economic activity even if\\n the connection between the challenged law and commerce isn’t\\n airtight. It is enough that the regulated activity involves “some sort\\n of economic endeavor” with “an apparent commercial character.”\\n Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 & n.4.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 10 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n We think the CTA is sufficiently connected to economic ac-\\n tivity to meet the first part of the substantial effects test. The law\\n applies to “corporation[s], limited liability compan[ies], or other\\n similar entit[ies].” 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11). Corporations are formed\\n when prospective shareholders exchange money, property, or\\n both, in return for stock. A corporation conducts business, realizes\\n losses or gains, pays taxes, and distributes dividends to its share-\\n holders. HOLGER SPAMANN, SCOTT HIRST & GABRIEL RAUTERBERG,\\n CORPORATIONS IN 100 PAGES 1-12 (2020); RICHARD D. FREER &\\n DOUGLAS K. MOLL, PRINCIPLES OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 194-96\\n (2d ed. 2018). Like corporations, LLCs offer owners protection\\n from personal liability, although profits are passed through to a\\n member’s personal income without facing corporate taxes.\\n FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 4-6 (3d ed. 2021);\\n STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP & LLCS 269 (4th\\n ed. 2024).\\n These entities are commercial by their very nature. As the\\n Supreme Court has long recognized, a corporation is never created\\n “for its own sake,” but instead exists “for the purpose of effecting\\n something else.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411\\n (1819). For-profit business entities are a means to an economic end.\\n They exist primarily to “use [their] resources and engage in activi-\\n ties designed to increase [their] profits.” MILTON FRIEDMAN,\\n CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,\\n CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 419-29 (2002) (traditional fidu-\\n ciary duties require corporations to maximize profits). Aside from\\n being profit maximizers, business entities also exist to efficiently\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 11 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n pool capital and allow creditors and shareholders to invest without\\n disclosing their identities. William J. Moon, Anonymous Companies,\\n 71 DUKE L.J. 1425, 1429-32 (2022). For all these reasons, the corpo-\\n rate form is understood to be “the foundation of the modern mar-\\n ket economy.” Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost\\n Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33\\n J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 225 (2017).\\n Considering the nature of the corporate form and modern\\n business, we can safely say that the CTA facially regulates eco-\\n nomic activity. The statute is specifically directed at domestic com-\\n panies created under the laws of a state and foreign companies reg-\\n istered to do business in the United States. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A). By requiring these corporate entities to provide\\n beneficial ownership information, the CTA regulates how they op-\\n erate and the level of secrecy with which they do business. The\\n maintenance and operation of a separate corporate entity is com-\\n parable to other regulated activities the Supreme Court has found\\n commercial in nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)\\n (consumption of home-grown wheat); Perez v. United States, 402\\n U.S. 146 (1971) (extortionate intrastate credit transactions).\\n NSBU’s and Winkles’s own declarations emphasize the\\n point. NSBU represents tens of thousands of businesses in every\\n sector of the economy. According to NSBU, eighty percent of its\\n members fall under the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n Winkles co-owns two corporations that “manage and lease real\\n property” and generate “annual turnover of under $20 million.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 12 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n Winkles Decl. at 1-2. Winkles’s two companies earn approximately\\n $8 million and $5 million in annual gross sales. Neither NSBU nor\\n Winkles has identified any reporting companies that do not engage\\n in commercial activity. That both plaintiffs are clearly economi-\\n cally active and failed to provide evidence of a non-commercial en-\\n tity regulated by the CTA is strong evidence that the statute regu-\\n lates commerce.\\n Moreover, to the extent a corporate entity is not involved in\\n commerce, the CTA’s many carveouts will likely exempt it. The\\n statute excludes trusts, banks, government agencies, public utili-\\n ties, political organizations, and nonprofits. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(B). The CTA also exempts inactive businesses that\\n are created on or before January 1, 2020, hold no assets, and have\\n not sent or received funds exceeding $1,000 in a year. 31 C.F.R.\\n § 1010.380(c)(2)(xxiii); 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B)(xxiii). Congress’s\\n decision to tailor the CTA to active businesses is further evidence\\n the statute regulates commerce on its face.\\n NSBU and Winkles make three arguments to resist this con-\\n clusion. None works.\\n First, they argue, like the district court, that the CTA regu-\\n lates the noneconomic “isolated, discrete act” of incorporation.\\n We’ll assume without deciding that this “isolated, discrete act” is\\n not itself commercial in character. Even indulging that assumption,\\n we believe the CTA’s text establishes that it does not regulate the\\n act of incorporation. Instead, the CTA regulates entities after they\\n have been incorporated. Even though the statute defines\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 13 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n “reporting company” as one “created by the filing of a document,”\\n this provision serves only to identify those entities that must com-\\n ply with the statute’s reporting requirements. 31 U.S.C.\\n § 5336(a)(11)(A)(i). The statute in no way affects how businesses in-\\n corporate. It does not alter any relevant state law. It addresses only\\n what entities must do after they are registered to do business—pro-\\n vide beneficial owner information to the Treasury Secretary.\\n Other parts of the text confirm that the CTA is not regulat-\\n ing the act of incorporation. The statute requires existing busi-\\n nesses that have already incorporated to continue reporting\\n changes in ownership. Id. § 5336(b)(1)(D). Foreign entities regis-\\n tered to do business in the United States, but that were incorpo-\\n rated abroad, are also subject to the CTA. Id. § 5336(a)(11)(A)(ii).\\n And, as we’ve already explained above, the CTA exempts busi-\\n nesses that are not actively engaged in commerce from the report-\\n ing requirement.\\n Second, NSBU and Winkles argue that the CTA is constitu-\\n tionally infirm because it lacks a jurisdictional element. Again, we\\n disagree. A jurisdictional element “ensure[s], through case-by-case\\n inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce.”\\n Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. We have held that a jurisdictional element—\\n because it allows a case-by-case assessment—immunizes criminal\\n statutes from facial challenges. United States v. Pugh, 90 F.4th 1318,\\n 1326 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 236 (2024). See also United\\n States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (jurisdictional\\n hook defeated facial challenge to statute prohibiting a felon from\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 14 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n possessing a firearm). But neither we nor the Supreme Court has\\n ever suggested that a jurisdictional element is necessary for an eco-\\n nomic regulation. See United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,\\n 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that a jurisdictional element was\\n unnecessary where the statute regulated economic activities hav-\\n ing a substantial effect on interstate commerce). In Lopez and Mor-\\n rison, for example, a case-by-case jurisdictional assessment was nec-\\n essary because the statutes facially regulated non-economic activ-\\n ity. “The absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means\\n that courts must determine independently whether the statute reg-\\n ulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commer-\\n cial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect\\n interstate commerce.” Id. (citation modified).\\n Finally, citing National Federation of Independent Business v.\\n Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), NSBU and Winkles say that the CTA\\n regulates inactivity. But the CTA does not “compel [entities] not\\n engaged in commerce” to do so. Id. at 549. Because of the tailored\\n scope of the act, it regulates entities that are active in commerce.\\n See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(B), (b)(1)(B). The CTA does not regulate\\n based on an entity’s anticipated future conduct. Instead, the CTA\\n anticipates the effects on commerce of active businesses not report-\\n ing ownership information. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 557.\\n In sum, the CTA regulates economic activity on its face. Ac-\\n cordingly, the only question for its facial constitutionality under the\\n Commerce Clause is whether the intrastate economic activity it\\n regulates substantially affects interstate commerce.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 15 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n 2.\\n\\n We turn now to that second question: did Congress ration-\\n ally conclude that the regulated conduct has a substantial aggregate\\n effect on interstate commerce? We believe that it did.\\n Apart from its scope, the CTA is a routine federal law. Fed-\\n eral reporting requirements are very common. See Cal. Bankers\\n Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 47 (1974) (“[P]rovisions requiring re-\\n porting or recordkeeping . . . are by no means unique.”). The\\n United States Code is replete with them. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5313\\n (requiring banks to file reports with the Secretary of the Treasury\\n whenever they are involved in cash transactions exceeding a cer-\\n tain amount); 52 U.S.C § 30104 (requiring political committees to\\n file reports of receipts and disbursements); 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (requir-\\n ing registered lobbyists to file reports with Congress that include\\n their name, a list of lobbying activities, and a list of employees). So\\n the CTA is hardly based on a “new conception[] of federal power.”\\n NFIB, 567 U.S. at 550.\\n This particular reporting requirement is an effort to curtail\\n abuses of the corporate form. In its report accompanying the CTA,\\n the House Committee on Financial Services found that anony-\\n mous ownership and the corporate form were contributing to\\n fraud. The Committee concluded that anonymous shell companies\\n “afford a high level of secrecy” to money launderers. H.R. REP. NO.\\n 116-227, at 10 (2019). The report also found that the United States\\n was not meeting international standards regarding disclosure re-\\n quirements, making it a target for money laundering. Id. at 2,11.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 16 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n In reaching these conclusions, Congress relied on input from\\n numerous national security and law enforcement experts about\\n how anonymous shell companies affect interstate and international\\n commerce. Congress held a hearing on the CTA, during which the\\n former Director of the FBI’s Terrorist Financing Operation Section\\n testified that the CTA was “necessary and long overdue.” Promoting\\n Corporate Transparency: Examining Legislative Proposals to Detect and\\n Deter Financial Crimes: Hearing on H.R. 2513 Before the Subcomm. on\\n Nat’l Sec., Int’l Dev., & Monetary Pol’y of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,\\n 116th Cong. 49 (2019) (statement of Dennis M. Lormel). Lormel\\n also stated that he believed reporting requirements would help re-\\n duce drug trafficking. Id. at 28. Congress heard additional testi-\\n mony in support of the CTA from law enforcement associations\\n such as the Fraternal Order of Police. The Fraternal Order said that\\n collecting beneficial ownership information would help combat\\n the threat posed by “[t]ransnational criminal organizations and ter-\\n rorist operations.” Id. at 69. Finally, an array of industry represent-\\n atives concluded the CTA would protect financial institutions of all\\n stripes from financial crime. Id. at 75-76.\\n Congress could rationally conclude that the freedom of ben-\\n eficial owners to operate anonymously through shell companies\\n had a substantial aggregate impact on interstate commerce. Con-\\n gress found that 2,000,000 corporations and LLCs are formed an-\\n nually. Congress reasonably concluded that failing to require busi-\\n nesses to report beneficial ownership information would undercut\\n its goal of regulating interstate financial crime. Indeed, it explicitly\\n found that the CTA was necessary to prevent the use of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 17 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n corporate form to commit fraud. Anti-Money Laundering Act of\\n 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6402(5), 134 Stat. 4547, 4604 (2021).\\n Although congressional findings are not necessary, Katzen-\\n bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299, 304 (1964), and alone cannot\\n sustain Commerce Clause legislation, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614,\\n such findings may better “enable us to evaluate the legislative judg-\\n ment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate\\n commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. Congress’s findings here are en-\\n titled to deference. See United States v. Viscome, 144 F.3d 1365, 1371\\n (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that “explicit findings that the proscribed\\n activity in issue substantially affected interstate commerce” are ac-\\n corded “substantial deference”). Here the connection between the\\n thing being regulated—the anonymous ownership and operation\\n of businesses—and its effect on interstate commerce is direct and\\n straightforward. Congress had a rational basis for believing that, in\\n the aggregate, the anonymous operation of businesses substan-\\n tially affected interstate commerce.\\n NSBU and Winkles resist this conclusion by citing examples\\n of hypothetical entities that engage in purely intrastate activity but\\n may still be regulated by the CTA. The existence of some edge\\n cases doesn’t help in this facial challenge. “[W]here a general regu-\\n latory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de min-\\n imis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of\\n no consequence.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz,\\n 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968) (citation modified), overruled on other\\n grounds by, Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). This\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 18 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n argument about corporations that are uniquely focused on intra-\\n state activity is the stuff of an as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Gonzales\\n v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Because Congress reasonably deter-\\n mined that this cumulative activity would substantially affect com-\\n merce, the existence of some purely intrastate entities does not in-\\n validate the CTA as a facial matter.\\n * * *\\n In short, the CTA is a constitutional exercise of Congress’s\\n enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. Because it is\\n directed at the ownership and maintenance of corporations, it is a\\n regulation of economic activity. And Congress rationally con-\\n cluded that this activity has a substantial aggregate impact on inter-\\n state commerce.\\n B.\\n\\n Having determined that Congress had the power to enact\\n the CTA, we now ask whether the CTA facially violates any indi-\\n vidual rights amendment. A facial challenge under an individual\\n rights amendment is “hard to win.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603\\n U.S. 707, 723 (2024). A plaintiff cannot succeed on such a facial chal-\\n lenge unless he “‘establish[es] that no set of circumstances exists\\n under which the [law] would be valid,’ or he shows that the law\\n lacks a ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sa-\\n lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) and Washington State Grange v. Wash-\\n ington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450–451 (2008)).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 19 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n NSBU and Winkles urge us to affirm on the ground that the\\n CTA facially violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amend-\\n ment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-\\n sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and\\n seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. NSBU and Winkles argue that\\n the reporting requirement is unconstitutional because it permits\\n suspicionless searches for general law enforcement purposes. 2 We\\n disagree.\\n The Supreme Court has previously considered Fourth\\n Amendment challenges to uniform reporting requirements. In\\n Shultz, the Court addressed a statute requiring banks to report do-\\n mestic currency transactions above a certain amount. 416 U.S. 21\\n (1974). The reports contained the “name, address, business or pro-\\n fession and social security number of the person conducting the\\n transaction,” as well as a description of the transaction itself. Id. at\\n 39 n.15. The Court upheld the statute against a Fourth Amendment\\n challenge, concluding that the regulations “do not impose unrea-\\n sonable reporting requirements on the banks.” Id. at 67. Even\\n though the law required banks to obtain information “simply be-\\n cause the Government want[ed] it,” the information was limited in\\n nature and “sufficiently related to a tenable congressional\\n\\n\\n 2 NSBU and Winkles vaguely reference First, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amend-\\n\\n ment claims but make no argument in support of them. These arguments are\\n abandoned for purposes of appeal. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739\\n F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (a party fails to adequately brief a claim when it\\n fails to clearly present it or refers to it only in passing).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 20 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10736\\n\\n determination as to improper use of transactions of that type in in-\\n terstate commerce.” Id.\\n Under this precedent, the CTA does not violate the Fourth\\n Amendment. It is a uniform reporting requirement applied to all\\n businesses that meet the CTA’s definition of “reporting company.”\\n There is nothing arbitrary or discretionary about its application. See\\n Brock v. Emerson Elec. Co., Elec. & Space Div., 834 F.2d 994, 996 n.2\\n (11th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a “uniform statutory or regulatory\\n reporting requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment concern re-\\n garding the potential for arbitrary invasions of privacy”). The infor-\\n mation it requires is “sufficiently described and limited in nature”\\n and is no more detailed than the reports in Shultz. 416 U.S. at 67.\\n The CTA also has several privacy guarantees. It permits dis-\\n closure of beneficial ownership information only upon request by\\n discrete categories of agencies under certain circumstances. 31\\n U.S.C. § 5336(c)(2). The statute requires the Secretary of the Treas-\\n ury to protect ownership information and prevent breaches of con-\\n fidentiality. Id. § 5336(c)(8). And the Comptroller General must\\n conduct periodic audits to ensure the Department of the Treasury\\n is using beneficial ownership information appropriately. Id.\\n § 5336(c)(10).\\n In support of their argument, NSBU and Winkles cite a se-\\n ries of decisions involving substantial arbitrary privacy intrusions\\n in which the government collected an array of detailed and sensi-\\n tive information. But these decisions bear no resemblance to the\\n facts of this case. Here, “[t]he inquiry is within the authority of the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 21 of 21\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10736 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information\\n sought is reasonably relevant.” Shultz, 416 U.S. at 67 (quoting\\n United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)). Because\\n the CTA’s disclosure requirement is reasonable, there is no Fourth\\n Amendment issue. See id.\\n IV.\\n\\n We REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings con-\\n sistent with this opinion.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30978,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10760278,"string":"10,760,278"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Sharon Keegan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-17"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"22-13019"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"GRANT, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 22-13019\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n SHARON ELIZABETH KEEGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00045-RSB-CLR-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides a hearsay\\n exception for a statement that is “made for—and is reasonably\\n pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment.” Sharon Keegan,\\n who took naked pictures and videos of her fourteen-year-old sister\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n and then sent them to her husband (both at his request and as a\\n special “surprise”), attempted to use this Rule to solve her main\\n problem at trial—getting her story out without also getting on the\\n stand.\\n The crux of Keegan’s defense was that she took the photos\\n under duress because her husband was abusing her. Of course,\\n getting on the witness stand and explaining that for herself would\\n have opened her up to cross-examination, a prospect that few\\n defendants relish. But perhaps, Keegan thought, if she told her\\n story to a medical expert witness that expert could share her\\n allegations with the jury, and she would be spared the risks of cross-\\n examination.\\n This approach is exactly what the hearsay rules seek to\\n prevent, and we reject the attempt to end-run the Rules of\\n Evidence. Between the plain text of Rule 803(4), the background\\n of the traditional rules regarding medical testimony, and the\\n district court’s factual findings in this case, we agree with the\\n district court that because Keegan’s allegations of abuse were not\\n made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment, those statements\\n cannot qualify for Rule 803(4)’s hearsay exception. We affirm.\\n I.\\n In 2019, Sharon Keegan began taking naked pictures and\\n videos of her little sister, who was fourteen. After creating these\\n files, Keegan would upload them to Dropbox for her husband’s\\n viewing pleasure. Sometimes it was at his request; other times she\\n uploaded out of the blue and teased him that there was a “surprise”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n waiting for him in the Dropbox. Keegan’s husband could not keep\\n some of these images and videos to himself, and eventually an\\n undercover agent in the United Kingdom detected them online.\\n The British agent passed the information to law enforcement\\n officers who secured an arrest warrant for Keegan’s husband and a\\n search warrant for his residence, which he shared with Keegan, her\\n parents, and her little sister.\\n At that point, the police did not yet suspect Keegan herself\\n of any wrongdoing. But that began to change when she told\\n officers that she had “accidentally sent maybe four or five photos\\n of her sister in pink panties to her husband.” And as Keegan’s\\n interview went on, investigators felt increasingly “strange” about\\n her role in the child pornography production.\\n Questioning whether Keegan was “as innocent” as she was\\n “letting on,” law enforcement agents forensically analyzed her\\n phone—which yielded even more nude images of the little sister.\\n Testimony from both the sister and Keegan’s husband confirmed\\n abuse. Both Keegan and her husband were charged with several\\n crimes, including producing, possessing, and distributing child\\n pornography; he pleaded guilty, but she did not.\\n Keegan’s defense was that she was under duress. She “did\\n not have the mens rea to commit the offenses charged,” she said,\\n because her husband had severely abused her. 1 Key to this defense\\n was the expert testimony of psychologist Victoria Reynolds, who\\n\\n\\n 1 Keegan’s husband denied the allegations at trial.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n had been a full-time expert witness for a decade—but had not done\\n any clinical work at all during that time.\\n Even though a hospital physician had already diagnosed\\n Keegan with a “dissociative disorder” three years earlier, Keegan’s\\n attorney contacted Reynolds, asking her to “evaluate the impacts”\\n of Keegan’s alleged abuse “as they relate to her current legal\\n charges.” After meeting with Keegan for two days, Reynolds made\\n the same diagnosis. She also planned to explain that Keegan’s\\n actions must be “understood as a series of complex and\\n recognizable trauma-driven adaptations and survival strategies”\\n and testify at length about the abuse that purportedly led to this\\n diagnosis.\\n The government sought to exclude all of Reynolds’s\\n testimony as irrelevant. After the district court rejected that effort,\\n finding the expert report “probative” of Keegan’s defense, the\\n government renewed its request on different grounds. This time,\\n it sought to exclude only part of Reynolds’s testimony—the\\n “statements that the defendant made to Dr. Reynolds as it relates\\n to [her husband’s] alleged abuse.” The government argued that\\n these statements were inadmissible hearsay not covered by the\\n exception in Rule 803(4). But it also conceded that the statements\\n could still be admissible to illustrate the basis of the expert’s\\n opinion under Rule 703.\\n This time the district court agreed. After reviewing the\\n record, the court concluded that Keegan’s “purpose here, it’s clear,\\n was to prepare the witness to testify to a jury”—to feed Reynolds\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n “her story in hopes that [the] witness would then be able to tell the\\n same story to the jury,” not to obtain “diagnosis or treatment.” The\\n court also excluded the statements under Rule 403 in the\\n alternative, explaining that their “probative value” was\\n “substantially outweighed by the unfair and the undue prejudice\\n that would go to the government.” Seeing the writing on the wall,\\n Keegan entered a conditional plea—guilty to one count of child\\n pornography production, but with the right to withdraw the plea\\n if she successfully appealed the court’s evidentiary ruling.\\n This is Keegan’s appeal. She argues that the district court\\n erred twice over: first by incorrectly interpreting Rule 803(4) and\\n then by unreasonably applying Rule 403. We disagree, at least on\\n the first point. The district court did not clearly err in finding that\\n there was no diagnostic purpose underlying Keegan’s statements\\n to Reynolds, and thus did not abuse its discretion in excluding them\\n as inadmissible hearsay; although they were made to a doctor, they\\n were not made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment. See Fed. R.\\n Evid. 803(4). Because we conclude that the district court did not\\n abuse its discretion, we do not address the Rule 403 argument.\\n II.\\n We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.\\n United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017).\\n “Basing an evidentiary ruling on a legal error constitutes an abuse\\n of discretion per se.” Id. We review factual findings underlying\\n evidentiary rulings for clear error. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Byrom,\\n 910 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir. 1990).\\n III.\\n Hearsay testimony is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid.\\n 802. And though the term “hearsay” has perplexed law students\\n and lawyers for decades, its core definition is simple: an out-of-\\n court statement offered to prove that what the statement says is\\n true. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as\\n “testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or\\n she knows personally, but what others have said.” Hearsay, Black’s\\n Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An example: “My neighbor told\\n me that she saw Bill start the fire.” That testimony cannot be used\\n to prove that Bill started the fire; the jury would be hearing from\\n someone who heard from someone else about who started the fire.\\n Instead, modern hearsay rules require that the neighbor testify\\n herself about what she saw.\\n Those modern rules are the product of hundreds of years of\\n English and then American jurisprudence, going back to the 1500s.\\n See 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law\\n § 1364, at 12 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1974). While hearsay\\n testimony was “constantly received” at trials throughout that\\n century, the tide began to turn in the 1600s as the common law\\n “steadily” began to appreciate the “impropriety” of admitting these\\n statements as evidence. See id. at 17–18. By 1690, it was clear that\\n the general rule against hearsay had “become a part of the law as\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n well as of the practice.” Id. at 18. And by the mid-1700s, the “only\\n question” was what the exceptions should be. Id. at 20.\\n The reason hearsay was generally considered unreliable (and\\n therefore inadmissible) was plain then and remains the same today:\\n “the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination.” Id.\\n Or as Chief Justice Kent put it more than two hundred years ago, a\\n witness who shares hearsay testimony need not “enter into any\\n particulars,” “answer any questions,” “solve any difficulties,”\\n “reconcile any contradictions,” “explain any obscurities,” or\\n “remove any ambiguities”; instead, “he intrenches himself in the\\n simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely\\n on his dead or absent author.” Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50\\n (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). In our adversarial system, cross-examination\\n is a fundamental proving ground—each side has the chance to put\\n the other’s witnesses to the test. But that chance disappears when\\n the factfinder receives hearsay evidence rather than testimony\\n from a live witness. For these reasons and more, Justice Story\\n lamented that hearsay evidence is “exceedingly infirm,\\n unsatisfactory and intrinsically weak in its very nature and\\n character.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836). Chief\\n Justice Marshall too described the “intrinsic weakness” of hearsay\\n evidence and “its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence\\n of the fact.” See Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 296 (1813).\\n Despite these concerns, many exceptions to the rule against\\n hearsay have arisen—typically for statements that are “made under\\n such circumstances that even a skeptical caution would look upon\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n it as trustworthy.” 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1420, at 252. Perhaps\\n the most commonly known is dying declarations. These\\n statements, which are exactly what they sound like, are presumed\\n to be reliable because “the sense of impending death is presumed\\n to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an\\n adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.” Mattox\\n v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).\\n Other exceptions have also emerged, including present sense\\n impressions, excited utterances, and business records, just to name\\n a few. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1), (2), (6). What unites these hearsay\\n exceptions and more is that the “probability of accuracy and\\n trustworthiness” of the statements is “practically sufficient, if not\\n quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional\\n manner.” 2 See 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1422, at 253.\\n We do not see why one exception should stand out among\\n the others. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) allows a hearsay\\n statement that “(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—\\n medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history;\\n past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their\\n general cause.” The key part of this Rule for our purposes is the\\n requirement that the statement be “made for . . . medical diagnosis\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 We see this same theme in the “Residual” hearsay exception: for a statement\\n\\n to qualify, it must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”\\n See Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n or treatment.” 3 The district court’s task was to decide whether that\\n would be true for Reynolds’s testimony recounting Keegan’s\\n allegations of abuse. That court said no, and we see no clear error\\n in its factual findings and no abuse of discretion in its evidentiary\\n ruling.\\n As always, we begin with the plain text of the Rule. The\\n word “for” is used “to indicate the object, aim, or purpose of an\\n action or activity.” For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the\\n English Language (5th ed. 2016); see also Webster’s Ninth New\\n Collegiate Dictionary (1986) (“for” is “used as a function word to\\n indicate purpose”). Or as Black’s Law Dictionary puts it: the word\\n for “connotes the end with reference to which anything is, acts,\\n serves, or is done.” For, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). In\\n short, the word “connotes intent.” Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Fortis\\n Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.). And the phrase\\n “for medical diagnosis” is there for a reason; otherwise, the\\n exception would include any statement made to a physician that\\n might conceivably be related to a patient’s medical history.\\n Given the centrality of reliability and trustworthiness in the\\n other hearsay exceptions, Rule 803(4)’s “for medical diagnosis”\\n language, we believe, ferrets out statements whose “real use and\\n predominating effect would be that of hearsay testimony of the\\n patient.” See 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common\\n Law § 1720, at 113 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1976). Such\\n\\n 3 The parties have not disputed whether Keegan’s allegations of abuse satisfy\\n\\n clause (B), so we will not consider that part of the Rule.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n statements “should be excluded.” See id. Rule 803(4)’s text\\n therefore creates a tight connection between purpose (“for”) and\\n result (“medical diagnosis”).\\n The Rule’s origins reveal the reason for that connective\\n language. Rule 803(4) codified one of our Nation’s most “firmly\\n rooted” hearsay exceptions: statements made for medical\\n treatment. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56 n.8 (1992)\\n (quotation omitted). And the justification for the exception is that\\n the reliability of such statements “is assured by the likelihood that\\n the patient believes that the effectiveness of the treatment depends\\n on the accuracy of the information provided to the doctor.” 2\\n Robert P. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431 (8th\\n ed. 2020). A patient is “highly unlikely to lie” to her doctor, the\\n logic goes, because if she does then she will receive faulty medical\\n care. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). The patient’s\\n natural desire to heal bestows a “guarantee of credibility” upon her\\n statements. See 5 Mark S. Brodin et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence\\n § 803.06[1], at 803–42 (2d ed. 2023). Simply put, Rule 803(4) is\\n premised on the existence of a “selfish treatment motivation.” 4 See\\n McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431.\\n It is true that some other subsections of Rule 803 have an\\n explicit reliability requirement that is absent in Rule 803(4). See,\\n\\n 4 In Rule 803(4), the terms “diagnosis” and “treatment” are set apart by a\\n\\n disjunctive “or.” So of course, attempts at either diagnosis or treatment can\\n trigger the Rule, even in the absence of the other. Indeed, many diagnoses do\\n not require follow-on medical treatment (say, a benign mole). But whether\\n seeking diagnosis or treatment, the patient has a strong incentive to tell the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (business records); 803(8) (public records).\\n But this omission should not be surprising—reliability is inherent\\n in Rule 803(4)’s context. A helpful comparison is the excited\\n utterances exception, which also has no explicit reliability\\n requirement. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). There too, the “firmly\\n rooted” exception to the hearsay rule inherently carries “sufficient\\n indicia of reliability.” White, 502 U.S. at 355–56 n.8. The\\n “evidentiary rationale” for both hearsay exceptions is simple: “such\\n out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide\\n substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” Id. at 355. All this\\n to say, the absence of an explicit reliability requirement in Rule\\n 803(4) does not make reliability irrelevant.\\n To the contrary—an expectation of reliability is woven into\\n the very fabric of Rule 803(4). See id. at 355–56 & n.8. But the same\\n cannot necessarily be said for other hearsay exceptions with an\\n explicit reliability requirement. Take the business records\\n exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). While classic business\\n records—“payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable,” and the\\n like—are “quite trustworthy,” experience has shown that some\\n records can be “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the\\n business.” See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1943). There\\n is no reason to think that these latter records—the ones whose\\n\\n\\n truth—to help the doctor get it right. So the fact that both fall within Rule\\n 803(4)’s exception does not mean that a statement can be made “for . . .\\n medical diagnosis” even when its purpose is entirely unrelated to ensuring the\\n patient’s health.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n “primary utility is in litigating”—are especially “reliable.” See id. at\\n 112, 114. By excluding them, then, the reliability requirement in\\n the Rule 803(6) business records exception ensures that “the door\\n to avoidance of cross-examination” is not “open[ed] wide.” Cf. id.\\n at 114.\\n Rule 803(4) does the same thing. It limits the hearsay\\n exception to evidence that has traditionally been considered\\n trustworthy. So for statements to be admissible under the Rule,\\n they must be made with the purpose of seeking—in other words,\\n “for”—medical treatment or diagnosis. And just like in other\\n hearsay contexts, the court decides whether the party seeking to\\n introduce the statement has “laid a proper foundation” for its\\n admission. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 880 (6th\\n Cir. 2019); United States v. Kootswatewa, 893 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir.\\n 2018); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).\\n IV.\\n We now examine whether Rule 803(4) applies to Keegan’s\\n statements to Reynolds about her husband’s abuse. The district\\n court concluded that she recounted the abuse “to prepare the\\n witness to testify to a jury”—not for “diagnosis or treatment.” That\\n factual finding is reviewed for clear error, and we see none.\\n Keegan herself acknowledges that she sought the expert\\n witness’s opinion “principally in anticipation of litigation.” Indeed,\\n her attorney requested that the expert witness—who has not done\\n clinical work in about a decade—evaluate Keegan’s experiences “as\\n they relate to her current legal charges.” This laser focus on\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n litigation makes us share the district court’s skepticism that\\n Keegan’s statements to her expert witness were for medical\\n diagnosis.\\n What’s more, Keegan did not consult Reynolds until after\\n she was indicted. By the time she first spoke with Reynolds, she\\n had spent four months in jail. And if Keegan genuinely wanted to\\n inform the jury of her diagnosis, she needed to look no further\\n than her own medical records—in 2018, she went to the hospital\\n and received the same diagnosis that she got three years later from\\n Reynolds. But that earlier physician did not know of Keegan’s\\n accusations against her husband, and therefore could not testify\\n about them. All this goes to show that there was no “selfish\\n treatment motivation” here. See McCormick on Evidence § 277, at\\n 431.\\n It is not enough that Keegan asked for a medical diagnosis\\n and got one. As the district court concluded, the medical diagnosis\\n was not “the object, aim, or purpose” of the “action or activity.”\\n For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language\\n (5th ed. 2016). And, as we said, the phrase “for medical diagnosis”\\n is there for a reason. Without it, statements like Keegan’s, made to\\n medical professionals without the true goal of seeking treatment,\\n could be entered into evidence—all while the true source of the\\n information evades cross-examination. See 6 Wigmore on\\n Evidence § 1720, at 113. Such evasion strikes at the heart of our\\n Nation’s hearsay rules, which aim to guarantee “an opportunity of\\n cross-examination, or to call attention to omitted facts, that if\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n stated might modify or completely overturn the inference drawn\\n from the declarations as made.” State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257, 283\\n (1872). And rules are not simply procedural loopholes to exploit;\\n they “guard against” the dangers that are “so liable to arise from\\n the admission, as evidence, of declarations not made under the\\n sanction of an oath.” Id.\\n To be sure, in other cases it may be more difficult to discern\\n why a litigant sought her medical expert. But district courts are\\n equipped to probe whether a litigant made specific statements to a\\n medical expert for the genuine purpose of obtaining a diagnosis or\\n treatment. “Immersed in the case as it unfolds, a district court is\\n more familiar with the procedural and factual details and is in a\\n better position to decide many evidentiary and similar issues.”\\n United States v. Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 943 (11th Cir. 2023)\\n (quotation omitted). Here, the district court did not clearly err in\\n finding that Keegan’s statements of abuse to her expert witness\\n were not made for medical diagnosis or treatment.\\n Keegan protests that the Advisory Committee on Evidence\\n Rules’ Note to Rule 803(4), published in 1972, requires a different\\n understanding of the Rule. But while the Committee’s Notes are\\n typically afforded “great weight,” they are “not binding.” See\\n Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005)\\n (quotation omitted). And they can be discounted when their\\n foundation has been eroded. Here there is good reason to ignore\\n the Note even apart from its atextual hostility to the reliability\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 15 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n standards inherent in the traditional rule: its rationale is\\n contradicted by a later amendment to the Rules of Evidence.\\n The Note says that statements made to “a physician\\n consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify” are\\n admissible under Rule 803(4). See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes\\n on Rule 803. Under “[c]onventional doctrine,” though, those\\n statements were “not admissible as substantive evidence.” Id. That\\n means that the jury could not consider the statements for their\\n truth. See United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n But the expert witness was allowed to use the statements to explain\\n “the basis of his opinion.” See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes on\\n Rule 803.\\n A concrete example clarifies the difference. Suppose\\n Reynolds testified as follows: “Based on what Keegan told me\\n about the abuse she suffered, I diagnosed her with dissociative\\n identity disorder.” Under the conventional doctrine, the jury could\\n not consider Keegan’s allegations of abuse as “substantive\\n evidence”—that is, as proof that she was abused. Instead, it could\\n consider the allegations only as the “basis” of Reynolds’s\\n testimony—that is, take account of the fact that Keegan’s\\n allegations were the reason Reynolds diagnosed Keegan with the\\n disorder.\\n The 1972 Note—but not the Rule itself—treated litigants’\\n statements to expert witnesses as substantive evidence, rejecting\\n that traditional distinction. Why? The Committee said it was “one\\n most unlikely to be made by juries.” See id. But that rationale no\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 16 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n longer holds up. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 now “demands that\\n juries make the exact distinction that the 1972 Advisory\\n Committee’s Note says they cannot.” Paul W. Kaufman &\\n Christopher J. Merken, Toward a Presumptive Admission of Medical\\n Records Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), 64 B.C. L. Rev. 567,\\n 585–86 n.85 (2023).\\n Rule 703 deals with the proper bases of an expert witness’s\\n opinion testimony. Before 2000, there was judicial and scholarly\\n disagreement about “how to treat inadmissible information when\\n it is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion.”\\n See 2000 Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 703 (collecting cases\\n and scholarship). Some argued that the rules governing expert\\n testimony should account for the “fine but important distinction”\\n between an expert’s opinion (which is substantive evidence) and\\n the basis of that opinion (which is not). See Ronald L. Carlson,\\n Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 577,\\n 584–86 (1986). Others disagreed, contending that the “charade that\\n opinions and their bases are severable should end.” See Paul R.\\n Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A\\n Response to Professor Carlson, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 583, 596 (1987).\\n Taking the 1972 Note to Rule 803(4) seriously would seem to\\n require adopting the latter approach—refusing to trust juries to\\n distinguish between substantive evidence and basis-of-opinion\\n evidence.\\n But that is not what happened. In fact, the 2000 amendment\\n to the text of Rule 703 did the opposite: it established that “hearsay\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 17 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n relied upon by an expert is admissible only to establish the basis of\\n that expert’s opinion and not as substantive evidence.” Kaufman\\n & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 585–86 n.85; see Henderson v. Ford Motor\\n Co., 72 F.4th 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2023). Given the contradiction\\n between this amendment and the 1972 Note, we have little reason\\n to afford the Note its ordinary persuasive value. 5\\n We acknowledge that the result here puts us at odds with\\n some of our sister circuits. See O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d\\n 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83\\n (8th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 & n.18 (4th Cir.\\n 1988); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).\\n But the most recent of these decisions was over three decades\\n ago—seven years before the relevant amendment to Rule 703. And,\\n with respect, none grapples with the text of or justification for Rule\\n 803(4). Instead, they home in on the Advisory Committee Note\\n and matter-of-factly state that “Rule 803(4) abolished the common-\\n\\n\\n 5 It is fair to wonder why the Advisory Committee did not update the Note to\\n\\n Rule 803(4) when it amended Rule 703. The likely reason is the Committee’s\\n enabling rules, which establish that the Committee’s mandate is to “consider\\n proposed new and amended rules (together with committee notes).” See Jud.\\n Conf. of the U.S., Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of\\n Practice and Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees § 440.20.30(c). The\\n Committee “reads this rule as not authorizing it to make changes to the\\n Advisory Committee Notes unless they coincide with a rule amendment.”\\n Kaufman & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 587 & n.93. And because there has not\\n been any “substantive change to Rule 803(4) since 1972,” the Committee\\n “could not have amended Rule 803(4)’s 1972 Advisory Committee Note when\\n it amended Rule 703 in 2000.” Id. at 587–88.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 18 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n law distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the\\n purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of\\n diagnosis only.” See Farley, 992 F.2d at 1125 (alteration adopted and\\n quotation omitted); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 950; Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at\\n 83; O’Gee, 570 F.2d at 1089. That approach both ignores the\\n meaning of the Rule, and strips the district court of its ordinary\\n authority to make factual judgments in evidentiary rulings. And as\\n we have explained, the Note cannot carry the weight those courts\\n put on it. Again, the 2000 amendment to Rule 703 requires juries to\\n make exactly the same distinction that the Note says they cannot\\n handle. We decline to rest our decision on the Note, and use the\\n text of the Rule instead.\\n Given the circumstances underlying Reynolds’s proffered\\n testimony, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that\\n Keegan did not seek out a medical expert to obtain a diagnosis.\\n And given the ordinary meaning of the word for—“not to mention\\n common sense”—the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\n concluding that Keegan’s statements do not qualify for the hearsay\\n exception in Rule 803(4). See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169,\\n 179 (2014).\\n * * *\\n To be clear: some statements made to medical expert\\n witnesses will qualify for the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). In\\n deciding which ones do, courts must consider, among other things,\\n the text of the Rule, the context surrounding the statement, and\\n the facts of the case. Given these considerations, Keegan’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 19 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n statements of abuse to her expert witness were not “for” medical\\n diagnosis. We AFFIRM.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 20 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226863/\", \"author_raw\": \"GRANT, Circuit Judge:\"}, {\"author\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n I concur in the Court’s decision and join its opinion. I write\\n separately merely to highlight a nuance that, to me, makes all the\\n difference.\\n The object of the interpretive inquiry here is Federal Rule of\\n Evidence 803(4). In relevant part, that Rule establishes an\\n exception to the prohibition against hearsay evidence for “[a]\\n statement that is . . . made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—\\n medical diagnosis or treatment . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). The\\n question, as the Court has well explained, is whether Sharon\\n Keegan’s “statement[s]” to Dr. Victoria Reynolds were made\\n “for . . . medical diagnosis.”\\n Keegan’s theory, as I understand it, is that, yes, of course she\\n made her statements to Dr. Reynolds “for . . . medical diagnosis”:\\n She wanted a diagnosis, and she got one—and that’s all Rule 803(4)\\n requires. The fact that she might also have made those statements\\n “for” later use in litigation, Keegan says, is neither here nor there,\\n because a person sometimes speaks “for” more than one reason—\\n and by its terms, the Rule doesn’t foreclose the possibility that she\\n might have had dual motives.\\n Cards on the table, I don’t think Keegan’s position can be\\n ruled out as a matter of pure, sterile semantics. She can credibly\\n contend that her reading is consistent with both Rule 803(4)’s\\n “plain text” and the leading dictionary definition of the word\\n “for”—as “indicat[ing] purpose or aim.” Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d\\n 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (citing dictionaries); accord id.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 21 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 22-13019\\n\\n at 1366 (Newsom, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)\\n (agreeing that, when used as it is here, the word “for” indicates\\n “purpose,” “an intended goal,” or “object”). Because, Keegan’s\\n argument goes, she talked to Dr. Reynolds for two reasons, one of\\n which was to obtain a medical diagnosis, her statements fit within\\n the Rule’s terms.\\n But—and it’s a big but—the sheer fact that Keegan’s reading\\n of the Rule is “linguistically plausible” doesn’t make it right. See\\n Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 73 F.4th 852, 864 (11th Cir. 2023) (Newsom,\\n J., concurring). And that’s because “proper textualism” isn’t\\n wooden “literalism.” Id. The aim of the interpretive enterprise\\n isn’t to isolate the clinical, classroom meaning of a particular string\\n of words. It’s subtler, richer: Here, we’re seeking to discern, as\\n best we can, how a real-life, flesh-and-blood individual would\\n understand the phrase “statement . . . made for . . . medical\\n diagnosis”—in particular, how he would understand that phrase as\\n used in the context of a compilation of rules regulating the\\n admission and exclusion of hearsay evidence. 1 And although that\\n question is ultimately empirical, it seems to me inconceivable that\\n anyone encountering that phrase would understand it to refer to a\\n statement like Keegan’s—one made for the immediate purpose of\\n obtaining a medical diagnosis but with a longer-term view to using\\n\\n\\n 1 Whether the target individual in this context is an ordinary citizen, an\\n\\n ordinary lawyer, or (even) an ordinary district court judge, I’m not quite sure.\\n It’s an interesting question, but not one, I think, whose resolution is necessary\\n here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 22 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n it in litigation. Every ounce of pertinent context—structural,\\n historical, etc.—weighs against Keegan’s mechanical\\n interpretation.\\n As the Court’s opinion helpfully recounts, the Federal Rules’\\n hearsay provisions didn’t just apparate, Harry-Potter-like. Rather,\\n they arose out of centuries’ worth of discussion and debate—not\\n only about the risks of hearsay statements but also the limited\\n circumstances in which some such statements might, despite their\\n out-of-court-ness, be sufficiently trustworthy to warrant\\n admission. See Maj. Op. at 6 et seq. And as the Court quite rightly\\n points out, the thread that binds the traditional hearsay exceptions\\n together—their animating justification, if you will—is that they\\n cover statements that, by their very nature, indicate reliability. See\\n id. at 7–8. That is clear not only from the history of the exceptions’\\n reception and adoption, but also from their enumeration in the\\n Federal Rules. So, as the Court notes, several of Rule 803(4)’s\\n closest neighbors memorialize exceptions for statements that, by\\n their very nature, give rise to a strong presumption of reliability—\\n e.g., “present-sense impression[s],” “excited utterance[s],” and\\n statements regarding “then-existing mental, emotional, or physical\\n condition[s].” See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1), (2), (3). And conspicuously,\\n some of the more prominent hearsay exceptions applicable to\\n statements whose reliability might not be inherent—e.g., business\\n and public records—explicitly prescribe a “trustworthiness”\\n requirement. See id. 803(6), (8).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 23 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 22-13019\\n\\n The historical and structural context is thus unmistakable:\\n One way or another, the hearsay exceptions reflect an evident\\n insistence on reliability. Call it what you will—context, manifest\\n purpose, common sense, etc.—but that backdrop matters. To be\\n clear, though—because the distinction is to my mind absolutely\\n essential—it matters not (as the pragmatist might contend) because\\n it provides a basis for ignoring or even discounting Rule 803(4)’s\\n terms, but rather because it informs the way an actual person in the\\n real world would process and understand those terms. The Court’s\\n reading of the Rule—namely, that it applies to statements made\\n with the aim of obtaining a medical diagnosis for its own sake—\\n squares perfectly with the available context, and thus with a proper\\n understanding of the provision’s text: A person can be expected to\\n speak truthfully to a doctor when her own health is at stake.\\n Keegan’s interpretation, by contrast—that the Rule also covers\\n statements made for the purpose of obtaining a medical diagnosis\\n that was itself sought for use in litigation—defies the lessons of\\n context, and thus (again) the proper understanding of the\\n provision’s text: There’s no particular reason to presume the\\n trustworthiness of a statement that an aspiring litigant makes with\\n one eye on the courtroom.\\n So even if Keegan’s interpretation of the phrase “made\\n for . . . medical diagnosis” can (as I think it can) claim consistency\\n with the literal, dictionary-driven meaning of Rule 803(4)’s terms, it\\n has no footing in—and indeed, is irreconcilable with—the real-\\n world, ordinary understanding of that phrase, as used in context.\\n And that, to me, is dispositive.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11226863/\", \"author_raw\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ABUDU"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"ABUDU\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10760278/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Sharon Keegan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-17\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 22-13019\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n SHARON ELIZABETH KEEGAN,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Georgia\n D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00045-RSB-CLR-2\n ____________________\n\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\n Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides a hearsay\n exception for a statement that is “made for—and is reasonably\n pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment.” Sharon Keegan,\n who took naked pictures and videos of her fourteen-year-old sister\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 2 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n and then sent them to her husband (both at his request and as a\n special “surprise”), attempted to use this Rule to solve her main\n problem at trial—getting her story out without also getting on the\n stand.\n The crux of Keegan’s defense was that she took the photos\n under duress because her husband was abusing her. Of course,\n getting on the witness stand and explaining that for herself would\n have opened her up to cross-examination, a prospect that few\n defendants relish. But perhaps, Keegan thought, if she told her\n story to a medical expert witness that expert could share her\n allegations with the jury, and she would be spared the risks of cross-\n examination.\n This approach is exactly what the hearsay rules seek to\n prevent, and we reject the attempt to end-run the Rules of\n Evidence. Between the plain text of Rule 803(4), the background\n of the traditional rules regarding medical testimony, and the\n district court’s factual findings in this case, we agree with the\n district court that because Keegan’s allegations of abuse were not\n made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment, those statements\n cannot qualify for Rule 803(4)’s hearsay exception. We affirm.\n I.\n In 2019, Sharon Keegan began taking naked pictures and\n videos of her little sister, who was fourteen. After creating these\n files, Keegan would upload them to Dropbox for her husband’s\n viewing pleasure. Sometimes it was at his request; other times she\n uploaded out of the blue and teased him that there was a “surprise”\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 3 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n waiting for him in the Dropbox. Keegan’s husband could not keep\n some of these images and videos to himself, and eventually an\n undercover agent in the United Kingdom detected them online.\n The British agent passed the information to law enforcement\n officers who secured an arrest warrant for Keegan’s husband and a\n search warrant for his residence, which he shared with Keegan, her\n parents, and her little sister.\n At that point, the police did not yet suspect Keegan herself\n of any wrongdoing. But that began to change when she told\n officers that she had “accidentally sent maybe four or five photos\n of her sister in pink panties to her husband.” And as Keegan’s\n interview went on, investigators felt increasingly “strange” about\n her role in the child pornography production.\n Questioning whether Keegan was “as innocent” as she was\n “letting on,” law enforcement agents forensically analyzed her\n phone—which yielded even more nude images of the little sister.\n Testimony from both the sister and Keegan’s husband confirmed\n abuse. Both Keegan and her husband were charged with several\n crimes, including producing, possessing, and distributing child\n pornography; he pleaded guilty, but she did not.\n Keegan’s defense was that she was under duress. She “did\n not have the mens rea to commit the offenses charged,” she said,\n because her husband had severely abused her. 1 Key to this defense\n was the expert testimony of psychologist Victoria Reynolds, who\n\n\n 1 Keegan’s husband denied the allegations at trial.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 4 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n had been a full-time expert witness for a decade—but had not done\n any clinical work at all during that time.\n Even though a hospital physician had already diagnosed\n Keegan with a “dissociative disorder” three years earlier, Keegan’s\n attorney contacted Reynolds, asking her to “evaluate the impacts”\n of Keegan’s alleged abuse “as they relate to her current legal\n charges.” After meeting with Keegan for two days, Reynolds made\n the same diagnosis. She also planned to explain that Keegan’s\n actions must be “understood as a series of complex and\n recognizable trauma-driven adaptations and survival strategies”\n and testify at length about the abuse that purportedly led to this\n diagnosis.\n The government sought to exclude all of Reynolds’s\n testimony as irrelevant. After the district court rejected that effort,\n finding the expert report “probative” of Keegan’s defense, the\n government renewed its request on different grounds. This time,\n it sought to exclude only part of Reynolds’s testimony—the\n “statements that the defendant made to Dr. Reynolds as it relates\n to [her husband’s] alleged abuse.” The government argued that\n these statements were inadmissible hearsay not covered by the\n exception in Rule 803(4). But it also conceded that the statements\n could still be admissible to illustrate the basis of the expert’s\n opinion under Rule 703.\n This time the district court agreed. After reviewing the\n record, the court concluded that Keegan’s “purpose here, it’s clear,\n was to prepare the witness to testify to a jury”—to feed Reynolds\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 5 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n “her story in hopes that [the] witness would then be able to tell the\n same story to the jury,” not to obtain “diagnosis or treatment.” The\n court also excluded the statements under Rule 403 in the\n alternative, explaining that their “probative value” was\n “substantially outweighed by the unfair and the undue prejudice\n that would go to the government.” Seeing the writing on the wall,\n Keegan entered a conditional plea—guilty to one count of child\n pornography production, but with the right to withdraw the plea\n if she successfully appealed the court’s evidentiary ruling.\n This is Keegan’s appeal. She argues that the district court\n erred twice over: first by incorrectly interpreting Rule 803(4) and\n then by unreasonably applying Rule 403. We disagree, at least on\n the first point. The district court did not clearly err in finding that\n there was no diagnostic purpose underlying Keegan’s statements\n to Reynolds, and thus did not abuse its discretion in excluding them\n as inadmissible hearsay; although they were made to a doctor, they\n were not made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment. See Fed. R.\n Evid. 803(4). Because we conclude that the district court did not\n abuse its discretion, we do not address the Rule 403 argument.\n II.\n We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.\n United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017).\n “Basing an evidentiary ruling on a legal error constitutes an abuse\n of discretion per se.” Id. We review factual findings underlying\n evidentiary rulings for clear error. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 6 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Byrom,\n 910 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir. 1990).\n III.\n Hearsay testimony is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid.\n 802. And though the term “hearsay” has perplexed law students\n and lawyers for decades, its core definition is simple: an out-of-\n court statement offered to prove that what the statement says is\n true. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as\n “testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or\n she knows personally, but what others have said.” Hearsay, Black’s\n Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An example: “My neighbor told\n me that she saw Bill start the fire.” That testimony cannot be used\n to prove that Bill started the fire; the jury would be hearing from\n someone who heard from someone else about who started the fire.\n Instead, modern hearsay rules require that the neighbor testify\n herself about what she saw.\n Those modern rules are the product of hundreds of years of\n English and then American jurisprudence, going back to the 1500s.\n See 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law\n § 1364, at 12 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1974). While hearsay\n testimony was “constantly received” at trials throughout that\n century, the tide began to turn in the 1600s as the common law\n “steadily” began to appreciate the “impropriety” of admitting these\n statements as evidence. See id. at 17–18. By 1690, it was clear that\n the general rule against hearsay had “become a part of the law as\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 7 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n well as of the practice.” Id. at 18. And by the mid-1700s, the “only\n question” was what the exceptions should be. Id. at 20.\n The reason hearsay was generally considered unreliable (and\n therefore inadmissible) was plain then and remains the same today:\n “the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination.” Id.\n Or as Chief Justice Kent put it more than two hundred years ago, a\n witness who shares hearsay testimony need not “enter into any\n particulars,” “answer any questions,” “solve any difficulties,”\n “reconcile any contradictions,” “explain any obscurities,” or\n “remove any ambiguities”; instead, “he intrenches himself in the\n simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely\n on his dead or absent author.” Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50\n (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). In our adversarial system, cross-examination\n is a fundamental proving ground—each side has the chance to put\n the other’s witnesses to the test. But that chance disappears when\n the factfinder receives hearsay evidence rather than testimony\n from a live witness. For these reasons and more, Justice Story\n lamented that hearsay evidence is “exceedingly infirm,\n unsatisfactory and intrinsically weak in its very nature and\n character.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836). Chief\n Justice Marshall too described the “intrinsic weakness” of hearsay\n evidence and “its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence\n of the fact.” See Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 296 (1813).\n Despite these concerns, many exceptions to the rule against\n hearsay have arisen—typically for statements that are “made under\n such circumstances that even a skeptical caution would look upon\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 8 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n it as trustworthy.” 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1420, at 252. Perhaps\n the most commonly known is dying declarations. These\n statements, which are exactly what they sound like, are presumed\n to be reliable because “the sense of impending death is presumed\n to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an\n adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.” Mattox\n v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).\n Other exceptions have also emerged, including present sense\n impressions, excited utterances, and business records, just to name\n a few. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1), (2), (6). What unites these hearsay\n exceptions and more is that the “probability of accuracy and\n trustworthiness” of the statements is “practically sufficient, if not\n quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional\n manner.” 2 See 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1422, at 253.\n We do not see why one exception should stand out among\n the others. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) allows a hearsay\n statement that “(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—\n medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history;\n past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their\n general cause.” The key part of this Rule for our purposes is the\n requirement that the statement be “made for . . . medical diagnosis\n\n\n\n\n 2 We see this same theme in the “Residual” hearsay exception: for a statement\n\n to qualify, it must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”\n See Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 9 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n or treatment.” 3 The district court’s task was to decide whether that\n would be true for Reynolds’s testimony recounting Keegan’s\n allegations of abuse. That court said no, and we see no clear error\n in its factual findings and no abuse of discretion in its evidentiary\n ruling.\n As always, we begin with the plain text of the Rule. The\n word “for” is used “to indicate the object, aim, or purpose of an\n action or activity.” For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the\n English Language (5th ed. 2016); see also Webster’s Ninth New\n Collegiate Dictionary (1986) (“for” is “used as a function word to\n indicate purpose”). Or as Black’s Law Dictionary puts it: the word\n for “connotes the end with reference to which anything is, acts,\n serves, or is done.” For, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). In\n short, the word “connotes intent.” Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Fortis\n Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.). And the phrase\n “for medical diagnosis” is there for a reason; otherwise, the\n exception would include any statement made to a physician that\n might conceivably be related to a patient’s medical history.\n Given the centrality of reliability and trustworthiness in the\n other hearsay exceptions, Rule 803(4)’s “for medical diagnosis”\n language, we believe, ferrets out statements whose “real use and\n predominating effect would be that of hearsay testimony of the\n patient.” See 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common\n Law § 1720, at 113 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1976). Such\n\n 3 The parties have not disputed whether Keegan’s allegations of abuse satisfy\n\n clause (B), so we will not consider that part of the Rule.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 10 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n statements “should be excluded.” See id. Rule 803(4)’s text\n therefore creates a tight connection between purpose (“for”) and\n result (“medical diagnosis”).\n The Rule’s origins reveal the reason for that connective\n language. Rule 803(4) codified one of our Nation’s most “firmly\n rooted” hearsay exceptions: statements made for medical\n treatment. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56 n.8 (1992)\n (quotation omitted). And the justification for the exception is that\n the reliability of such statements “is assured by the likelihood that\n the patient believes that the effectiveness of the treatment depends\n on the accuracy of the information provided to the doctor.” 2\n Robert P. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431 (8th\n ed. 2020). A patient is “highly unlikely to lie” to her doctor, the\n logic goes, because if she does then she will receive faulty medical\n care. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). The patient’s\n natural desire to heal bestows a “guarantee of credibility” upon her\n statements. See 5 Mark S. Brodin et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence\n § 803.06[1], at 803–42 (2d ed. 2023). Simply put, Rule 803(4) is\n premised on the existence of a “selfish treatment motivation.” 4 See\n McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431.\n It is true that some other subsections of Rule 803 have an\n explicit reliability requirement that is absent in Rule 803(4). See,\n\n 4 In Rule 803(4), the terms “diagnosis” and “treatment” are set apart by a\n\n disjunctive “or.” So of course, attempts at either diagnosis or treatment can\n trigger the Rule, even in the absence of the other. Indeed, many diagnoses do\n not require follow-on medical treatment (say, a benign mole). But whether\n seeking diagnosis or treatment, the patient has a strong incentive to tell the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 11 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (business records); 803(8) (public records).\n But this omission should not be surprising—reliability is inherent\n in Rule 803(4)’s context. A helpful comparison is the excited\n utterances exception, which also has no explicit reliability\n requirement. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). There too, the “firmly\n rooted” exception to the hearsay rule inherently carries “sufficient\n indicia of reliability.” White, 502 U.S. at 355–56 n.8. The\n “evidentiary rationale” for both hearsay exceptions is simple: “such\n out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide\n substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” Id. at 355. All this\n to say, the absence of an explicit reliability requirement in Rule\n 803(4) does not make reliability irrelevant.\n To the contrary—an expectation of reliability is woven into\n the very fabric of Rule 803(4). See id. at 355–56 & n.8. But the same\n cannot necessarily be said for other hearsay exceptions with an\n explicit reliability requirement. Take the business records\n exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). While classic business\n records—“payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable,” and the\n like—are “quite trustworthy,” experience has shown that some\n records can be “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the\n business.” See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1943). There\n is no reason to think that these latter records—the ones whose\n\n\n truth—to help the doctor get it right. So the fact that both fall within Rule\n 803(4)’s exception does not mean that a statement can be made “for . . .\n medical diagnosis” even when its purpose is entirely unrelated to ensuring the\n patient’s health.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 12 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n “primary utility is in litigating”—are especially “reliable.” See id. at\n 112, 114. By excluding them, then, the reliability requirement in\n the Rule 803(6) business records exception ensures that “the door\n to avoidance of cross-examination” is not “open[ed] wide.” Cf. id.\n at 114.\n Rule 803(4) does the same thing. It limits the hearsay\n exception to evidence that has traditionally been considered\n trustworthy. So for statements to be admissible under the Rule,\n they must be made with the purpose of seeking—in other words,\n “for”—medical treatment or diagnosis. And just like in other\n hearsay contexts, the court decides whether the party seeking to\n introduce the statement has “laid a proper foundation” for its\n admission. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 880 (6th\n Cir. 2019); United States v. Kootswatewa, 893 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir.\n 2018); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).\n IV.\n We now examine whether Rule 803(4) applies to Keegan’s\n statements to Reynolds about her husband’s abuse. The district\n court concluded that she recounted the abuse “to prepare the\n witness to testify to a jury”—not for “diagnosis or treatment.” That\n factual finding is reviewed for clear error, and we see none.\n Keegan herself acknowledges that she sought the expert\n witness’s opinion “principally in anticipation of litigation.” Indeed,\n her attorney requested that the expert witness—who has not done\n clinical work in about a decade—evaluate Keegan’s experiences “as\n they relate to her current legal charges.” This laser focus on\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 13 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n litigation makes us share the district court’s skepticism that\n Keegan’s statements to her expert witness were for medical\n diagnosis.\n What’s more, Keegan did not consult Reynolds until after\n she was indicted. By the time she first spoke with Reynolds, she\n had spent four months in jail. And if Keegan genuinely wanted to\n inform the jury of her diagnosis, she needed to look no further\n than her own medical records—in 2018, she went to the hospital\n and received the same diagnosis that she got three years later from\n Reynolds. But that earlier physician did not know of Keegan’s\n accusations against her husband, and therefore could not testify\n about them. All this goes to show that there was no “selfish\n treatment motivation” here. See McCormick on Evidence § 277, at\n 431.\n It is not enough that Keegan asked for a medical diagnosis\n and got one. As the district court concluded, the medical diagnosis\n was not “the object, aim, or purpose” of the “action or activity.”\n For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language\n (5th ed. 2016). And, as we said, the phrase “for medical diagnosis”\n is there for a reason. Without it, statements like Keegan’s, made to\n medical professionals without the true goal of seeking treatment,\n could be entered into evidence—all while the true source of the\n information evades cross-examination. See 6 Wigmore on\n Evidence § 1720, at 113. Such evasion strikes at the heart of our\n Nation’s hearsay rules, which aim to guarantee “an opportunity of\n cross-examination, or to call attention to omitted facts, that if\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 14 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n stated might modify or completely overturn the inference drawn\n from the declarations as made.” State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257, 283\n (1872). And rules are not simply procedural loopholes to exploit;\n they “guard against” the dangers that are “so liable to arise from\n the admission, as evidence, of declarations not made under the\n sanction of an oath.” Id.\n To be sure, in other cases it may be more difficult to discern\n why a litigant sought her medical expert. But district courts are\n equipped to probe whether a litigant made specific statements to a\n medical expert for the genuine purpose of obtaining a diagnosis or\n treatment. “Immersed in the case as it unfolds, a district court is\n more familiar with the procedural and factual details and is in a\n better position to decide many evidentiary and similar issues.”\n United States v. Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 943 (11th Cir. 2023)\n (quotation omitted). Here, the district court did not clearly err in\n finding that Keegan’s statements of abuse to her expert witness\n were not made for medical diagnosis or treatment.\n Keegan protests that the Advisory Committee on Evidence\n Rules’ Note to Rule 803(4), published in 1972, requires a different\n understanding of the Rule. But while the Committee’s Notes are\n typically afforded “great weight,” they are “not binding.” See\n Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005)\n (quotation omitted). And they can be discounted when their\n foundation has been eroded. Here there is good reason to ignore\n the Note even apart from its atextual hostility to the reliability\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 15 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n standards inherent in the traditional rule: its rationale is\n contradicted by a later amendment to the Rules of Evidence.\n The Note says that statements made to “a physician\n consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify” are\n admissible under Rule 803(4). See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes\n on Rule 803. Under “[c]onventional doctrine,” though, those\n statements were “not admissible as substantive evidence.” Id. That\n means that the jury could not consider the statements for their\n truth. See United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2024).\n But the expert witness was allowed to use the statements to explain\n “the basis of his opinion.” See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes on\n Rule 803.\n A concrete example clarifies the difference. Suppose\n Reynolds testified as follows: “Based on what Keegan told me\n about the abuse she suffered, I diagnosed her with dissociative\n identity disorder.” Under the conventional doctrine, the jury could\n not consider Keegan’s allegations of abuse as “substantive\n evidence”—that is, as proof that she was abused. Instead, it could\n consider the allegations only as the “basis” of Reynolds’s\n testimony—that is, take account of the fact that Keegan’s\n allegations were the reason Reynolds diagnosed Keegan with the\n disorder.\n The 1972 Note—but not the Rule itself—treated litigants’\n statements to expert witnesses as substantive evidence, rejecting\n that traditional distinction. Why? The Committee said it was “one\n most unlikely to be made by juries.” See id. But that rationale no\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 16 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n longer holds up. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 now “demands that\n juries make the exact distinction that the 1972 Advisory\n Committee’s Note says they cannot.” Paul W. Kaufman &\n Christopher J. Merken, Toward a Presumptive Admission of Medical\n Records Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), 64 B.C. L. Rev. 567,\n 585–86 n.85 (2023).\n Rule 703 deals with the proper bases of an expert witness’s\n opinion testimony. Before 2000, there was judicial and scholarly\n disagreement about “how to treat inadmissible information when\n it is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion.”\n See 2000 Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 703 (collecting cases\n and scholarship). Some argued that the rules governing expert\n testimony should account for the “fine but important distinction”\n between an expert’s opinion (which is substantive evidence) and\n the basis of that opinion (which is not). See Ronald L. Carlson,\n Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 577,\n 584–86 (1986). Others disagreed, contending that the “charade that\n opinions and their bases are severable should end.” See Paul R.\n Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A\n Response to Professor Carlson, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 583, 596 (1987).\n Taking the 1972 Note to Rule 803(4) seriously would seem to\n require adopting the latter approach—refusing to trust juries to\n distinguish between substantive evidence and basis-of-opinion\n evidence.\n But that is not what happened. In fact, the 2000 amendment\n to the text of Rule 703 did the opposite: it established that “hearsay\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 17 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n relied upon by an expert is admissible only to establish the basis of\n that expert’s opinion and not as substantive evidence.” Kaufman\n & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 585–86 n.85; see Henderson v. Ford Motor\n Co., 72 F.4th 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2023). Given the contradiction\n between this amendment and the 1972 Note, we have little reason\n to afford the Note its ordinary persuasive value. 5\n We acknowledge that the result here puts us at odds with\n some of our sister circuits. See O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d\n 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83\n (8th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 & n.18 (4th Cir.\n 1988); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).\n But the most recent of these decisions was over three decades\n ago—seven years before the relevant amendment to Rule 703. And,\n with respect, none grapples with the text of or justification for Rule\n 803(4). Instead, they home in on the Advisory Committee Note\n and matter-of-factly state that “Rule 803(4) abolished the common-\n\n\n 5 It is fair to wonder why the Advisory Committee did not update the Note to\n\n Rule 803(4) when it amended Rule 703. The likely reason is the Committee’s\n enabling rules, which establish that the Committee’s mandate is to “consider\n proposed new and amended rules (together with committee notes).” See Jud.\n Conf. of the U.S., Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of\n Practice and Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees § 440.20.30(c). The\n Committee “reads this rule as not authorizing it to make changes to the\n Advisory Committee Notes unless they coincide with a rule amendment.”\n Kaufman & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 587 & n.93. And because there has not\n been any “substantive change to Rule 803(4) since 1972,” the Committee\n “could not have amended Rule 803(4)’s 1972 Advisory Committee Note when\n it amended Rule 703 in 2000.” Id. at 587–88.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 18 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\n\n law distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the\n purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of\n diagnosis only.” See Farley, 992 F.2d at 1125 (alteration adopted and\n quotation omitted); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 950; Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at\n 83; O’Gee, 570 F.2d at 1089. That approach both ignores the\n meaning of the Rule, and strips the district court of its ordinary\n authority to make factual judgments in evidentiary rulings. And as\n we have explained, the Note cannot carry the weight those courts\n put on it. Again, the 2000 amendment to Rule 703 requires juries to\n make exactly the same distinction that the Note says they cannot\n handle. We decline to rest our decision on the Note, and use the\n text of the Rule instead.\n Given the circumstances underlying Reynolds’s proffered\n testimony, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that\n Keegan did not seek out a medical expert to obtain a diagnosis.\n And given the ordinary meaning of the word for—“not to mention\n common sense”—the district court did not abuse its discretion in\n concluding that Keegan’s statements do not qualify for the hearsay\n exception in Rule 803(4). See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169,\n 179 (2014).\n * * *\n To be clear: some statements made to medical expert\n witnesses will qualify for the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). In\n deciding which ones do, courts must consider, among other things,\n the text of the Rule, the context surrounding the statement, and\n the facts of the case. Given these considerations, Keegan’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 19 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n statements of abuse to her expert witness were not “for” medical\n diagnosis. We AFFIRM.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 20 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22-13019 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Sharon Keegan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-17\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 22-13019\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n SHARON ELIZABETH KEEGAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Georgia\\n D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00045-RSB-CLR-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.\\n GRANT, Circuit Judge:\\n Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) provides a hearsay\\n exception for a statement that is “made for—and is reasonably\\n pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment.” Sharon Keegan,\\n who took naked pictures and videos of her fourteen-year-old sister\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n and then sent them to her husband (both at his request and as a\\n special “surprise”), attempted to use this Rule to solve her main\\n problem at trial—getting her story out without also getting on the\\n stand.\\n The crux of Keegan’s defense was that she took the photos\\n under duress because her husband was abusing her. Of course,\\n getting on the witness stand and explaining that for herself would\\n have opened her up to cross-examination, a prospect that few\\n defendants relish. But perhaps, Keegan thought, if she told her\\n story to a medical expert witness that expert could share her\\n allegations with the jury, and she would be spared the risks of cross-\\n examination.\\n This approach is exactly what the hearsay rules seek to\\n prevent, and we reject the attempt to end-run the Rules of\\n Evidence. Between the plain text of Rule 803(4), the background\\n of the traditional rules regarding medical testimony, and the\\n district court’s factual findings in this case, we agree with the\\n district court that because Keegan’s allegations of abuse were not\\n made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment, those statements\\n cannot qualify for Rule 803(4)’s hearsay exception. We affirm.\\n I.\\n In 2019, Sharon Keegan began taking naked pictures and\\n videos of her little sister, who was fourteen. After creating these\\n files, Keegan would upload them to Dropbox for her husband’s\\n viewing pleasure. Sometimes it was at his request; other times she\\n uploaded out of the blue and teased him that there was a “surprise”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n waiting for him in the Dropbox. Keegan’s husband could not keep\\n some of these images and videos to himself, and eventually an\\n undercover agent in the United Kingdom detected them online.\\n The British agent passed the information to law enforcement\\n officers who secured an arrest warrant for Keegan’s husband and a\\n search warrant for his residence, which he shared with Keegan, her\\n parents, and her little sister.\\n At that point, the police did not yet suspect Keegan herself\\n of any wrongdoing. But that began to change when she told\\n officers that she had “accidentally sent maybe four or five photos\\n of her sister in pink panties to her husband.” And as Keegan’s\\n interview went on, investigators felt increasingly “strange” about\\n her role in the child pornography production.\\n Questioning whether Keegan was “as innocent” as she was\\n “letting on,” law enforcement agents forensically analyzed her\\n phone—which yielded even more nude images of the little sister.\\n Testimony from both the sister and Keegan’s husband confirmed\\n abuse. Both Keegan and her husband were charged with several\\n crimes, including producing, possessing, and distributing child\\n pornography; he pleaded guilty, but she did not.\\n Keegan’s defense was that she was under duress. She “did\\n not have the mens rea to commit the offenses charged,” she said,\\n because her husband had severely abused her. 1 Key to this defense\\n was the expert testimony of psychologist Victoria Reynolds, who\\n\\n\\n 1 Keegan’s husband denied the allegations at trial.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n had been a full-time expert witness for a decade—but had not done\\n any clinical work at all during that time.\\n Even though a hospital physician had already diagnosed\\n Keegan with a “dissociative disorder” three years earlier, Keegan’s\\n attorney contacted Reynolds, asking her to “evaluate the impacts”\\n of Keegan’s alleged abuse “as they relate to her current legal\\n charges.” After meeting with Keegan for two days, Reynolds made\\n the same diagnosis. She also planned to explain that Keegan’s\\n actions must be “understood as a series of complex and\\n recognizable trauma-driven adaptations and survival strategies”\\n and testify at length about the abuse that purportedly led to this\\n diagnosis.\\n The government sought to exclude all of Reynolds’s\\n testimony as irrelevant. After the district court rejected that effort,\\n finding the expert report “probative” of Keegan’s defense, the\\n government renewed its request on different grounds. This time,\\n it sought to exclude only part of Reynolds’s testimony—the\\n “statements that the defendant made to Dr. Reynolds as it relates\\n to [her husband’s] alleged abuse.” The government argued that\\n these statements were inadmissible hearsay not covered by the\\n exception in Rule 803(4). But it also conceded that the statements\\n could still be admissible to illustrate the basis of the expert’s\\n opinion under Rule 703.\\n This time the district court agreed. After reviewing the\\n record, the court concluded that Keegan’s “purpose here, it’s clear,\\n was to prepare the witness to testify to a jury”—to feed Reynolds\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n “her story in hopes that [the] witness would then be able to tell the\\n same story to the jury,” not to obtain “diagnosis or treatment.” The\\n court also excluded the statements under Rule 403 in the\\n alternative, explaining that their “probative value” was\\n “substantially outweighed by the unfair and the undue prejudice\\n that would go to the government.” Seeing the writing on the wall,\\n Keegan entered a conditional plea—guilty to one count of child\\n pornography production, but with the right to withdraw the plea\\n if she successfully appealed the court’s evidentiary ruling.\\n This is Keegan’s appeal. She argues that the district court\\n erred twice over: first by incorrectly interpreting Rule 803(4) and\\n then by unreasonably applying Rule 403. We disagree, at least on\\n the first point. The district court did not clearly err in finding that\\n there was no diagnostic purpose underlying Keegan’s statements\\n to Reynolds, and thus did not abuse its discretion in excluding them\\n as inadmissible hearsay; although they were made to a doctor, they\\n were not made “for” medical diagnosis or treatment. See Fed. R.\\n Evid. 803(4). Because we conclude that the district court did not\\n abuse its discretion, we do not address the Rule 403 argument.\\n II.\\n We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.\\n United States v. Williams, 865 F.3d 1328, 1337 (11th Cir. 2017).\\n “Basing an evidentiary ruling on a legal error constitutes an abuse\\n of discretion per se.” Id. We review factual findings underlying\\n evidentiary rulings for clear error. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Byrom,\\n 910 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir. 1990).\\n III.\\n Hearsay testimony is generally inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid.\\n 802. And though the term “hearsay” has perplexed law students\\n and lawyers for decades, its core definition is simple: an out-of-\\n court statement offered to prove that what the statement says is\\n true. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as\\n “testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or\\n she knows personally, but what others have said.” Hearsay, Black’s\\n Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An example: “My neighbor told\\n me that she saw Bill start the fire.” That testimony cannot be used\\n to prove that Bill started the fire; the jury would be hearing from\\n someone who heard from someone else about who started the fire.\\n Instead, modern hearsay rules require that the neighbor testify\\n herself about what she saw.\\n Those modern rules are the product of hundreds of years of\\n English and then American jurisprudence, going back to the 1500s.\\n See 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law\\n § 1364, at 12 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1974). While hearsay\\n testimony was “constantly received” at trials throughout that\\n century, the tide began to turn in the 1600s as the common law\\n “steadily” began to appreciate the “impropriety” of admitting these\\n statements as evidence. See id. at 17–18. By 1690, it was clear that\\n the general rule against hearsay had “become a part of the law as\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n well as of the practice.” Id. at 18. And by the mid-1700s, the “only\\n question” was what the exceptions should be. Id. at 20.\\n The reason hearsay was generally considered unreliable (and\\n therefore inadmissible) was plain then and remains the same today:\\n “the other side hath no opportunity of a cross-examination.” Id.\\n Or as Chief Justice Kent put it more than two hundred years ago, a\\n witness who shares hearsay testimony need not “enter into any\\n particulars,” “answer any questions,” “solve any difficulties,”\\n “reconcile any contradictions,” “explain any obscurities,” or\\n “remove any ambiguities”; instead, “he intrenches himself in the\\n simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely\\n on his dead or absent author.” Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, 50\\n (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). In our adversarial system, cross-examination\\n is a fundamental proving ground—each side has the chance to put\\n the other’s witnesses to the test. But that chance disappears when\\n the factfinder receives hearsay evidence rather than testimony\\n from a live witness. For these reasons and more, Justice Story\\n lamented that hearsay evidence is “exceedingly infirm,\\n unsatisfactory and intrinsically weak in its very nature and\\n character.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 436 (1836). Chief\\n Justice Marshall too described the “intrinsic weakness” of hearsay\\n evidence and “its incompetency to satisfy the mind of the existence\\n of the fact.” See Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 296 (1813).\\n Despite these concerns, many exceptions to the rule against\\n hearsay have arisen—typically for statements that are “made under\\n such circumstances that even a skeptical caution would look upon\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n it as trustworthy.” 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1420, at 252. Perhaps\\n the most commonly known is dying declarations. These\\n statements, which are exactly what they sound like, are presumed\\n to be reliable because “the sense of impending death is presumed\\n to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an\\n adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath.” Mattox\\n v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).\\n Other exceptions have also emerged, including present sense\\n impressions, excited utterances, and business records, just to name\\n a few. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(1), (2), (6). What unites these hearsay\\n exceptions and more is that the “probability of accuracy and\\n trustworthiness” of the statements is “practically sufficient, if not\\n quite equivalent to that of statements tested in the conventional\\n manner.” 2 See 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1422, at 253.\\n We do not see why one exception should stand out among\\n the others. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) allows a hearsay\\n statement that “(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—\\n medical diagnosis or treatment; and (B) describes medical history;\\n past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their\\n general cause.” The key part of this Rule for our purposes is the\\n requirement that the statement be “made for . . . medical diagnosis\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 We see this same theme in the “Residual” hearsay exception: for a statement\\n\\n to qualify, it must be “supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”\\n See Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(1).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n or treatment.” 3 The district court’s task was to decide whether that\\n would be true for Reynolds’s testimony recounting Keegan’s\\n allegations of abuse. That court said no, and we see no clear error\\n in its factual findings and no abuse of discretion in its evidentiary\\n ruling.\\n As always, we begin with the plain text of the Rule. The\\n word “for” is used “to indicate the object, aim, or purpose of an\\n action or activity.” For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the\\n English Language (5th ed. 2016); see also Webster’s Ninth New\\n Collegiate Dictionary (1986) (“for” is “used as a function word to\\n indicate purpose”). Or as Black’s Law Dictionary puts it: the word\\n for “connotes the end with reference to which anything is, acts,\\n serves, or is done.” For, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). In\\n short, the word “connotes intent.” Lawson ex rel. Lawson v. Fortis\\n Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (Alito, J.). And the phrase\\n “for medical diagnosis” is there for a reason; otherwise, the\\n exception would include any statement made to a physician that\\n might conceivably be related to a patient’s medical history.\\n Given the centrality of reliability and trustworthiness in the\\n other hearsay exceptions, Rule 803(4)’s “for medical diagnosis”\\n language, we believe, ferrets out statements whose “real use and\\n predominating effect would be that of hearsay testimony of the\\n patient.” See 6 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common\\n Law § 1720, at 113 ( James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1976). Such\\n\\n 3 The parties have not disputed whether Keegan’s allegations of abuse satisfy\\n\\n clause (B), so we will not consider that part of the Rule.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n statements “should be excluded.” See id. Rule 803(4)’s text\\n therefore creates a tight connection between purpose (“for”) and\\n result (“medical diagnosis”).\\n The Rule’s origins reveal the reason for that connective\\n language. Rule 803(4) codified one of our Nation’s most “firmly\\n rooted” hearsay exceptions: statements made for medical\\n treatment. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–56 n.8 (1992)\\n (quotation omitted). And the justification for the exception is that\\n the reliability of such statements “is assured by the likelihood that\\n the patient believes that the effectiveness of the treatment depends\\n on the accuracy of the information provided to the doctor.” 2\\n Robert P. Mosteller et al., McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431 (8th\\n ed. 2020). A patient is “highly unlikely to lie” to her doctor, the\\n logic goes, because if she does then she will receive faulty medical\\n care. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990). The patient’s\\n natural desire to heal bestows a “guarantee of credibility” upon her\\n statements. See 5 Mark S. Brodin et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence\\n § 803.06[1], at 803–42 (2d ed. 2023). Simply put, Rule 803(4) is\\n premised on the existence of a “selfish treatment motivation.” 4 See\\n McCormick on Evidence § 277, at 431.\\n It is true that some other subsections of Rule 803 have an\\n explicit reliability requirement that is absent in Rule 803(4). See,\\n\\n 4 In Rule 803(4), the terms “diagnosis” and “treatment” are set apart by a\\n\\n disjunctive “or.” So of course, attempts at either diagnosis or treatment can\\n trigger the Rule, even in the absence of the other. Indeed, many diagnoses do\\n not require follow-on medical treatment (say, a benign mole). But whether\\n seeking diagnosis or treatment, the patient has a strong incentive to tell the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) (business records); 803(8) (public records).\\n But this omission should not be surprising—reliability is inherent\\n in Rule 803(4)’s context. A helpful comparison is the excited\\n utterances exception, which also has no explicit reliability\\n requirement. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). There too, the “firmly\\n rooted” exception to the hearsay rule inherently carries “sufficient\\n indicia of reliability.” White, 502 U.S. at 355–56 n.8. The\\n “evidentiary rationale” for both hearsay exceptions is simple: “such\\n out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide\\n substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness.” Id. at 355. All this\\n to say, the absence of an explicit reliability requirement in Rule\\n 803(4) does not make reliability irrelevant.\\n To the contrary—an expectation of reliability is woven into\\n the very fabric of Rule 803(4). See id. at 355–56 & n.8. But the same\\n cannot necessarily be said for other hearsay exceptions with an\\n explicit reliability requirement. Take the business records\\n exception. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). While classic business\\n records—“payrolls, accounts receivable, accounts payable,” and the\\n like—are “quite trustworthy,” experience has shown that some\\n records can be “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the\\n business.” See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 113–14 (1943). There\\n is no reason to think that these latter records—the ones whose\\n\\n\\n truth—to help the doctor get it right. So the fact that both fall within Rule\\n 803(4)’s exception does not mean that a statement can be made “for . . .\\n medical diagnosis” even when its purpose is entirely unrelated to ensuring the\\n patient’s health.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n “primary utility is in litigating”—are especially “reliable.” See id. at\\n 112, 114. By excluding them, then, the reliability requirement in\\n the Rule 803(6) business records exception ensures that “the door\\n to avoidance of cross-examination” is not “open[ed] wide.” Cf. id.\\n at 114.\\n Rule 803(4) does the same thing. It limits the hearsay\\n exception to evidence that has traditionally been considered\\n trustworthy. So for statements to be admissible under the Rule,\\n they must be made with the purpose of seeking—in other words,\\n “for”—medical treatment or diagnosis. And just like in other\\n hearsay contexts, the court decides whether the party seeking to\\n introduce the statement has “laid a proper foundation” for its\\n admission. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 880 (6th\\n Cir. 2019); United States v. Kootswatewa, 893 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir.\\n 2018); Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).\\n IV.\\n We now examine whether Rule 803(4) applies to Keegan’s\\n statements to Reynolds about her husband’s abuse. The district\\n court concluded that she recounted the abuse “to prepare the\\n witness to testify to a jury”—not for “diagnosis or treatment.” That\\n factual finding is reviewed for clear error, and we see none.\\n Keegan herself acknowledges that she sought the expert\\n witness’s opinion “principally in anticipation of litigation.” Indeed,\\n her attorney requested that the expert witness—who has not done\\n clinical work in about a decade—evaluate Keegan’s experiences “as\\n they relate to her current legal charges.” This laser focus on\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n litigation makes us share the district court’s skepticism that\\n Keegan’s statements to her expert witness were for medical\\n diagnosis.\\n What’s more, Keegan did not consult Reynolds until after\\n she was indicted. By the time she first spoke with Reynolds, she\\n had spent four months in jail. And if Keegan genuinely wanted to\\n inform the jury of her diagnosis, she needed to look no further\\n than her own medical records—in 2018, she went to the hospital\\n and received the same diagnosis that she got three years later from\\n Reynolds. But that earlier physician did not know of Keegan’s\\n accusations against her husband, and therefore could not testify\\n about them. All this goes to show that there was no “selfish\\n treatment motivation” here. See McCormick on Evidence § 277, at\\n 431.\\n It is not enough that Keegan asked for a medical diagnosis\\n and got one. As the district court concluded, the medical diagnosis\\n was not “the object, aim, or purpose” of the “action or activity.”\\n For, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language\\n (5th ed. 2016). And, as we said, the phrase “for medical diagnosis”\\n is there for a reason. Without it, statements like Keegan’s, made to\\n medical professionals without the true goal of seeking treatment,\\n could be entered into evidence—all while the true source of the\\n information evades cross-examination. See 6 Wigmore on\\n Evidence § 1720, at 113. Such evasion strikes at the heart of our\\n Nation’s hearsay rules, which aim to guarantee “an opportunity of\\n cross-examination, or to call attention to omitted facts, that if\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n stated might modify or completely overturn the inference drawn\\n from the declarations as made.” State v. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257, 283\\n (1872). And rules are not simply procedural loopholes to exploit;\\n they “guard against” the dangers that are “so liable to arise from\\n the admission, as evidence, of declarations not made under the\\n sanction of an oath.” Id.\\n To be sure, in other cases it may be more difficult to discern\\n why a litigant sought her medical expert. But district courts are\\n equipped to probe whether a litigant made specific statements to a\\n medical expert for the genuine purpose of obtaining a diagnosis or\\n treatment. “Immersed in the case as it unfolds, a district court is\\n more familiar with the procedural and factual details and is in a\\n better position to decide many evidentiary and similar issues.”\\n United States v. Shamsid-Deen, 61 F.4th 935, 943 (11th Cir. 2023)\\n (quotation omitted). Here, the district court did not clearly err in\\n finding that Keegan’s statements of abuse to her expert witness\\n were not made for medical diagnosis or treatment.\\n Keegan protests that the Advisory Committee on Evidence\\n Rules’ Note to Rule 803(4), published in 1972, requires a different\\n understanding of the Rule. But while the Committee’s Notes are\\n typically afforded “great weight,” they are “not binding.” See\\n Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132 (11th Cir. 2005)\\n (quotation omitted). And they can be discounted when their\\n foundation has been eroded. Here there is good reason to ignore\\n the Note even apart from its atextual hostility to the reliability\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 15 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n standards inherent in the traditional rule: its rationale is\\n contradicted by a later amendment to the Rules of Evidence.\\n The Note says that statements made to “a physician\\n consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify” are\\n admissible under Rule 803(4). See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes\\n on Rule 803. Under “[c]onventional doctrine,” though, those\\n statements were “not admissible as substantive evidence.” Id. That\\n means that the jury could not consider the statements for their\\n truth. See United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n But the expert witness was allowed to use the statements to explain\\n “the basis of his opinion.” See 1972 Advisory Committee Notes on\\n Rule 803.\\n A concrete example clarifies the difference. Suppose\\n Reynolds testified as follows: “Based on what Keegan told me\\n about the abuse she suffered, I diagnosed her with dissociative\\n identity disorder.” Under the conventional doctrine, the jury could\\n not consider Keegan’s allegations of abuse as “substantive\\n evidence”—that is, as proof that she was abused. Instead, it could\\n consider the allegations only as the “basis” of Reynolds’s\\n testimony—that is, take account of the fact that Keegan’s\\n allegations were the reason Reynolds diagnosed Keegan with the\\n disorder.\\n The 1972 Note—but not the Rule itself—treated litigants’\\n statements to expert witnesses as substantive evidence, rejecting\\n that traditional distinction. Why? The Committee said it was “one\\n most unlikely to be made by juries.” See id. But that rationale no\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 16 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n longer holds up. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 now “demands that\\n juries make the exact distinction that the 1972 Advisory\\n Committee’s Note says they cannot.” Paul W. Kaufman &\\n Christopher J. Merken, Toward a Presumptive Admission of Medical\\n Records Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), 64 B.C. L. Rev. 567,\\n 585–86 n.85 (2023).\\n Rule 703 deals with the proper bases of an expert witness’s\\n opinion testimony. Before 2000, there was judicial and scholarly\\n disagreement about “how to treat inadmissible information when\\n it is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion.”\\n See 2000 Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 703 (collecting cases\\n and scholarship). Some argued that the rules governing expert\\n testimony should account for the “fine but important distinction”\\n between an expert’s opinion (which is substantive evidence) and\\n the basis of that opinion (which is not). See Ronald L. Carlson,\\n Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 577,\\n 584–86 (1986). Others disagreed, contending that the “charade that\\n opinions and their bases are severable should end.” See Paul R.\\n Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A\\n Response to Professor Carlson, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 583, 596 (1987).\\n Taking the 1972 Note to Rule 803(4) seriously would seem to\\n require adopting the latter approach—refusing to trust juries to\\n distinguish between substantive evidence and basis-of-opinion\\n evidence.\\n But that is not what happened. In fact, the 2000 amendment\\n to the text of Rule 703 did the opposite: it established that “hearsay\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 17 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n relied upon by an expert is admissible only to establish the basis of\\n that expert’s opinion and not as substantive evidence.” Kaufman\\n & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 585–86 n.85; see Henderson v. Ford Motor\\n Co., 72 F.4th 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2023). Given the contradiction\\n between this amendment and the 1972 Note, we have little reason\\n to afford the Note its ordinary persuasive value. 5\\n We acknowledge that the result here puts us at odds with\\n some of our sister circuits. See O’Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d\\n 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83\\n (8th Cir. 1980); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 & n.18 (4th Cir.\\n 1988); United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993).\\n But the most recent of these decisions was over three decades\\n ago—seven years before the relevant amendment to Rule 703. And,\\n with respect, none grapples with the text of or justification for Rule\\n 803(4). Instead, they home in on the Advisory Committee Note\\n and matter-of-factly state that “Rule 803(4) abolished the common-\\n\\n\\n 5 It is fair to wonder why the Advisory Committee did not update the Note to\\n\\n Rule 803(4) when it amended Rule 703. The likely reason is the Committee’s\\n enabling rules, which establish that the Committee’s mandate is to “consider\\n proposed new and amended rules (together with committee notes).” See Jud.\\n Conf. of the U.S., Procedures for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of\\n Practice and Procedure and Its Advisory Rules Committees § 440.20.30(c). The\\n Committee “reads this rule as not authorizing it to make changes to the\\n Advisory Committee Notes unless they coincide with a rule amendment.”\\n Kaufman & Merken, 64 B.C. L. Rev. at 587 & n.93. And because there has not\\n been any “substantive change to Rule 803(4) since 1972,” the Committee\\n “could not have amended Rule 803(4)’s 1972 Advisory Committee Note when\\n it amended Rule 703 in 2000.” Id. at 587–88.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 18 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-13019\\n\\n law distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the\\n purpose of treatment and an examination for the purpose of\\n diagnosis only.” See Farley, 992 F.2d at 1125 (alteration adopted and\\n quotation omitted); Morgan, 846 F.2d at 950; Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at\\n 83; O’Gee, 570 F.2d at 1089. That approach both ignores the\\n meaning of the Rule, and strips the district court of its ordinary\\n authority to make factual judgments in evidentiary rulings. And as\\n we have explained, the Note cannot carry the weight those courts\\n put on it. Again, the 2000 amendment to Rule 703 requires juries to\\n make exactly the same distinction that the Note says they cannot\\n handle. We decline to rest our decision on the Note, and use the\\n text of the Rule instead.\\n Given the circumstances underlying Reynolds’s proffered\\n testimony, we see no clear error in the district court’s finding that\\n Keegan did not seek out a medical expert to obtain a diagnosis.\\n And given the ordinary meaning of the word for—“not to mention\\n common sense”—the district court did not abuse its discretion in\\n concluding that Keegan’s statements do not qualify for the hearsay\\n exception in Rule 803(4). See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169,\\n 179 (2014).\\n * * *\\n To be clear: some statements made to medical expert\\n witnesses will qualify for the hearsay exception in Rule 803(4). In\\n deciding which ones do, courts must consider, among other things,\\n the text of the Rule, the context surrounding the statement, and\\n the facts of the case. Given these considerations, Keegan’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 19 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n statements of abuse to her expert witness were not “for” medical\\n diagnosis. We AFFIRM.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 20 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-13019 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30979,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10761036,"string":"10,761,036"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Racheal Gantt v. Deputy Everett"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-18"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-12167"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 1 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12167\\n ____________________\\n\\n RACHEAL GANTT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n DEPUTY EVERETT,\\n Jefferson County Corrections Officer,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00648-RDP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether a\\n deputy was deliberately indifferent to injuries suffered by an\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 2 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n inmate during her attempted suicide. After Deputy Monica Everett\\n saw that Racheal Gantt had suffered a head injury that needed med-\\n ical attention and spoke with a nurse about it, she remotely un-\\n locked Gantt’s jail cell door to transport her to the medical clinic.\\n Gantt suddenly ran up a flight of stairs and jumped from a second-\\n story landing. Gantt sued Everett for deliberate indifference, 42\\n U.S.C. § 1983, and Everett later moved for summary judgment\\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied summary\\n judgment. We vacate and remand with instructions to grant Ever-\\n ett qualified immunity because she did not violate Gantt’s consti-\\n tutional rights.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n This appeal arises out of Racheal Gantt’s pretrial detainment\\n at the Jefferson County Jail. After Gantt expressed suicidal thoughts\\n to mental health personnel, she was placed on suicide watch and\\n transferred to the A Block. The A Block is on the fifth floor, and it\\n contains two stories of cells that open to a common area called the\\n “day space.” Gantt was placed in a cell on the bottom story. Be-\\n cause she was on suicide watch, Gantt had a “suicide smock” in-\\n stead of a standard uniform. Suicide smocks are thick, green Velcro\\n blankets that inmates cannot rip or tear.\\n On February 8, 2023, Deputies Morgan and Yunker were\\n working on the fifth floor where Gantt was detained. Control\\n Room Operator Lovell was stationed in the fifth-floor control\\n room. Deputies can unlock cell doors from the control room or,\\n while standing in a particular block, use the intercom system to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 3 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n request that the control room operator unlock a certain cell door.\\n When a cell door is unlocked from the control room, it swings\\n open.\\n Everett was stationed on the first floor that day, but she\\n went to the fifth floor “to assist with a shakedown in [the] F Block.”\\n During the shakedown, Everett and Deputy McCants escorted a\\n female inmate from the F Block to the A Block for disciplinary pur-\\n poses.\\n In the A Block, Everett heard Gantt “screaming and crying\\n hysterically” in her cell. Everett had never interacted with or heard\\n of Gantt. Everett testified that suicide attempts are “well-known\\n throughout the jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s]\\n name plenty of times if she had done anything.” But Everett knew\\n that prison staff typically kept suicidal inmates on the bottom floor\\n of the A Block because jumping off the second-story landing is an\\n “obvious suicide” risk. Before the incident with Gantt, Everett\\n knew of two inmates in the general jail population who had\\n jumped off the second-story landing and injured themselves.\\n Everett noticed Gantt’s suicide smock and realized that she\\n was on suicide watch, which meant “that at some point, [Gantt]\\n had to have told somebody she wanted to kill herself.” Gantt told\\n Everett that she had a head injury, but it is unclear precisely what\\n Gantt said. In any event, Everett saw a “large knot” on Gantt’s\\n head, so she went to the control room and called the medical clinic.\\n A nurse told Everett to bring Gantt to the clinic. When Ev-\\n erett told the other deputies in the control room that she was\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 4 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n taking Gantt to the medical clinic, none of them warned her that\\n “they [were] worried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that\\n was more likely to commit suicide,” even though the deputies reg-\\n ularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about particular\\n inmates.” And in Everett’s view, Gantt’s request for help was “a\\n sure sign that [Gantt] want[ed] help not to harm herself any fur-\\n ther.” Everett yelled for another deputy to grab a uniform for Gantt\\n and unlocked Gantt’s cell door from the control room. There were\\n no deputies in the A Block when Everett unlocked Gantt’s cell.\\n After her cell door unlocked, Gantt ran out of her cell, across\\n the day space, and up the stairs leading to the second level of the A\\n Block. At this point, Everett had left the control room and returned\\n to the A Block. She saw Gantt run up the stairs and yelled at her to\\n come down. Everett initially “assumed that [Gantt] was just trying\\n to get something from somebody” on the second story because\\n Gantt did not have access to the prison store. But when Gantt\\n reached the top landing and “had her hand on the rail,” Everett\\n “knew what she was doing.”\\n Everett ran up the stairs to try to stop Gantt, but she did not\\n reach Gantt before Gantt jumped. Gantt jumped 23 seconds after\\n Everett unlocked her cell door. Gantt was taken to the emergency\\n room, where she was treated for ankle fractures from her jump and\\n for her preexisting head injury.\\n Gantt sued Everett for violating her rights under the Four-\\n teenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that Everett\\n was deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood that she would\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 5 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n attempt to take her own life and that Everett’s deliberate indiffer-\\n ence resulted in her suicide attempt and injuries.\\n After discovery, Everett moved for summary judgment\\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.\\n It ruled that a reasonable juror could find that Everett violated\\n Gantt’s constitutional rights by “deliberately disregard[ing] a\\n strong likelihood . . . that harm would occur if she let [Gantt] out\\n of her cell unsupervised.” It also ruled that Everett violated clearly\\n established law because “the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that\\n an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm to a\\n detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n “[Q]ualified immunity completely protects government of-\\n ficials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individ-\\n ual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established stat-\\n utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would\\n have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.\\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The official\\n invoking qualified immunity has the initial burden to establish that\\n she was acting within her discretionary authority. Id. Gantt does\\n not dispute that Everett acted within her discretionary authority.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 6 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n So Gantt bore the burden to prove that a reasonable jury could find\\n that Everett violated her constitutional right and that her right was\\n clearly established when Everett violated it. See Nelson, 89 F.4th at\\n 1296.\\n Pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right “to\\n be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.” Jackson\\n v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For\\n a prisoner-suicide claim, “the plaintiff must show that the jail offi-\\n cial displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his\\n own life.” Id. at 1353 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quo-\\n tation marks omitted). A deliberate-indifference claim has both an\\n objective and a subjective component: an inmate must prove that\\n she “suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, sufficiently seri-\\n ous” and that the defendant “acted with subjective recklessness as\\n used in the criminal law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262\\n (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks\\n omitted) (clarifying the standard for establishing liability on an\\n Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim); see also Tittle v.\\n Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)\\n (“Whether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or\\n Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial because in a prisoner suicide\\n case . . . under either the [E]ighth or [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,\\n the plaintiff must show that the jail official defendant displayed de-\\n liberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.” (alter-\\n ations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n Subjective recklessness means that “the defendant was actually,\\n subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 7 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. The offi-\\n cial’s subjective awareness of the risk must be tied to the specific\\n individual whose rights are at issue. See Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539\\n (“[O]fficials [must] have notice of the suicidal tendency of the indi-\\n vidual whose rights are at issue in order to be held liable for the\\n suicide of that individual.”).\\n Gantt satisfied the objective requirement of her claim of de-\\n liberate indifference. She “suffered a deprivation that was, objec-\\n tively, sufficiently serious” because she was not prevented from in-\\n juring herself by jumping off the stairs. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (ci-\\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted). But Gantt failed to\\n establish that Everett was “actually, subjectively aware” that her\\n decision to unlock Gantt’s cell from the control room “caused a\\n substantial risk of serious harm” to Gantt based on Gantt’s suicidal\\n tendencies. Id.\\n To be sure, Everett knew that suicidal inmates were kept on\\n the bottom floor of the A Block because jumping off the second-\\n story landing is an “obvious suicide” risk, and she knew of two in-\\n mates in the general jail population who had jumped from the sec-\\n ond-story landing and injured themselves. She agreed that when\\n the cell door was unlocked, that would give Gantt the opportunity\\n to run up the stairs and jump “[i]f she wanted to.” And Everett\\n “knew that at some point, [Gantt] had to have told somebody she\\n wanted to kill herself to be on suicide watch.”\\n But there is no evidence in the record from which a reason-\\n able jury could find that when Everett remotely unlocked Gantt’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 8 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n cell door, Everett was subjectively aware that doing so created a\\n substantial risk that Gantt would climb the stairs and jump. Everett\\n had no prior knowledge about any suicide attempts by Gantt. She\\n testified that suicide attempts are “well-known throughout the\\n jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s] name plenty of\\n times if she had done anything.” She also testified that when she\\n walked into the control room and told the deputies there that she\\n was about to take Gantt to the medical clinic, “if they [were] wor-\\n ried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that was more likely\\n to commit suicide,” they would have warned her because the dep-\\n uties regularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about\\n particular inmates.” Everett testified, without dispute, that Gantt’s\\n request for assistance was, in her view, “a sure sign that [Gantt]\\n want[ed] help not to harm herself any further.” And when Everett\\n first saw Gantt climb the stairs, she “assumed that [Gantt] was just\\n trying to get something from somebody” because Gantt did not\\n have access to the prison store as a suicidal inmate. It was not until\\n Gantt “had her hand on the rail” that Everett “knew what she was\\n doing.”\\n We reject the notion that we must view Everett’s response\\n to Gantt’s suicide risk in isolation from the risk posed by her head\\n injury. Everett perceived that Gantt’s head injury created an imme-\\n diate risk of serious harm for which she was seeking help, and Ev-\\n erett indisputably tried to help her. She approached Gantt’s cell\\n upon hearing her cries, relayed her injury to the jail’s nurses, and\\n arranged for her transport to the medical clinic. After unlocking\\n Gantt’s door from the control room, Everett immediately walked\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 9 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n back to the A Block to take Gantt to the medical clinic. When she\\n realized that Gantt was going to jump, Everett chased after her to\\n try to stop her. Because Everett sought to aid Gantt, we cannot say\\n that she knowingly ignored a substantial risk of harm at the same\\n time.\\n Perhaps Everett acted negligently in rendering aid. Perhaps\\n she should have ensured that another deputy was in the A Block\\n before unlocking Gantt’s cell. Perhaps she could have made her\\n way back to the A Block with greater haste. But the Fourteenth\\n Amendment does not prohibit negligence; it prohibits “subjective\\n recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262\\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Everett\\n was not criminally reckless, she did not violate Gantt’s constitu-\\n tional rights and is entitled to qualified immunity.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE and REMAND with instructions to enter\\n summary judgment for Everett based on qualified immunity.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 10 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Kidd, J., Dissenting 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11227621/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:\\n This deliberate indifference claim comes with a knotty fact\\n pattern. Deputy Everett had to confront two separate, known risks\\n to Gantt’s health and safety. The first risk was the obvious head in-\\n jury that Everett saw when she observed Gantt in her cell. No one\\n faults Everett for attempting to help Gantt with that medical emer-\\n gency. But this first risk is not before us, and we must be careful not\\n to allow Everett’s response to Gantt’s head injury to cloud our re-\\n view of her response to the second risk: Gantt’s known suicidal\\n tendencies. I disagree with the majority’s finding that “there is no\\n evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that\\n when Everett remotely unlocked Gantt’s cell door, Everett was sub-\\n jectively aware that doing so created a substantial risk that Gantt\\n would climb the stairs and jump.” That conclusion is at odds with\\n the record before us.\\n The majority and I both begin our deliberate indifference\\n analysis with Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024) (en\\n banc). In Wade, we held that “a deliberate-indifference plaintiff\\n must show that the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness\\n as used in the criminal law,’ and that in order to do so, the plaintiff\\n must demonstrate that the defendant actually knew that his con-\\n duct—his own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial\\n risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1253 (citation omitted) (quoting Farmer\\n v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)). That is what occurred here.\\n As the majority recognizes, despite minimal prior interac-\\n tion between Everett and Gantt, Everett subjectively knew that (1)\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 11 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Kidd, J., Dissenting 24-12167\\n\\n Gantt was suicidal and was on suicide watch; (2) suicidal inmates\\n were kept on the bottom floor of the A Block because jumping off\\n the second-story landing is an “obvious suicide” risk; (3) at least two\\n other inmates in the general jail population had jumped from the\\n second-story landing and injured themselves; and (4) remotely un-\\n locking Gantt’s door gave Gantt the opportunity to run up the\\n stairs and jump.\\n What did Everett do with this knowledge? She remotely un-\\n locked Gantt’s cell door (knowing that Gantt was on suicide\\n watch), which allowed Gantt to run up the stairs and jump (exactly\\n what Everett knew other inmates had done before). Everett’s ac-\\n tions went beyond mere negligence. It does not matter if Everett\\n thought, or if we believe that it was reasonable for Everett to think,\\n that Gantt might not attempt suicide at that moment. Rather, the\\n evidence supports that Everett “[was] aware that [her] conduct\\n might cause the [attempted suicide] result, though it [was] not sub-\\n stantially certain to happen.” Id. at 1261 (emphasis omitted) (quot-\\n ing Wayne LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.4(f ), at 507 (2018))\\n (citation modified). That is all “subjective recklessness as used in\\n the criminal law” requires.\\n In Wade, we also added the caveat that, if the defendant “‘ac-\\n tually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,’ he ‘can-\\n not be found liable . . .’ if he ‘responded reasonably to th[at] risk.’”\\n Id. at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45). There are several\\n reasonable responses that Everett could have taken in light of\\n Gantt’s suicide risk, including, as the majority notes, “ensur[ing]\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 12 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Kidd, J., Dissenting 3\\n\\n that another deputy was in the A Block before unlocking Gantt’s\\n cell.” That would have allowed Everett to respond reasonably both\\n to Gantt’s head injury and to her suicide risk.\\n What was not a reasonable response to Gantt’s suicide risk\\n was simply unlocking the cell door remotely and providing the op-\\n portunity for Gantt to do what Everett knew was possible: a suicide\\n attempt. The majority accurately notes that, after unlocking\\n Gantt’s cell door, Everett walked back to the cell block and then\\n chased Gantt up the stairs. But that was not a response to Gantt’s\\n suicide risk. That was Everett’s response to her own misjudgment.\\n Perhaps that response would be persuasive to a jury at trial, but it\\n should not entirely absolve her of liability at this stage through\\n qualified immunity.\\n We must bear in mind that this case is currently before us on\\n summary judgment. “Where the nonmoving party [here, Gantt]\\n bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party [here, Everett]\\n may discharge this initial responsibility by showing that there is an\\n absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. If [Ev-\\n erett] makes that showing, [Gantt] must come forward with evi-\\n dence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion.” Bayse v.\\n Ward, 147 F.4th 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).\\n In my view, Gantt has put forth enough evidence for a rea-\\n sonable jury to find that Everett violated Gantt’s constitutional\\n rights under the Wade standard. I would therefore affirm the district\\n court, deny Everett qualified immunity, and allow a jury to decide\\n whether Everett should be liable to Gantt.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 13 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Kidd, J., Dissenting 24-12167\\n\\n I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11227621/\", \"author_raw\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761036/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Racheal Gantt v. Deputy Everett\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-18\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 1 of 13\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-12167\n ____________________\n\n RACHEAL GANTT,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n DEPUTY EVERETT,\n Jefferson County Corrections Officer,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00648-RDP\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\n Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether a\n deputy was deliberately indifferent to injuries suffered by an\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 2 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\n\n inmate during her attempted suicide. After Deputy Monica Everett\n saw that Racheal Gantt had suffered a head injury that needed med-\n ical attention and spoke with a nurse about it, she remotely un-\n locked Gantt’s jail cell door to transport her to the medical clinic.\n Gantt suddenly ran up a flight of stairs and jumped from a second-\n story landing. Gantt sued Everett for deliberate indifference, 42\n U.S.C. § 1983, and Everett later moved for summary judgment\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied summary\n judgment. We vacate and remand with instructions to grant Ever-\n ett qualified immunity because she did not violate Gantt’s consti-\n tutional rights.\n I. BACKGROUND\n This appeal arises out of Racheal Gantt’s pretrial detainment\n at the Jefferson County Jail. After Gantt expressed suicidal thoughts\n to mental health personnel, she was placed on suicide watch and\n transferred to the A Block. The A Block is on the fifth floor, and it\n contains two stories of cells that open to a common area called the\n “day space.” Gantt was placed in a cell on the bottom story. Be-\n cause she was on suicide watch, Gantt had a “suicide smock” in-\n stead of a standard uniform. Suicide smocks are thick, green Velcro\n blankets that inmates cannot rip or tear.\n On February 8, 2023, Deputies Morgan and Yunker were\n working on the fifth floor where Gantt was detained. Control\n Room Operator Lovell was stationed in the fifth-floor control\n room. Deputies can unlock cell doors from the control room or,\n while standing in a particular block, use the intercom system to\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 3 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n request that the control room operator unlock a certain cell door.\n When a cell door is unlocked from the control room, it swings\n open.\n Everett was stationed on the first floor that day, but she\n went to the fifth floor “to assist with a shakedown in [the] F Block.”\n During the shakedown, Everett and Deputy McCants escorted a\n female inmate from the F Block to the A Block for disciplinary pur-\n poses.\n In the A Block, Everett heard Gantt “screaming and crying\n hysterically” in her cell. Everett had never interacted with or heard\n of Gantt. Everett testified that suicide attempts are “well-known\n throughout the jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s]\n name plenty of times if she had done anything.” But Everett knew\n that prison staff typically kept suicidal inmates on the bottom floor\n of the A Block because jumping off the second-story landing is an\n “obvious suicide” risk. Before the incident with Gantt, Everett\n knew of two inmates in the general jail population who had\n jumped off the second-story landing and injured themselves.\n Everett noticed Gantt’s suicide smock and realized that she\n was on suicide watch, which meant “that at some point, [Gantt]\n had to have told somebody she wanted to kill herself.” Gantt told\n Everett that she had a head injury, but it is unclear precisely what\n Gantt said. In any event, Everett saw a “large knot” on Gantt’s\n head, so she went to the control room and called the medical clinic.\n A nurse told Everett to bring Gantt to the clinic. When Ev-\n erett told the other deputies in the control room that she was\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 4 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\n\n taking Gantt to the medical clinic, none of them warned her that\n “they [were] worried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that\n was more likely to commit suicide,” even though the deputies reg-\n ularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about particular\n inmates.” And in Everett’s view, Gantt’s request for help was “a\n sure sign that [Gantt] want[ed] help not to harm herself any fur-\n ther.” Everett yelled for another deputy to grab a uniform for Gantt\n and unlocked Gantt’s cell door from the control room. There were\n no deputies in the A Block when Everett unlocked Gantt’s cell.\n After her cell door unlocked, Gantt ran out of her cell, across\n the day space, and up the stairs leading to the second level of the A\n Block. At this point, Everett had left the control room and returned\n to the A Block. She saw Gantt run up the stairs and yelled at her to\n come down. Everett initially “assumed that [Gantt] was just trying\n to get something from somebody” on the second story because\n Gantt did not have access to the prison store. But when Gantt\n reached the top landing and “had her hand on the rail,” Everett\n “knew what she was doing.”\n Everett ran up the stairs to try to stop Gantt, but she did not\n reach Gantt before Gantt jumped. Gantt jumped 23 seconds after\n Everett unlocked her cell door. Gantt was taken to the emergency\n room, where she was treated for ankle fractures from her jump and\n for her preexisting head injury.\n Gantt sued Everett for violating her rights under the Four-\n teenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that Everett\n was deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood that she would\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 5 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n attempt to take her own life and that Everett’s deliberate indiffer-\n ence resulted in her suicide attempt and injuries.\n After discovery, Everett moved for summary judgment\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.\n It ruled that a reasonable juror could find that Everett violated\n Gantt’s constitutional rights by “deliberately disregard[ing] a\n strong likelihood . . . that harm would occur if she let [Gantt] out\n of her cell unsupervised.” It also ruled that Everett violated clearly\n established law because “the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that\n an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm to a\n detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024).\n III. DISCUSSION\n “[Q]ualified immunity completely protects government of-\n ficials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individ-\n ual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established stat-\n utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would\n have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The official\n invoking qualified immunity has the initial burden to establish that\n she was acting within her discretionary authority. Id. Gantt does\n not dispute that Everett acted within her discretionary authority.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 6 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\n\n So Gantt bore the burden to prove that a reasonable jury could find\n that Everett violated her constitutional right and that her right was\n clearly established when Everett violated it. See Nelson, 89 F.4th at\n 1296.\n Pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right “to\n be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.” Jackson\n v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For\n a prisoner-suicide claim, “the plaintiff must show that the jail offi-\n cial displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his\n own life.” Id. at 1353 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quo-\n tation marks omitted). A deliberate-indifference claim has both an\n objective and a subjective component: an inmate must prove that\n she “suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, sufficiently seri-\n ous” and that the defendant “acted with subjective recklessness as\n used in the criminal law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262\n (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks\n omitted) (clarifying the standard for establishing liability on an\n Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim); see also Tittle v.\n Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)\n (“Whether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or\n Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial because in a prisoner suicide\n case . . . under either the [E]ighth or [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,\n the plaintiff must show that the jail official defendant displayed de-\n liberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.” (alter-\n ations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).\n Subjective recklessness means that “the defendant was actually,\n subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 7 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. The offi-\n cial’s subjective awareness of the risk must be tied to the specific\n individual whose rights are at issue. See Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539\n (“[O]fficials [must] have notice of the suicidal tendency of the indi-\n vidual whose rights are at issue in order to be held liable for the\n suicide of that individual.”).\n Gantt satisfied the objective requirement of her claim of de-\n liberate indifference. She “suffered a deprivation that was, objec-\n tively, sufficiently serious” because she was not prevented from in-\n juring herself by jumping off the stairs. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (ci-\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted). But Gantt failed to\n establish that Everett was “actually, subjectively aware” that her\n decision to unlock Gantt’s cell from the control room “caused a\n substantial risk of serious harm” to Gantt based on Gantt’s suicidal\n tendencies. Id.\n To be sure, Everett knew that suicidal inmates were kept on\n the bottom floor of the A Block because jumping off the second-\n story landing is an “obvious suicide” risk, and she knew of two in-\n mates in the general jail population who had jumped from the sec-\n ond-story landing and injured themselves. She agreed that when\n the cell door was unlocked, that would give Gantt the opportunity\n to run up the stairs and jump “[i]f she wanted to.” And Everett\n “knew that at some point, [Gantt] had to have told somebody she\n wanted to kill herself to be on suicide watch.”\n But there is no evidence in the record from which a reason-\n able jury could find that when Everett remotely unlocked Gantt’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 8 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\n\n cell door, Everett was subjectively aware that doing so created a\n substantial risk that Gantt would climb the stairs and jump. Everett\n had no prior knowledge about any suicide attempts by Gantt. She\n testified that suicide attempts are “well-known throughout the\n jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s] name plenty of\n times if she had done anything.” She also testified that when she\n walked into the control room and told the deputies there that she\n was about to take Gantt to the medical clinic, “if they [were] wor-\n ried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that was more likely\n to commit suicide,” they would have warned her because the dep-\n uties regularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about\n particular inmates.” Everett testified, without dispute, that Gantt’s\n request for assistance was, in her view, “a sure sign that [Gantt]\n want[ed] help not to harm herself any further.” And when Everett\n first saw Gantt climb the stairs, she “assumed that [Gantt] was just\n trying to get something from somebody” because Gantt did not\n have access to the prison store as a suicidal inmate. It was not until\n Gantt “had her hand on the rail” that Everett “knew what she was\n doing.”\n We reject the notion that we must view Everett’s response\n to Gantt’s suicide risk in isolation from the risk posed by her head\n injury. Everett perceived that Gantt’s head injury created an imme-\n diate risk of serious harm for which she was seeking help, and Ev-\n erett indisputably tried to help her. She approached Gantt’s cell\n upon hearing her cries, relayed her injury to the jail’s nurses, and\n arranged for her transport to the medical clinic. After unlocking\n Gantt’s door from the control room, Everett immediately walked\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 9 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n back to the A Block to take Gantt to the medical clinic. When she\n realized that Gantt was going to jump, Everett chased after her to\n try to stop her. Because Everett sought to aid Gantt, we cannot say\n that she knowingly ignored a substantial risk of harm at the same\n time.\n Perhaps Everett acted negligently in rendering aid. Perhaps\n she should have ensured that another deputy was in the A Block\n before unlocking Gantt’s cell. Perhaps she could have made her\n way back to the A Block with greater haste. But the Fourteenth\n Amendment does not prohibit negligence; it prohibits “subjective\n recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Everett\n was not criminally reckless, she did not violate Gantt’s constitu-\n tional rights and is entitled to qualified immunity.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We VACATE and REMAND with instructions to enter\n summary judgment for Everett based on qualified immunity.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 10 of 13\n\n\n\n\n 24-12167 Kidd, J., Dissenting 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Racheal Gantt v. Deputy Everett\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-18\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 1 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12167\\n ____________________\\n\\n RACHEAL GANTT,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n DEPUTY EVERETT,\\n Jefferson County Corrections Officer,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:23-cv-00648-RDP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether a\\n deputy was deliberately indifferent to injuries suffered by an\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 2 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n inmate during her attempted suicide. After Deputy Monica Everett\\n saw that Racheal Gantt had suffered a head injury that needed med-\\n ical attention and spoke with a nurse about it, she remotely un-\\n locked Gantt’s jail cell door to transport her to the medical clinic.\\n Gantt suddenly ran up a flight of stairs and jumped from a second-\\n story landing. Gantt sued Everett for deliberate indifference, 42\\n U.S.C. § 1983, and Everett later moved for summary judgment\\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied summary\\n judgment. We vacate and remand with instructions to grant Ever-\\n ett qualified immunity because she did not violate Gantt’s consti-\\n tutional rights.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n This appeal arises out of Racheal Gantt’s pretrial detainment\\n at the Jefferson County Jail. After Gantt expressed suicidal thoughts\\n to mental health personnel, she was placed on suicide watch and\\n transferred to the A Block. The A Block is on the fifth floor, and it\\n contains two stories of cells that open to a common area called the\\n “day space.” Gantt was placed in a cell on the bottom story. Be-\\n cause she was on suicide watch, Gantt had a “suicide smock” in-\\n stead of a standard uniform. Suicide smocks are thick, green Velcro\\n blankets that inmates cannot rip or tear.\\n On February 8, 2023, Deputies Morgan and Yunker were\\n working on the fifth floor where Gantt was detained. Control\\n Room Operator Lovell was stationed in the fifth-floor control\\n room. Deputies can unlock cell doors from the control room or,\\n while standing in a particular block, use the intercom system to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 3 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n request that the control room operator unlock a certain cell door.\\n When a cell door is unlocked from the control room, it swings\\n open.\\n Everett was stationed on the first floor that day, but she\\n went to the fifth floor “to assist with a shakedown in [the] F Block.”\\n During the shakedown, Everett and Deputy McCants escorted a\\n female inmate from the F Block to the A Block for disciplinary pur-\\n poses.\\n In the A Block, Everett heard Gantt “screaming and crying\\n hysterically” in her cell. Everett had never interacted with or heard\\n of Gantt. Everett testified that suicide attempts are “well-known\\n throughout the jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s]\\n name plenty of times if she had done anything.” But Everett knew\\n that prison staff typically kept suicidal inmates on the bottom floor\\n of the A Block because jumping off the second-story landing is an\\n “obvious suicide” risk. Before the incident with Gantt, Everett\\n knew of two inmates in the general jail population who had\\n jumped off the second-story landing and injured themselves.\\n Everett noticed Gantt’s suicide smock and realized that she\\n was on suicide watch, which meant “that at some point, [Gantt]\\n had to have told somebody she wanted to kill herself.” Gantt told\\n Everett that she had a head injury, but it is unclear precisely what\\n Gantt said. In any event, Everett saw a “large knot” on Gantt’s\\n head, so she went to the control room and called the medical clinic.\\n A nurse told Everett to bring Gantt to the clinic. When Ev-\\n erett told the other deputies in the control room that she was\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 4 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n taking Gantt to the medical clinic, none of them warned her that\\n “they [were] worried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that\\n was more likely to commit suicide,” even though the deputies reg-\\n ularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about particular\\n inmates.” And in Everett’s view, Gantt’s request for help was “a\\n sure sign that [Gantt] want[ed] help not to harm herself any fur-\\n ther.” Everett yelled for another deputy to grab a uniform for Gantt\\n and unlocked Gantt’s cell door from the control room. There were\\n no deputies in the A Block when Everett unlocked Gantt’s cell.\\n After her cell door unlocked, Gantt ran out of her cell, across\\n the day space, and up the stairs leading to the second level of the A\\n Block. At this point, Everett had left the control room and returned\\n to the A Block. She saw Gantt run up the stairs and yelled at her to\\n come down. Everett initially “assumed that [Gantt] was just trying\\n to get something from somebody” on the second story because\\n Gantt did not have access to the prison store. But when Gantt\\n reached the top landing and “had her hand on the rail,” Everett\\n “knew what she was doing.”\\n Everett ran up the stairs to try to stop Gantt, but she did not\\n reach Gantt before Gantt jumped. Gantt jumped 23 seconds after\\n Everett unlocked her cell door. Gantt was taken to the emergency\\n room, where she was treated for ankle fractures from her jump and\\n for her preexisting head injury.\\n Gantt sued Everett for violating her rights under the Four-\\n teenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that Everett\\n was deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood that she would\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 5 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n attempt to take her own life and that Everett’s deliberate indiffer-\\n ence resulted in her suicide attempt and injuries.\\n After discovery, Everett moved for summary judgment\\n based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion.\\n It ruled that a reasonable juror could find that Everett violated\\n Gantt’s constitutional rights by “deliberately disregard[ing] a\\n strong likelihood . . . that harm would occur if she let [Gantt] out\\n of her cell unsupervised.” It also ruled that Everett violated clearly\\n established law because “the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that\\n an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm to a\\n detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We “review a denial of qualified immunity de novo and, on a\\n motion for summary judgment, view the evidence in the light most\\n favorable to the nonmoving party.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th\\n 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n “[Q]ualified immunity completely protects government of-\\n ficials performing discretionary functions from suit in their individ-\\n ual capacities unless their conduct violates clearly established stat-\\n utory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would\\n have known.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir.\\n 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The official\\n invoking qualified immunity has the initial burden to establish that\\n she was acting within her discretionary authority. Id. Gantt does\\n not dispute that Everett acted within her discretionary authority.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 6 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n So Gantt bore the burden to prove that a reasonable jury could find\\n that Everett violated her constitutional right and that her right was\\n clearly established when Everett violated it. See Nelson, 89 F.4th at\\n 1296.\\n Pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right “to\\n be protected from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.” Jackson\\n v. West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For\\n a prisoner-suicide claim, “the plaintiff must show that the jail offi-\\n cial displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his\\n own life.” Id. at 1353 (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quo-\\n tation marks omitted). A deliberate-indifference claim has both an\\n objective and a subjective component: an inmate must prove that\\n she “suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, sufficiently seri-\\n ous” and that the defendant “acted with subjective recklessness as\\n used in the criminal law.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262\\n (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks\\n omitted) (clarifying the standard for establishing liability on an\\n Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim); see also Tittle v.\\n Jefferson Cnty. Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)\\n (“Whether the alleged violation is reviewed under the Eighth or\\n Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial because in a prisoner suicide\\n case . . . under either the [E]ighth or [F]ourteenth [A]mendment,\\n the plaintiff must show that the jail official defendant displayed de-\\n liberate indifference to the prisoner’s taking of his own life.” (alter-\\n ations adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).\\n Subjective recklessness means that “the defendant was actually,\\n subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 7 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. The offi-\\n cial’s subjective awareness of the risk must be tied to the specific\\n individual whose rights are at issue. See Tittle, 10 F.3d at 1539\\n (“[O]fficials [must] have notice of the suicidal tendency of the indi-\\n vidual whose rights are at issue in order to be held liable for the\\n suicide of that individual.”).\\n Gantt satisfied the objective requirement of her claim of de-\\n liberate indifference. She “suffered a deprivation that was, objec-\\n tively, sufficiently serious” because she was not prevented from in-\\n juring herself by jumping off the stairs. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (ci-\\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted). But Gantt failed to\\n establish that Everett was “actually, subjectively aware” that her\\n decision to unlock Gantt’s cell from the control room “caused a\\n substantial risk of serious harm” to Gantt based on Gantt’s suicidal\\n tendencies. Id.\\n To be sure, Everett knew that suicidal inmates were kept on\\n the bottom floor of the A Block because jumping off the second-\\n story landing is an “obvious suicide” risk, and she knew of two in-\\n mates in the general jail population who had jumped from the sec-\\n ond-story landing and injured themselves. She agreed that when\\n the cell door was unlocked, that would give Gantt the opportunity\\n to run up the stairs and jump “[i]f she wanted to.” And Everett\\n “knew that at some point, [Gantt] had to have told somebody she\\n wanted to kill herself to be on suicide watch.”\\n But there is no evidence in the record from which a reason-\\n able jury could find that when Everett remotely unlocked Gantt’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 8 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12167\\n\\n cell door, Everett was subjectively aware that doing so created a\\n substantial risk that Gantt would climb the stairs and jump. Everett\\n had no prior knowledge about any suicide attempts by Gantt. She\\n testified that suicide attempts are “well-known throughout the\\n jail,” and that she “would have heard [Gantt’s] name plenty of\\n times if she had done anything.” She also testified that when she\\n walked into the control room and told the deputies there that she\\n was about to take Gantt to the medical clinic, “if they [were] wor-\\n ried about [Gantt], [or] thought she was one that was more likely\\n to commit suicide,” they would have warned her because the dep-\\n uties regularly “rely on each other . . . for information . . . about\\n particular inmates.” Everett testified, without dispute, that Gantt’s\\n request for assistance was, in her view, “a sure sign that [Gantt]\\n want[ed] help not to harm herself any further.” And when Everett\\n first saw Gantt climb the stairs, she “assumed that [Gantt] was just\\n trying to get something from somebody” because Gantt did not\\n have access to the prison store as a suicidal inmate. It was not until\\n Gantt “had her hand on the rail” that Everett “knew what she was\\n doing.”\\n We reject the notion that we must view Everett’s response\\n to Gantt’s suicide risk in isolation from the risk posed by her head\\n injury. Everett perceived that Gantt’s head injury created an imme-\\n diate risk of serious harm for which she was seeking help, and Ev-\\n erett indisputably tried to help her. She approached Gantt’s cell\\n upon hearing her cries, relayed her injury to the jail’s nurses, and\\n arranged for her transport to the medical clinic. After unlocking\\n Gantt’s door from the control room, Everett immediately walked\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 9 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n back to the A Block to take Gantt to the medical clinic. When she\\n realized that Gantt was going to jump, Everett chased after her to\\n try to stop her. Because Everett sought to aid Gantt, we cannot say\\n that she knowingly ignored a substantial risk of harm at the same\\n time.\\n Perhaps Everett acted negligently in rendering aid. Perhaps\\n she should have ensured that another deputy was in the A Block\\n before unlocking Gantt’s cell. Perhaps she could have made her\\n way back to the A Block with greater haste. But the Fourteenth\\n Amendment does not prohibit negligence; it prohibits “subjective\\n recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262\\n (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because Everett\\n was not criminally reckless, she did not violate Gantt’s constitu-\\n tional rights and is entitled to qualified immunity.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE and REMAND with instructions to enter\\n summary judgment for Everett based on qualified immunity.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 10 of 13\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12167 Kidd, J., Dissenting 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30980,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10761881,"string":"10,761,881"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Hassan Jones"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-19"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-10938"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,∗ Dis- trict Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10938\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n HASSAN JONES,\\n a.k.a. Hot,\\n a.k.a. Hotboy23,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00126-JB-N-1\\n ____________________\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,∗ Dis-\\n trict Judge.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n This case requires us to decide whether Hassan Jones was\\n properly convicted of several drug- and gun-related crimes.\\n Police found a bunch of evidence that Jones had engaged in\\n a variety of criminal conduct. First, during a traffic stop, officers\\n found Jones and two associates with a gun, drugs, and cash. Next,\\n following Jones’s traffic-stop arrest, officers searched his cellphone\\n and discovered photographs, videos, texts, and notes implicating\\n him in drug-dealing activities. Then, after executing a search war-\\n rant at Jones’s apartment, officers found two more guns (one of\\n them a machine gun), ammunition, two more incriminating cell-\\n phones, and a small quantity of drugs. Finally, in Jones’s girl-\\n friend’s car, officers discovered distribution amounts of marijuana.\\n The government charged Jones with five counts: two related to\\n drug distribution (Counts 1 and 2), two alleging illegal gun posses-\\n sion (Counts 4 and 5), and one alleging possession of a gun in fur-\\n therance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 3). Jones was con-\\n victed on all five counts and sentenced to 45 years in prison.\\n On appeal, Jones urges reversal on five grounds: He con-\\n tends (1) that the government presented insufficient evidence to\\n\\n\\n ∗ Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n prove that he used a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking\\n crime, (2) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he re-\\n lied on an unadmitted exhibit during his closing argument, (3) that\\n the district court erroneously admitted prejudicial rap music vid-\\n eos, images, and lyrics at trial, (4) that the prosecutor violated due\\n process by questioning a law-enforcement witness about Jones’s in-\\n vocation of his Miranda rights, and (5) that these errors cumula-\\n tively warrant reversal.\\n For reasons we will explain, we agree with one of Jones’s\\n contentions: We hold that the prosecutor committed misconduct\\n by invoking the unadmitted exhibit in his closing argument to urge\\n the jury to convict Jones on Count 3, and we therefore vacate\\n Jones’s conviction as to, and remand for a new trial on, that count.\\n We affirm on all other issues.\\n I\\n A\\n Hassan Jones was arrested after police stopped a car in which\\n he was a passenger and found a loaded Glock handgun, marijuana,\\n promethazine hydrocodone syrup, and more than $5,000 in cash.\\n Following Jones’s arrest, officers seized and searched his cellphone,\\n which contained incriminating photographs, videos, text messages,\\n notes, and browser searches. In particular, officers found videos of\\n firearms and money, text messages about drug sales, and photos of\\n high-grade marijuana.\\n Almost two years later, police officers executed a search war-\\n rant at the apartment where Jones lived with his girlfriend, her\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n family, and his infant son. In Jones’s bedroom, officers found a ma-\\n rijuana cigarette on a counter, a loaded Glock handgun with an ex-\\n tended magazine in his dresser drawer, a Glock handgun with an\\n extended magazine and machine-gun-conversion switch on top of\\n a laundry hamper, two cellphones, one prescription bottle of co-\\n deine syrup labeled with Jones’s name and address, and an empty\\n bottle of suspected codeine syrup. In Jones’s girlfriend’s car, which\\n was parked some 60 to 80 feet away from the apartment’s front\\n door, officers found four pounds of marijuana.\\n A grand jury indicted Jones on five counts: (1) conspiracy to\\n possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846); (2)\\n possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C.\\n § 841(a)(1)); (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-\\n trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)); (4) possession of a\\n firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); and (5) possession of an\\n unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).\\n B\\n A detailed account of Jones’s trial is essential to understand-\\n ing several of his claims on appeal.\\n The government introduced evidence of everything discov-\\n ered in the searches described above: the gun, drugs, and cash dis-\\n covered during the traffic stop; the digital evidence found on\\n Jones’s cellphone following his arrest; the guns, drugs, and digital\\n evidence collected during the search of his apartment; and the ma-\\n rijuana found in his girlfriend’s car. Various experts connected the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n government’s evidence to Jones, translated drug-trafficking lingo,\\n and explained how drug dealers typically conduct their business.\\n Several incidents that occurred during the trial are particu-\\n larly significant. First, Corporal Charles Hunter—who conducted\\n the search of Jones’s apartment—took the stand on the govern-\\n ment’s behalf. In the course of describing the process of collecting\\n a DNA sample, he offered the following snippet of testimony: “Mr.\\n Jones was transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-\\n ]up investigation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as\\n he invoked his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda\\n rights.” Trial Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Jones’s attorney didn’t\\n object to Hunter’s reference to Jones’s invocation of Miranda, and\\n the prosecutor didn’t immediately ask any follow-up questions.\\n Several minutes later, though, the prosecutor revisited the issue:\\n “[Y]ou said that you attempted to interview him but he invoked\\n his—or after Mirandizing him, he invoked his rights, correct?” Trial\\n Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–20. The officer responded, “That\\n is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No. 111 at 220. Again, no objec-\\n tion.\\n Second, over Jones’s pre-trial and mid-trial objections, the\\n government presented evidence of rap-music videos, images, and\\n lyrics that Jones had posted depicting him with marijuana, cash,\\n and firearms with machine-gun-conversion switches. The videos\\n bore disclaimers clarifying that the videos were made for “enter-\\n tainment purposes only” and that the “props scenes and lyrics\\n should not be taken seriously.” Trial Tr. at 352, Dkt. No. 112 at 108.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n When the government rested, Jones filed a motion for a\\n judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied.\\n Jones opted not to testify, so the defense rested.\\n That leaves the third and final trial episode worth highlight-\\n ing. During his closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jury’s\\n attention to Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a series of Jones’s Insta-\\n gram messages. In connection with Count 3—possession of a fire-\\n arm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime—the prosecutor\\n said the following:\\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\\n don’t have my money.”\\n\\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\\n message.\\n\\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\\n The difficulty arises because all now agree that Exhibit 19Z was\\n never admitted into evidence, and so wasn’t properly before the\\n jury.\\n The jury convicted Jones on all five counts. Importantly\\n here, on Count 3 the jury specifically found that Jones used a Glock\\n 23 .40 caliber pistol equipped with a machine-gun-conversion\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n switch in furtherance of Counts 1 and 2. As a result of that finding,\\n Jones’s sentence on Count 3 was enhanced from 5 to 30 years.\\n Jones was sentenced to a total of 45 years in prison.\\n As already noted, Jones raises five issues on appeal. First, he\\n contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Count 3—\\n i.e., to prove that he used the Glock 23 in furtherance of a drug-\\n trafficking crime. Second, Jones argues that his conviction on\\n Count 3 should be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in mis-\\n conduct when he invoked the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z during clos-\\n ing argument. Third, he contends that his convictions on all counts\\n should be reversed because the district court erroneously admitted\\n the rap-music videos, images, and lyrics at trial. Fourth, Jones ar-\\n gues that the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by ques-\\n tioning Corporal Hunter about his invocation of his Miranda\\n rights. Finally, he argues that all of these errors, even if not inde-\\n pendently reversible, cumulatively warrant reversal.\\n II\\n For the reasons that follow, we agree with Jones that the\\n prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he invoked the unadmit-\\n ted Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3 during his closing ar-\\n gument and that the error was plain and warrants correction. Ac-\\n cordingly, we vacate Jones’s conviction as to Count 3 and remand\\n for a new trial on that count.\\n We reject Jones’s remaining arguments. We hold that the\\n government presented sufficient evidence—even if only barely—to\\n convict Jones on Count 3. We conclude that although the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n court erred in admitting the rap-related evidence, the error was\\n harmless. We hold that, in the circumstances of this case, even if\\n the prosecutor’s comment about Jones’s invocation of his Miranda\\n rights violated due process, the error was harmless. And we find\\n that there is no cumulative error warranting reversal.\\n A\\n We begin, as Jones does, with the contention that the gov-\\n ernment presented insufficient evidence to prove Count 3—and\\n therefore, that the district court erred in denying Jones’s motion for\\n judgment of acquittal on that charge. Although the question is\\n close—the government’s § 924(c) case was hardly overwhelming—\\n we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient.\\n One important preliminary: The sufficiency challenge that\\n Jones raises on appeal is different from the one he presented in the\\n district court. In particular, whereas Jones contended below that\\n the government hadn’t proven that the police actually found a con-\\n trolled substance, see Trial Tr. at 491, Dkt. No. 112 at 247, he argues\\n on appeal that it failed to prove that he used firearms “in further-\\n ance of ” his drug-related crimes, see Br. of Appellant at 25–29. Ac-\\n cordingly, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Baston,\\n 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a defendant must\\n challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to a specific count in\\n the district court in order to preserve the challenge for appeal). Ac-\\n cordingly, we must find, as an initial matter, that (1) “there [was] an\\n error,” (2) “the error [was] plain,” and (3) “the error . . . affected\\n [Jones’s] substantial rights.” United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n 1264 (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134\\n (2018)). If those criteria are met, we (4) “may exercise [our] discre-\\n tion” to rectify [the] plain error, “but only if the error seriously af-\\n fected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-\\n ceedings.” Id. (citation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed be-\\n yond the first step because we conclude that although the question\\n is close, a reasonable jury could convict Jones on Count 3 based on\\n the evidence presented at trial.\\n The applicable standard of review is doing a lot of work\\n here. The well-worn rule, of course, is that on a sufficiency chal-\\n lenge we must “[v]iew[] the evidence in the light most favorable to\\n the government and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the\\n jury’s verdict.” United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir.\\n 2011). “[W]e allow the jury to choose among several reasonable\\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citation modi-\\n fied). To convict Jones on Count 3 and get the accompanying 30-\\n year sentence, the government had to connect Jones’s possession\\n of his machine gun—the Glock 23 with the conversion switch\\n found in his bedroom—to his drug-trafficking crime—the mariju-\\n ana found in his girlfriend’s car. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii).\\n We’ve held that it’s not enough for the government to demonstrate\\n the mere “presence of a gun within the defendant’s dominion and\\n control during a drug trafficking offense.” United States v. Timmons,\\n 283 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002). Rather, the government must\\n show that the guns that the defendant possessed “helped, fur-\\n thered, promoted, or advanced” one of his drug-trafficking of-\\n fenses. Id. at 1252. Accordingly, to support Jones’s conviction and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n 30-year sentence, there must be a “nexus” between the firearms he\\n possessed—including the machine gun—and, as relevant here, a\\n distribution amount of marijuana. Id. at 1253.\\n To satisfy this “nexus” requirement, the government intro-\\n duced the following evidence, in addition to that collected during\\n the various searches: (1) expert testimony that drug dealers “typi-\\n cally” use guns to protect their stashes, Trial Tr. at 476–77, Dkt. No.\\n 112 at 232–33; (2) a text exchange in which another individual re-\\n ferred to “clutching” an assault rifle while selling marijuana, and\\n Jones responded, “I need my gun fool . . . I need my stick to fool”;\\n (3) and a video showing Jones holding a Glock switch in his hand\\n and a bag of marijuana in his lap.\\n Hardly overwhelming, but given the applicable standard, le-\\n gally sufficient. A jury could reasonably conclude from the combi-\\n nation of the government’s evidence that Jones possessed the ma-\\n chine gun in furtherance of his drug-trafficking activities. Follow-\\n ing the government’s narrative, the jury could conclude that Jones\\n possessed both guns to protect his drug-dealing operation and that\\n he put similar weapons near small amounts of drugs in the music\\n video because he is a “typical” drug dealer. Viewing the evidence\\n in the government’s favor, and drawing all inferences in favor of the\\n jury’s verdict, see Gamory, 635 F.3d at 497, we find no error in the\\n district court’s denial of Jones’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.\\n B\\n Next up, Jones’s contention that the prosecutor engaged in\\n misconduct when, during closing argument, he referenced an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n exhibit that hadn’t been admitted as evidence. As already ex-\\n plained, in support of Count 3, the prosecutor invoked the unad-\\n mitted Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a collection of messages\\n from Jones’s Instagram account. The prosecutor was pretty blunt:\\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\\n don’t have my money.”\\n\\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\\n message.\\n\\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\\n Because Jones’s attorney didn’t object to the prosecutor’s in-\\n vocation of Exhibit 19Z, we review only for plain error using the\\n traditional four-element test already outlined. See supra at 8.\\n 1\\n First, error. We evaluate alleged prosecutorial misconduct\\n using a two-part test: “(1) the remarks must be improper, and (2)\\n the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the\\n defendant.” United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th Cir. 2014)\\n (citation modified).\\n The first element is easily satisfied. We have held that “[a]\\n prosecutor may not go beyond the evidence before the jury during\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n closing argument,” United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th\\n Cir. 1990), and the government has acknowledged, as it must, that\\n Exhibit 19Z “was not admitted into evidence,” Br. of Appellee at\\n 34. Worse, by far—more on this shortly—the prosecutor told ju-\\n rors that, with respect to Count 3, Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [they]\\n need[ed] to know.” Trial Tr. at 542, Dkt. No. 113 at 21.\\n In assessing the second element, “[w]e generally consider\\n four factors,” which must be “viewed in the context of the trial as\\n a whole”: “(1) whether the challenged comments had a tendency\\n to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the\\n comments were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the comments\\n were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the\\n strength of the competent proof establishing the guilt of the de-\\n fendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d at 505.\\n Our evaluation of the four factors leads us to conclude that\\n the prosecutor engaged in misconduct—and thus committed er-\\n ror—when he invoked Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3.\\n First, the prosecutor’s comment had a “tendency to . . . prejudice”\\n Jones because he expressly told jurors that the unadmitted Exhibit\\n 19Z was “[a]ll [they] need[ed] to know” to convict him on the\\n § 924(c) charge. Second, while the comment might be deemed to\\n have been “isolated” in a sense, Exhibit 19Z was one of only three\\n pieces of evidence that the prosecutor highlighted in closing, and\\n he lingered on it for about 45 seconds. Third, given its centrality\\n to the prosecutor’s argument, it is inconceivable that Exhibit 19Z\\n was “accidentally placed before the jury.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Our assessment of the fourth factor—“the strength of the\\n competent proof establishing [Jones’s] guilt”—warrants a bit more\\n explanation because, for reasons already explained, although the\\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient, it wasn’t particularly\\n “str[ong].”\\n We think the government sufficiently proved that Jones pos-\\n sessed the two firearms—including the machine gun. In particular,\\n the government presented the two guns found in the search of the\\n apartment—one in a dresser drawer and one in the hamper—as\\n well as a text exchange in which Jones and another dealer commis-\\n erated about the importance of their firearms. And we think the\\n government likewise proved that Jones possessed distribution\\n amounts of marijuana. Specifically, it pointed to the four pounds\\n of marijuana found in Jones’s girlfriend’s car. The stickier question\\n is the “strength” of the government’s proof regarding the required\\n nexus—i.e., that Jones possessed firearms to further his trafficking\\n crimes.\\n Lacking any direct evidence, the government called expert\\n witnesses to testify that drug dealers “typically” use guns to protect\\n their stashes. See Br. of Appellee at 25. And it contends on appeal\\n that because Jones had the firearms, and because he had the mari-\\n juana, the circumstantial evidence “supported the conclusion that\\n the firearm furthered Jones’s possession with intent to distribute\\n the marijuana found in the trunk of the car.” Id. Sufficient, but\\n again, hardly compelling.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n Nor do the factors that we outlined in Timmons meaning-\\n fully move the “strength” needle. Per Timmons, we consider “the\\n type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the\\n firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon was stolen,\\n the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun\\n is loaded, proximity to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and\\n circumstances under which the gun is found.” 283 F.3d at 1253 (ci-\\n tation modified). True, Jones possessed the guns in question ille-\\n gally. And true, they were loaded. But they were more than 60 feet\\n away from a distribution amount of marijuana, which was itself\\n locked in a car’s trunk. And because the guns were stashed in a\\n dresser drawer and on a laundry hamper, they weren’t necessarily\\n readily accessible to Jones. All of which is to say that while the\\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient to convict Jones on\\n Count 3, it wasn’t what we’d call “str[ong].” Reeves, 742 F.3d a 505.\\n In light of (1) the prosecutor’s statement that the unadmit-\\n ted Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [the jury] need[ed] to know” to convict\\n Jones on Count 3, (2) the fact that the prosecutor highlighted the\\n exhibit during his closing, (3) our conclusion that the prosecutor\\n likely invoked the exhibit intentionally, rather than accidentally, and\\n (4) the sufficient-but-not-strong character of the government’s evi-\\n dence on the § 924(c) count, we have little trouble concluding that\\n the prosecutor’s remarks “prejudicially affect[ed Jones’s] substan-\\n tial rights.” Id. Accordingly, we find that Jones has met the first\\n prong of the plain-error test.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 15 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n 2\\n Second, we conclude that the error was plain. “An error is\\n ‘plain’ if it is obvious or clear under current law.” United States v.\\n Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).\\n “[W]here the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specif-\\n ically resolve an issue,” plainness requires “precedent from the Su-\\n preme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v.\\n Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).\\n Our caselaw is clear: “[A] prosecutor may not exceed the\\n evidence presented at trial during [] closing argument.” Reeves, 742\\n F.3d at 505; see United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir.\\n 1997); United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 1215, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019);\\n United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021);\\n United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1328 (11th Cir. 2024). And\\n that prohibition is as longstanding as it is clear, stretching back\\n nearly 50 years. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th\\n Cir. Unit B 1981) (“[A] prosecutor is prohibited from seeking to ob-\\n tain a conviction by going beyond the evidence before the jury.”);\\n United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The legal\\n metes and bounds of a prosecutor’s argument are defined by the\\n evidence before the jury. Thus, a prosecutor must limit his com-\\n ments to admissible evidence.”); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d\\n 473, 476 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Lawyers know that argument to the jury\\n must be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial.”).\\n The prosecutor’s use of the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z was in\\n direct contravention of our precedent. The prosecutor wasn’t\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 16 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n assisting the jury in “analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evi-\\n dence,” wasn’t suggesting conclusions that the jury should draw\\n from the record evidence, and wasn’t “indicat[ing] [the govern-\\n ment’s] opinion.” United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.\\n 1978). Rather, he was expressly urging the jury to convict Jones on\\n the basis of extra-record evidence. The error was patent.\\n 3\\n Third, the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit 19Z affected\\n Jones’s substantial rights. When reviewing alleged prosecutorial\\n misconduct for plain error, the error and substantial-rights inquir-\\n ies substantially overlap. As already explained, in evaluating the\\n merits of a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, we ask—at the second\\n step of a two-step analysis—whether “the remarks . . . prejudicially\\n affect[ed] the substantial rights of the defendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d\\n at 505. And in making that determination, we ask whether a “rea-\\n sonable probability arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of\\n the trial would have been different.” Id. (citation modified). That\\n inquiry mirrors almost precisely the plain-error test’s substantial-\\n rights analysis, which asks whether an error was “prejudicial”—i.e.,\\n whether it “affected the outcome of the district court proceed-\\n ings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).\\n Accordingly, for all the reasons we concluded that Jones\\n demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that the miscon-\\n duct affected his substantial rights for plain-error purposes.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 17 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n 4\\n The first three conditions of plain-error review having been\\n satisfied, we conclude that the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit\\n 19Z in connection with Count 3 “seriously affected the fairness, in-\\n tegrity, or public reputation” of Jones’s trial. Hawkins, 934 F.3d at\\n 1267 (citation modified). The circumstances we confront are par-\\n ticularly troubling: The evidence of Jones’s guilt on the § 924(c)\\n offense was thin, the prosecutor told jurors at the close of trial that\\n “all [they] need[ed]” to convict him of that crime was a piece of\\n evidence that wasn’t before them, and Jones was sentenced to 30\\n years on that count alone. If left uncorrected, the prosecutor’s mis-\\n conduct in this case would leave “reasonable citizen[s]” with “a\\n rightly diminished view of the judicial process.” Id. at 1268 (cita-\\n tion modified).\\n ∗ ∗ ∗\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the prosecutor’s in-\\n vocation of unadmitted evidence in connection with Count 3 con-\\n stituted plain error that affected Jones’s substantial rights, and we\\n exercise our discretion to correct it. We therefore vacate Jones’s\\n conviction on Count 3 and remand for a new trial as to that count.\\n C\\n Jones separately challenges the introduction of (1) a 29-sec-\\n ond video clip in which he raps and wields a gun, (2) a series of\\n screenshots from a music video depicting him handling various\\n firearms as well as images of drugs and cash, and (3) a note from\\n his phone featuring what seem to be violent rap-music lyrics. He\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 18 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting\\n those items under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. 1 In par-\\n ticular, Jones argues that that government couldn’t prove that the\\n items depicted in what we’ll call the “rap-related evidence” were\\n real and, therefore, that the evidence was both (1) irrelevant and (2)\\n substantially more prejudicial than probative. The government re-\\n sponds that the evidence demonstrates that Jones handled weapons\\n similar to the one seized from his apartment and that he possessed\\n and conspired to distribute marijuana.\\n We agree with the government that the evidence meets the\\n low relevance bar prescribed by Rules 401 and 402—namely, that a\\n piece of evidence have “any tendency to make a fact more or less\\n probable” and be “of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.\\n R. Evid. 401. A jury could conclude that the rap-related evidence\\n made it somewhat “more . . . probable” that Jones possessed the\\n contraband he was charged with possessing.\\n Rule 403 separately directs district courts to “exclude rele-\\n vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by,\\n among other things, “unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here,\\n as in a past case of ours, “the substance of the rap [evidence] was\\n heavily prejudicial” because, as there, the videos and lyrics con-\\n tained “violence [and] profanity” and “could reasonably be under-\\n stood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.” Gamory, 635\\n\\n 1 Because Jones timely objected in the district court, we review for abuse of\\n\\n discretion. Gamory, 635 F.3d at 492. Errors aren’t reversible if they are harm-\\n less. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 19 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n F.3d at 493. The government counters that the evidence is proba-\\n tive of “Jones’s knowing possession of the firearms” alongside\\n “cash [] and marijuana similar to” that alleged in the indictment.\\n Br. of Appellee at 27–28.\\n We’re skeptical. Like the evidence at issue in Gamory, the\\n videos, screenshots, and lyrics have little relevance to Jones’s know-\\n ing possession of the two Glocks at issue here. See Gamory, 635\\n F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011). The government witness presenting\\n the screenshots at trial couldn’t tell whether the guns shown were\\n real or props, and on appeal the government doesn’t dispute Jones’s\\n contention that “the guns depicted in the videos were not the guns\\n charged in the indictment,” Br. of Appellant at 35. Instead, it as-\\n serts only that the firearms (many of which weren’t Glocks) were\\n “similar to that alleged in the superseding indictment,” Br. of Ap-\\n pellee at 28. Add to that the fact that one of the YouTube videos\\n included the disclaimer that “[a]ll props scenes and lyrics should not\\n be taken seriously” and the probative value seems pretty low.\\n We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though,\\n because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related evi-\\n dence was harmless. Even where a district court abuses its discre-\\n tion in admitting disputed evidence, its error will be deemed harm-\\n less when we can say with “fair assurance” that the “judgment was\\n not substantially swayed by the error.” Kotteakos v. United States,\\n 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Here, the government presented substan-\\n tial proof, rap-related items aside, that Jones knowingly possessed\\n the two Glocks at issue here. And indeed, before us, Jones\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 20 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n effectively admits as much: “At trial, the government introduced\\n numerous exhibits not extracted from music videos that showed\\n Mr. Jones talking about or handling drugs, guns, and cash, and the\\n two guns charged in the superseding indictment were found in Mr.\\n Jones’s bedroom with his DNA on them.” Br. of Appellant at 37;\\n see also Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. We are satisfied the jury was\\n presented with ample evidence to convict Jones on Counts 1, 2, 4,\\n and 5.\\n D\\n Next up, Jones’s argument that the government violated the\\n Due Process Clause as interpreted in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610\\n (1976), when one of its witnesses and the prosecutor both com-\\n mented on his invocation of his Miranda rights. 2\\n Recall that at trial, Corporal Hunter—who had conducted\\n the search of Jones’s apartment—testified for the government. In\\n the course of describing the process by which he had collected a\\n DNA sample, he made the following comment: “Mr. Jones was\\n transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-]up investi-\\n gation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked\\n his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” Trial\\n Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor\\n circled back to the issue: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\\n\\n 2 We review “issues of constitutional law de novo.” United States v. O’Keefe, 461\\n\\n F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006). Alleged Doyle violations are subject to harm-\\n less-error review. See United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir.\\n 2001).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 21 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\\n voked his rights, correct?” Trial Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–\\n 20. Hunter responded, “That is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No.\\n 111 at 220. Jones’s lawyer didn’t object to either comment at the\\n time, but Jones contends on appeal that they ran afoul of Doyle.\\n Because Jones’s lawyer didn’t lodge a contemporaneous ob-\\n jection, we review only for plain error. See supra at 8. For reasons\\n we will explain, we hold that in the particular circumstances of this\\n case, any Doyle error that might have occurred was harmless.\\n In order to give effect to Miranda’s “prophylactic” protec-\\n tions, the Supreme Court has barred the government from using\\n an “arrested person’s silence” against him at trial for “impeachment\\n or for substantive evidence of guilt.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–19; ac-\\n cord United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1985).\\n A violation of that prohibition, the Court has explained, would be\\n “fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process.” Doyle,\\n 426 U.S. at 618; accord United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285\\n (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To be clear, the prosecutor here should not—not, not, not—\\n have commented on Jones’s invocation of his right to remain silent.\\n We don’t fault the prosecutor for Corporal Hunter’s spontaneous\\n statement, in response to a question about DNA collection, that\\n “[n]o interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked his\\n right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” But we\\n can—and do—fault the prosecutor for returning to the issue with\\n her own pointed question: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 22 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\\n voked his rights, correct?” We shouldn’t have to keep saying this,\\n but alas, it seems the message isn’t getting through: So let us once\\n again make “crystal clear” that the government may not “call at-\\n tention to” a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights. Miller,\\n 255 F.3d at 1285. Prosecutors know better, and they simply must\\n stop “continu[ing] to indulge themselves in this way”—enough is\\n enough. Id.\\n Despite the impropriety of the prosecutor’s conduct—and\\n our increasing consternation at government lawyers’ repeated re-\\n fusals to heed our warnings—we are satisfied that, in the particular\\n circumstances presented in this case, any Doyle violation that might\\n have occurred was harmless. We’ve held that “a prosecutor’s single\\n reference to [a] defendant’s post-Miranda silence” is harmless “if it\\n occurs during a trial at which the government’s evidence was oth-\\n erwise overwhelming.” Id. at 1285–86; see also United States v. Gon-\\n zalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549–51 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, it’s clear to us\\n that between the items collected during the apartment search and\\n the digital evidence on Jones’s phones, any lingering implication\\n from the prosecutor’s improper question had “no substantial and\\n injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” on\\n Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. Miller, 255 F.3d at 1285 (citation modified).\\n E\\n Jones finally argues that even if none of the errors that he\\n has alleged warrants reversal on its own, their accumulation does.\\n Because we vacate Count 3 on the ground that the prosecutor’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 23 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n reliance on the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z constituted plain error, we\\n focus here only on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors on\\n the remaining counts.\\n We reject Jones’s cumulative-error argument. Even viewed\\n in combination, the errors that Jones has alleged didn’t render his\\n trial fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332,\\n 1343 (11th Cir. 1995). “[E]xamin[ing] the trial as a whole,” United\\n States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997), he suffered\\n no violation of his “substantial rights.” United States v. Margarita\\n Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).\\n III\\n To recap, we hold that the government’s use of Exhibit 19Z\\n in its closing argument was plain error, and we exercise our discre-\\n tion to correct it. We therefore VACATE Jones’s conviction on the\\n § 924(c) offense and REMAND for a new trial on Count 3. We re-\\n ject Jones’s remaining arguments and AFFIRM the district court’s\\n judgment in all other respects.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11228466/\", \"author_raw\": \"NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CORRIGAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"CORRIGAN\": \", Dis trict\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761881/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Hassan Jones\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-19\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-10938\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n HASSAN JONES,\n a.k.a. Hot,\n a.k.a. Hotboy23,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00126-JB-N-1\n ____________________\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 2 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,∗ Dis-\n trict Judge.\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\n This case requires us to decide whether Hassan Jones was\n properly convicted of several drug- and gun-related crimes.\n Police found a bunch of evidence that Jones had engaged in\n a variety of criminal conduct. First, during a traffic stop, officers\n found Jones and two associates with a gun, drugs, and cash. Next,\n following Jones’s traffic-stop arrest, officers searched his cellphone\n and discovered photographs, videos, texts, and notes implicating\n him in drug-dealing activities. Then, after executing a search war-\n rant at Jones’s apartment, officers found two more guns (one of\n them a machine gun), ammunition, two more incriminating cell-\n phones, and a small quantity of drugs. Finally, in Jones’s girl-\n friend’s car, officers discovered distribution amounts of marijuana.\n The government charged Jones with five counts: two related to\n drug distribution (Counts 1 and 2), two alleging illegal gun posses-\n sion (Counts 4 and 5), and one alleging possession of a gun in fur-\n therance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 3). Jones was con-\n victed on all five counts and sentenced to 45 years in prison.\n On appeal, Jones urges reversal on five grounds: He con-\n tends (1) that the government presented insufficient evidence to\n\n\n ∗ Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 3 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n prove that he used a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking\n crime, (2) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he re-\n lied on an unadmitted exhibit during his closing argument, (3) that\n the district court erroneously admitted prejudicial rap music vid-\n eos, images, and lyrics at trial, (4) that the prosecutor violated due\n process by questioning a law-enforcement witness about Jones’s in-\n vocation of his Miranda rights, and (5) that these errors cumula-\n tively warrant reversal.\n For reasons we will explain, we agree with one of Jones’s\n contentions: We hold that the prosecutor committed misconduct\n by invoking the unadmitted exhibit in his closing argument to urge\n the jury to convict Jones on Count 3, and we therefore vacate\n Jones’s conviction as to, and remand for a new trial on, that count.\n We affirm on all other issues.\n I\n A\n Hassan Jones was arrested after police stopped a car in which\n he was a passenger and found a loaded Glock handgun, marijuana,\n promethazine hydrocodone syrup, and more than $5,000 in cash.\n Following Jones’s arrest, officers seized and searched his cellphone,\n which contained incriminating photographs, videos, text messages,\n notes, and browser searches. In particular, officers found videos of\n firearms and money, text messages about drug sales, and photos of\n high-grade marijuana.\n Almost two years later, police officers executed a search war-\n rant at the apartment where Jones lived with his girlfriend, her\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 4 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n family, and his infant son. In Jones’s bedroom, officers found a ma-\n rijuana cigarette on a counter, a loaded Glock handgun with an ex-\n tended magazine in his dresser drawer, a Glock handgun with an\n extended magazine and machine-gun-conversion switch on top of\n a laundry hamper, two cellphones, one prescription bottle of co-\n deine syrup labeled with Jones’s name and address, and an empty\n bottle of suspected codeine syrup. In Jones’s girlfriend’s car, which\n was parked some 60 to 80 feet away from the apartment’s front\n door, officers found four pounds of marijuana.\n A grand jury indicted Jones on five counts: (1) conspiracy to\n possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846); (2)\n possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C.\n § 841(a)(1)); (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-\n trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)); (4) possession of a\n firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); and (5) possession of an\n unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).\n B\n A detailed account of Jones’s trial is essential to understand-\n ing several of his claims on appeal.\n The government introduced evidence of everything discov-\n ered in the searches described above: the gun, drugs, and cash dis-\n covered during the traffic stop; the digital evidence found on\n Jones’s cellphone following his arrest; the guns, drugs, and digital\n evidence collected during the search of his apartment; and the ma-\n rijuana found in his girlfriend’s car. Various experts connected the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 5 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n government’s evidence to Jones, translated drug-trafficking lingo,\n and explained how drug dealers typically conduct their business.\n Several incidents that occurred during the trial are particu-\n larly significant. First, Corporal Charles Hunter—who conducted\n the search of Jones’s apartment—took the stand on the govern-\n ment’s behalf. In the course of describing the process of collecting\n a DNA sample, he offered the following snippet of testimony: “Mr.\n Jones was transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-\n ]up investigation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as\n he invoked his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda\n rights.” Trial Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Jones’s attorney didn’t\n object to Hunter’s reference to Jones’s invocation of Miranda, and\n the prosecutor didn’t immediately ask any follow-up questions.\n Several minutes later, though, the prosecutor revisited the issue:\n “[Y]ou said that you attempted to interview him but he invoked\n his—or after Mirandizing him, he invoked his rights, correct?” Trial\n Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–20. The officer responded, “That\n is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No. 111 at 220. Again, no objec-\n tion.\n Second, over Jones’s pre-trial and mid-trial objections, the\n government presented evidence of rap-music videos, images, and\n lyrics that Jones had posted depicting him with marijuana, cash,\n and firearms with machine-gun-conversion switches. The videos\n bore disclaimers clarifying that the videos were made for “enter-\n tainment purposes only” and that the “props scenes and lyrics\n should not be taken seriously.” Trial Tr. at 352, Dkt. No. 112 at 108.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 6 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n When the government rested, Jones filed a motion for a\n judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied.\n Jones opted not to testify, so the defense rested.\n That leaves the third and final trial episode worth highlight-\n ing. During his closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jury’s\n attention to Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a series of Jones’s Insta-\n gram messages. In connection with Count 3—possession of a fire-\n arm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime—the prosecutor\n said the following:\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\n don’t have my money.”\n\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\n message.\n\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\n The difficulty arises because all now agree that Exhibit 19Z was\n never admitted into evidence, and so wasn’t properly before the\n jury.\n The jury convicted Jones on all five counts. Importantly\n here, on Count 3 the jury specifically found that Jones used a Glock\n 23 .40 caliber pistol equipped with a machine-gun-conversion\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 7 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n switch in furtherance of Counts 1 and 2. As a result of that finding,\n Jones’s sentence on Count 3 was enhanced from 5 to 30 years.\n Jones was sentenced to a total of 45 years in prison.\n As already noted, Jones raises five issues on appeal. First, he\n contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Count 3—\n i.e., to prove that he used the Glock 23 in furtherance of a drug-\n trafficking crime. Second, Jones argues that his conviction on\n Count 3 should be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in mis-\n conduct when he invoked the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z during clos-\n ing argument. Third, he contends that his convictions on all counts\n should be reversed because the district court erroneously admitted\n the rap-music videos, images, and lyrics at trial. Fourth, Jones ar-\n gues that the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by ques-\n tioning Corporal Hunter about his invocation of his Miranda\n rights. Finally, he argues that all of these errors, even if not inde-\n pendently reversible, cumulatively warrant reversal.\n II\n For the reasons that follow, we agree with Jones that the\n prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he invoked the unadmit-\n ted Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3 during his closing ar-\n gument and that the error was plain and warrants correction. Ac-\n cordingly, we vacate Jones’s conviction as to Count 3 and remand\n for a new trial on that count.\n We reject Jones’s remaining arguments. We hold that the\n government presented sufficient evidence—even if only barely—to\n convict Jones on Count 3. We conclude that although the district\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 8 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n court erred in admitting the rap-related evidence, the error was\n harmless. We hold that, in the circumstances of this case, even if\n the prosecutor’s comment about Jones’s invocation of his Miranda\n rights violated due process, the error was harmless. And we find\n that there is no cumulative error warranting reversal.\n A\n We begin, as Jones does, with the contention that the gov-\n ernment presented insufficient evidence to prove Count 3—and\n therefore, that the district court erred in denying Jones’s motion for\n judgment of acquittal on that charge. Although the question is\n close—the government’s § 924(c) case was hardly overwhelming—\n we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient.\n One important preliminary: The sufficiency challenge that\n Jones raises on appeal is different from the one he presented in the\n district court. In particular, whereas Jones contended below that\n the government hadn’t proven that the police actually found a con-\n trolled substance, see Trial Tr. at 491, Dkt. No. 112 at 247, he argues\n on appeal that it failed to prove that he used firearms “in further-\n ance of ” his drug-related crimes, see Br. of Appellant at 25–29. Ac-\n cordingly, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Baston,\n 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a defendant must\n challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to a specific count in\n the district court in order to preserve the challenge for appeal). Ac-\n cordingly, we must find, as an initial matter, that (1) “there [was] an\n error,” (2) “the error [was] plain,” and (3) “the error . . . affected\n [Jones’s] substantial rights.” United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 9 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n 1264 (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134\n (2018)). If those criteria are met, we (4) “may exercise [our] discre-\n tion” to rectify [the] plain error, “but only if the error seriously af-\n fected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-\n ceedings.” Id. (citation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed be-\n yond the first step because we conclude that although the question\n is close, a reasonable jury could convict Jones on Count 3 based on\n the evidence presented at trial.\n The applicable standard of review is doing a lot of work\n here. The well-worn rule, of course, is that on a sufficiency chal-\n lenge we must “[v]iew[] the evidence in the light most favorable to\n the government and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the\n jury’s verdict.” United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir.\n 2011). “[W]e allow the jury to choose among several reasonable\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citation modi-\n fied). To convict Jones on Count 3 and get the accompanying 30-\n year sentence, the government had to connect Jones’s possession\n of his machine gun—the Glock 23 with the conversion switch\n found in his bedroom—to his drug-trafficking crime—the mariju-\n ana found in his girlfriend’s car. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii).\n We’ve held that it’s not enough for the government to demonstrate\n the mere “presence of a gun within the defendant’s dominion and\n control during a drug trafficking offense.” United States v. Timmons,\n 283 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002). Rather, the government must\n show that the guns that the defendant possessed “helped, fur-\n thered, promoted, or advanced” one of his drug-trafficking of-\n fenses. Id. at 1252. Accordingly, to support Jones’s conviction and\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 10 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n 30-year sentence, there must be a “nexus” between the firearms he\n possessed—including the machine gun—and, as relevant here, a\n distribution amount of marijuana. Id. at 1253.\n To satisfy this “nexus” requirement, the government intro-\n duced the following evidence, in addition to that collected during\n the various searches: (1) expert testimony that drug dealers “typi-\n cally” use guns to protect their stashes, Trial Tr. at 476–77, Dkt. No.\n 112 at 232–33; (2) a text exchange in which another individual re-\n ferred to “clutching” an assault rifle while selling marijuana, and\n Jones responded, “I need my gun fool . . . I need my stick to fool”;\n (3) and a video showing Jones holding a Glock switch in his hand\n and a bag of marijuana in his lap.\n Hardly overwhelming, but given the applicable standard, le-\n gally sufficient. A jury could reasonably conclude from the combi-\n nation of the government’s evidence that Jones possessed the ma-\n chine gun in furtherance of his drug-trafficking activities. Follow-\n ing the government’s narrative, the jury could conclude that Jones\n possessed both guns to protect his drug-dealing operation and that\n he put similar weapons near small amounts of drugs in the music\n video because he is a “typical” drug dealer. Viewing the evidence\n in the government’s favor, and drawing all inferences in favor of the\n jury’s verdict, see Gamory, 635 F.3d at 497, we find no error in the\n district court’s denial of Jones’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.\n B\n Next up, Jones’s contention that the prosecutor engaged in\n misconduct when, during closing argument, he referenced an\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 11 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n exhibit that hadn’t been admitted as evidence. As already ex-\n plained, in support of Count 3, the prosecutor invoked the unad-\n mitted Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a collection of messages\n from Jones’s Instagram account. The prosecutor was pretty blunt:\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\n don’t have my money.”\n\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\n message.\n\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\n Because Jones’s attorney didn’t object to the prosecutor’s in-\n vocation of Exhibit 19Z, we review only for plain error using the\n traditional four-element test already outlined. See supra at 8.\n 1\n First, error. We evaluate alleged prosecutorial misconduct\n using a two-part test: “(1) the remarks must be improper, and (2)\n the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the\n defendant.” United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th Cir. 2014)\n (citation modified).\n The first element is easily satisfied. We have held that “[a]\n prosecutor may not go beyond the evidence before the jury during\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 12 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n closing argument,” United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th\n Cir. 1990), and the government has acknowledged, as it must, that\n Exhibit 19Z “was not admitted into evidence,” Br. of Appellee at\n 34. Worse, by far—more on this shortly—the prosecutor told ju-\n rors that, with respect to Count 3, Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [they]\n need[ed] to know.” Trial Tr. at 542, Dkt. No. 113 at 21.\n In assessing the second element, “[w]e generally consider\n four factors,” which must be “viewed in the context of the trial as\n a whole”: “(1) whether the challenged comments had a tendency\n to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the\n comments were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the comments\n were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the\n strength of the competent proof establishing the guilt of the de-\n fendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d at 505.\n Our evaluation of the four factors leads us to conclude that\n the prosecutor engaged in misconduct—and thus committed er-\n ror—when he invoked Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3.\n First, the prosecutor’s comment had a “tendency to . . . prejudice”\n Jones because he expressly told jurors that the unadmitted Exhibit\n 19Z was “[a]ll [they] need[ed] to know” to convict him on the\n § 924(c) charge. Second, while the comment might be deemed to\n have been “isolated” in a sense, Exhibit 19Z was one of only three\n pieces of evidence that the prosecutor highlighted in closing, and\n he lingered on it for about 45 seconds. Third, given its centrality\n to the prosecutor’s argument, it is inconceivable that Exhibit 19Z\n was “accidentally placed before the jury.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 13 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n Our assessment of the fourth factor—“the strength of the\n competent proof establishing [Jones’s] guilt”—warrants a bit more\n explanation because, for reasons already explained, although the\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient, it wasn’t particularly\n “str[ong].”\n We think the government sufficiently proved that Jones pos-\n sessed the two firearms—including the machine gun. In particular,\n the government presented the two guns found in the search of the\n apartment—one in a dresser drawer and one in the hamper—as\n well as a text exchange in which Jones and another dealer commis-\n erated about the importance of their firearms. And we think the\n government likewise proved that Jones possessed distribution\n amounts of marijuana. Specifically, it pointed to the four pounds\n of marijuana found in Jones’s girlfriend’s car. The stickier question\n is the “strength” of the government’s proof regarding the required\n nexus—i.e., that Jones possessed firearms to further his trafficking\n crimes.\n Lacking any direct evidence, the government called expert\n witnesses to testify that drug dealers “typically” use guns to protect\n their stashes. See Br. of Appellee at 25. And it contends on appeal\n that because Jones had the firearms, and because he had the mari-\n juana, the circumstantial evidence “supported the conclusion that\n the firearm furthered Jones’s possession with intent to distribute\n the marijuana found in the trunk of the car.” Id. Sufficient, but\n again, hardly compelling.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 14 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n Nor do the factors that we outlined in Timmons meaning-\n fully move the “strength” needle. Per Timmons, we consider “the\n type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the\n firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon was stolen,\n the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun\n is loaded, proximity to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and\n circumstances under which the gun is found.” 283 F.3d at 1253 (ci-\n tation modified). True, Jones possessed the guns in question ille-\n gally. And true, they were loaded. But they were more than 60 feet\n away from a distribution amount of marijuana, which was itself\n locked in a car’s trunk. And because the guns were stashed in a\n dresser drawer and on a laundry hamper, they weren’t necessarily\n readily accessible to Jones. All of which is to say that while the\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient to convict Jones on\n Count 3, it wasn’t what we’d call “str[ong].” Reeves, 742 F.3d a 505.\n In light of (1) the prosecutor’s statement that the unadmit-\n ted Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [the jury] need[ed] to know” to convict\n Jones on Count 3, (2) the fact that the prosecutor highlighted the\n exhibit during his closing, (3) our conclusion that the prosecutor\n likely invoked the exhibit intentionally, rather than accidentally, and\n (4) the sufficient-but-not-strong character of the government’s evi-\n dence on the § 924(c) count, we have little trouble concluding that\n the prosecutor’s remarks “prejudicially affect[ed Jones’s] substan-\n tial rights.” Id. Accordingly, we find that Jones has met the first\n prong of the plain-error test.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 15 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n 2\n Second, we conclude that the error was plain. “An error is\n ‘plain’ if it is obvious or clear under current law.” United States v.\n Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).\n “[W]here the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specif-\n ically resolve an issue,” plainness requires “precedent from the Su-\n preme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v.\n Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).\n Our caselaw is clear: “[A] prosecutor may not exceed the\n evidence presented at trial during [] closing argument.” Reeves, 742\n F.3d at 505; see United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir.\n 1997); United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 1215, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019);\n United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021);\n United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1328 (11th Cir. 2024). And\n that prohibition is as longstanding as it is clear, stretching back\n nearly 50 years. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th\n Cir. Unit B 1981) (“[A] prosecutor is prohibited from seeking to ob-\n tain a conviction by going beyond the evidence before the jury.”);\n United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The legal\n metes and bounds of a prosecutor’s argument are defined by the\n evidence before the jury. Thus, a prosecutor must limit his com-\n ments to admissible evidence.”); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d\n 473, 476 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Lawyers know that argument to the jury\n must be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial.”).\n The prosecutor’s use of the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z was in\n direct contravention of our precedent. The prosecutor wasn’t\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 16 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n assisting the jury in “analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evi-\n dence,” wasn’t suggesting conclusions that the jury should draw\n from the record evidence, and wasn’t “indicat[ing] [the govern-\n ment’s] opinion.” United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.\n 1978). Rather, he was expressly urging the jury to convict Jones on\n the basis of extra-record evidence. The error was patent.\n 3\n Third, the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit 19Z affected\n Jones’s substantial rights. When reviewing alleged prosecutorial\n misconduct for plain error, the error and substantial-rights inquir-\n ies substantially overlap. As already explained, in evaluating the\n merits of a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, we ask—at the second\n step of a two-step analysis—whether “the remarks . . . prejudicially\n affect[ed] the substantial rights of the defendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d\n at 505. And in making that determination, we ask whether a “rea-\n sonable probability arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of\n the trial would have been different.” Id. (citation modified). That\n inquiry mirrors almost precisely the plain-error test’s substantial-\n rights analysis, which asks whether an error was “prejudicial”—i.e.,\n whether it “affected the outcome of the district court proceed-\n ings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).\n Accordingly, for all the reasons we concluded that Jones\n demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that the miscon-\n duct affected his substantial rights for plain-error purposes.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 17 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n 4\n The first three conditions of plain-error review having been\n satisfied, we conclude that the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit\n 19Z in connection with Count 3 “seriously affected the fairness, in-\n tegrity, or public reputation” of Jones’s trial. Hawkins, 934 F.3d at\n 1267 (citation modified). The circumstances we confront are par-\n ticularly troubling: The evidence of Jones’s guilt on the § 924(c)\n offense was thin, the prosecutor told jurors at the close of trial that\n “all [they] need[ed]” to convict him of that crime was a piece of\n evidence that wasn’t before them, and Jones was sentenced to 30\n years on that count alone. If left uncorrected, the prosecutor’s mis-\n conduct in this case would leave “reasonable citizen[s]” with “a\n rightly diminished view of the judicial process.” Id. at 1268 (cita-\n tion modified).\n ∗ ∗ ∗\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the prosecutor’s in-\n vocation of unadmitted evidence in connection with Count 3 con-\n stituted plain error that affected Jones’s substantial rights, and we\n exercise our discretion to correct it. We therefore vacate Jones’s\n conviction on Count 3 and remand for a new trial as to that count.\n C\n Jones separately challenges the introduction of (1) a 29-sec-\n ond video clip in which he raps and wields a gun, (2) a series of\n screenshots from a music video depicting him handling various\n firearms as well as images of drugs and cash, and (3) a note from\n his phone featuring what seem to be violent rap-music lyrics. He\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 18 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting\n those items under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. 1 In par-\n ticular, Jones argues that that government couldn’t prove that the\n items depicted in what we’ll call the “rap-related evidence” were\n real and, therefore, that the evidence was both (1) irrelevant and (2)\n substantially more prejudicial than probative. The government re-\n sponds that the evidence demonstrates that Jones handled weapons\n similar to the one seized from his apartment and that he possessed\n and conspired to distribute marijuana.\n We agree with the government that the evidence meets the\n low relevance bar prescribed by Rules 401 and 402—namely, that a\n piece of evidence have “any tendency to make a fact more or less\n probable” and be “of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.\n R. Evid. 401. A jury could conclude that the rap-related evidence\n made it somewhat “more . . . probable” that Jones possessed the\n contraband he was charged with possessing.\n Rule 403 separately directs district courts to “exclude rele-\n vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by,\n among other things, “unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here,\n as in a past case of ours, “the substance of the rap [evidence] was\n heavily prejudicial” because, as there, the videos and lyrics con-\n tained “violence [and] profanity” and “could reasonably be under-\n stood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.” Gamory, 635\n\n 1 Because Jones timely objected in the district court, we review for abuse of\n\n discretion. Gamory, 635 F.3d at 492. Errors aren’t reversible if they are harm-\n less. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 19 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n F.3d at 493. The government counters that the evidence is proba-\n tive of “Jones’s knowing possession of the firearms” alongside\n “cash [] and marijuana similar to” that alleged in the indictment.\n Br. of Appellee at 27–28.\n We’re skeptical. Like the evidence at issue in Gamory, the\n videos, screenshots, and lyrics have little relevance to Jones’s know-\n ing possession of the two Glocks at issue here. See Gamory, 635\n F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011). The government witness presenting\n the screenshots at trial couldn’t tell whether the guns shown were\n real or props, and on appeal the government doesn’t dispute Jones’s\n contention that “the guns depicted in the videos were not the guns\n charged in the indictment,” Br. of Appellant at 35. Instead, it as-\n serts only that the firearms (many of which weren’t Glocks) were\n “similar to that alleged in the superseding indictment,” Br. of Ap-\n pellee at 28. Add to that the fact that one of the YouTube videos\n included the disclaimer that “[a]ll props scenes and lyrics should not\n be taken seriously” and the probative value seems pretty low.\n We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though,\n because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related evi-\n dence was harmless. Even where a district court abuses its discre-\n tion in admitting disputed evidence, its error will be deemed harm-\n less when we can say with “fair assurance” that the “judgment was\n not substantially swayed by the error.” Kotteakos v. United States,\n 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Here, the government presented substan-\n tial proof, rap-related items aside, that Jones knowingly possessed\n the two Glocks at issue here. And indeed, before us, Jones\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 20 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n effectively admits as much: “At trial, the government introduced\n numerous exhibits not extracted from music videos that showed\n Mr. Jones talking about or handling drugs, guns, and cash, and the\n two guns charged in the superseding indictment were found in Mr.\n Jones’s bedroom with his DNA on them.” Br. of Appellant at 37;\n see also Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. We are satisfied the jury was\n presented with ample evidence to convict Jones on Counts 1, 2, 4,\n and 5.\n D\n Next up, Jones’s argument that the government violated the\n Due Process Clause as interpreted in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610\n (1976), when one of its witnesses and the prosecutor both com-\n mented on his invocation of his Miranda rights. 2\n Recall that at trial, Corporal Hunter—who had conducted\n the search of Jones’s apartment—testified for the government. In\n the course of describing the process by which he had collected a\n DNA sample, he made the following comment: “Mr. Jones was\n transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-]up investi-\n gation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked\n his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” Trial\n Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor\n circled back to the issue: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\n\n 2 We review “issues of constitutional law de novo.” United States v. O’Keefe, 461\n\n F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006). Alleged Doyle violations are subject to harm-\n less-error review. See United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir.\n 2001).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 21 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\n voked his rights, correct?” Trial Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–\n 20. Hunter responded, “That is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No.\n 111 at 220. Jones’s lawyer didn’t object to either comment at the\n time, but Jones contends on appeal that they ran afoul of Doyle.\n Because Jones’s lawyer didn’t lodge a contemporaneous ob-\n jection, we review only for plain error. See supra at 8. For reasons\n we will explain, we hold that in the particular circumstances of this\n case, any Doyle error that might have occurred was harmless.\n In order to give effect to Miranda’s “prophylactic” protec-\n tions, the Supreme Court has barred the government from using\n an “arrested person’s silence” against him at trial for “impeachment\n or for substantive evidence of guilt.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–19; ac-\n cord United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1985).\n A violation of that prohibition, the Court has explained, would be\n “fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process.” Doyle,\n 426 U.S. at 618; accord United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285\n (11th Cir. 2001).\n To be clear, the prosecutor here should not—not, not, not—\n have commented on Jones’s invocation of his right to remain silent.\n We don’t fault the prosecutor for Corporal Hunter’s spontaneous\n statement, in response to a question about DNA collection, that\n “[n]o interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked his\n right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” But we\n can—and do—fault the prosecutor for returning to the issue with\n her own pointed question: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 22 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\n\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\n voked his rights, correct?” We shouldn’t have to keep saying this,\n but alas, it seems the message isn’t getting through: So let us once\n again make “crystal clear” that the government may not “call at-\n tention to” a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights. Miller,\n 255 F.3d at 1285. Prosecutors know better, and they simply must\n stop “continu[ing] to indulge themselves in this way”—enough is\n enough. Id.\n Despite the impropriety of the prosecutor’s conduct—and\n our increasing consternation at government lawyers’ repeated re-\n fusals to heed our warnings—we are satisfied that, in the particular\n circumstances presented in this case, any Doyle violation that might\n have occurred was harmless. We’ve held that “a prosecutor’s single\n reference to [a] defendant’s post-Miranda silence” is harmless “if it\n occurs during a trial at which the government’s evidence was oth-\n erwise overwhelming.” Id. at 1285–86; see also United States v. Gon-\n zalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549–51 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, it’s clear to us\n that between the items collected during the apartment search and\n the digital evidence on Jones’s phones, any lingering implication\n from the prosecutor’s improper question had “no substantial and\n injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” on\n Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. Miller, 255 F.3d at 1285 (citation modified).\n E\n Jones finally argues that even if none of the errors that he\n has alleged warrants reversal on its own, their accumulation does.\n Because we vacate Count 3 on the ground that the prosecutor’s\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 23 of 23\n\n\n\n\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n reliance on the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z constituted plain error, we\n focus here only on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors on\n the remaining counts.\n We reject Jones’s cumulative-error argument. Even viewed\n in combination, the errors that Jones has alleged didn’t render his\n trial fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332,\n 1343 (11th Cir. 1995). “[E]xamin[ing] the trial as a whole,” United\n States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997), he suffered\n no violation of his “substantial rights.” United States v. Margarita\n Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).\n III\n To recap, we hold that the government’s use of Exhibit 19Z\n in its closing argument was plain error, and we exercise our discre-\n tion to correct it. We therefore VACATE Jones’s conviction on the\n § 924(c) offense and REMAND for a new trial on Count 3. We re-\n ject Jones’s remaining arguments and AFFIRM the district court’s\n judgment in all other respects.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Hassan Jones\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-19\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 1 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-10938\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n HASSAN JONES,\\n a.k.a. Hot,\\n a.k.a. Hotboy23,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-00126-JB-N-1\\n ____________________\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 2 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,∗ Dis-\\n trict Judge.\\n NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:\\n This case requires us to decide whether Hassan Jones was\\n properly convicted of several drug- and gun-related crimes.\\n Police found a bunch of evidence that Jones had engaged in\\n a variety of criminal conduct. First, during a traffic stop, officers\\n found Jones and two associates with a gun, drugs, and cash. Next,\\n following Jones’s traffic-stop arrest, officers searched his cellphone\\n and discovered photographs, videos, texts, and notes implicating\\n him in drug-dealing activities. Then, after executing a search war-\\n rant at Jones’s apartment, officers found two more guns (one of\\n them a machine gun), ammunition, two more incriminating cell-\\n phones, and a small quantity of drugs. Finally, in Jones’s girl-\\n friend’s car, officers discovered distribution amounts of marijuana.\\n The government charged Jones with five counts: two related to\\n drug distribution (Counts 1 and 2), two alleging illegal gun posses-\\n sion (Counts 4 and 5), and one alleging possession of a gun in fur-\\n therance of a drug-trafficking crime (Count 3). Jones was con-\\n victed on all five counts and sentenced to 45 years in prison.\\n On appeal, Jones urges reversal on five grounds: He con-\\n tends (1) that the government presented insufficient evidence to\\n\\n\\n ∗ Honorable Timothy J. Corrigan, Senior United States District Judge for the\\n Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 3 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n prove that he used a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking\\n crime, (2) that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he re-\\n lied on an unadmitted exhibit during his closing argument, (3) that\\n the district court erroneously admitted prejudicial rap music vid-\\n eos, images, and lyrics at trial, (4) that the prosecutor violated due\\n process by questioning a law-enforcement witness about Jones’s in-\\n vocation of his Miranda rights, and (5) that these errors cumula-\\n tively warrant reversal.\\n For reasons we will explain, we agree with one of Jones’s\\n contentions: We hold that the prosecutor committed misconduct\\n by invoking the unadmitted exhibit in his closing argument to urge\\n the jury to convict Jones on Count 3, and we therefore vacate\\n Jones’s conviction as to, and remand for a new trial on, that count.\\n We affirm on all other issues.\\n I\\n A\\n Hassan Jones was arrested after police stopped a car in which\\n he was a passenger and found a loaded Glock handgun, marijuana,\\n promethazine hydrocodone syrup, and more than $5,000 in cash.\\n Following Jones’s arrest, officers seized and searched his cellphone,\\n which contained incriminating photographs, videos, text messages,\\n notes, and browser searches. In particular, officers found videos of\\n firearms and money, text messages about drug sales, and photos of\\n high-grade marijuana.\\n Almost two years later, police officers executed a search war-\\n rant at the apartment where Jones lived with his girlfriend, her\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 4 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n family, and his infant son. In Jones’s bedroom, officers found a ma-\\n rijuana cigarette on a counter, a loaded Glock handgun with an ex-\\n tended magazine in his dresser drawer, a Glock handgun with an\\n extended magazine and machine-gun-conversion switch on top of\\n a laundry hamper, two cellphones, one prescription bottle of co-\\n deine syrup labeled with Jones’s name and address, and an empty\\n bottle of suspected codeine syrup. In Jones’s girlfriend’s car, which\\n was parked some 60 to 80 feet away from the apartment’s front\\n door, officers found four pounds of marijuana.\\n A grand jury indicted Jones on five counts: (1) conspiracy to\\n possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846); (2)\\n possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C.\\n § 841(a)(1)); (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-\\n trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)); (4) possession of a\\n firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); and (5) possession of an\\n unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).\\n B\\n A detailed account of Jones’s trial is essential to understand-\\n ing several of his claims on appeal.\\n The government introduced evidence of everything discov-\\n ered in the searches described above: the gun, drugs, and cash dis-\\n covered during the traffic stop; the digital evidence found on\\n Jones’s cellphone following his arrest; the guns, drugs, and digital\\n evidence collected during the search of his apartment; and the ma-\\n rijuana found in his girlfriend’s car. Various experts connected the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 5 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n government’s evidence to Jones, translated drug-trafficking lingo,\\n and explained how drug dealers typically conduct their business.\\n Several incidents that occurred during the trial are particu-\\n larly significant. First, Corporal Charles Hunter—who conducted\\n the search of Jones’s apartment—took the stand on the govern-\\n ment’s behalf. In the course of describing the process of collecting\\n a DNA sample, he offered the following snippet of testimony: “Mr.\\n Jones was transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-\\n ]up investigation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as\\n he invoked his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda\\n rights.” Trial Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Jones’s attorney didn’t\\n object to Hunter’s reference to Jones’s invocation of Miranda, and\\n the prosecutor didn’t immediately ask any follow-up questions.\\n Several minutes later, though, the prosecutor revisited the issue:\\n “[Y]ou said that you attempted to interview him but he invoked\\n his—or after Mirandizing him, he invoked his rights, correct?” Trial\\n Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–20. The officer responded, “That\\n is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No. 111 at 220. Again, no objec-\\n tion.\\n Second, over Jones’s pre-trial and mid-trial objections, the\\n government presented evidence of rap-music videos, images, and\\n lyrics that Jones had posted depicting him with marijuana, cash,\\n and firearms with machine-gun-conversion switches. The videos\\n bore disclaimers clarifying that the videos were made for “enter-\\n tainment purposes only” and that the “props scenes and lyrics\\n should not be taken seriously.” Trial Tr. at 352, Dkt. No. 112 at 108.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 6 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n When the government rested, Jones filed a motion for a\\n judgment of acquittal on all counts, which the district court denied.\\n Jones opted not to testify, so the defense rested.\\n That leaves the third and final trial episode worth highlight-\\n ing. During his closing argument, the prosecutor drew the jury’s\\n attention to Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a series of Jones’s Insta-\\n gram messages. In connection with Count 3—possession of a fire-\\n arm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime—the prosecutor\\n said the following:\\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\\n don’t have my money.”\\n\\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\\n message.\\n\\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\\n The difficulty arises because all now agree that Exhibit 19Z was\\n never admitted into evidence, and so wasn’t properly before the\\n jury.\\n The jury convicted Jones on all five counts. Importantly\\n here, on Count 3 the jury specifically found that Jones used a Glock\\n 23 .40 caliber pistol equipped with a machine-gun-conversion\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 7 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n switch in furtherance of Counts 1 and 2. As a result of that finding,\\n Jones’s sentence on Count 3 was enhanced from 5 to 30 years.\\n Jones was sentenced to a total of 45 years in prison.\\n As already noted, Jones raises five issues on appeal. First, he\\n contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Count 3—\\n i.e., to prove that he used the Glock 23 in furtherance of a drug-\\n trafficking crime. Second, Jones argues that his conviction on\\n Count 3 should be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in mis-\\n conduct when he invoked the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z during clos-\\n ing argument. Third, he contends that his convictions on all counts\\n should be reversed because the district court erroneously admitted\\n the rap-music videos, images, and lyrics at trial. Fourth, Jones ar-\\n gues that the prosecutor violated his due-process rights by ques-\\n tioning Corporal Hunter about his invocation of his Miranda\\n rights. Finally, he argues that all of these errors, even if not inde-\\n pendently reversible, cumulatively warrant reversal.\\n II\\n For the reasons that follow, we agree with Jones that the\\n prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he invoked the unadmit-\\n ted Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3 during his closing ar-\\n gument and that the error was plain and warrants correction. Ac-\\n cordingly, we vacate Jones’s conviction as to Count 3 and remand\\n for a new trial on that count.\\n We reject Jones’s remaining arguments. We hold that the\\n government presented sufficient evidence—even if only barely—to\\n convict Jones on Count 3. We conclude that although the district\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 8 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n court erred in admitting the rap-related evidence, the error was\\n harmless. We hold that, in the circumstances of this case, even if\\n the prosecutor’s comment about Jones’s invocation of his Miranda\\n rights violated due process, the error was harmless. And we find\\n that there is no cumulative error warranting reversal.\\n A\\n We begin, as Jones does, with the contention that the gov-\\n ernment presented insufficient evidence to prove Count 3—and\\n therefore, that the district court erred in denying Jones’s motion for\\n judgment of acquittal on that charge. Although the question is\\n close—the government’s § 924(c) case was hardly overwhelming—\\n we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient.\\n One important preliminary: The sufficiency challenge that\\n Jones raises on appeal is different from the one he presented in the\\n district court. In particular, whereas Jones contended below that\\n the government hadn’t proven that the police actually found a con-\\n trolled substance, see Trial Tr. at 491, Dkt. No. 112 at 247, he argues\\n on appeal that it failed to prove that he used firearms “in further-\\n ance of ” his drug-related crimes, see Br. of Appellant at 25–29. Ac-\\n cordingly, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Baston,\\n 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that a defendant must\\n challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to a specific count in\\n the district court in order to preserve the challenge for appeal). Ac-\\n cordingly, we must find, as an initial matter, that (1) “there [was] an\\n error,” (2) “the error [was] plain,” and (3) “the error . . . affected\\n [Jones’s] substantial rights.” United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 9 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n 1264 (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134\\n (2018)). If those criteria are met, we (4) “may exercise [our] discre-\\n tion” to rectify [the] plain error, “but only if the error seriously af-\\n fected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-\\n ceedings.” Id. (citation modified). Here, we needn’t proceed be-\\n yond the first step because we conclude that although the question\\n is close, a reasonable jury could convict Jones on Count 3 based on\\n the evidence presented at trial.\\n The applicable standard of review is doing a lot of work\\n here. The well-worn rule, of course, is that on a sufficiency chal-\\n lenge we must “[v]iew[] the evidence in the light most favorable to\\n the government and draw[] all reasonable inferences in favor of the\\n jury’s verdict.” United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir.\\n 2011). “[W]e allow the jury to choose among several reasonable\\n conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (citation modi-\\n fied). To convict Jones on Count 3 and get the accompanying 30-\\n year sentence, the government had to connect Jones’s possession\\n of his machine gun—the Glock 23 with the conversion switch\\n found in his bedroom—to his drug-trafficking crime—the mariju-\\n ana found in his girlfriend’s car. 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (B)(ii).\\n We’ve held that it’s not enough for the government to demonstrate\\n the mere “presence of a gun within the defendant’s dominion and\\n control during a drug trafficking offense.” United States v. Timmons,\\n 283 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002). Rather, the government must\\n show that the guns that the defendant possessed “helped, fur-\\n thered, promoted, or advanced” one of his drug-trafficking of-\\n fenses. Id. at 1252. Accordingly, to support Jones’s conviction and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 10 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n 30-year sentence, there must be a “nexus” between the firearms he\\n possessed—including the machine gun—and, as relevant here, a\\n distribution amount of marijuana. Id. at 1253.\\n To satisfy this “nexus” requirement, the government intro-\\n duced the following evidence, in addition to that collected during\\n the various searches: (1) expert testimony that drug dealers “typi-\\n cally” use guns to protect their stashes, Trial Tr. at 476–77, Dkt. No.\\n 112 at 232–33; (2) a text exchange in which another individual re-\\n ferred to “clutching” an assault rifle while selling marijuana, and\\n Jones responded, “I need my gun fool . . . I need my stick to fool”;\\n (3) and a video showing Jones holding a Glock switch in his hand\\n and a bag of marijuana in his lap.\\n Hardly overwhelming, but given the applicable standard, le-\\n gally sufficient. A jury could reasonably conclude from the combi-\\n nation of the government’s evidence that Jones possessed the ma-\\n chine gun in furtherance of his drug-trafficking activities. Follow-\\n ing the government’s narrative, the jury could conclude that Jones\\n possessed both guns to protect his drug-dealing operation and that\\n he put similar weapons near small amounts of drugs in the music\\n video because he is a “typical” drug dealer. Viewing the evidence\\n in the government’s favor, and drawing all inferences in favor of the\\n jury’s verdict, see Gamory, 635 F.3d at 497, we find no error in the\\n district court’s denial of Jones’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.\\n B\\n Next up, Jones’s contention that the prosecutor engaged in\\n misconduct when, during closing argument, he referenced an\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 11 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n exhibit that hadn’t been admitted as evidence. As already ex-\\n plained, in support of Count 3, the prosecutor invoked the unad-\\n mitted Exhibit 19Z, which comprised a collection of messages\\n from Jones’s Instagram account. The prosecutor was pretty blunt:\\n Take a look at Government’s Exhibit 19Z. Messages\\n from the defendant’s Instagram. What are these\\n about? “We got 1,700 apiece. I brought weed with\\n my money and told you I would have eff after I sold it\\n and you.” Right? What’s the defendant respond?\\n “I’m through talking. I’m going to smoke you if you\\n don’t have my money.”\\n\\n All you need to know about the defendant’s posses-\\n sion of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one\\n message.\\n\\n Trial Tr. at 541–42, Dkt. No. 113 at 20–21 (quotation marks added).\\n Because Jones’s attorney didn’t object to the prosecutor’s in-\\n vocation of Exhibit 19Z, we review only for plain error using the\\n traditional four-element test already outlined. See supra at 8.\\n 1\\n First, error. We evaluate alleged prosecutorial misconduct\\n using a two-part test: “(1) the remarks must be improper, and (2)\\n the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the\\n defendant.” United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 505 (11th Cir. 2014)\\n (citation modified).\\n The first element is easily satisfied. We have held that “[a]\\n prosecutor may not go beyond the evidence before the jury during\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 12 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n closing argument,” United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th\\n Cir. 1990), and the government has acknowledged, as it must, that\\n Exhibit 19Z “was not admitted into evidence,” Br. of Appellee at\\n 34. Worse, by far—more on this shortly—the prosecutor told ju-\\n rors that, with respect to Count 3, Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [they]\\n need[ed] to know.” Trial Tr. at 542, Dkt. No. 113 at 21.\\n In assessing the second element, “[w]e generally consider\\n four factors,” which must be “viewed in the context of the trial as\\n a whole”: “(1) whether the challenged comments had a tendency\\n to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the\\n comments were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the comments\\n were deliberately or accidentally placed before the jury; and (4) the\\n strength of the competent proof establishing the guilt of the de-\\n fendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d at 505.\\n Our evaluation of the four factors leads us to conclude that\\n the prosecutor engaged in misconduct—and thus committed er-\\n ror—when he invoked Exhibit 19Z in connection with Count 3.\\n First, the prosecutor’s comment had a “tendency to . . . prejudice”\\n Jones because he expressly told jurors that the unadmitted Exhibit\\n 19Z was “[a]ll [they] need[ed] to know” to convict him on the\\n § 924(c) charge. Second, while the comment might be deemed to\\n have been “isolated” in a sense, Exhibit 19Z was one of only three\\n pieces of evidence that the prosecutor highlighted in closing, and\\n he lingered on it for about 45 seconds. Third, given its centrality\\n to the prosecutor’s argument, it is inconceivable that Exhibit 19Z\\n was “accidentally placed before the jury.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 13 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n Our assessment of the fourth factor—“the strength of the\\n competent proof establishing [Jones’s] guilt”—warrants a bit more\\n explanation because, for reasons already explained, although the\\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient, it wasn’t particularly\\n “str[ong].”\\n We think the government sufficiently proved that Jones pos-\\n sessed the two firearms—including the machine gun. In particular,\\n the government presented the two guns found in the search of the\\n apartment—one in a dresser drawer and one in the hamper—as\\n well as a text exchange in which Jones and another dealer commis-\\n erated about the importance of their firearms. And we think the\\n government likewise proved that Jones possessed distribution\\n amounts of marijuana. Specifically, it pointed to the four pounds\\n of marijuana found in Jones’s girlfriend’s car. The stickier question\\n is the “strength” of the government’s proof regarding the required\\n nexus—i.e., that Jones possessed firearms to further his trafficking\\n crimes.\\n Lacking any direct evidence, the government called expert\\n witnesses to testify that drug dealers “typically” use guns to protect\\n their stashes. See Br. of Appellee at 25. And it contends on appeal\\n that because Jones had the firearms, and because he had the mari-\\n juana, the circumstantial evidence “supported the conclusion that\\n the firearm furthered Jones’s possession with intent to distribute\\n the marijuana found in the trunk of the car.” Id. Sufficient, but\\n again, hardly compelling.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 14 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n Nor do the factors that we outlined in Timmons meaning-\\n fully move the “strength” needle. Per Timmons, we consider “the\\n type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the\\n firearm, the type of the weapon, whether the weapon was stolen,\\n the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun\\n is loaded, proximity to the drugs or drug profits, and the time and\\n circumstances under which the gun is found.” 283 F.3d at 1253 (ci-\\n tation modified). True, Jones possessed the guns in question ille-\\n gally. And true, they were loaded. But they were more than 60 feet\\n away from a distribution amount of marijuana, which was itself\\n locked in a car’s trunk. And because the guns were stashed in a\\n dresser drawer and on a laundry hamper, they weren’t necessarily\\n readily accessible to Jones. All of which is to say that while the\\n government’s evidence was legally sufficient to convict Jones on\\n Count 3, it wasn’t what we’d call “str[ong].” Reeves, 742 F.3d a 505.\\n In light of (1) the prosecutor’s statement that the unadmit-\\n ted Exhibit 19Z was “[a]ll [the jury] need[ed] to know” to convict\\n Jones on Count 3, (2) the fact that the prosecutor highlighted the\\n exhibit during his closing, (3) our conclusion that the prosecutor\\n likely invoked the exhibit intentionally, rather than accidentally, and\\n (4) the sufficient-but-not-strong character of the government’s evi-\\n dence on the § 924(c) count, we have little trouble concluding that\\n the prosecutor’s remarks “prejudicially affect[ed Jones’s] substan-\\n tial rights.” Id. Accordingly, we find that Jones has met the first\\n prong of the plain-error test.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 15 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n 2\\n Second, we conclude that the error was plain. “An error is\\n ‘plain’ if it is obvious or clear under current law.” United States v.\\n Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified).\\n “[W]here the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specif-\\n ically resolve an issue,” plainness requires “precedent from the Su-\\n preme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v.\\n Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003).\\n Our caselaw is clear: “[A] prosecutor may not exceed the\\n evidence presented at trial during [] closing argument.” Reeves, 742\\n F.3d at 505; see United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir.\\n 1997); United States v. Smith, 928 F.3d 1215, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019);\\n United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021);\\n United States v. Al Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1328 (11th Cir. 2024). And\\n that prohibition is as longstanding as it is clear, stretching back\\n nearly 50 years. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th\\n Cir. Unit B 1981) (“[A] prosecutor is prohibited from seeking to ob-\\n tain a conviction by going beyond the evidence before the jury.”);\\n United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The legal\\n metes and bounds of a prosecutor’s argument are defined by the\\n evidence before the jury. Thus, a prosecutor must limit his com-\\n ments to admissible evidence.”); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d\\n 473, 476 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Lawyers know that argument to the jury\\n must be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial.”).\\n The prosecutor’s use of the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z was in\\n direct contravention of our precedent. The prosecutor wasn’t\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 16 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n assisting the jury in “analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evi-\\n dence,” wasn’t suggesting conclusions that the jury should draw\\n from the record evidence, and wasn’t “indicat[ing] [the govern-\\n ment’s] opinion.” United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.\\n 1978). Rather, he was expressly urging the jury to convict Jones on\\n the basis of extra-record evidence. The error was patent.\\n 3\\n Third, the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit 19Z affected\\n Jones’s substantial rights. When reviewing alleged prosecutorial\\n misconduct for plain error, the error and substantial-rights inquir-\\n ies substantially overlap. As already explained, in evaluating the\\n merits of a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, we ask—at the second\\n step of a two-step analysis—whether “the remarks . . . prejudicially\\n affect[ed] the substantial rights of the defendant.” Reeves, 742 F.3d\\n at 505. And in making that determination, we ask whether a “rea-\\n sonable probability arises that, but for the remarks, the outcome of\\n the trial would have been different.” Id. (citation modified). That\\n inquiry mirrors almost precisely the plain-error test’s substantial-\\n rights analysis, which asks whether an error was “prejudicial”—i.e.,\\n whether it “affected the outcome of the district court proceed-\\n ings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).\\n Accordingly, for all the reasons we concluded that Jones\\n demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that the miscon-\\n duct affected his substantial rights for plain-error purposes.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 17 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n 4\\n The first three conditions of plain-error review having been\\n satisfied, we conclude that the prosecutor’s invocation of Exhibit\\n 19Z in connection with Count 3 “seriously affected the fairness, in-\\n tegrity, or public reputation” of Jones’s trial. Hawkins, 934 F.3d at\\n 1267 (citation modified). The circumstances we confront are par-\\n ticularly troubling: The evidence of Jones’s guilt on the § 924(c)\\n offense was thin, the prosecutor told jurors at the close of trial that\\n “all [they] need[ed]” to convict him of that crime was a piece of\\n evidence that wasn’t before them, and Jones was sentenced to 30\\n years on that count alone. If left uncorrected, the prosecutor’s mis-\\n conduct in this case would leave “reasonable citizen[s]” with “a\\n rightly diminished view of the judicial process.” Id. at 1268 (cita-\\n tion modified).\\n ∗ ∗ ∗\\n For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the prosecutor’s in-\\n vocation of unadmitted evidence in connection with Count 3 con-\\n stituted plain error that affected Jones’s substantial rights, and we\\n exercise our discretion to correct it. We therefore vacate Jones’s\\n conviction on Count 3 and remand for a new trial as to that count.\\n C\\n Jones separately challenges the introduction of (1) a 29-sec-\\n ond video clip in which he raps and wields a gun, (2) a series of\\n screenshots from a music video depicting him handling various\\n firearms as well as images of drugs and cash, and (3) a note from\\n his phone featuring what seem to be violent rap-music lyrics. He\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 18 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting\\n those items under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. 1 In par-\\n ticular, Jones argues that that government couldn’t prove that the\\n items depicted in what we’ll call the “rap-related evidence” were\\n real and, therefore, that the evidence was both (1) irrelevant and (2)\\n substantially more prejudicial than probative. The government re-\\n sponds that the evidence demonstrates that Jones handled weapons\\n similar to the one seized from his apartment and that he possessed\\n and conspired to distribute marijuana.\\n We agree with the government that the evidence meets the\\n low relevance bar prescribed by Rules 401 and 402—namely, that a\\n piece of evidence have “any tendency to make a fact more or less\\n probable” and be “of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.\\n R. Evid. 401. A jury could conclude that the rap-related evidence\\n made it somewhat “more . . . probable” that Jones possessed the\\n contraband he was charged with possessing.\\n Rule 403 separately directs district courts to “exclude rele-\\n vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed” by,\\n among other things, “unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Here,\\n as in a past case of ours, “the substance of the rap [evidence] was\\n heavily prejudicial” because, as there, the videos and lyrics con-\\n tained “violence [and] profanity” and “could reasonably be under-\\n stood as promoting a violent and unlawful lifestyle.” Gamory, 635\\n\\n 1 Because Jones timely objected in the district court, we review for abuse of\\n\\n discretion. Gamory, 635 F.3d at 492. Errors aren’t reversible if they are harm-\\n less. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 19 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n F.3d at 493. The government counters that the evidence is proba-\\n tive of “Jones’s knowing possession of the firearms” alongside\\n “cash [] and marijuana similar to” that alleged in the indictment.\\n Br. of Appellee at 27–28.\\n We’re skeptical. Like the evidence at issue in Gamory, the\\n videos, screenshots, and lyrics have little relevance to Jones’s know-\\n ing possession of the two Glocks at issue here. See Gamory, 635\\n F.3d 480, 493 (11th Cir. 2011). The government witness presenting\\n the screenshots at trial couldn’t tell whether the guns shown were\\n real or props, and on appeal the government doesn’t dispute Jones’s\\n contention that “the guns depicted in the videos were not the guns\\n charged in the indictment,” Br. of Appellant at 35. Instead, it as-\\n serts only that the firearms (many of which weren’t Glocks) were\\n “similar to that alleged in the superseding indictment,” Br. of Ap-\\n pellee at 28. Add to that the fact that one of the YouTube videos\\n included the disclaimer that “[a]ll props scenes and lyrics should not\\n be taken seriously” and the probative value seems pretty low.\\n We needn’t definitively decide the Rule 403 issue, though,\\n because we hold that any error in admitting the rap-related evi-\\n dence was harmless. Even where a district court abuses its discre-\\n tion in admitting disputed evidence, its error will be deemed harm-\\n less when we can say with “fair assurance” that the “judgment was\\n not substantially swayed by the error.” Kotteakos v. United States,\\n 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Here, the government presented substan-\\n tial proof, rap-related items aside, that Jones knowingly possessed\\n the two Glocks at issue here. And indeed, before us, Jones\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 20 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n effectively admits as much: “At trial, the government introduced\\n numerous exhibits not extracted from music videos that showed\\n Mr. Jones talking about or handling drugs, guns, and cash, and the\\n two guns charged in the superseding indictment were found in Mr.\\n Jones’s bedroom with his DNA on them.” Br. of Appellant at 37;\\n see also Reply Br. of Appellant at 5. We are satisfied the jury was\\n presented with ample evidence to convict Jones on Counts 1, 2, 4,\\n and 5.\\n D\\n Next up, Jones’s argument that the government violated the\\n Due Process Clause as interpreted in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610\\n (1976), when one of its witnesses and the prosecutor both com-\\n mented on his invocation of his Miranda rights. 2\\n Recall that at trial, Corporal Hunter—who had conducted\\n the search of Jones’s apartment—testified for the government. In\\n the course of describing the process by which he had collected a\\n DNA sample, he made the following comment: “Mr. Jones was\\n transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-]up investi-\\n gation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked\\n his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” Trial\\n Tr. at 216, Dkt. No. 111 at 216. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor\\n circled back to the issue: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\\n\\n 2 We review “issues of constitutional law de novo.” United States v. O’Keefe, 461\\n\\n F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006). Alleged Doyle violations are subject to harm-\\n less-error review. See United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285–86 (11th Cir.\\n 2001).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 21 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\\n voked his rights, correct?” Trial Tr. at 219–20, Dkt. No. 111 at 219–\\n 20. Hunter responded, “That is correct.” Trial Tr. at 220, Dkt. No.\\n 111 at 220. Jones’s lawyer didn’t object to either comment at the\\n time, but Jones contends on appeal that they ran afoul of Doyle.\\n Because Jones’s lawyer didn’t lodge a contemporaneous ob-\\n jection, we review only for plain error. See supra at 8. For reasons\\n we will explain, we hold that in the particular circumstances of this\\n case, any Doyle error that might have occurred was harmless.\\n In order to give effect to Miranda’s “prophylactic” protec-\\n tions, the Supreme Court has barred the government from using\\n an “arrested person’s silence” against him at trial for “impeachment\\n or for substantive evidence of guilt.” Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617–19; ac-\\n cord United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1985).\\n A violation of that prohibition, the Court has explained, would be\\n “fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process.” Doyle,\\n 426 U.S. at 618; accord United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282, 1285\\n (11th Cir. 2001).\\n To be clear, the prosecutor here should not—not, not, not—\\n have commented on Jones’s invocation of his right to remain silent.\\n We don’t fault the prosecutor for Corporal Hunter’s spontaneous\\n statement, in response to a question about DNA collection, that\\n “[n]o interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked his\\n right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.” But we\\n can—and do—fault the prosecutor for returning to the issue with\\n her own pointed question: “[Y]ou said that you attempted to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 22 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 24-10938\\n\\n interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he in-\\n voked his rights, correct?” We shouldn’t have to keep saying this,\\n but alas, it seems the message isn’t getting through: So let us once\\n again make “crystal clear” that the government may not “call at-\\n tention to” a defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights. Miller,\\n 255 F.3d at 1285. Prosecutors know better, and they simply must\\n stop “continu[ing] to indulge themselves in this way”—enough is\\n enough. Id.\\n Despite the impropriety of the prosecutor’s conduct—and\\n our increasing consternation at government lawyers’ repeated re-\\n fusals to heed our warnings—we are satisfied that, in the particular\\n circumstances presented in this case, any Doyle violation that might\\n have occurred was harmless. We’ve held that “a prosecutor’s single\\n reference to [a] defendant’s post-Miranda silence” is harmless “if it\\n occurs during a trial at which the government’s evidence was oth-\\n erwise overwhelming.” Id. at 1285–86; see also United States v. Gon-\\n zalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1549–51 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, it’s clear to us\\n that between the items collected during the apartment search and\\n the digital evidence on Jones’s phones, any lingering implication\\n from the prosecutor’s improper question had “no substantial and\\n injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” on\\n Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5. Miller, 255 F.3d at 1285 (citation modified).\\n E\\n Jones finally argues that even if none of the errors that he\\n has alleged warrants reversal on its own, their accumulation does.\\n Because we vacate Count 3 on the ground that the prosecutor’s\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 23 of 23\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-10938 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n reliance on the unadmitted Exhibit 19Z constituted plain error, we\\n focus here only on the cumulative effect of the alleged errors on\\n the remaining counts.\\n We reject Jones’s cumulative-error argument. Even viewed\\n in combination, the errors that Jones has alleged didn’t render his\\n trial fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332,\\n 1343 (11th Cir. 1995). “[E]xamin[ing] the trial as a whole,” United\\n States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997), he suffered\\n no violation of his “substantial rights.” United States v. Margarita\\n Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).\\n III\\n To recap, we hold that the government’s use of Exhibit 19Z\\n in its closing argument was plain error, and we exercise our discre-\\n tion to correct it. We therefore VACATE Jones’s conviction on the\\n § 924(c) offense and REMAND for a new trial on Count 3. We re-\\n ject Jones’s remaining arguments and AFFIRM the district court’s\\n judgment in all other respects.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30981,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10762941,"string":"10,762,941"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Elena Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc."},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-11586"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11586\\n ____________________\\n\\n ELENA MUKHINA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n WALMART, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00361-JB-C\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\\n erred when it granted summary judgment against an employee’s\\n claims of national origin discrimination based on a hostile work\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n environment, religious discrimination, and retaliatory discharge.\\n Elena Mukhina alleges that, during her employment with\\n Walmart, her coworkers and customers treated her poorly because\\n she could not speak English, she was denied time off on a religious\\n holiday, and Walmart retaliated against her for raising complaints.\\n Because Mukhina failed to present substantial evidence of either a\\n hostile work environment or retaliation and failed to exhaust her\\n administrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination,\\n we affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Mukhina is a Russian national and adherent of Russian Folk\\n Christianity. She understands some English but cannot speak the\\n language well. She began working at Walmart in the apparel de-\\n partment where she understood she would communicate with cus-\\n tomers.\\n When customers realized she did not speak English, some\\n expressed dissatisfaction and anger and others laughed at her or\\n mocked her. Mukhina experienced this treatment every day.\\n Coworkers also laughed at her and spoke to her disparagingly be-\\n cause she did not understand them.\\n Mukhina complained to her supervisor that customers were\\n rude to her because she could not understand English, and she re-\\n quested a transfer to work on the night shift. Her manager told her\\n that he could transfer her to the night shift after he found a replace-\\n ment for her, but that it might take a few weeks. Six weeks later,\\n Mukhina complained of harassment and discrimination by both\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n customers and coworkers. She received the transfer three days\\n later, and her working conditions improved.\\n Mukhina still experienced some negative treatment from\\n her coworkers after her transfer. One coworker pushed a shopping\\n cart toward her, and another accused her of being greedy because\\n the night shift pays a higher rate. She also had to retrieve her own\\n freight and was told she could not use a shopping cart for her work.\\n Mukhina requested leave on New Year’s Eve. She told her\\n supervisor that New Year’s Eve was an important holiday for her as\\n a Russian and that it was the same for her as Christmas Day was for\\n Americans. Her supervisor denied the leave request because re-\\n quests were granted on a first come, first serve basis, and other as-\\n sociates had asked for that day off before her. Mukhina took New\\n Year’s Eve off without permission and received two attendance\\n points according to Walmart’s attendance policy.\\n Mukhina filed an ethics complaint with Walmart based on\\n the denial of her request for time off. After filing the complaint,\\n some employees treated Mukhina better by greeting her and speak-\\n ing to her politely and some treated her worse. One unidentified\\n coworker approached her and engaged in verbally abusive behavior\\n toward her regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Mukhina\\n did not tell anyone about the interaction and decided to quit.\\n Walmart officially terminated Mukhina’s employment soon after-\\n ward.\\n Mukhina completed an intake questionnaire with the Equal\\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In it, Mukhina listed only\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the complaint.\\n She stated that she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of\\n the most important holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person”\\n with many “national traditions.” She said that in Russia, New\\n Year’s Eve “is like Christmas in America.” But she did not allege\\n that she considered New Year’s Eve to be a religious holiday.\\n Mukhina next filed a charge of discrimination with the Com-\\n mission that alleged retaliation and discrimination based on na-\\n tional origin. The narrative section of the charge did not include\\n any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s Eve. The\\n Commission dismissed her charge and issued her a right-to-sue let-\\n ter.\\n Mukhina filed a pro se complaint against Walmart. She al-\\n leged that Walmart subjected her to a hostile work environment\\n based on her national origin, discriminated against her based on her\\n religion by failing to provide reasonable accommodations, and re-\\n taliated against her for requesting accommodations and complain-\\n ing about the alleged discrimination. Walmart moved for summary\\n judgment.\\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of\\n Walmart. It ruled that Mukhina failed to establish that her hostile\\n work environment was based on her national origin, that the har-\\n assment was sufficiently severe, or that Walmart was responsible\\n for any mistreatment. It ruled that Mukhina had failed to exhaust\\n her claim of religious discrimination, and even assuming her claim\\n was not barred, she did not inform Walmart of the religious nature\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n of the holiday and did not suffer an adverse action. As to her retal-\\n iation claim, it ruled that she could not establish an adverse action\\n causally connected to her complaint of discrimination.\\n We appointed Travis Ramey of the University of Alabama\\n School of Law’s Appellate Advocacy Clinic as counsel for Mukhina.\\n Sarah Frances Jackson and Abby Vandiver presented oral argu-\\n ment. We thank Mr. Ramey, Ms. Jackson, Ms. Vandiver, and the\\n clinic for accepting the appointment and for their excellent repre-\\n sentation.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, and we view the\\n evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\\n moving party. Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265,\\n 1272 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide this discussion into three parts. First, we explain\\n that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of hostile work environ-\\n ment. Second, we explain that Mukhina failed to exhaust her ad-\\n ministrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination. Fi-\\n nally, we explain that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of retalia-\\n tion.\\n A. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of a\\n Hostile Work Environment.\\n To prove a claim of hostile work environment under Title\\n VII, the plaintiff must present evidence that she belongs to a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n protected group; she has been subject to unwelcome harassment;\\n the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the em-\\n ployee, such as national origin; the harassment “was sufficiently se-\\n vere or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment\\n and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment”; and\\n there is a basis for holding the employer liable. Miller v. Kenworth of\\n Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). To determine if\\n harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive, we look to the to-\\n tality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of\\n the conduct, “whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-\\n miliating” instead of “a mere offensive utterance,” and “whether\\n the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job per-\\n formance.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 837\\n (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Isolated incidents are ordinarily not sufficient to establish a hostile\\n work environment. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245\\n (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). When “the alleged harassment is com-\\n mitted by co-workers or customers,” the plaintiff must establish\\n that the employer “had notice of the alleged harassment and failed\\n to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” Watson v.\\n Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).\\n Mukhina experienced daily instances of customers, cowork-\\n ers, and supervisors laughing at her, mocking her, and becoming\\n angry with her due to her inability to communicate in English. But\\n frustration with her inability to communicate does not constitute\\n harassment based on her national origin. See EEOC v. Catastrophe\\n Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that Title\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n VII protects immutable characteristics, not cultural practices like a\\n preferred language); see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268–271\\n (5th Cir. 1980). And Mukhina failed to provide evidence that inci-\\n dents where a coworker pushed a shopping cart toward her, pre-\\n vented her from using a shopping cart, or required her to retrieve\\n her own freight were related to her national origin. See Miller, 277\\n F.3d at 1275. Only an isolated incident involving a comment about\\n the Russian invasion of Ukraine involved her national origin. But\\n that single utterance was not “physically threatening or humiliat-\\n ing” and did not “unreasonably interfere[] with [her] job perfor-\\n mance” so that it could be considered severe. Tonkyro, 995 F.3d at\\n 837 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Mukhina cites one precedent for the proposition that “com-\\n ments about an employee’s accent or linguistic mannerisms sup-\\n port an inference of discrimination based on national origin.” Yet\\n that decision involved more than “comments about an employee’s\\n accent or linguistic mannerisms.” See Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of\\n Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding jury’s find-\\n ing of discrimination when a supervisor “blatantly state[d] that the\\n reason [the employee] was passed over for the promotion was his\\n ethnicity”). To be sure, comments about an employee’s accent or\\n linguistic mannerisms can support an inference of discrimination\\n when combined with other harassing conduct motivated by na-\\n tional origin, but Title VII “does not support an interpretation that\\n equates the language an employee prefers to use with his national\\n origin.” Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Garcia,\\n 618 F.2d at 270).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n Mukhina also failed to establish any basis for holding\\n Walmart liable. When she first complained to her manager,\\n Mukhina stated only that customers were being rude to her based\\n on her inability to communicate. She did not complain about her\\n coworkers or report discrimination at that time. Her manager ex-\\n pressed a willingness to transfer her to the night shift as soon as he\\n found a replacement for her, but he explained that locating a re-\\n placement could take time. It was not until Mukhina complained\\n again that her manager understood her to complain of harassment\\n and discrimination by both customers and coworkers. And even\\n then, Mukhina again attributed the harassment to her language\\n struggles, not to any protected characteristic. Three days after the\\n second complaint, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the night shift.\\n Walmart took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” after\\n learning about the harassment. Watson, 324 F.3d at 1257.\\n B. Mukhina Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies for Her\\n Claim of Religious Discrimination.\\n Before filing a complaint under Title VII, an employee must\\n file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor-\\n tunity Commission. Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345\\n (11th Cir. 2022). A complaint is “limited by the scope of the [Com-\\n mission] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow\\n out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. (citation and internal quo-\\n tation marks omitted). “The facts alleged in the charge matter\\n most” and “the legal theory the charging party articulates is far less\\n important.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 990 (11th Cir.\\n 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the\\n allegations in the [Commission] complaint, but . . . allegations of\\n new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t\\n of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Mukhina relies on the intake questionnaire she filed with the\\n Commission to argue that her religious discrimination claim “grew\\n out of ” her initial allegations. In her view, the intake questionnaire\\n alleged a claim of religious discrimination because it explained that\\n she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of the most im-\\n portant holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person” with many\\n “national traditions,” and compared the holiday to “Christmas in\\n America.” But the employee’s formal charge, not the intake ques-\\n tionnaire, is what counts. Pijnenburg v. W. Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255\\n F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). Although we have recognized a\\n limited exception to this rule for purposes of the statute of limita-\\n tions, see Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir.\\n 2001), Mukhina cannot invoke that exception because she filed a\\n timely charge with the Commission. And her operative charge al-\\n leged only “retaliation” and “national origin” discrimination, not\\n religious discrimination. Nor did the narrative section of the charge\\n include any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s\\n Eve.\\n Even if we could consider Mukhina’s intake questionnaire,\\n it would not help her. Much like her charge, the questionnaire lists\\n only “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n complaint. And although the questionnaire compared New Year’s\\n Eve to “Christmas in America,” it never stated that New Year’s Eve\\n was a religious holiday for Mukhina or even mentioned Mukhina’s\\n religious beliefs. Likewise, her reference to “national traditions”\\n connotes a cultural, not religious, practice. A claim of religious dis-\\n crimination would not be expected to “grow out of ” the allegations\\n in the intake questionnaire because the questionnaire did not men-\\n tion Mukhina’s religion or that New Year’s Eve was a religious hol-\\n iday. See Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). Mukhina failed to exhaust her administrative rem-\\n edies for her claim of religious discrimination.\\n C. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of Retaliation.\\n To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must\\n prove that she participated in protected activity, that she suffered\\n an adverse action, and that there was a causal relationship between\\n the protected activity and the adverse action. Goldsmith v. Bagby El-\\n evator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must\\n prove that “her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged\\n adverse action,” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329,\\n 1338 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted), and that “the adverse act followed the protected conduct,”\\n Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). There\\n is no claim for retaliation when the “alleged retaliatory conduct\\n was the same continuous harassment that gave rise to the initial\\n complaint . . . unless . . . there was a ratcheting up of the harass-\\n ment.” Id. (alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n marks omitted). If the employer offers “a legitimate, non-retalia-\\n tory reason for the adverse employment action,” the plaintiff must\\n prove that the employer’s reason “is a pretext for prohibited, retal-\\n iatory conduct.” Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th\\n Cir. 1998).\\n Mukhina argues that her complaints to her supervisors\\n about her working conditions, her request for time off to celebrate\\n a religious holiday, and her ethics complaint constitute protected\\n activity. And she argues that she suffered two adverse employment\\n actions because of her participation in those protected activities:\\n the imposition of two attendance points and her constructive dis-\\n charge.\\n Mukhina failed to prove a causal connection between her\\n protected activity and the imposition of two attendance points.\\n Mukhina was assigned the attendance points because she missed\\n work, not because she requested the day off or made an ethics com-\\n plaint. Mukhina cannot establish that but for her request or her\\n complaint, she would not have been assigned the attendance\\n points. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1338. And even assuming, for the sake\\n of argument, that Mukhina proved a causal connection, Walmart\\n offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why it imposed the\\n attendance points: “Walmart’s policy provided for them.”\\n Mukhina offers no evidence that this reason is pretextual.\\n Mukhina’s argument that she suffered a constructive dis-\\n charge fails too. Because she argues that the harassment created a\\n hostile work environment before she complained, Walmart could\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n not have created the hostile environment that led her to quit in re-\\n taliation for her complaints. See Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1284. Mukhina\\n also failed to establish that the harassment “ratchet[ed] up” after\\n she complained to her supervisors. Id. (citation and internal quota-\\n tion marks omitted). Indeed, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the\\n night shift after she complained, and her working conditions im-\\n proved. And Mukhina did not quit until several months after the\\n transfer. She was not constructively discharged in retaliation for her\\n informal complaints or for her ethics complaint.\\n Mukhina also failed to present a convincing mosaic of cir-\\n cumstantial evidence to support her claim of retaliation. See Berry\\n v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n Nothing in the record supports an inference that Walmart took re-\\n taliatory action against her after she complained or requested time\\n off. A reasonable jury could not infer retaliatory intent based on\\n this record.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Walmart.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229526/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762941/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Elena Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc.\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 12\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-11586\n ____________________\n\n ELENA MUKHINA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n WALMART, INC.,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00361-JB-C\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\n Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\n erred when it granted summary judgment against an employee’s\n claims of national origin discrimination based on a hostile work\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n environment, religious discrimination, and retaliatory discharge.\n Elena Mukhina alleges that, during her employment with\n Walmart, her coworkers and customers treated her poorly because\n she could not speak English, she was denied time off on a religious\n holiday, and Walmart retaliated against her for raising complaints.\n Because Mukhina failed to present substantial evidence of either a\n hostile work environment or retaliation and failed to exhaust her\n administrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination,\n we affirm.\n I. BACKGROUND\n Mukhina is a Russian national and adherent of Russian Folk\n Christianity. She understands some English but cannot speak the\n language well. She began working at Walmart in the apparel de-\n partment where she understood she would communicate with cus-\n tomers.\n When customers realized she did not speak English, some\n expressed dissatisfaction and anger and others laughed at her or\n mocked her. Mukhina experienced this treatment every day.\n Coworkers also laughed at her and spoke to her disparagingly be-\n cause she did not understand them.\n Mukhina complained to her supervisor that customers were\n rude to her because she could not understand English, and she re-\n quested a transfer to work on the night shift. Her manager told her\n that he could transfer her to the night shift after he found a replace-\n ment for her, but that it might take a few weeks. Six weeks later,\n Mukhina complained of harassment and discrimination by both\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n customers and coworkers. She received the transfer three days\n later, and her working conditions improved.\n Mukhina still experienced some negative treatment from\n her coworkers after her transfer. One coworker pushed a shopping\n cart toward her, and another accused her of being greedy because\n the night shift pays a higher rate. She also had to retrieve her own\n freight and was told she could not use a shopping cart for her work.\n Mukhina requested leave on New Year’s Eve. She told her\n supervisor that New Year’s Eve was an important holiday for her as\n a Russian and that it was the same for her as Christmas Day was for\n Americans. Her supervisor denied the leave request because re-\n quests were granted on a first come, first serve basis, and other as-\n sociates had asked for that day off before her. Mukhina took New\n Year’s Eve off without permission and received two attendance\n points according to Walmart’s attendance policy.\n Mukhina filed an ethics complaint with Walmart based on\n the denial of her request for time off. After filing the complaint,\n some employees treated Mukhina better by greeting her and speak-\n ing to her politely and some treated her worse. One unidentified\n coworker approached her and engaged in verbally abusive behavior\n toward her regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Mukhina\n did not tell anyone about the interaction and decided to quit.\n Walmart officially terminated Mukhina’s employment soon after-\n ward.\n Mukhina completed an intake questionnaire with the Equal\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In it, Mukhina listed only\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the complaint.\n She stated that she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of\n the most important holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person”\n with many “national traditions.” She said that in Russia, New\n Year’s Eve “is like Christmas in America.” But she did not allege\n that she considered New Year’s Eve to be a religious holiday.\n Mukhina next filed a charge of discrimination with the Com-\n mission that alleged retaliation and discrimination based on na-\n tional origin. The narrative section of the charge did not include\n any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s Eve. The\n Commission dismissed her charge and issued her a right-to-sue let-\n ter.\n Mukhina filed a pro se complaint against Walmart. She al-\n leged that Walmart subjected her to a hostile work environment\n based on her national origin, discriminated against her based on her\n religion by failing to provide reasonable accommodations, and re-\n taliated against her for requesting accommodations and complain-\n ing about the alleged discrimination. Walmart moved for summary\n judgment.\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of\n Walmart. It ruled that Mukhina failed to establish that her hostile\n work environment was based on her national origin, that the har-\n assment was sufficiently severe, or that Walmart was responsible\n for any mistreatment. It ruled that Mukhina had failed to exhaust\n her claim of religious discrimination, and even assuming her claim\n was not barred, she did not inform Walmart of the religious nature\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n of the holiday and did not suffer an adverse action. As to her retal-\n iation claim, it ruled that she could not establish an adverse action\n causally connected to her complaint of discrimination.\n We appointed Travis Ramey of the University of Alabama\n School of Law’s Appellate Advocacy Clinic as counsel for Mukhina.\n Sarah Frances Jackson and Abby Vandiver presented oral argu-\n ment. We thank Mr. Ramey, Ms. Jackson, Ms. Vandiver, and the\n clinic for accepting the appointment and for their excellent repre-\n sentation.\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n We review a summary judgment de novo, and we view the\n evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\n moving party. Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265,\n 1272 (11th Cir. 2021).\n III. DISCUSSION\n We divide this discussion into three parts. First, we explain\n that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of hostile work environ-\n ment. Second, we explain that Mukhina failed to exhaust her ad-\n ministrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination. Fi-\n nally, we explain that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of retalia-\n tion.\n A. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of a\n Hostile Work Environment.\n To prove a claim of hostile work environment under Title\n VII, the plaintiff must present evidence that she belongs to a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n protected group; she has been subject to unwelcome harassment;\n the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the em-\n ployee, such as national origin; the harassment “was sufficiently se-\n vere or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment\n and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment”; and\n there is a basis for holding the employer liable. Miller v. Kenworth of\n Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). To determine if\n harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive, we look to the to-\n tality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of\n the conduct, “whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-\n miliating” instead of “a mere offensive utterance,” and “whether\n the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job per-\n formance.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 837\n (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n Isolated incidents are ordinarily not sufficient to establish a hostile\n work environment. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245\n (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). When “the alleged harassment is com-\n mitted by co-workers or customers,” the plaintiff must establish\n that the employer “had notice of the alleged harassment and failed\n to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” Watson v.\n Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).\n Mukhina experienced daily instances of customers, cowork-\n ers, and supervisors laughing at her, mocking her, and becoming\n angry with her due to her inability to communicate in English. But\n frustration with her inability to communicate does not constitute\n harassment based on her national origin. See EEOC v. Catastrophe\n Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that Title\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n VII protects immutable characteristics, not cultural practices like a\n preferred language); see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268–271\n (5th Cir. 1980). And Mukhina failed to provide evidence that inci-\n dents where a coworker pushed a shopping cart toward her, pre-\n vented her from using a shopping cart, or required her to retrieve\n her own freight were related to her national origin. See Miller, 277\n F.3d at 1275. Only an isolated incident involving a comment about\n the Russian invasion of Ukraine involved her national origin. But\n that single utterance was not “physically threatening or humiliat-\n ing” and did not “unreasonably interfere[] with [her] job perfor-\n mance” so that it could be considered severe. Tonkyro, 995 F.3d at\n 837 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n Mukhina cites one precedent for the proposition that “com-\n ments about an employee’s accent or linguistic mannerisms sup-\n port an inference of discrimination based on national origin.” Yet\n that decision involved more than “comments about an employee’s\n accent or linguistic mannerisms.” See Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of\n Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding jury’s find-\n ing of discrimination when a supervisor “blatantly state[d] that the\n reason [the employee] was passed over for the promotion was his\n ethnicity”). To be sure, comments about an employee’s accent or\n linguistic mannerisms can support an inference of discrimination\n when combined with other harassing conduct motivated by na-\n tional origin, but Title VII “does not support an interpretation that\n equates the language an employee prefers to use with his national\n origin.” Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Garcia,\n 618 F.2d at 270).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n Mukhina also failed to establish any basis for holding\n Walmart liable. When she first complained to her manager,\n Mukhina stated only that customers were being rude to her based\n on her inability to communicate. She did not complain about her\n coworkers or report discrimination at that time. Her manager ex-\n pressed a willingness to transfer her to the night shift as soon as he\n found a replacement for her, but he explained that locating a re-\n placement could take time. It was not until Mukhina complained\n again that her manager understood her to complain of harassment\n and discrimination by both customers and coworkers. And even\n then, Mukhina again attributed the harassment to her language\n struggles, not to any protected characteristic. Three days after the\n second complaint, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the night shift.\n Walmart took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” after\n learning about the harassment. Watson, 324 F.3d at 1257.\n B. Mukhina Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies for Her\n Claim of Religious Discrimination.\n Before filing a complaint under Title VII, an employee must\n file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor-\n tunity Commission. Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345\n (11th Cir. 2022). A complaint is “limited by the scope of the [Com-\n mission] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow\n out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. (citation and internal quo-\n tation marks omitted). “The facts alleged in the charge matter\n most” and “the legal theory the charging party articulates is far less\n important.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 990 (11th Cir.\n 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the\n allegations in the [Commission] complaint, but . . . allegations of\n new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t\n of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and\n internal quotation marks omitted).\n Mukhina relies on the intake questionnaire she filed with the\n Commission to argue that her religious discrimination claim “grew\n out of ” her initial allegations. In her view, the intake questionnaire\n alleged a claim of religious discrimination because it explained that\n she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of the most im-\n portant holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person” with many\n “national traditions,” and compared the holiday to “Christmas in\n America.” But the employee’s formal charge, not the intake ques-\n tionnaire, is what counts. Pijnenburg v. W. Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255\n F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). Although we have recognized a\n limited exception to this rule for purposes of the statute of limita-\n tions, see Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir.\n 2001), Mukhina cannot invoke that exception because she filed a\n timely charge with the Commission. And her operative charge al-\n leged only “retaliation” and “national origin” discrimination, not\n religious discrimination. Nor did the narrative section of the charge\n include any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s\n Eve.\n Even if we could consider Mukhina’s intake questionnaire,\n it would not help her. Much like her charge, the questionnaire lists\n only “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n complaint. And although the questionnaire compared New Year’s\n Eve to “Christmas in America,” it never stated that New Year’s Eve\n was a religious holiday for Mukhina or even mentioned Mukhina’s\n religious beliefs. Likewise, her reference to “national traditions”\n connotes a cultural, not religious, practice. A claim of religious dis-\n crimination would not be expected to “grow out of ” the allegations\n in the intake questionnaire because the questionnaire did not men-\n tion Mukhina’s religion or that New Year’s Eve was a religious hol-\n iday. See Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (citation and internal quotation\n marks omitted). Mukhina failed to exhaust her administrative rem-\n edies for her claim of religious discrimination.\n C. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of Retaliation.\n To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must\n prove that she participated in protected activity, that she suffered\n an adverse action, and that there was a causal relationship between\n the protected activity and the adverse action. Goldsmith v. Bagby El-\n evator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must\n prove that “her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged\n adverse action,” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329,\n 1338 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\n ted), and that “the adverse act followed the protected conduct,”\n Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). There\n is no claim for retaliation when the “alleged retaliatory conduct\n was the same continuous harassment that gave rise to the initial\n complaint . . . unless . . . there was a ratcheting up of the harass-\n ment.” Id. (alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n marks omitted). If the employer offers “a legitimate, non-retalia-\n tory reason for the adverse employment action,” the plaintiff must\n prove that the employer’s reason “is a pretext for prohibited, retal-\n iatory conduct.” Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th\n Cir. 1998).\n Mukhina argues that her complaints to her supervisors\n about her working conditions, her request for time off to celebrate\n a religious holiday, and her ethics complaint constitute protected\n activity. And she argues that she suffered two adverse employment\n actions because of her participation in those protected activities:\n the imposition of two attendance points and her constructive dis-\n charge.\n Mukhina failed to prove a causal connection between her\n protected activity and the imposition of two attendance points.\n Mukhina was assigned the attendance points because she missed\n work, not because she requested the day off or made an ethics com-\n plaint. Mukhina cannot establish that but for her request or her\n complaint, she would not have been assigned the attendance\n points. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1338. And even assuming, for the sake\n of argument, that Mukhina proved a causal connection, Walmart\n offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why it imposed the\n attendance points: “Walmart’s policy provided for them.”\n Mukhina offers no evidence that this reason is pretextual.\n Mukhina’s argument that she suffered a constructive dis-\n charge fails too. Because she argues that the harassment created a\n hostile work environment before she complained, Walmart could\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 12\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\n\n not have created the hostile environment that led her to quit in re-\n taliation for her complaints. See Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1284. Mukhina\n also failed to establish that the harassment “ratchet[ed] up” after\n she complained to her supervisors. Id. (citation and internal quota-\n tion marks omitted). Indeed, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the\n night shift after she complained, and her working conditions im-\n proved. And Mukhina did not quit until several months after the\n transfer. She was not constructively discharged in retaliation for her\n informal complaints or for her ethics complaint.\n Mukhina also failed to present a convincing mosaic of cir-\n cumstantial evidence to support her claim of retaliation. See Berry\n v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2023).\n Nothing in the record supports an inference that Walmart took re-\n taliatory action against her after she complained or requested time\n off. A reasonable jury could not infer retaliatory intent based on\n this record.\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Walmart.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Elena Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc.\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-11586\\n ____________________\\n\\n ELENA MUKHINA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n WALMART, INC.,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00361-JB-C\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether the district court\\n erred when it granted summary judgment against an employee’s\\n claims of national origin discrimination based on a hostile work\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n environment, religious discrimination, and retaliatory discharge.\\n Elena Mukhina alleges that, during her employment with\\n Walmart, her coworkers and customers treated her poorly because\\n she could not speak English, she was denied time off on a religious\\n holiday, and Walmart retaliated against her for raising complaints.\\n Because Mukhina failed to present substantial evidence of either a\\n hostile work environment or retaliation and failed to exhaust her\\n administrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination,\\n we affirm.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n Mukhina is a Russian national and adherent of Russian Folk\\n Christianity. She understands some English but cannot speak the\\n language well. She began working at Walmart in the apparel de-\\n partment where she understood she would communicate with cus-\\n tomers.\\n When customers realized she did not speak English, some\\n expressed dissatisfaction and anger and others laughed at her or\\n mocked her. Mukhina experienced this treatment every day.\\n Coworkers also laughed at her and spoke to her disparagingly be-\\n cause she did not understand them.\\n Mukhina complained to her supervisor that customers were\\n rude to her because she could not understand English, and she re-\\n quested a transfer to work on the night shift. Her manager told her\\n that he could transfer her to the night shift after he found a replace-\\n ment for her, but that it might take a few weeks. Six weeks later,\\n Mukhina complained of harassment and discrimination by both\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n customers and coworkers. She received the transfer three days\\n later, and her working conditions improved.\\n Mukhina still experienced some negative treatment from\\n her coworkers after her transfer. One coworker pushed a shopping\\n cart toward her, and another accused her of being greedy because\\n the night shift pays a higher rate. She also had to retrieve her own\\n freight and was told she could not use a shopping cart for her work.\\n Mukhina requested leave on New Year’s Eve. She told her\\n supervisor that New Year’s Eve was an important holiday for her as\\n a Russian and that it was the same for her as Christmas Day was for\\n Americans. Her supervisor denied the leave request because re-\\n quests were granted on a first come, first serve basis, and other as-\\n sociates had asked for that day off before her. Mukhina took New\\n Year’s Eve off without permission and received two attendance\\n points according to Walmart’s attendance policy.\\n Mukhina filed an ethics complaint with Walmart based on\\n the denial of her request for time off. After filing the complaint,\\n some employees treated Mukhina better by greeting her and speak-\\n ing to her politely and some treated her worse. One unidentified\\n coworker approached her and engaged in verbally abusive behavior\\n toward her regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Mukhina\\n did not tell anyone about the interaction and decided to quit.\\n Walmart officially terminated Mukhina’s employment soon after-\\n ward.\\n Mukhina completed an intake questionnaire with the Equal\\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In it, Mukhina listed only\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the complaint.\\n She stated that she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of\\n the most important holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person”\\n with many “national traditions.” She said that in Russia, New\\n Year’s Eve “is like Christmas in America.” But she did not allege\\n that she considered New Year’s Eve to be a religious holiday.\\n Mukhina next filed a charge of discrimination with the Com-\\n mission that alleged retaliation and discrimination based on na-\\n tional origin. The narrative section of the charge did not include\\n any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s Eve. The\\n Commission dismissed her charge and issued her a right-to-sue let-\\n ter.\\n Mukhina filed a pro se complaint against Walmart. She al-\\n leged that Walmart subjected her to a hostile work environment\\n based on her national origin, discriminated against her based on her\\n religion by failing to provide reasonable accommodations, and re-\\n taliated against her for requesting accommodations and complain-\\n ing about the alleged discrimination. Walmart moved for summary\\n judgment.\\n The district court granted summary judgment in favor of\\n Walmart. It ruled that Mukhina failed to establish that her hostile\\n work environment was based on her national origin, that the har-\\n assment was sufficiently severe, or that Walmart was responsible\\n for any mistreatment. It ruled that Mukhina had failed to exhaust\\n her claim of religious discrimination, and even assuming her claim\\n was not barred, she did not inform Walmart of the religious nature\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n of the holiday and did not suffer an adverse action. As to her retal-\\n iation claim, it ruled that she could not establish an adverse action\\n causally connected to her complaint of discrimination.\\n We appointed Travis Ramey of the University of Alabama\\n School of Law’s Appellate Advocacy Clinic as counsel for Mukhina.\\n Sarah Frances Jackson and Abby Vandiver presented oral argu-\\n ment. We thank Mr. Ramey, Ms. Jackson, Ms. Vandiver, and the\\n clinic for accepting the appointment and for their excellent repre-\\n sentation.\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review a summary judgment de novo, and we view the\\n evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-\\n moving party. Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265,\\n 1272 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n We divide this discussion into three parts. First, we explain\\n that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of hostile work environ-\\n ment. Second, we explain that Mukhina failed to exhaust her ad-\\n ministrative remedies for her claim of religious discrimination. Fi-\\n nally, we explain that Mukhina failed to establish a claim of retalia-\\n tion.\\n A. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of a\\n Hostile Work Environment.\\n To prove a claim of hostile work environment under Title\\n VII, the plaintiff must present evidence that she belongs to a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n protected group; she has been subject to unwelcome harassment;\\n the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the em-\\n ployee, such as national origin; the harassment “was sufficiently se-\\n vere or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment\\n and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment”; and\\n there is a basis for holding the employer liable. Miller v. Kenworth of\\n Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). To determine if\\n harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive, we look to the to-\\n tality of the circumstances, including the frequency and severity of\\n the conduct, “whether the conduct is physically threatening or hu-\\n miliating” instead of “a mere offensive utterance,” and “whether\\n the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job per-\\n formance.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 837\\n (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Isolated incidents are ordinarily not sufficient to establish a hostile\\n work environment. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1245\\n (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). When “the alleged harassment is com-\\n mitted by co-workers or customers,” the plaintiff must establish\\n that the employer “had notice of the alleged harassment and failed\\n to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” Watson v.\\n Blue Circle, Inc., 324 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003).\\n Mukhina experienced daily instances of customers, cowork-\\n ers, and supervisors laughing at her, mocking her, and becoming\\n angry with her due to her inability to communicate in English. But\\n frustration with her inability to communicate does not constitute\\n harassment based on her national origin. See EEOC v. Catastrophe\\n Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that Title\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n VII protects immutable characteristics, not cultural practices like a\\n preferred language); see also Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268–271\\n (5th Cir. 1980). And Mukhina failed to provide evidence that inci-\\n dents where a coworker pushed a shopping cart toward her, pre-\\n vented her from using a shopping cart, or required her to retrieve\\n her own freight were related to her national origin. See Miller, 277\\n F.3d at 1275. Only an isolated incident involving a comment about\\n the Russian invasion of Ukraine involved her national origin. But\\n that single utterance was not “physically threatening or humiliat-\\n ing” and did not “unreasonably interfere[] with [her] job perfor-\\n mance” so that it could be considered severe. Tonkyro, 995 F.3d at\\n 837 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Mukhina cites one precedent for the proposition that “com-\\n ments about an employee’s accent or linguistic mannerisms sup-\\n port an inference of discrimination based on national origin.” Yet\\n that decision involved more than “comments about an employee’s\\n accent or linguistic mannerisms.” See Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of\\n Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding jury’s find-\\n ing of discrimination when a supervisor “blatantly state[d] that the\\n reason [the employee] was passed over for the promotion was his\\n ethnicity”). To be sure, comments about an employee’s accent or\\n linguistic mannerisms can support an inference of discrimination\\n when combined with other harassing conduct motivated by na-\\n tional origin, but Title VII “does not support an interpretation that\\n equates the language an employee prefers to use with his national\\n origin.” Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Garcia,\\n 618 F.2d at 270).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n Mukhina also failed to establish any basis for holding\\n Walmart liable. When she first complained to her manager,\\n Mukhina stated only that customers were being rude to her based\\n on her inability to communicate. She did not complain about her\\n coworkers or report discrimination at that time. Her manager ex-\\n pressed a willingness to transfer her to the night shift as soon as he\\n found a replacement for her, but he explained that locating a re-\\n placement could take time. It was not until Mukhina complained\\n again that her manager understood her to complain of harassment\\n and discrimination by both customers and coworkers. And even\\n then, Mukhina again attributed the harassment to her language\\n struggles, not to any protected characteristic. Three days after the\\n second complaint, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the night shift.\\n Walmart took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” after\\n learning about the harassment. Watson, 324 F.3d at 1257.\\n B. Mukhina Failed to Exhaust Her Administrative Remedies for Her\\n Claim of Religious Discrimination.\\n Before filing a complaint under Title VII, an employee must\\n file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor-\\n tunity Commission. Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345\\n (11th Cir. 2022). A complaint is “limited by the scope of the [Com-\\n mission] investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow\\n out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. (citation and internal quo-\\n tation marks omitted). “The facts alleged in the charge matter\\n most” and “the legal theory the charging party articulates is far less\\n important.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146 F.4th 972, 990 (11th Cir.\\n 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[J]udicial\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n claims are allowed if they amplify, clarify, or more clearly focus the\\n allegations in the [Commission] complaint, but . . . allegations of\\n new acts of discrimination are inappropriate.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t\\n of Hum. Res., 355 F.3d 1277, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation and\\n internal quotation marks omitted).\\n Mukhina relies on the intake questionnaire she filed with the\\n Commission to argue that her religious discrimination claim “grew\\n out of ” her initial allegations. In her view, the intake questionnaire\\n alleged a claim of religious discrimination because it explained that\\n she was denied time off on New Year’s Eve, “one of the most im-\\n portant holidays for [Mukhina] as a Russian person” with many\\n “national traditions,” and compared the holiday to “Christmas in\\n America.” But the employee’s formal charge, not the intake ques-\\n tionnaire, is what counts. Pijnenburg v. W. Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255\\n F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). Although we have recognized a\\n limited exception to this rule for purposes of the statute of limita-\\n tions, see Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir.\\n 2001), Mukhina cannot invoke that exception because she filed a\\n timely charge with the Commission. And her operative charge al-\\n leged only “retaliation” and “national origin” discrimination, not\\n religious discrimination. Nor did the narrative section of the charge\\n include any details about her being denied time off on New Year’s\\n Eve.\\n Even if we could consider Mukhina’s intake questionnaire,\\n it would not help her. Much like her charge, the questionnaire lists\\n only “National origin and/or ethnicity” as the reason for the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n complaint. And although the questionnaire compared New Year’s\\n Eve to “Christmas in America,” it never stated that New Year’s Eve\\n was a religious holiday for Mukhina or even mentioned Mukhina’s\\n religious beliefs. Likewise, her reference to “national traditions”\\n connotes a cultural, not religious, practice. A claim of religious dis-\\n crimination would not be expected to “grow out of ” the allegations\\n in the intake questionnaire because the questionnaire did not men-\\n tion Mukhina’s religion or that New Year’s Eve was a religious hol-\\n iday. See Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (citation and internal quotation\\n marks omitted). Mukhina failed to exhaust her administrative rem-\\n edies for her claim of religious discrimination.\\n C. Mukhina Failed to Present Substantial Evidence of Retaliation.\\n To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must\\n prove that she participated in protected activity, that she suffered\\n an adverse action, and that there was a causal relationship between\\n the protected activity and the adverse action. Goldsmith v. Bagby El-\\n evator Co., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff must\\n prove that “her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged\\n adverse action,” Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329,\\n 1338 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-\\n ted), and that “the adverse act followed the protected conduct,”\\n Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). There\\n is no claim for retaliation when the “alleged retaliatory conduct\\n was the same continuous harassment that gave rise to the initial\\n complaint . . . unless . . . there was a ratcheting up of the harass-\\n ment.” Id. (alterations adopted) (citation and internal quotation\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-11586 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n marks omitted). If the employer offers “a legitimate, non-retalia-\\n tory reason for the adverse employment action,” the plaintiff must\\n prove that the employer’s reason “is a pretext for prohibited, retal-\\n iatory conduct.” Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp., 141 F.3d 1457, 1460 (11th\\n Cir. 1998).\\n Mukhina argues that her complaints to her supervisors\\n about her working conditions, her request for time off to celebrate\\n a religious holiday, and her ethics complaint constitute protected\\n activity. And she argues that she suffered two adverse employment\\n actions because of her participation in those protected activities:\\n the imposition of two attendance points and her constructive dis-\\n charge.\\n Mukhina failed to prove a causal connection between her\\n protected activity and the imposition of two attendance points.\\n Mukhina was assigned the attendance points because she missed\\n work, not because she requested the day off or made an ethics com-\\n plaint. Mukhina cannot establish that but for her request or her\\n complaint, she would not have been assigned the attendance\\n points. See Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1338. And even assuming, for the sake\\n of argument, that Mukhina proved a causal connection, Walmart\\n offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why it imposed the\\n attendance points: “Walmart’s policy provided for them.”\\n Mukhina offers no evidence that this reason is pretextual.\\n Mukhina’s argument that she suffered a constructive dis-\\n charge fails too. Because she argues that the harassment created a\\n hostile work environment before she complained, Walmart could\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 12\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 24-11586\\n\\n not have created the hostile environment that led her to quit in re-\\n taliation for her complaints. See Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1284. Mukhina\\n also failed to establish that the harassment “ratchet[ed] up” after\\n she complained to her supervisors. Id. (citation and internal quota-\\n tion marks omitted). Indeed, Walmart transferred Mukhina to the\\n night shift after she complained, and her working conditions im-\\n proved. And Mukhina did not quit until several months after the\\n transfer. She was not constructively discharged in retaliation for her\\n informal complaints or for her ethics complaint.\\n Mukhina also failed to present a convincing mosaic of cir-\\n cumstantial evidence to support her claim of retaliation. See Berry\\n v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n Nothing in the record supports an inference that Walmart took re-\\n taliatory action against her after she complained or requested time\\n off. A reasonable jury could not infer retaliatory intent based on\\n this record.\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of Walmart.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30982,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10762986,"string":"10,762,986"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"James Malvezzi v. State of Florida"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-13051"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12600\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Martin County,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,\\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\\n 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,\\n in their official capacity and personally, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\\n ____________________\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13051\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Martin County,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY,\\n FLORIDA, CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF\\n APPEAL,\\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\\n THE 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNT SHERIFF OFFICE et al.,\\n in their official capacity and personally,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n James Malvezzi, proceeding pro se, appeals the district\\n court’s sua sponte dismissal of his action against the State of Florida\\n and several government officials. The district court dismissed the\\n action because it determined that Malvezzi had improperly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n removed a pending criminal case from state court. But Malvezzi’s\\n filing, liberally construed, was a complaint that raised federal civil\\n rights claims against the defendants. After careful review, we con-\\n clude that the district court erred by failing to construe Malvezzi’s\\n filing as a complaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for fur-\\n ther proceedings.\\n I.\\n Malvezzi is a Florida citizen who filed an action in the South-\\n ern District of Florida. He initiated the action by filing a document\\n entitled “Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint of the\\n Terminated State Criminal Prosecution and New Matters to Fed-\\n eral Court.” In this filing, he named as defendants the “State of Flor-\\n ida Martin County”; the Clerk of Court of Martin County, in his\\n official and individual capacities; the Clerk of Court of the Fourth\\n District Court of Appeal of Florida, in his official and individual ca-\\n pacities; the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, in his official\\n and individual capacities; four officers of the Martin County sher-\\n iff’s office, in their official and individual capacities; a Florida state\\n court judge in his individual capacity; and two assistant state attor-\\n neys, in their official and individual capacities.\\n In the filing, Malvezzi alleged that, in November 2023, the\\n defendants assaulted him with physical force and falsely accused\\n him of a crime. As a result of the false accusation, Malvezzi alleged,\\n he was named as a defendant in a criminal case in Florida state\\n court in Martin County. He alleged that in the state court case the\\n defendants prevented him from submitting evidence, including a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n\\n video of the attack. He also alleged that the defendants had con-\\n spired with each other to violate his constitutional rights. In the\\n filing, he purported to bring claims against the defendants under\\n 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He asserted that the district\\n court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 1 He demanded\\n $10 million in damages.\\n Shortly after Malvezzi submitted his filing, the district court\\n dismissed the action. It construed Malvezzi’s filing as a notice of\\n removal that purported to remove his state criminal case to federal\\n court. The court concluded that such removal was improper and\\n directed the clerk of court to close the case. In reaching this conclu-\\n sion, the court expressly found that Malvezzi “has not filed a com-\\n plaint in this action.”\\n Malvezzi filed a notice of appeal. After filing the notice of\\n appeal, he filed in the district court an application for clerk’s entry\\n of default as well as a motion for reconsideration. The district court\\n concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review these requests be-\\n cause of Malvezzi’s pending appeal. Malvezzi filed a second notice\\n of appeal.\\n Both Malvezzi’s appeals are presently before us.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 This provision gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action”\\n\\n brought by a person “[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State\\n law . . . of any right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States.”\\n 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n III.\\n Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action\\n is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 3. The question before us in this appeal is whether Malvezzi’s\\n initial filing in this case was a complaint.\\n Because Malvezzi was proceeding pro se, the district court\\n was required to liberally construe his pleadings. See Campbell v. Air\\n Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). His initial filing,\\n when liberally construed, was a complaint. It was formatted like a\\n complaint. It had a caption that set forth all the required infor-\\n mation, including the court’s name, a file number, and the names\\n of all parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The caption also included a\\n title identifying the filing as a complaint. In addition, the filing con-\\n tained all the information that is required in a complaint. It set forth\\n the basis for invoking the court’s jurisdiction, a statement showing\\n why Malvezzi believed he was entitled to relief, and a demand for\\n relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Given the filing’s content, we con-\\n clude that the district court erred in failing to construe it as a com-\\n plaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the district court to\\n treat it as a complaint. 2\\n\\n\\n 2 We agree with the district court that to the extent that Malvezzi’s filing\\n\\n sought to remove his pending state criminal proceedings to federal court, re-\\n moval was improper. Federal law permits the removal of a state criminal ac-\\n tion to federal court in narrow circumstances only. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442;\\n 1442a; 1443. Malvezzi’s filing did not establish that removal was appropriate\\n under any of these statutes. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331, 1338 (11th Cir.\\n 2023) (addressing when federal officer removal may remove a state criminal\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n\\n We caution that we make no decision today about whether\\n the allegations in Malvezzi’s complaint are sufficient to state a\\n claim for relief. We also do not decide whether his claims are\\n barred for any other reason, such as sovereign immunity, or\\n whether the district court should abstain from reviewing the claims\\n in the complaint while Malvezzi’s state court criminal case is pend-\\n ing. Nothing in our decision today bars the district court, upon re-\\n mand, from considering these issues or others, aside from whether\\n the filing is a complaint.\\n Because we conclude that the district court erred and re-\\n mand for further proceedings, we do not reach the additional issues\\n of whether the district court erred when it concluded that it lacked\\n jurisdiction to review Malvezzi’s application for clerk’s entry of de-\\n fault or his motion for reconsideration.\\n For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s order\\n dismissing the action and remand the case for further proceedings\\n not inconsistent with this opinion.3\\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n proceeding under § 1442); Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429, 1430 (11th Cir.\\n 1988) (addressing when member of the armed forces may remove a state crim-\\n inal proceeding under § 1442a); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966) (set-\\n ting forth when a state criminal prosecution may be removed to federal court\\n under § 1443 because the defendant is denied or cannot enforce in state court\\n a right under any law providing for equal civil rights).\\n 3 Malvezzi’s motion demanding his release from state prison is DENIED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229571/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"JILL PRYOR"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"LUCK"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"JILL PRYOR\": \", Circuit\", \"LUCK\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762986/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: James Malvezzi v. State of Florida\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-12600\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\n Martin County,\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA,\n CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\n 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,\n in their official capacity and personally, et al.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\n ____________________\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\n ____________________\n No. 24-13051\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\n Martin County,\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY,\n FLORIDA, CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF\n APPEAL,\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\n THE 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNT SHERIFF OFFICE et al.,\n in their official capacity and personally,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n James Malvezzi, proceeding pro se, appeals the district\n court’s sua sponte dismissal of his action against the State of Florida\n and several government officials. The district court dismissed the\n action because it determined that Malvezzi had improperly\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n removed a pending criminal case from state court. But Malvezzi’s\n filing, liberally construed, was a complaint that raised federal civil\n rights claims against the defendants. After careful review, we con-\n clude that the district court erred by failing to construe Malvezzi’s\n filing as a complaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for fur-\n ther proceedings.\n I.\n Malvezzi is a Florida citizen who filed an action in the South-\n ern District of Florida. He initiated the action by filing a document\n entitled “Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint of the\n Terminated State Criminal Prosecution and New Matters to Fed-\n eral Court.” In this filing, he named as defendants the “State of Flor-\n ida Martin County”; the Clerk of Court of Martin County, in his\n official and individual capacities; the Clerk of Court of the Fourth\n District Court of Appeal of Florida, in his official and individual ca-\n pacities; the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, in his official\n and individual capacities; four officers of the Martin County sher-\n iff’s office, in their official and individual capacities; a Florida state\n court judge in his individual capacity; and two assistant state attor-\n neys, in their official and individual capacities.\n In the filing, Malvezzi alleged that, in November 2023, the\n defendants assaulted him with physical force and falsely accused\n him of a crime. As a result of the false accusation, Malvezzi alleged,\n he was named as a defendant in a criminal case in Florida state\n court in Martin County. He alleged that in the state court case the\n defendants prevented him from submitting evidence, including a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\n\n video of the attack. He also alleged that the defendants had con-\n spired with each other to violate his constitutional rights. In the\n filing, he purported to bring claims against the defendants under\n 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He asserted that the district\n court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 1 He demanded\n $10 million in damages.\n Shortly after Malvezzi submitted his filing, the district court\n dismissed the action. It construed Malvezzi’s filing as a notice of\n removal that purported to remove his state criminal case to federal\n court. The court concluded that such removal was improper and\n directed the clerk of court to close the case. In reaching this conclu-\n sion, the court expressly found that Malvezzi “has not filed a com-\n plaint in this action.”\n Malvezzi filed a notice of appeal. After filing the notice of\n appeal, he filed in the district court an application for clerk’s entry\n of default as well as a motion for reconsideration. The district court\n concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review these requests be-\n cause of Malvezzi’s pending appeal. Malvezzi filed a second notice\n of appeal.\n Both Malvezzi’s appeals are presently before us.\n\n\n\n\n 1 This provision gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action”\n\n brought by a person “[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State\n law . . . of any right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States.”\n 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n III.\n Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action\n is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ.\n P. 3. The question before us in this appeal is whether Malvezzi’s\n initial filing in this case was a complaint.\n Because Malvezzi was proceeding pro se, the district court\n was required to liberally construe his pleadings. See Campbell v. Air\n Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). His initial filing,\n when liberally construed, was a complaint. It was formatted like a\n complaint. It had a caption that set forth all the required infor-\n mation, including the court’s name, a file number, and the names\n of all parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The caption also included a\n title identifying the filing as a complaint. In addition, the filing con-\n tained all the information that is required in a complaint. It set forth\n the basis for invoking the court’s jurisdiction, a statement showing\n why Malvezzi believed he was entitled to relief, and a demand for\n relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Given the filing’s content, we con-\n clude that the district court erred in failing to construe it as a com-\n plaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the district court to\n treat it as a complaint. 2\n\n\n 2 We agree with the district court that to the extent that Malvezzi’s filing\n\n sought to remove his pending state criminal proceedings to federal court, re-\n moval was improper. Federal law permits the removal of a state criminal ac-\n tion to federal court in narrow circumstances only. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442;\n 1442a; 1443. Malvezzi’s filing did not establish that removal was appropriate\n under any of these statutes. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331, 1338 (11th Cir.\n 2023) (addressing when federal officer removal may remove a state criminal\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\n\n We caution that we make no decision today about whether\n the allegations in Malvezzi’s complaint are sufficient to state a\n claim for relief. We also do not decide whether his claims are\n barred for any other reason, such as sovereign immunity, or\n whether the district court should abstain from reviewing the claims\n in the complaint while Malvezzi’s state court criminal case is pend-\n ing. Nothing in our decision today bars the district court, upon re-\n mand, from considering these issues or others, aside from whether\n the filing is a complaint.\n Because we conclude that the district court erred and re-\n mand for further proceedings, we do not reach the additional issues\n of whether the district court erred when it concluded that it lacked\n jurisdiction to review Malvezzi’s application for clerk’s entry of de-\n fault or his motion for reconsideration.\n For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s order\n dismissing the action and remand the case for further proceedings\n not inconsistent with this opinion.3\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\n\n\n\n proceeding under § 1442); Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429, 1430 (11th Cir.\n 1988) (addressing when member of the armed forces may remove a state crim-\n inal proceeding under § 1442a); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966) (set-\n ting forth when a state criminal prosecution may be removed to federal court\n under § 1443 because the defendant is denied or cannot enforce in state court\n a right under any law providing for equal civil rights).\n 3 Malvezzi’s motion demanding his release from state prison is DENIED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: James Malvezzi v. State of Florida\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12600\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Martin County,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,\\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\\n 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE,\\n in their official capacity and personally, et al.,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\\n ____________________\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13051\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n JAMES MALVEZZI,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n STATE OF FLORIDA,\\n Martin County,\\n CLERK OF COURT OF MARTIN COUNTY,\\n FLORIDA, CLERK OF COURT OF 4TH DISTRICT COURT OF\\n APPEAL,\\n CLERK - FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,\\n THE 4 OFFICERS OF MARTIN COUNT SHERIFF OFFICE et al.,\\n in their official capacity and personally,\\n Defendants-Appellees.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:24-cv-14220-AMC\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n James Malvezzi, proceeding pro se, appeals the district\\n court’s sua sponte dismissal of his action against the State of Florida\\n and several government officials. The district court dismissed the\\n action because it determined that Malvezzi had improperly\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n removed a pending criminal case from state court. But Malvezzi’s\\n filing, liberally construed, was a complaint that raised federal civil\\n rights claims against the defendants. After careful review, we con-\\n clude that the district court erred by failing to construe Malvezzi’s\\n filing as a complaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for fur-\\n ther proceedings.\\n I.\\n Malvezzi is a Florida citizen who filed an action in the South-\\n ern District of Florida. He initiated the action by filing a document\\n entitled “Notice of Removal and Constitutional Complaint of the\\n Terminated State Criminal Prosecution and New Matters to Fed-\\n eral Court.” In this filing, he named as defendants the “State of Flor-\\n ida Martin County”; the Clerk of Court of Martin County, in his\\n official and individual capacities; the Clerk of Court of the Fourth\\n District Court of Appeal of Florida, in his official and individual ca-\\n pacities; the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Florida, in his official\\n and individual capacities; four officers of the Martin County sher-\\n iff’s office, in their official and individual capacities; a Florida state\\n court judge in his individual capacity; and two assistant state attor-\\n neys, in their official and individual capacities.\\n In the filing, Malvezzi alleged that, in November 2023, the\\n defendants assaulted him with physical force and falsely accused\\n him of a crime. As a result of the false accusation, Malvezzi alleged,\\n he was named as a defendant in a criminal case in Florida state\\n court in Martin County. He alleged that in the state court case the\\n defendants prevented him from submitting evidence, including a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n\\n video of the attack. He also alleged that the defendants had con-\\n spired with each other to violate his constitutional rights. In the\\n filing, he purported to bring claims against the defendants under\\n 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. He asserted that the district\\n court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343. 1 He demanded\\n $10 million in damages.\\n Shortly after Malvezzi submitted his filing, the district court\\n dismissed the action. It construed Malvezzi’s filing as a notice of\\n removal that purported to remove his state criminal case to federal\\n court. The court concluded that such removal was improper and\\n directed the clerk of court to close the case. In reaching this conclu-\\n sion, the court expressly found that Malvezzi “has not filed a com-\\n plaint in this action.”\\n Malvezzi filed a notice of appeal. After filing the notice of\\n appeal, he filed in the district court an application for clerk’s entry\\n of default as well as a motion for reconsideration. The district court\\n concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review these requests be-\\n cause of Malvezzi’s pending appeal. Malvezzi filed a second notice\\n of appeal.\\n Both Malvezzi’s appeals are presently before us.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1 This provision gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action”\\n\\n brought by a person “[t]o redress the deprivation, under color of any State\\n law . . . of any right . . . secured by the Constitution of the United States.”\\n 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12600 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n III.\\n Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] civil action\\n is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 3. The question before us in this appeal is whether Malvezzi’s\\n initial filing in this case was a complaint.\\n Because Malvezzi was proceeding pro se, the district court\\n was required to liberally construe his pleadings. See Campbell v. Air\\n Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). His initial filing,\\n when liberally construed, was a complaint. It was formatted like a\\n complaint. It had a caption that set forth all the required infor-\\n mation, including the court’s name, a file number, and the names\\n of all parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The caption also included a\\n title identifying the filing as a complaint. In addition, the filing con-\\n tained all the information that is required in a complaint. It set forth\\n the basis for invoking the court’s jurisdiction, a statement showing\\n why Malvezzi believed he was entitled to relief, and a demand for\\n relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Given the filing’s content, we con-\\n clude that the district court erred in failing to construe it as a com-\\n plaint. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the district court to\\n treat it as a complaint. 2\\n\\n\\n 2 We agree with the district court that to the extent that Malvezzi’s filing\\n\\n sought to remove his pending state criminal proceedings to federal court, re-\\n moval was improper. Federal law permits the removal of a state criminal ac-\\n tion to federal court in narrow circumstances only. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442;\\n 1442a; 1443. Malvezzi’s filing did not establish that removal was appropriate\\n under any of these statutes. See State v. Meadows, 88 F.4th 1331, 1338 (11th Cir.\\n 2023) (addressing when federal officer removal may remove a state criminal\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12600\\n\\n We caution that we make no decision today about whether\\n the allegations in Malvezzi’s complaint are sufficient to state a\\n claim for relief. We also do not decide whether his claims are\\n barred for any other reason, such as sovereign immunity, or\\n whether the district court should abstain from reviewing the claims\\n in the complaint while Malvezzi’s state court criminal case is pend-\\n ing. Nothing in our decision today bars the district court, upon re-\\n mand, from considering these issues or others, aside from whether\\n the filing is a complaint.\\n Because we conclude that the district court erred and re-\\n mand for further proceedings, we do not reach the additional issues\\n of whether the district court erred when it concluded that it lacked\\n jurisdiction to review Malvezzi’s application for clerk’s entry of de-\\n fault or his motion for reconsideration.\\n For the above reasons, we vacate the district court’s order\\n dismissing the action and remand the case for further proceedings\\n not inconsistent with this opinion.3\\n VACATED AND REMANDED.\\n\\n\\n\\n proceeding under § 1442); Florida v. Simanonok, 850 F.2d 1429, 1430 (11th Cir.\\n 1988) (addressing when member of the armed forces may remove a state crim-\\n inal proceeding under § 1442a); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966) (set-\\n ting forth when a state criminal prosecution may be removed to federal court\\n under § 1443 because the defendant is denied or cannot enforce in state court\\n a right under any law providing for equal civil rights).\\n 3 Malvezzi’s motion demanding his release from state prison is DENIED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30983,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763079,"string":"10,763,079"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Tyrell Bouie"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-12347"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12347\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n TYRELL BRION BOUIE,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12374\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\\n\\n versus\\n\\n ANTHONY CHRISTOPHER DIGGS, JR.,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-3\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Tyrell Bouie and Anthony Christopher Diggs, Jr. appeal\\n their 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions for brandishing a firearm in re-\\n lation to a crime of violence, which were predicated on Hobbs Act\\n robbery. On appeal, both appellants argue that the district court\\n lacked jurisdiction over their § 924(c) charges because completed\\n Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a predicate “crime of vi-\\n olence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause after the Supreme\\n Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).\\n We review de novo whether an offense is a qualifying crime\\n of violence under § 924(c). See United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355,\\n 1360 (11th Cir. 2023). And we review de novo the subject matter\\n jurisdiction of the district court. See United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th\\n 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n “Federal district courts have original jurisdiction . . . of all of-\\n fenses against the laws of the United States.” United States v. Wilson,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n 979 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Ac-\\n cordingly, “so long as the indictment charges the defendant with\\n violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States\\n Code, it alleges an offense against the laws of the United States,\\n and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subject-matter jurisdic-\\n tion.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).\\n We have held that Hobbs Act robbery “clearly” qualifies as\\n a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, noting\\n that it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\n of physical force against the person or property of another.” In re\\n St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).\\n In Taylor, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held\\n that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate\\n crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See Tay-\\n lor, 596 U.S. at 849-52. The Court explained that, to prove at-\\n tempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must show that the\\n defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property\\n by means of actual or threatened force and completed a “substan-\\n tial step” toward that end. See id. at 851. But the Court noted that,\\n while the government would have to show that the defendant took\\n an “unequivocal” and “significant” step towards committing rob-\\n bery, it need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted\\n to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). See\\n id. at 851-52. Therefore, the Court concluded that attempted\\n Hobbs Act robbery was not categorically a crime of violence under\\n § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See id. at 852. In so holding, the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\\n\\n Court in Taylor rejected the “realistic probability” test set out in\\n United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2018), as\\n well as St. Hubert’s reasoning that, because a completed Hobbs Act\\n robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted Hobbs Act\\n robbery must qualify as well. See Taylor, 596 U.S. at 852-59 (citing\\n St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 352-53).\\n In Wiley, decided after Taylor, we held that aiding and abet-\\n ting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, reasoning that “Tay-\\n lor did not disturb [our] holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery\\n is a crime of violence.” Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365. We recently con-\\n firmed that “Taylor says nothing of the completed crime of Hobbs\\n Act robbery and thus does not disturb [our] precedent holding that\\n Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” United States v. Solomon,\\n 136 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025). First, we rejected the conten-\\n tion that Wiley was inapposite to convictions for completed rob-\\n bery, explaining that “aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is a\\n crime of violence because a completed Hobbs Act robbery is, itself,\\n a crime of violence.” Id. at 1321. Second, we rejected the appel-\\n lants’ assertion that Wiley was not controlling because their appeal\\n raised new arguments not considered in Wiley. See id. Thus, we\\n concluded that the appellants’ request “to avoid Wiley’s resolution\\n of an issue, based on unraised arguments [] is foreclosed by Lambrix\\n and does not implicate Jackson and Webster.” Id.\\n Nevertheless, in Solomon we considered and rejected the ap-\\n pellants’ specific arguments. See id. First, we concluded that Wiley\\n rendered meritless the argument that Hobbs Act robbery was not\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n a crime of violence after Taylor because Taylor abrogated St. Hubert.\\n See id. Second, we explained that, although Taylor abrogated the\\n “realistic probability” test used in St. Hubert, that did not “advance\\n the appellants’ cause” because we held in St. Fleur that Hobbs Act\\n robbery “require[s] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\n physical force.” Id. Third, we confirmed that the Hobbs Act stat-\\n ute is divisible as to robbery and attempted robbery. Id. Fourth,\\n we declined to ignore St. Fleur on the ground that it “arose in a\\n collateral context without true adversarial briefing,” stating that\\n the prior-panel-precedent rule still applies. See id. Fifth, we re-\\n jected the argument that, based on our pattern jury instructions,\\n the least culpable conduct for Hobbs Act robbery was “taking per-\\n sonal property against the victim’s will by threatening the victim’s\\n intangible property e.g., threat of financial harm.” Id. We ex-\\n plained that “jury instructions are not binding law” and that cases\\n before and after Taylor concluded that “Hobbs Act robbery cannot\\n be accomplished without the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\n of force.” Id.\\n Here, the appellants’ § 924(c) arguments are foreclosed by\\n our binding precent, including Solomon. The district court did not\\n err in determining that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a\\n crime of violence after Taylor and, therefore, a valid predicate of-\\n fense for the appellants’ § 924(c) convictions.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229664/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"ROSENBAUM"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"ROSENBAUM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763079/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Tyrell Bouie\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 5\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-12347\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n TYRELL BRION BOUIE,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-2\n ____________________\n ____________________\n No. 24-12374\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 5\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\n\n versus\n\n ANTHONY CHRISTOPHER DIGGS, JR.,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-3\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Tyrell Bouie and Anthony Christopher Diggs, Jr. appeal\n their 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions for brandishing a firearm in re-\n lation to a crime of violence, which were predicated on Hobbs Act\n robbery. On appeal, both appellants argue that the district court\n lacked jurisdiction over their § 924(c) charges because completed\n Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a predicate “crime of vi-\n olence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause after the Supreme\n Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).\n We review de novo whether an offense is a qualifying crime\n of violence under § 924(c). See United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355,\n 1360 (11th Cir. 2023). And we review de novo the subject matter\n jurisdiction of the district court. See United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th\n 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023).\n “Federal district courts have original jurisdiction . . . of all of-\n fenses against the laws of the United States.” United States v. Wilson,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 5\n\n\n\n\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n 979 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Ac-\n cordingly, “so long as the indictment charges the defendant with\n violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States\n Code, it alleges an offense against the laws of the United States,\n and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subject-matter jurisdic-\n tion.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).\n We have held that Hobbs Act robbery “clearly” qualifies as\n a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, noting\n that it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\n of physical force against the person or property of another.” In re\n St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).\n In Taylor, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held\n that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate\n crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See Tay-\n lor, 596 U.S. at 849-52. The Court explained that, to prove at-\n tempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must show that the\n defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property\n by means of actual or threatened force and completed a “substan-\n tial step” toward that end. See id. at 851. But the Court noted that,\n while the government would have to show that the defendant took\n an “unequivocal” and “significant” step towards committing rob-\n bery, it need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted\n to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). See\n id. at 851-52. Therefore, the Court concluded that attempted\n Hobbs Act robbery was not categorically a crime of violence under\n § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See id. at 852. In so holding, the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 5\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\n\n Court in Taylor rejected the “realistic probability” test set out in\n United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2018), as\n well as St. Hubert’s reasoning that, because a completed Hobbs Act\n robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted Hobbs Act\n robbery must qualify as well. See Taylor, 596 U.S. at 852-59 (citing\n St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 352-53).\n In Wiley, decided after Taylor, we held that aiding and abet-\n ting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, reasoning that “Tay-\n lor did not disturb [our] holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery\n is a crime of violence.” Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365. We recently con-\n firmed that “Taylor says nothing of the completed crime of Hobbs\n Act robbery and thus does not disturb [our] precedent holding that\n Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” United States v. Solomon,\n 136 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025). First, we rejected the conten-\n tion that Wiley was inapposite to convictions for completed rob-\n bery, explaining that “aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is a\n crime of violence because a completed Hobbs Act robbery is, itself,\n a crime of violence.” Id. at 1321. Second, we rejected the appel-\n lants’ assertion that Wiley was not controlling because their appeal\n raised new arguments not considered in Wiley. See id. Thus, we\n concluded that the appellants’ request “to avoid Wiley’s resolution\n of an issue, based on unraised arguments [] is foreclosed by Lambrix\n and does not implicate Jackson and Webster.” Id.\n Nevertheless, in Solomon we considered and rejected the ap-\n pellants’ specific arguments. See id. First, we concluded that Wiley\n rendered meritless the argument that Hobbs Act robbery was not\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 5\n\n\n\n\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n a crime of violence after Taylor because Taylor abrogated St. Hubert.\n See id. Second, we explained that, although Taylor abrogated the\n “realistic probability” test used in St. Hubert, that did not “advance\n the appellants’ cause” because we held in St. Fleur that Hobbs Act\n robbery “require[s] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\n physical force.” Id. Third, we confirmed that the Hobbs Act stat-\n ute is divisible as to robbery and attempted robbery. Id. Fourth,\n we declined to ignore St. Fleur on the ground that it “arose in a\n collateral context without true adversarial briefing,” stating that\n the prior-panel-precedent rule still applies. See id. Fifth, we re-\n jected the argument that, based on our pattern jury instructions,\n the least culpable conduct for Hobbs Act robbery was “taking per-\n sonal property against the victim’s will by threatening the victim’s\n intangible property e.g., threat of financial harm.” Id. We ex-\n plained that “jury instructions are not binding law” and that cases\n before and after Taylor concluded that “Hobbs Act robbery cannot\n be accomplished without the use, attempted use, or threatened use\n of force.” Id.\n Here, the appellants’ § 924(c) arguments are foreclosed by\n our binding precent, including Solomon. The district court did not\n err in determining that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a\n crime of violence after Taylor and, therefore, a valid predicate of-\n fense for the appellants’ § 924(c) convictions.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Tyrell Bouie\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12347\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n TYRELL BRION BOUIE,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12374\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\\n\\n versus\\n\\n ANTHONY CHRISTOPHER DIGGS, JR.,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cr-60138-AHS-3\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Tyrell Bouie and Anthony Christopher Diggs, Jr. appeal\\n their 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions for brandishing a firearm in re-\\n lation to a crime of violence, which were predicated on Hobbs Act\\n robbery. On appeal, both appellants argue that the district court\\n lacked jurisdiction over their § 924(c) charges because completed\\n Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualifies as a predicate “crime of vi-\\n olence” under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause after the Supreme\\n Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022).\\n We review de novo whether an offense is a qualifying crime\\n of violence under § 924(c). See United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355,\\n 1360 (11th Cir. 2023). And we review de novo the subject matter\\n jurisdiction of the district court. See United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th\\n 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n “Federal district courts have original jurisdiction . . . of all of-\\n fenses against the laws of the United States.” United States v. Wilson,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n 979 F.3d 889, 902 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). Ac-\\n cordingly, “so long as the indictment charges the defendant with\\n violating a valid federal statute as enacted in the United States\\n Code, it alleges an offense against the laws of the United States,\\n and, thereby, invokes the district court’s subject-matter jurisdic-\\n tion.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted).\\n We have held that Hobbs Act robbery “clearly” qualifies as\\n a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause, noting\\n that it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\n of physical force against the person or property of another.” In re\\n St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).\\n In Taylor, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held\\n that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate\\n crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See Tay-\\n lor, 596 U.S. at 849-52. The Court explained that, to prove at-\\n tempted Hobbs Act robbery, the government must show that the\\n defendant intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property\\n by means of actual or threatened force and completed a “substan-\\n tial step” toward that end. See id. at 851. But the Court noted that,\\n while the government would have to show that the defendant took\\n an “unequivocal” and “significant” step towards committing rob-\\n bery, it need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted\\n to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). See\\n id. at 851-52. Therefore, the Court concluded that attempted\\n Hobbs Act robbery was not categorically a crime of violence under\\n § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. See id. at 852. In so holding, the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12347\\n\\n Court in Taylor rejected the “realistic probability” test set out in\\n United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 352-53 (11th Cir. 2018), as\\n well as St. Hubert’s reasoning that, because a completed Hobbs Act\\n robbery qualifies as a crime of violence, an attempted Hobbs Act\\n robbery must qualify as well. See Taylor, 596 U.S. at 852-59 (citing\\n St. Hubert, 909 F.3d at 352-53).\\n In Wiley, decided after Taylor, we held that aiding and abet-\\n ting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence, reasoning that “Tay-\\n lor did not disturb [our] holding that completed Hobbs Act robbery\\n is a crime of violence.” Wiley, 78 F.4th at 1365. We recently con-\\n firmed that “Taylor says nothing of the completed crime of Hobbs\\n Act robbery and thus does not disturb [our] precedent holding that\\n Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence.” United States v. Solomon,\\n 136 F.4th 1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2025). First, we rejected the conten-\\n tion that Wiley was inapposite to convictions for completed rob-\\n bery, explaining that “aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery is a\\n crime of violence because a completed Hobbs Act robbery is, itself,\\n a crime of violence.” Id. at 1321. Second, we rejected the appel-\\n lants’ assertion that Wiley was not controlling because their appeal\\n raised new arguments not considered in Wiley. See id. Thus, we\\n concluded that the appellants’ request “to avoid Wiley’s resolution\\n of an issue, based on unraised arguments [] is foreclosed by Lambrix\\n and does not implicate Jackson and Webster.” Id.\\n Nevertheless, in Solomon we considered and rejected the ap-\\n pellants’ specific arguments. See id. First, we concluded that Wiley\\n rendered meritless the argument that Hobbs Act robbery was not\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 5\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12347 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n a crime of violence after Taylor because Taylor abrogated St. Hubert.\\n See id. Second, we explained that, although Taylor abrogated the\\n “realistic probability” test used in St. Hubert, that did not “advance\\n the appellants’ cause” because we held in St. Fleur that Hobbs Act\\n robbery “require[s] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of\\n physical force.” Id. Third, we confirmed that the Hobbs Act stat-\\n ute is divisible as to robbery and attempted robbery. Id. Fourth,\\n we declined to ignore St. Fleur on the ground that it “arose in a\\n collateral context without true adversarial briefing,” stating that\\n the prior-panel-precedent rule still applies. See id. Fifth, we re-\\n jected the argument that, based on our pattern jury instructions,\\n the least culpable conduct for Hobbs Act robbery was “taking per-\\n sonal property against the victim’s will by threatening the victim’s\\n intangible property e.g., threat of financial harm.” Id. We ex-\\n plained that “jury instructions are not binding law” and that cases\\n before and after Taylor concluded that “Hobbs Act robbery cannot\\n be accomplished without the use, attempted use, or threatened use\\n of force.” Id.\\n Here, the appellants’ § 924(c) arguments are foreclosed by\\n our binding precent, including Solomon. The district court did not\\n err in determining that completed Hobbs Act robbery remains a\\n crime of violence after Taylor and, therefore, a valid predicate of-\\n fense for the appellants’ § 924(c) convictions.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30984,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763080,"string":"10,763,080"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Benjamin Graddy"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-10191"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10164\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\\n Defendant- Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cr-00157-WFJ-SPF-1\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10191\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n versus\\n\\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\\n Defendant- Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00014-WFJ-AAS-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Benjamin Graddy appeals his 144-month sentence for pos-\\n session of a firearm by a convicted felon and his 24-month impris-\\n onment sentence for revocation of supervised release. Graddy ar-\\n gues that the district court’s 144-month sentence, a 39-month up-\\n ward variance from the guideline range of 84 to 105 months, was\\n substantively unreasonable because the district court improperly\\n weighed his criminal history and the need for adequate deterrence\\n and did not account for the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.\\n When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,\\n we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential\\n abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51\\n (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of es-\\n tablishing that it is unreasonable based on the record and the\\n § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th\\n Cir. 2018). An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n below the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively un-\\n reasonable if, on review, we are “left with the definite and firm con-\\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\\n the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The district court abuses its\\n discretion if it: “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors\\n that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an\\n improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-\\n ment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quotation\\n marks omitted). An unjustified reliance on a single factor may be\\n a “symptom” of an unreasonable sentence. United States v.\\n Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court,\\n however, does not have to give all the factors equal weight and is\\n given discretion to attach greater weight to one factor over an-\\n other. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.\\n 2015). The district court’s failure to discuss mitigating factors cited\\n by the defendant does not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ig-\\n nored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo,\\n 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s “acknowledgment\\n that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\\n ments is sufficient.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th\\n Cir. 2022).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient,\\n but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18\\n U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include\\n the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,\\n promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter crimi-\\n nal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal conduct.\\n Id. § 3553(a)(2). Additional considerations include the nature and\\n circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the\\n defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline\\n range, the need to avoid sentencing disparities among similarly sit-\\n uated defendants, the need to provide restitution to victims, and\\n the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. Id.\\n § 3553(a)(1)–(7). “Placing substantial weight on a defendant’s crim-\\n inal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the\\n factors it requires a court to consider are related to criminal his-\\n tory.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263.\\n The district court also has discretion to impose an upward\\n variance based on the § 3553(a) factors and is not bound by the\\n guideline range or the government’s recommended sentence. See,\\n e.g., United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221-23 (11th Cir. 2012)\\n (affirming a 210-month sentence, a significant upward variance\\n from the government’s guideline-based recommendation of 78\\n months). We do not presume that a sentence outside of the guide-\\n line range is unreasonable but give deference to the district court’s\\n decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen sentence. Irey,\\n 612 F.3d at 1187. We must determine whether the variance is sup-\\n ported by a “sufficiently compelling” justification, with major\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n variances requiring “more significant justification[s]” than minor\\n ones. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We have held that sentences were sub-\\n stantively unreasonable where the district court did not adequately\\n consider the guideline range. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d\\n 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court erred in\\n not giving any “real weight” to the guideline imprisonment range\\n of 97 to 120 months when sentencing the defendant to probation).\\n “The district court may vary upward based on conduct that was\\n already considered in calculating the guideline range.” United\\n States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation\\n modified).\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in impos-\\n ing a 144-month sentence. Graddy argues that the district court did\\n not provide an adequately compelling justification to support the\\n degree of upward variance it imposed, but the district court need\\n not discuss every § 3553(a) factor and the court acknowledged the\\n parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors before setting Graddy’s\\n sentence. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833; Butler at 1356. The district court\\n specifically explained that it imposed an upward variance because\\n of the nature of Graddy’s offense, the need to protect the public,\\n the need for specific deterrence, and the need to avoid further\\n crimes. Furthermore, although the government requested a 90-\\n month sentence that it argued would account for Graddy’s crimi-\\n nal history and recidivism, the district court was not bound by the\\n government’s sentencing recommendation and acted within its dis-\\n cretion in determining that the government’s sentence would be\\n insufficient. Early, 686 F.3d at 1221-23. The district court acted\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n within its discretion to give more weight to the need for future de-\\n terrence over other sentencing factors by considering Graddy’s ex-\\n tensive history of recidivism. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The\\n fact that the district court’s sentence was 60% higher than the gov-\\n ernment’s requested one does not mean it is unreasonable because\\n there is no presumption that a sentence above the Guidelines is un-\\n reasonable, and the court is not bound by the government’s rec-\\n ommendation. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187; Early, 686 F.3d at 1221 23.\\n Additionally, Graddy’s 144-month sentence is still 3 years below\\n the statutory maximum, further indicating its reasonableness.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by more heav-\\n ily considering Graddy’s long criminal history, which included fire-\\n arms and violence. Moreover, the offense here happened only a\\n few months into his supervised release term. Graddy’s history rea-\\n sonably led the district court to find that Graddy was not “ame-\\n nab[le] to supervision” and needed to be given a longer sentence.\\n Lastly, at the end of the hearing, the district court stated it hoped\\n this sentence would be the end of Graddy’s difficulty with the crim-\\n inal justice system, suggesting that the court imposed the upward\\n variance with the intention to help Graddy avoid future criminal\\n conduct.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229665/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRASHER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ANDERSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"BRASHER\": \", Circuit\", \"ANDERSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763080/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Benjamin Graddy\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 25-10164\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\n Defendant- Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cr-00157-WFJ-SPF-1\n ____________________\n ____________________\n No. 25-10191\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\n\n versus\n\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\n Defendant- Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00014-WFJ-AAS-1\n ____________________\n\n Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Benjamin Graddy appeals his 144-month sentence for pos-\n session of a firearm by a convicted felon and his 24-month impris-\n onment sentence for revocation of supervised release. Graddy ar-\n gues that the district court’s 144-month sentence, a 39-month up-\n ward variance from the guideline range of 84 to 105 months, was\n substantively unreasonable because the district court improperly\n weighed his criminal history and the need for adequate deterrence\n and did not account for the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.\n When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,\n we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential\n abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51\n (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of es-\n tablishing that it is unreasonable based on the record and the\n § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th\n Cir. 2018). An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n below the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014).\n We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively un-\n reasonable if, on review, we are “left with the definite and firm con-\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\n the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)\n (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The district court abuses its\n discretion if it: “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors\n that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an\n improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-\n ment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quotation\n marks omitted). An unjustified reliance on a single factor may be\n a “symptom” of an unreasonable sentence. United States v.\n Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court,\n however, does not have to give all the factors equal weight and is\n given discretion to attach greater weight to one factor over an-\n other. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.\n 2015). The district court’s failure to discuss mitigating factors cited\n by the defendant does not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ig-\n nored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo,\n 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s “acknowledgment\n that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\n ments is sufficient.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th\n Cir. 2022).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\n\n The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient,\n but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18\n U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include\n the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,\n promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter crimi-\n nal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal conduct.\n Id. § 3553(a)(2). Additional considerations include the nature and\n circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the\n defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline\n range, the need to avoid sentencing disparities among similarly sit-\n uated defendants, the need to provide restitution to victims, and\n the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. Id.\n § 3553(a)(1)–(7). “Placing substantial weight on a defendant’s crim-\n inal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the\n factors it requires a court to consider are related to criminal his-\n tory.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263.\n The district court also has discretion to impose an upward\n variance based on the § 3553(a) factors and is not bound by the\n guideline range or the government’s recommended sentence. See,\n e.g., United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221-23 (11th Cir. 2012)\n (affirming a 210-month sentence, a significant upward variance\n from the government’s guideline-based recommendation of 78\n months). We do not presume that a sentence outside of the guide-\n line range is unreasonable but give deference to the district court’s\n decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen sentence. Irey,\n 612 F.3d at 1187. We must determine whether the variance is sup-\n ported by a “sufficiently compelling” justification, with major\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n variances requiring “more significant justification[s]” than minor\n ones. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We have held that sentences were sub-\n stantively unreasonable where the district court did not adequately\n consider the guideline range. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d\n 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court erred in\n not giving any “real weight” to the guideline imprisonment range\n of 97 to 120 months when sentencing the defendant to probation).\n “The district court may vary upward based on conduct that was\n already considered in calculating the guideline range.” United\n States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation\n modified).\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in impos-\n ing a 144-month sentence. Graddy argues that the district court did\n not provide an adequately compelling justification to support the\n degree of upward variance it imposed, but the district court need\n not discuss every § 3553(a) factor and the court acknowledged the\n parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors before setting Graddy’s\n sentence. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833; Butler at 1356. The district court\n specifically explained that it imposed an upward variance because\n of the nature of Graddy’s offense, the need to protect the public,\n the need for specific deterrence, and the need to avoid further\n crimes. Furthermore, although the government requested a 90-\n month sentence that it argued would account for Graddy’s crimi-\n nal history and recidivism, the district court was not bound by the\n government’s sentencing recommendation and acted within its dis-\n cretion in determining that the government’s sentence would be\n insufficient. Early, 686 F.3d at 1221-23. The district court acted\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\n\n within its discretion to give more weight to the need for future de-\n terrence over other sentencing factors by considering Graddy’s ex-\n tensive history of recidivism. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The\n fact that the district court’s sentence was 60% higher than the gov-\n ernment’s requested one does not mean it is unreasonable because\n there is no presumption that a sentence above the Guidelines is un-\n reasonable, and the court is not bound by the government’s rec-\n ommendation. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187; Early, 686 F.3d at 1221 23.\n Additionally, Graddy’s 144-month sentence is still 3 years below\n the statutory maximum, further indicating its reasonableness.\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364.\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by more heav-\n ily considering Graddy’s long criminal history, which included fire-\n arms and violence. Moreover, the offense here happened only a\n few months into his supervised release term. Graddy’s history rea-\n sonably led the district court to find that Graddy was not “ame-\n nab[le] to supervision” and needed to be given a longer sentence.\n Lastly, at the end of the hearing, the district court stated it hoped\n this sentence would be the end of Graddy’s difficulty with the crim-\n inal justice system, suggesting that the court imposed the upward\n variance with the intention to help Graddy avoid future criminal\n conduct.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Benjamin Graddy\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10164\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\\n Defendant- Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cr-00157-WFJ-SPF-1\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10191\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n versus\\n\\n BENJAMIN CEDRIC GRADDY,\\n Defendant- Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00014-WFJ-AAS-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Benjamin Graddy appeals his 144-month sentence for pos-\\n session of a firearm by a convicted felon and his 24-month impris-\\n onment sentence for revocation of supervised release. Graddy ar-\\n gues that the district court’s 144-month sentence, a 39-month up-\\n ward variance from the guideline range of 84 to 105 months, was\\n substantively unreasonable because the district court improperly\\n weighed his criminal history and the need for adequate deterrence\\n and did not account for the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.\\n When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,\\n we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential\\n abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51\\n (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of es-\\n tablishing that it is unreasonable based on the record and the\\n § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th\\n Cir. 2018). An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n below the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014).\\n We will vacate a defendant’s sentence as substantively un-\\n reasonable if, on review, we are “left with the definite and firm con-\\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\\n the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). The district court abuses its\\n discretion if it: “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors\\n that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an\\n improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-\\n ment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (quotation\\n marks omitted). An unjustified reliance on a single factor may be\\n a “symptom” of an unreasonable sentence. United States v.\\n Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013). The district court,\\n however, does not have to give all the factors equal weight and is\\n given discretion to attach greater weight to one factor over an-\\n other. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.\\n 2015). The district court’s failure to discuss mitigating factors cited\\n by the defendant does not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ig-\\n nored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo,\\n 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). The court’s “acknowledgment\\n that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\\n ments is sufficient.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th\\n Cir. 2022).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient,\\n but not greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18\\n U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include\\n the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,\\n promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter crimi-\\n nal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal conduct.\\n Id. § 3553(a)(2). Additional considerations include the nature and\\n circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the\\n defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline\\n range, the need to avoid sentencing disparities among similarly sit-\\n uated defendants, the need to provide restitution to victims, and\\n the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. Id.\\n § 3553(a)(1)–(7). “Placing substantial weight on a defendant’s crim-\\n inal record is entirely consistent with § 3553(a) because five of the\\n factors it requires a court to consider are related to criminal his-\\n tory.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1263.\\n The district court also has discretion to impose an upward\\n variance based on the § 3553(a) factors and is not bound by the\\n guideline range or the government’s recommended sentence. See,\\n e.g., United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221-23 (11th Cir. 2012)\\n (affirming a 210-month sentence, a significant upward variance\\n from the government’s guideline-based recommendation of 78\\n months). We do not presume that a sentence outside of the guide-\\n line range is unreasonable but give deference to the district court’s\\n decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen sentence. Irey,\\n 612 F.3d at 1187. We must determine whether the variance is sup-\\n ported by a “sufficiently compelling” justification, with major\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 25-10164 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n variances requiring “more significant justification[s]” than minor\\n ones. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We have held that sentences were sub-\\n stantively unreasonable where the district court did not adequately\\n consider the guideline range. See United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d\\n 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court erred in\\n not giving any “real weight” to the guideline imprisonment range\\n of 97 to 120 months when sentencing the defendant to probation).\\n “The district court may vary upward based on conduct that was\\n already considered in calculating the guideline range.” United\\n States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation\\n modified).\\n Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in impos-\\n ing a 144-month sentence. Graddy argues that the district court did\\n not provide an adequately compelling justification to support the\\n degree of upward variance it imposed, but the district court need\\n not discuss every § 3553(a) factor and the court acknowledged the\\n parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors before setting Graddy’s\\n sentence. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833; Butler at 1356. The district court\\n specifically explained that it imposed an upward variance because\\n of the nature of Graddy’s offense, the need to protect the public,\\n the need for specific deterrence, and the need to avoid further\\n crimes. Furthermore, although the government requested a 90-\\n month sentence that it argued would account for Graddy’s crimi-\\n nal history and recidivism, the district court was not bound by the\\n government’s sentencing recommendation and acted within its dis-\\n cretion in determining that the government’s sentence would be\\n insufficient. Early, 686 F.3d at 1221-23. The district court acted\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 25-10164\\n\\n within its discretion to give more weight to the need for future de-\\n terrence over other sentencing factors by considering Graddy’s ex-\\n tensive history of recidivism. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254. The\\n fact that the district court’s sentence was 60% higher than the gov-\\n ernment’s requested one does not mean it is unreasonable because\\n there is no presumption that a sentence above the Guidelines is un-\\n reasonable, and the court is not bound by the government’s rec-\\n ommendation. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187; Early, 686 F.3d at 1221 23.\\n Additionally, Graddy’s 144-month sentence is still 3 years below\\n the statutory maximum, further indicating its reasonableness.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d at 1364.\\n The district court did not abuse its discretion by more heav-\\n ily considering Graddy’s long criminal history, which included fire-\\n arms and violence. Moreover, the offense here happened only a\\n few months into his supervised release term. Graddy’s history rea-\\n sonably led the district court to find that Graddy was not “ame-\\n nab[le] to supervision” and needed to be given a longer sentence.\\n Lastly, at the end of the hearing, the district court stated it hoped\\n this sentence would be the end of Graddy’s difficulty with the crim-\\n inal justice system, suggesting that the court imposed the upward\\n variance with the intention to help Graddy avoid future criminal\\n conduct.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30985,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763138,"string":"10,763,138"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Juan Ortiz-Valle"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-12388"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12388\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JUAN ANTONIO ORTIZ-VALLE,\\n a.k.a. Juan Ortiz,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00180-KKM-TGW-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Thomas A. Burns, appointed counsel for Juan Ortiz-Valle in\\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12388\\n\\n representation and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386\\n U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record re-\\n veals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is\\n correct. Because independent examination of the entire record re-\\n veals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is\\n GRANTED, and Ortiz-Valle’s convictions and sentence are\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229723/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"ANDERSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\", \"ANDERSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763138/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Juan Ortiz-Valle\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-12388\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n JUAN ANTONIO ORTIZ-VALLE,\n a.k.a. Juan Ortiz,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00180-KKM-TGW-1\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Thomas A. Burns, appointed counsel for Juan Ortiz-Valle in\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12388\n\n representation and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386\n U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record re-\n veals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is\n correct. Because independent examination of the entire record re-\n veals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is\n GRANTED, and Ortiz-Valle’s convictions and sentence are\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Juan Ortiz-Valle\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-12388\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JUAN ANTONIO ORTIZ-VALLE,\\n a.k.a. Juan Ortiz,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00180-KKM-TGW-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Thomas A. Burns, appointed counsel for Juan Ortiz-Valle in\\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-12388\\n\\n representation and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386\\n U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record re-\\n veals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is\\n correct. Because independent examination of the entire record re-\\n veals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is\\n GRANTED, and Ortiz-Valle’s convictions and sentence are\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30986,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763139,"string":"10,763,139"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jonathan Grenon"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"23-13478"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13478\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JONATHAN DAVID GRENON,\\n JORDAN PAUL GRENON,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n JOSEPH TIMOTHY GRENON,\\n Defendant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20242-CMA-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Brothers Jonathan and Jordan Grenon 1 sold bottles of “Mir-\\n acle Mineral Solution” as a cure-all capable of treating conditions\\n like cancer, autism, and even the coronavirus. In reality, the broth-\\n ers were selling toxic bleach. After a civil proceeding, the brothers\\n were ordered to stop selling the solution, but they ignored that or-\\n der. The brothers were then charged and convicted for conspiracy\\n and criminal contempt, which they now appeal. We affirm.\\n FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\n The “Miracle Mineral Solution” the brothers had been sell-\\n ing contained sodium chlorite. They sold the product through an\\n organization called the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing.\\n When mixed with an activator, as the label instructed, sodium\\n chlorite becomes chlorine dioxide, otherwise known as bleach. In\\n early July 2020, the brothers were arrested in the Middle District of\\n Florida and brought before a magistrate judge for an initial appear-\\n ance. The complaint charged the brothers, along with their father\\n and a third brother, with one count of conspiracy to defraud the\\n United States, and two counts of criminal contempt.\\n Because the brothers bring six arguments on appeal, we di-\\n vide the remainder of the factual and procedural history to mirror\\n the issues as they will follow in the discussion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Because the appellants share the same last name, we refer to them collectively\\n as the brothers and individually by their first names.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Pro Se Representation\\n At the initial appearance, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\\n that he was “going to be pro se.” Jordan first asked, “[i]s this only\\n for this meeting?” The magistrate judge explained that Jordan\\n could later change his mind. Jordan then confirmed he was “pro se\\n until further notice.” The magistrate judge told the brothers that a\\n federal public defender was available to assist and informed the\\n brothers of: their right to counsel; the maximum sentence they\\n faced; the pitfalls of self-representation; the rules that govern the\\n district court; and how a trained lawyer could benefit the brothers’\\n defense. The brothers confirmed they wished to proceed pro se,\\n and the magistrate judge found the brothers knowingly and volun-\\n tarily waived their right to counsel.\\n At the brothers’ detention hearing the next day, the magis-\\n trate judge noted the presence of a federal public defender available\\n to assist, but the brothers refused to speak with him. The magis-\\n trate judge asked the brothers to let her know if they changed their\\n minds and the brothers confirmed they would. The brothers’ case\\n was then transferred to the Southern District of Florida.\\n In its order denying the brothers’ motion to dismiss, the dis-\\n trict court noted the motion’s “bizarre contents” and directed the\\n government to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or\\n psychological examinations.” The government responded that it\\n was not seeking competency evaluations at that time. The district\\n court then appointed the brothers standby counsel and held an-\\n other Faretta hearing. After discussing with the brothers the skills\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n required for self-representation—along with its pitfalls—the dis-\\n trict court found the brothers capable of representing themselves.\\n More than a year passed as the brothers awaited the other\\n two codefendants’ extradition from Colombia. Shortly after the\\n final extradition, the brothers filed requests to be appointed coun-\\n sel. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the brothers’ request.\\n Counsel was appointed at Jordan’s hearing. At Jonathan’s hearing,\\n he refused to answer the magistrate judge’s financial questions, and\\n the magistrate judge ordered a follow-up hearing to occur the next\\n month.\\n At the follow-up hearing, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\\n he “will need 30 to 60 days to accomplish obtaining counsel.” The\\n magistrate judge then asked, “you do [not] want me to appoint you\\n a lawyer at this point?” Jonathan responded, “[a]t this point I [am]\\n trying to accomplish that myself.” The magistrate judge warned\\n Jonathan that the trial date was fast approaching and that it may be\\n difficult to find a lawyer who could prepare in time. With those\\n concerns in mind, the magistrate judge bluntly said, “let me ap-\\n point you a lawyer.” Jonathan replied, “[n]o. I’m going to con-\\n tinue, myself, exhausting my administrative remedies.” The mag-\\n istrate judge set another hearing for the following month.\\n Meanwhile, the district court reviewed the docket and found\\n the brothers’ motions for appointment of counsel had been filed by\\n an unauthorized third party and denied Jonathan’s still-pending\\n motion. Jordan’s counsel then moved to withdraw at Jordan’s re-\\n quest. After yet another Faretta inquiry, the district court granted\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n counsel’s motion to withdraw. By the next status conference, the\\n brothers returned to stating unequivocally they no longer wished\\n to be represented by counsel.\\n The Friday before the trial was set to begin, the district court\\n held one final status conference where it asked, “[d]o any of you\\n wish to have counsel appointed to represent you in this case?” The\\n brothers refused to answer. The district court asked the same ques-\\n tions and provided the same warnings about self-representation\\n that the magistrate judge had when the brothers made their first\\n appearance, and the brothers refused to respond. During the trial\\n the brothers chose to remain silent throughout.\\n Speedy Trial\\n Returning to the brothers’ initial appearance in early July\\n 2020, the magistrate judge ruled the brothers would remain de-\\n tained pending trial. The case was then transferred to the Southern\\n District of Florida, where the offense was alleged to have been\\n committed. The brothers were indicted and arraigned at the end\\n of April 2021—the government had been awaiting the extradition\\n of two codefendants but decided to move forward with the broth-\\n ers’ indictments.\\n The district court set a trial date for the end of September\\n 2021. A month later, the government moved for a continuance,\\n citing the administrative difficulty of extraditing the codefendants\\n from Colombia. At a hearing, the government noted that its Co-\\n lombian counterparts said it takes approximately one year to pro-\\n cess an extradition. The brothers demanded the indictment be\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n dismissed—primarily reasserting sovereign-citizen arguments\\n from an earlier motion—but the brothers did not directly comment\\n on whether they opposed a continuance. The district court made\\n an ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order contin-\\n uing the trial until March 2022. In December 2021, the third\\n brother was extradited and had his initial appearance.\\n Then, in January 2022, the government filed its second mo-\\n tion to continue the trial. At a hearing, the government explained\\n that, while it did take approximately a year to extradite the third\\n brother, a different Colombian judge had been handling the fa-\\n ther’s extradition request and that judge retired, which was slow-\\n ing down the process. It is difficult to decipher whether the broth-\\n ers opposed the continuance. Much of the hearing involved the\\n brothers accusing the court of, among other things, committing\\n barratry, slavery, peonage, and press-ganging for failing to dismiss\\n the indictment. Jonathan also claimed the proceedings were “a\\n conspiracy against my family” and noted “[t]he Lord will take\\n vengeance on his adversaries and reserve his wrath for his ene-\\n mies.” But, interwoven between these claims, Jonathan did appear\\n to oppose the continuance, saying that it was “just a way to keep\\n extending and extending time.” The district court again made an\\n ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order continuing\\n the trial until September 2022.\\n In July 2022, the final codefendant was finally extradited and\\n arraigned. At a status conference a few days later, the government\\n said that it was ready for trial. When the district court asked the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n brothers if they had an opinion on the trial date, the brothers ex-\\n pressed none. Three days later, the district court, on its own, or-\\n dered competency evaluations for all four defendants. The gov-\\n ernment then moved for a third continuance, noting the bureau of\\n prisons could not complete the competency evaluations in time for\\n the trial. The district court granted the motion, again finding the\\n ends of justice supported the continuance, and scheduled the trial\\n for January 2023.\\n In late August 2022, the brothers moved to dismiss, taking\\n issue with the competency evaluations and claiming their speedy-\\n trial rights had been violated. The district court denied Jordan’s\\n motion because it was filed pro se and he was represented by coun-\\n sel at the time. It denied Jonathan’s motion, finding only excluda-\\n ble time had passed. Two months later, the brothers filed nearly\\n identical motions. The district court again denied Jordan’s motion\\n because he was represented by counsel.\\n In November, two days after the defendants had been found\\n competent to stand trial, the district court held another status con-\\n ference. There, Jonathan told the district court he was “in the pro-\\n cess of trying to acquire effective counsel.” The district court noted\\n the brothers had sought to dismiss the indictment due to delay and\\n asked “[s]o how long are we going to wait?” Jonathan replied, “I\\n [have] not exhausted my administrative remedies.” Later in the\\n hearing, the district court denied Jonathan’s motion because he\\n was responsible for delaying the trial due to his late-breaking re-\\n quest to find counsel. At that same hearing, Jordan asked to fire\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n the federal public defender representing him and find his own\\n counsel. The district court replied that he could, “like [his] brother,\\n continue searching for one until you find one.” It then ruled it was\\n “going to make a finding that all of these delays to the scheduling\\n of the trial are being caused” by the brothers. The district court\\n found the brothers’ stance on counsel made it so they would “not\\n be ready to proceed to trial as presently scheduled,” continued the\\n trial and set a new trial period beginning in July 2023. The trial\\n began on July 17, 2023.\\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\\n The brothers invoked religious concepts throughout the\\n proceedings. Starting as early as the brothers’ first appearance, Jon-\\n athan proclaimed that “the First Amendment is being broken,” that\\n “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their] sacrament,” and that the proceedings\\n were “totally against [their] religious rights.”\\n Later, the brothers filed their first motion to dismiss. Much\\n of that document is hard to decipher and claims the brothers are\\n “vessels,” and the United States government is an illegitimate “[d]e\\n [f]acto [g]overnment” whose “[c]orporate [b]y-laws” do not apply\\n to “G-d fearing sons” like them. The motion also claimed “[t]hat\\n [their] [r]eligious freedoms have been violated,” which was “[a]ll\\n d[ue] to [p]olicies of the [Food and Drug Administration] unlaw-\\n fully issued by someone an employee Ms. Dix ([n]ot [a]ppointed or\\n [n]ot elected).” The district court denied the motion to dismiss.\\n Shortly before trial, the government filed a motion in limine\\n seeking to preclude the brothers from pursuing a defense based on\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court granted\\n the motion to the extent that it sought to preclude the brothers\\n from putting the issue to the jury. But the order explained that the\\n Act’s applicability was a pure question of law the brothers had not\\n raised and that if the brothers wished to raise it they would need to\\n bring a motion to dismiss. The brothers never did.\\n After opening statements at trial, the district court instructed\\n the jury that the First Amendment was not a defense to the charged\\n conduct. During its case-in-chief, the government presented evi-\\n dence that the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing was a\\n “nonreligious church.” The organization was structured this way\\n “[t]o get around [g]overnment regulation and to not go to jail.”\\n The government pointed to the organization’s newsletter from\\n around the time of its founding that proclaimed: “[s]o here it is, we\\n are forming a church of health and healing. Now, that [is] not reli-\\n gion, that [is] health and healing.” The organization continued,\\n “[d]o you understand the power that a church has that has [not]\\n given up its power? Look at the Catholics. Their priests have been\\n molesting women and children for centuries and the governments\\n have not been able to stop it. If handled properly, a church can\\n protect us.” The brothers never invoked the Act at trial.\\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\\n The indictment referenced federal regulations. In the “Reg-\\n ulatory Framework” section of the indictment, after reciting the\\n statutory definition of “drug,” which focuses on the substance’s\\n “intended use,” the indictment noted that a regulation, 21 C.F.R.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n section 201.128, defined “intended use.” At trial, the government\\n expert testified about the terms in the indictment.\\n The district court’s jury instructions explained that “[a]\\n product’s intended use is what a reasonable person would conclude\\n the manufacturer or seller intended based on all the relevant infor-\\n mation.” The instructions clarified that a jury could determine a\\n product’s intended use by “considering the label, accompanying la-\\n belling, promotional material, advertising, oral representations\\n made about the product, the circumstances surrounding the distri-\\n bution of the article and information from any other source which\\n discloses intended use.” The brothers did not object to the regula-\\n tory framework section of the indictment, the expert’s testimony,\\n or the jury instructions.\\n Jury Trial\\n At the calendar call before trial, the government said that it\\n would be introducing the temporary restraining order and prelim-\\n inary injunction that were issued against the brothers in the civil\\n proceeding. There, the government sought to enjoin the brothers,\\n along with the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing and the\\n other two codefendants, from distributing Miracle Mineral Solu-\\n tion. The civil proceeding resulted in a temporary restraining or-\\n der, a preliminary injunction, and then, after the government\\n moved for and obtained a default judgment, a permanent injunc-\\n tion. The government’s civil complaint sought only injunctive re-\\n lief and did not request a jury trial. Because the brothers never ap-\\n peared in the civil case, they also did not request a jury trial.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\\n At trial, the government presented evidence that the broth-\\n ers were selling chlorine dioxide to the public online. The brothers’\\n email addresses were listed on the organization’s contact card. Or-\\n ders were shipped out from Jonathan’s address. After an under-\\n cover agent successfully purchased chlorine dioxide from the web-\\n site, he reached out to the organization. He wrote that his cancer-\\n stricken wife had been taking the product for three weeks without\\n her condition improving. Jordan responded by saying, “[t]hree\\n weeks is not long enough for more serious diseases like cancer.”\\n Receipts confirmed that the brothers had made tens of thousands\\n of sales and were making over $120,000 per month.\\n At the sentencing hearing, there was an exchange about\\n whether the brothers had received the presentence investigation\\n reports more than thirty-five days before the hearing. During Jon-\\n athan’s hearing, given the brothers’ earlier refusal to accept docu-\\n ments, the probation office confirmed that it had dropped off the\\n reports in the jail’s legal mailbox earlier in the week. At Jordan’s\\n sentencing hearing, he confirmed he had seen the report. The\\n brothers made no specific objections to particular provisions in the\\n report, but they did make general statements about the legitimacy\\n of the proceedings. Jordan said, “[t]here is no valid claim by a man\\n or woman. Therefore, there are no victims nor to whom restitu-\\n tion would be due.” Jonathan likewise noted that “[he], living man,\\n object[s] because there has not been any valid claims from any man\\n or woman. There cannot be any losses or restitution.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Throughout the trial, the brothers questioned the legitimacy of the\\n proceedings. For example, at a continuance hearing roughly eight-\\n een months before trial, Jonathan asked, “why are the Grenons still\\n being held when no crime has been committed nor has there been\\n any intent to commit a crime and there are no victims?” “[Y]ou can\\n order chlorine dioxide on Amazon, and many other companies\\n provide it. It is not illegal and it can[not] be.”\\n The presentence investigation reports calculated the broth-\\n ers’ guideline ranges as 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The re-\\n ports included four enhancements for the number of victims, vul-\\n nerable victims, the number of vulnerable victims, and the amount\\n of loss caused. The district court adopted the reports and the advi-\\n sory guideline ranges.\\n Three weeks before trial, the district court granted the gov-\\n ernment’s motion to dismiss the contempt counts against the\\n brothers’ two codefendants because the extradition agreement\\n with Colombia prohibited prosecution on those counts. However,\\n the government proceeded with the contempt charges against the\\n brothers. The brothers were convicted on all three counts and re-\\n ceived 151 months’ imprisonment; the codefendants were con-\\n victed on one count and received sixty months’ imprisonment.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion in six parts. First, we consider the\\n brothers’ contention that their waivers of the right to counsel were\\n not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Second, we address the\\n brothers’ argument that they were denied their statutory and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Third, we review the broth-\\n ers’ assertion that the indictment should have been dismissed un-\\n der the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Fourth, we discuss the\\n brothers’ contention that the district court improperly relied on the\\n Food and Drug Administration’s interpretation of the term “in-\\n tended uses.” Fifth, we consider the brothers’ argument that the\\n temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were not\\n lawful orders capable of supporting a criminal contempt conviction\\n because the brothers were entitled to a jury trial in the civil pro-\\n ceeding. And finally, we address the brothers’ assertion that their\\n sentences were not procedurally reasonable because the district\\n court should have found that no enhancements for loss amount, or\\n number and type of victims, should apply.\\n Pro Se Representation\\n The brothers first contend that the district court erred when\\n it allowed them to proceed pro se throughout the proceedings.\\n They argue their various waivers of the right to counsel were not\\n knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.\\n Whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing, intelligent, and\\n voluntary is “a mixed question of law and fact which this Court\\n reviews de novo.” United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th\\n Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). On direct appeal, it is the\\n government’s burden to prove the waiver was valid. Id. “The\\n Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration\\n the right to counsel at all ‘critical stages’ of the criminal process.”\\n Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, a defendant also\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n may choose to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,\\n 817 (1975). “Because the constitutional rights to counsel and to\\n self-representation cannot be exercised at once, a defendant can ex-\\n ercise one only if he waives the other.” United States v. Hakim, 30\\n F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022). To waive the right to counsel, a\\n defendant must unequivocally invoke his right of self-representa-\\n tion. United States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020).\\n His waiver also must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id.\\n “If the waiver was not made by the accused with the requisite\\n knowledge, then he has been deprived of ‘the right to counsel.’”\\n Hakim, 30 F.4th at 1322.\\n Here, the record shows the brothers made knowing, intelli-\\n gent, and voluntary waivers of their right to counsel throughout\\n the critical stages of the proceedings. We start with the brothers’\\n initial appearance. “[T]he right to counsel attaches at the initial ap-\\n pearance before a judicial officer.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex.,\\n 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008). The magistrate judge appropriately\\n alerted the brothers of their right to counsel, explained the maxi-\\n mum penalty they faced, explained the knowledge required to\\n mount a defense, explained a federal public defender was present\\n and ready to assist, and offered to adjourn until the next day if the\\n brothers wanted to retain their own counsel or seek the assistance\\n of a public defender. The brothers unequivocally waived their\\n right to counsel.\\n The district court ensured the waiver remained effective all\\n the way until the eve of trial where it performed one final Faretta\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n hearing. Standby counsel was present as they had been through-\\n out. The district court asked the brothers, “do you wish to con-\\n tinue in this case representing yourselves?” As they had done on\\n many prior occasions, the brothers did not respond. The district\\n court asked again, “[d]o any of you wish to have counsel appointed\\n to represent you in this case?” Again, the brothers were silent. The\\n district court asked standby counsel, “can you advise whether any\\n of the Defendants has sought your legal advice or assistance?”\\n They replied that they had not.\\n “[A]n unwilling defendant can foil a district court’s best ef-\\n forts to engage in a dialogue, thereby preventing the court from\\n eliciting clear information regarding the defendant’s understanding\\n of the dangers of proceeding pro se.” Garey, 540 F.3d at 1267. That\\n is what happened here. In this circumstance, so long as the district\\n court “is assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before\\n him, (2) knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se, and\\n (3) had rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally enti-\\n tled,” it may allow the defendant to proceed pro se with standby\\n counsel in place. Id. That is what the district court did here, and\\n accordingly “a Faretta-like monologue . . . suffice[d].” Id. at 1269.\\n The brothers make several counterarguments, none of\\n which are availing. First, Jordan argues that his waiver at the initial\\n appearance was not unequivocal because he asked if his decision\\n only applied to “this meeting.” But the magistrate judge answered\\n his question and Jordan then unequivocally expressed his desire to\\n proceed pro se. He reaffirmed that decision at the next hearing a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n day later and refused to speak with the standby federal public de-\\n fender. He confirmed with the magistrate judge that he would let\\n her know if he changed his mind at any point. He continued to\\n clearly and consistently express his desire to represent himself until\\n he requested counsel for the first time two years later. 2\\n Second, the brothers argue that the district court erred when\\n it noted their motion to dismiss was “bizarre” and directed the gov-\\n ernment to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or psy-\\n chological examinations,” yet continued to allow them to repre-\\n sent themselves. But the district court did not err because, after it\\n ruled on the motion to dismiss, the court held another Faretta hear-\\n ing and determined the brothers were capable of representing\\n themselves after appointing standby counsel for both brothers.\\n The brothers do not point to anything calling that determination\\n into question.\\n Third, the brothers maintain that the district court erred\\n when after those hearings it found the brothers lacked “the skill or\\n training to represent” themselves but still found their waiver of the\\n right to counsel knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant’s\\n “educational background” and “understanding of rules of proce-\\n dure [and] evidence” are relevant factors in determining the valid-\\n ity of a defendant’s waiver. Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049. But “a defend-\\n ant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in\\n\\n 2\\n Jordan also argues that his codefendants had a “coercive effect” on him, but\\n we decline to evaluate an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.\\n United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.”\\n Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. A district court need not determine\\n “whether, for example, [the d]efendant could recite the steps to in-\\n troduce a document into evidence.” United States v. Kimball, 291\\n F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2002). Instead, “we need only to determine\\n whether [the d]efendant understood that rules do exist to govern\\n the procedure of a trial, the introduction of evidence and the be-\\n havior of advocates and to determine whether Defendant under-\\n stood that he would be bound by those rules.” Id. At the Faretta\\n hearings, the district court thoroughly explained the downsides of\\n a lack of legal training and the brothers said that they wished to\\n represent themselves.\\n Finally, Jonathan argues that the district court erred when it\\n declined to appoint him a federal public defender after he requested\\n one. Because Jonathan never formally requested counsel, there\\n was no error here. As the district court correctly found, the motion\\n was invalid because it was filed by a third-party nonlawyer. By the\\n time the next status conference occurred, Jonathan told the district\\n court that he, “the living man, d[id] not consent to having a law-\\n yer.” And even if Jonathan had made an effective request for coun-\\n sel, he never showed he was entitled to court-appointed counsel.\\n At the hearing to determine whether Jonathan was indigent, he re-\\n fused to answer the magistrate judge’s questions about his financial\\n ability to obtain counsel. See Owen, 963 F.3d at 1052 (noting that a\\n court must conduct an “appropriate inquiry” to determine whether\\n a defendant is “financially unable to obtain counsel” before ap-\\n pointing counsel).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Speedy Trial\\n The brothers next contend their statutory and constitutional\\n speedy trial rights were violated when the district court ordered\\n several continuances before trial. “We review a claim under the\\n Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district court’s factual de-\\n terminations on excludable time for clear error.” United States v.\\n Williams, 314 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 2002). When reviewing a\\n constitutional speedy trial claim, we review the district court’s legal\\n conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United\\n States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n Beginning with the brothers’ statutory speedy trial claims,\\n under the Speedy Trial Act the government was required to indict\\n the brothers within thirty days of their arrest, and to begin trial\\n within seventy days of filing the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b),\\n (c)(1). However, the Act also carves out several types of excluded\\n time. See id. § 3161(h). Here, there were nine and a half months\\n between arrest and indictment, and two years and three months\\n between indictment and trial. But because each delay was permit-\\n ted by statute, the district court did not err when it denied the\\n brothers’ motions to dismiss based on the statutory right to a\\n speedy trial.\\n The first relevant exclusion is for “[a] reasonable period of\\n delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as\\n to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance\\n has been granted.” Id. § 3161(h)(6). The brothers were initially ar-\\n rested on July 8, 2020 and were indicted on April 22, 2021. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n final codefendant had his initial appearance on July 28, 2022. So the\\n question becomes whether these delays are reasonable under the\\n statute. We have said that whether the period of delay is reasona-\\n ble can be determined by “the totality of the circumstances prior to\\n trial, by the extent to which the appellant’s defense was prejudiced,\\n or by the sheer length of the delay.” United States v. Davenport, 935\\n F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991).\\n As to the length of the delay, we have found similar ones\\n reasonable. See United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1476\\n (11th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary,\\n 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding eighteen-month delay reason-\\n able). As to prejudice, the brothers make no argument they suf-\\n fered prejudice, and nothing in the record supports that they were\\n prejudiced. And the brothers never moved for severance. Because\\n the brothers cannot show the period of exclusion attributable to\\n missing codefendants was unreasonable, this period was properly\\n excluded.\\n Days after the final defendant was extradited on July 28,\\n 2022, but around one month before trial was set to begin, the sec-\\n ond relevant exclusion period began. Delays “resulting from any\\n proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental\\n competency . . . of the defendant” are also excludable under the\\n Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A). When the district court ordered\\n competency evaluations for all four defendants, the government\\n moved for a continuance, noting that the bureau of prisons could\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n not complete the competency evaluations by the time of the trial.\\n The district court granted that motion until January 3, 2023.\\n Finally, once that exclusion period ended, the third exclu-\\n sion period began when Jonathan requested a continuance at a sta-\\n tus conference and Jordan asked to fire the federal public defender.\\n Noting these developments, the district court made an ends-of-jus-\\n tice finding that the delay “to the scheduling of the trial [was]\\n caused” by the brothers and set a trial period beginning in July 2023.\\n See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (“[A] judge shall consider in deter-\\n mining whether to grant a continuance . . . [w]hether the failure to\\n grant such a continuance . . . would deny the defendant reasonable\\n time to obtain counsel[.]”).\\n This was well within the district court’s “broad discretion”\\n in managing “the mandates of the Speedy Trial Act and the exclu-\\n sions thereto.” United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir.\\n 2024) (quoting United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.\\n 1983)). The brothers never argue the ends-of-justice continuances\\n were unwarranted. And the district court set forth its reasoning on\\n the record as required. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). We have ap-\\n proved of longer delays than this one when multiple excludable pe-\\n riods of time come together to form the delay. See United States v.\\n Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) (38-month delay).\\n Thus, the time up until July 3, 2023, was excludable, and only two\\n weeks passed from that date to the beginning of trial. The broth-\\n ers’ statutory speedy trial argument therefore fails.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n Turning to the brothers’ constitutional speedy trial argu-\\n ment, here too the district court committed no error. The Sixth\\n Amendment provides that in “all criminal prosecutions, the ac-\\n cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.\\n CONST. amend. VI.\\n The Supreme Court has held that when determining\\n whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were denied, a court\\n should consider the “[1] [l]ength of delay, [2] the reason for the de-\\n lay, [3] the defendant’s assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice to\\n the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). We have\\n held “a defendant generally must show actual prejudice unless the\\n first three factors in Barker all weigh heavily against the govern-\\n ment.” Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1239.\\n The length of delay is a “triggering mechanism.” Barker, 407\\n U.S. at 530. “Until there is some delay which is presumptively prej-\\n udicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that\\n go into the balance.” Id. “A delay is considered presumptively prej-\\n udicial as it approaches one year.” United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d\\n 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). The delay is measured “between the\\n date of the indictment and the trial date.” Id. Here, over two years\\n passed between the brothers’ indictment and trial, so the delay was\\n presumptively prejudicial.\\n Turning to the reason for the delay, much of it stems from\\n the brothers. The Supreme Court has differentiated between de-\\n liberate, neutral, and valid reasons for delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at\\n 531. The brothers’ shifting stances on whether they wanted to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n represent themselves and then firing various counsel appointed to\\n them no doubt were responsible for some of the delay. But even if\\n most of the delay was attributable to the government, like in Dav-\\n enport, “the delays in this case were inherent to the government’s\\n good faith effort to conduct a complex, joint trial.” 935 F.2d at\\n 1239. And so “[t]he reasons for delay in this case were, at worst,\\n neutral.” Id. at 1240. That means “the reasons for delay do not\\n weigh heavily against the government and do not excuse a show-\\n ing of actual prejudice.” Id.\\n It is thus unnecessary to examine the third Barker factor as\\n the brothers cannot show that all three of the first factors weigh\\n heavily in their favor, and so they must show actual prejudice. But\\n the brothers do not even attempt to argue prejudice here. Their\\n briefing instead relied on showing a presumption of prejudice. The\\n brothers’ constitutional speedy trial claim therefore fails.\\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\\n Third, the brothers contend that the district court should\\n have dismissed the complaint based on the Religious Freedom Res-\\n toration Act. Generally, “we review the district court’s denial of a\\n motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion.” United\\n States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United\\n States v. Farias, 836 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 1016)). But “[w]hen\\n the defendant does not preserve an argument for appeal, we review\\n for plain error.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1008 (11th\\n Cir. 2007). Whether government action complies with the Act is a\\n legal question we review de novo. Grady, 18 F.4th at 1285.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Tattenbaum v.\\n United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Sometimes that\\n may require determining whether an unclear claim fits in another\\n recognizable form. See United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624–25\\n (11th Cir. 1990). But district courts need not consider arguments\\n not properly presented. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d\\n 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]o preserve an issue, a litigant must\\n ‘first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as\\n to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on\\n it.’” United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2020) (quot-\\n ing Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012)).\\n We agree with the district court that this issue was never\\n raised. When the government flagged the potential applicability of\\n the Act in a motion in limine, the district court found that the\\n brothers never sought dismissal based on the Act before trial. The\\n brothers also never sought dismissal at or after trial. The brothers\\n did bring an earlier motion to dismiss that asserted “[their] [r]eli-\\n gious freedoms have been violated.” But that statement did not\\n clearly apply to any one government act. Instead, in context, the\\n statement reads as a continuation of the brothers’ sovereign-citi-\\n zen-style argument from the previous sentence in their motion that\\n they “are unaware that [c]orporate [b]y-laws do even apply to G-d\\n fearing sons, ([m]ankind) not residing in a [f]oreign [f]ederal\\n [d]istrict . . . .”\\n We therefore agree that the argument was not raised below.\\n Because the brothers also do not point to a statute or on-point\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n precedent, there was no plain error. “When neither the Supreme\\n Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, there can be no plain\\n error in regard to that issue.” See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th\\n 815, 829 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n The brothers counter that Jonathan’s statements at his initial\\n appearance ought to be liberally construed as raising a defense un-\\n der the Act. At the initial appearance, Jonathan claimed “the First\\n Amendment is being broken,” that “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their]\\n sacrament,” and that “[f]or [the government] to be saying it [is] a\\n drug, it [is] totally against [their] religious rights.” But Jonathan’s\\n general statements were not enough to put the district court on\\n notice that the brothers intended to seek dismissal under the Act.\\n He mentioned that he thought the complaint, like the civil pro-\\n ceedings before it, was directed at the Genesis II Church of Health\\n and Healing. Given this context it was impossible to infer that he\\n sought dismissal under the Act.\\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\\n Fourth, the brothers argue the district court plainly erred in\\n instructing the jury and admitting expert testimony that inappro-\\n priately relied on the Food and Drug Administration’s definition of\\n the term “intended uses.” “Where a party did not object to a jury\\n instruction in the district court, we review that instruction for plain\\n error.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n We also review the admission of expert testimony only for plain\\n error where the defendant did not object below. See United States\\n v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n Neither the government expert nor the district court erred\\n by relying on the agency’s definition of “intended uses.” 3 Accord-\\n ing to the agency, “[t]he words intended uses . . . refer to the objec-\\n tive intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of an\\n article (or their representatives).” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. This regu-\\n latory definition is at issue because two of the potential objects of\\n the conspiracy involved selling an “unapproved drug” or a “misla-\\n beled drug.” In turn, the statutory definition of “drug” requires the\\n substance to be “intended for use” in various medical applications.\\n 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).\\n The brothers argue that it is error to defer to an agency’s\\n interpretation of the law. They argue a district court must instead\\n use its “independent judgment.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,\\n 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). But this argument fails because the broth-\\n ers never explain how the instructions or expert relied on the\\n agency’s definition instead of a commonsense definition of the\\n term consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.\\n The jury instructions did not use the agency’s definition.\\n The district court instructed the jury that “a product’s intended use\\n is what a reasonable person would conclude the manufacturer or\\n\\n\\n 3\\n This claim of error could only possibly apply to the conspiracy count in the\\n indictment. The collateral bar rule prevents a defendant in a criminal con-\\n tempt proceeding from raising the invalidity of the underlying civil order as a\\n defense. Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. So, to the extent the brothers wish to chal-\\n lenge the validity of the civil order, or its definitions, they needed to do so in\\n a direct appeal.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n seller intended based on all the relevant information.” And that the\\n jury could “determine the intended use of a product by considering\\n the label.” In addition, while the expert examined the labeling as\\n part of her investigation into whether the solution was an unap-\\n proved or mislabeled drug, the expert made clear that she relied on\\n the statutory definition of drug to reach her conclusion.\\n While the agency’s definition of intended use does empha-\\n size the drug’s label, we are unaware of any definition of the term\\n “intended use” that would bar considering a product’s label. And\\n no regulatory definition is required to understand that a product’s\\n label might help the user determine whether he should use the\\n product to treat an illness or instead use it to clean the floors. To\\n the extent that a regulatory definition overlaps with the plain\\n meaning of the statute, it is not error when the district court admits\\n expert testimony or crafts a jury instruction consistent with that\\n plain meaning.\\n The brothers counter that only the agency’s definition of in-\\n tended use “allowed for a wide enough net to capture Mr. Grenon’s\\n actions.” The definition of “intended uses,” they argue, was the\\n “lynch pin” of the conspiracy charge. But that conflates the im-\\n portance of the concept of the product’s intended use—a necessary\\n component of the offense—with the importance of the regulatory\\n definition. The brothers never explain how the district court used\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n anything but its independent judgment in interpreting the statute. 4\\n Even if the district court had erred, the brothers do not explain how\\n it was plain error. The brothers do not point to, and we are una-\\n ware of, any case that explains the implications of the Supreme\\n Court’s Loper Bright decision on the Food and Drug Administra-\\n tion’s “intended uses” regulations. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 829.\\n Jury Trial\\n Fifth, the brothers contend that the district court plainly\\n erred by not dismissing the contempt charges against them despite\\n the fact the temporary restraining order and injunctions were not\\n lawful orders. “A valid conviction for criminal contempt requires\\n proof of all the following: (1) the court entered a lawful order of\\n reasonable specificity; (2) the defendant violated that order; and\\n (3) the defendant did so willfully.” United States v. Robinson, 83\\n F.4th 868, 878 (11th Cir. 2023). The brothers argue that because\\n the district court entered a temporary restraining order and prelim-\\n inary injunction (the two orders that form the bases for the con-\\n tempt charges) against them without a jury trial in the civil pro-\\n ceeding, the orders were not lawful.\\n But the collateral bar rule prevented the brothers from at-\\n tacking the validity of the civil orders in this criminal proceeding.\\n Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. While there are exceptions to that rule,\\n the brothers do not argue for any here, and none apply. Cf. In re\\n\\n 4\\n The brothers also argue that the term “adequate directions for use” was de-\\n fined by the Food and Drug Administration. But they similarly fail to explain\\n where and how the district court relied on this definition.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing for challenges\\n in instances where, for example, the issuing court “lack[ed] subject-\\n matter jurisdiction”).\\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\\n Finally, the brothers contend that their sentences were pro-\\n cedurally unreasonable because the district court should have lib-\\n erally construed statements they made at sentencing as objections\\n and granted those objections as they pertained to loss amount and\\n number of victims. We review interpretation and application of\\n the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d\\n 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020). We review underlying factual findings\\n like loss amount and the number of victims for clear error. United\\n States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011); United\\n States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). But where\\n the district court states that, based on its consideration of 18 U.S.C.\\n section 3553(a) factors, it would have imposed the same sentence\\n regardless of any guideline-calculation error, the error is harmless\\n if the sentence would be reasonable even if the district court’s\\n guideline calculation was erroneous. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d\\n 1347, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n That’s what happened here. The district court said that the\\n brothers’ “sentence would be the same regardless of the additional\\n enhancements.” And their 151-month prison sentences would\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n have been reasonable even if the district court erred in calculating\\n the guidelines. 5\\n Even though they had no criminal history, the brothers’\\n criminal conduct went on for years. They defrauded hundreds of\\n people into buying bleach as medicine and they did so by targeting\\n the sick and the dying—those with cancer, Alzheimer’s, malaria,\\n Parkinson’s, Multiple Sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS. The brothers\\n brought in more than a million dollars for their efforts. Yet, they\\n refused to stop when the district court entered a temporary re-\\n straining order and then a preliminary injunction. Based on the\\n evidence from trial, we do not have a definite and firm conviction\\n that the district court made a clear error of judgment.\\n The brothers raise two other sentencing arguments that we\\n must address. First, they contend that they did not get their presen-\\n tence investigation reports more than thirty-five days before their\\n sentencing hearing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-\\n dure 32(e)(2). The brothers are right, but any error in failing to\\n\\n 5\\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discre-\\n tion. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford con-\\n sideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-\\n icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error\\n of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (citation modified).\\n We will only vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness where “we\\n are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed\\n a clear error of judgment in weighing the [section] 3553(a) factors by arriving\\n at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by\\n the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n timely disclose the report was harmless. See United States v. Willis,\\n 649 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). The presentence investigation\\n reports were available and disclosed forty-two days before sentenc-\\n ing. But the brothers didn’t get the reports because they refused to\\n receive court documents. Even so, the reports were hand delivered\\n to them at the prison, they acknowledged receiving the reports be-\\n fore the sentencing hearing, and there’s no indication that they\\n were prejudiced by the late disclosure.\\n Second, Jordan argues that his sentence was substantively\\n unreasonable because two of the three codefendants received\\n shorter sentences than he did. Section 3553(a) requires the district\\n court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispar-\\n ities among defendants with similar records who have been found\\n guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Here, the two\\n codefendants Jordan compares himself to were convicted of only\\n one crime, while he was convicted of three. While the defendants\\n were charged with the same crimes initially, the government had\\n to abandon the contempt charges against Jordan’s codefendants be-\\n cause of the extradition agreement with Colombia. The codefend-\\n ants were therefore not found guilty of “similar conduct” for pur-\\n poses of the sentencing factors.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229724/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LUCK"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"LUCK\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763139/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jonathan Grenon\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 23-13478\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n JONATHAN DAVID GRENON,\n JORDAN PAUL GRENON,\n Defendants-Appellants.\n JOSEPH TIMOTHY GRENON,\n Defendant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20242-CMA-2\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n Brothers Jonathan and Jordan Grenon 1 sold bottles of “Mir-\n acle Mineral Solution” as a cure-all capable of treating conditions\n like cancer, autism, and even the coronavirus. In reality, the broth-\n ers were selling toxic bleach. After a civil proceeding, the brothers\n were ordered to stop selling the solution, but they ignored that or-\n der. The brothers were then charged and convicted for conspiracy\n and criminal contempt, which they now appeal. We affirm.\n FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\n The “Miracle Mineral Solution” the brothers had been sell-\n ing contained sodium chlorite. They sold the product through an\n organization called the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing.\n When mixed with an activator, as the label instructed, sodium\n chlorite becomes chlorine dioxide, otherwise known as bleach. In\n early July 2020, the brothers were arrested in the Middle District of\n Florida and brought before a magistrate judge for an initial appear-\n ance. The complaint charged the brothers, along with their father\n and a third brother, with one count of conspiracy to defraud the\n United States, and two counts of criminal contempt.\n Because the brothers bring six arguments on appeal, we di-\n vide the remainder of the factual and procedural history to mirror\n the issues as they will follow in the discussion.\n\n\n\n\n 1\n Because the appellants share the same last name, we refer to them collectively\n as the brothers and individually by their first names.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n Pro Se Representation\n At the initial appearance, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\n that he was “going to be pro se.” Jordan first asked, “[i]s this only\n for this meeting?” The magistrate judge explained that Jordan\n could later change his mind. Jordan then confirmed he was “pro se\n until further notice.” The magistrate judge told the brothers that a\n federal public defender was available to assist and informed the\n brothers of: their right to counsel; the maximum sentence they\n faced; the pitfalls of self-representation; the rules that govern the\n district court; and how a trained lawyer could benefit the brothers’\n defense. The brothers confirmed they wished to proceed pro se,\n and the magistrate judge found the brothers knowingly and volun-\n tarily waived their right to counsel.\n At the brothers’ detention hearing the next day, the magis-\n trate judge noted the presence of a federal public defender available\n to assist, but the brothers refused to speak with him. The magis-\n trate judge asked the brothers to let her know if they changed their\n minds and the brothers confirmed they would. The brothers’ case\n was then transferred to the Southern District of Florida.\n In its order denying the brothers’ motion to dismiss, the dis-\n trict court noted the motion’s “bizarre contents” and directed the\n government to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or\n psychological examinations.” The government responded that it\n was not seeking competency evaluations at that time. The district\n court then appointed the brothers standby counsel and held an-\n other Faretta hearing. After discussing with the brothers the skills\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n required for self-representation—along with its pitfalls—the dis-\n trict court found the brothers capable of representing themselves.\n More than a year passed as the brothers awaited the other\n two codefendants’ extradition from Colombia. Shortly after the\n final extradition, the brothers filed requests to be appointed coun-\n sel. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the brothers’ request.\n Counsel was appointed at Jordan’s hearing. At Jonathan’s hearing,\n he refused to answer the magistrate judge’s financial questions, and\n the magistrate judge ordered a follow-up hearing to occur the next\n month.\n At the follow-up hearing, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\n he “will need 30 to 60 days to accomplish obtaining counsel.” The\n magistrate judge then asked, “you do [not] want me to appoint you\n a lawyer at this point?” Jonathan responded, “[a]t this point I [am]\n trying to accomplish that myself.” The magistrate judge warned\n Jonathan that the trial date was fast approaching and that it may be\n difficult to find a lawyer who could prepare in time. With those\n concerns in mind, the magistrate judge bluntly said, “let me ap-\n point you a lawyer.” Jonathan replied, “[n]o. I’m going to con-\n tinue, myself, exhausting my administrative remedies.” The mag-\n istrate judge set another hearing for the following month.\n Meanwhile, the district court reviewed the docket and found\n the brothers’ motions for appointment of counsel had been filed by\n an unauthorized third party and denied Jonathan’s still-pending\n motion. Jordan’s counsel then moved to withdraw at Jordan’s re-\n quest. After yet another Faretta inquiry, the district court granted\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n counsel’s motion to withdraw. By the next status conference, the\n brothers returned to stating unequivocally they no longer wished\n to be represented by counsel.\n The Friday before the trial was set to begin, the district court\n held one final status conference where it asked, “[d]o any of you\n wish to have counsel appointed to represent you in this case?” The\n brothers refused to answer. The district court asked the same ques-\n tions and provided the same warnings about self-representation\n that the magistrate judge had when the brothers made their first\n appearance, and the brothers refused to respond. During the trial\n the brothers chose to remain silent throughout.\n Speedy Trial\n Returning to the brothers’ initial appearance in early July\n 2020, the magistrate judge ruled the brothers would remain de-\n tained pending trial. The case was then transferred to the Southern\n District of Florida, where the offense was alleged to have been\n committed. The brothers were indicted and arraigned at the end\n of April 2021—the government had been awaiting the extradition\n of two codefendants but decided to move forward with the broth-\n ers’ indictments.\n The district court set a trial date for the end of September\n 2021. A month later, the government moved for a continuance,\n citing the administrative difficulty of extraditing the codefendants\n from Colombia. At a hearing, the government noted that its Co-\n lombian counterparts said it takes approximately one year to pro-\n cess an extradition. The brothers demanded the indictment be\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n dismissed—primarily reasserting sovereign-citizen arguments\n from an earlier motion—but the brothers did not directly comment\n on whether they opposed a continuance. The district court made\n an ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order contin-\n uing the trial until March 2022. In December 2021, the third\n brother was extradited and had his initial appearance.\n Then, in January 2022, the government filed its second mo-\n tion to continue the trial. At a hearing, the government explained\n that, while it did take approximately a year to extradite the third\n brother, a different Colombian judge had been handling the fa-\n ther’s extradition request and that judge retired, which was slow-\n ing down the process. It is difficult to decipher whether the broth-\n ers opposed the continuance. Much of the hearing involved the\n brothers accusing the court of, among other things, committing\n barratry, slavery, peonage, and press-ganging for failing to dismiss\n the indictment. Jonathan also claimed the proceedings were “a\n conspiracy against my family” and noted “[t]he Lord will take\n vengeance on his adversaries and reserve his wrath for his ene-\n mies.” But, interwoven between these claims, Jonathan did appear\n to oppose the continuance, saying that it was “just a way to keep\n extending and extending time.” The district court again made an\n ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order continuing\n the trial until September 2022.\n In July 2022, the final codefendant was finally extradited and\n arraigned. At a status conference a few days later, the government\n said that it was ready for trial. When the district court asked the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n brothers if they had an opinion on the trial date, the brothers ex-\n pressed none. Three days later, the district court, on its own, or-\n dered competency evaluations for all four defendants. The gov-\n ernment then moved for a third continuance, noting the bureau of\n prisons could not complete the competency evaluations in time for\n the trial. The district court granted the motion, again finding the\n ends of justice supported the continuance, and scheduled the trial\n for January 2023.\n In late August 2022, the brothers moved to dismiss, taking\n issue with the competency evaluations and claiming their speedy-\n trial rights had been violated. The district court denied Jordan’s\n motion because it was filed pro se and he was represented by coun-\n sel at the time. It denied Jonathan’s motion, finding only excluda-\n ble time had passed. Two months later, the brothers filed nearly\n identical motions. The district court again denied Jordan’s motion\n because he was represented by counsel.\n In November, two days after the defendants had been found\n competent to stand trial, the district court held another status con-\n ference. There, Jonathan told the district court he was “in the pro-\n cess of trying to acquire effective counsel.” The district court noted\n the brothers had sought to dismiss the indictment due to delay and\n asked “[s]o how long are we going to wait?” Jonathan replied, “I\n [have] not exhausted my administrative remedies.” Later in the\n hearing, the district court denied Jonathan’s motion because he\n was responsible for delaying the trial due to his late-breaking re-\n quest to find counsel. At that same hearing, Jordan asked to fire\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n the federal public defender representing him and find his own\n counsel. The district court replied that he could, “like [his] brother,\n continue searching for one until you find one.” It then ruled it was\n “going to make a finding that all of these delays to the scheduling\n of the trial are being caused” by the brothers. The district court\n found the brothers’ stance on counsel made it so they would “not\n be ready to proceed to trial as presently scheduled,” continued the\n trial and set a new trial period beginning in July 2023. The trial\n began on July 17, 2023.\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\n The brothers invoked religious concepts throughout the\n proceedings. Starting as early as the brothers’ first appearance, Jon-\n athan proclaimed that “the First Amendment is being broken,” that\n “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their] sacrament,” and that the proceedings\n were “totally against [their] religious rights.”\n Later, the brothers filed their first motion to dismiss. Much\n of that document is hard to decipher and claims the brothers are\n “vessels,” and the United States government is an illegitimate “[d]e\n [f]acto [g]overnment” whose “[c]orporate [b]y-laws” do not apply\n to “G-d fearing sons” like them. The motion also claimed “[t]hat\n [their] [r]eligious freedoms have been violated,” which was “[a]ll\n d[ue] to [p]olicies of the [Food and Drug Administration] unlaw-\n fully issued by someone an employee Ms. Dix ([n]ot [a]ppointed or\n [n]ot elected).” The district court denied the motion to dismiss.\n Shortly before trial, the government filed a motion in limine\n seeking to preclude the brothers from pursuing a defense based on\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court granted\n the motion to the extent that it sought to preclude the brothers\n from putting the issue to the jury. But the order explained that the\n Act’s applicability was a pure question of law the brothers had not\n raised and that if the brothers wished to raise it they would need to\n bring a motion to dismiss. The brothers never did.\n After opening statements at trial, the district court instructed\n the jury that the First Amendment was not a defense to the charged\n conduct. During its case-in-chief, the government presented evi-\n dence that the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing was a\n “nonreligious church.” The organization was structured this way\n “[t]o get around [g]overnment regulation and to not go to jail.”\n The government pointed to the organization’s newsletter from\n around the time of its founding that proclaimed: “[s]o here it is, we\n are forming a church of health and healing. Now, that [is] not reli-\n gion, that [is] health and healing.” The organization continued,\n “[d]o you understand the power that a church has that has [not]\n given up its power? Look at the Catholics. Their priests have been\n molesting women and children for centuries and the governments\n have not been able to stop it. If handled properly, a church can\n protect us.” The brothers never invoked the Act at trial.\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\n The indictment referenced federal regulations. In the “Reg-\n ulatory Framework” section of the indictment, after reciting the\n statutory definition of “drug,” which focuses on the substance’s\n “intended use,” the indictment noted that a regulation, 21 C.F.R.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n section 201.128, defined “intended use.” At trial, the government\n expert testified about the terms in the indictment.\n The district court’s jury instructions explained that “[a]\n product’s intended use is what a reasonable person would conclude\n the manufacturer or seller intended based on all the relevant infor-\n mation.” The instructions clarified that a jury could determine a\n product’s intended use by “considering the label, accompanying la-\n belling, promotional material, advertising, oral representations\n made about the product, the circumstances surrounding the distri-\n bution of the article and information from any other source which\n discloses intended use.” The brothers did not object to the regula-\n tory framework section of the indictment, the expert’s testimony,\n or the jury instructions.\n Jury Trial\n At the calendar call before trial, the government said that it\n would be introducing the temporary restraining order and prelim-\n inary injunction that were issued against the brothers in the civil\n proceeding. There, the government sought to enjoin the brothers,\n along with the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing and the\n other two codefendants, from distributing Miracle Mineral Solu-\n tion. The civil proceeding resulted in a temporary restraining or-\n der, a preliminary injunction, and then, after the government\n moved for and obtained a default judgment, a permanent injunc-\n tion. The government’s civil complaint sought only injunctive re-\n lief and did not request a jury trial. Because the brothers never ap-\n peared in the civil case, they also did not request a jury trial.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\n At trial, the government presented evidence that the broth-\n ers were selling chlorine dioxide to the public online. The brothers’\n email addresses were listed on the organization’s contact card. Or-\n ders were shipped out from Jonathan’s address. After an under-\n cover agent successfully purchased chlorine dioxide from the web-\n site, he reached out to the organization. He wrote that his cancer-\n stricken wife had been taking the product for three weeks without\n her condition improving. Jordan responded by saying, “[t]hree\n weeks is not long enough for more serious diseases like cancer.”\n Receipts confirmed that the brothers had made tens of thousands\n of sales and were making over $120,000 per month.\n At the sentencing hearing, there was an exchange about\n whether the brothers had received the presentence investigation\n reports more than thirty-five days before the hearing. During Jon-\n athan’s hearing, given the brothers’ earlier refusal to accept docu-\n ments, the probation office confirmed that it had dropped off the\n reports in the jail’s legal mailbox earlier in the week. At Jordan’s\n sentencing hearing, he confirmed he had seen the report. The\n brothers made no specific objections to particular provisions in the\n report, but they did make general statements about the legitimacy\n of the proceedings. Jordan said, “[t]here is no valid claim by a man\n or woman. Therefore, there are no victims nor to whom restitu-\n tion would be due.” Jonathan likewise noted that “[he], living man,\n object[s] because there has not been any valid claims from any man\n or woman. There cannot be any losses or restitution.”\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n Throughout the trial, the brothers questioned the legitimacy of the\n proceedings. For example, at a continuance hearing roughly eight-\n een months before trial, Jonathan asked, “why are the Grenons still\n being held when no crime has been committed nor has there been\n any intent to commit a crime and there are no victims?” “[Y]ou can\n order chlorine dioxide on Amazon, and many other companies\n provide it. It is not illegal and it can[not] be.”\n The presentence investigation reports calculated the broth-\n ers’ guideline ranges as 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The re-\n ports included four enhancements for the number of victims, vul-\n nerable victims, the number of vulnerable victims, and the amount\n of loss caused. The district court adopted the reports and the advi-\n sory guideline ranges.\n Three weeks before trial, the district court granted the gov-\n ernment’s motion to dismiss the contempt counts against the\n brothers’ two codefendants because the extradition agreement\n with Colombia prohibited prosecution on those counts. However,\n the government proceeded with the contempt charges against the\n brothers. The brothers were convicted on all three counts and re-\n ceived 151 months’ imprisonment; the codefendants were con-\n victed on one count and received sixty months’ imprisonment.\n DISCUSSION\n We divide our discussion in six parts. First, we consider the\n brothers’ contention that their waivers of the right to counsel were\n not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Second, we address the\n brothers’ argument that they were denied their statutory and\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Third, we review the broth-\n ers’ assertion that the indictment should have been dismissed un-\n der the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Fourth, we discuss the\n brothers’ contention that the district court improperly relied on the\n Food and Drug Administration’s interpretation of the term “in-\n tended uses.” Fifth, we consider the brothers’ argument that the\n temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were not\n lawful orders capable of supporting a criminal contempt conviction\n because the brothers were entitled to a jury trial in the civil pro-\n ceeding. And finally, we address the brothers’ assertion that their\n sentences were not procedurally reasonable because the district\n court should have found that no enhancements for loss amount, or\n number and type of victims, should apply.\n Pro Se Representation\n The brothers first contend that the district court erred when\n it allowed them to proceed pro se throughout the proceedings.\n They argue their various waivers of the right to counsel were not\n knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.\n Whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing, intelligent, and\n voluntary is “a mixed question of law and fact which this Court\n reviews de novo.” United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th\n Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). On direct appeal, it is the\n government’s burden to prove the waiver was valid. Id. “The\n Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration\n the right to counsel at all ‘critical stages’ of the criminal process.”\n Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, a defendant also\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n may choose to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,\n 817 (1975). “Because the constitutional rights to counsel and to\n self-representation cannot be exercised at once, a defendant can ex-\n ercise one only if he waives the other.” United States v. Hakim, 30\n F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022). To waive the right to counsel, a\n defendant must unequivocally invoke his right of self-representa-\n tion. United States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020).\n His waiver also must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id.\n “If the waiver was not made by the accused with the requisite\n knowledge, then he has been deprived of ‘the right to counsel.’”\n Hakim, 30 F.4th at 1322.\n Here, the record shows the brothers made knowing, intelli-\n gent, and voluntary waivers of their right to counsel throughout\n the critical stages of the proceedings. We start with the brothers’\n initial appearance. “[T]he right to counsel attaches at the initial ap-\n pearance before a judicial officer.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex.,\n 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008). The magistrate judge appropriately\n alerted the brothers of their right to counsel, explained the maxi-\n mum penalty they faced, explained the knowledge required to\n mount a defense, explained a federal public defender was present\n and ready to assist, and offered to adjourn until the next day if the\n brothers wanted to retain their own counsel or seek the assistance\n of a public defender. The brothers unequivocally waived their\n right to counsel.\n The district court ensured the waiver remained effective all\n the way until the eve of trial where it performed one final Faretta\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n hearing. Standby counsel was present as they had been through-\n out. The district court asked the brothers, “do you wish to con-\n tinue in this case representing yourselves?” As they had done on\n many prior occasions, the brothers did not respond. The district\n court asked again, “[d]o any of you wish to have counsel appointed\n to represent you in this case?” Again, the brothers were silent. The\n district court asked standby counsel, “can you advise whether any\n of the Defendants has sought your legal advice or assistance?”\n They replied that they had not.\n “[A]n unwilling defendant can foil a district court’s best ef-\n forts to engage in a dialogue, thereby preventing the court from\n eliciting clear information regarding the defendant’s understanding\n of the dangers of proceeding pro se.” Garey, 540 F.3d at 1267. That\n is what happened here. In this circumstance, so long as the district\n court “is assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before\n him, (2) knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se, and\n (3) had rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally enti-\n tled,” it may allow the defendant to proceed pro se with standby\n counsel in place. Id. That is what the district court did here, and\n accordingly “a Faretta-like monologue . . . suffice[d].” Id. at 1269.\n The brothers make several counterarguments, none of\n which are availing. First, Jordan argues that his waiver at the initial\n appearance was not unequivocal because he asked if his decision\n only applied to “this meeting.” But the magistrate judge answered\n his question and Jordan then unequivocally expressed his desire to\n proceed pro se. He reaffirmed that decision at the next hearing a\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n day later and refused to speak with the standby federal public de-\n fender. He confirmed with the magistrate judge that he would let\n her know if he changed his mind at any point. He continued to\n clearly and consistently express his desire to represent himself until\n he requested counsel for the first time two years later. 2\n Second, the brothers argue that the district court erred when\n it noted their motion to dismiss was “bizarre” and directed the gov-\n ernment to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or psy-\n chological examinations,” yet continued to allow them to repre-\n sent themselves. But the district court did not err because, after it\n ruled on the motion to dismiss, the court held another Faretta hear-\n ing and determined the brothers were capable of representing\n themselves after appointing standby counsel for both brothers.\n The brothers do not point to anything calling that determination\n into question.\n Third, the brothers maintain that the district court erred\n when after those hearings it found the brothers lacked “the skill or\n training to represent” themselves but still found their waiver of the\n right to counsel knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant’s\n “educational background” and “understanding of rules of proce-\n dure [and] evidence” are relevant factors in determining the valid-\n ity of a defendant’s waiver. Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049. But “a defend-\n ant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in\n\n 2\n Jordan also argues that his codefendants had a “coercive effect” on him, but\n we decline to evaluate an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.\n United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.”\n Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. A district court need not determine\n “whether, for example, [the d]efendant could recite the steps to in-\n troduce a document into evidence.” United States v. Kimball, 291\n F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2002). Instead, “we need only to determine\n whether [the d]efendant understood that rules do exist to govern\n the procedure of a trial, the introduction of evidence and the be-\n havior of advocates and to determine whether Defendant under-\n stood that he would be bound by those rules.” Id. At the Faretta\n hearings, the district court thoroughly explained the downsides of\n a lack of legal training and the brothers said that they wished to\n represent themselves.\n Finally, Jonathan argues that the district court erred when it\n declined to appoint him a federal public defender after he requested\n one. Because Jonathan never formally requested counsel, there\n was no error here. As the district court correctly found, the motion\n was invalid because it was filed by a third-party nonlawyer. By the\n time the next status conference occurred, Jonathan told the district\n court that he, “the living man, d[id] not consent to having a law-\n yer.” And even if Jonathan had made an effective request for coun-\n sel, he never showed he was entitled to court-appointed counsel.\n At the hearing to determine whether Jonathan was indigent, he re-\n fused to answer the magistrate judge’s questions about his financial\n ability to obtain counsel. See Owen, 963 F.3d at 1052 (noting that a\n court must conduct an “appropriate inquiry” to determine whether\n a defendant is “financially unable to obtain counsel” before ap-\n pointing counsel).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n Speedy Trial\n The brothers next contend their statutory and constitutional\n speedy trial rights were violated when the district court ordered\n several continuances before trial. “We review a claim under the\n Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district court’s factual de-\n terminations on excludable time for clear error.” United States v.\n Williams, 314 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 2002). When reviewing a\n constitutional speedy trial claim, we review the district court’s legal\n conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United\n States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).\n Beginning with the brothers’ statutory speedy trial claims,\n under the Speedy Trial Act the government was required to indict\n the brothers within thirty days of their arrest, and to begin trial\n within seventy days of filing the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b),\n (c)(1). However, the Act also carves out several types of excluded\n time. See id. § 3161(h). Here, there were nine and a half months\n between arrest and indictment, and two years and three months\n between indictment and trial. But because each delay was permit-\n ted by statute, the district court did not err when it denied the\n brothers’ motions to dismiss based on the statutory right to a\n speedy trial.\n The first relevant exclusion is for “[a] reasonable period of\n delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as\n to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance\n has been granted.” Id. § 3161(h)(6). The brothers were initially ar-\n rested on July 8, 2020 and were indicted on April 22, 2021. The\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n final codefendant had his initial appearance on July 28, 2022. So the\n question becomes whether these delays are reasonable under the\n statute. We have said that whether the period of delay is reasona-\n ble can be determined by “the totality of the circumstances prior to\n trial, by the extent to which the appellant’s defense was prejudiced,\n or by the sheer length of the delay.” United States v. Davenport, 935\n F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991).\n As to the length of the delay, we have found similar ones\n reasonable. See United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1476\n (11th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary,\n 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding eighteen-month delay reason-\n able). As to prejudice, the brothers make no argument they suf-\n fered prejudice, and nothing in the record supports that they were\n prejudiced. And the brothers never moved for severance. Because\n the brothers cannot show the period of exclusion attributable to\n missing codefendants was unreasonable, this period was properly\n excluded.\n Days after the final defendant was extradited on July 28,\n 2022, but around one month before trial was set to begin, the sec-\n ond relevant exclusion period began. Delays “resulting from any\n proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental\n competency . . . of the defendant” are also excludable under the\n Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A). When the district court ordered\n competency evaluations for all four defendants, the government\n moved for a continuance, noting that the bureau of prisons could\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n not complete the competency evaluations by the time of the trial.\n The district court granted that motion until January 3, 2023.\n Finally, once that exclusion period ended, the third exclu-\n sion period began when Jonathan requested a continuance at a sta-\n tus conference and Jordan asked to fire the federal public defender.\n Noting these developments, the district court made an ends-of-jus-\n tice finding that the delay “to the scheduling of the trial [was]\n caused” by the brothers and set a trial period beginning in July 2023.\n See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (“[A] judge shall consider in deter-\n mining whether to grant a continuance . . . [w]hether the failure to\n grant such a continuance . . . would deny the defendant reasonable\n time to obtain counsel[.]”).\n This was well within the district court’s “broad discretion”\n in managing “the mandates of the Speedy Trial Act and the exclu-\n sions thereto.” United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir.\n 2024) (quoting United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.\n 1983)). The brothers never argue the ends-of-justice continuances\n were unwarranted. And the district court set forth its reasoning on\n the record as required. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). We have ap-\n proved of longer delays than this one when multiple excludable pe-\n riods of time come together to form the delay. See United States v.\n Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) (38-month delay).\n Thus, the time up until July 3, 2023, was excludable, and only two\n weeks passed from that date to the beginning of trial. The broth-\n ers’ statutory speedy trial argument therefore fails.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n Turning to the brothers’ constitutional speedy trial argu-\n ment, here too the district court committed no error. The Sixth\n Amendment provides that in “all criminal prosecutions, the ac-\n cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.\n CONST. amend. VI.\n The Supreme Court has held that when determining\n whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were denied, a court\n should consider the “[1] [l]ength of delay, [2] the reason for the de-\n lay, [3] the defendant’s assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice to\n the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). We have\n held “a defendant generally must show actual prejudice unless the\n first three factors in Barker all weigh heavily against the govern-\n ment.” Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1239.\n The length of delay is a “triggering mechanism.” Barker, 407\n U.S. at 530. “Until there is some delay which is presumptively prej-\n udicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that\n go into the balance.” Id. “A delay is considered presumptively prej-\n udicial as it approaches one year.” United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d\n 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). The delay is measured “between the\n date of the indictment and the trial date.” Id. Here, over two years\n passed between the brothers’ indictment and trial, so the delay was\n presumptively prejudicial.\n Turning to the reason for the delay, much of it stems from\n the brothers. The Supreme Court has differentiated between de-\n liberate, neutral, and valid reasons for delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at\n 531. The brothers’ shifting stances on whether they wanted to\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n represent themselves and then firing various counsel appointed to\n them no doubt were responsible for some of the delay. But even if\n most of the delay was attributable to the government, like in Dav-\n enport, “the delays in this case were inherent to the government’s\n good faith effort to conduct a complex, joint trial.” 935 F.2d at\n 1239. And so “[t]he reasons for delay in this case were, at worst,\n neutral.” Id. at 1240. That means “the reasons for delay do not\n weigh heavily against the government and do not excuse a show-\n ing of actual prejudice.” Id.\n It is thus unnecessary to examine the third Barker factor as\n the brothers cannot show that all three of the first factors weigh\n heavily in their favor, and so they must show actual prejudice. But\n the brothers do not even attempt to argue prejudice here. Their\n briefing instead relied on showing a presumption of prejudice. The\n brothers’ constitutional speedy trial claim therefore fails.\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\n Third, the brothers contend that the district court should\n have dismissed the complaint based on the Religious Freedom Res-\n toration Act. Generally, “we review the district court’s denial of a\n motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion.” United\n States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United\n States v. Farias, 836 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 1016)). But “[w]hen\n the defendant does not preserve an argument for appeal, we review\n for plain error.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1008 (11th\n Cir. 2007). Whether government action complies with the Act is a\n legal question we review de novo. Grady, 18 F.4th at 1285.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Tattenbaum v.\n United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Sometimes that\n may require determining whether an unclear claim fits in another\n recognizable form. See United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624–25\n (11th Cir. 1990). But district courts need not consider arguments\n not properly presented. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d\n 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]o preserve an issue, a litigant must\n ‘first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as\n to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on\n it.’” United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2020) (quot-\n ing Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012)).\n We agree with the district court that this issue was never\n raised. When the government flagged the potential applicability of\n the Act in a motion in limine, the district court found that the\n brothers never sought dismissal based on the Act before trial. The\n brothers also never sought dismissal at or after trial. The brothers\n did bring an earlier motion to dismiss that asserted “[their] [r]eli-\n gious freedoms have been violated.” But that statement did not\n clearly apply to any one government act. Instead, in context, the\n statement reads as a continuation of the brothers’ sovereign-citi-\n zen-style argument from the previous sentence in their motion that\n they “are unaware that [c]orporate [b]y-laws do even apply to G-d\n fearing sons, ([m]ankind) not residing in a [f]oreign [f]ederal\n [d]istrict . . . .”\n We therefore agree that the argument was not raised below.\n Because the brothers also do not point to a statute or on-point\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n precedent, there was no plain error. “When neither the Supreme\n Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, there can be no plain\n error in regard to that issue.” See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th\n 815, 829 (11th Cir. 2024).\n The brothers counter that Jonathan’s statements at his initial\n appearance ought to be liberally construed as raising a defense un-\n der the Act. At the initial appearance, Jonathan claimed “the First\n Amendment is being broken,” that “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their]\n sacrament,” and that “[f]or [the government] to be saying it [is] a\n drug, it [is] totally against [their] religious rights.” But Jonathan’s\n general statements were not enough to put the district court on\n notice that the brothers intended to seek dismissal under the Act.\n He mentioned that he thought the complaint, like the civil pro-\n ceedings before it, was directed at the Genesis II Church of Health\n and Healing. Given this context it was impossible to infer that he\n sought dismissal under the Act.\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\n Fourth, the brothers argue the district court plainly erred in\n instructing the jury and admitting expert testimony that inappro-\n priately relied on the Food and Drug Administration’s definition of\n the term “intended uses.” “Where a party did not object to a jury\n instruction in the district court, we review that instruction for plain\n error.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).\n We also review the admission of expert testimony only for plain\n error where the defendant did not object below. See United States\n v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n Neither the government expert nor the district court erred\n by relying on the agency’s definition of “intended uses.” 3 Accord-\n ing to the agency, “[t]he words intended uses . . . refer to the objec-\n tive intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of an\n article (or their representatives).” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. This regu-\n latory definition is at issue because two of the potential objects of\n the conspiracy involved selling an “unapproved drug” or a “misla-\n beled drug.” In turn, the statutory definition of “drug” requires the\n substance to be “intended for use” in various medical applications.\n 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).\n The brothers argue that it is error to defer to an agency’s\n interpretation of the law. They argue a district court must instead\n use its “independent judgment.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,\n 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). But this argument fails because the broth-\n ers never explain how the instructions or expert relied on the\n agency’s definition instead of a commonsense definition of the\n term consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.\n The jury instructions did not use the agency’s definition.\n The district court instructed the jury that “a product’s intended use\n is what a reasonable person would conclude the manufacturer or\n\n\n 3\n This claim of error could only possibly apply to the conspiracy count in the\n indictment. The collateral bar rule prevents a defendant in a criminal con-\n tempt proceeding from raising the invalidity of the underlying civil order as a\n defense. Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. So, to the extent the brothers wish to chal-\n lenge the validity of the civil order, or its definitions, they needed to do so in\n a direct appeal.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n seller intended based on all the relevant information.” And that the\n jury could “determine the intended use of a product by considering\n the label.” In addition, while the expert examined the labeling as\n part of her investigation into whether the solution was an unap-\n proved or mislabeled drug, the expert made clear that she relied on\n the statutory definition of drug to reach her conclusion.\n While the agency’s definition of intended use does empha-\n size the drug’s label, we are unaware of any definition of the term\n “intended use” that would bar considering a product’s label. And\n no regulatory definition is required to understand that a product’s\n label might help the user determine whether he should use the\n product to treat an illness or instead use it to clean the floors. To\n the extent that a regulatory definition overlaps with the plain\n meaning of the statute, it is not error when the district court admits\n expert testimony or crafts a jury instruction consistent with that\n plain meaning.\n The brothers counter that only the agency’s definition of in-\n tended use “allowed for a wide enough net to capture Mr. Grenon’s\n actions.” The definition of “intended uses,” they argue, was the\n “lynch pin” of the conspiracy charge. But that conflates the im-\n portance of the concept of the product’s intended use—a necessary\n component of the offense—with the importance of the regulatory\n definition. The brothers never explain how the district court used\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n anything but its independent judgment in interpreting the statute. 4\n Even if the district court had erred, the brothers do not explain how\n it was plain error. The brothers do not point to, and we are una-\n ware of, any case that explains the implications of the Supreme\n Court’s Loper Bright decision on the Food and Drug Administra-\n tion’s “intended uses” regulations. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 829.\n Jury Trial\n Fifth, the brothers contend that the district court plainly\n erred by not dismissing the contempt charges against them despite\n the fact the temporary restraining order and injunctions were not\n lawful orders. “A valid conviction for criminal contempt requires\n proof of all the following: (1) the court entered a lawful order of\n reasonable specificity; (2) the defendant violated that order; and\n (3) the defendant did so willfully.” United States v. Robinson, 83\n F.4th 868, 878 (11th Cir. 2023). The brothers argue that because\n the district court entered a temporary restraining order and prelim-\n inary injunction (the two orders that form the bases for the con-\n tempt charges) against them without a jury trial in the civil pro-\n ceeding, the orders were not lawful.\n But the collateral bar rule prevented the brothers from at-\n tacking the validity of the civil orders in this criminal proceeding.\n Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. While there are exceptions to that rule,\n the brothers do not argue for any here, and none apply. Cf. In re\n\n 4\n The brothers also argue that the term “adequate directions for use” was de-\n fined by the Food and Drug Administration. But they similarly fail to explain\n where and how the district court relied on this definition.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing for challenges\n in instances where, for example, the issuing court “lack[ed] subject-\n matter jurisdiction”).\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\n Finally, the brothers contend that their sentences were pro-\n cedurally unreasonable because the district court should have lib-\n erally construed statements they made at sentencing as objections\n and granted those objections as they pertained to loss amount and\n number of victims. We review interpretation and application of\n the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d\n 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020). We review underlying factual findings\n like loss amount and the number of victims for clear error. United\n States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011); United\n States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). But where\n the district court states that, based on its consideration of 18 U.S.C.\n section 3553(a) factors, it would have imposed the same sentence\n regardless of any guideline-calculation error, the error is harmless\n if the sentence would be reasonable even if the district court’s\n guideline calculation was erroneous. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d\n 1347, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2006).\n That’s what happened here. The district court said that the\n brothers’ “sentence would be the same regardless of the additional\n enhancements.” And their 151-month prison sentences would\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n have been reasonable even if the district court erred in calculating\n the guidelines. 5\n Even though they had no criminal history, the brothers’\n criminal conduct went on for years. They defrauded hundreds of\n people into buying bleach as medicine and they did so by targeting\n the sick and the dying—those with cancer, Alzheimer’s, malaria,\n Parkinson’s, Multiple Sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS. The brothers\n brought in more than a million dollars for their efforts. Yet, they\n refused to stop when the district court entered a temporary re-\n straining order and then a preliminary injunction. Based on the\n evidence from trial, we do not have a definite and firm conviction\n that the district court made a clear error of judgment.\n The brothers raise two other sentencing arguments that we\n must address. First, they contend that they did not get their presen-\n tence investigation reports more than thirty-five days before their\n sentencing hearing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-\n dure 32(e)(2). The brothers are right, but any error in failing to\n\n 5\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discre-\n tion. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010)\n (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford con-\n sideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-\n icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error\n of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (citation modified).\n We will only vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness where “we\n are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed\n a clear error of judgment in weighing the [section] 3553(a) factors by arriving\n at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by\n the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 30\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\n\n timely disclose the report was harmless. See United States v. Willis,\n 649 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). The presentence investigation\n reports were available and disclosed forty-two days before sentenc-\n ing. But the brothers didn’t get the reports because they refused to\n receive court documents. Even so, the reports were hand delivered\n to them at the prison, they acknowledged receiving the reports be-\n fore the sentencing hearing, and there’s no indication that they\n were prejudiced by the late disclosure.\n Second, Jordan argues that his sentence was substantively\n unreasonable because two of the three codefendants received\n shorter sentences than he did. Section 3553(a) requires the district\n court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispar-\n ities among defendants with similar records who have been found\n guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Here, the two\n codefendants Jordan compares himself to were convicted of only\n one crime, while he was convicted of three. While the defendants\n were charged with the same crimes initially, the government had\n to abandon the contempt charges against Jordan’s codefendants be-\n cause of the extradition agreement with Colombia. The codefend-\n ants were therefore not found guilty of “similar conduct” for pur-\n poses of the sentencing factors.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jonathan Grenon\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 23-13478\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JONATHAN DAVID GRENON,\\n JORDAN PAUL GRENON,\\n Defendants-Appellants.\\n JOSEPH TIMOTHY GRENON,\\n Defendant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20242-CMA-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Brothers Jonathan and Jordan Grenon 1 sold bottles of “Mir-\\n acle Mineral Solution” as a cure-all capable of treating conditions\\n like cancer, autism, and even the coronavirus. In reality, the broth-\\n ers were selling toxic bleach. After a civil proceeding, the brothers\\n were ordered to stop selling the solution, but they ignored that or-\\n der. The brothers were then charged and convicted for conspiracy\\n and criminal contempt, which they now appeal. We affirm.\\n FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY\\n The “Miracle Mineral Solution” the brothers had been sell-\\n ing contained sodium chlorite. They sold the product through an\\n organization called the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing.\\n When mixed with an activator, as the label instructed, sodium\\n chlorite becomes chlorine dioxide, otherwise known as bleach. In\\n early July 2020, the brothers were arrested in the Middle District of\\n Florida and brought before a magistrate judge for an initial appear-\\n ance. The complaint charged the brothers, along with their father\\n and a third brother, with one count of conspiracy to defraud the\\n United States, and two counts of criminal contempt.\\n Because the brothers bring six arguments on appeal, we di-\\n vide the remainder of the factual and procedural history to mirror\\n the issues as they will follow in the discussion.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Because the appellants share the same last name, we refer to them collectively\\n as the brothers and individually by their first names.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Pro Se Representation\\n At the initial appearance, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\\n that he was “going to be pro se.” Jordan first asked, “[i]s this only\\n for this meeting?” The magistrate judge explained that Jordan\\n could later change his mind. Jordan then confirmed he was “pro se\\n until further notice.” The magistrate judge told the brothers that a\\n federal public defender was available to assist and informed the\\n brothers of: their right to counsel; the maximum sentence they\\n faced; the pitfalls of self-representation; the rules that govern the\\n district court; and how a trained lawyer could benefit the brothers’\\n defense. The brothers confirmed they wished to proceed pro se,\\n and the magistrate judge found the brothers knowingly and volun-\\n tarily waived their right to counsel.\\n At the brothers’ detention hearing the next day, the magis-\\n trate judge noted the presence of a federal public defender available\\n to assist, but the brothers refused to speak with him. The magis-\\n trate judge asked the brothers to let her know if they changed their\\n minds and the brothers confirmed they would. The brothers’ case\\n was then transferred to the Southern District of Florida.\\n In its order denying the brothers’ motion to dismiss, the dis-\\n trict court noted the motion’s “bizarre contents” and directed the\\n government to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or\\n psychological examinations.” The government responded that it\\n was not seeking competency evaluations at that time. The district\\n court then appointed the brothers standby counsel and held an-\\n other Faretta hearing. After discussing with the brothers the skills\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n required for self-representation—along with its pitfalls—the dis-\\n trict court found the brothers capable of representing themselves.\\n More than a year passed as the brothers awaited the other\\n two codefendants’ extradition from Colombia. Shortly after the\\n final extradition, the brothers filed requests to be appointed coun-\\n sel. The magistrate judge held a hearing on the brothers’ request.\\n Counsel was appointed at Jordan’s hearing. At Jonathan’s hearing,\\n he refused to answer the magistrate judge’s financial questions, and\\n the magistrate judge ordered a follow-up hearing to occur the next\\n month.\\n At the follow-up hearing, Jonathan told the magistrate judge\\n he “will need 30 to 60 days to accomplish obtaining counsel.” The\\n magistrate judge then asked, “you do [not] want me to appoint you\\n a lawyer at this point?” Jonathan responded, “[a]t this point I [am]\\n trying to accomplish that myself.” The magistrate judge warned\\n Jonathan that the trial date was fast approaching and that it may be\\n difficult to find a lawyer who could prepare in time. With those\\n concerns in mind, the magistrate judge bluntly said, “let me ap-\\n point you a lawyer.” Jonathan replied, “[n]o. I’m going to con-\\n tinue, myself, exhausting my administrative remedies.” The mag-\\n istrate judge set another hearing for the following month.\\n Meanwhile, the district court reviewed the docket and found\\n the brothers’ motions for appointment of counsel had been filed by\\n an unauthorized third party and denied Jonathan’s still-pending\\n motion. Jordan’s counsel then moved to withdraw at Jordan’s re-\\n quest. After yet another Faretta inquiry, the district court granted\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n counsel’s motion to withdraw. By the next status conference, the\\n brothers returned to stating unequivocally they no longer wished\\n to be represented by counsel.\\n The Friday before the trial was set to begin, the district court\\n held one final status conference where it asked, “[d]o any of you\\n wish to have counsel appointed to represent you in this case?” The\\n brothers refused to answer. The district court asked the same ques-\\n tions and provided the same warnings about self-representation\\n that the magistrate judge had when the brothers made their first\\n appearance, and the brothers refused to respond. During the trial\\n the brothers chose to remain silent throughout.\\n Speedy Trial\\n Returning to the brothers’ initial appearance in early July\\n 2020, the magistrate judge ruled the brothers would remain de-\\n tained pending trial. The case was then transferred to the Southern\\n District of Florida, where the offense was alleged to have been\\n committed. The brothers were indicted and arraigned at the end\\n of April 2021—the government had been awaiting the extradition\\n of two codefendants but decided to move forward with the broth-\\n ers’ indictments.\\n The district court set a trial date for the end of September\\n 2021. A month later, the government moved for a continuance,\\n citing the administrative difficulty of extraditing the codefendants\\n from Colombia. At a hearing, the government noted that its Co-\\n lombian counterparts said it takes approximately one year to pro-\\n cess an extradition. The brothers demanded the indictment be\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n dismissed—primarily reasserting sovereign-citizen arguments\\n from an earlier motion—but the brothers did not directly comment\\n on whether they opposed a continuance. The district court made\\n an ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order contin-\\n uing the trial until March 2022. In December 2021, the third\\n brother was extradited and had his initial appearance.\\n Then, in January 2022, the government filed its second mo-\\n tion to continue the trial. At a hearing, the government explained\\n that, while it did take approximately a year to extradite the third\\n brother, a different Colombian judge had been handling the fa-\\n ther’s extradition request and that judge retired, which was slow-\\n ing down the process. It is difficult to decipher whether the broth-\\n ers opposed the continuance. Much of the hearing involved the\\n brothers accusing the court of, among other things, committing\\n barratry, slavery, peonage, and press-ganging for failing to dismiss\\n the indictment. Jonathan also claimed the proceedings were “a\\n conspiracy against my family” and noted “[t]he Lord will take\\n vengeance on his adversaries and reserve his wrath for his ene-\\n mies.” But, interwoven between these claims, Jonathan did appear\\n to oppose the continuance, saying that it was “just a way to keep\\n extending and extending time.” The district court again made an\\n ends-of-justice finding on the record and issued an order continuing\\n the trial until September 2022.\\n In July 2022, the final codefendant was finally extradited and\\n arraigned. At a status conference a few days later, the government\\n said that it was ready for trial. When the district court asked the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n brothers if they had an opinion on the trial date, the brothers ex-\\n pressed none. Three days later, the district court, on its own, or-\\n dered competency evaluations for all four defendants. The gov-\\n ernment then moved for a third continuance, noting the bureau of\\n prisons could not complete the competency evaluations in time for\\n the trial. The district court granted the motion, again finding the\\n ends of justice supported the continuance, and scheduled the trial\\n for January 2023.\\n In late August 2022, the brothers moved to dismiss, taking\\n issue with the competency evaluations and claiming their speedy-\\n trial rights had been violated. The district court denied Jordan’s\\n motion because it was filed pro se and he was represented by coun-\\n sel at the time. It denied Jonathan’s motion, finding only excluda-\\n ble time had passed. Two months later, the brothers filed nearly\\n identical motions. The district court again denied Jordan’s motion\\n because he was represented by counsel.\\n In November, two days after the defendants had been found\\n competent to stand trial, the district court held another status con-\\n ference. There, Jonathan told the district court he was “in the pro-\\n cess of trying to acquire effective counsel.” The district court noted\\n the brothers had sought to dismiss the indictment due to delay and\\n asked “[s]o how long are we going to wait?” Jonathan replied, “I\\n [have] not exhausted my administrative remedies.” Later in the\\n hearing, the district court denied Jonathan’s motion because he\\n was responsible for delaying the trial due to his late-breaking re-\\n quest to find counsel. At that same hearing, Jordan asked to fire\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n the federal public defender representing him and find his own\\n counsel. The district court replied that he could, “like [his] brother,\\n continue searching for one until you find one.” It then ruled it was\\n “going to make a finding that all of these delays to the scheduling\\n of the trial are being caused” by the brothers. The district court\\n found the brothers’ stance on counsel made it so they would “not\\n be ready to proceed to trial as presently scheduled,” continued the\\n trial and set a new trial period beginning in July 2023. The trial\\n began on July 17, 2023.\\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\\n The brothers invoked religious concepts throughout the\\n proceedings. Starting as early as the brothers’ first appearance, Jon-\\n athan proclaimed that “the First Amendment is being broken,” that\\n “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their] sacrament,” and that the proceedings\\n were “totally against [their] religious rights.”\\n Later, the brothers filed their first motion to dismiss. Much\\n of that document is hard to decipher and claims the brothers are\\n “vessels,” and the United States government is an illegitimate “[d]e\\n [f]acto [g]overnment” whose “[c]orporate [b]y-laws” do not apply\\n to “G-d fearing sons” like them. The motion also claimed “[t]hat\\n [their] [r]eligious freedoms have been violated,” which was “[a]ll\\n d[ue] to [p]olicies of the [Food and Drug Administration] unlaw-\\n fully issued by someone an employee Ms. Dix ([n]ot [a]ppointed or\\n [n]ot elected).” The district court denied the motion to dismiss.\\n Shortly before trial, the government filed a motion in limine\\n seeking to preclude the brothers from pursuing a defense based on\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court granted\\n the motion to the extent that it sought to preclude the brothers\\n from putting the issue to the jury. But the order explained that the\\n Act’s applicability was a pure question of law the brothers had not\\n raised and that if the brothers wished to raise it they would need to\\n bring a motion to dismiss. The brothers never did.\\n After opening statements at trial, the district court instructed\\n the jury that the First Amendment was not a defense to the charged\\n conduct. During its case-in-chief, the government presented evi-\\n dence that the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing was a\\n “nonreligious church.” The organization was structured this way\\n “[t]o get around [g]overnment regulation and to not go to jail.”\\n The government pointed to the organization’s newsletter from\\n around the time of its founding that proclaimed: “[s]o here it is, we\\n are forming a church of health and healing. Now, that [is] not reli-\\n gion, that [is] health and healing.” The organization continued,\\n “[d]o you understand the power that a church has that has [not]\\n given up its power? Look at the Catholics. Their priests have been\\n molesting women and children for centuries and the governments\\n have not been able to stop it. If handled properly, a church can\\n protect us.” The brothers never invoked the Act at trial.\\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\\n The indictment referenced federal regulations. In the “Reg-\\n ulatory Framework” section of the indictment, after reciting the\\n statutory definition of “drug,” which focuses on the substance’s\\n “intended use,” the indictment noted that a regulation, 21 C.F.R.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n section 201.128, defined “intended use.” At trial, the government\\n expert testified about the terms in the indictment.\\n The district court’s jury instructions explained that “[a]\\n product’s intended use is what a reasonable person would conclude\\n the manufacturer or seller intended based on all the relevant infor-\\n mation.” The instructions clarified that a jury could determine a\\n product’s intended use by “considering the label, accompanying la-\\n belling, promotional material, advertising, oral representations\\n made about the product, the circumstances surrounding the distri-\\n bution of the article and information from any other source which\\n discloses intended use.” The brothers did not object to the regula-\\n tory framework section of the indictment, the expert’s testimony,\\n or the jury instructions.\\n Jury Trial\\n At the calendar call before trial, the government said that it\\n would be introducing the temporary restraining order and prelim-\\n inary injunction that were issued against the brothers in the civil\\n proceeding. There, the government sought to enjoin the brothers,\\n along with the Genesis II Church of Health and Healing and the\\n other two codefendants, from distributing Miracle Mineral Solu-\\n tion. The civil proceeding resulted in a temporary restraining or-\\n der, a preliminary injunction, and then, after the government\\n moved for and obtained a default judgment, a permanent injunc-\\n tion. The government’s civil complaint sought only injunctive re-\\n lief and did not request a jury trial. Because the brothers never ap-\\n peared in the civil case, they also did not request a jury trial.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\\n At trial, the government presented evidence that the broth-\\n ers were selling chlorine dioxide to the public online. The brothers’\\n email addresses were listed on the organization’s contact card. Or-\\n ders were shipped out from Jonathan’s address. After an under-\\n cover agent successfully purchased chlorine dioxide from the web-\\n site, he reached out to the organization. He wrote that his cancer-\\n stricken wife had been taking the product for three weeks without\\n her condition improving. Jordan responded by saying, “[t]hree\\n weeks is not long enough for more serious diseases like cancer.”\\n Receipts confirmed that the brothers had made tens of thousands\\n of sales and were making over $120,000 per month.\\n At the sentencing hearing, there was an exchange about\\n whether the brothers had received the presentence investigation\\n reports more than thirty-five days before the hearing. During Jon-\\n athan’s hearing, given the brothers’ earlier refusal to accept docu-\\n ments, the probation office confirmed that it had dropped off the\\n reports in the jail’s legal mailbox earlier in the week. At Jordan’s\\n sentencing hearing, he confirmed he had seen the report. The\\n brothers made no specific objections to particular provisions in the\\n report, but they did make general statements about the legitimacy\\n of the proceedings. Jordan said, “[t]here is no valid claim by a man\\n or woman. Therefore, there are no victims nor to whom restitu-\\n tion would be due.” Jonathan likewise noted that “[he], living man,\\n object[s] because there has not been any valid claims from any man\\n or woman. There cannot be any losses or restitution.”\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Throughout the trial, the brothers questioned the legitimacy of the\\n proceedings. For example, at a continuance hearing roughly eight-\\n een months before trial, Jonathan asked, “why are the Grenons still\\n being held when no crime has been committed nor has there been\\n any intent to commit a crime and there are no victims?” “[Y]ou can\\n order chlorine dioxide on Amazon, and many other companies\\n provide it. It is not illegal and it can[not] be.”\\n The presentence investigation reports calculated the broth-\\n ers’ guideline ranges as 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. The re-\\n ports included four enhancements for the number of victims, vul-\\n nerable victims, the number of vulnerable victims, and the amount\\n of loss caused. The district court adopted the reports and the advi-\\n sory guideline ranges.\\n Three weeks before trial, the district court granted the gov-\\n ernment’s motion to dismiss the contempt counts against the\\n brothers’ two codefendants because the extradition agreement\\n with Colombia prohibited prosecution on those counts. However,\\n the government proceeded with the contempt charges against the\\n brothers. The brothers were convicted on all three counts and re-\\n ceived 151 months’ imprisonment; the codefendants were con-\\n victed on one count and received sixty months’ imprisonment.\\n DISCUSSION\\n We divide our discussion in six parts. First, we consider the\\n brothers’ contention that their waivers of the right to counsel were\\n not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Second, we address the\\n brothers’ argument that they were denied their statutory and\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Third, we review the broth-\\n ers’ assertion that the indictment should have been dismissed un-\\n der the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Fourth, we discuss the\\n brothers’ contention that the district court improperly relied on the\\n Food and Drug Administration’s interpretation of the term “in-\\n tended uses.” Fifth, we consider the brothers’ argument that the\\n temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction were not\\n lawful orders capable of supporting a criminal contempt conviction\\n because the brothers were entitled to a jury trial in the civil pro-\\n ceeding. And finally, we address the brothers’ assertion that their\\n sentences were not procedurally reasonable because the district\\n court should have found that no enhancements for loss amount, or\\n number and type of victims, should apply.\\n Pro Se Representation\\n The brothers first contend that the district court erred when\\n it allowed them to proceed pro se throughout the proceedings.\\n They argue their various waivers of the right to counsel were not\\n knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.\\n Whether a defendant’s waiver is knowing, intelligent, and\\n voluntary is “a mixed question of law and fact which this Court\\n reviews de novo.” United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th\\n Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasis omitted). On direct appeal, it is the\\n government’s burden to prove the waiver was valid. Id. “The\\n Sixth Amendment secures to a defendant who faces incarceration\\n the right to counsel at all ‘critical stages’ of the criminal process.”\\n Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). However, a defendant also\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n may choose to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,\\n 817 (1975). “Because the constitutional rights to counsel and to\\n self-representation cannot be exercised at once, a defendant can ex-\\n ercise one only if he waives the other.” United States v. Hakim, 30\\n F.4th 1310, 1322 (11th Cir. 2022). To waive the right to counsel, a\\n defendant must unequivocally invoke his right of self-representa-\\n tion. United States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020).\\n His waiver also must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id.\\n “If the waiver was not made by the accused with the requisite\\n knowledge, then he has been deprived of ‘the right to counsel.’”\\n Hakim, 30 F.4th at 1322.\\n Here, the record shows the brothers made knowing, intelli-\\n gent, and voluntary waivers of their right to counsel throughout\\n the critical stages of the proceedings. We start with the brothers’\\n initial appearance. “[T]he right to counsel attaches at the initial ap-\\n pearance before a judicial officer.” Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex.,\\n 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008). The magistrate judge appropriately\\n alerted the brothers of their right to counsel, explained the maxi-\\n mum penalty they faced, explained the knowledge required to\\n mount a defense, explained a federal public defender was present\\n and ready to assist, and offered to adjourn until the next day if the\\n brothers wanted to retain their own counsel or seek the assistance\\n of a public defender. The brothers unequivocally waived their\\n right to counsel.\\n The district court ensured the waiver remained effective all\\n the way until the eve of trial where it performed one final Faretta\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n hearing. Standby counsel was present as they had been through-\\n out. The district court asked the brothers, “do you wish to con-\\n tinue in this case representing yourselves?” As they had done on\\n many prior occasions, the brothers did not respond. The district\\n court asked again, “[d]o any of you wish to have counsel appointed\\n to represent you in this case?” Again, the brothers were silent. The\\n district court asked standby counsel, “can you advise whether any\\n of the Defendants has sought your legal advice or assistance?”\\n They replied that they had not.\\n “[A]n unwilling defendant can foil a district court’s best ef-\\n forts to engage in a dialogue, thereby preventing the court from\\n eliciting clear information regarding the defendant’s understanding\\n of the dangers of proceeding pro se.” Garey, 540 F.3d at 1267. That\\n is what happened here. In this circumstance, so long as the district\\n court “is assured the defendant (1) understands the choices before\\n him, (2) knows the potential dangers of proceeding pro se, and\\n (3) had rejected the lawyer to whom he is constitutionally enti-\\n tled,” it may allow the defendant to proceed pro se with standby\\n counsel in place. Id. That is what the district court did here, and\\n accordingly “a Faretta-like monologue . . . suffice[d].” Id. at 1269.\\n The brothers make several counterarguments, none of\\n which are availing. First, Jordan argues that his waiver at the initial\\n appearance was not unequivocal because he asked if his decision\\n only applied to “this meeting.” But the magistrate judge answered\\n his question and Jordan then unequivocally expressed his desire to\\n proceed pro se. He reaffirmed that decision at the next hearing a\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n day later and refused to speak with the standby federal public de-\\n fender. He confirmed with the magistrate judge that he would let\\n her know if he changed his mind at any point. He continued to\\n clearly and consistently express his desire to represent himself until\\n he requested counsel for the first time two years later. 2\\n Second, the brothers argue that the district court erred when\\n it noted their motion to dismiss was “bizarre” and directed the gov-\\n ernment to “indicat[e] whether it will be seeking psychiatric or psy-\\n chological examinations,” yet continued to allow them to repre-\\n sent themselves. But the district court did not err because, after it\\n ruled on the motion to dismiss, the court held another Faretta hear-\\n ing and determined the brothers were capable of representing\\n themselves after appointing standby counsel for both brothers.\\n The brothers do not point to anything calling that determination\\n into question.\\n Third, the brothers maintain that the district court erred\\n when after those hearings it found the brothers lacked “the skill or\\n training to represent” themselves but still found their waiver of the\\n right to counsel knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A defendant’s\\n “educational background” and “understanding of rules of proce-\\n dure [and] evidence” are relevant factors in determining the valid-\\n ity of a defendant’s waiver. Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049. But “a defend-\\n ant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in\\n\\n 2\\n Jordan also argues that his codefendants had a “coercive effect” on him, but\\n we decline to evaluate an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.\\n United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation.”\\n Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. A district court need not determine\\n “whether, for example, [the d]efendant could recite the steps to in-\\n troduce a document into evidence.” United States v. Kimball, 291\\n F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 2002). Instead, “we need only to determine\\n whether [the d]efendant understood that rules do exist to govern\\n the procedure of a trial, the introduction of evidence and the be-\\n havior of advocates and to determine whether Defendant under-\\n stood that he would be bound by those rules.” Id. At the Faretta\\n hearings, the district court thoroughly explained the downsides of\\n a lack of legal training and the brothers said that they wished to\\n represent themselves.\\n Finally, Jonathan argues that the district court erred when it\\n declined to appoint him a federal public defender after he requested\\n one. Because Jonathan never formally requested counsel, there\\n was no error here. As the district court correctly found, the motion\\n was invalid because it was filed by a third-party nonlawyer. By the\\n time the next status conference occurred, Jonathan told the district\\n court that he, “the living man, d[id] not consent to having a law-\\n yer.” And even if Jonathan had made an effective request for coun-\\n sel, he never showed he was entitled to court-appointed counsel.\\n At the hearing to determine whether Jonathan was indigent, he re-\\n fused to answer the magistrate judge’s questions about his financial\\n ability to obtain counsel. See Owen, 963 F.3d at 1052 (noting that a\\n court must conduct an “appropriate inquiry” to determine whether\\n a defendant is “financially unable to obtain counsel” before ap-\\n pointing counsel).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Speedy Trial\\n The brothers next contend their statutory and constitutional\\n speedy trial rights were violated when the district court ordered\\n several continuances before trial. “We review a claim under the\\n Speedy Trial Act de novo and review a district court’s factual de-\\n terminations on excludable time for clear error.” United States v.\\n Williams, 314 F.3d 552, 556 (11th Cir. 2002). When reviewing a\\n constitutional speedy trial claim, we review the district court’s legal\\n conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United\\n States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n Beginning with the brothers’ statutory speedy trial claims,\\n under the Speedy Trial Act the government was required to indict\\n the brothers within thirty days of their arrest, and to begin trial\\n within seventy days of filing the indictment. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b),\\n (c)(1). However, the Act also carves out several types of excluded\\n time. See id. § 3161(h). Here, there were nine and a half months\\n between arrest and indictment, and two years and three months\\n between indictment and trial. But because each delay was permit-\\n ted by statute, the district court did not err when it denied the\\n brothers’ motions to dismiss based on the statutory right to a\\n speedy trial.\\n The first relevant exclusion is for “[a] reasonable period of\\n delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as\\n to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance\\n has been granted.” Id. § 3161(h)(6). The brothers were initially ar-\\n rested on July 8, 2020 and were indicted on April 22, 2021. The\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n final codefendant had his initial appearance on July 28, 2022. So the\\n question becomes whether these delays are reasonable under the\\n statute. We have said that whether the period of delay is reasona-\\n ble can be determined by “the totality of the circumstances prior to\\n trial, by the extent to which the appellant’s defense was prejudiced,\\n or by the sheer length of the delay.” United States v. Davenport, 935\\n F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir. 1991).\\n As to the length of the delay, we have found similar ones\\n reasonable. See United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1476\\n (11th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary,\\n 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding eighteen-month delay reason-\\n able). As to prejudice, the brothers make no argument they suf-\\n fered prejudice, and nothing in the record supports that they were\\n prejudiced. And the brothers never moved for severance. Because\\n the brothers cannot show the period of exclusion attributable to\\n missing codefendants was unreasonable, this period was properly\\n excluded.\\n Days after the final defendant was extradited on July 28,\\n 2022, but around one month before trial was set to begin, the sec-\\n ond relevant exclusion period began. Delays “resulting from any\\n proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental\\n competency . . . of the defendant” are also excludable under the\\n Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A). When the district court ordered\\n competency evaluations for all four defendants, the government\\n moved for a continuance, noting that the bureau of prisons could\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n not complete the competency evaluations by the time of the trial.\\n The district court granted that motion until January 3, 2023.\\n Finally, once that exclusion period ended, the third exclu-\\n sion period began when Jonathan requested a continuance at a sta-\\n tus conference and Jordan asked to fire the federal public defender.\\n Noting these developments, the district court made an ends-of-jus-\\n tice finding that the delay “to the scheduling of the trial [was]\\n caused” by the brothers and set a trial period beginning in July 2023.\\n See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (“[A] judge shall consider in deter-\\n mining whether to grant a continuance . . . [w]hether the failure to\\n grant such a continuance . . . would deny the defendant reasonable\\n time to obtain counsel[.]”).\\n This was well within the district court’s “broad discretion”\\n in managing “the mandates of the Speedy Trial Act and the exclu-\\n sions thereto.” United States v. Ogiekpolor, 122 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir.\\n 2024) (quoting United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir.\\n 1983)). The brothers never argue the ends-of-justice continuances\\n were unwarranted. And the district court set forth its reasoning on\\n the record as required. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). We have ap-\\n proved of longer delays than this one when multiple excludable pe-\\n riods of time come together to form the delay. See United States v.\\n Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 n.8 (11th Cir. 1999) (38-month delay).\\n Thus, the time up until July 3, 2023, was excludable, and only two\\n weeks passed from that date to the beginning of trial. The broth-\\n ers’ statutory speedy trial argument therefore fails.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n Turning to the brothers’ constitutional speedy trial argu-\\n ment, here too the district court committed no error. The Sixth\\n Amendment provides that in “all criminal prosecutions, the ac-\\n cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S.\\n CONST. amend. VI.\\n The Supreme Court has held that when determining\\n whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights were denied, a court\\n should consider the “[1] [l]ength of delay, [2] the reason for the de-\\n lay, [3] the defendant’s assertion of his right, and [4] prejudice to\\n the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). We have\\n held “a defendant generally must show actual prejudice unless the\\n first three factors in Barker all weigh heavily against the govern-\\n ment.” Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1239.\\n The length of delay is a “triggering mechanism.” Barker, 407\\n U.S. at 530. “Until there is some delay which is presumptively prej-\\n udicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that\\n go into the balance.” Id. “A delay is considered presumptively prej-\\n udicial as it approaches one year.” United States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d\\n 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). The delay is measured “between the\\n date of the indictment and the trial date.” Id. Here, over two years\\n passed between the brothers’ indictment and trial, so the delay was\\n presumptively prejudicial.\\n Turning to the reason for the delay, much of it stems from\\n the brothers. The Supreme Court has differentiated between de-\\n liberate, neutral, and valid reasons for delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at\\n 531. The brothers’ shifting stances on whether they wanted to\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n represent themselves and then firing various counsel appointed to\\n them no doubt were responsible for some of the delay. But even if\\n most of the delay was attributable to the government, like in Dav-\\n enport, “the delays in this case were inherent to the government’s\\n good faith effort to conduct a complex, joint trial.” 935 F.2d at\\n 1239. And so “[t]he reasons for delay in this case were, at worst,\\n neutral.” Id. at 1240. That means “the reasons for delay do not\\n weigh heavily against the government and do not excuse a show-\\n ing of actual prejudice.” Id.\\n It is thus unnecessary to examine the third Barker factor as\\n the brothers cannot show that all three of the first factors weigh\\n heavily in their favor, and so they must show actual prejudice. But\\n the brothers do not even attempt to argue prejudice here. Their\\n briefing instead relied on showing a presumption of prejudice. The\\n brothers’ constitutional speedy trial claim therefore fails.\\n Religious Freedom Restoration Act\\n Third, the brothers contend that the district court should\\n have dismissed the complaint based on the Religious Freedom Res-\\n toration Act. Generally, “we review the district court’s denial of a\\n motion to dismiss an indictment for abuse of discretion.” United\\n States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United\\n States v. Farias, 836 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 1016)). But “[w]hen\\n the defendant does not preserve an argument for appeal, we review\\n for plain error.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1008 (11th\\n Cir. 2007). Whether government action complies with the Act is a\\n legal question we review de novo. Grady, 18 F.4th at 1285.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Tattenbaum v.\\n United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Sometimes that\\n may require determining whether an unclear claim fits in another\\n recognizable form. See United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 624–25\\n (11th Cir. 1990). But district courts need not consider arguments\\n not properly presented. See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d\\n 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]o preserve an issue, a litigant must\\n ‘first clearly present it to the district court, that is, in such a way as\\n to afford the district court an opportunity to recognize and rule on\\n it.’” United States v. Pon, 963 F.3d 1207, 1225 (11th Cir. 2020) (quot-\\n ing Juris v. Inamed Corp., 685 F.3d 1294, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012)).\\n We agree with the district court that this issue was never\\n raised. When the government flagged the potential applicability of\\n the Act in a motion in limine, the district court found that the\\n brothers never sought dismissal based on the Act before trial. The\\n brothers also never sought dismissal at or after trial. The brothers\\n did bring an earlier motion to dismiss that asserted “[their] [r]eli-\\n gious freedoms have been violated.” But that statement did not\\n clearly apply to any one government act. Instead, in context, the\\n statement reads as a continuation of the brothers’ sovereign-citi-\\n zen-style argument from the previous sentence in their motion that\\n they “are unaware that [c]orporate [b]y-laws do even apply to G-d\\n fearing sons, ([m]ankind) not residing in a [f]oreign [f]ederal\\n [d]istrict . . . .”\\n We therefore agree that the argument was not raised below.\\n Because the brothers also do not point to a statute or on-point\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n precedent, there was no plain error. “When neither the Supreme\\n Court nor this Court has resolved an issue, there can be no plain\\n error in regard to that issue.” See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th\\n 815, 829 (11th Cir. 2024).\\n The brothers counter that Jonathan’s statements at his initial\\n appearance ought to be liberally construed as raising a defense un-\\n der the Act. At the initial appearance, Jonathan claimed “the First\\n Amendment is being broken,” that “chlorine dioxide . . . is [their]\\n sacrament,” and that “[f]or [the government] to be saying it [is] a\\n drug, it [is] totally against [their] religious rights.” But Jonathan’s\\n general statements were not enough to put the district court on\\n notice that the brothers intended to seek dismissal under the Act.\\n He mentioned that he thought the complaint, like the civil pro-\\n ceedings before it, was directed at the Genesis II Church of Health\\n and Healing. Given this context it was impossible to infer that he\\n sought dismissal under the Act.\\n Deference to Agency Interpretation\\n Fourth, the brothers argue the district court plainly erred in\\n instructing the jury and admitting expert testimony that inappro-\\n priately relied on the Food and Drug Administration’s definition of\\n the term “intended uses.” “Where a party did not object to a jury\\n instruction in the district court, we review that instruction for plain\\n error.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000).\\n We also review the admission of expert testimony only for plain\\n error where the defendant did not object below. See United States\\n v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n Neither the government expert nor the district court erred\\n by relying on the agency’s definition of “intended uses.” 3 Accord-\\n ing to the agency, “[t]he words intended uses . . . refer to the objec-\\n tive intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of an\\n article (or their representatives).” 21 C.F.R. § 201.128. This regu-\\n latory definition is at issue because two of the potential objects of\\n the conspiracy involved selling an “unapproved drug” or a “misla-\\n beled drug.” In turn, the statutory definition of “drug” requires the\\n substance to be “intended for use” in various medical applications.\\n 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).\\n The brothers argue that it is error to defer to an agency’s\\n interpretation of the law. They argue a district court must instead\\n use its “independent judgment.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,\\n 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024). But this argument fails because the broth-\\n ers never explain how the instructions or expert relied on the\\n agency’s definition instead of a commonsense definition of the\\n term consistent with the plain meaning of the statute.\\n The jury instructions did not use the agency’s definition.\\n The district court instructed the jury that “a product’s intended use\\n is what a reasonable person would conclude the manufacturer or\\n\\n\\n 3\\n This claim of error could only possibly apply to the conspiracy count in the\\n indictment. The collateral bar rule prevents a defendant in a criminal con-\\n tempt proceeding from raising the invalidity of the underlying civil order as a\\n defense. Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. So, to the extent the brothers wish to chal-\\n lenge the validity of the civil order, or its definitions, they needed to do so in\\n a direct appeal.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n seller intended based on all the relevant information.” And that the\\n jury could “determine the intended use of a product by considering\\n the label.” In addition, while the expert examined the labeling as\\n part of her investigation into whether the solution was an unap-\\n proved or mislabeled drug, the expert made clear that she relied on\\n the statutory definition of drug to reach her conclusion.\\n While the agency’s definition of intended use does empha-\\n size the drug’s label, we are unaware of any definition of the term\\n “intended use” that would bar considering a product’s label. And\\n no regulatory definition is required to understand that a product’s\\n label might help the user determine whether he should use the\\n product to treat an illness or instead use it to clean the floors. To\\n the extent that a regulatory definition overlaps with the plain\\n meaning of the statute, it is not error when the district court admits\\n expert testimony or crafts a jury instruction consistent with that\\n plain meaning.\\n The brothers counter that only the agency’s definition of in-\\n tended use “allowed for a wide enough net to capture Mr. Grenon’s\\n actions.” The definition of “intended uses,” they argue, was the\\n “lynch pin” of the conspiracy charge. But that conflates the im-\\n portance of the concept of the product’s intended use—a necessary\\n component of the offense—with the importance of the regulatory\\n definition. The brothers never explain how the district court used\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n anything but its independent judgment in interpreting the statute. 4\\n Even if the district court had erred, the brothers do not explain how\\n it was plain error. The brothers do not point to, and we are una-\\n ware of, any case that explains the implications of the Supreme\\n Court’s Loper Bright decision on the Food and Drug Administra-\\n tion’s “intended uses” regulations. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 829.\\n Jury Trial\\n Fifth, the brothers contend that the district court plainly\\n erred by not dismissing the contempt charges against them despite\\n the fact the temporary restraining order and injunctions were not\\n lawful orders. “A valid conviction for criminal contempt requires\\n proof of all the following: (1) the court entered a lawful order of\\n reasonable specificity; (2) the defendant violated that order; and\\n (3) the defendant did so willfully.” United States v. Robinson, 83\\n F.4th 868, 878 (11th Cir. 2023). The brothers argue that because\\n the district court entered a temporary restraining order and prelim-\\n inary injunction (the two orders that form the bases for the con-\\n tempt charges) against them without a jury trial in the civil pro-\\n ceeding, the orders were not lawful.\\n But the collateral bar rule prevented the brothers from at-\\n tacking the validity of the civil orders in this criminal proceeding.\\n Straub, 508 F.3d at 1010. While there are exceptions to that rule,\\n the brothers do not argue for any here, and none apply. Cf. In re\\n\\n 4\\n The brothers also argue that the term “adequate directions for use” was de-\\n fined by the Food and Drug Administration. But they similarly fail to explain\\n where and how the district court relied on this definition.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing for challenges\\n in instances where, for example, the issuing court “lack[ed] subject-\\n matter jurisdiction”).\\n Reasonableness of Their Sentences\\n Finally, the brothers contend that their sentences were pro-\\n cedurally unreasonable because the district court should have lib-\\n erally construed statements they made at sentencing as objections\\n and granted those objections as they pertained to loss amount and\\n number of victims. We review interpretation and application of\\n the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Cingari, 952 F.3d\\n 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020). We review underlying factual findings\\n like loss amount and the number of victims for clear error. United\\n States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1197 (11th Cir. 2011); United\\n States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). But where\\n the district court states that, based on its consideration of 18 U.S.C.\\n section 3553(a) factors, it would have imposed the same sentence\\n regardless of any guideline-calculation error, the error is harmless\\n if the sentence would be reasonable even if the district court’s\\n guideline calculation was erroneous. United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d\\n 1347, 1348–49 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n That’s what happened here. The district court said that the\\n brothers’ “sentence would be the same regardless of the additional\\n enhancements.” And their 151-month prison sentences would\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 23-13478 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n have been reasonable even if the district court erred in calculating\\n the guidelines. 5\\n Even though they had no criminal history, the brothers’\\n criminal conduct went on for years. They defrauded hundreds of\\n people into buying bleach as medicine and they did so by targeting\\n the sick and the dying—those with cancer, Alzheimer’s, malaria,\\n Parkinson’s, Multiple Sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS. The brothers\\n brought in more than a million dollars for their efforts. Yet, they\\n refused to stop when the district court entered a temporary re-\\n straining order and then a preliminary injunction. Based on the\\n evidence from trial, we do not have a definite and firm conviction\\n that the district court made a clear error of judgment.\\n The brothers raise two other sentencing arguments that we\\n must address. First, they contend that they did not get their presen-\\n tence investigation reports more than thirty-five days before their\\n sentencing hearing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-\\n dure 32(e)(2). The brothers are right, but any error in failing to\\n\\n 5\\n We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discre-\\n tion. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1186, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford con-\\n sideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-\\n icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error\\n of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. at 1189 (citation modified).\\n We will only vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness where “we\\n are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed\\n a clear error of judgment in weighing the [section] 3553(a) factors by arriving\\n at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by\\n the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 30\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 23-13478\\n\\n timely disclose the report was harmless. See United States v. Willis,\\n 649 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011). The presentence investigation\\n reports were available and disclosed forty-two days before sentenc-\\n ing. But the brothers didn’t get the reports because they refused to\\n receive court documents. Even so, the reports were hand delivered\\n to them at the prison, they acknowledged receiving the reports be-\\n fore the sentencing hearing, and there’s no indication that they\\n were prejudiced by the late disclosure.\\n Second, Jordan argues that his sentence was substantively\\n unreasonable because two of the three codefendants received\\n shorter sentences than he did. Section 3553(a) requires the district\\n court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispar-\\n ities among defendants with similar records who have been found\\n guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Here, the two\\n codefendants Jordan compares himself to were convicted of only\\n one crime, while he was convicted of three. While the defendants\\n were charged with the same crimes initially, the government had\\n to abandon the contempt charges against Jordan’s codefendants be-\\n cause of the extradition agreement with Colombia. The codefend-\\n ants were therefore not found guilty of “similar conduct” for pur-\\n poses of the sentencing factors.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30987,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763140,"string":"10,763,140"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Gito St Fort"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-10369"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10369\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n GITO ST FORT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 9:24-cr-80063-AMC-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Gito St. Fort appeals his sentence of 320 months’ imprison-\\n ment for distribution of fentanyl that resulted in a death. On ap-\\n peal, St. Fort argues that: (1) his sentence was procedurally\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n unreasonable because the district court plainly erred by failing to\\n adequately explain its reasoning for imposing a sentence above the\\n mandatory minimum; and (2) his sentence was substantively un-\\n reasonable because the district court did not appropriately weigh\\n the mitigating evidence in denying St. Fort’s motion for a down-\\n ward variance. After thorough review, we affirm.\\n When a party fails to object to an error regarding the district\\n court’s statement of reasons for imposing a sentence, we will re-\\n view for plain error. United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1322\\n (2024) (en banc). To establish plain error, the defendant must show\\n (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial\\n rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n If the defendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our dis-\\n cretion to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,\\n integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error\\n is plain if “the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent\\n from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves the issue.”\\n United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020) (cita-\\n tion modified).\\n In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two\\n steps. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).\\n First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no significant\\n procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calcu-\\n lating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,\\n failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based\\n on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from\\n the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.\\n 38, 51 (2007)). 1 A sentencing court must “set forth enough to satisfy\\n the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments\\n and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmak-\\n ing authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The\\n district court is not required to state on the record that it has ex-\\n plicitly considered each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the rec-\\n ord reflects the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) fac-\\n tors. United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir.\\n 2020). So, an acknowledgment by the district court that it consid-\\n ered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281.\\n Further, a failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate\\n that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-\\n dence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n “[T]he adequacy of a district court’s findings and sentence\\n explanation is a classic procedural issue, not a substantive one.”\\n United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).\\n\\n 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense\\n\\n and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-\\n tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for\\n the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the\\n sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the\\n public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational\\n training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing\\n Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-\\n mission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the\\n need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n “The primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral and written\\n statement is so that a defendant can meaningfully appeal the sen-\\n tence.” Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1325. A defendant’s substantial rights\\n are not affected by a § 3553(c) error if the record is clear enough to\\n allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence. Id.\\n If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally\\n err, we consider the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence\\n imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” based on the “‘to-\\n tality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. A court may\\n abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that are\\n due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor\\n significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by bal-\\n ancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Also,\\n a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a\\n symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454\\n F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n We have “underscored” that we must give “‘due deference’”\\n to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing\\n factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.\\n 2018). The district court does not have to give all the factors equal\\n weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one factor\\n over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254\\n (11th Cir. 2015). Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court\\n should consider the particularized facts of the case and the guide-\\n line range. Id. at 1259–60. However, it maintains discretion to give\\n heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a) factors or combination of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n factors than to the guideline range. Id. at 1259. The district court\\n also has considerable discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) fac-\\n tors justify a variance. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238\\n (11th Cir. 2009). We’ve said that we will only reverse a procedur-\\n ally proper sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm con-\\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\\n the case.” United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir.\\n 2007) (citation modified).\\n An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well be-\\n low the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). A sentence within\\n the guideline range is expected, but not presumed to be reasonable.\\n United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). The party\\n challenging a sentence for substantive unreasonableness bears the\\n burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of\\n the case and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d\\n 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n Here, St. Fort did not object in district court to the adequacy\\n of the court’s explanation of its sentence, so we review his claim of\\n procedural unreasonableness for plain error, and we can find none.\\n For starters, the record reflects that the district court expressly said\\n that it considered the parties’ statements, the PSI, which included\\n the guideline calculations, and the § 3553(a) factors. As for the mit-\\n igating factors -- which the court was not required to discuss\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n individually -- the court nevertheless addressed them. This in-\\n cluded the death of St. Fort’s sister -- when the court clarified that\\n St. Fort’s drug-trafficking convictions began before her death in re-\\n sponse to St. Fort’s claim that his drug addiction severely worsened\\n after her death -- and St. Fort’s familial foundation -- when the court\\n noted that he began selling drugs despite family support and his\\n achievements. The court also recognized St. Fort’s substance\\n abuse, and distinguished it from drug trafficking. In addition, the\\n court explained how the nature and circumstances of the offense\\n and St. Fort’s criminal history affected its sentencing determining,\\n outlining his past convictions and finding the conduct here to be an\\n escalation of prior criminal activity. Multiple times, the court re-\\n peated that the conduct in this case was serious and led to a death.\\n By addressing each of the mitigating factors relevant to the\\n case, St. Fort’s criminal history, and the nature and circumstances\\n of the offense, the district court went beyond merely acknowledg-\\n ing that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\\n ments. Further, to the extent St. Fort argues that the district court\\n must explain why a defendant’s proposed sentence, or the manda-\\n tory minimum sentence, is inadequate, he has not pointed to any\\n on point binding precedent. St. Fort also failed to identify binding\\n authority holding that the court must explain why a defendant’s\\n mitigating factors do not warrant a lesser sentence. Thus, St. Fort\\n has failed to show that the court erred, much less plainly erred, by\\n failing to sufficiently explain his sentence to allow for meaningful\\n review, and we affirm as to procedural reasonableness.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n St. Fort also has not shown that his sentence is substantively\\n unreasonable. As the record reveals, the district court weighed the\\n factors of St. Fort’s criminal history, personal history, substance\\n abuse, and conduct in this offense, and did not abuse its discretion\\n in weighing the factors nor in concluding that a downward vari-\\n ance was not warranted. Among other things, the district court\\n discussed: (1) St. Fort’s criminal history, noting that St. Fort was\\n first convicted for the serious crime of sale of heroin, just a few\\n years after his success in basketball and despite his family founda-\\n tion, and noting that overall, St. Fort’s additional convictions and\\n criminal history were very significant; (2) specific and general de-\\n terrence, finding it to be necessary considering St. Fort’s criminal\\n history; (3) the nature of this offense, in which St. Fort sold narcot-\\n ics to an individual who overdosed from the drugs, deeming it very\\n serious and considering it to be an escalation of St. Fort’s criminal\\n activity and part of repeated illegal drug activity; (4) mitigating fac-\\n tors presented by St. Fort at the sentencing hearing, as we’ve dis-\\n cussed; (5) St. Fort’s acceptance of responsibility; (6) St. Fort’s own\\n substance abuse, which the court distinguished from his spreading\\n of drug addiction to the community, which led to a death in this\\n case; and (7) the timing of St. Fort’s past convictions for drug traf-\\n ficking, some of which occurred before the death of his youngest\\n sister. The district court ultimately found that weighing all of the\\n factors presented a disturbing picture of drug-trafficking in a seri-\\n ous and repeated way, involving a diverse amount of deadly drugs.\\n On this record, the district court exercised its discretion in\\n weighing the relevant factors and in denying a downward variance.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n St. Fort has not met his burden of establishing that the district court\\n made a clear error of judgment in considering the § 3553(a) factors\\n and the facts of this case. Further, St. Fort’s 320-month sentence\\n fell well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and\\n was within the guideline range, both of which indicate that the dis-\\n trict court imposed a reasonable sentence. Accordingly, St. Fort has\\n not shown that the district court’s 320-month sentence was sub-\\n stantively unreasonable, and we affirm.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229725/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"MARCUS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\", \"MARCUS\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763140/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Gito St Fort\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 25-10369\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n GITO ST FORT,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 9:24-cr-80063-AMC-1\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Gito St. Fort appeals his sentence of 320 months’ imprison-\n ment for distribution of fentanyl that resulted in a death. On ap-\n peal, St. Fort argues that: (1) his sentence was procedurally\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\n\n\n\n\n unreasonable because the district court plainly erred by failing to\n adequately explain its reasoning for imposing a sentence above the\n mandatory minimum; and (2) his sentence was substantively un-\n reasonable because the district court did not appropriately weigh\n the mitigating evidence in denying St. Fort’s motion for a down-\n ward variance. After thorough review, we affirm.\n When a party fails to object to an error regarding the district\n court’s statement of reasons for imposing a sentence, we will re-\n view for plain error. United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1322\n (2024) (en banc). To establish plain error, the defendant must show\n (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial\n rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).\n If the defendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our dis-\n cretion to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,\n integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error\n is plain if “the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent\n from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves the issue.”\n United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020) (cita-\n tion modified).\n In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two\n steps. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).\n First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no significant\n procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calcu-\n lating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,\n failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based\n on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\n\n\n\n\n chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from\n the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.\n 38, 51 (2007)). 1 A sentencing court must “set forth enough to satisfy\n the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments\n and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmak-\n ing authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The\n district court is not required to state on the record that it has ex-\n plicitly considered each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the rec-\n ord reflects the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) fac-\n tors. United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir.\n 2020). So, an acknowledgment by the district court that it consid-\n ered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281.\n Further, a failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate\n that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-\n dence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).\n “[T]he adequacy of a district court’s findings and sentence\n explanation is a classic procedural issue, not a substantive one.”\n United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).\n\n 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense\n\n and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-\n tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for\n the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the\n sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the\n public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational\n training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing\n Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-\n mission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the\n need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\n\n\n\n\n “The primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral and written\n statement is so that a defendant can meaningfully appeal the sen-\n tence.” Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1325. A defendant’s substantial rights\n are not affected by a § 3553(c) error if the record is clear enough to\n allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence. Id.\n If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally\n err, we consider the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence\n imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” based on the “‘to-\n tality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. A court may\n abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that are\n due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor\n significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by bal-\n ancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Also,\n a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a\n symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454\n F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).\n We have “underscored” that we must give “‘due deference’”\n to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing\n factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.\n 2018). The district court does not have to give all the factors equal\n weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one factor\n over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254\n (11th Cir. 2015). Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court\n should consider the particularized facts of the case and the guide-\n line range. Id. at 1259–60. However, it maintains discretion to give\n heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a) factors or combination of\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\n\n\n\n\n factors than to the guideline range. Id. at 1259. The district court\n also has considerable discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) fac-\n tors justify a variance. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238\n (11th Cir. 2009). We’ve said that we will only reverse a procedur-\n ally proper sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm con-\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\n the case.” United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir.\n 2007) (citation modified).\n An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well be-\n low the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). A sentence within\n the guideline range is expected, but not presumed to be reasonable.\n United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). The party\n challenging a sentence for substantive unreasonableness bears the\n burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of\n the case and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d\n 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).\n Here, St. Fort did not object in district court to the adequacy\n of the court’s explanation of its sentence, so we review his claim of\n procedural unreasonableness for plain error, and we can find none.\n For starters, the record reflects that the district court expressly said\n that it considered the parties’ statements, the PSI, which included\n the guideline calculations, and the § 3553(a) factors. As for the mit-\n igating factors -- which the court was not required to discuss\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\n\n\n\n\n individually -- the court nevertheless addressed them. This in-\n cluded the death of St. Fort’s sister -- when the court clarified that\n St. Fort’s drug-trafficking convictions began before her death in re-\n sponse to St. Fort’s claim that his drug addiction severely worsened\n after her death -- and St. Fort’s familial foundation -- when the court\n noted that he began selling drugs despite family support and his\n achievements. The court also recognized St. Fort’s substance\n abuse, and distinguished it from drug trafficking. In addition, the\n court explained how the nature and circumstances of the offense\n and St. Fort’s criminal history affected its sentencing determining,\n outlining his past convictions and finding the conduct here to be an\n escalation of prior criminal activity. Multiple times, the court re-\n peated that the conduct in this case was serious and led to a death.\n By addressing each of the mitigating factors relevant to the\n case, St. Fort’s criminal history, and the nature and circumstances\n of the offense, the district court went beyond merely acknowledg-\n ing that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\n ments. Further, to the extent St. Fort argues that the district court\n must explain why a defendant’s proposed sentence, or the manda-\n tory minimum sentence, is inadequate, he has not pointed to any\n on point binding precedent. St. Fort also failed to identify binding\n authority holding that the court must explain why a defendant’s\n mitigating factors do not warrant a lesser sentence. Thus, St. Fort\n has failed to show that the court erred, much less plainly erred, by\n failing to sufficiently explain his sentence to allow for meaningful\n review, and we affirm as to procedural reasonableness.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\n\n\n\n\n St. Fort also has not shown that his sentence is substantively\n unreasonable. As the record reveals, the district court weighed the\n factors of St. Fort’s criminal history, personal history, substance\n abuse, and conduct in this offense, and did not abuse its discretion\n in weighing the factors nor in concluding that a downward vari-\n ance was not warranted. Among other things, the district court\n discussed: (1) St. Fort’s criminal history, noting that St. Fort was\n first convicted for the serious crime of sale of heroin, just a few\n years after his success in basketball and despite his family founda-\n tion, and noting that overall, St. Fort’s additional convictions and\n criminal history were very significant; (2) specific and general de-\n terrence, finding it to be necessary considering St. Fort’s criminal\n history; (3) the nature of this offense, in which St. Fort sold narcot-\n ics to an individual who overdosed from the drugs, deeming it very\n serious and considering it to be an escalation of St. Fort’s criminal\n activity and part of repeated illegal drug activity; (4) mitigating fac-\n tors presented by St. Fort at the sentencing hearing, as we’ve dis-\n cussed; (5) St. Fort’s acceptance of responsibility; (6) St. Fort’s own\n substance abuse, which the court distinguished from his spreading\n of drug addiction to the community, which led to a death in this\n case; and (7) the timing of St. Fort’s past convictions for drug traf-\n ficking, some of which occurred before the death of his youngest\n sister. The district court ultimately found that weighing all of the\n factors presented a disturbing picture of drug-trafficking in a seri-\n ous and repeated way, involving a diverse amount of deadly drugs.\n On this record, the district court exercised its discretion in\n weighing the relevant factors and in denying a downward variance.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\n\n\n\n\n St. Fort has not met his burden of establishing that the district court\n made a clear error of judgment in considering the § 3553(a) factors\n and the facts of this case. Further, St. Fort’s 320-month sentence\n fell well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and\n was within the guideline range, both of which indicate that the dis-\n trict court imposed a reasonable sentence. Accordingly, St. Fort has\n not shown that the district court’s 320-month sentence was sub-\n stantively unreasonable, and we affirm.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Gito St Fort\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 25-10369\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n GITO ST FORT,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 9:24-cr-80063-AMC-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Gito St. Fort appeals his sentence of 320 months’ imprison-\\n ment for distribution of fentanyl that resulted in a death. On ap-\\n peal, St. Fort argues that: (1) his sentence was procedurally\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n unreasonable because the district court plainly erred by failing to\\n adequately explain its reasoning for imposing a sentence above the\\n mandatory minimum; and (2) his sentence was substantively un-\\n reasonable because the district court did not appropriately weigh\\n the mitigating evidence in denying St. Fort’s motion for a down-\\n ward variance. After thorough review, we affirm.\\n When a party fails to object to an error regarding the district\\n court’s statement of reasons for imposing a sentence, we will re-\\n view for plain error. United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th 1316, 1322\\n (2024) (en banc). To establish plain error, the defendant must show\\n (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial\\n rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n If the defendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our dis-\\n cretion to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,\\n integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. An error\\n is plain if “the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent\\n from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves the issue.”\\n United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020) (cita-\\n tion modified).\\n In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two\\n steps. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008).\\n First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no significant\\n procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calcu-\\n lating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,\\n failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based\\n on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from\\n the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.\\n 38, 51 (2007)). 1 A sentencing court must “set forth enough to satisfy\\n the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments\\n and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmak-\\n ing authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The\\n district court is not required to state on the record that it has ex-\\n plicitly considered each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the rec-\\n ord reflects the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) fac-\\n tors. United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir.\\n 2020). So, an acknowledgment by the district court that it consid-\\n ered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281.\\n Further, a failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate\\n that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evi-\\n dence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).\\n “[T]he adequacy of a district court’s findings and sentence\\n explanation is a classic procedural issue, not a substantive one.”\\n United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).\\n\\n 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense\\n\\n and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-\\n tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for\\n the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the\\n sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the\\n public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational\\n training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing\\n Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-\\n mission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the\\n need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n “The primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral and written\\n statement is so that a defendant can meaningfully appeal the sen-\\n tence.” Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1325. A defendant’s substantial rights\\n are not affected by a § 3553(c) error if the record is clear enough to\\n allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence. Id.\\n If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally\\n err, we consider the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence\\n imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,’” based on the “‘to-\\n tality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. A court may\\n abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that are\\n due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor\\n significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by bal-\\n ancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Also,\\n a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a\\n symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454\\n F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).\\n We have “underscored” that we must give “‘due deference’”\\n to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing\\n factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.\\n 2018). The district court does not have to give all the factors equal\\n weight and is given discretion to attach great weight to one factor\\n over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254\\n (11th Cir. 2015). Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court\\n should consider the particularized facts of the case and the guide-\\n line range. Id. at 1259–60. However, it maintains discretion to give\\n heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a) factors or combination of\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n factors than to the guideline range. Id. at 1259. The district court\\n also has considerable discretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) fac-\\n tors justify a variance. United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238\\n (11th Cir. 2009). We’ve said that we will only reverse a procedur-\\n ally proper sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm con-\\n viction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment\\n in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies\\n outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of\\n the case.” United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir.\\n 2007) (citation modified).\\n An indicator of a reasonable sentence is one that is well be-\\n low the statutory maximum for the crime. United States v.\\n Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). A sentence within\\n the guideline range is expected, but not presumed to be reasonable.\\n United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). The party\\n challenging a sentence for substantive unreasonableness bears the\\n burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of\\n the case and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d\\n 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).\\n Here, St. Fort did not object in district court to the adequacy\\n of the court’s explanation of its sentence, so we review his claim of\\n procedural unreasonableness for plain error, and we can find none.\\n For starters, the record reflects that the district court expressly said\\n that it considered the parties’ statements, the PSI, which included\\n the guideline calculations, and the § 3553(a) factors. As for the mit-\\n igating factors -- which the court was not required to discuss\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n individually -- the court nevertheless addressed them. This in-\\n cluded the death of St. Fort’s sister -- when the court clarified that\\n St. Fort’s drug-trafficking convictions began before her death in re-\\n sponse to St. Fort’s claim that his drug addiction severely worsened\\n after her death -- and St. Fort’s familial foundation -- when the court\\n noted that he began selling drugs despite family support and his\\n achievements. The court also recognized St. Fort’s substance\\n abuse, and distinguished it from drug trafficking. In addition, the\\n court explained how the nature and circumstances of the offense\\n and St. Fort’s criminal history affected its sentencing determining,\\n outlining his past convictions and finding the conduct here to be an\\n escalation of prior criminal activity. Multiple times, the court re-\\n peated that the conduct in this case was serious and led to a death.\\n By addressing each of the mitigating factors relevant to the\\n case, St. Fort’s criminal history, and the nature and circumstances\\n of the offense, the district court went beyond merely acknowledg-\\n ing that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argu-\\n ments. Further, to the extent St. Fort argues that the district court\\n must explain why a defendant’s proposed sentence, or the manda-\\n tory minimum sentence, is inadequate, he has not pointed to any\\n on point binding precedent. St. Fort also failed to identify binding\\n authority holding that the court must explain why a defendant’s\\n mitigating factors do not warrant a lesser sentence. Thus, St. Fort\\n has failed to show that the court erred, much less plainly erred, by\\n failing to sufficiently explain his sentence to allow for meaningful\\n review, and we affirm as to procedural reasonableness.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n St. Fort also has not shown that his sentence is substantively\\n unreasonable. As the record reveals, the district court weighed the\\n factors of St. Fort’s criminal history, personal history, substance\\n abuse, and conduct in this offense, and did not abuse its discretion\\n in weighing the factors nor in concluding that a downward vari-\\n ance was not warranted. Among other things, the district court\\n discussed: (1) St. Fort’s criminal history, noting that St. Fort was\\n first convicted for the serious crime of sale of heroin, just a few\\n years after his success in basketball and despite his family founda-\\n tion, and noting that overall, St. Fort’s additional convictions and\\n criminal history were very significant; (2) specific and general de-\\n terrence, finding it to be necessary considering St. Fort’s criminal\\n history; (3) the nature of this offense, in which St. Fort sold narcot-\\n ics to an individual who overdosed from the drugs, deeming it very\\n serious and considering it to be an escalation of St. Fort’s criminal\\n activity and part of repeated illegal drug activity; (4) mitigating fac-\\n tors presented by St. Fort at the sentencing hearing, as we’ve dis-\\n cussed; (5) St. Fort’s acceptance of responsibility; (6) St. Fort’s own\\n substance abuse, which the court distinguished from his spreading\\n of drug addiction to the community, which led to a death in this\\n case; and (7) the timing of St. Fort’s past convictions for drug traf-\\n ficking, some of which occurred before the death of his youngest\\n sister. The district court ultimately found that weighing all of the\\n factors presented a disturbing picture of drug-trafficking in a seri-\\n ous and repeated way, involving a diverse amount of deadly drugs.\\n On this record, the district court exercised its discretion in\\n weighing the relevant factors and in denying a downward variance.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n St. Fort has not met his burden of establishing that the district court\\n made a clear error of judgment in considering the § 3553(a) factors\\n and the facts of this case. Further, St. Fort’s 320-month sentence\\n fell well below the statutory maximum of life imprisonment and\\n was within the guideline range, both of which indicate that the dis-\\n trict court imposed a reasonable sentence. Accordingly, St. Fort has\\n not shown that the district court’s 320-month sentence was sub-\\n stantively unreasonable, and we affirm.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30988,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763170,"string":"10,763,170"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"22-12354"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 22-12354\\n ____________________\\n\\n AILEEN MULLIN,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02697-VMC-AEP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n The Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. However, to\\n correct a factual error, we VACATE and withdraw our previous\\n opinion dated August 8, 2025, 149 F.4th 1244 (11th Cir. 2025), and\\n substitute the following opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Aileen Mullin sued the Department of Veterans Affairs, as-\\n serting many claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.\\n § 794. The claims were for disability discrimination, failure to ac-\\n commodate, unlawful disclosure, and retaliation (and/or a retalia-\\n tory hostile work environment). The district court granted sum-\\n mary judgment for the Department on all the claims, and Ms.\\n Mullin now appeals.\\n Following a review of the record, and with the benefit of\\n oral argument, we reverse and remand on the unlawful disclosure\\n claim and affirm on the other claims.1\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment order,\\n we view the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin. See\\n Taxinet Corp. v. Leon, 114 F.4th 1212, 1231 (11th Cir. 2024). Seen\\n through that lens, the record reflects the following.2\\n A.\\n Ms. Mullin began her employment with the Department of\\n Veterans Affairs in February 2009. She remains employed by the\\n Department as a Ratings Veterans Service Representative at the St.\\n Petersburg Regional Office of the Veterans Benefits Administra-\\n tion.\\n\\n\\n 1 As to any issues not discussed in this opinion, we summarily affirm.\\n\\n 2 We include a fair number of dates in setting out the chronology of events\\n\\n because the dates in this case matter.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n In July 2010, Ms. Mullin began to experience respiratory is-\\n sues at work. Believing that the building she worked in was caus-\\n ing the respiratory problems, she spoke with someone at the De-\\n partment that month about what could be done to address what\\n she believed to be issues with the building. According to Ms.\\n Mullin, the Department did not do anything after she first raised\\n her concerns, and she was told to file a claim for worker’s compen-\\n sation.\\n Ms. Mullin’s respiratory issues worsened over time. In De-\\n cember 2011 she informed the Department that she was still having\\n trouble with her breathing and asthma. She asked for an alterna-\\n tive work schedule to limit the time she spent in the building. She\\n also sought relocation of her workstation to a different place in the\\n building.\\n The Department granted both requests. It limited the num-\\n ber of days Ms. Mullin was required to be in the office and it\\n changed her workstation. Although she had requested these ac-\\n commodations, Ms. Mullin did not consider them effective because\\n she continued to suffer from respiratory issues.\\n In January 2012, Ms. Mullin informed the Department that\\n her respiratory issues were continuing and remained severe. That\\n same month, she met with human resources specialist Tammi\\n Clarke and a union representative to discuss her ongoing health is-\\n sues. Ms. Mullin does not remember whether she made any ac-\\n commodation requests at this meeting, but she recalls that Ms.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Clarke told her that her workstation would be moved from the sec-\\n ond floor to the third floor.\\n Ms. Mullin returned to work two days after this meeting and\\n found that she had not been assigned a new workstation, which\\n shocked and terrified her. She suffered an asthma attack that day\\n and went to the hospital. The next time she returned to work, her\\n workstation had been moved to the third floor.\\n On January 31, 2012, Ms. Mullin emailed the human re-\\n sources department asking that an air purifier Ms. Clarke previ-\\n ously proposed placing in her office on the third floor be put there\\n without delay. The air purifier was placed in her office two days\\n later. Ms. Mullin informed the Department that she did not believe\\n the air purifier would be effective because, based on her research,\\n it was designed for smaller spaces. She also noted that she would\\n “have it running full force and [her] fingers [were] crossed.”\\n B.\\n In March 2012, Ms. Mullin was diagnosed with breast can-\\n cer. Her oncologist noted in a Family and Medical Leave Act\\n (FMLA) certification form that she would require a six-month ab-\\n sence at work for surgery, chemotherapy, and potential radiation.\\n Ms. Mullin submitted this FMLA form to the human resources de-\\n partment.\\n In May 2012, a few months after the cancer diagnosis, Casey\\n Crump—a steward with the union Ms. Mullin belonged to—sent\\n Ms. Mullin an email. In that email, Mr. Crump mentioned that he\\n heard about Ms. Mullin’s “condition” from Bonnie Wax, a human\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n resources manager. Mr. Crump also noted that Ms. Wax believed\\n that Ms. Mullin’s breathing issues were caused by her tumor, not\\n by any problems with the building. Ms. Mullin was surprised to\\n learn that Mr. Crump knew about her cancer diagnosis. The only\\n people she had told were a friend at work and Sandra Smith, a Vet-\\n erans Service Center manager.\\n Ms. Mullin completed her cancer treatment in December\\n 2012 and returned to work the following month. She continued to\\n work remotely three days a week and came into the office the other\\n two days. Shortly after she came back to work, she informed the\\n Department that the issues in the building were worsening her\\n health condition, and she asked to “further minimize” the time\\n spent in the building.\\n On January 30, 2013, Ms. Mullin met with Ms. Clarke and a\\n union representative. At the meeting, Ms. Mullin requested addi-\\n tional accommodations. These included working entirely from\\n home or from a location other than the St. Petersburg office. She\\n also asked to meet another employee outside her building to hand\\n off important paperwork so she would not have to go inside.\\n Four weeks later, the Department again agreed to move Ms.\\n Mullin’s workstation and to place a second air purifier in her office.\\n It also agreed to place her printer near her workstation to limit her\\n movement outside of her workstation.\\n At a meeting held shortly thereafter, a union representative\\n proposed permitting Ms. Mullin to work a half-day schedule on the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n two days she was in the office. Ms. Mullin began working this pro-\\n posed modified schedule but this accommodation was not formally\\n approved. It appears that at some point the Department discov-\\n ered this new work schedule and informed Ms. Mullin that her ac-\\n commodations did not include this modified schedule.\\n C.\\n In March 2013, a supervisor informed Ms. Clarke that Ms.\\n Mullin was still having issues with the air purifiers. Ms. Clarke\\n added a third air purifier to Ms. Mullin’s office and tested the air\\n quality.\\n The following month, on April 12, 2013, Ms. Mullin’s doctor\\n wrote a note to the Department recommending that Ms. Mullin be\\n allowed to work entirely from home. He also explained that the\\n air purifiers were not effective. Three days later, the Department\\n permitted Ms. Mullin to work from home four days a week, come\\n into work on Friday mornings from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., and\\n work the remainder of that day from home. Ms. Mullin informed\\n the Department that these accommodations were unsatisfactory to\\n her because they were “useless and potentially harmful.”\\n On April 19, 2013, the Department permitted Ms. Mullin to\\n work entirely from home. She was, however, required to meet\\n someone outside the building on Friday mornings to exchange\\n work-related papers. It is unclear whether Ms. Mullin continues to\\n receive this accommodation.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n D.\\n Ms. Mullin brought suit in the district court after she filed a\\n complaint—which she amended numerous times—with the Equal\\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In her district court com-\\n plaint, she asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act for disabil-\\n ity discrimination based on disparate treatment and failure to ac-\\n commodate, unlawful disclosures and privacy violations, and retal-\\n iation (and/or a retaliatory hostile work environment).\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, apply-\\n ing the same legal standard used by the district court. See Taxinet\\n Corp., 114 F.4th at 1230. Under Rule 56, summary judgment is war-\\n ranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to\\n the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact\\n and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving\\n party.” Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from en-\\n gaging in employment discrimination against otherwise qualified\\n individuals with a disability. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326\\n (11th Cir. 2005); Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.\\n 2000). Specifically, qualified individuals with a disability shall not\\n “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or\\n be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activ-\\n ity conducted by any Executive agency” solely because of their dis-\\n ability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).\\n “The standards used to determine whether [the Rehabilita-\\n tion Act] has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under\\n [T]itle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and the provi-\\n sions of [S]ections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with\\n Disabilities Act . . . , as such sections relate to employment.” 29\\n U.S.C. § 794(d); see also Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (“The standard for\\n determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as\\n that under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . ; thus, cases in-\\n volving the ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilita-\\n tion Act.”). With this backdrop, we address Ms. Mullin’s Rehabili-\\n tation Act claims.\\n A. Disability Discrimination\\n Ms. Mullin asserts a claim of disability discrimination against\\n the Department under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court\\n concluded that she failed to establish that she was discriminated\\n against because of her disability. We agree with the district court.\\n “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the\\n [Rehabilitation] Act, an individual must show that (1) [s]he has a\\n disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified for the position; and\\n (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as the result of\\n h[er] disability.” Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185\\n F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 1999)). To establish the third ele-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n ment, the plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employ-\\n ment action because of her disability. See id. Importantly, the\\n plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment action was\\n “solely by reason of her . . . disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As a\\n result, a claim of disability discrimination fails if the employer\\n based the adverse employment action partially on disability and\\n partially on other factors. See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326.\\n A claim of disability discrimination against an employer un-\\n der the Rehabilitation Act may be established in two ways: (1) dis-\\n parate treatment; or (2) failure to make a reasonable accommoda-\\n tion. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6\\n (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the ADA and the Rehabilitation\\n Act “recognize disparate treatment and reasonable accommoda-\\n tion theories”).\\n Disparate treatment occurs when a covered entity treats a\\n disabled individual differently than a non-disabled individual. See\\n 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). A disparate treatment claim requires a show-\\n ing of discriminatory intent. See Berg v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & Employ-\\n ment, 163 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1998).\\n A failure to accommodate claim arises when a covered en-\\n tity fails its affirmative duty to make “reasonable accommodations\\n to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-\\n fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,\\n unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommoda-\\n tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the busi-\\n ness.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A failure to make a reasonable\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n accommodation does not require a showing of discriminatory in-\\n tent. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th\\n Cir. 2007) (“[A]n employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a\\n disabled individual itself constitutes discrimination under the ADA\\n . . . . There is no additional burden . . . .”). “An accommodation is\\n reasonable if it enables the employee to perform the essential func-\\n tions of the job.” Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985, 987 (11th\\n Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d\\n 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Stu-\\n dent Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen an\\n employee triggers an employer’s accommodation duties, the em-\\n ployer must expend time and expense to explore the universe of\\n reasonable accommodations, identify one that is mutually agreeable\\n to the parties, and implement it.” (emphasis added)).\\n 1. Disparate Treatment\\n As to her disparate treatment theory, Ms. Mullin argues that\\n she suffered disability discrimination because the Department de-\\n nied her request for advanced sick leave. See Appellant’s Br. at 44–\\n 45.\\n The record reflects that, around May 4, 2012, Ms. Mullin re-\\n quested advanced sick leave “of 72–80 hours . . . [to] take care of\\n the post-operative period of 2 weeks followed by approximately 6\\n weeks of radiation . . . .” On May 7, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor pro-\\n vided the relevant documentation for her advanced sick leave re-\\n quest. That same day, the Department approved Ms. Mullin’s re-\\n quest for 80 hours of advanced sick leave—the amount she initially\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n requested—in a memorandum. On May 10, 2024, the Department\\n memorialized this decision in a Request for Leave or Approved Ab-\\n sence form signed by Kerri Witty, the Department Director.\\n The record further shows that the Department continued to\\n approve advanced sick leave for Ms. Mullin between June and Au-\\n gust of 2012, despite Ms. Mullin having “used all of her leave to\\n include accrued and sick leave.” The Department also admitted\\n Ms. Mullin to the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, from which\\n she received donations in addition to her advanced sick leave.\\n The parties spar about whether Ms. Mullin was denied any\\n request for sick leave, but this disagreement misses the mark. We\\n have not found—and Ms. Mullin has not identified—anything in\\n the record to show (or create a genuine issue of fact) that a request\\n for sick for leave was denied solely because of her disability. In fact,\\n she has not shown that any sick leave was denied even in part due\\n to her disability.\\n We have identified three instances where Ms. Mullin’s leave\\n request was denied during the relevant period for her disparate\\n treatment theory. None of these support Ms. Mullin’s disparate\\n treatment claim.\\n The first comes from Ms. Mullin’s own testimony at her dep-\\n osition. Ms. Mullin stated that at some point Ms. Clarke verbally\\n denied her advanced sick leave request. But this testimony is belied\\n by the record, which reflects that the Department ultimately\\n granted her advanced sick leave request. See Blanco v. Samuel, 91\\n F.4th 1061, 1070 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he court cannot discount a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n party’s testimony on summary judgment ‘unless it is blatantly con-\\n tradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a\\n matter of law . . . .’” (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707\\n F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013))). Even if we assume that Ms.\\n Clarke orally denied the request, Ms. Mullin has failed to establish\\n (or create a genuine issue of fact) that her request was denied solely\\n because of her disability.\\n The second is based on a Department memorandum dated\\n April 9, 2012, approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application related to\\n her cancer diagnosis. This memorandum determined that Ms.\\n Mullin “is entitled to a total of 12 workweeks or 480 hours of FMLA\\n leave during a 12-month period,” but noted that she “previously\\n invoked her entitlement to FMLA on March 9, 2012 . . . .” The\\n memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin “is not allowed an addi-\\n tional 12 workweeks” until her current FMLA entitlement “period\\n ends, and a new event or situation occurs that entitles [Ms. Mullin]\\n to another period of . . . medical leave.”\\n The third is based on a similar Department memorandum\\n dated May 11, 2012, evaluating additional medical documentation\\n for Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application regarding the cancer diagnosis.\\n This memorandum stated that an “employee is entitled to up to a\\n total of 12 administrative workweeks of leave without pay . . . [and]\\n [Ms. Mullin] can use a total of 480 hours for the entire FMLA enti-\\n tlement period.” The memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin\\n was “not allowed an additional 12 workweeks [of leave] based on”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n the additional medical documentation but notes that she could re-\\n new her entitlement at the end of her then current FMLA entitle-\\n ment period.\\n These two Department memoranda fare no better for Ms.\\n Mullin’s disparate treatment theory. Neither denial—assuming\\n they were denials—was based solely on her disability. The district\\n court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the\\n Department on the disparate treatment theory.\\n 2. Failure to Accommodate\\n As to her failure to accommodate claim, Ms. Mullin argues\\n that the Department failed to reasonably accommodate her by un-\\n duly delaying in providing her a full-time work-from-home accom-\\n modation in light of her known health conditions. See Appellant’s\\n Br. at 18–28. To avoid summary judgment, Ms. Mullin must pre-\\n sent sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the\\n Department failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. She\\n failed to do so. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to\\n her, the Department provided reasonable accommodations for Ms.\\n Mullin’s disability and ultimately provided her with the accommo-\\n dation she desired—working from home full time.\\n The failure to accommodate claim can be distilled to two\\n main theories. First, Ms. Mullin argues that the Department un-\\n duly delayed in providing, in her view, the only reasonable accom-\\n modation for her medical conditions—a full-time work from home\\n accommodation. Second, she argues that the Department failed to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n provide her with reasonable accommodations during the interac-\\n tive process despite the Department being aware of her medical\\n conditions.\\n The parties dispute the length of the alleged delay before\\n Ms. Mullin received a full-time work-from-home accommodation.\\n Although the Department argues—and the district court agreed—\\n that there was only a three-month delay, if any, Ms. Mullin argues\\n that the Department unreasonably delayed in providing her re-\\n quested accommodation for 10 months. Ms. Mullin’s estimation\\n of the delay is belied by the chronology of events and the record\\n before us. The record reflects that Ms. Mullin was away from work\\n on medical leave due to her cancer treatment during the latter half\\n of 2012 and did not return to work on a regular basis until January\\n 2013. Ms. Mullin cannot fairly cast the period in which she was\\n away from work due to her cancer treatment as an unreasonable\\n delay on the part of the Department. The delay in granting Ms.\\n Mullin the accommodation of full-time work from home was\\n therefore approximately three months.\\n The parties also dispute whether the Department provided\\n Ms. Mullin a reasonable accommodation for her medical condi-\\n tions. Ms. Mullin “bears the burden of identifying an accommoda-\\n tion, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows [her]\\n to perform the job’s essential functions.” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255–\\n 56. The record indicates that before the cancer diagnosis and upon\\n her return from the cancer treatment, the Department addressed\\n each of Ms. Mullin’s accommodation requests and provided her\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n with an accommodation. Many of these accommodations were in\\n direct response to Ms. Mullin’s own requests and suggestions. For\\n example, before Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis, the Department al-\\n tered her in-office work schedule, moved her workstation to a dif-\\n ferent part of the building, and provided her with an air purifier.\\n And in response to Ms. Mullin submitting an FMLA leave request\\n that included her doctor recommending that she “be allowed to\\n work from home with periodic trips to the work site as required,”\\n the Department formalized a three-day work from home schedule\\n for Ms. Mullin.\\n Upon returning to work in January 2013, Ms. Mullin and the\\n Department resumed the interactive process to identify a reasona-\\n ble accommodation for her medical needs. Between January and\\n April of 2013, and in response to Ms. Mullin’s complaints and re-\\n quests, the Department moved Ms. Mullin’s workstation to an-\\n other part of the building and provided her with two additional air\\n purifiers. It also further modified her schedule to permit her to\\n work from home four days a week and to only come to the office\\n on Friday for four hours in the morning. When these accommo-\\n dations were unsatisfactory to Ms. Mullin, the Department permit-\\n ted her to fully work from home and exchange work-related docu-\\n ments with another employee at the building on Fridays.\\n In reaching our conclusion, we find our reasoning in Sol-\\n loway persuasive. There, an employee suffered from post-trau-\\n matic stress disorder (PTSD) from a past sexual assault. See 738 F.\\n App’x at 986. The employee later learned that her direct supervisor\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n was reprimanded for watching pornography at the workplace,\\n which triggered the employee’s PTSD. See id. The employee re-\\n quested an accommodation to work from home full-time as a re-\\n sult. See id. While that request was pending, the employee re-\\n ceived several accommodations to ensure that she would avoid her\\n direct supervisor, including teleworking on days her direct super-\\n visor was in the office and moving her office away from his. See id.\\n The employer allowed these accommodations to continue for two\\n years, even after the employee’s request to work from home full-\\n time was denied. See id. at 986–87. The employee made a second\\n request to work from home full-time, which was denied again. See\\n id. at 987. The employee was later placed on paid administrative\\n leave with full benefits after the employer determined she was un-\\n able to perform the essential functions of her job. See id. The em-\\n ployee was ultimately reinstated and allowed to work from home\\n full-time when her employer’s work from home policy changed.\\n See id.\\n We determined that the employer did not violate the Reha-\\n bilitation Act by denying the employee’s request to telework full\\n time. See id. at 988. Specifically, we concluded that “[a]lthough the\\n [employer] denied her specific request for full-time telework, it not\\n only allowed her to continue teleworking part-time but also re-\\n quired [her direct supervisor] to telework part-time on an alternate\\n schedule so that she would not encounter him.” Id. We also noted\\n that the employee “eventually received her preferred accommoda-\\n tion of full-time telework” and never lost her job. See id. We\\n thought it “unreasonable” to require the employer to “guarantee\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n that [the employee] would never encounter [her direct supervi-\\n sor].” Id.\\n Here Ms. Mullin requested accommodations that would re-\\n duce her exposure to the building to avoid triggering her respira-\\n tory conditions. In response, the Department provided several ac-\\n commodations, including moving her workstation, providing her\\n with air purifiers, and modifying her in-office schedule to reduce\\n exposure. When Ms. Mullin complained that a certain accommo-\\n dation was ineffective or not satisfactory, the Department made\\n further adjustments to accommodate her. Although these accom-\\n modations may not have been the ones Ms. Mullin desired—e.g.,\\n to work from home full-time—the Department was only required\\n to provide a reasonable accommodation that allowed her “to per-\\n form the essential functions of the job.” See id. at 987; see also Ow-\\n ens, 52 F.4th at 1335 (noting that a reasonable accommodation\\n must be “mutually agreeable to the parties”); D’Onofrio v. Costco\\n Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n em-\\n ployer is not required to accommodate an employee in any manner\\n that the employee desires—or even provide that employee’s pre-\\n ferred accommodation.”). Moreover, the Department ultimately\\n granted Ms. Mullin’s desired accommodation to work from home\\n full time, just like the employer in Solloway. See 738 F. App’x at 988\\n (noting that the employee “eventually received her preferred ac-\\n commodation of full-time telework”).\\n The Department made reasonable efforts to accommodate\\n Ms. Mullin, and continually expanded her accommodations when\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n she complained. Ms. Mullin’s dissatisfaction with the accommoda-\\n tions she received does not, by itself, create an issue of fact with\\n respect to her claim of disability discrimination. As we have noted,\\n “a qualified individual with a disability is not entitled to the accom-\\n modation of her choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation.”\\n Solloway, 738 F. App’x at 988 (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman’s\\n Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also\\n D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022 (“Of course, there are limits to the ac-\\n commodations an employer must provide. . . . [A]n employer is not\\n required to accommodate an employee in any manner that the em-\\n ployee desires—or even provide that employee’s preferred accom-\\n modation.”). Moreover, an employer is not required to provide\\n “the maximum accommodation or every conceivable accommoda-\\n tion possible.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285–86 (quoting Lewis v. Zilog,\\n Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1995)). The employee is only\\n entitled to a reasonable accommodation, not to the accommoda-\\n tion of her choice. See id. at 1286.\\n Some courts have held that an unreasonable delay in provid-\\n ing an accommodation can violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation\\n Act. See generally Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C.\\n Cir. 2010) (citing cases). In assessing claims of unreasonable delay,\\n courts consider “the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,\\n whether the employer has offered any alternative accommodations\\n while evaluating a particular request, and whether the employer\\n has acted in good faith.” Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d\\n 1249, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2001). Here the three-month delay in\\n granting Ms. Mullin the requested accommodation of full-time\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n work from home was not unreasonable, particularly given the in-\\n termediate additional accommodations provided by the Depart-\\n ment in early 2013 (the moving of the workstation, the placement\\n of two additional air purifiers in her workstation, and the modifica-\\n tion of her in-office schedule). Cf. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24,\\n 34 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating that a three-month delay in granting\\n a telework accommodation was not a “long delay”).\\n The district court did not err in granting summary judgment\\n to the Department on the failure to accommodate theory.\\n B. Unlawful Disclosure Claim\\n Ms. Mullin claimed that the Department failed to protect\\n and unlawfully disclosed her confidential and sensitive medical in-\\n formation. The district court granted summary judgment for the\\n Department as to the disclosure claim. We conclude, however,\\n that it erred in doing so because Ms. Mullin presented sufficient ev-\\n idence to create issues of fact.\\n 1. Legal Standard\\n The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the confidentiality pro-\\n visions of the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d). In general,\\n “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual\\n on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions,\\n and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Moreover,\\n “[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and\\n shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such em-\\n ployee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or sever-\\n ity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A).\\n The relevant regulation similarly states that “[a] covered en-\\n tity may require a medical examination (and/or inquiry) of an em-\\n ployee that is job-related and consistent with business necessity. A\\n covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an employee\\n to perform job-related functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). Infor-\\n mation obtained from an employee through a medical examination\\n or inquiry “shall be collected and maintained on separate forms and\\n in separate medical files and be treated as a confidential medical\\n record . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1). The Rehabilitation Act sim-\\n ilarly provides that the information obtained is generally “treated\\n as a confidential medical record” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B),\\n subject to limited exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C).\\n We have not addressed whether there is a private right of\\n action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). But we have “explicitly rec-\\n ognize[d] that a plaintiff has a private right of action under 42\\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), irrespective of . . . disability status.” Harrison\\n v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.\\n 2010). We have also noted that “§ 12112(d)(2)(A) and (d)(4)(A) are\\n parallel provisions with similar language and virtually identical pro-\\n hibitions concerning medical inquiries . . . [and] proof of damages\\n requirement . . . .” Russell v. City of Mobile Police Dep’t, 552 F. App’x\\n 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 3\\n\\n\\n 3 Russell is unpublished, but we find it persuasive.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n We therefore recognize a private right of action under 42\\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) irrespective of disability status. See Owusu-An-\\n sah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2013) (imply-\\n ing a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) and rec-\\n ognizing “that § 12112(d)(4)(A) [also] protects employees who are\\n not disabled”); see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906–07 (“An em-\\n ployee may raise a § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim whether or not she is dis-\\n abled . . . [and] the proof of damages requirement set in Harrison\\n equally applies to cases involving allegedly improper inquiries un-\\n der § 12112(d)(4)(A).”). To bring a claim under § 12112(d)(4), an\\n employee must show that (1) the employer either made an unlaw-\\n ful inquiry in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) or violated its confiden-\\n tiality requirements after making a proper inquiry under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), and (2) the employee suffered a tangible injury\\n from the unlawful inquiry or disclosure. See 42 U.S.C.\\n § 12112(d)(4); Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906.\\n 2. Ms. Mullin’s Claim\\n To get to a jury on her unlawful disclosure claim under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), Ms. Mullin must present sufficient evidence to\\n create issues of fact on whether the Department made a proper in-\\n quiry into her medical condition, whether the Department dis-\\n closed the results of that inquiry to persons in violation of the Re-\\n habilitation Act, and whether she suffered a tangible injury because\\n of the unlawful disclosure. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C); Russell,\\n 552 F. App’x at 906. The district court ruled that Ms. Mullin failed\\n to show that she suffered any harm because of the Department’s\\n alleged improper disclosure by Ms. Wax. As a result, the district\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n court did not address whether the Department made an inquiry; it\\n noted, however, in a footnote that it was “not at all convinced” that\\n an inquiry occurred when Ms. Mullin disclosed her medical infor-\\n mation in a required FMLA form requesting leave for her cancer\\n treatment.\\n On appeal, the Department argues that Ms. Mullin’s unlaw-\\n ful disclosure claim fails because it did not make an inquiry in the\\n first place. The Department contends that it did not make an in-\\n quiry because the FMLA leave form “is not an inquiry that is in-\\n tended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability [as] an em-\\n ployee could be eligible for FMLA leave based on a serious medical\\n condition that is not considered a disability . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at\\n 42. The Department alternatively argues that “[e]ven if an inquiry\\n was made,” it remains entitled to summary judgment because Ms.\\n Mullin failed to show that her medical condition was confidential\\n at the time of the disclosure and because she failed to establish that\\n she suffered a tangible injury from the disclosure.\\n We disagree with the Department’s arguments. Viewing\\n the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin as the nonmov-\\n ing party, see Williams, 64 F.4th at 1188, we believe that an inquiry\\n was made and that there are issues of fact as to whether there was\\n an unlawful disclosure stemming from that inquiry.\\n a. Whether There Was an Inquiry\\n As a general matter, an employer must request a medical ex-\\n amination or inquire into an employee’s medical status for there to\\n be an “inquiry” under the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). An employee’s voluntary\\n disclosure of a medical diagnosis to a supervisor or co-worker is not\\n an examination or inquiry for purposes of § 12112(d)(4). See Cash\\n v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no unlawful\\n disclosure where the matter disclosed at issue “was not of the result\\n of an examination ordered by [the employer], but of a voluntary\\n disclosure” by the employee to the employer).\\n We have not previously addressed whether an employee’s\\n disclosure of confidential medical information in an FMLA leave\\n form constitutes an inquiry by the employer within the meaning of\\n the Rehabilitation Act. We now hold that when an employer con-\\n ditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave on the\\n submission of medical information, that is an “inquiry” under\\n § 12112(d)(4). The statute prohibits employers from making medi-\\n cal inquiries unless they are job-related and consistent with busi-\\n ness necessity. That restriction cannot be avoided simply because\\n the employer’s demand for information is embedded in the me-\\n chanics of leave approval.\\n This conclusion is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s reason-\\n ing in Doe v. United States Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir.\\n 2003). In Doe, an employee of the United States Postal Service\\n missed several weeks of work due to an AIDS-related illness. See\\n id. at 341. The employee’s direct supervisor sent the employee a\\n letter regarding his extended absence and attached a Department\\n of Labor Form WH 380 (the FMLA form)—the same form that Ms.\\n Mullin completed—stating that the employee’s “condition may\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n qualify [him] to be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Poli-\\n cies.” Id. The employee completed the FMLA form and disclosed\\n his HIV status on it. See id. When the employee returned to work,\\n he learned that several co-workers were aware of his HIV status,\\n and several of them identified a supervisor to whom he had not\\n disclosed his status as the source of the information. See id. The\\n employee sued under the Rehabilitation Act and the Privacy Act.\\n See id. The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for\\n summary judgment in part because it concluded that the FMLA\\n form was not an employer inquiry. The D.C. Circuit disagreed and\\n reversed.\\n The D.C. Circuit held in Doe that the FMLA form was an\\n inquiry and explained that the employee “revealed his medical di-\\n agnosis . . . only after the [Postal] Service, through his direct super-\\n visor, told him in writing that he would face disciplinary proceed-\\n ings unless he completed either the FMLA form or a medical cer-\\n tificate explaining” the nature of his illness. Id. at 344. The D.C.\\n Circuit reasoned that even if the employee could “be said to have\\n submitted the FMLA request voluntarily, . . . that hardly mean[t]\\n he volunteered his medical diagnosis.” Id. The D.C. Circuit went\\n on to conclude that “[t]he Postal Service conditioned [the em-\\n ployee’s] receipt of FMLA leave on his submission of supporting\\n medical documentation, as the FMLA authorized it to do. . . . [I]t\\n was thus the Postal Service, acting pursuant to this statutory au-\\n thorization, not [the employee], that initiated the inquiry into his\\n medical condition by asking for this medical certification.” Id. Be-\\n cause the Postal Service conditioned eligibility for FMLA leave on\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n the employee disclosing medical information that established eligi-\\n bility, the FMLA form constituted an “inquiry.” See id. To hold\\n otherwise, the D.C. Circuit noted, would lead to employees being\\n forced “to choose between waiving their right to avoid being pub-\\n licly identified as having a disability and exercising their statutory\\n rights . . . .” Id.\\n The same reasoning applies here. The record shows that in\\n March 2012 Ms. Mullin sought a work-from-home accommodation\\n and also applied for FMLA leave related to her asthma.4 On March\\n 14, 2012, the Department approved her FMLA leave, totaling 12\\n work weeks, and told her, “If it should become necessary for you\\n to extend your entitlement beyond the current certification, you\\n will be required to provide an updated physician’s statement from\\n your healthcare provider.”\\n A March 14 memorandum from Human Resources to Vet-\\n erans Service Center Manager Sandra Smith also recounted that\\n “The employee was informed (in writing) by Human Resources\\n that new medical documentation will be required if their leave ex-\\n ceeds the amount recommended by the Health Care Provider.” A\\n few lines later, the memorandum says, “It is the responsibility of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 On March 13, an internal email chain that the Department appended to its\\n\\n motion for summary judgment stated that “Maybe [the Department] can\\n move [Mullin’s accommodation request] quickly if there is med[ical] documen-\\n tation to support[ it.]” (emphasis added).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n the supervisor to . . . [n]otify the employee that new medical doc-\\n umentation is required when leave usage is not intermittent as de-\\n fined by the Health Care Provider.”\\n On March 20, 2012, the Department approved her work-\\n from-home accommodation for three days working from home\\n and two days working in the office. The approval form stated that\\n Reasonable accommodations are an interactive pro-\\n cess requiring communication to ensure that the ac-\\n commodation continues to meet your workplace re-\\n quirements. As a result, the agency may periodically\\n ask you to provide updated medical evidence to es-\\n tablish whether the accommodation should continue\\n and/or be changed. If your condition changes, or if a\\n change in the accommodation is warranted, it is your\\n responsibility to notify human resources.\\n On March 23, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor submitted an FMLA\\n form disclosing her cancer diagnosis and stating that she would be\\n out continuously for six months. On April 9, 2012, the Department\\n approved that request but noted that she was not eligible for a new\\n 12-week allotment of leave until her prior entitlement period for\\n her previously-approved FMLA leave expired. That letter, like the\\n first, told Ms. Mullin that “If it should become necessary for you to\\n extend your entitlement beyond the current certification of 30\\n days, you may be required to provide an updated physician’s state-\\n ment from your healthcare provider.”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n In short, the record shows that when Ms. Mullin requested\\n leave, the Department told her approval required submission of ad-\\n ditional medical documentation. 5 So when Ms. Mullin was diag-\\n nosed with cancer, she simply did what the Department had al-\\n ready told her she must do: submit medical documentation. She\\n did not volunteer the information; she disclosed it because, under\\n the Department’s previous letters, it was apparent that disclosing\\n the information was the only way to maintain her leave and her\\n pay. Accord Doe, 317 F.3d at 344. That kind of disclosure is not\\n “voluntary” in any meaningful sense. See id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Ms. Mullin’s brief stated that the Department required her to complete an\\n\\n FMLA form to receive her statutory leave. The Department did not dispute\\n that in its answer brief. Rather, it accepted the premise and argued only that:\\n “[Ms. Mullin] claims that the VA made an inquiry when it required her to dis-\\n close medical information in an FMLA certification form in order to obtain\\n FMLA leave. . . . But, as a matter of law, that form is not an inquiry . . . .” At\\n oral argument, Ms. Mullin’s counsel reaffirmed that the Department required\\n employees to submit an FMLA form as a precondition to taking leave. The\\n Department again did not dispute the point, instead reiterating its position that\\n requiring an FMLA form is never an inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act.\\n We thus take as undisputed that the Department’s policy required employees\\n to submit an FMLA form to obtain leave. We express no view on situations\\n where no policy or practice requires employees to submit medical documen-\\n tation to exercise their statutory right to leave. Contra Dissenting Op. at 3\\n (incorrectly recasting our holding as “any time an FMLA form is submitted—\\n regardless of whether the employee submits it voluntarily or at the request of the\\n employer—there is an inquiry by the employer under § 12112(d)” (emphases\\n added)).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n The upshot is that when an employee must share medical\\n information to receive benefits guaranteed by law, the require-\\n ment operates as an inquiry by the employer. We therefore hold\\n that, as a matter of law, there was an inquiry here.\\n The partial dissent reaches a different conclusion, but it blurs\\n two distinct legal questions: whether the Department made a med-\\n ical inquiry, and whether it later disclosed information obtained\\n through that inquiry. Those questions are analytically separate.\\n The first concerns the scope of employer conduct regulated by\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); the second involves whether the employer vio-\\n lated its confidentiality obligations under § 12112(d)(4)(C). We ad-\\n dress only the first here and conclude that the Department did\\n make an inquiry.\\n The partial dissent’s reasoning rests on the premise that Ms.\\n Mullin’s (possible) earlier, voluntary disclosure of her cancer diag-\\n nosis forecloses a finding that the Department later initiated an in-\\n quiry. 6 But nothing in the statute supports the result. Section\\n 12112(d)(4) prohibits employers from making medical inquiries un-\\n less they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. It\\n does not say—expressly or by implication—that an employee’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 It bears repeating that the Department’s only argument on the inquiry issue\\n\\n is that an FMLA form is not an inquiry as a matter of law. See supra note 5.\\n Unlike the partial dissent, neither the Department nor Ms. Mullin has ever\\n argued that a factual dispute about a prior voluntary disclosure has any bearing\\n on the inquiry analysis.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n prior voluntary disclosure prevents a finding of a subsequent statu-\\n tory inquiry. And the partial dissent cites no case adopting that\\n theory.7\\n To the extent Ms. Mullin disclosed her diagnosis before sub-\\n mitting the FMLA form, that fact bears on whether the Depart-\\n ment unlawfully disclosed confidential information under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C). But it has no bearing on whether an inquiry oc-\\n curred under § 12112(d)(4)(A). The statute treats those as distinct\\n questions, and so must we. If both a prior voluntary disclosure and\\n a later inquiry happened, the proper question is whether the disclo-\\n sure stemmed from the inquiry (which is prohibited by the Act) or\\n from the voluntary disclosure (which is not covered by the Act).\\n The partial dissent’s contrary approach would create a\\n sweeping exception. Employers could bypass the Rehabilitation\\n Act’s inquiry safeguards by seizing on a prior voluntary disclosure\\n and treating all future demands for medical documentation as out-\\n side the statute’s reach. But where, as here, an employer requires\\n medical information as a condition of leave approval, that demand\\n qualifies as a statutory inquiry—regardless of any earlier voluntary\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 The partial dissent’s reliance on Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2001),\\n\\n only underscores the distinction between an inquiry and a voluntary disclo-\\n sure. There, we held that the employer was not liable because the challenged\\n disclosure involved information the employee had volunteered—not infor-\\n mation obtained through an inquiry. Id. at 1307–08. Neither Cash nor any\\n case the partial dissent cites supports the proposition that a prior voluntary\\n disclosure forecloses the possibility of a later statutory inquiry.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n disclosure. That conclusion follows from both the text and struc-\\n ture of the Act.\\n b. Whether There Was an Unlawful Disclosure\\n Having found that the Department made an inquiry into Ms.\\n Mullin’s medical condition, Ms. Mullin must now show that confi-\\n dential information from that inquiry was disclosed in violation of\\n the Rehabilitation Act. The district court did not address whether\\n Ms. Wax’s disclosure to Mr. Crump of Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagno-\\n sis amounted to an unlawful disclosure.\\n The Department argues that summary judgment is appro-\\n priate because Ms. Mullin failed to show that her cancer diagnosis\\n was confidential. It maintains that there is no proof that Mr.\\n Crump’s knowledge of Ms. Mullin’s diagnosis came first from Ms.\\n Wax, and that Ms. Mullin told other people about her cancer diag-\\n nosis before she received Mr. Crump’s email.\\n Given that we are in a summary judgment posture and must\\n view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Ms.\\n Mullin, we are unpersuaded by the Department’s argument. There\\n is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find that Ms. Wax\\n was the source of the allegedly unlawful disclosure and that she\\n obtained the information from the FMLA form. First, an internal\\n Department memorandum approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA leave\\n request for her cancer diagnosis, which was dated before Mr.\\n Crump’s email and signed by Ms. Wax, stated that “[t]he specific\\n medical condition was intentionally left off . . . to avoid accidental\\n disclosure.” Second, Mr. Crump’s email to Ms. Mullin—which\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 31 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n came after the Department had approved Mr. Mullin’s FMLA re-\\n quest—stated that Mr. Crump and Ms. Wax discussed Ms. Mullin’s\\n cancer diagnosis. Third, although Ms. Mullin said she spoke to a\\n few people—including friends outside of work and doctors—about\\n her diagnosis, there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Crump learned\\n of her diagnosis from anyone other than Ms. Wax. Of course, shar-\\n ing a medical condition with a few relatives or close friends does\\n not, as a matter of law, make the condition non-confidential.\\n Fourth, Ms. Mullin testified that she never told Ms. Wax about her\\n cancer diagnosis.\\n There is also an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Crump\\n learned of the cancer diagnosis before Ms. Mullin told anyone at\\n work. In cases involving disclosure of confidential information\\n from private records, circumstantial evidence may suffice to defeat\\n a motion for summary judgment, as “plaintiffs can rarely produce\\n direct evidence that the government has disclosed confidential in-\\n formation obtained from their private records . . . .” Doe, 317 F.3d\\n at 343. The D.C. Circuit in Doe, for example, found that the em-\\n ployee presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a gen-\\n uine issue of fact as to when and from whom “his HIV status had\\n become common knowledge among his co-workers,” including\\n that the disclosure came after he submitted the FMLA form and\\n that the source of the information was from a specific manage-\\n ment-level supervisor. Id. at 341–43. Here, a reasonable jury could\\n find that Ms. Wax disclosed Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis to Mr.\\n Crump after the FMLA form was submitted. As a result, Ms.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 32 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Mullin survives summary judgment on the inquiry and disclosure\\n aspects of her unlawful disclosure claim.\\n c. Whether Ms. Mullin Suffered a Tangible Injury\\n For Ms. Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim to proceed past\\n summary judgment, she must also show (or create an issue of fact)\\n that she suffered a tangible injury from the alleged unlawful disclo-\\n sure of her cancer diagnosis. The district court believed that Ms.\\n Mullin failed to present “more than a scintilla of evidence of a tan-\\n gible injury resulting from the alleged disclosure of her breast can-\\n cer diagnosis.” We disagree.\\n To succeed on an unlawful disclosure claim, a “plaintiff\\n [must] at least show some damages (emotional, pecuniary, or oth-\\n erwise) caused by a § 12112(d) violation.” Harrison, 593 F.3d at\\n 1216–17; see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 907 (holding that an em-\\n ployee who alleges an unlawful disclosure in violation of\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A) “must show damages—emotional, pecuniary, or\\n otherwise”). As one of our sister circuits aptly stated, in the\\n § 12112(d)(2)(A) context the “damages liability . . . must be based\\n on something more than a mere violation of that provision. There\\n must be some cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is a\\n legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single viola-\\n tion.” Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir.\\n 1998); see also, e.g., Hustvet v. Allina Health Sys., 910 F.3d 399, 406–\\n 07 (8th Cir. 2018) (“If a violation occurs, it is not necessary that an\\n applicant be disabled to bring a claim under § 12112(d). The appli-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 33 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n cant must, however, establish the prospective employer’s ‘viola-\\n tion of the ADA caused some sort of tangible injury.’” (quoting Cos-\\n sette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1999))); Tice\\n v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting\\n that some circuits require a showing of the “existence of an injury-\\n in-fact,” such as “actual damage[s] (emotional, pecuniary, or other-\\n wise)” for a plaintiff to have a cause of action for a violation of\\n § 12112(d)).\\n Ms. Mullin alleged that she suffered emotional distress be-\\n cause of the alleged unlawful disclosure of her cancer diagnosis.\\n She testified as follows during her deposition concerning her emo-\\n tional distress:\\n Q. . . . Can you tell me how . . . Mrs. Wax’s conversa-\\n tion with [Mr.] Crump about your cancer and your\\n health issues harmed you?\\n A. It still harms me.\\n Q. And how did it harm you?\\n A. I had cancer and I just had to get things in order so\\n I could treat my cancer. And Bonnie [Wax] had to\\n interject her issues around the building and defending\\n the building and she-- my surgery, the first one, I went\\n under anesthesia worried about Bonnie Wax and\\n what she was going to do to me. I came out of anes-\\n thesia that way. I spent more time crying and con-\\n cerned. At times I had no pay, nothing, and I never\\n knew if I’d get paid. The anxiety-- what the anxiety\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 34 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n did to my body and my brain and her callousness. It\\n was breast cancer. . . .\\n Q. . . . So is there any other way that the conversation\\n between Mrs. Wax and [Mr.] Crump harmed you or\\n affected you?\\n A. Did the conversation between-- it distracted me\\n from caring for myself. It distracted me from honor-\\n ing my body and focusing on healing and health.\\n This testimony was enough to withstand summary judgment on\\n the injury aspect of the unlawful disclosure claim. See Walters v.\\n Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642, 648 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Walters’s deposi-\\n tion testimony describing his lost time, economic harm, and emo-\\n tional distress is sufficient evidence . . . to survive summary judg-\\n ment.”).\\n Although documentation of emotional distress is not re-\\n quired, see id., we note that the record also contains two letters\\n from the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation\\n Programs updating Ms. Mullin’s medical conditions in her file. The\\n first is a letter dated October 26, 2015, which updates her diagnosed\\n conditions to include PTSD. The second is a letter dated February\\n 2, 2017, which updates her diagnosed conditions to include major\\n depressive disorder. Ms. Mullin does not rely on these two letters\\n to support her claim of a tangible injury and it is unclear whether\\n either diagnosis is related to her unlawful disclosure claim. But if\\n those diagnoses are connected to the alleged unlawful disclosure, a\\n jury could reasonably find that Ms. Mullin suffered a tangible injury\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 35 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n from the disclosure—for example, anxiety that developed into\\n PTSD and/or depression.8\\n In short, there are issues of fact as to whether Ms. Wax im-\\n properly disclosed Ms. Mullin’s confidential cancer diagnosis,\\n whether Ms. Wax obtained that information from the FMLA form\\n or from Ms. Mullin’s voluntary disclosure, and whether Ms. Mullin\\n suffered a tangible injury as a result. The district court erred in\\n granting summary judgment in favor of the Department on Ms.\\n Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim.\\n C. Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment Claims\\n Ms. Mullin asserted claims of retaliation (and/or a retalia-\\n tory hostile work environment) based on her disability. We agree\\n with the district court that the Department was entitled to sum-\\n mary judgment on these claims. We address retaliation first and\\n then move on to retaliatory hostile work environment.\\n 1. Retaliation\\n To establish a claim of retaliation, Ms. Mullin must prove\\n that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, that she suffered\\n a materially adverse action, and that there was some causal relation\\n between the two events. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998\\n F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021). As to the second element, she\\n must show that the adverse action “well might have dissuaded a\\n\\n\\n 8 Because the parties did not brief whether Ms. Mullin’s diagnoses of PTSD\\n\\n and depression were caused by or related to the alleged unlawful disclosure of\\n her cancer diagnosis, we do not decide that question here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 36 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrim-\\n ination.” Monahgan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th\\n Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548\\n U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).\\n The district court granted the Department’s motion for\\n summary judgment on the retaliation claim because it concluded\\n that Ms. Mullin had not established a causal connection between\\n protected activity and any materially adverse action. We need not\\n reach this issue because Ms. Mullin’s retaliation claim is simply a\\n claim for a failure to accommodate disguised as retaliation.\\n Ms. Mullin’s theory is that the Department’s alleged denial\\n of her requests for accommodation was retaliatory. See Appellant’s\\n Br. at 42. This is merely an attempt to reassert a disability discrim-\\n ination claim, which we have explained will not itself sustain a\\n claim of retaliation. See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1261 (“Lucas also con-\\n tends that Grainger took adverse action against him by failing to\\n reasonably accommodate him . . . . But this contention merely re-\\n clothes Lucas’ ADA discrimination claim, which we have already\\n rejected, and it fares no better in this garb.”); see also Stewart, 117\\n F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he acts Stewart describes relate directly to her\\n ‘reasonable accommodation’ discrimination claim, not her retalia-\\n tion claim, and accordingly provide no basis for denying summary\\n judgment on this issue.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s\\n grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 37 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n 2. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment\\n As the district court noted, we have not opined on whether\\n a retaliatory hostile work environment claim can be properly as-\\n serted under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. We need not re-\\n solve that issue here because even if such a claim is cognizable, Ms.\\n Mullin has failed to identify any issues of fact with respect to the\\n essential elements of that claim.\\n To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff\\n must establish that (1) that she belongs to a protected group;\\n (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the\\n harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) that the\\n harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the terms\\n and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abu-\\n sive working environment; and (5) that her employer was respon-\\n sible under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Reeves\\n v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc). The fourth element—whether the harassment was suf-\\n ficiently severe or pervasive—has a subjective component and an\\n objective component. See id. at 809. This means that the employee\\n must “subjectively perceive” the harassment as severe or pervasive\\n enough to change the terms or conditions of employment, and this\\n perception must be objectively reasonable. See id. at 808–09. In\\n assessing the objective component, we consider the allegedly dis-\\n criminatory conduct’s “frequency . . . ; its severity; whether it is\\n physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-\\n ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 38 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n work performance.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.\\n 17, 23 (1993)).\\n Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin,\\n we agree with the district court that she did not provide evidence\\n demonstrating how the Department’s handling of her continued\\n requests for accommodations was sufficiently “severe or perva-\\n sive.” Ms. Mullin’s allegations reflect her dissatisfaction with the\\n many accommodations the Department provided at her request\\n for her ongoing issues. Although the accommodations Ms. Mullin\\n received before she was eventually granted permission to fully\\n work from home may not have been exactly what she wanted, a\\n jury could not reasonably find that the Department’s attempts to\\n accommodate Ms. Mullin were sufficiently severe and pervasive so\\n as to be objectively hostile and abusive. Accordingly, the district\\n court did not err in granting summary judgment on the hostile\\n work environment claim based on disability. 9\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We affirm the district court’s summary judgment order as\\n to Ms. Mullin’s claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and\\n retaliatory hostile work environment. We reverse the district\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 We need not address whether Ms. Mullin established the other necessary\\n\\n elements of a hostile work of environment claim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 39 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 39\\n\\n court’s summary judgment order as to Ms. Mullin’s unlawful dis-\\n closure claim and remand for further proceedings on that claim.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and\\n REMANDED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 40 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229755/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring:\\n I write separately to flag a defect that, while not raised on\\n appeal, jumps off the page: Ms. Mullin’s complaint is a shotgun\\n pleading. It should not have proceeded as written.\\n The body of the complaint spans 38 pages and includes 184\\n numbered paragraphs. The factual narrative begins at paragraph 12\\n and runs through paragraph 158. These allegations cover a host of\\n subjects—workplace interactions, asthma attacks, accommodation\\n requests, medical disclosures, and more. Each of the complaint’s\\n four counts—though resting on different legal theories—incorpo-\\n rates the entire factual section wholesale. And they go further still.\\n Count 11 incorporates paragraphs 1 through 159, which in-\\n cludes every paragraph leading up to and including the opening\\n line of Count 1 itself. Count 22 incorporates paragraphs 1 through\\n 165, sweeping in the full factual narrative and most of Count 1.\\n Count 3 3 does the same. Count 4 4 goes even further. It first alleges\\n that “[t]he allegations in paragraphs 1–167 are realleged as if set\\n forth fully herein” and then again states that “Defendant is liable\\n\\n 1 Count 1 alleges disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. It com-\\n\\n prises paragraphs 159 through 167.\\n 2 Count 2 alleges a failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act. It\\n\\n comprises paragraphs 168 through 172.\\n 3 Count 3 alleges an unlawful disclosure under the Rehabilitation Act. It com-\\n\\n prises paragraphs 173 through 178.\\n 4 Count 4 alleges a hostile work environment under Title VII. It comprises\\n\\n paragraphs 179 through 184.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 41 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 22-12354\\n\\n for the retaliation alleged herein including, but not limited to, par-\\n agraphs 1 through 159.” The result: every count is tethered to\\n every fact, no matter how irrelevant.\\n And the sprawl does not end there. Appended to the com-\\n plaint are 53 exhibits spanning 930 pages. 5 Those exhibits are refer-\\n enced throughout the complaint and—because each count adopts\\n the factual narrative wholesale—every reference to each exhibit is\\n swept into every count by incorporation.\\n Ms. Mullin’s complaint is not a “short and plain statement of\\n the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.\\n P. 8(a)(2). It is a mockery of our pleading standards and a paradig-\\n matic shotgun pleading. 6 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898\\n F.3d 1348, 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2018).\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to\\n\\n a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”).\\n 6 We have identified four types of shotgun pleadings. First “is a complaint con-\\n\\n taining multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preced-\\n ing counts.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th\\n Cir. 2015). Second “is a complaint that [is] replete with conclusory, vague, and\\n immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.”\\n Id. at 1322. Third “is one that commits the sin of not separating into a different\\n count each cause of action or claim for relief.” Id. at 1323. And fourth “is the\\n relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants\\n without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or\\n omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. The\\n complaint here falls into the first category. See id. at 1321 n.11 (listing similar\\n cases).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 42 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n We have repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings because\\n they “violate[] either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or\\n Rule 10(b), or both.” Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th\\n Cir. 2021). These rules serve a purpose:\\n to require the pleader to present his claims discretely\\n and succinctly, so that, his adversary can discern what\\n he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the\\n court can determine which facts support which\\n claims and whether the plaintiff has stated any claims\\n upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the\\n court can determine that evidence which is relevant\\n and that which is not.\\n T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins., 760 F.2d 1520, 1543 n.14 (11th Cir.\\n 1985) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).\\n This case illustrates the problem. Count 3, for example, al-\\n leges that the Department violated the Rehabilitation Act by dis-\\n closing Ms. Mullin’s breast cancer diagnosis. That count hinges on\\n a single alleged disclosure. Yet it incorporates over a hundred par-\\n agraphs of unrelated material—allegations about asthma, delayed\\n accommodations, and intra-office conflict. That indiscriminate in-\\n corporation muddies the claim, burdens the defense, and invites\\n the court to sift through the narrative to reconstruct a viable the-\\n ory. That is not the court’s role, 7 and it is not the defendant’s bur-\\n den. It is the plaintiff’s obligation “to separate the wheat from the\\n\\n 7 “[D]istrict courts are flatly forbidden from scouring shotgun complaints to\\n\\n craft a potentially viable claim for a plaintiff. By digging through a complaint\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 43 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 22-12354\\n\\n chaff.” See Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir.\\n 2014); Est. of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc., 947 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir.\\n 2020).\\n The strain that shotgun pleadings impose on the judiciary is\\n substantial. As I explained, “[t]he federal judiciary is a system of\\n scarce resources, and ‘it is not the proper function of courts in this\\n Circuit to parse out incomprehensible allegations.’” Barmapov, 986\\n F.3d at 1327–28 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (quoting Est. of Bass, 947\\n F.3d at 1358) (alterations adopted). “Our district courts have nei-\\n ther the manpower nor the time to sift through a morass of irrele-\\n vant facts in order to piece together claims for plaintiff’s counsel.”\\n Id.; see also id. at 1327 (explaining that it “may seem like strong med-\\n icine” to “dispos[e] of . . . otherwise viable claims because a plain-\\n tiff’s lawyer pled too many facts” but “it is strong medicine . . . for\\n good reason”).\\n “The persistence of the shotgun pleading problem is partic-\\n ularly frustrating because the relevant actors all have it within their\\n power to avoid it.” Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins., 748 F.3d 1117, 1127\\n (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs should not file them, defendants should\\n move to either dismiss them or request a more definite statement,\\n and district courts should sua sponte strike them. See id. at 1127–\\n\\n\\n in search of a valid claim, the courts ‘would give the appearance of lawyering\\n for one side of the controversy.’ This in turn, would cast doubt on the impar-\\n tiality of the judiciary. Such a result is plainly inconsistent with the oath to\\n which each judge has sworn.” Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1328 (Tjoflat, J., concur-\\n ring) (quoting Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1355 n.6).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 44 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 5\\n\\n 28; Vargas v. Lincare, Inc., 135 F.4th 1150, 1163 (11th Cir. 2025)\\n (Tjoflat, J., concurring). Inexplicably, though, no party here exer-\\n cised those tools, and the shotgun complaint advanced without\\n challenge. That is unacceptable.\\n We have been crystal clear: when faced with a shotgun\\n pleading, the district court should require repleading. See, e.g., Est.\\n of Bass, 947 F.3d at 1358 (“[W]e have stated that a district court that\\n receives a shotgun pleading should strike it and instruct counsel to\\n replead the case—even if the other party does not move the court\\n to strike the pleading.” (citations omitted)). We have that rule be-\\n cause “[s]hotgun pleadings . . . exact an intolerable toll on the trial\\n court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchannelled discovery,\\n and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the\\n court’s parajudicial personnel and resources.” Cramer v. Florida, 117\\n F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997). Beyond the district court’s docket,\\n When a district court fails to squeeze a pleading down\\n and determine whether it complies with Rules 8(a)(2)\\n and 10(b), appellate courts are required to pore over\\n the record and rebuild the case from scratch. This is a\\n herculean undertaking: appellate courts are simply\\n too far removed from the underlying facts to com-\\n plete the task successfully and efficiently.\\n Barmapov, 986 F.3d at 1329 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).\\n The Department, too, should have known better than to let\\n the complaint pass without objection. Instead, it responded in kind.\\n Where Ms. Mullin incorporated by reference paragraphs wholly ir-\\n relevant to a given count, the Department incorporated answers\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 45 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 22-12354\\n\\n wholly irrelevant in turn. And “[r]ather than availing itself of the\\n protective tools in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [the De-\\n partment] responded to [Ms. Mullin’s] shotgun pleading with a\\n shotgun answer: [7] one-line affirmative defenses, none of which\\n refers to a particular count.” See Paylor, 748 F.3d at 1127. Yet be-\\n cause the Department never moved to dismiss the complaint,8 and\\n because Ms. Mullin never moved to strike any of the defenses un-\\n der Rule 12(f), the sufficiency of the defenses was never presented\\n to the District Court for resolution.\\n To be sure, the shotgun nature of the complaint is not before\\n us in this appeal. But that does not mean we should ignore it. We\\n have spent decades condemning these pleadings, and yet, they\\n keep coming. The rules are clear, the law is settled, and the conse-\\n quences are costly. We have put it where the goats can get it.\\n Enough is enough.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) requires that an attorney present\\n\\n defenses only when “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument\\n for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law.” The Department’s failure\\n to invoke—or even mention—these defenses in the course of litigation raises\\n a serious question whether they were in fact warranted under Rule 11.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 46 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part & Dissenting in Part 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229755/\", \"author_raw\": \"TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring\"}, {\"author\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part:\\n I join the majority’s opinion as to all but Part III.B. As to\\n Part III.B, I agree with some of the analysis but disagree with the\\n majority’s resolution of whether the Department initiated an in-\\n quiry for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).\\n Like the majority, I find Doe v. United States Postal Service, 317\\n F.3d 339, 343–45 (D.C. Cir. 2003), persuasive and believe it should\\n be followed insofar as it holds that an FMLA form can be an inquiry\\n under § 12112(d)(4) when it is provided by the employer to the em-\\n ployee without the employee having first disclosed her medical\\n condition. Nevertheless, the facts in Doe differ from those here and\\n that case therefore does not control the result here.\\n In Doe, the employer provided the FMLA form to the em-\\n ployee first in a letter regarding the employee’s extended absence.\\n See id. at 341. The employee subsequently submitted the form to\\n his employer and, upon returning to work, found out that his co-\\n workers had learned of his medical condition from a supervisor.\\n See id. Because the employee submitted the FMLA form in re-\\n sponse to the employer’s letter, and because the form asked for\\n medical information, the D.C. Circuit concluded that there was an\\n inquiry by the employer. See id. at 344.\\n The record before us in this case is not as clear, and there is\\n a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Department made an in-\\n quiry into Ms. Mullin’s medical condition, i.e., her cancer diagno-\\n sis. First, the record suggests that Ms. Mullin had previously told a\\n co-worker and Sandra Smith, a Veterans Service Center manager,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 47 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part & Dissenting in Part 22-12354\\n\\n of her cancer diagnosis. See, e.g., D.E. 32-2 at 12–13, 92. Second,\\n Ms. Mullin cannot recall whether the Department provided her\\n with the FMLA form and if so when. See id. at 89. Third, it looks\\n like Ms. Mullin voluntarily submitted the FMLA form to the De-\\n partment with the medical provider’s portion already completed,\\n and that portion set out her cancer diagnosis. See, e.g., id. at 89, 90–\\n 91.\\n As the majority explains, there were several communica-\\n tions from the Department indicating that Ms. Mullin was to pro-\\n vide an updated physician statement if she needed to extend her\\n previous requests for FMLA leave. And the FMLA form itself re-\\n quired Ms. Mullin to submit a medical certification to support her\\n request for leave. Yet the record indicates that the alleged disclo-\\n sure of Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis by Bonnie Wax took place on\\n March 3, 2012—meaning that the condition had been disclosed by\\n that date—and Ms. Mullin did not turn in her FMLA form before\\n March 23, 2012. Compare D.E. 34-1 at 163–64 (Ms. Wax’s sworn\\n testimony before the EEO investigator), with D.E. 32-2 at 490–94\\n (FMLA form).\\n We have previously stated that § 12112(d) does “not govern\\n voluntary disclosures initiated by the employee,” and instead “enu-\\n merates the situations in which an employer may require an em-\\n ployee to submit to a medical examination . . . [and] the results of\\n any such examination shall be considered confidential . . . .” Cash\\n v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1307–08 (11th Cir. 2011). Our sister circuits\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 48 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part & Dissenting in Part 3\\n\\n have similarly held that voluntary disclosures of medical infor-\\n mation—as opposed to those acquired from a medical inquiry or\\n examination first requested or ordered by the employer—do not\\n constitute an inquiry for purposes of § 12112(d). See, e.g., Taylor v.\\n City of Shreveport, 798 F.3d 276, 288 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Importantly,\\n § 12112(d) prohibits an employer from disclosing an employee’s\\n medical information only if the employer first acquired the infor-\\n mation as a result of a medical inquiry or examination as those terms\\n are defined in the ADA. If the employee voluntarily divulges the\\n medical information to the employer without the employer specif-\\n ically demanding the information first, . . . then the employer has\\n no duty under § 12112(d) to keep that information confidential.”);\\n E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1047 (10th Cir. 2011)\\n (noting that the statute “on its face, . . . does not apply to or protect\\n information that is voluntarily disclosed by an employee unless it is\\n elicited during an authorized employment-related medical exami-\\n nation or inquiry”).\\n As the majority apparently sees things, any time an FMLA\\n form is submitted—regardless of whether the employee submits it\\n voluntarily or at the request of the employer—there is an inquiry\\n by the employer under § 12112(d). If that view is correct, what\\n does a district court do in a case—much like in Cash and possibly\\n here—where the employee voluntarily discloses a medical condi-\\n tion to a colleague at work, that colleague then shares the infor-\\n mation with others, and the employee subsequently submits a re-\\n quest for leave by turning in an FMLA form? Should the district\\n court conclude that an inquiry occurred as a matter of law and that\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 49 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 JORDAN, J., Concurring in Part & Dissenting in Part 22-12354\\n\\n the employer failed to maintain the confidentiality of the medical\\n condition? Such a conclusion, in my view, is difficult to square with\\n our decision in Cash, 231 F.3d at 1307–08.\\n I would set aside the district court’s summary judgment in\\n favor of the Department as to the § 12112(d)(4) inquiry claim and\\n have a jury decide, among other things, whether the Department\\n initiated an inquiry.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229755/\", \"author_raw\": \"JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"TJOFLAT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"TJOFLAT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":3,"string":"3"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763170/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 49\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 22-12354\n ____________________\n\n AILEEN MULLIN,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02697-VMC-AEP\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n The Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. However, to\n correct a factual error, we VACATE and withdraw our previous\n opinion dated August 8, 2025, 149 F.4th 1244 (11th Cir. 2025), and\n substitute the following opinion.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n Aileen Mullin sued the Department of Veterans Affairs, as-\n serting many claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.\n § 794. The claims were for disability discrimination, failure to ac-\n commodate, unlawful disclosure, and retaliation (and/or a retalia-\n tory hostile work environment). The district court granted sum-\n mary judgment for the Department on all the claims, and Ms.\n Mullin now appeals.\n Following a review of the record, and with the benefit of\n oral argument, we reverse and remand on the unlawful disclosure\n claim and affirm on the other claims.1\n I. BACKGROUND\n In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment order,\n we view the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin. See\n Taxinet Corp. v. Leon, 114 F.4th 1212, 1231 (11th Cir. 2024). Seen\n through that lens, the record reflects the following.2\n A.\n Ms. Mullin began her employment with the Department of\n Veterans Affairs in February 2009. She remains employed by the\n Department as a Ratings Veterans Service Representative at the St.\n Petersburg Regional Office of the Veterans Benefits Administra-\n tion.\n\n\n 1 As to any issues not discussed in this opinion, we summarily affirm.\n\n 2 We include a fair number of dates in setting out the chronology of events\n\n because the dates in this case matter.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n In July 2010, Ms. Mullin began to experience respiratory is-\n sues at work. Believing that the building she worked in was caus-\n ing the respiratory problems, she spoke with someone at the De-\n partment that month about what could be done to address what\n she believed to be issues with the building. According to Ms.\n Mullin, the Department did not do anything after she first raised\n her concerns, and she was told to file a claim for worker’s compen-\n sation.\n Ms. Mullin’s respiratory issues worsened over time. In De-\n cember 2011 she informed the Department that she was still having\n trouble with her breathing and asthma. She asked for an alterna-\n tive work schedule to limit the time she spent in the building. She\n also sought relocation of her workstation to a different place in the\n building.\n The Department granted both requests. It limited the num-\n ber of days Ms. Mullin was required to be in the office and it\n changed her workstation. Although she had requested these ac-\n commodations, Ms. Mullin did not consider them effective because\n she continued to suffer from respiratory issues.\n In January 2012, Ms. Mullin informed the Department that\n her respiratory issues were continuing and remained severe. That\n same month, she met with human resources specialist Tammi\n Clarke and a union representative to discuss her ongoing health is-\n sues. Ms. Mullin does not remember whether she made any ac-\n commodation requests at this meeting, but she recalls that Ms.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n Clarke told her that her workstation would be moved from the sec-\n ond floor to the third floor.\n Ms. Mullin returned to work two days after this meeting and\n found that she had not been assigned a new workstation, which\n shocked and terrified her. She suffered an asthma attack that day\n and went to the hospital. The next time she returned to work, her\n workstation had been moved to the third floor.\n On January 31, 2012, Ms. Mullin emailed the human re-\n sources department asking that an air purifier Ms. Clarke previ-\n ously proposed placing in her office on the third floor be put there\n without delay. The air purifier was placed in her office two days\n later. Ms. Mullin informed the Department that she did not believe\n the air purifier would be effective because, based on her research,\n it was designed for smaller spaces. She also noted that she would\n “have it running full force and [her] fingers [were] crossed.”\n B.\n In March 2012, Ms. Mullin was diagnosed with breast can-\n cer. Her oncologist noted in a Family and Medical Leave Act\n (FMLA) certification form that she would require a six-month ab-\n sence at work for surgery, chemotherapy, and potential radiation.\n Ms. Mullin submitted this FMLA form to the human resources de-\n partment.\n In May 2012, a few months after the cancer diagnosis, Casey\n Crump—a steward with the union Ms. Mullin belonged to—sent\n Ms. Mullin an email. In that email, Mr. Crump mentioned that he\n heard about Ms. Mullin’s “condition” from Bonnie Wax, a human\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n resources manager. Mr. Crump also noted that Ms. Wax believed\n that Ms. Mullin’s breathing issues were caused by her tumor, not\n by any problems with the building. Ms. Mullin was surprised to\n learn that Mr. Crump knew about her cancer diagnosis. The only\n people she had told were a friend at work and Sandra Smith, a Vet-\n erans Service Center manager.\n Ms. Mullin completed her cancer treatment in December\n 2012 and returned to work the following month. She continued to\n work remotely three days a week and came into the office the other\n two days. Shortly after she came back to work, she informed the\n Department that the issues in the building were worsening her\n health condition, and she asked to “further minimize” the time\n spent in the building.\n On January 30, 2013, Ms. Mullin met with Ms. Clarke and a\n union representative. At the meeting, Ms. Mullin requested addi-\n tional accommodations. These included working entirely from\n home or from a location other than the St. Petersburg office. She\n also asked to meet another employee outside her building to hand\n off important paperwork so she would not have to go inside.\n Four weeks later, the Department again agreed to move Ms.\n Mullin’s workstation and to place a second air purifier in her office.\n It also agreed to place her printer near her workstation to limit her\n movement outside of her workstation.\n At a meeting held shortly thereafter, a union representative\n proposed permitting Ms. Mullin to work a half-day schedule on the\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n two days she was in the office. Ms. Mullin began working this pro-\n posed modified schedule but this accommodation was not formally\n approved. It appears that at some point the Department discov-\n ered this new work schedule and informed Ms. Mullin that her ac-\n commodations did not include this modified schedule.\n C.\n In March 2013, a supervisor informed Ms. Clarke that Ms.\n Mullin was still having issues with the air purifiers. Ms. Clarke\n added a third air purifier to Ms. Mullin’s office and tested the air\n quality.\n The following month, on April 12, 2013, Ms. Mullin’s doctor\n wrote a note to the Department recommending that Ms. Mullin be\n allowed to work entirely from home. He also explained that the\n air purifiers were not effective. Three days later, the Department\n permitted Ms. Mullin to work from home four days a week, come\n into work on Friday mornings from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., and\n work the remainder of that day from home. Ms. Mullin informed\n the Department that these accommodations were unsatisfactory to\n her because they were “useless and potentially harmful.”\n On April 19, 2013, the Department permitted Ms. Mullin to\n work entirely from home. She was, however, required to meet\n someone outside the building on Friday mornings to exchange\n work-related papers. It is unclear whether Ms. Mullin continues to\n receive this accommodation.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n D.\n Ms. Mullin brought suit in the district court after she filed a\n complaint—which she amended numerous times—with the Equal\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In her district court com-\n plaint, she asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act for disabil-\n ity discrimination based on disparate treatment and failure to ac-\n commodate, unlawful disclosures and privacy violations, and retal-\n iation (and/or a retaliatory hostile work environment).\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, apply-\n ing the same legal standard used by the district court. See Taxinet\n Corp., 114 F.4th at 1230. Under Rule 56, summary judgment is war-\n ranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to\n the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact\n and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving\n party.” Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted).\n III. DISCUSSION\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from en-\n gaging in employment discrimination against otherwise qualified\n individuals with a disability. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326\n (11th Cir. 2005); Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.\n 2000). Specifically, qualified individuals with a disability shall not\n “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or\n be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activ-\n ity conducted by any Executive agency” solely because of their dis-\n ability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).\n “The standards used to determine whether [the Rehabilita-\n tion Act] has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under\n [T]itle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and the provi-\n sions of [S]ections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with\n Disabilities Act . . . , as such sections relate to employment.” 29\n U.S.C. § 794(d); see also Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (“The standard for\n determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as\n that under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . ; thus, cases in-\n volving the ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilita-\n tion Act.”). With this backdrop, we address Ms. Mullin’s Rehabili-\n tation Act claims.\n A. Disability Discrimination\n Ms. Mullin asserts a claim of disability discrimination against\n the Department under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court\n concluded that she failed to establish that she was discriminated\n against because of her disability. We agree with the district court.\n “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the\n [Rehabilitation] Act, an individual must show that (1) [s]he has a\n disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified for the position; and\n (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as the result of\n h[er] disability.” Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185\n F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 1999)). To establish the third ele-\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 9\n\n ment, the plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employ-\n ment action because of her disability. See id. Importantly, the\n plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment action was\n “solely by reason of her . . . disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As a\n result, a claim of disability discrimination fails if the employer\n based the adverse employment action partially on disability and\n partially on other factors. See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326.\n A claim of disability discrimination against an employer un-\n der the Rehabilitation Act may be established in two ways: (1) dis-\n parate treatment; or (2) failure to make a reasonable accommoda-\n tion. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6\n (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the ADA and the Rehabilitation\n Act “recognize disparate treatment and reasonable accommoda-\n tion theories”).\n Disparate treatment occurs when a covered entity treats a\n disabled individual differently than a non-disabled individual. See\n 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). A disparate treatment claim requires a show-\n ing of discriminatory intent. See Berg v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & Employ-\n ment, 163 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1998).\n A failure to accommodate claim arises when a covered en-\n tity fails its affirmative duty to make “reasonable accommodations\n to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-\n fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,\n unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommoda-\n tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the busi-\n ness.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A failure to make a reasonable\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n accommodation does not require a showing of discriminatory in-\n tent. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th\n Cir. 2007) (“[A]n employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a\n disabled individual itself constitutes discrimination under the ADA\n . . . . There is no additional burden . . . .”). “An accommodation is\n reasonable if it enables the employee to perform the essential func-\n tions of the job.” Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985, 987 (11th\n Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d\n 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Stu-\n dent Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen an\n employee triggers an employer’s accommodation duties, the em-\n ployer must expend time and expense to explore the universe of\n reasonable accommodations, identify one that is mutually agreeable\n to the parties, and implement it.” (emphasis added)).\n 1. Disparate Treatment\n As to her disparate treatment theory, Ms. Mullin argues that\n she suffered disability discrimination because the Department de-\n nied her request for advanced sick leave. See Appellant’s Br. at 44–\n 45.\n The record reflects that, around May 4, 2012, Ms. Mullin re-\n quested advanced sick leave “of 72–80 hours . . . [to] take care of\n the post-operative period of 2 weeks followed by approximately 6\n weeks of radiation . . . .” On May 7, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor pro-\n vided the relevant documentation for her advanced sick leave re-\n quest. That same day, the Department approved Ms. Mullin’s re-\n quest for 80 hours of advanced sick leave—the amount she initially\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 11\n\n requested—in a memorandum. On May 10, 2024, the Department\n memorialized this decision in a Request for Leave or Approved Ab-\n sence form signed by Kerri Witty, the Department Director.\n The record further shows that the Department continued to\n approve advanced sick leave for Ms. Mullin between June and Au-\n gust of 2012, despite Ms. Mullin having “used all of her leave to\n include accrued and sick leave.” The Department also admitted\n Ms. Mullin to the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, from which\n she received donations in addition to her advanced sick leave.\n The parties spar about whether Ms. Mullin was denied any\n request for sick leave, but this disagreement misses the mark. We\n have not found—and Ms. Mullin has not identified—anything in\n the record to show (or create a genuine issue of fact) that a request\n for sick for leave was denied solely because of her disability. In fact,\n she has not shown that any sick leave was denied even in part due\n to her disability.\n We have identified three instances where Ms. Mullin’s leave\n request was denied during the relevant period for her disparate\n treatment theory. None of these support Ms. Mullin’s disparate\n treatment claim.\n The first comes from Ms. Mullin’s own testimony at her dep-\n osition. Ms. Mullin stated that at some point Ms. Clarke verbally\n denied her advanced sick leave request. But this testimony is belied\n by the record, which reflects that the Department ultimately\n granted her advanced sick leave request. See Blanco v. Samuel, 91\n F.4th 1061, 1070 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he court cannot discount a\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n party’s testimony on summary judgment ‘unless it is blatantly con-\n tradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a\n matter of law . . . .’” (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707\n F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013))). Even if we assume that Ms.\n Clarke orally denied the request, Ms. Mullin has failed to establish\n (or create a genuine issue of fact) that her request was denied solely\n because of her disability.\n The second is based on a Department memorandum dated\n April 9, 2012, approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application related to\n her cancer diagnosis. This memorandum determined that Ms.\n Mullin “is entitled to a total of 12 workweeks or 480 hours of FMLA\n leave during a 12-month period,” but noted that she “previously\n invoked her entitlement to FMLA on March 9, 2012 . . . .” The\n memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin “is not allowed an addi-\n tional 12 workweeks” until her current FMLA entitlement “period\n ends, and a new event or situation occurs that entitles [Ms. Mullin]\n to another period of . . . medical leave.”\n The third is based on a similar Department memorandum\n dated May 11, 2012, evaluating additional medical documentation\n for Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application regarding the cancer diagnosis.\n This memorandum stated that an “employee is entitled to up to a\n total of 12 administrative workweeks of leave without pay . . . [and]\n [Ms. Mullin] can use a total of 480 hours for the entire FMLA enti-\n tlement period.” The memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin\n was “not allowed an additional 12 workweeks [of leave] based on”\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 13\n\n the additional medical documentation but notes that she could re-\n new her entitlement at the end of her then current FMLA entitle-\n ment period.\n These two Department memoranda fare no better for Ms.\n Mullin’s disparate treatment theory. Neither denial—assuming\n they were denials—was based solely on her disability. The district\n court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the\n Department on the disparate treatment theory.\n 2. Failure to Accommodate\n As to her failure to accommodate claim, Ms. Mullin argues\n that the Department failed to reasonably accommodate her by un-\n duly delaying in providing her a full-time work-from-home accom-\n modation in light of her known health conditions. See Appellant’s\n Br. at 18–28. To avoid summary judgment, Ms. Mullin must pre-\n sent sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the\n Department failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. She\n failed to do so. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to\n her, the Department provided reasonable accommodations for Ms.\n Mullin’s disability and ultimately provided her with the accommo-\n dation she desired—working from home full time.\n The failure to accommodate claim can be distilled to two\n main theories. First, Ms. Mullin argues that the Department un-\n duly delayed in providing, in her view, the only reasonable accom-\n modation for her medical conditions—a full-time work from home\n accommodation. Second, she argues that the Department failed to\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n provide her with reasonable accommodations during the interac-\n tive process despite the Department being aware of her medical\n conditions.\n The parties dispute the length of the alleged delay before\n Ms. Mullin received a full-time work-from-home accommodation.\n Although the Department argues—and the district court agreed—\n that there was only a three-month delay, if any, Ms. Mullin argues\n that the Department unreasonably delayed in providing her re-\n quested accommodation for 10 months. Ms. Mullin’s estimation\n of the delay is belied by the chronology of events and the record\n before us. The record reflects that Ms. Mullin was away from work\n on medical leave due to her cancer treatment during the latter half\n of 2012 and did not return to work on a regular basis until January\n 2013. Ms. Mullin cannot fairly cast the period in which she was\n away from work due to her cancer treatment as an unreasonable\n delay on the part of the Department. The delay in granting Ms.\n Mullin the accommodation of full-time work from home was\n therefore approximately three months.\n The parties also dispute whether the Department provided\n Ms. Mullin a reasonable accommodation for her medical condi-\n tions. Ms. Mullin “bears the burden of identifying an accommoda-\n tion, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows [her]\n to perform the job’s essential functions.” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255–\n 56. The record indicates that before the cancer diagnosis and upon\n her return from the cancer treatment, the Department addressed\n each of Ms. Mullin’s accommodation requests and provided her\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 15\n\n with an accommodation. Many of these accommodations were in\n direct response to Ms. Mullin’s own requests and suggestions. For\n example, before Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis, the Department al-\n tered her in-office work schedule, moved her workstation to a dif-\n ferent part of the building, and provided her with an air purifier.\n And in response to Ms. Mullin submitting an FMLA leave request\n that included her doctor recommending that she “be allowed to\n work from home with periodic trips to the work site as required,”\n the Department formalized a three-day work from home schedule\n for Ms. Mullin.\n Upon returning to work in January 2013, Ms. Mullin and the\n Department resumed the interactive process to identify a reasona-\n ble accommodation for her medical needs. Between January and\n April of 2013, and in response to Ms. Mullin’s complaints and re-\n quests, the Department moved Ms. Mullin’s workstation to an-\n other part of the building and provided her with two additional air\n purifiers. It also further modified her schedule to permit her to\n work from home four days a week and to only come to the office\n on Friday for four hours in the morning. When these accommo-\n dations were unsatisfactory to Ms. Mullin, the Department permit-\n ted her to fully work from home and exchange work-related docu-\n ments with another employee at the building on Fridays.\n In reaching our conclusion, we find our reasoning in Sol-\n loway persuasive. There, an employee suffered from post-trau-\n matic stress disorder (PTSD) from a past sexual assault. See 738 F.\n App’x at 986. The employee later learned that her direct supervisor\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n was reprimanded for watching pornography at the workplace,\n which triggered the employee’s PTSD. See id. The employee re-\n quested an accommodation to work from home full-time as a re-\n sult. See id. While that request was pending, the employee re-\n ceived several accommodations to ensure that she would avoid her\n direct supervisor, including teleworking on days her direct super-\n visor was in the office and moving her office away from his. See id.\n The employer allowed these accommodations to continue for two\n years, even after the employee’s request to work from home full-\n time was denied. See id. at 986–87. The employee made a second\n request to work from home full-time, which was denied again. See\n id. at 987. The employee was later placed on paid administrative\n leave with full benefits after the employer determined she was un-\n able to perform the essential functions of her job. See id. The em-\n ployee was ultimately reinstated and allowed to work from home\n full-time when her employer’s work from home policy changed.\n See id.\n We determined that the employer did not violate the Reha-\n bilitation Act by denying the employee’s request to telework full\n time. See id. at 988. Specifically, we concluded that “[a]lthough the\n [employer] denied her specific request for full-time telework, it not\n only allowed her to continue teleworking part-time but also re-\n quired [her direct supervisor] to telework part-time on an alternate\n schedule so that she would not encounter him.” Id. We also noted\n that the employee “eventually received her preferred accommoda-\n tion of full-time telework” and never lost her job. See id. We\n thought it “unreasonable” to require the employer to “guarantee\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 17\n\n that [the employee] would never encounter [her direct supervi-\n sor].” Id.\n Here Ms. Mullin requested accommodations that would re-\n duce her exposure to the building to avoid triggering her respira-\n tory conditions. In response, the Department provided several ac-\n commodations, including moving her workstation, providing her\n with air purifiers, and modifying her in-office schedule to reduce\n exposure. When Ms. Mullin complained that a certain accommo-\n dation was ineffective or not satisfactory, the Department made\n further adjustments to accommodate her. Although these accom-\n modations may not have been the ones Ms. Mullin desired—e.g.,\n to work from home full-time—the Department was only required\n to provide a reasonable accommodation that allowed her “to per-\n form the essential functions of the job.” See id. at 987; see also Ow-\n ens, 52 F.4th at 1335 (noting that a reasonable accommodation\n must be “mutually agreeable to the parties”); D’Onofrio v. Costco\n Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n em-\n ployer is not required to accommodate an employee in any manner\n that the employee desires—or even provide that employee’s pre-\n ferred accommodation.”). Moreover, the Department ultimately\n granted Ms. Mullin’s desired accommodation to work from home\n full time, just like the employer in Solloway. See 738 F. App’x at 988\n (noting that the employee “eventually received her preferred ac-\n commodation of full-time telework”).\n The Department made reasonable efforts to accommodate\n Ms. Mullin, and continually expanded her accommodations when\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n she complained. Ms. Mullin’s dissatisfaction with the accommoda-\n tions she received does not, by itself, create an issue of fact with\n respect to her claim of disability discrimination. As we have noted,\n “a qualified individual with a disability is not entitled to the accom-\n modation of her choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation.”\n Solloway, 738 F. App’x at 988 (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman’s\n Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also\n D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022 (“Of course, there are limits to the ac-\n commodations an employer must provide. . . . [A]n employer is not\n required to accommodate an employee in any manner that the em-\n ployee desires—or even provide that employee’s preferred accom-\n modation.”). Moreover, an employer is not required to provide\n “the maximum accommodation or every conceivable accommoda-\n tion possible.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285–86 (quoting Lewis v. Zilog,\n Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1995)). The employee is only\n entitled to a reasonable accommodation, not to the accommoda-\n tion of her choice. See id. at 1286.\n Some courts have held that an unreasonable delay in provid-\n ing an accommodation can violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation\n Act. See generally Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C.\n Cir. 2010) (citing cases). In assessing claims of unreasonable delay,\n courts consider “the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,\n whether the employer has offered any alternative accommodations\n while evaluating a particular request, and whether the employer\n has acted in good faith.” Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d\n 1249, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2001). Here the three-month delay in\n granting Ms. Mullin the requested accommodation of full-time\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 19\n\n work from home was not unreasonable, particularly given the in-\n termediate additional accommodations provided by the Depart-\n ment in early 2013 (the moving of the workstation, the placement\n of two additional air purifiers in her workstation, and the modifica-\n tion of her in-office schedule). Cf. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24,\n 34 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating that a three-month delay in granting\n a telework accommodation was not a “long delay”).\n The district court did not err in granting summary judgment\n to the Department on the failure to accommodate theory.\n B. Unlawful Disclosure Claim\n Ms. Mullin claimed that the Department failed to protect\n and unlawfully disclosed her confidential and sensitive medical in-\n formation. The district court granted summary judgment for the\n Department as to the disclosure claim. We conclude, however,\n that it erred in doing so because Ms. Mullin presented sufficient ev-\n idence to create issues of fact.\n 1. Legal Standard\n The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the confidentiality pro-\n visions of the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d). In general,\n “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual\n on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions,\n and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Moreover,\n “[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and\n shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such em-\n ployee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or sever-\n ity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 20 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C.\n § 12112(d)(4)(A).\n The relevant regulation similarly states that “[a] covered en-\n tity may require a medical examination (and/or inquiry) of an em-\n ployee that is job-related and consistent with business necessity. A\n covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an employee\n to perform job-related functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). Infor-\n mation obtained from an employee through a medical examination\n or inquiry “shall be collected and maintained on separate forms and\n in separate medical files and be treated as a confidential medical\n record . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1). The Rehabilitation Act sim-\n ilarly provides that the information obtained is generally “treated\n as a confidential medical record” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B),\n subject to limited exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C).\n We have not addressed whether there is a private right of\n action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). But we have “explicitly rec-\n ognize[d] that a plaintiff has a private right of action under 42\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), irrespective of . . . disability status.” Harrison\n v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.\n 2010). We have also noted that “§ 12112(d)(2)(A) and (d)(4)(A) are\n parallel provisions with similar language and virtually identical pro-\n hibitions concerning medical inquiries . . . [and] proof of damages\n requirement . . . .” Russell v. City of Mobile Police Dep’t, 552 F. App’x\n 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 3\n\n\n 3 Russell is unpublished, but we find it persuasive.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 21\n\n We therefore recognize a private right of action under 42\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) irrespective of disability status. See Owusu-An-\n sah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2013) (imply-\n ing a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) and rec-\n ognizing “that § 12112(d)(4)(A) [also] protects employees who are\n not disabled”); see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906–07 (“An em-\n ployee may raise a § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim whether or not she is dis-\n abled . . . [and] the proof of damages requirement set in Harrison\n equally applies to cases involving allegedly improper inquiries un-\n der § 12112(d)(4)(A).”). To bring a claim under § 12112(d)(4), an\n employee must show that (1) the employer either made an unlaw-\n ful inquiry in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) or violated its confiden-\n tiality requirements after making a proper inquiry under\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), and (2) the employee suffered a tangible injury\n from the unlawful inquiry or disclosure. See 42 U.S.C.\n § 12112(d)(4); Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906.\n 2. Ms. Mullin’s Claim\n To get to a jury on her unlawful disclosure claim under\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), Ms. Mullin must present sufficient evidence to\n create issues of fact on whether the Department made a proper in-\n quiry into her medical condition, whether the Department dis-\n closed the results of that inquiry to persons in violation of the Re-\n habilitation Act, and whether she suffered a tangible injury because\n of the unlawful disclosure. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C); Russell,\n 552 F. App’x at 906. The district court ruled that Ms. Mullin failed\n to show that she suffered any harm because of the Department’s\n alleged improper disclosure by Ms. Wax. As a result, the district\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n court did not address whether the Department made an inquiry; it\n noted, however, in a footnote that it was “not at all convinced” that\n an inquiry occurred when Ms. Mullin disclosed her medical infor-\n mation in a required FMLA form requesting leave for her cancer\n treatment.\n On appeal, the Department argues that Ms. Mullin’s unlaw-\n ful disclosure claim fails because it did not make an inquiry in the\n first place. The Department contends that it did not make an in-\n quiry because the FMLA leave form “is not an inquiry that is in-\n tended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability [as] an em-\n ployee could be eligible for FMLA leave based on a serious medical\n condition that is not considered a disability . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at\n 42. The Department alternatively argues that “[e]ven if an inquiry\n was made,” it remains entitled to summary judgment because Ms.\n Mullin failed to show that her medical condition was confidential\n at the time of the disclosure and because she failed to establish that\n she suffered a tangible injury from the disclosure.\n We disagree with the Department’s arguments. Viewing\n the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin as the nonmov-\n ing party, see Williams, 64 F.4th at 1188, we believe that an inquiry\n was made and that there are issues of fact as to whether there was\n an unlawful disclosure stemming from that inquiry.\n a. Whether There Was an Inquiry\n As a general matter, an employer must request a medical ex-\n amination or inquire into an employee’s medical status for there to\n be an “inquiry” under the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 23\n\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). An employee’s voluntary\n disclosure of a medical diagnosis to a supervisor or co-worker is not\n an examination or inquiry for purposes of § 12112(d)(4). See Cash\n v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no unlawful\n disclosure where the matter disclosed at issue “was not of the result\n of an examination ordered by [the employer], but of a voluntary\n disclosure” by the employee to the employer).\n We have not previously addressed whether an employee’s\n disclosure of confidential medical information in an FMLA leave\n form constitutes an inquiry by the employer within the meaning of\n the Rehabilitation Act. We now hold that when an employer con-\n ditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave on the\n submission of medical information, that is an “inquiry” under\n § 12112(d)(4). The statute prohibits employers from making medi-\n cal inquiries unless they are job-related and consistent with busi-\n ness necessity. That restriction cannot be avoided simply because\n the employer’s demand for information is embedded in the me-\n chanics of leave approval.\n This conclusion is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s reason-\n ing in Doe v. United States Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir.\n 2003). In Doe, an employee of the United States Postal Service\n missed several weeks of work due to an AIDS-related illness. See\n id. at 341. The employee’s direct supervisor sent the employee a\n letter regarding his extended absence and attached a Department\n of Labor Form WH 380 (the FMLA form)—the same form that Ms.\n Mullin completed—stating that the employee’s “condition may\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 24 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n qualify [him] to be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Poli-\n cies.” Id. The employee completed the FMLA form and disclosed\n his HIV status on it. See id. When the employee returned to work,\n he learned that several co-workers were aware of his HIV status,\n and several of them identified a supervisor to whom he had not\n disclosed his status as the source of the information. See id. The\n employee sued under the Rehabilitation Act and the Privacy Act.\n See id. The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for\n summary judgment in part because it concluded that the FMLA\n form was not an employer inquiry. The D.C. Circuit disagreed and\n reversed.\n The D.C. Circuit held in Doe that the FMLA form was an\n inquiry and explained that the employee “revealed his medical di-\n agnosis . . . only after the [Postal] Service, through his direct super-\n visor, told him in writing that he would face disciplinary proceed-\n ings unless he completed either the FMLA form or a medical cer-\n tificate explaining” the nature of his illness. Id. at 344. The D.C.\n Circuit reasoned that even if the employee could “be said to have\n submitted the FMLA request voluntarily, . . . that hardly mean[t]\n he volunteered his medical diagnosis.” Id. The D.C. Circuit went\n on to conclude that “[t]he Postal Service conditioned [the em-\n ployee’s] receipt of FMLA leave on his submission of supporting\n medical documentation, as the FMLA authorized it to do. . . . [I]t\n was thus the Postal Service, acting pursuant to this statutory au-\n thorization, not [the employee], that initiated the inquiry into his\n medical condition by asking for this medical certification.” Id. Be-\n cause the Postal Service conditioned eligibility for FMLA leave on\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 25\n\n the employee disclosing medical information that established eligi-\n bility, the FMLA form constituted an “inquiry.” See id. To hold\n otherwise, the D.C. Circuit noted, would lead to employees being\n forced “to choose between waiving their right to avoid being pub-\n licly identified as having a disability and exercising their statutory\n rights . . . .” Id.\n The same reasoning applies here. The record shows that in\n March 2012 Ms. Mullin sought a work-from-home accommodation\n and also applied for FMLA leave related to her asthma.4 On March\n 14, 2012, the Department approved her FMLA leave, totaling 12\n work weeks, and told her, “If it should become necessary for you\n to extend your entitlement beyond the current certification, you\n will be required to provide an updated physician’s statement from\n your healthcare provider.”\n A March 14 memorandum from Human Resources to Vet-\n erans Service Center Manager Sandra Smith also recounted that\n “The employee was informed (in writing) by Human Resources\n that new medical documentation will be required if their leave ex-\n ceeds the amount recommended by the Health Care Provider.” A\n few lines later, the memorandum says, “It is the responsibility of\n\n\n\n\n 4 On March 13, an internal email chain that the Department appended to its\n\n motion for summary judgment stated that “Maybe [the Department] can\n move [Mullin’s accommodation request] quickly if there is med[ical] documen-\n tation to support[ it.]” (emphasis added).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 26 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n the supervisor to . . . [n]otify the employee that new medical doc-\n umentation is required when leave usage is not intermittent as de-\n fined by the Health Care Provider.”\n On March 20, 2012, the Department approved her work-\n from-home accommodation for three days working from home\n and two days working in the office. The approval form stated that\n Reasonable accommodations are an interactive pro-\n cess requiring communication to ensure that the ac-\n commodation continues to meet your workplace re-\n quirements. As a result, the agency may periodically\n ask you to provide updated medical evidence to es-\n tablish whether the accommodation should continue\n and/or be changed. If your condition changes, or if a\n change in the accommodation is warranted, it is your\n responsibility to notify human resources.\n On March 23, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor submitted an FMLA\n form disclosing her cancer diagnosis and stating that she would be\n out continuously for six months. On April 9, 2012, the Department\n approved that request but noted that she was not eligible for a new\n 12-week allotment of leave until her prior entitlement period for\n her previously-approved FMLA leave expired. That letter, like the\n first, told Ms. Mullin that “If it should become necessary for you to\n extend your entitlement beyond the current certification of 30\n days, you may be required to provide an updated physician’s state-\n ment from your healthcare provider.”\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 27\n\n In short, the record shows that when Ms. Mullin requested\n leave, the Department told her approval required submission of ad-\n ditional medical documentation. 5 So when Ms. Mullin was diag-\n nosed with cancer, she simply did what the Department had al-\n ready told her she must do: submit medical documentation. She\n did not volunteer the information; she disclosed it because, under\n the Department’s previous letters, it was apparent that disclosing\n the information was the only way to maintain her leave and her\n pay. Accord Doe, 317 F.3d at 344. That kind of disclosure is not\n “voluntary” in any meaningful sense. See id.\n\n\n\n\n 5 Ms. Mullin’s brief stated that the Department required her to complete an\n\n FMLA form to receive her statutory leave. The Department did not dispute\n that in its answer brief. Rather, it accepted the premise and argued only that:\n “[Ms. Mullin] claims that the VA made an inquiry when it required her to dis-\n close medical information in an FMLA certification form in order to obtain\n FMLA leave. . . . But, as a matter of law, that form is not an inquiry . . . .” At\n oral argument, Ms. Mullin’s counsel reaffirmed that the Department required\n employees to submit an FMLA form as a precondition to taking leave. The\n Department again did not dispute the point, instead reiterating its position that\n requiring an FMLA form is never an inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act.\n We thus take as undisputed that the Department’s policy required employees\n to submit an FMLA form to obtain leave. We express no view on situations\n where no policy or practice requires employees to submit medical documen-\n tation to exercise their statutory right to leave. Contra Dissenting Op. at 3\n (incorrectly recasting our holding as “any time an FMLA form is submitted—\n regardless of whether the employee submits it voluntarily or at the request of the\n employer—there is an inquiry by the employer under § 12112(d)” (emphases\n added)).\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 28 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n The upshot is that when an employee must share medical\n information to receive benefits guaranteed by law, the require-\n ment operates as an inquiry by the employer. We therefore hold\n that, as a matter of law, there was an inquiry here.\n The partial dissent reaches a different conclusion, but it blurs\n two distinct legal questions: whether the Department made a med-\n ical inquiry, and whether it later disclosed information obtained\n through that inquiry. Those questions are analytically separate.\n The first concerns the scope of employer conduct regulated by\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); the second involves whether the employer vio-\n lated its confidentiality obligations under § 12112(d)(4)(C). We ad-\n dress only the first here and conclude that the Department did\n make an inquiry.\n The partial dissent’s reasoning rests on the premise that Ms.\n Mullin’s (possible) earlier, voluntary disclosure of her cancer diag-\n nosis forecloses a finding that the Department later initiated an in-\n quiry. 6 But nothing in the statute supports the result. Section\n 12112(d)(4) prohibits employers from making medical inquiries un-\n less they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. It\n does not say—expressly or by implication—that an employee’s\n\n\n\n 6 It bears repeating that the Department’s only argument on the inquiry issue\n\n is that an FMLA form is not an inquiry as a matter of law. See supra note 5.\n Unlike the partial dissent, neither the Department nor Ms. Mullin has ever\n argued that a factual dispute about a prior voluntary disclosure has any bearing\n on the inquiry analysis.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 29\n\n prior voluntary disclosure prevents a finding of a subsequent statu-\n tory inquiry. And the partial dissent cites no case adopting that\n theory.7\n To the extent Ms. Mullin disclosed her diagnosis before sub-\n mitting the FMLA form, that fact bears on whether the Depart-\n ment unlawfully disclosed confidential information under\n § 12112(d)(4)(C). But it has no bearing on whether an inquiry oc-\n curred under § 12112(d)(4)(A). The statute treats those as distinct\n questions, and so must we. If both a prior voluntary disclosure and\n a later inquiry happened, the proper question is whether the disclo-\n sure stemmed from the inquiry (which is prohibited by the Act) or\n from the voluntary disclosure (which is not covered by the Act).\n The partial dissent’s contrary approach would create a\n sweeping exception. Employers could bypass the Rehabilitation\n Act’s inquiry safeguards by seizing on a prior voluntary disclosure\n and treating all future demands for medical documentation as out-\n side the statute’s reach. But where, as here, an employer requires\n medical information as a condition of leave approval, that demand\n qualifies as a statutory inquiry—regardless of any earlier voluntary\n\n\n\n 7 The partial dissent’s reliance on Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2001),\n\n only underscores the distinction between an inquiry and a voluntary disclo-\n sure. There, we held that the employer was not liable because the challenged\n disclosure involved information the employee had volunteered—not infor-\n mation obtained through an inquiry. Id. at 1307–08. Neither Cash nor any\n case the partial dissent cites supports the proposition that a prior voluntary\n disclosure forecloses the possibility of a later statutory inquiry.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 30 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n disclosure. That conclusion follows from both the text and struc-\n ture of the Act.\n b. Whether There Was an Unlawful Disclosure\n Having found that the Department made an inquiry into Ms.\n Mullin’s medical condition, Ms. Mullin must now show that confi-\n dential information from that inquiry was disclosed in violation of\n the Rehabilitation Act. The district court did not address whether\n Ms. Wax’s disclosure to Mr. Crump of Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagno-\n sis amounted to an unlawful disclosure.\n The Department argues that summary judgment is appro-\n priate because Ms. Mullin failed to show that her cancer diagnosis\n was confidential. It maintains that there is no proof that Mr.\n Crump’s knowledge of Ms. Mullin’s diagnosis came first from Ms.\n Wax, and that Ms. Mullin told other people about her cancer diag-\n nosis before she received Mr. Crump’s email.\n Given that we are in a summary judgment posture and must\n view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Ms.\n Mullin, we are unpersuaded by the Department’s argument. There\n is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find that Ms. Wax\n was the source of the allegedly unlawful disclosure and that she\n obtained the information from the FMLA form. First, an internal\n Department memorandum approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA leave\n request for her cancer diagnosis, which was dated before Mr.\n Crump’s email and signed by Ms. Wax, stated that “[t]he specific\n medical condition was intentionally left off . . . to avoid accidental\n disclosure.” Second, Mr. Crump’s email to Ms. Mullin—which\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 31 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 31\n\n came after the Department had approved Mr. Mullin’s FMLA re-\n quest—stated that Mr. Crump and Ms. Wax discussed Ms. Mullin’s\n cancer diagnosis. Third, although Ms. Mullin said she spoke to a\n few people—including friends outside of work and doctors—about\n her diagnosis, there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Crump learned\n of her diagnosis from anyone other than Ms. Wax. Of course, shar-\n ing a medical condition with a few relatives or close friends does\n not, as a matter of law, make the condition non-confidential.\n Fourth, Ms. Mullin testified that she never told Ms. Wax about her\n cancer diagnosis.\n There is also an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Crump\n learned of the cancer diagnosis before Ms. Mullin told anyone at\n work. In cases involving disclosure of confidential information\n from private records, circumstantial evidence may suffice to defeat\n a motion for summary judgment, as “plaintiffs can rarely produce\n direct evidence that the government has disclosed confidential in-\n formation obtained from their private records . . . .” Doe, 317 F.3d\n at 343. The D.C. Circuit in Doe, for example, found that the em-\n ployee presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a gen-\n uine issue of fact as to when and from whom “his HIV status had\n become common knowledge among his co-workers,” including\n that the disclosure came after he submitted the FMLA form and\n that the source of the information was from a specific manage-\n ment-level supervisor. Id. at 341–43. Here, a reasonable jury could\n find that Ms. Wax disclosed Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis to Mr.\n Crump after the FMLA form was submitted. As a result, Ms.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 32 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 32 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n Mullin survives summary judgment on the inquiry and disclosure\n aspects of her unlawful disclosure claim.\n c. Whether Ms. Mullin Suffered a Tangible Injury\n For Ms. Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim to proceed past\n summary judgment, she must also show (or create an issue of fact)\n that she suffered a tangible injury from the alleged unlawful disclo-\n sure of her cancer diagnosis. The district court believed that Ms.\n Mullin failed to present “more than a scintilla of evidence of a tan-\n gible injury resulting from the alleged disclosure of her breast can-\n cer diagnosis.” We disagree.\n To succeed on an unlawful disclosure claim, a “plaintiff\n [must] at least show some damages (emotional, pecuniary, or oth-\n erwise) caused by a § 12112(d) violation.” Harrison, 593 F.3d at\n 1216–17; see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 907 (holding that an em-\n ployee who alleges an unlawful disclosure in violation of\n § 12112(d)(4)(A) “must show damages—emotional, pecuniary, or\n otherwise”). As one of our sister circuits aptly stated, in the\n § 12112(d)(2)(A) context the “damages liability . . . must be based\n on something more than a mere violation of that provision. There\n must be some cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is a\n legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single viola-\n tion.” Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir.\n 1998); see also, e.g., Hustvet v. Allina Health Sys., 910 F.3d 399, 406–\n 07 (8th Cir. 2018) (“If a violation occurs, it is not necessary that an\n applicant be disabled to bring a claim under § 12112(d). The appli-\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 33 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 33\n\n cant must, however, establish the prospective employer’s ‘viola-\n tion of the ADA caused some sort of tangible injury.’” (quoting Cos-\n sette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1999))); Tice\n v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting\n that some circuits require a showing of the “existence of an injury-\n in-fact,” such as “actual damage[s] (emotional, pecuniary, or other-\n wise)” for a plaintiff to have a cause of action for a violation of\n § 12112(d)).\n Ms. Mullin alleged that she suffered emotional distress be-\n cause of the alleged unlawful disclosure of her cancer diagnosis.\n She testified as follows during her deposition concerning her emo-\n tional distress:\n Q. . . . Can you tell me how . . . Mrs. Wax’s conversa-\n tion with [Mr.] Crump about your cancer and your\n health issues harmed you?\n A. It still harms me.\n Q. And how did it harm you?\n A. I had cancer and I just had to get things in order so\n I could treat my cancer. And Bonnie [Wax] had to\n interject her issues around the building and defending\n the building and she-- my surgery, the first one, I went\n under anesthesia worried about Bonnie Wax and\n what she was going to do to me. I came out of anes-\n thesia that way. I spent more time crying and con-\n cerned. At times I had no pay, nothing, and I never\n knew if I’d get paid. The anxiety-- what the anxiety\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 34 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 34 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n did to my body and my brain and her callousness. It\n was breast cancer. . . .\n Q. . . . So is there any other way that the conversation\n between Mrs. Wax and [Mr.] Crump harmed you or\n affected you?\n A. Did the conversation between-- it distracted me\n from caring for myself. It distracted me from honor-\n ing my body and focusing on healing and health.\n This testimony was enough to withstand summary judgment on\n the injury aspect of the unlawful disclosure claim. See Walters v.\n Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642, 648 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Walters’s deposi-\n tion testimony describing his lost time, economic harm, and emo-\n tional distress is sufficient evidence . . . to survive summary judg-\n ment.”).\n Although documentation of emotional distress is not re-\n quired, see id., we note that the record also contains two letters\n from the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation\n Programs updating Ms. Mullin’s medical conditions in her file. The\n first is a letter dated October 26, 2015, which updates her diagnosed\n conditions to include PTSD. The second is a letter dated February\n 2, 2017, which updates her diagnosed conditions to include major\n depressive disorder. Ms. Mullin does not rely on these two letters\n to support her claim of a tangible injury and it is unclear whether\n either diagnosis is related to her unlawful disclosure claim. But if\n those diagnoses are connected to the alleged unlawful disclosure, a\n jury could reasonably find that Ms. Mullin suffered a tangible injury\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 35 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 35\n\n from the disclosure—for example, anxiety that developed into\n PTSD and/or depression.8\n In short, there are issues of fact as to whether Ms. Wax im-\n properly disclosed Ms. Mullin’s confidential cancer diagnosis,\n whether Ms. Wax obtained that information from the FMLA form\n or from Ms. Mullin’s voluntary disclosure, and whether Ms. Mullin\n suffered a tangible injury as a result. The district court erred in\n granting summary judgment in favor of the Department on Ms.\n Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim.\n C. Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment Claims\n Ms. Mullin asserted claims of retaliation (and/or a retalia-\n tory hostile work environment) based on her disability. We agree\n with the district court that the Department was entitled to sum-\n mary judgment on these claims. We address retaliation first and\n then move on to retaliatory hostile work environment.\n 1. Retaliation\n To establish a claim of retaliation, Ms. Mullin must prove\n that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, that she suffered\n a materially adverse action, and that there was some causal relation\n between the two events. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998\n F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021). As to the second element, she\n must show that the adverse action “well might have dissuaded a\n\n\n 8 Because the parties did not brief whether Ms. Mullin’s diagnoses of PTSD\n\n and depression were caused by or related to the alleged unlawful disclosure of\n her cancer diagnosis, we do not decide that question here.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 36 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 36 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrim-\n ination.” Monahgan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th\n Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548\n U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).\n The district court granted the Department’s motion for\n summary judgment on the retaliation claim because it concluded\n that Ms. Mullin had not established a causal connection between\n protected activity and any materially adverse action. We need not\n reach this issue because Ms. Mullin’s retaliation claim is simply a\n claim for a failure to accommodate disguised as retaliation.\n Ms. Mullin’s theory is that the Department’s alleged denial\n of her requests for accommodation was retaliatory. See Appellant’s\n Br. at 42. This is merely an attempt to reassert a disability discrim-\n ination claim, which we have explained will not itself sustain a\n claim of retaliation. See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1261 (“Lucas also con-\n tends that Grainger took adverse action against him by failing to\n reasonably accommodate him . . . . But this contention merely re-\n clothes Lucas’ ADA discrimination claim, which we have already\n rejected, and it fares no better in this garb.”); see also Stewart, 117\n F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he acts Stewart describes relate directly to her\n ‘reasonable accommodation’ discrimination claim, not her retalia-\n tion claim, and accordingly provide no basis for denying summary\n judgment on this issue.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s\n grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 37 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 37\n\n 2. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment\n As the district court noted, we have not opined on whether\n a retaliatory hostile work environment claim can be properly as-\n serted under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. We need not re-\n solve that issue here because even if such a claim is cognizable, Ms.\n Mullin has failed to identify any issues of fact with respect to the\n essential elements of that claim.\n To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff\n must establish that (1) that she belongs to a protected group;\n (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the\n harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) that the\n harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the terms\n and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abu-\n sive working environment; and (5) that her employer was respon-\n sible under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Reeves\n v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010)\n (en banc). The fourth element—whether the harassment was suf-\n ficiently severe or pervasive—has a subjective component and an\n objective component. See id. at 809. This means that the employee\n must “subjectively perceive” the harassment as severe or pervasive\n enough to change the terms or conditions of employment, and this\n perception must be objectively reasonable. See id. at 808–09. In\n assessing the objective component, we consider the allegedly dis-\n criminatory conduct’s “frequency . . . ; its severity; whether it is\n physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-\n ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 38 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 38 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\n\n work performance.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.\n 17, 23 (1993)).\n Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin,\n we agree with the district court that she did not provide evidence\n demonstrating how the Department’s handling of her continued\n requests for accommodations was sufficiently “severe or perva-\n sive.” Ms. Mullin’s allegations reflect her dissatisfaction with the\n many accommodations the Department provided at her request\n for her ongoing issues. Although the accommodations Ms. Mullin\n received before she was eventually granted permission to fully\n work from home may not have been exactly what she wanted, a\n jury could not reasonably find that the Department’s attempts to\n accommodate Ms. Mullin were sufficiently severe and pervasive so\n as to be objectively hostile and abusive. Accordingly, the district\n court did not err in granting summary judgment on the hostile\n work environment claim based on disability. 9\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We affirm the district court’s summary judgment order as\n to Ms. Mullin’s claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and\n retaliatory hostile work environment. We reverse the district\n\n\n\n\n 9 We need not address whether Ms. Mullin established the other necessary\n\n elements of a hostile work of environment claim.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 39 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 39\n\n court’s summary judgment order as to Ms. Mullin’s unlawful dis-\n closure claim and remand for further proceedings on that claim.\n AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and\n REMANDED.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 40 of 49\n\n\n\n\n 22-12354 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 22-12354\\n ____________________\\n\\n AILEEN MULLIN,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-02697-VMC-AEP\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n The Petition for Panel Rehearing is DENIED. However, to\\n correct a factual error, we VACATE and withdraw our previous\\n opinion dated August 8, 2025, 149 F.4th 1244 (11th Cir. 2025), and\\n substitute the following opinion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Aileen Mullin sued the Department of Veterans Affairs, as-\\n serting many claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.\\n § 794. The claims were for disability discrimination, failure to ac-\\n commodate, unlawful disclosure, and retaliation (and/or a retalia-\\n tory hostile work environment). The district court granted sum-\\n mary judgment for the Department on all the claims, and Ms.\\n Mullin now appeals.\\n Following a review of the record, and with the benefit of\\n oral argument, we reverse and remand on the unlawful disclosure\\n claim and affirm on the other claims.1\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In reviewing the district court’s summary judgment order,\\n we view the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin. See\\n Taxinet Corp. v. Leon, 114 F.4th 1212, 1231 (11th Cir. 2024). Seen\\n through that lens, the record reflects the following.2\\n A.\\n Ms. Mullin began her employment with the Department of\\n Veterans Affairs in February 2009. She remains employed by the\\n Department as a Ratings Veterans Service Representative at the St.\\n Petersburg Regional Office of the Veterans Benefits Administra-\\n tion.\\n\\n\\n 1 As to any issues not discussed in this opinion, we summarily affirm.\\n\\n 2 We include a fair number of dates in setting out the chronology of events\\n\\n because the dates in this case matter.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n In July 2010, Ms. Mullin began to experience respiratory is-\\n sues at work. Believing that the building she worked in was caus-\\n ing the respiratory problems, she spoke with someone at the De-\\n partment that month about what could be done to address what\\n she believed to be issues with the building. According to Ms.\\n Mullin, the Department did not do anything after she first raised\\n her concerns, and she was told to file a claim for worker’s compen-\\n sation.\\n Ms. Mullin’s respiratory issues worsened over time. In De-\\n cember 2011 she informed the Department that she was still having\\n trouble with her breathing and asthma. She asked for an alterna-\\n tive work schedule to limit the time she spent in the building. She\\n also sought relocation of her workstation to a different place in the\\n building.\\n The Department granted both requests. It limited the num-\\n ber of days Ms. Mullin was required to be in the office and it\\n changed her workstation. Although she had requested these ac-\\n commodations, Ms. Mullin did not consider them effective because\\n she continued to suffer from respiratory issues.\\n In January 2012, Ms. Mullin informed the Department that\\n her respiratory issues were continuing and remained severe. That\\n same month, she met with human resources specialist Tammi\\n Clarke and a union representative to discuss her ongoing health is-\\n sues. Ms. Mullin does not remember whether she made any ac-\\n commodation requests at this meeting, but she recalls that Ms.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Clarke told her that her workstation would be moved from the sec-\\n ond floor to the third floor.\\n Ms. Mullin returned to work two days after this meeting and\\n found that she had not been assigned a new workstation, which\\n shocked and terrified her. She suffered an asthma attack that day\\n and went to the hospital. The next time she returned to work, her\\n workstation had been moved to the third floor.\\n On January 31, 2012, Ms. Mullin emailed the human re-\\n sources department asking that an air purifier Ms. Clarke previ-\\n ously proposed placing in her office on the third floor be put there\\n without delay. The air purifier was placed in her office two days\\n later. Ms. Mullin informed the Department that she did not believe\\n the air purifier would be effective because, based on her research,\\n it was designed for smaller spaces. She also noted that she would\\n “have it running full force and [her] fingers [were] crossed.”\\n B.\\n In March 2012, Ms. Mullin was diagnosed with breast can-\\n cer. Her oncologist noted in a Family and Medical Leave Act\\n (FMLA) certification form that she would require a six-month ab-\\n sence at work for surgery, chemotherapy, and potential radiation.\\n Ms. Mullin submitted this FMLA form to the human resources de-\\n partment.\\n In May 2012, a few months after the cancer diagnosis, Casey\\n Crump—a steward with the union Ms. Mullin belonged to—sent\\n Ms. Mullin an email. In that email, Mr. Crump mentioned that he\\n heard about Ms. Mullin’s “condition” from Bonnie Wax, a human\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n resources manager. Mr. Crump also noted that Ms. Wax believed\\n that Ms. Mullin’s breathing issues were caused by her tumor, not\\n by any problems with the building. Ms. Mullin was surprised to\\n learn that Mr. Crump knew about her cancer diagnosis. The only\\n people she had told were a friend at work and Sandra Smith, a Vet-\\n erans Service Center manager.\\n Ms. Mullin completed her cancer treatment in December\\n 2012 and returned to work the following month. She continued to\\n work remotely three days a week and came into the office the other\\n two days. Shortly after she came back to work, she informed the\\n Department that the issues in the building were worsening her\\n health condition, and she asked to “further minimize” the time\\n spent in the building.\\n On January 30, 2013, Ms. Mullin met with Ms. Clarke and a\\n union representative. At the meeting, Ms. Mullin requested addi-\\n tional accommodations. These included working entirely from\\n home or from a location other than the St. Petersburg office. She\\n also asked to meet another employee outside her building to hand\\n off important paperwork so she would not have to go inside.\\n Four weeks later, the Department again agreed to move Ms.\\n Mullin’s workstation and to place a second air purifier in her office.\\n It also agreed to place her printer near her workstation to limit her\\n movement outside of her workstation.\\n At a meeting held shortly thereafter, a union representative\\n proposed permitting Ms. Mullin to work a half-day schedule on the\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n two days she was in the office. Ms. Mullin began working this pro-\\n posed modified schedule but this accommodation was not formally\\n approved. It appears that at some point the Department discov-\\n ered this new work schedule and informed Ms. Mullin that her ac-\\n commodations did not include this modified schedule.\\n C.\\n In March 2013, a supervisor informed Ms. Clarke that Ms.\\n Mullin was still having issues with the air purifiers. Ms. Clarke\\n added a third air purifier to Ms. Mullin’s office and tested the air\\n quality.\\n The following month, on April 12, 2013, Ms. Mullin’s doctor\\n wrote a note to the Department recommending that Ms. Mullin be\\n allowed to work entirely from home. He also explained that the\\n air purifiers were not effective. Three days later, the Department\\n permitted Ms. Mullin to work from home four days a week, come\\n into work on Friday mornings from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M., and\\n work the remainder of that day from home. Ms. Mullin informed\\n the Department that these accommodations were unsatisfactory to\\n her because they were “useless and potentially harmful.”\\n On April 19, 2013, the Department permitted Ms. Mullin to\\n work entirely from home. She was, however, required to meet\\n someone outside the building on Friday mornings to exchange\\n work-related papers. It is unclear whether Ms. Mullin continues to\\n receive this accommodation.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n D.\\n Ms. Mullin brought suit in the district court after she filed a\\n complaint—which she amended numerous times—with the Equal\\n Employment Opportunity Commission. In her district court com-\\n plaint, she asserted claims under the Rehabilitation Act for disabil-\\n ity discrimination based on disparate treatment and failure to ac-\\n commodate, unlawful disclosures and privacy violations, and retal-\\n iation (and/or a retaliatory hostile work environment).\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, apply-\\n ing the same legal standard used by the district court. See Taxinet\\n Corp., 114 F.4th at 1230. Under Rule 56, summary judgment is war-\\n ranted “when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to\\n the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact\\n and compels judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving\\n party.” Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 2023) (ci-\\n tation and internal quotation marks omitted).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from en-\\n gaging in employment discrimination against otherwise qualified\\n individuals with a disability. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326\\n (11th Cir. 2005); Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.\\n 2000). Specifically, qualified individuals with a disability shall not\\n “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or\\n be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n ceiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activ-\\n ity conducted by any Executive agency” solely because of their dis-\\n ability. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).\\n “The standards used to determine whether [the Rehabilita-\\n tion Act] has been violated . . . shall be the standards applied under\\n [T]itle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and the provi-\\n sions of [S]ections 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with\\n Disabilities Act . . . , as such sections relate to employment.” 29\\n U.S.C. § 794(d); see also Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (“The standard for\\n determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as\\n that under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . ; thus, cases in-\\n volving the ADA are precedent for those involving the Rehabilita-\\n tion Act.”). With this backdrop, we address Ms. Mullin’s Rehabili-\\n tation Act claims.\\n A. Disability Discrimination\\n Ms. Mullin asserts a claim of disability discrimination against\\n the Department under the Rehabilitation Act. The district court\\n concluded that she failed to establish that she was discriminated\\n against because of her disability. We agree with the district court.\\n “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the\\n [Rehabilitation] Act, an individual must show that (1) [s]he has a\\n disability; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified for the position; and\\n (3) [s]he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as the result of\\n h[er] disability.” Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (quoting Sutton v. Lader, 185\\n F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 1999)). To establish the third ele-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 9 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 9\\n\\n ment, the plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employ-\\n ment action because of her disability. See id. Importantly, the\\n plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment action was\\n “solely by reason of her . . . disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). As a\\n result, a claim of disability discrimination fails if the employer\\n based the adverse employment action partially on disability and\\n partially on other factors. See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326.\\n A claim of disability discrimination against an employer un-\\n der the Rehabilitation Act may be established in two ways: (1) dis-\\n parate treatment; or (2) failure to make a reasonable accommoda-\\n tion. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6\\n (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the ADA and the Rehabilitation\\n Act “recognize disparate treatment and reasonable accommoda-\\n tion theories”).\\n Disparate treatment occurs when a covered entity treats a\\n disabled individual differently than a non-disabled individual. See\\n 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). A disparate treatment claim requires a show-\\n ing of discriminatory intent. See Berg v. Fla. Dept. of Labor & Employ-\\n ment, 163 F.3d 1251, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1998).\\n A failure to accommodate claim arises when a covered en-\\n tity fails its affirmative duty to make “reasonable accommodations\\n to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise quali-\\n fied individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,\\n unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommoda-\\n tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the busi-\\n ness.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A failure to make a reasonable\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 10 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 10 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n accommodation does not require a showing of discriminatory in-\\n tent. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th\\n Cir. 2007) (“[A]n employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate a\\n disabled individual itself constitutes discrimination under the ADA\\n . . . . There is no additional burden . . . .”). “An accommodation is\\n reasonable if it enables the employee to perform the essential func-\\n tions of the job.” Solloway v. Clayton, 738 F. App’x 985, 987 (11th\\n Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (citing Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d\\n 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Stu-\\n dent Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen an\\n employee triggers an employer’s accommodation duties, the em-\\n ployer must expend time and expense to explore the universe of\\n reasonable accommodations, identify one that is mutually agreeable\\n to the parties, and implement it.” (emphasis added)).\\n 1. Disparate Treatment\\n As to her disparate treatment theory, Ms. Mullin argues that\\n she suffered disability discrimination because the Department de-\\n nied her request for advanced sick leave. See Appellant’s Br. at 44–\\n 45.\\n The record reflects that, around May 4, 2012, Ms. Mullin re-\\n quested advanced sick leave “of 72–80 hours . . . [to] take care of\\n the post-operative period of 2 weeks followed by approximately 6\\n weeks of radiation . . . .” On May 7, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor pro-\\n vided the relevant documentation for her advanced sick leave re-\\n quest. That same day, the Department approved Ms. Mullin’s re-\\n quest for 80 hours of advanced sick leave—the amount she initially\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 11 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 11\\n\\n requested—in a memorandum. On May 10, 2024, the Department\\n memorialized this decision in a Request for Leave or Approved Ab-\\n sence form signed by Kerri Witty, the Department Director.\\n The record further shows that the Department continued to\\n approve advanced sick leave for Ms. Mullin between June and Au-\\n gust of 2012, despite Ms. Mullin having “used all of her leave to\\n include accrued and sick leave.” The Department also admitted\\n Ms. Mullin to the Voluntary Leave Transfer Program, from which\\n she received donations in addition to her advanced sick leave.\\n The parties spar about whether Ms. Mullin was denied any\\n request for sick leave, but this disagreement misses the mark. We\\n have not found—and Ms. Mullin has not identified—anything in\\n the record to show (or create a genuine issue of fact) that a request\\n for sick for leave was denied solely because of her disability. In fact,\\n she has not shown that any sick leave was denied even in part due\\n to her disability.\\n We have identified three instances where Ms. Mullin’s leave\\n request was denied during the relevant period for her disparate\\n treatment theory. None of these support Ms. Mullin’s disparate\\n treatment claim.\\n The first comes from Ms. Mullin’s own testimony at her dep-\\n osition. Ms. Mullin stated that at some point Ms. Clarke verbally\\n denied her advanced sick leave request. But this testimony is belied\\n by the record, which reflects that the Department ultimately\\n granted her advanced sick leave request. See Blanco v. Samuel, 91\\n F.4th 1061, 1070 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he court cannot discount a\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 12 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 12 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n party’s testimony on summary judgment ‘unless it is blatantly con-\\n tradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a\\n matter of law . . . .’” (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707\\n F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013))). Even if we assume that Ms.\\n Clarke orally denied the request, Ms. Mullin has failed to establish\\n (or create a genuine issue of fact) that her request was denied solely\\n because of her disability.\\n The second is based on a Department memorandum dated\\n April 9, 2012, approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application related to\\n her cancer diagnosis. This memorandum determined that Ms.\\n Mullin “is entitled to a total of 12 workweeks or 480 hours of FMLA\\n leave during a 12-month period,” but noted that she “previously\\n invoked her entitlement to FMLA on March 9, 2012 . . . .” The\\n memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin “is not allowed an addi-\\n tional 12 workweeks” until her current FMLA entitlement “period\\n ends, and a new event or situation occurs that entitles [Ms. Mullin]\\n to another period of . . . medical leave.”\\n The third is based on a similar Department memorandum\\n dated May 11, 2012, evaluating additional medical documentation\\n for Ms. Mullin’s FMLA application regarding the cancer diagnosis.\\n This memorandum stated that an “employee is entitled to up to a\\n total of 12 administrative workweeks of leave without pay . . . [and]\\n [Ms. Mullin] can use a total of 480 hours for the entire FMLA enti-\\n tlement period.” The memorandum concluded that Ms. Mullin\\n was “not allowed an additional 12 workweeks [of leave] based on”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 13 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 13\\n\\n the additional medical documentation but notes that she could re-\\n new her entitlement at the end of her then current FMLA entitle-\\n ment period.\\n These two Department memoranda fare no better for Ms.\\n Mullin’s disparate treatment theory. Neither denial—assuming\\n they were denials—was based solely on her disability. The district\\n court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the\\n Department on the disparate treatment theory.\\n 2. Failure to Accommodate\\n As to her failure to accommodate claim, Ms. Mullin argues\\n that the Department failed to reasonably accommodate her by un-\\n duly delaying in providing her a full-time work-from-home accom-\\n modation in light of her known health conditions. See Appellant’s\\n Br. at 18–28. To avoid summary judgment, Ms. Mullin must pre-\\n sent sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether the\\n Department failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. She\\n failed to do so. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to\\n her, the Department provided reasonable accommodations for Ms.\\n Mullin’s disability and ultimately provided her with the accommo-\\n dation she desired—working from home full time.\\n The failure to accommodate claim can be distilled to two\\n main theories. First, Ms. Mullin argues that the Department un-\\n duly delayed in providing, in her view, the only reasonable accom-\\n modation for her medical conditions—a full-time work from home\\n accommodation. Second, she argues that the Department failed to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 14 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 14 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n provide her with reasonable accommodations during the interac-\\n tive process despite the Department being aware of her medical\\n conditions.\\n The parties dispute the length of the alleged delay before\\n Ms. Mullin received a full-time work-from-home accommodation.\\n Although the Department argues—and the district court agreed—\\n that there was only a three-month delay, if any, Ms. Mullin argues\\n that the Department unreasonably delayed in providing her re-\\n quested accommodation for 10 months. Ms. Mullin’s estimation\\n of the delay is belied by the chronology of events and the record\\n before us. The record reflects that Ms. Mullin was away from work\\n on medical leave due to her cancer treatment during the latter half\\n of 2012 and did not return to work on a regular basis until January\\n 2013. Ms. Mullin cannot fairly cast the period in which she was\\n away from work due to her cancer treatment as an unreasonable\\n delay on the part of the Department. The delay in granting Ms.\\n Mullin the accommodation of full-time work from home was\\n therefore approximately three months.\\n The parties also dispute whether the Department provided\\n Ms. Mullin a reasonable accommodation for her medical condi-\\n tions. Ms. Mullin “bears the burden of identifying an accommoda-\\n tion, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows [her]\\n to perform the job’s essential functions.” Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1255–\\n 56. The record indicates that before the cancer diagnosis and upon\\n her return from the cancer treatment, the Department addressed\\n each of Ms. Mullin’s accommodation requests and provided her\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 15 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 15\\n\\n with an accommodation. Many of these accommodations were in\\n direct response to Ms. Mullin’s own requests and suggestions. For\\n example, before Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis, the Department al-\\n tered her in-office work schedule, moved her workstation to a dif-\\n ferent part of the building, and provided her with an air purifier.\\n And in response to Ms. Mullin submitting an FMLA leave request\\n that included her doctor recommending that she “be allowed to\\n work from home with periodic trips to the work site as required,”\\n the Department formalized a three-day work from home schedule\\n for Ms. Mullin.\\n Upon returning to work in January 2013, Ms. Mullin and the\\n Department resumed the interactive process to identify a reasona-\\n ble accommodation for her medical needs. Between January and\\n April of 2013, and in response to Ms. Mullin’s complaints and re-\\n quests, the Department moved Ms. Mullin’s workstation to an-\\n other part of the building and provided her with two additional air\\n purifiers. It also further modified her schedule to permit her to\\n work from home four days a week and to only come to the office\\n on Friday for four hours in the morning. When these accommo-\\n dations were unsatisfactory to Ms. Mullin, the Department permit-\\n ted her to fully work from home and exchange work-related docu-\\n ments with another employee at the building on Fridays.\\n In reaching our conclusion, we find our reasoning in Sol-\\n loway persuasive. There, an employee suffered from post-trau-\\n matic stress disorder (PTSD) from a past sexual assault. See 738 F.\\n App’x at 986. The employee later learned that her direct supervisor\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 16 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 16 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n was reprimanded for watching pornography at the workplace,\\n which triggered the employee’s PTSD. See id. The employee re-\\n quested an accommodation to work from home full-time as a re-\\n sult. See id. While that request was pending, the employee re-\\n ceived several accommodations to ensure that she would avoid her\\n direct supervisor, including teleworking on days her direct super-\\n visor was in the office and moving her office away from his. See id.\\n The employer allowed these accommodations to continue for two\\n years, even after the employee’s request to work from home full-\\n time was denied. See id. at 986–87. The employee made a second\\n request to work from home full-time, which was denied again. See\\n id. at 987. The employee was later placed on paid administrative\\n leave with full benefits after the employer determined she was un-\\n able to perform the essential functions of her job. See id. The em-\\n ployee was ultimately reinstated and allowed to work from home\\n full-time when her employer’s work from home policy changed.\\n See id.\\n We determined that the employer did not violate the Reha-\\n bilitation Act by denying the employee’s request to telework full\\n time. See id. at 988. Specifically, we concluded that “[a]lthough the\\n [employer] denied her specific request for full-time telework, it not\\n only allowed her to continue teleworking part-time but also re-\\n quired [her direct supervisor] to telework part-time on an alternate\\n schedule so that she would not encounter him.” Id. We also noted\\n that the employee “eventually received her preferred accommoda-\\n tion of full-time telework” and never lost her job. See id. We\\n thought it “unreasonable” to require the employer to “guarantee\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 17 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 17\\n\\n that [the employee] would never encounter [her direct supervi-\\n sor].” Id.\\n Here Ms. Mullin requested accommodations that would re-\\n duce her exposure to the building to avoid triggering her respira-\\n tory conditions. In response, the Department provided several ac-\\n commodations, including moving her workstation, providing her\\n with air purifiers, and modifying her in-office schedule to reduce\\n exposure. When Ms. Mullin complained that a certain accommo-\\n dation was ineffective or not satisfactory, the Department made\\n further adjustments to accommodate her. Although these accom-\\n modations may not have been the ones Ms. Mullin desired—e.g.,\\n to work from home full-time—the Department was only required\\n to provide a reasonable accommodation that allowed her “to per-\\n form the essential functions of the job.” See id. at 987; see also Ow-\\n ens, 52 F.4th at 1335 (noting that a reasonable accommodation\\n must be “mutually agreeable to the parties”); D’Onofrio v. Costco\\n Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n em-\\n ployer is not required to accommodate an employee in any manner\\n that the employee desires—or even provide that employee’s pre-\\n ferred accommodation.”). Moreover, the Department ultimately\\n granted Ms. Mullin’s desired accommodation to work from home\\n full time, just like the employer in Solloway. See 738 F. App’x at 988\\n (noting that the employee “eventually received her preferred ac-\\n commodation of full-time telework”).\\n The Department made reasonable efforts to accommodate\\n Ms. Mullin, and continually expanded her accommodations when\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 18 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 18 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n she complained. Ms. Mullin’s dissatisfaction with the accommoda-\\n tions she received does not, by itself, create an issue of fact with\\n respect to her claim of disability discrimination. As we have noted,\\n “a qualified individual with a disability is not entitled to the accom-\\n modation of her choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation.”\\n Solloway, 738 F. App’x at 988 (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman’s\\n Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also\\n D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022 (“Of course, there are limits to the ac-\\n commodations an employer must provide. . . . [A]n employer is not\\n required to accommodate an employee in any manner that the em-\\n ployee desires—or even provide that employee’s preferred accom-\\n modation.”). Moreover, an employer is not required to provide\\n “the maximum accommodation or every conceivable accommoda-\\n tion possible.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285–86 (quoting Lewis v. Zilog,\\n Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931, 947 (N.D. Ga. 1995)). The employee is only\\n entitled to a reasonable accommodation, not to the accommoda-\\n tion of her choice. See id. at 1286.\\n Some courts have held that an unreasonable delay in provid-\\n ing an accommodation can violate the ADA or the Rehabilitation\\n Act. See generally Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162, 1168 (D.C.\\n Cir. 2010) (citing cases). In assessing claims of unreasonable delay,\\n courts consider “the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay,\\n whether the employer has offered any alternative accommodations\\n while evaluating a particular request, and whether the employer\\n has acted in good faith.” Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d\\n 1249, 1262–63 (10th Cir. 2001). Here the three-month delay in\\n granting Ms. Mullin the requested accommodation of full-time\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 19 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 19\\n\\n work from home was not unreasonable, particularly given the in-\\n termediate additional accommodations provided by the Depart-\\n ment in early 2013 (the moving of the workstation, the placement\\n of two additional air purifiers in her workstation, and the modifica-\\n tion of her in-office schedule). Cf. Ward v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 24,\\n 34 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating that a three-month delay in granting\\n a telework accommodation was not a “long delay”).\\n The district court did not err in granting summary judgment\\n to the Department on the failure to accommodate theory.\\n B. Unlawful Disclosure Claim\\n Ms. Mullin claimed that the Department failed to protect\\n and unlawfully disclosed her confidential and sensitive medical in-\\n formation. The district court granted summary judgment for the\\n Department as to the disclosure claim. We conclude, however,\\n that it erred in doing so because Ms. Mullin presented sufficient ev-\\n idence to create issues of fact.\\n 1. Legal Standard\\n The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the confidentiality pro-\\n visions of the ADA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d). In general,\\n “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual\\n on the basis of disability in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions,\\n and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Moreover,\\n “[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and\\n shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such em-\\n ployee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or sever-\\n ity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 20 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 20 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C.\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A).\\n The relevant regulation similarly states that “[a] covered en-\\n tity may require a medical examination (and/or inquiry) of an em-\\n ployee that is job-related and consistent with business necessity. A\\n covered entity may make inquiries into the ability of an employee\\n to perform job-related functions.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). Infor-\\n mation obtained from an employee through a medical examination\\n or inquiry “shall be collected and maintained on separate forms and\\n in separate medical files and be treated as a confidential medical\\n record . . . .” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c)(1). The Rehabilitation Act sim-\\n ilarly provides that the information obtained is generally “treated\\n as a confidential medical record” under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B),\\n subject to limited exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C).\\n We have not addressed whether there is a private right of\\n action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). But we have “explicitly rec-\\n ognize[d] that a plaintiff has a private right of action under 42\\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), irrespective of . . . disability status.” Harrison\\n v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.\\n 2010). We have also noted that “§ 12112(d)(2)(A) and (d)(4)(A) are\\n parallel provisions with similar language and virtually identical pro-\\n hibitions concerning medical inquiries . . . [and] proof of damages\\n requirement . . . .” Russell v. City of Mobile Police Dep’t, 552 F. App’x\\n 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 3\\n\\n\\n 3 Russell is unpublished, but we find it persuasive.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 21 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 21\\n\\n We therefore recognize a private right of action under 42\\n U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) irrespective of disability status. See Owusu-An-\\n sah v. Coca-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2013) (imply-\\n ing a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) and rec-\\n ognizing “that § 12112(d)(4)(A) [also] protects employees who are\\n not disabled”); see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906–07 (“An em-\\n ployee may raise a § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim whether or not she is dis-\\n abled . . . [and] the proof of damages requirement set in Harrison\\n equally applies to cases involving allegedly improper inquiries un-\\n der § 12112(d)(4)(A).”). To bring a claim under § 12112(d)(4), an\\n employee must show that (1) the employer either made an unlaw-\\n ful inquiry in violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) or violated its confiden-\\n tiality requirements after making a proper inquiry under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), and (2) the employee suffered a tangible injury\\n from the unlawful inquiry or disclosure. See 42 U.S.C.\\n § 12112(d)(4); Russell, 552 F. App’x at 906.\\n 2. Ms. Mullin’s Claim\\n To get to a jury on her unlawful disclosure claim under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C), Ms. Mullin must present sufficient evidence to\\n create issues of fact on whether the Department made a proper in-\\n quiry into her medical condition, whether the Department dis-\\n closed the results of that inquiry to persons in violation of the Re-\\n habilitation Act, and whether she suffered a tangible injury because\\n of the unlawful disclosure. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C); Russell,\\n 552 F. App’x at 906. The district court ruled that Ms. Mullin failed\\n to show that she suffered any harm because of the Department’s\\n alleged improper disclosure by Ms. Wax. As a result, the district\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 22 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n court did not address whether the Department made an inquiry; it\\n noted, however, in a footnote that it was “not at all convinced” that\\n an inquiry occurred when Ms. Mullin disclosed her medical infor-\\n mation in a required FMLA form requesting leave for her cancer\\n treatment.\\n On appeal, the Department argues that Ms. Mullin’s unlaw-\\n ful disclosure claim fails because it did not make an inquiry in the\\n first place. The Department contends that it did not make an in-\\n quiry because the FMLA leave form “is not an inquiry that is in-\\n tended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability [as] an em-\\n ployee could be eligible for FMLA leave based on a serious medical\\n condition that is not considered a disability . . . .” Appellee’s Br. at\\n 42. The Department alternatively argues that “[e]ven if an inquiry\\n was made,” it remains entitled to summary judgment because Ms.\\n Mullin failed to show that her medical condition was confidential\\n at the time of the disclosure and because she failed to establish that\\n she suffered a tangible injury from the disclosure.\\n We disagree with the Department’s arguments. Viewing\\n the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin as the nonmov-\\n ing party, see Williams, 64 F.4th at 1188, we believe that an inquiry\\n was made and that there are issues of fact as to whether there was\\n an unlawful disclosure stemming from that inquiry.\\n a. Whether There Was an Inquiry\\n As a general matter, an employer must request a medical ex-\\n amination or inquire into an employee’s medical status for there to\\n be an “inquiry” under the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 23 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 23\\n\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c). An employee’s voluntary\\n disclosure of a medical diagnosis to a supervisor or co-worker is not\\n an examination or inquiry for purposes of § 12112(d)(4). See Cash\\n v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding no unlawful\\n disclosure where the matter disclosed at issue “was not of the result\\n of an examination ordered by [the employer], but of a voluntary\\n disclosure” by the employee to the employer).\\n We have not previously addressed whether an employee’s\\n disclosure of confidential medical information in an FMLA leave\\n form constitutes an inquiry by the employer within the meaning of\\n the Rehabilitation Act. We now hold that when an employer con-\\n ditions an employee’s access to statutorily protected leave on the\\n submission of medical information, that is an “inquiry” under\\n § 12112(d)(4). The statute prohibits employers from making medi-\\n cal inquiries unless they are job-related and consistent with busi-\\n ness necessity. That restriction cannot be avoided simply because\\n the employer’s demand for information is embedded in the me-\\n chanics of leave approval.\\n This conclusion is consistent with the D.C. Circuit’s reason-\\n ing in Doe v. United States Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir.\\n 2003). In Doe, an employee of the United States Postal Service\\n missed several weeks of work due to an AIDS-related illness. See\\n id. at 341. The employee’s direct supervisor sent the employee a\\n letter regarding his extended absence and attached a Department\\n of Labor Form WH 380 (the FMLA form)—the same form that Ms.\\n Mullin completed—stating that the employee’s “condition may\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 24 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n qualify [him] to be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Poli-\\n cies.” Id. The employee completed the FMLA form and disclosed\\n his HIV status on it. See id. When the employee returned to work,\\n he learned that several co-workers were aware of his HIV status,\\n and several of them identified a supervisor to whom he had not\\n disclosed his status as the source of the information. See id. The\\n employee sued under the Rehabilitation Act and the Privacy Act.\\n See id. The district court granted the Postal Service’s motion for\\n summary judgment in part because it concluded that the FMLA\\n form was not an employer inquiry. The D.C. Circuit disagreed and\\n reversed.\\n The D.C. Circuit held in Doe that the FMLA form was an\\n inquiry and explained that the employee “revealed his medical di-\\n agnosis . . . only after the [Postal] Service, through his direct super-\\n visor, told him in writing that he would face disciplinary proceed-\\n ings unless he completed either the FMLA form or a medical cer-\\n tificate explaining” the nature of his illness. Id. at 344. The D.C.\\n Circuit reasoned that even if the employee could “be said to have\\n submitted the FMLA request voluntarily, . . . that hardly mean[t]\\n he volunteered his medical diagnosis.” Id. The D.C. Circuit went\\n on to conclude that “[t]he Postal Service conditioned [the em-\\n ployee’s] receipt of FMLA leave on his submission of supporting\\n medical documentation, as the FMLA authorized it to do. . . . [I]t\\n was thus the Postal Service, acting pursuant to this statutory au-\\n thorization, not [the employee], that initiated the inquiry into his\\n medical condition by asking for this medical certification.” Id. Be-\\n cause the Postal Service conditioned eligibility for FMLA leave on\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 25 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 25\\n\\n the employee disclosing medical information that established eligi-\\n bility, the FMLA form constituted an “inquiry.” See id. To hold\\n otherwise, the D.C. Circuit noted, would lead to employees being\\n forced “to choose between waiving their right to avoid being pub-\\n licly identified as having a disability and exercising their statutory\\n rights . . . .” Id.\\n The same reasoning applies here. The record shows that in\\n March 2012 Ms. Mullin sought a work-from-home accommodation\\n and also applied for FMLA leave related to her asthma.4 On March\\n 14, 2012, the Department approved her FMLA leave, totaling 12\\n work weeks, and told her, “If it should become necessary for you\\n to extend your entitlement beyond the current certification, you\\n will be required to provide an updated physician’s statement from\\n your healthcare provider.”\\n A March 14 memorandum from Human Resources to Vet-\\n erans Service Center Manager Sandra Smith also recounted that\\n “The employee was informed (in writing) by Human Resources\\n that new medical documentation will be required if their leave ex-\\n ceeds the amount recommended by the Health Care Provider.” A\\n few lines later, the memorandum says, “It is the responsibility of\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 On March 13, an internal email chain that the Department appended to its\\n\\n motion for summary judgment stated that “Maybe [the Department] can\\n move [Mullin’s accommodation request] quickly if there is med[ical] documen-\\n tation to support[ it.]” (emphasis added).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 26 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 26 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n the supervisor to . . . [n]otify the employee that new medical doc-\\n umentation is required when leave usage is not intermittent as de-\\n fined by the Health Care Provider.”\\n On March 20, 2012, the Department approved her work-\\n from-home accommodation for three days working from home\\n and two days working in the office. The approval form stated that\\n Reasonable accommodations are an interactive pro-\\n cess requiring communication to ensure that the ac-\\n commodation continues to meet your workplace re-\\n quirements. As a result, the agency may periodically\\n ask you to provide updated medical evidence to es-\\n tablish whether the accommodation should continue\\n and/or be changed. If your condition changes, or if a\\n change in the accommodation is warranted, it is your\\n responsibility to notify human resources.\\n On March 23, 2012, Ms. Mullin’s doctor submitted an FMLA\\n form disclosing her cancer diagnosis and stating that she would be\\n out continuously for six months. On April 9, 2012, the Department\\n approved that request but noted that she was not eligible for a new\\n 12-week allotment of leave until her prior entitlement period for\\n her previously-approved FMLA leave expired. That letter, like the\\n first, told Ms. Mullin that “If it should become necessary for you to\\n extend your entitlement beyond the current certification of 30\\n days, you may be required to provide an updated physician’s state-\\n ment from your healthcare provider.”\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 27 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 27\\n\\n In short, the record shows that when Ms. Mullin requested\\n leave, the Department told her approval required submission of ad-\\n ditional medical documentation. 5 So when Ms. Mullin was diag-\\n nosed with cancer, she simply did what the Department had al-\\n ready told her she must do: submit medical documentation. She\\n did not volunteer the information; she disclosed it because, under\\n the Department’s previous letters, it was apparent that disclosing\\n the information was the only way to maintain her leave and her\\n pay. Accord Doe, 317 F.3d at 344. That kind of disclosure is not\\n “voluntary” in any meaningful sense. See id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5 Ms. Mullin’s brief stated that the Department required her to complete an\\n\\n FMLA form to receive her statutory leave. The Department did not dispute\\n that in its answer brief. Rather, it accepted the premise and argued only that:\\n “[Ms. Mullin] claims that the VA made an inquiry when it required her to dis-\\n close medical information in an FMLA certification form in order to obtain\\n FMLA leave. . . . But, as a matter of law, that form is not an inquiry . . . .” At\\n oral argument, Ms. Mullin’s counsel reaffirmed that the Department required\\n employees to submit an FMLA form as a precondition to taking leave. The\\n Department again did not dispute the point, instead reiterating its position that\\n requiring an FMLA form is never an inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act.\\n We thus take as undisputed that the Department’s policy required employees\\n to submit an FMLA form to obtain leave. We express no view on situations\\n where no policy or practice requires employees to submit medical documen-\\n tation to exercise their statutory right to leave. Contra Dissenting Op. at 3\\n (incorrectly recasting our holding as “any time an FMLA form is submitted—\\n regardless of whether the employee submits it voluntarily or at the request of the\\n employer—there is an inquiry by the employer under § 12112(d)” (emphases\\n added)).\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 28 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 28 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n The upshot is that when an employee must share medical\\n information to receive benefits guaranteed by law, the require-\\n ment operates as an inquiry by the employer. We therefore hold\\n that, as a matter of law, there was an inquiry here.\\n The partial dissent reaches a different conclusion, but it blurs\\n two distinct legal questions: whether the Department made a med-\\n ical inquiry, and whether it later disclosed information obtained\\n through that inquiry. Those questions are analytically separate.\\n The first concerns the scope of employer conduct regulated by\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A); the second involves whether the employer vio-\\n lated its confidentiality obligations under § 12112(d)(4)(C). We ad-\\n dress only the first here and conclude that the Department did\\n make an inquiry.\\n The partial dissent’s reasoning rests on the premise that Ms.\\n Mullin’s (possible) earlier, voluntary disclosure of her cancer diag-\\n nosis forecloses a finding that the Department later initiated an in-\\n quiry. 6 But nothing in the statute supports the result. Section\\n 12112(d)(4) prohibits employers from making medical inquiries un-\\n less they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. It\\n does not say—expressly or by implication—that an employee’s\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 It bears repeating that the Department’s only argument on the inquiry issue\\n\\n is that an FMLA form is not an inquiry as a matter of law. See supra note 5.\\n Unlike the partial dissent, neither the Department nor Ms. Mullin has ever\\n argued that a factual dispute about a prior voluntary disclosure has any bearing\\n on the inquiry analysis.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 29 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 29\\n\\n prior voluntary disclosure prevents a finding of a subsequent statu-\\n tory inquiry. And the partial dissent cites no case adopting that\\n theory.7\\n To the extent Ms. Mullin disclosed her diagnosis before sub-\\n mitting the FMLA form, that fact bears on whether the Depart-\\n ment unlawfully disclosed confidential information under\\n § 12112(d)(4)(C). But it has no bearing on whether an inquiry oc-\\n curred under § 12112(d)(4)(A). The statute treats those as distinct\\n questions, and so must we. If both a prior voluntary disclosure and\\n a later inquiry happened, the proper question is whether the disclo-\\n sure stemmed from the inquiry (which is prohibited by the Act) or\\n from the voluntary disclosure (which is not covered by the Act).\\n The partial dissent’s contrary approach would create a\\n sweeping exception. Employers could bypass the Rehabilitation\\n Act’s inquiry safeguards by seizing on a prior voluntary disclosure\\n and treating all future demands for medical documentation as out-\\n side the statute’s reach. But where, as here, an employer requires\\n medical information as a condition of leave approval, that demand\\n qualifies as a statutory inquiry—regardless of any earlier voluntary\\n\\n\\n\\n 7 The partial dissent’s reliance on Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2001),\\n\\n only underscores the distinction between an inquiry and a voluntary disclo-\\n sure. There, we held that the employer was not liable because the challenged\\n disclosure involved information the employee had volunteered—not infor-\\n mation obtained through an inquiry. Id. at 1307–08. Neither Cash nor any\\n case the partial dissent cites supports the proposition that a prior voluntary\\n disclosure forecloses the possibility of a later statutory inquiry.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 30 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 30 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n disclosure. That conclusion follows from both the text and struc-\\n ture of the Act.\\n b. Whether There Was an Unlawful Disclosure\\n Having found that the Department made an inquiry into Ms.\\n Mullin’s medical condition, Ms. Mullin must now show that confi-\\n dential information from that inquiry was disclosed in violation of\\n the Rehabilitation Act. The district court did not address whether\\n Ms. Wax’s disclosure to Mr. Crump of Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagno-\\n sis amounted to an unlawful disclosure.\\n The Department argues that summary judgment is appro-\\n priate because Ms. Mullin failed to show that her cancer diagnosis\\n was confidential. It maintains that there is no proof that Mr.\\n Crump’s knowledge of Ms. Mullin’s diagnosis came first from Ms.\\n Wax, and that Ms. Mullin told other people about her cancer diag-\\n nosis before she received Mr. Crump’s email.\\n Given that we are in a summary judgment posture and must\\n view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to Ms.\\n Mullin, we are unpersuaded by the Department’s argument. There\\n is sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find that Ms. Wax\\n was the source of the allegedly unlawful disclosure and that she\\n obtained the information from the FMLA form. First, an internal\\n Department memorandum approving Ms. Mullin’s FMLA leave\\n request for her cancer diagnosis, which was dated before Mr.\\n Crump’s email and signed by Ms. Wax, stated that “[t]he specific\\n medical condition was intentionally left off . . . to avoid accidental\\n disclosure.” Second, Mr. Crump’s email to Ms. Mullin—which\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 31 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 31\\n\\n came after the Department had approved Mr. Mullin’s FMLA re-\\n quest—stated that Mr. Crump and Ms. Wax discussed Ms. Mullin’s\\n cancer diagnosis. Third, although Ms. Mullin said she spoke to a\\n few people—including friends outside of work and doctors—about\\n her diagnosis, there is insufficient evidence that Mr. Crump learned\\n of her diagnosis from anyone other than Ms. Wax. Of course, shar-\\n ing a medical condition with a few relatives or close friends does\\n not, as a matter of law, make the condition non-confidential.\\n Fourth, Ms. Mullin testified that she never told Ms. Wax about her\\n cancer diagnosis.\\n There is also an issue of fact as to whether Mr. Crump\\n learned of the cancer diagnosis before Ms. Mullin told anyone at\\n work. In cases involving disclosure of confidential information\\n from private records, circumstantial evidence may suffice to defeat\\n a motion for summary judgment, as “plaintiffs can rarely produce\\n direct evidence that the government has disclosed confidential in-\\n formation obtained from their private records . . . .” Doe, 317 F.3d\\n at 343. The D.C. Circuit in Doe, for example, found that the em-\\n ployee presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a gen-\\n uine issue of fact as to when and from whom “his HIV status had\\n become common knowledge among his co-workers,” including\\n that the disclosure came after he submitted the FMLA form and\\n that the source of the information was from a specific manage-\\n ment-level supervisor. Id. at 341–43. Here, a reasonable jury could\\n find that Ms. Wax disclosed Ms. Mullin’s cancer diagnosis to Mr.\\n Crump after the FMLA form was submitted. As a result, Ms.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 32 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 32 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n Mullin survives summary judgment on the inquiry and disclosure\\n aspects of her unlawful disclosure claim.\\n c. Whether Ms. Mullin Suffered a Tangible Injury\\n For Ms. Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim to proceed past\\n summary judgment, she must also show (or create an issue of fact)\\n that she suffered a tangible injury from the alleged unlawful disclo-\\n sure of her cancer diagnosis. The district court believed that Ms.\\n Mullin failed to present “more than a scintilla of evidence of a tan-\\n gible injury resulting from the alleged disclosure of her breast can-\\n cer diagnosis.” We disagree.\\n To succeed on an unlawful disclosure claim, a “plaintiff\\n [must] at least show some damages (emotional, pecuniary, or oth-\\n erwise) caused by a § 12112(d) violation.” Harrison, 593 F.3d at\\n 1216–17; see also Russell, 552 F. App’x at 907 (holding that an em-\\n ployee who alleges an unlawful disclosure in violation of\\n § 12112(d)(4)(A) “must show damages—emotional, pecuniary, or\\n otherwise”). As one of our sister circuits aptly stated, in the\\n § 12112(d)(2)(A) context the “damages liability . . . must be based\\n on something more than a mere violation of that provision. There\\n must be some cognizable injury in fact of which the violation is a\\n legal and proximate cause for damages to arise from a single viola-\\n tion.” Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir.\\n 1998); see also, e.g., Hustvet v. Allina Health Sys., 910 F.3d 399, 406–\\n 07 (8th Cir. 2018) (“If a violation occurs, it is not necessary that an\\n applicant be disabled to bring a claim under § 12112(d). The appli-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 33 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 33\\n\\n cant must, however, establish the prospective employer’s ‘viola-\\n tion of the ADA caused some sort of tangible injury.’” (quoting Cos-\\n sette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 970 (8th Cir. 1999))); Tice\\n v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 519 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting\\n that some circuits require a showing of the “existence of an injury-\\n in-fact,” such as “actual damage[s] (emotional, pecuniary, or other-\\n wise)” for a plaintiff to have a cause of action for a violation of\\n § 12112(d)).\\n Ms. Mullin alleged that she suffered emotional distress be-\\n cause of the alleged unlawful disclosure of her cancer diagnosis.\\n She testified as follows during her deposition concerning her emo-\\n tional distress:\\n Q. . . . Can you tell me how . . . Mrs. Wax’s conversa-\\n tion with [Mr.] Crump about your cancer and your\\n health issues harmed you?\\n A. It still harms me.\\n Q. And how did it harm you?\\n A. I had cancer and I just had to get things in order so\\n I could treat my cancer. And Bonnie [Wax] had to\\n interject her issues around the building and defending\\n the building and she-- my surgery, the first one, I went\\n under anesthesia worried about Bonnie Wax and\\n what she was going to do to me. I came out of anes-\\n thesia that way. I spent more time crying and con-\\n cerned. At times I had no pay, nothing, and I never\\n knew if I’d get paid. The anxiety-- what the anxiety\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 34 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 34 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n did to my body and my brain and her callousness. It\\n was breast cancer. . . .\\n Q. . . . So is there any other way that the conversation\\n between Mrs. Wax and [Mr.] Crump harmed you or\\n affected you?\\n A. Did the conversation between-- it distracted me\\n from caring for myself. It distracted me from honor-\\n ing my body and focusing on healing and health.\\n This testimony was enough to withstand summary judgment on\\n the injury aspect of the unlawful disclosure claim. See Walters v.\\n Fast AC, LLC, 60 F.4th 642, 648 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Walters’s deposi-\\n tion testimony describing his lost time, economic harm, and emo-\\n tional distress is sufficient evidence . . . to survive summary judg-\\n ment.”).\\n Although documentation of emotional distress is not re-\\n quired, see id., we note that the record also contains two letters\\n from the Department of Labor Office of Workers’ Compensation\\n Programs updating Ms. Mullin’s medical conditions in her file. The\\n first is a letter dated October 26, 2015, which updates her diagnosed\\n conditions to include PTSD. The second is a letter dated February\\n 2, 2017, which updates her diagnosed conditions to include major\\n depressive disorder. Ms. Mullin does not rely on these two letters\\n to support her claim of a tangible injury and it is unclear whether\\n either diagnosis is related to her unlawful disclosure claim. But if\\n those diagnoses are connected to the alleged unlawful disclosure, a\\n jury could reasonably find that Ms. Mullin suffered a tangible injury\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 35 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 35\\n\\n from the disclosure—for example, anxiety that developed into\\n PTSD and/or depression.8\\n In short, there are issues of fact as to whether Ms. Wax im-\\n properly disclosed Ms. Mullin’s confidential cancer diagnosis,\\n whether Ms. Wax obtained that information from the FMLA form\\n or from Ms. Mullin’s voluntary disclosure, and whether Ms. Mullin\\n suffered a tangible injury as a result. The district court erred in\\n granting summary judgment in favor of the Department on Ms.\\n Mullin’s unlawful disclosure claim.\\n C. Retaliation and Hostile Work Environment Claims\\n Ms. Mullin asserted claims of retaliation (and/or a retalia-\\n tory hostile work environment) based on her disability. We agree\\n with the district court that the Department was entitled to sum-\\n mary judgment on these claims. We address retaliation first and\\n then move on to retaliatory hostile work environment.\\n 1. Retaliation\\n To establish a claim of retaliation, Ms. Mullin must prove\\n that she engaged in statutorily protected activity, that she suffered\\n a materially adverse action, and that there was some causal relation\\n between the two events. See Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998\\n F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021). As to the second element, she\\n must show that the adverse action “well might have dissuaded a\\n\\n\\n 8 Because the parties did not brief whether Ms. Mullin’s diagnoses of PTSD\\n\\n and depression were caused by or related to the alleged unlawful disclosure of\\n her cancer diagnosis, we do not decide that question here.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 36 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 36 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrim-\\n ination.” Monahgan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855, 861 (11th\\n Cir. 2020) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548\\n U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).\\n The district court granted the Department’s motion for\\n summary judgment on the retaliation claim because it concluded\\n that Ms. Mullin had not established a causal connection between\\n protected activity and any materially adverse action. We need not\\n reach this issue because Ms. Mullin’s retaliation claim is simply a\\n claim for a failure to accommodate disguised as retaliation.\\n Ms. Mullin’s theory is that the Department’s alleged denial\\n of her requests for accommodation was retaliatory. See Appellant’s\\n Br. at 42. This is merely an attempt to reassert a disability discrim-\\n ination claim, which we have explained will not itself sustain a\\n claim of retaliation. See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1261 (“Lucas also con-\\n tends that Grainger took adverse action against him by failing to\\n reasonably accommodate him . . . . But this contention merely re-\\n clothes Lucas’ ADA discrimination claim, which we have already\\n rejected, and it fares no better in this garb.”); see also Stewart, 117\\n F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he acts Stewart describes relate directly to her\\n ‘reasonable accommodation’ discrimination claim, not her retalia-\\n tion claim, and accordingly provide no basis for denying summary\\n judgment on this issue.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s\\n grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 37 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 37\\n\\n 2. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment\\n As the district court noted, we have not opined on whether\\n a retaliatory hostile work environment claim can be properly as-\\n serted under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. We need not re-\\n solve that issue here because even if such a claim is cognizable, Ms.\\n Mullin has failed to identify any issues of fact with respect to the\\n essential elements of that claim.\\n To state a claim for hostile work environment, a plaintiff\\n must establish that (1) that she belongs to a protected group;\\n (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the\\n harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) that the\\n harassment was “sufficiently severe or pervasive” to alter the terms\\n and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abu-\\n sive working environment; and (5) that her employer was respon-\\n sible under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. See Reeves\\n v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 (11th Cir. 2010)\\n (en banc). The fourth element—whether the harassment was suf-\\n ficiently severe or pervasive—has a subjective component and an\\n objective component. See id. at 809. This means that the employee\\n must “subjectively perceive” the harassment as severe or pervasive\\n enough to change the terms or conditions of employment, and this\\n perception must be objectively reasonable. See id. at 808–09. In\\n assessing the objective component, we consider the allegedly dis-\\n criminatory conduct’s “frequency . . . ; its severity; whether it is\\n physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-\\n ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 38 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 38 Opinion of the Court 22-12354\\n\\n work performance.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S.\\n 17, 23 (1993)).\\n Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Mullin,\\n we agree with the district court that she did not provide evidence\\n demonstrating how the Department’s handling of her continued\\n requests for accommodations was sufficiently “severe or perva-\\n sive.” Ms. Mullin’s allegations reflect her dissatisfaction with the\\n many accommodations the Department provided at her request\\n for her ongoing issues. Although the accommodations Ms. Mullin\\n received before she was eventually granted permission to fully\\n work from home may not have been exactly what she wanted, a\\n jury could not reasonably find that the Department’s attempts to\\n accommodate Ms. Mullin were sufficiently severe and pervasive so\\n as to be objectively hostile and abusive. Accordingly, the district\\n court did not err in granting summary judgment on the hostile\\n work environment claim based on disability. 9\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We affirm the district court’s summary judgment order as\\n to Ms. Mullin’s claims of disability discrimination, retaliation, and\\n retaliatory hostile work environment. We reverse the district\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 9 We need not address whether Ms. Mullin established the other necessary\\n\\n elements of a hostile work of environment claim.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 39 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 Opinion of the Court 39\\n\\n court’s summary judgment order as to Ms. Mullin’s unlawful dis-\\n closure claim and remand for further proceedings on that claim.\\n AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and\\n REMANDED.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 40 of 49\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 22-12354 TJOFLAT, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30989,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763171,"string":"10,763,171"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Zurich American Insurance Company v. Jerry Walker"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-12085"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12085\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n ROBERT BLANCHARD,\\n Plaintiff,\\n ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE\\n COMPANY,\\n Intervenor-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n JERRY DONALD WALKER,\\n ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE\\n COMPANY,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00696-RAH-CWB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Zurich American Insurance Company appeals the District\\n Court’s dismissal of its Complaint in Intervention after the District\\n Court dismissed the underlying complaint in the case. We affirm.\\n I.\\n On April 18, 2018, Jerry Donald Walker, an Alabama resi-\\n dent, crashed his motor vehicle into that of Robert James\\n Blanchard, a Louisiana resident, in Alabama, injuring Blanchard.\\n Blanchard, an employee of Linden Bulk Transportation, LLC, was\\n working and driving a tractor-trailer for Linden at the time of the\\n accident. After the crash, Zurich, Linden’s workers’ compensation\\n insurance provider, began paying Blanchard employment and\\n medical benefits. Blanchard sued Walker; Walker’s insurer, Allstate\\n Insurance Company; and Linden’s underinsured motorist insur-\\n ance provider, Ace American Insurance Company, in federal dis-\\n trict court in Alabama on April 17, 2020, under diversity jurisdic-\\n tion. 1 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and Notice of Statutory\\n Lien in that lawsuit on July 24, 2020, stating that it had a lien on\\n\\n 1 This created Case No. 2:20-cv-265-WKW. This case is not on appeal here,\\n\\n but it is relevant for our discussion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Blanchard’s proceeds from the case. Before ruling on Zurich’s mo-\\n tion, the District Court dismissed the case without prejudice be-\\n cause the complaint’s jurisdictional statement was deficient and\\n Blanchard had failed to comply with court orders to file a motion\\n to amend. In the dismissal, the Court ruled that Zurich’s Motion to\\n Intervene was moot.\\n Blanchard then filed a nearly identical suit in the same court,\\n against the same parties, 2 and with a corrected jurisdictional state-\\n ment, on September 2, 2020. This created a second lawsuit, which\\n is the focus of this appeal. 3 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and\\n Notice of Statutory Lien in that lawsuit on November 5, 2020. The\\n motion again stated that Zurich had a lien on Blanchard’s proceeds\\n from the case, specifically that “Zurich . . . ha[d] a subrogation in-\\n terest, or a lien, in the proceeds as specifically provided for in La.\\n R.S. § 23:1102 . . . if the Plaintiff is successful in his action against\\n Defendants.” The District Court granted Zurich’s motion on Au-\\n gust 31, 2021, after no parties objected. Zurich then filed its Com-\\n plaint in Intervention on October 1, 2021, which stated that “[p]ur-\\n suant to La. R.S. § 23:1102 . . . Zurich is entitled to reimbursement\\n and exoneration out of the proceeds of any recovery from the De-\\n fendants herein, and to have its rights determined by final judg-\\n ment of this Honorable Court.”\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Allstate was later removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit.\\n\\n 3 This is Case No. 2:20-cv-696-SRW.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n Walker filed a motion to dismiss Blanchard’s claims against\\n him because Blanchard had filed this second suit after the statute of\\n limitations had passed. The District Court granted the motion and\\n dismissed Blanchard’s claims against Walker with prejudice.\\n Blanchard and Ace later settled the claim between them, and\\n Blanchard, Ace, and Zurich4 filed a joint stipulation for dismissal\\n “except as to the Intervenor’s, Zurich American Insurance Com-\\n pany’s, claims against Jerry Donald Walker.” The District Court\\n granted the joint stipulation “on the terms agreed to and set out by\\n the parties.” It further provided that “[a]ll pending deadlines are\\n terminated” and directed the Clerk of the Court to “close the case.”\\n At this point, Zurich filed a Motion for Reconsideration, stat-\\n ing that the District Court had accidentally closed the entire case,\\n instead of just the claims between Blanchard and Ace. Zurich main-\\n tained that it still had a claim against Walker. The District Court\\n granted Zurich’s motion and later ordered Walker to respond to\\n Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention. Walker instead filed a Motion\\n to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the District Court\\n granted on June 11, 2024. The Court explained that dismissal was\\n appropriate because Zurich’s claims were moot now that the un-\\n derlying case between Blanchard and Walker was dismissed and,\\n even if its claims were not moot, Zurich had filed them outside its\\n statute of limitations. Zurich timely appeals.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Allstate had been removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit before this\\n\\n filing.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n II.\\n We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint\\n for failure to state a claim. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802\\n (11th Cir. 1999). To survive the motion to dismiss, “a complaint\\n must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a\\n claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.\\n Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)), when\\n “construe[d] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v.\\n McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, “a case\\n must be dismissed as moot if events that occur subsequent to the\\n filing of a lawsuit deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff\\n meaningful relief.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257,\\n 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted) (citation and internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n Under Alabama law, 5 a person injured in a car accident has\\n two years to sue for damages. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l) (“All actions\\n for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from\\n contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be\\n brought within two years.”); Davison v. Pogue, 735 So. 2d 1240, 1242\\n (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (“[The] two-year limitations period applies to\\n actions based upon collisions arising from alleged negligence in the\\n operation of a motor vehicle.”). The two years “begins to run from\\n the time the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues,” Singer Asset Fin. Co.\\n\\n\\n 5 The parties do not dispute that Alabama procedural law governs this case.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 975 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala. Civ. App.\\n 2007), which is “when the force wrongfully put in motion produces\\n injury.” Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278, 281 (Ala. 1983) (citation\\n omitted).\\n A workers’ compensation insurer can intervene in that law-\\n suit for “reimburse[ment]” for compensation benefits paid or to\\n “preserve its subrogation interest” for medical benefits paid. Trott\\n v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2007); Ala. Code § 25-5-11(a)\\n (2024). For the compensation benefits, reimbursement is to come\\n from recovery in the underlying suit. Id. For the medical benefits,\\n the Alabama Supreme Court “equates” the term “subrogation”\\n with equitable subrogation. Trott, 972 So. 2d at 85–86. And “[u]nder\\n the equitable doctrine of subrogation, a subrogee steps into the\\n shoes of [the] subrogor and that subrogee only gets those rights\\n that its subrogor has. The subrogee can have no greater rights.” Id.\\n at 87. In other words, if the subrogee cannot pursue a claim against\\n the third party, then the subrogor, stepping into the subrogee’s\\n shoes, cannot pursue a claim either.6 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Though, “In the event the injured employee . . . do[es] not file a civil action\\n\\n against the other party to recover damages within the time allowed by law\\n [and the insurance carrier has paid compensation to the employee,] the . . .\\n insurance carrier . . . shall be allowed an additional period of six months within\\n which to bring a civil action against the other party for damages on account of\\n the injury . . . . in the name of the injured employee . . . or the insurance car-\\n rier.” Ala. Code § 25-5-11(d) (2024).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n In a particularly convoluted brief, Zurich argues that the\\n District Court erred in dismissing its Complaint in Intervention be-\\n cause it has a claim that can continue regardless of the dismissal in\\n the underlying suit. We disagree.\\n Zurich intervened in Blanchard’s suit. He put a lien on the\\n recovery and preserved a right of subrogation. However, a lien on\\n recovery requires that Blanchard actually recover, and standing in\\n Blanchard’s shoes to pursue a claim requires that Blanchard had the\\n ability to pursue a claim on his own. Neither is the case here.\\n In other words, the only claim still in existence after Ace and\\n Blanchard settled the claim between them was Zurich’s claim\\n against Blanchard for reimbursement out of that settlement. Zur-\\n ich waived that claim in the joint stipulation for dismissal, which\\n stated that the only claim not to be dismissed was Zurich’s claim\\n against Walker. In reality, Zurich had no claim against Walker at\\n that time. Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of the underlying suit\\n “deprive[d] the court of the ability to give [Zurich] meaningful re-\\n lief.” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1267. Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention\\n was properly dismissed. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 We would be remiss if we did not directly address two questionable argu-\\n\\n ments Zurich made. Zurich explained that Walker did not object to its inter-\\n vention or file a motion to dismiss its claim when the Court first dismissed\\n Blanchard’s, implying that Walker was “okay” being sued by Zurich at the\\n start, so we should let Zurich continue suing him now. That reads a lot into\\n the actions of the defendant and, regardless, is not a reason for the Court to\\n ignore the procedural rules it operates under. Zurich also made multiple state-\\n ments such as “this result [was] not intended by the Alabama legislature,” but\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n III.\\n We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Zurich’s Com-\\n plaint in Intervention.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n it provided no support or citation for such claims. We cannot rely on bare\\n conjecture about the drafters of a statute simply because a party is upset with\\n where the statute leaves it.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229756/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"NEWSOM"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GRANT"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"TJOFLAT"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"NEWSOM\": \", Circuit\", \"GRANT\": \", Circuit\", \"TJOFLAT\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763171/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Zurich American Insurance Company v. Jerry Walker\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-12085\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n ROBERT BLANCHARD,\n Plaintiff,\n ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE\n COMPANY,\n Intervenor-Appellant,\n versus\n\n JERRY DONALD WALKER,\n ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE\n COMPANY,\n Defendants-Appellees,\n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,\n Defendant.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00696-RAH-CWB\n ____________________\n\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Zurich American Insurance Company appeals the District\n Court’s dismissal of its Complaint in Intervention after the District\n Court dismissed the underlying complaint in the case. We affirm.\n I.\n On April 18, 2018, Jerry Donald Walker, an Alabama resi-\n dent, crashed his motor vehicle into that of Robert James\n Blanchard, a Louisiana resident, in Alabama, injuring Blanchard.\n Blanchard, an employee of Linden Bulk Transportation, LLC, was\n working and driving a tractor-trailer for Linden at the time of the\n accident. After the crash, Zurich, Linden’s workers’ compensation\n insurance provider, began paying Blanchard employment and\n medical benefits. Blanchard sued Walker; Walker’s insurer, Allstate\n Insurance Company; and Linden’s underinsured motorist insur-\n ance provider, Ace American Insurance Company, in federal dis-\n trict court in Alabama on April 17, 2020, under diversity jurisdic-\n tion. 1 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and Notice of Statutory\n Lien in that lawsuit on July 24, 2020, stating that it had a lien on\n\n 1 This created Case No. 2:20-cv-265-WKW. This case is not on appeal here,\n\n but it is relevant for our discussion.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n Blanchard’s proceeds from the case. Before ruling on Zurich’s mo-\n tion, the District Court dismissed the case without prejudice be-\n cause the complaint’s jurisdictional statement was deficient and\n Blanchard had failed to comply with court orders to file a motion\n to amend. In the dismissal, the Court ruled that Zurich’s Motion to\n Intervene was moot.\n Blanchard then filed a nearly identical suit in the same court,\n against the same parties, 2 and with a corrected jurisdictional state-\n ment, on September 2, 2020. This created a second lawsuit, which\n is the focus of this appeal. 3 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and\n Notice of Statutory Lien in that lawsuit on November 5, 2020. The\n motion again stated that Zurich had a lien on Blanchard’s proceeds\n from the case, specifically that “Zurich . . . ha[d] a subrogation in-\n terest, or a lien, in the proceeds as specifically provided for in La.\n R.S. § 23:1102 . . . if the Plaintiff is successful in his action against\n Defendants.” The District Court granted Zurich’s motion on Au-\n gust 31, 2021, after no parties objected. Zurich then filed its Com-\n plaint in Intervention on October 1, 2021, which stated that “[p]ur-\n suant to La. R.S. § 23:1102 . . . Zurich is entitled to reimbursement\n and exoneration out of the proceeds of any recovery from the De-\n fendants herein, and to have its rights determined by final judg-\n ment of this Honorable Court.”\n\n\n\n\n 2 Allstate was later removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit.\n\n 3 This is Case No. 2:20-cv-696-SRW.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\n\n Walker filed a motion to dismiss Blanchard’s claims against\n him because Blanchard had filed this second suit after the statute of\n limitations had passed. The District Court granted the motion and\n dismissed Blanchard’s claims against Walker with prejudice.\n Blanchard and Ace later settled the claim between them, and\n Blanchard, Ace, and Zurich4 filed a joint stipulation for dismissal\n “except as to the Intervenor’s, Zurich American Insurance Com-\n pany’s, claims against Jerry Donald Walker.” The District Court\n granted the joint stipulation “on the terms agreed to and set out by\n the parties.” It further provided that “[a]ll pending deadlines are\n terminated” and directed the Clerk of the Court to “close the case.”\n At this point, Zurich filed a Motion for Reconsideration, stat-\n ing that the District Court had accidentally closed the entire case,\n instead of just the claims between Blanchard and Ace. Zurich main-\n tained that it still had a claim against Walker. The District Court\n granted Zurich’s motion and later ordered Walker to respond to\n Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention. Walker instead filed a Motion\n to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the District Court\n granted on June 11, 2024. The Court explained that dismissal was\n appropriate because Zurich’s claims were moot now that the un-\n derlying case between Blanchard and Walker was dismissed and,\n even if its claims were not moot, Zurich had filed them outside its\n statute of limitations. Zurich timely appeals.\n\n\n\n 4 Allstate had been removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit before this\n\n filing.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n II.\n We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint\n for failure to state a claim. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802\n (11th Cir. 1999). To survive the motion to dismiss, “a complaint\n must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a\n claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\n 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.\n Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)), when\n “construe[d] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v.\n McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, “a case\n must be dismissed as moot if events that occur subsequent to the\n filing of a lawsuit deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff\n meaningful relief.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257,\n 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted) (citation and internal\n quotation marks omitted).\n Under Alabama law, 5 a person injured in a car accident has\n two years to sue for damages. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l) (“All actions\n for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from\n contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be\n brought within two years.”); Davison v. Pogue, 735 So. 2d 1240, 1242\n (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (“[The] two-year limitations period applies to\n actions based upon collisions arising from alleged negligence in the\n operation of a motor vehicle.”). The two years “begins to run from\n the time the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues,” Singer Asset Fin. Co.\n\n\n 5 The parties do not dispute that Alabama procedural law governs this case.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\n\n v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 975 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala. Civ. App.\n 2007), which is “when the force wrongfully put in motion produces\n injury.” Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278, 281 (Ala. 1983) (citation\n omitted).\n A workers’ compensation insurer can intervene in that law-\n suit for “reimburse[ment]” for compensation benefits paid or to\n “preserve its subrogation interest” for medical benefits paid. Trott\n v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2007); Ala. Code § 25-5-11(a)\n (2024). For the compensation benefits, reimbursement is to come\n from recovery in the underlying suit. Id. For the medical benefits,\n the Alabama Supreme Court “equates” the term “subrogation”\n with equitable subrogation. Trott, 972 So. 2d at 85–86. And “[u]nder\n the equitable doctrine of subrogation, a subrogee steps into the\n shoes of [the] subrogor and that subrogee only gets those rights\n that its subrogor has. The subrogee can have no greater rights.” Id.\n at 87. In other words, if the subrogee cannot pursue a claim against\n the third party, then the subrogor, stepping into the subrogee’s\n shoes, cannot pursue a claim either.6 Id.\n\n\n\n\n 6 Though, “In the event the injured employee . . . do[es] not file a civil action\n\n against the other party to recover damages within the time allowed by law\n [and the insurance carrier has paid compensation to the employee,] the . . .\n insurance carrier . . . shall be allowed an additional period of six months within\n which to bring a civil action against the other party for damages on account of\n the injury . . . . in the name of the injured employee . . . or the insurance car-\n rier.” Ala. Code § 25-5-11(d) (2024).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n In a particularly convoluted brief, Zurich argues that the\n District Court erred in dismissing its Complaint in Intervention be-\n cause it has a claim that can continue regardless of the dismissal in\n the underlying suit. We disagree.\n Zurich intervened in Blanchard’s suit. He put a lien on the\n recovery and preserved a right of subrogation. However, a lien on\n recovery requires that Blanchard actually recover, and standing in\n Blanchard’s shoes to pursue a claim requires that Blanchard had the\n ability to pursue a claim on his own. Neither is the case here.\n In other words, the only claim still in existence after Ace and\n Blanchard settled the claim between them was Zurich’s claim\n against Blanchard for reimbursement out of that settlement. Zur-\n ich waived that claim in the joint stipulation for dismissal, which\n stated that the only claim not to be dismissed was Zurich’s claim\n against Walker. In reality, Zurich had no claim against Walker at\n that time. Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of the underlying suit\n “deprive[d] the court of the ability to give [Zurich] meaningful re-\n lief.” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1267. Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention\n was properly dismissed. 7\n\n\n 7 We would be remiss if we did not directly address two questionable argu-\n\n ments Zurich made. Zurich explained that Walker did not object to its inter-\n vention or file a motion to dismiss its claim when the Court first dismissed\n Blanchard’s, implying that Walker was “okay” being sued by Zurich at the\n start, so we should let Zurich continue suing him now. That reads a lot into\n the actions of the defendant and, regardless, is not a reason for the Court to\n ignore the procedural rules it operates under. Zurich also made multiple state-\n ments such as “this result [was] not intended by the Alabama legislature,” but\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\n\n\n\n\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\n\n III.\n We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Zurich’s Com-\n plaint in Intervention.\n AFFIRMED.\n\n\n\n\n it provided no support or citation for such claims. We cannot rely on bare\n conjecture about the drafters of a statute simply because a party is upset with\n where the statute leaves it.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Zurich American Insurance Company v. Jerry Walker\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-12085\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n ROBERT BLANCHARD,\\n Plaintiff,\\n ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE\\n COMPANY,\\n Intervenor-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n JERRY DONALD WALKER,\\n ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE\\n COMPANY,\\n Defendants-Appellees,\\n ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,\\n Defendant.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00696-RAH-CWB\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Zurich American Insurance Company appeals the District\\n Court’s dismissal of its Complaint in Intervention after the District\\n Court dismissed the underlying complaint in the case. We affirm.\\n I.\\n On April 18, 2018, Jerry Donald Walker, an Alabama resi-\\n dent, crashed his motor vehicle into that of Robert James\\n Blanchard, a Louisiana resident, in Alabama, injuring Blanchard.\\n Blanchard, an employee of Linden Bulk Transportation, LLC, was\\n working and driving a tractor-trailer for Linden at the time of the\\n accident. After the crash, Zurich, Linden’s workers’ compensation\\n insurance provider, began paying Blanchard employment and\\n medical benefits. Blanchard sued Walker; Walker’s insurer, Allstate\\n Insurance Company; and Linden’s underinsured motorist insur-\\n ance provider, Ace American Insurance Company, in federal dis-\\n trict court in Alabama on April 17, 2020, under diversity jurisdic-\\n tion. 1 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and Notice of Statutory\\n Lien in that lawsuit on July 24, 2020, stating that it had a lien on\\n\\n 1 This created Case No. 2:20-cv-265-WKW. This case is not on appeal here,\\n\\n but it is relevant for our discussion.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n Blanchard’s proceeds from the case. Before ruling on Zurich’s mo-\\n tion, the District Court dismissed the case without prejudice be-\\n cause the complaint’s jurisdictional statement was deficient and\\n Blanchard had failed to comply with court orders to file a motion\\n to amend. In the dismissal, the Court ruled that Zurich’s Motion to\\n Intervene was moot.\\n Blanchard then filed a nearly identical suit in the same court,\\n against the same parties, 2 and with a corrected jurisdictional state-\\n ment, on September 2, 2020. This created a second lawsuit, which\\n is the focus of this appeal. 3 Zurich filed a Motion to Intervene and\\n Notice of Statutory Lien in that lawsuit on November 5, 2020. The\\n motion again stated that Zurich had a lien on Blanchard’s proceeds\\n from the case, specifically that “Zurich . . . ha[d] a subrogation in-\\n terest, or a lien, in the proceeds as specifically provided for in La.\\n R.S. § 23:1102 . . . if the Plaintiff is successful in his action against\\n Defendants.” The District Court granted Zurich’s motion on Au-\\n gust 31, 2021, after no parties objected. Zurich then filed its Com-\\n plaint in Intervention on October 1, 2021, which stated that “[p]ur-\\n suant to La. R.S. § 23:1102 . . . Zurich is entitled to reimbursement\\n and exoneration out of the proceeds of any recovery from the De-\\n fendants herein, and to have its rights determined by final judg-\\n ment of this Honorable Court.”\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Allstate was later removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit.\\n\\n 3 This is Case No. 2:20-cv-696-SRW.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n Walker filed a motion to dismiss Blanchard’s claims against\\n him because Blanchard had filed this second suit after the statute of\\n limitations had passed. The District Court granted the motion and\\n dismissed Blanchard’s claims against Walker with prejudice.\\n Blanchard and Ace later settled the claim between them, and\\n Blanchard, Ace, and Zurich4 filed a joint stipulation for dismissal\\n “except as to the Intervenor’s, Zurich American Insurance Com-\\n pany’s, claims against Jerry Donald Walker.” The District Court\\n granted the joint stipulation “on the terms agreed to and set out by\\n the parties.” It further provided that “[a]ll pending deadlines are\\n terminated” and directed the Clerk of the Court to “close the case.”\\n At this point, Zurich filed a Motion for Reconsideration, stat-\\n ing that the District Court had accidentally closed the entire case,\\n instead of just the claims between Blanchard and Ace. Zurich main-\\n tained that it still had a claim against Walker. The District Court\\n granted Zurich’s motion and later ordered Walker to respond to\\n Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention. Walker instead filed a Motion\\n to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the District Court\\n granted on June 11, 2024. The Court explained that dismissal was\\n appropriate because Zurich’s claims were moot now that the un-\\n derlying case between Blanchard and Walker was dismissed and,\\n even if its claims were not moot, Zurich had filed them outside its\\n statute of limitations. Zurich timely appeals.\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Allstate had been removed as a named defendant in the lawsuit before this\\n\\n filing.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n II.\\n We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint\\n for failure to state a claim. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802\\n (11th Cir. 1999). To survive the motion to dismiss, “a complaint\\n must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a\\n claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.\\n 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.\\n Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)), when\\n “construe[d] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v.\\n McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, “a case\\n must be dismissed as moot if events that occur subsequent to the\\n filing of a lawsuit deprive the court of the ability to give the plaintiff\\n meaningful relief.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257,\\n 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted) (citation and internal\\n quotation marks omitted).\\n Under Alabama law, 5 a person injured in a car accident has\\n two years to sue for damages. See Ala. Code § 6-2-38(l) (“All actions\\n for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from\\n contract and not specifically enumerated in this section must be\\n brought within two years.”); Davison v. Pogue, 735 So. 2d 1240, 1242\\n (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (“[The] two-year limitations period applies to\\n actions based upon collisions arising from alleged negligence in the\\n operation of a motor vehicle.”). The two years “begins to run from\\n the time the plaintiff’s cause of action accrues,” Singer Asset Fin. Co.\\n\\n\\n 5 The parties do not dispute that Alabama procedural law governs this case.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 975 So. 2d 375, 382 (Ala. Civ. App.\\n 2007), which is “when the force wrongfully put in motion produces\\n injury.” Stephens v. Creel, 429 So. 2d 278, 281 (Ala. 1983) (citation\\n omitted).\\n A workers’ compensation insurer can intervene in that law-\\n suit for “reimburse[ment]” for compensation benefits paid or to\\n “preserve its subrogation interest” for medical benefits paid. Trott\\n v. Brinks, Inc., 972 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2007); Ala. Code § 25-5-11(a)\\n (2024). For the compensation benefits, reimbursement is to come\\n from recovery in the underlying suit. Id. For the medical benefits,\\n the Alabama Supreme Court “equates” the term “subrogation”\\n with equitable subrogation. Trott, 972 So. 2d at 85–86. And “[u]nder\\n the equitable doctrine of subrogation, a subrogee steps into the\\n shoes of [the] subrogor and that subrogee only gets those rights\\n that its subrogor has. The subrogee can have no greater rights.” Id.\\n at 87. In other words, if the subrogee cannot pursue a claim against\\n the third party, then the subrogor, stepping into the subrogee’s\\n shoes, cannot pursue a claim either.6 Id.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Though, “In the event the injured employee . . . do[es] not file a civil action\\n\\n against the other party to recover damages within the time allowed by law\\n [and the insurance carrier has paid compensation to the employee,] the . . .\\n insurance carrier . . . shall be allowed an additional period of six months within\\n which to bring a civil action against the other party for damages on account of\\n the injury . . . . in the name of the injured employee . . . or the insurance car-\\n rier.” Ala. Code § 25-5-11(d) (2024).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 7 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-12085 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n In a particularly convoluted brief, Zurich argues that the\\n District Court erred in dismissing its Complaint in Intervention be-\\n cause it has a claim that can continue regardless of the dismissal in\\n the underlying suit. We disagree.\\n Zurich intervened in Blanchard’s suit. He put a lien on the\\n recovery and preserved a right of subrogation. However, a lien on\\n recovery requires that Blanchard actually recover, and standing in\\n Blanchard’s shoes to pursue a claim requires that Blanchard had the\\n ability to pursue a claim on his own. Neither is the case here.\\n In other words, the only claim still in existence after Ace and\\n Blanchard settled the claim between them was Zurich’s claim\\n against Blanchard for reimbursement out of that settlement. Zur-\\n ich waived that claim in the joint stipulation for dismissal, which\\n stated that the only claim not to be dismissed was Zurich’s claim\\n against Walker. In reality, Zurich had no claim against Walker at\\n that time. Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of the underlying suit\\n “deprive[d] the court of the ability to give [Zurich] meaningful re-\\n lief.” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1267. Zurich’s Complaint in Intervention\\n was properly dismissed. 7\\n\\n\\n 7 We would be remiss if we did not directly address two questionable argu-\\n\\n ments Zurich made. Zurich explained that Walker did not object to its inter-\\n vention or file a motion to dismiss its claim when the Court first dismissed\\n Blanchard’s, implying that Walker was “okay” being sued by Zurich at the\\n start, so we should let Zurich continue suing him now. That reads a lot into\\n the actions of the defendant and, regardless, is not a reason for the Court to\\n ignore the procedural rules it operates under. Zurich also made multiple state-\\n ments such as “this result [was] not intended by the Alabama legislature,” but\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 8 of 8\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 8 Opinion of the Court 24-12085\\n\\n III.\\n We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Zurich’s Com-\\n plaint in Intervention.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n it provided no support or citation for such claims. We cannot rely on bare\\n conjecture about the drafters of a statute simply because a party is upset with\\n where the statute leaves it.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30990,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763172,"string":"10,763,172"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Josue Garriga, III"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-13988"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13988\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JOSUE GARRIGA, III,\\n a.k.a. Sway,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cr-00087-MMH-SJH-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Matthew Cavender, appointed counsel for Josue Garriga in\\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13988\\n\\n representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders\\n v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the\\n record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the\\n appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the record\\n reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw\\n is GRANTED, and Garriga’s conviction and sentence are\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229757/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"BRANCH"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"BRANCH\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763172/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Josue Garriga, III\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-13988\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n JOSUE GARRIGA, III,\n a.k.a. Sway,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Middle District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cr-00087-MMH-SJH-1\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Matthew Cavender, appointed counsel for Josue Garriga in\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13988\n\n representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders\n v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the\n record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the\n appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the record\n reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw\n is GRANTED, and Garriga’s conviction and sentence are\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Josue Garriga, III\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13988\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n JOSUE GARRIGA, III,\\n a.k.a. Sway,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Middle District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:24-cr-00087-MMH-SJH-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Matthew Cavender, appointed counsel for Josue Garriga in\\n this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13988\\n\\n representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders\\n v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the\\n record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the\\n appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the record\\n reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw\\n is GRANTED, and Garriga’s conviction and sentence are\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30991,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763232,"string":"10,763,232"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Marco Duncan"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-22"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-13715"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13085\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13715\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n versus\\n\\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Defendant-Appellant Marco Duncan, proceeding pro se, ap-\\n peals the district court’s orders denying his motion for compassion-\\n ate release and motion for reconsideration. He argues that the dis-\\n trict court erred by failing to consider his eligibility for compassion-\\n ate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Duncan also argues that\\n the district court failed to properly weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)\\n factors and further failed to describe how the factors were balanced\\n or weighed. Lastly, he argues that the district court abused its dis-\\n cretion by failing to consider his untimely motion for reconsidera-\\n tion on the merits. After careful review, we affirm.\\n I.\\n “We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a\\n sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States\\n v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is es-\\n tablished, we review a district court’s denial of an eligible\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n defendant’s request for compassionate release under\\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Id. We review the denial of\\n a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States\\n v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court\\n abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows\\n improper procedures in making the determination, commits a\\n clear error of judgment, or makes findings that are clearly errone-\\n ous. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en\\n banc).\\n II.\\n In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has\\n been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n Either the Bureau of Prisons or a defendant who has exhausted ad-\\n ministrative remedies may move the court to reduce a term of im-\\n prisonment based on compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).\\n A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under\\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing\\n so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing\\n so; (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community\\n within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4142(g); and (4) a reduction is\\n consistent with the applicable Sentencing Commission policy state-\\n ments. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021)\\n (per curiam). If the district court finds against the movant on any\\n one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not ana-\\n lyze the other requirements. See id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n As an initial matter, Duncan spends much of his brief argu-\\n ing that there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for\\n granting compassionate release. 1 But we do not need to address\\n those arguments. As explained below, Duncan has not shown that\\n the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for\\n compassionate release because the § 3553 factors did not support\\n the request.\\n The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances\\n of the offense, the history, and characteristics of the defendant, the\\n need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the\\n crime, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for\\n the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public\\n from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The\\n district court need not address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all\\n mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. Instead, an acknowl-\\n edgment that the court considered all applicable § 3553(a) factors\\n and the parties’ arguments along with “enough analysis that mean-\\n ingful appellate review of the factors’ application can take place” is\\n sufficient. Id. at 1240–41 (citation modified). The weight given to\\n\\n\\n 1 Though not necessary to resolve the instant appeal, the relevant categories\\n\\n of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” implicated by Duncan’s motion\\n are: (1) the defendant’s medical conditions; (2) the defendant was a victim of\\n sexual or physical abuse while in custody; (3) the defendant has served at least\\n ten years of an “unusually long sentence” and there has been a qualifying\\n change in law; and (4) a catchall “Other Reasons” or combination of reasons\\n that are similar in gravity to certain enumerated extraordinary and compelling\\n reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the discretion of the district\\n court. Id.\\n Here, the district court appropriately considered the § 3553\\n factors. Once it acknowledged that it considered all the factors, the\\n court found the nature of Duncan’s offense and his conduct in\\n prison 2 supported not exercising discretion for compassionate re-\\n lease. Duncan quarrels with how the district court weighed the rel-\\n evant factors, but the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)\\n factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district\\n court. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241.\\n Lastly, Duncan argues the district court erred in denying his\\n motion for reconsideration. Although a motion for reconsidera-\\n tion in a criminal action is not expressly authorized by the Federal\\n Rules of Criminal Procedure, the timely filing of such a motion will\\n toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, with the time beginning\\n to run anew following the disposition of the motion. United States\\n v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). A\\n motion for reconsideration in a criminal case must be filed within\\n the time allotted for filing a notice of appeal, however, in order to\\n extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b);\\n Vicaria, 963 F.2d at 1414. Thus, a criminal defendant must file a\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Duncan’s disciplinary history in prison includes possessing a dangerous\\n\\n weapon, possessing contraband such as drugs or alcohol, and attempting to\\n kill a prison staff member, which resulted in Duncan being housed in the most\\n restrictive unit since 2018.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n motion for reconsideration within 14 days of the order or judg-\\n ment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).\\n The district court denied Duncan’s motion for compassion-\\n ate release on August 22, 2024. Duncan asserted that he received\\n the order on September 5, 2024 but did not file his motion for re-\\n consideration until October 7, 2024—over thirty days after receiv-\\n ing the order. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion\\n in denying Duncan’s motion for reconsideration as untimely be-\\n cause he did not file the motion for reconsideration within 14 days\\n of the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate\\n release.\\n AFFIRMED.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11229817/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"JORDAN"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"WILSON"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"JORDAN\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\", \"WILSON\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763232/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Marco Duncan\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-13085\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n versus\n\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\n ____________________\n ____________________\n No. 24-13715\n Non-Argument Calendar\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\n\n versus\n\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Northern District of Florida\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\n ____________________\n\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.\n PER CURIAM:\n Defendant-Appellant Marco Duncan, proceeding pro se, ap-\n peals the district court’s orders denying his motion for compassion-\n ate release and motion for reconsideration. He argues that the dis-\n trict court erred by failing to consider his eligibility for compassion-\n ate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Duncan also argues that\n the district court failed to properly weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)\n factors and further failed to describe how the factors were balanced\n or weighed. Lastly, he argues that the district court abused its dis-\n cretion by failing to consider his untimely motion for reconsidera-\n tion on the merits. After careful review, we affirm.\n I.\n “We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a\n sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States\n v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is es-\n tablished, we review a district court’s denial of an eligible\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n defendant’s request for compassionate release under\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Id. We review the denial of\n a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States\n v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court\n abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows\n improper procedures in making the determination, commits a\n clear error of judgment, or makes findings that are clearly errone-\n ous. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en\n banc).\n II.\n In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has\n been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C.\n § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021).\n Either the Bureau of Prisons or a defendant who has exhausted ad-\n ministrative remedies may move the court to reduce a term of im-\n prisonment based on compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).\n A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing\n so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing\n so; (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community\n within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4142(g); and (4) a reduction is\n consistent with the applicable Sentencing Commission policy state-\n ments. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021)\n (per curiam). If the district court finds against the movant on any\n one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not ana-\n lyze the other requirements. See id.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\n\n As an initial matter, Duncan spends much of his brief argu-\n ing that there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for\n granting compassionate release. 1 But we do not need to address\n those arguments. As explained below, Duncan has not shown that\n the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for\n compassionate release because the § 3553 factors did not support\n the request.\n The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances\n of the offense, the history, and characteristics of the defendant, the\n need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the\n crime, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for\n the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public\n from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The\n district court need not address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all\n mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. Instead, an acknowl-\n edgment that the court considered all applicable § 3553(a) factors\n and the parties’ arguments along with “enough analysis that mean-\n ingful appellate review of the factors’ application can take place” is\n sufficient. Id. at 1240–41 (citation modified). The weight given to\n\n\n 1 Though not necessary to resolve the instant appeal, the relevant categories\n\n of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” implicated by Duncan’s motion\n are: (1) the defendant’s medical conditions; (2) the defendant was a victim of\n sexual or physical abuse while in custody; (3) the defendant has served at least\n ten years of an “unusually long sentence” and there has been a qualifying\n change in law; and (4) a catchall “Other Reasons” or combination of reasons\n that are similar in gravity to certain enumerated extraordinary and compelling\n reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6).\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the discretion of the district\n court. Id.\n Here, the district court appropriately considered the § 3553\n factors. Once it acknowledged that it considered all the factors, the\n court found the nature of Duncan’s offense and his conduct in\n prison 2 supported not exercising discretion for compassionate re-\n lease. Duncan quarrels with how the district court weighed the rel-\n evant factors, but the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)\n factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district\n court. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241.\n Lastly, Duncan argues the district court erred in denying his\n motion for reconsideration. Although a motion for reconsidera-\n tion in a criminal action is not expressly authorized by the Federal\n Rules of Criminal Procedure, the timely filing of such a motion will\n toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, with the time beginning\n to run anew following the disposition of the motion. United States\n v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). A\n motion for reconsideration in a criminal case must be filed within\n the time allotted for filing a notice of appeal, however, in order to\n extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b);\n Vicaria, 963 F.2d at 1414. Thus, a criminal defendant must file a\n\n\n\n 2 Duncan’s disciplinary history in prison includes possessing a dangerous\n\n weapon, possessing contraband such as drugs or alcohol, and attempting to\n kill a prison staff member, which resulted in Duncan being housed in the most\n restrictive unit since 2018.\n\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\n\n motion for reconsideration within 14 days of the order or judg-\n ment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).\n The district court denied Duncan’s motion for compassion-\n ate release on August 22, 2024. Duncan asserted that he received\n the order on September 5, 2024 but did not file his motion for re-\n consideration until October 7, 2024—over thirty days after receiv-\n ing the order. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion\n in denying Duncan’s motion for reconsideration as untimely be-\n cause he did not file the motion for reconsideration within 14 days\n of the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate\n release.\n AFFIRMED.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Marco Duncan\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-22\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13085\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n versus\\n\\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\\n ____________________\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13715\\n Non-Argument Calendar\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellee,\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 2 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n versus\\n\\n MARCO D. DUNCAN,\\n Defendant-Appellant.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Northern District of Florida\\n D.C. Docket No. 3:02-cr-00020-MW-ZCB-2\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.\\n PER CURIAM:\\n Defendant-Appellant Marco Duncan, proceeding pro se, ap-\\n peals the district court’s orders denying his motion for compassion-\\n ate release and motion for reconsideration. He argues that the dis-\\n trict court erred by failing to consider his eligibility for compassion-\\n ate release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Duncan also argues that\\n the district court failed to properly weigh the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)\\n factors and further failed to describe how the factors were balanced\\n or weighed. Lastly, he argues that the district court abused its dis-\\n cretion by failing to consider his untimely motion for reconsidera-\\n tion on the merits. After careful review, we affirm.\\n I.\\n “We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a\\n sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” United States\\n v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). After eligibility is es-\\n tablished, we review a district court’s denial of an eligible\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 3 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n defendant’s request for compassionate release under\\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Id. We review the denial of\\n a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. United States\\n v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court\\n abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows\\n improper procedures in making the determination, commits a\\n clear error of judgment, or makes findings that are clearly errone-\\n ous. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en\\n banc).\\n II.\\n In general, a court may not modify a sentence once it has\\n been imposed, except under certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3582(c); United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021).\\n Either the Bureau of Prisons or a defendant who has exhausted ad-\\n ministrative remedies may move the court to reduce a term of im-\\n prisonment based on compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).\\n A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under\\n § 3582(c)(1)(A) if: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor doing\\n so; (2) there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing\\n so; (3) doing so would not endanger any person or the community\\n within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 4142(g); and (4) a reduction is\\n consistent with the applicable Sentencing Commission policy state-\\n ments. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021)\\n (per curiam). If the district court finds against the movant on any\\n one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief and need not ana-\\n lyze the other requirements. See id.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 4 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n As an initial matter, Duncan spends much of his brief argu-\\n ing that there are “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for\\n granting compassionate release. 1 But we do not need to address\\n those arguments. As explained below, Duncan has not shown that\\n the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for\\n compassionate release because the § 3553 factors did not support\\n the request.\\n The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances\\n of the offense, the history, and characteristics of the defendant, the\\n need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the\\n crime, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for\\n the offense, afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public\\n from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The\\n district court need not address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all\\n mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241. Instead, an acknowl-\\n edgment that the court considered all applicable § 3553(a) factors\\n and the parties’ arguments along with “enough analysis that mean-\\n ingful appellate review of the factors’ application can take place” is\\n sufficient. Id. at 1240–41 (citation modified). The weight given to\\n\\n\\n 1 Though not necessary to resolve the instant appeal, the relevant categories\\n\\n of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” implicated by Duncan’s motion\\n are: (1) the defendant’s medical conditions; (2) the defendant was a victim of\\n sexual or physical abuse while in custody; (3) the defendant has served at least\\n ten years of an “unusually long sentence” and there has been a qualifying\\n change in law; and (4) a catchall “Other Reasons” or combination of reasons\\n that are similar in gravity to certain enumerated extraordinary and compelling\\n reasons. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6).\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 5 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13085 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the discretion of the district\\n court. Id.\\n Here, the district court appropriately considered the § 3553\\n factors. Once it acknowledged that it considered all the factors, the\\n court found the nature of Duncan’s offense and his conduct in\\n prison 2 supported not exercising discretion for compassionate re-\\n lease. Duncan quarrels with how the district court weighed the rel-\\n evant factors, but the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)\\n factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district\\n court. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1241.\\n Lastly, Duncan argues the district court erred in denying his\\n motion for reconsideration. Although a motion for reconsidera-\\n tion in a criminal action is not expressly authorized by the Federal\\n Rules of Criminal Procedure, the timely filing of such a motion will\\n toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, with the time beginning\\n to run anew following the disposition of the motion. United States\\n v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413–14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). A\\n motion for reconsideration in a criminal case must be filed within\\n the time allotted for filing a notice of appeal, however, in order to\\n extend the time for filing the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b);\\n Vicaria, 963 F.2d at 1414. Thus, a criminal defendant must file a\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Duncan’s disciplinary history in prison includes possessing a dangerous\\n\\n weapon, possessing contraband such as drugs or alcohol, and attempting to\\n kill a prison staff member, which resulted in Duncan being housed in the most\\n restrictive unit since 2018.\\n\\fUSCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 6 of 6\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13085\\n\\n motion for reconsideration within 14 days of the order or judg-\\n ment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b).\\n The district court denied Duncan’s motion for compassion-\\n ate release on August 22, 2024. Duncan asserted that he received\\n the order on September 5, 2024 but did not file his motion for re-\\n consideration until October 7, 2024—over thirty days after receiv-\\n ing the order. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion\\n in denying Duncan’s motion for reconsideration as untimely be-\\n cause he did not file the motion for reconsideration within 14 days\\n of the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate\\n release.\\n AFFIRMED.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30992,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10763814,"string":"10,763,814"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Erika Day"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-23"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-13312"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"USCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13312\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n ERIKA KELLEY DAY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00052-JB-MU-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum prison sentence for\\n substantial assistance for one offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n depart from a separate statutory minimum sentence for another\\n offense. Erika Day was convicted of both methamphetamine pos-\\n session with intent to distribute and firearm use attendant to a drug\\n crime. Each offense carries a statutory minimum prison sentence\\n of five years. The government moved to depart below the statu-\\n tory minimum for the offense of methamphetamine possession.\\n The district court granted that motion but sentenced Day below\\n the statutory minimum for both offenses. Because section 3553(e)\\n allows a departure from a statutory minimum sentence only when\\n the government moves for it, we vacate and remand for resentenc-\\n ing.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In her written plea agreement with the government, Erika\\n Kelley Day provided an undisputed factual resume. Deputies with\\n the Mobile County Sheriff’s Office arrested Day in a drug bust after\\n the Office received a tip that a fugitive was staying at a local park\\n for recreational vehicles. Upon arrival at the location, a corporal\\n saw a car, driven by Day, leave the lot. Deputies then stopped the\\n car for a traffic violation. While conducting the traffic stop, they\\n saw crystal methamphetamine in the front seat. They arrested Day,\\n and upon patting her down, found that she was carrying a hand-\\n gun.\\n Two months later, a federal grand jury indicted Day on two\\n counts. Count one, methamphetamine possession with intent to\\n distribute, carries a minimum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C.\\n § 841(b)(1)(B)(8). Count two, firearm use attendant to a drug crime,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n carries a consecutive minimum sentence of five years. 18 U.S.C.\\n § 924(c)(1)(A). Day pleaded guilty to both counts.\\n In her plea agreement, the government promised Day that\\n if she cooperated and her cooperation “result[ed] in substantial as-\\n sistance” to the government, it would “move for a downward de-\\n parture in accordance with Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sen-\\n tencing Guidelines or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-\\n cedure.” The same paragraph provided that the determination\\n whether Day provided substantial assistance was “a decision re-\\n served by the United States in the exercise of its sole discretion,”\\n and that the government “specifically reserve[d] the right to make\\n the decision relating to the extent of any such departure request.”\\n After warning Day that it could impose a sentence “more severe or\\n less severe” than provided by the guidelines and that she faced two\\n statutory minimum sentences, the district court accepted her plea.\\n The government and Day agreed to postpone sentencing\\n several times because her cooperation “was not yet completed.”\\n The government later moved for a downward departure from the\\n statutory minimum sentence Day faced for count one, under sec-\\n tion 5K1.1 and section 3553(e). The motion did not mention count\\n two.\\n After calculating the guideline range, the district court\\n granted the substantial-assistance motion. It decided that Day’s co-\\n operation warranted an extraordinary reduction and stated that the\\n “government’s 5K motion” allows “the Court to move below stat-\\n utory minimum sentencing.” The district court issued “a time-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n served sentence on Count One,” and “one day on Count Two to\\n be served consecutively.” The prosecutor objected because “[t]he\\n government’s motion was restricted to Count One,” and reduction\\n below the statutory minimum on the other count was “an illegal\\n sentence.” The district court replied, “I disagree, and so I’m going\\n to overrule your objection.”\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Section 3553(e) allows a district court to depart from a stat-\\n utory minimum “upon motion of the Government.” 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3553(e). Any departure must be based on “only substantial assis-\\n tance factors.” United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th\\n Cir. 2007). The text and structure of section 3553(e), along with our\\n precedents, make clear that a substantial-assistance motion for one\\n count does not allow a district court to depart from the statutory\\n minimum on another count.\\n Start with the statutory text. Subsection (e) uses the singular\\n when allowing a district court to depart below “a level established\\n by statute as a minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (emphasis\\n added). Although district courts often pronounce “[m]ultiple sen-\\n tence[s] as an [a]ggregate” “for administrative purposes,”\\n id. § 3584(c), each offense still carries a separate sentence. Because\\n subsection (e) applies to “a minimum sentence,” not the aggregate\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n of multiple sentences, a motion for departure on one sentence does\\n not apply to other sentences.\\n A departure from the statutory minimum is possible only\\n “[u]pon motion of the Government.” Id. § 3553(e). District courts\\n have no authority to depart below a statutory minimum without\\n “a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court\\n to . . . impose such a sentence.” Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S.\\n 120, 125–26 (1996). Because the government did not move to de-\\n part below the statutory minimum for count two, the district court\\n lacked the authority to do so independently.\\n Our precedent confirms this conclusion. We have held that\\n the government has discretion to “direct [a] Rule 35(b) motion to a\\n specific count.” United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th\\n Cir. 2008). And we have “accord[ed]” section 3553(e) and\\n Rule 35(b) “the same interpretation.” United States v. Aponte, 36\\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994).\\n Day asserts that section 3553(e) “says nothing about sen-\\n tence relief when multiple counts in an indictment carry minimum\\n mandatory sentences.” But we disagree. A plain reading of the stat-\\n utory text dispels any doubt about its application, and Day offers\\n no reason to reject the answer required by the text and our prece-\\n dent.\\n Day also argues that we must affirm to cure the prosecu-\\n tion’s alleged breach of her plea agreement. In her telling, nothing\\n in the plea agreement allowed the government to “unilaterally\\n limit its departure obligation to a single count.” And if the plea\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n agreement was ambiguous on any point, we must construe the\\n agreement “against the government.”\\n At the outset, we doubt that breach of a plea agreement\\n could grant the district court authority to bypass the statutory text.\\n Nor is it clear that we can cure a breach by affirming an illegal sen-\\n tence. But we need not reach either issue because the government\\n did not breach the plea agreement.\\n Neither Day nor the district court even suggested that the\\n plea agreement had been breached at any point in the proceedings\\n before the district court—and for good reason. The agreement did\\n not oblige the government to file a motion to depart as to count\\n two. The agreement said nothing about section 3553(e), as it re-\\n ferred only to section 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b). Because “[s]ilence is\\n not ambiguity” and “no promise was made about filing a [sec-\\n tion] 3553(e) motion,” we cannot construe the agreement to re-\\n quire the prosecution to file a motion to depart on count two.\\n United States v. Melton, 861 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017). More-\\n over, the agreement confirmed the government’s discretion to de-\\n termine “the extent of any such departure request.”\\n Day offers us two reasons to think that the plea agreement\\n required the government to file a motion as to count two, neither\\n of which is persuasive. First, Day argues that at the plea hearing the\\n district court told her she might receive a “less severe” sentence\\n than the guidelines recommended. Because the guideline sentence\\n and the statutory minimum for count two were the same, she con-\\n tends that the government’s silence suggested it implicitly agreed\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n to file a motion allowing a “less severe” sentence. But the district\\n court asked only a formulaic question to ensure that Day under-\\n stood the guidelines are advisory. And the district court immedi-\\n ately clarified that she faced multiple statutory minimum sen-\\n tences. Second, Day argues that the district court construed the\\n motion broadly to avoid a breach of the plea agreement. But, as we\\n have already explained, neither Day nor the district court sug-\\n gested at the sentencing hearing that the government had breached\\n the plea agreement. The district court said only that it “disagree[d]”\\n with the government’s interpretation of section 3553(e).\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE the sentence as to count two and REMAND\\n with instructions to resentence Day in accordance with this opin-\\n ion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 KIDD, J., Concurring 1\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11230399/\", \"author_raw\": \"WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge\"}, {\"author\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, Concurring\", \"type\": \"concurrence\", \"text\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, Concurring:\\n In November 2020, Erika Day was battling a years-long drug\\n addiction. And like every other person in her situation, she had a\\n drug supplier. Unfortunately for Day, the police were monitoring\\n her supplier when they saw her drive away from his residence at\\n some point. They pulled her over and found methamphetamine\\n and a gun in her vehicle—a bad combination, to be sure. But Day’s\\n lack of sophistication as a drug dealer is exhibited by one telling\\n fact: She dumped the methamphetamine on her car’s floorboard in\\n a bungled attempt to dispose of the evidence.\\n Day pleaded guilty to the federal gun and drug charges, but\\n the district court allowed her to remain on pretrial release before\\n her sentencing. By all accounts, Day turned her life around. She\\n enrolled in a year-long transitional program at the Lovelady Cen-\\n ter. In that program, she took parenting, relapse prevention, and\\n anger management classes. Day was randomly drug tested two to\\n three times a month as part of the program, and, remarkably, she\\n never tested positive. After completing the program, she remained\\n employed by the Lovelady Center, where she was able to mentor\\n other women who were undergoing similar life events. At her sen-\\n tencing, Day testified that she maintained two jobs, paid off her\\n fines, obtained a driver license for the first time in twelve years, pur-\\n chased a vehicle, and secured stable housing. Perhaps most im-\\n portantly, she had made significant progress in repairing her rela-\\n tionship with her two daughters.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 9 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 KIDD, J., Concurring 24-13312\\n\\n In addition to her personal progress, Day also assisted the\\n government in its prosecutions of her drug suppliers. Notably,\\n Day’s sentencing was postponed by more than two years for this\\n purpose. While Day was in the middle of drug-addiction treatment\\n in Birmingham, she agreed to arrange for her own transportation\\n four hours each way to the Mobile area to meet with federal agents,\\n wear a wire, reenter a drug den, and participate in a controlled drug\\n purchase. She also agreed to testify against multiple defendants. Ac-\\n cording to the government, Day’s cooperation led to the indict-\\n ment of two additional subjects on federal charges—both of whom\\n subsequently entered guilty pleas. Additionally, she provided infor-\\n mation about her previous interactions with another methamphet-\\n amine dealer who was already under federal indictment.\\n It is not often that a district court has the benefit of seeing\\n what a defendant would do if given a second chance. Normally, the\\n court just hopes for the best. But here, due to Day’s cooperation\\n with the government, the district court was able to observe Day’s\\n rehabilitative actions over the course of two years. And there is lit-\\n tle more that could have been asked of her. The district judge, con-\\n sidering all the factors that Congress has instructed him to con-\\n sider, decided that “[b]ecause of the work [she had] done, going to\\n prison now is not going to be helpful to [her]. It’s not going to be\\n helpful to the community.” So he sentenced Day to time served so\\n that she could continue the remarkable progress that she had made\\n over the prior two years.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 10 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 KIDD, J., Concurring 3\\n\\n But that does not matter. By statute, only one person’s opin-\\n ion mattered that day: Gloria A. Bedwell’s, the Assistant United\\n States Attorney. Under the sentencing regime that Congress has es-\\n tablished for consideration of assistance to the government, Ms.\\n Bedwell, under the supervision of United States Attorney Sean P.\\n Costello, had all the cards. Only she could allow the district court\\n to impose the sentence that the court considered to be the most\\n just. But she refused, and today’s opinion affirms that she had the\\n power to do so.\\n I concur with the majority opinion, as section 3553(e) and\\n our precedents make clear that a district court cannot impose a sen-\\n tence below a statutory mandatory minimum for one offense based\\n on the government’s substantial assistance motion for a different\\n offense. But I join my colleague in noting that this “asymmetry\\n warrants reflection.” United States v. Perez, __ F.4th __, No. 23-12336\\n (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (Abudu, J., concurring). While our sentenc-\\n ing regime affords district courts with nearly unbounded discretion\\n to impose higher sentences, it does not entrust them with the same\\n discretion to impose lower sentences. Day’s case “illustrates the\\n consequences” of this asymmetry. Id.\\n Yet there remains one actor with nearly unbounded discre-\\n tion both ways and who still has the opportunity to exercise that\\n discretion in Day’s case on remand: the federal prosecutor. I hope\\n that Ms. Bedwell, or whomever succeeds her, uses the discretion\\n afforded to her by the people of the United States to reach a just\\n result in Day’s case.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11230399/\", \"author_raw\": \"KIDD, Circuit Judge, Concurring\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"WILLIAM PRYOR"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"LAGOA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"KIDD"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"WILLIAM PRYOR\": \", Chief\", \"LAGOA\": \", Circuit\", \"KIDD\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763814/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Erika Day\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-23\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1 of 10\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eleventh Circuit\n ____________________\n No. 24-13312\n ____________________\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n versus\n\n ERIKA KELLEY DAY,\n Defendant-Appellee.\n ____________________\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the Southern District of Alabama\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00052-JB-MU-1\n ____________________\n\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\n Judges.\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum prison sentence for\n substantial assistance for one offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\n\n depart from a separate statutory minimum sentence for another\n offense. Erika Day was convicted of both methamphetamine pos-\n session with intent to distribute and firearm use attendant to a drug\n crime. Each offense carries a statutory minimum prison sentence\n of five years. The government moved to depart below the statu-\n tory minimum for the offense of methamphetamine possession.\n The district court granted that motion but sentenced Day below\n the statutory minimum for both offenses. Because section 3553(e)\n allows a departure from a statutory minimum sentence only when\n the government moves for it, we vacate and remand for resentenc-\n ing.\n I. BACKGROUND\n In her written plea agreement with the government, Erika\n Kelley Day provided an undisputed factual resume. Deputies with\n the Mobile County Sheriff’s Office arrested Day in a drug bust after\n the Office received a tip that a fugitive was staying at a local park\n for recreational vehicles. Upon arrival at the location, a corporal\n saw a car, driven by Day, leave the lot. Deputies then stopped the\n car for a traffic violation. While conducting the traffic stop, they\n saw crystal methamphetamine in the front seat. They arrested Day,\n and upon patting her down, found that she was carrying a hand-\n gun.\n Two months later, a federal grand jury indicted Day on two\n counts. Count one, methamphetamine possession with intent to\n distribute, carries a minimum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C.\n § 841(b)(1)(B)(8). Count two, firearm use attendant to a drug crime,\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 3\n\n carries a consecutive minimum sentence of five years. 18 U.S.C.\n § 924(c)(1)(A). Day pleaded guilty to both counts.\n In her plea agreement, the government promised Day that\n if she cooperated and her cooperation “result[ed] in substantial as-\n sistance” to the government, it would “move for a downward de-\n parture in accordance with Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sen-\n tencing Guidelines or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-\n cedure.” The same paragraph provided that the determination\n whether Day provided substantial assistance was “a decision re-\n served by the United States in the exercise of its sole discretion,”\n and that the government “specifically reserve[d] the right to make\n the decision relating to the extent of any such departure request.”\n After warning Day that it could impose a sentence “more severe or\n less severe” than provided by the guidelines and that she faced two\n statutory minimum sentences, the district court accepted her plea.\n The government and Day agreed to postpone sentencing\n several times because her cooperation “was not yet completed.”\n The government later moved for a downward departure from the\n statutory minimum sentence Day faced for count one, under sec-\n tion 5K1.1 and section 3553(e). The motion did not mention count\n two.\n After calculating the guideline range, the district court\n granted the substantial-assistance motion. It decided that Day’s co-\n operation warranted an extraordinary reduction and stated that the\n “government’s 5K motion” allows “the Court to move below stat-\n utory minimum sentencing.” The district court issued “a time-\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\n\n served sentence on Count One,” and “one day on Count Two to\n be served consecutively.” The prosecutor objected because “[t]he\n government’s motion was restricted to Count One,” and reduction\n below the statutory minimum on the other count was “an illegal\n sentence.” The district court replied, “I disagree, and so I’m going\n to overrule your objection.”\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\n III. DISCUSSION\n Section 3553(e) allows a district court to depart from a stat-\n utory minimum “upon motion of the Government.” 18 U.S.C.\n § 3553(e). Any departure must be based on “only substantial assis-\n tance factors.” United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th\n Cir. 2007). The text and structure of section 3553(e), along with our\n precedents, make clear that a substantial-assistance motion for one\n count does not allow a district court to depart from the statutory\n minimum on another count.\n Start with the statutory text. Subsection (e) uses the singular\n when allowing a district court to depart below “a level established\n by statute as a minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (emphasis\n added). Although district courts often pronounce “[m]ultiple sen-\n tence[s] as an [a]ggregate” “for administrative purposes,”\n id. § 3584(c), each offense still carries a separate sentence. Because\n subsection (e) applies to “a minimum sentence,” not the aggregate\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 5\n\n of multiple sentences, a motion for departure on one sentence does\n not apply to other sentences.\n A departure from the statutory minimum is possible only\n “[u]pon motion of the Government.” Id. § 3553(e). District courts\n have no authority to depart below a statutory minimum without\n “a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court\n to . . . impose such a sentence.” Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S.\n 120, 125–26 (1996). Because the government did not move to de-\n part below the statutory minimum for count two, the district court\n lacked the authority to do so independently.\n Our precedent confirms this conclusion. We have held that\n the government has discretion to “direct [a] Rule 35(b) motion to a\n specific count.” United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th\n Cir. 2008). And we have “accord[ed]” section 3553(e) and\n Rule 35(b) “the same interpretation.” United States v. Aponte, 36\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994).\n Day asserts that section 3553(e) “says nothing about sen-\n tence relief when multiple counts in an indictment carry minimum\n mandatory sentences.” But we disagree. A plain reading of the stat-\n utory text dispels any doubt about its application, and Day offers\n no reason to reject the answer required by the text and our prece-\n dent.\n Day also argues that we must affirm to cure the prosecu-\n tion’s alleged breach of her plea agreement. In her telling, nothing\n in the plea agreement allowed the government to “unilaterally\n limit its departure obligation to a single count.” And if the plea\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\n\n agreement was ambiguous on any point, we must construe the\n agreement “against the government.”\n At the outset, we doubt that breach of a plea agreement\n could grant the district court authority to bypass the statutory text.\n Nor is it clear that we can cure a breach by affirming an illegal sen-\n tence. But we need not reach either issue because the government\n did not breach the plea agreement.\n Neither Day nor the district court even suggested that the\n plea agreement had been breached at any point in the proceedings\n before the district court—and for good reason. The agreement did\n not oblige the government to file a motion to depart as to count\n two. The agreement said nothing about section 3553(e), as it re-\n ferred only to section 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b). Because “[s]ilence is\n not ambiguity” and “no promise was made about filing a [sec-\n tion] 3553(e) motion,” we cannot construe the agreement to re-\n quire the prosecution to file a motion to depart on count two.\n United States v. Melton, 861 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017). More-\n over, the agreement confirmed the government’s discretion to de-\n termine “the extent of any such departure request.”\n Day offers us two reasons to think that the plea agreement\n required the government to file a motion as to count two, neither\n of which is persuasive. First, Day argues that at the plea hearing the\n district court told her she might receive a “less severe” sentence\n than the guidelines recommended. Because the guideline sentence\n and the statutory minimum for count two were the same, she con-\n tends that the government’s silence suggested it implicitly agreed\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 7\n\n to file a motion allowing a “less severe” sentence. But the district\n court asked only a formulaic question to ensure that Day under-\n stood the guidelines are advisory. And the district court immedi-\n ately clarified that she faced multiple statutory minimum sen-\n tences. Second, Day argues that the district court construed the\n motion broadly to avoid a breach of the plea agreement. But, as we\n have already explained, neither Day nor the district court sug-\n gested at the sentencing hearing that the government had breached\n the plea agreement. The district court said only that it “disagree[d]”\n with the government’s interpretation of section 3553(e).\n IV. CONCLUSION\n We VACATE the sentence as to count two and REMAND\n with instructions to resentence Day in accordance with this opin-\n ion.\n\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8 of 10\n\n\n\n\n 24-13312 KIDD, J., Concurring 1\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Erika Day\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-23\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: Yes\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n FOR PUBLICATION\\n\\n\\n In the\\n United States Court of Appeals\\n For the Eleventh Circuit\\n ____________________\\n No. 24-13312\\n ____________________\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\\n versus\\n\\n ERIKA KELLEY DAY,\\n Defendant-Appellee.\\n ____________________\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the Southern District of Alabama\\n D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00052-JB-MU-1\\n ____________________\\n\\n Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit\\n Judges.\\n WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:\\n This appeal requires us to decide whether a district court, on\\n a motion to depart from a statutory minimum prison sentence for\\n substantial assistance for one offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), may\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 2 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n depart from a separate statutory minimum sentence for another\\n offense. Erika Day was convicted of both methamphetamine pos-\\n session with intent to distribute and firearm use attendant to a drug\\n crime. Each offense carries a statutory minimum prison sentence\\n of five years. The government moved to depart below the statu-\\n tory minimum for the offense of methamphetamine possession.\\n The district court granted that motion but sentenced Day below\\n the statutory minimum for both offenses. Because section 3553(e)\\n allows a departure from a statutory minimum sentence only when\\n the government moves for it, we vacate and remand for resentenc-\\n ing.\\n I. BACKGROUND\\n In her written plea agreement with the government, Erika\\n Kelley Day provided an undisputed factual resume. Deputies with\\n the Mobile County Sheriff’s Office arrested Day in a drug bust after\\n the Office received a tip that a fugitive was staying at a local park\\n for recreational vehicles. Upon arrival at the location, a corporal\\n saw a car, driven by Day, leave the lot. Deputies then stopped the\\n car for a traffic violation. While conducting the traffic stop, they\\n saw crystal methamphetamine in the front seat. They arrested Day,\\n and upon patting her down, found that she was carrying a hand-\\n gun.\\n Two months later, a federal grand jury indicted Day on two\\n counts. Count one, methamphetamine possession with intent to\\n distribute, carries a minimum sentence of five years. 21 U.S.C.\\n § 841(b)(1)(B)(8). Count two, firearm use attendant to a drug crime,\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 3 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 3\\n\\n carries a consecutive minimum sentence of five years. 18 U.S.C.\\n § 924(c)(1)(A). Day pleaded guilty to both counts.\\n In her plea agreement, the government promised Day that\\n if she cooperated and her cooperation “result[ed] in substantial as-\\n sistance” to the government, it would “move for a downward de-\\n parture in accordance with Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sen-\\n tencing Guidelines or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-\\n cedure.” The same paragraph provided that the determination\\n whether Day provided substantial assistance was “a decision re-\\n served by the United States in the exercise of its sole discretion,”\\n and that the government “specifically reserve[d] the right to make\\n the decision relating to the extent of any such departure request.”\\n After warning Day that it could impose a sentence “more severe or\\n less severe” than provided by the guidelines and that she faced two\\n statutory minimum sentences, the district court accepted her plea.\\n The government and Day agreed to postpone sentencing\\n several times because her cooperation “was not yet completed.”\\n The government later moved for a downward departure from the\\n statutory minimum sentence Day faced for count one, under sec-\\n tion 5K1.1 and section 3553(e). The motion did not mention count\\n two.\\n After calculating the guideline range, the district court\\n granted the substantial-assistance motion. It decided that Day’s co-\\n operation warranted an extraordinary reduction and stated that the\\n “government’s 5K motion” allows “the Court to move below stat-\\n utory minimum sentencing.” The district court issued “a time-\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 4 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 4 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n served sentence on Count One,” and “one day on Count Two to\\n be served consecutively.” The prosecutor objected because “[t]he\\n government’s motion was restricted to Count One,” and reduction\\n below the statutory minimum on the other count was “an illegal\\n sentence.” The district court replied, “I disagree, and so I’m going\\n to overrule your objection.”\\n II. STANDARD OF REVIEW\\n “We review de novo the legality of a sentence.” United States\\n v. Hall, 64 F.4th 1200, 1202 (11th Cir. 2023).\\n III. DISCUSSION\\n Section 3553(e) allows a district court to depart from a stat-\\n utory minimum “upon motion of the Government.” 18 U.S.C.\\n § 3553(e). Any departure must be based on “only substantial assis-\\n tance factors.” United States v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350, 1356 (11th\\n Cir. 2007). The text and structure of section 3553(e), along with our\\n precedents, make clear that a substantial-assistance motion for one\\n count does not allow a district court to depart from the statutory\\n minimum on another count.\\n Start with the statutory text. Subsection (e) uses the singular\\n when allowing a district court to depart below “a level established\\n by statute as a minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (emphasis\\n added). Although district courts often pronounce “[m]ultiple sen-\\n tence[s] as an [a]ggregate” “for administrative purposes,”\\n id. § 3584(c), each offense still carries a separate sentence. Because\\n subsection (e) applies to “a minimum sentence,” not the aggregate\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 5 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 5\\n\\n of multiple sentences, a motion for departure on one sentence does\\n not apply to other sentences.\\n A departure from the statutory minimum is possible only\\n “[u]pon motion of the Government.” Id. § 3553(e). District courts\\n have no authority to depart below a statutory minimum without\\n “a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district court\\n to . . . impose such a sentence.” Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S.\\n 120, 125–26 (1996). Because the government did not move to de-\\n part below the statutory minimum for count two, the district court\\n lacked the authority to do so independently.\\n Our precedent confirms this conclusion. We have held that\\n the government has discretion to “direct [a] Rule 35(b) motion to a\\n specific count.” United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th\\n Cir. 2008). And we have “accord[ed]” section 3553(e) and\\n Rule 35(b) “the same interpretation.” United States v. Aponte, 36\\n F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1994).\\n Day asserts that section 3553(e) “says nothing about sen-\\n tence relief when multiple counts in an indictment carry minimum\\n mandatory sentences.” But we disagree. A plain reading of the stat-\\n utory text dispels any doubt about its application, and Day offers\\n no reason to reject the answer required by the text and our prece-\\n dent.\\n Day also argues that we must affirm to cure the prosecu-\\n tion’s alleged breach of her plea agreement. In her telling, nothing\\n in the plea agreement allowed the government to “unilaterally\\n limit its departure obligation to a single count.” And if the plea\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 6 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 6 Opinion of the Court 24-13312\\n\\n agreement was ambiguous on any point, we must construe the\\n agreement “against the government.”\\n At the outset, we doubt that breach of a plea agreement\\n could grant the district court authority to bypass the statutory text.\\n Nor is it clear that we can cure a breach by affirming an illegal sen-\\n tence. But we need not reach either issue because the government\\n did not breach the plea agreement.\\n Neither Day nor the district court even suggested that the\\n plea agreement had been breached at any point in the proceedings\\n before the district court—and for good reason. The agreement did\\n not oblige the government to file a motion to depart as to count\\n two. The agreement said nothing about section 3553(e), as it re-\\n ferred only to section 5K1.1 and Rule 35(b). Because “[s]ilence is\\n not ambiguity” and “no promise was made about filing a [sec-\\n tion] 3553(e) motion,” we cannot construe the agreement to re-\\n quire the prosecution to file a motion to depart on count two.\\n United States v. Melton, 861 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2017). More-\\n over, the agreement confirmed the government’s discretion to de-\\n termine “the extent of any such departure request.”\\n Day offers us two reasons to think that the plea agreement\\n required the government to file a motion as to count two, neither\\n of which is persuasive. First, Day argues that at the plea hearing the\\n district court told her she might receive a “less severe” sentence\\n than the guidelines recommended. Because the guideline sentence\\n and the statutory minimum for count two were the same, she con-\\n tends that the government’s silence suggested it implicitly agreed\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 7 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 Opinion of the Court 7\\n\\n to file a motion allowing a “less severe” sentence. But the district\\n court asked only a formulaic question to ensure that Day under-\\n stood the guidelines are advisory. And the district court immedi-\\n ately clarified that she faced multiple statutory minimum sen-\\n tences. Second, Day argues that the district court construed the\\n motion broadly to avoid a breach of the plea agreement. But, as we\\n have already explained, neither Day nor the district court sug-\\n gested at the sentencing hearing that the government had breached\\n the plea agreement. The district court said only that it “disagree[d]”\\n with the government’s interpretation of section 3553(e).\\n IV. CONCLUSION\\n We VACATE the sentence as to count two and REMAND\\n with instructions to resentence Day in accordance with this opin-\\n ion.\\n\\nUSCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 8 of 10\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 24-13312 KIDD, J., Concurring 1\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30993,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10745905,"string":"10,745,905"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Derrek Arrington"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-02"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-3077"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n\\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\nArgued October 21, 2025 Decided December 2, 2025\\nNo. 24-3077\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\nAPPELLEE\\n\\nV.\\n\\nDERREK E. ARRINGTON,\\nAPPELLANT\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court\\nfor the District of Columbia\\n(No. 1:00-cr-00159-1)\\n\\nLisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender,\\nargued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.\\nKramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant\\nFederal Public Defender, entered an appearance.\\n\\nTimothy R. Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the\\ncause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris\\nPirro, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S.\\nAttorney.\\n\\nBefore: CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\\n\\fOpinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\\nRANDOLPH.\\n\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A jury convicted\\nDerrek Arrington on two counts: (1) assaulting a Park Police\\nOfficer with a deadly weapon (a car) when Arrington, trying to\\navoid arrest, trapped the officer’s arm in the driver’s side\\nwindow and drove away, dragging the officer through an\\nintersection; and (2) being a felon in possession of a stolen\\nfirearm. We affirmed Arrington’s convictions, for which Judge\\nRobertson imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.\\nSee United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\nFor reasons unnecessary to recount, in 2024 a different\\ndistrict judge—Lamberth, J—set aside Arrington’s original\\nsentence. By then Arrington had finished serving his time for\\nthe assault and gun charges. But he remained in prison because\\nhe committed those two offenses while he was on parole for an\\narmed robbery conviction in the D.C. Superior Court. That court\\nrevoked his parole and required him to serve the remaining 11\\nyears’ imprisonment of his armed robbery sentence. Arrington’s\\nSuperior Court parole-revocation sentence ran from the end of\\nhis federal imprisonment. So Arrington asserts that if Judge\\nLamberth resentenced him to less than 240 months, Arrington’s\\nrelease date from his parole violation sentence would be earlier.\\nWe shall assume he is correct.\\n\\nThe issues on appeal deal with whether Judge Lamberth\\nerred in resentencing Arrington to a 240-month term of\\nimprisonment.\\n\\nArrington’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 140—175\\nmonths’ imprisonment. APP 236. Judge Lamberth decided to\\n\\f3\\n\\norder an upward variance of 65 months from the top of the\\nrange, thus making the resentence equal to the original\\nsentence—the maximum sentence permissible. APP 211.\\nForemost in the judge’s remarks at the hearing and in his written\\nStatement of Reasons was “the moral depravity” of Arrington’s\\nattempted murder of the Park Police officer—after dragging the\\nofficer down the street in his car, Arrington shot him in the face\\nat point-blank range, severing one of the officer’s facial nerves\\nand causing permanent facial paralysis and loss of vision.' The\\njudge’s Statement of Reasons also mentioned Arrington’s\\nconvictions for armed robberies, one of which came after his\\noriginal sentencing in this case, and the felon-in-possession\\ncharge, which the judge thought was not adequately factored into\\nthe overall Guideline calculation.\\n\\nThe main ground of appeal is that Judge Lamberth failed\\nto consider Arrington’s purported rehabilitation while in prison\\nbetween the first sentence in this case and the hearing on\\nresentencing. Arrington is correct that on resentencing, a\\ndefendant’s interim rehabilitation is a predictive consideration\\nthat may lend support to a downward departure from the\\nSentencing Guidelines range. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States,\\n562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011). Judge Lamberth, an experienced\\nfederal judge, knew this full well, as our court recognized in\\nUnited States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n' Judge Lamberth stated at the hearing: “If I merely hued\\nto the high end of the guideline range, it would not provide\\nadequate penalty for the heinous act which was coming within\\na millimeter of ending the officer’s life by the shot which I find\\nthat you did, in fact, shoot him in the face. I think then, that\\nthere’s a variance upward in the guidelines to the maximum\\nsentence under the statute.” APP 257.\\n\\f4\\n\\nArrington’s counsel presumably realized that Judge\\nLamberth did not need to be reminded to consider evidence of\\nreformation. Even when prompted, defense counsel registered\\nno objection to the judge’s treatment of Arrington’s\\nrehabilitation claim. We therefore may reverse only if Judge\\nLamberth committed a “plain error’ under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 52(b)—that is, a mistake so obvious that the\\njudge should have recognized his blunder even though counsel\\nfailed to point it out. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,\\n734 (1993).\\n\\nTo support his argument, Arrington cites the judge’s\\nremarks at the hearing: “I’m not sentencing the guy that is\\nappearing before me here today. I’m doing what I think would\\nhave been the sentence Judge Robertson would have imposed\\nwere you there then.” APP 259. Together these statements may\\nseem a bit confusing. One interpretation—Arrington’s—is that\\nthe judge was ignoring the defense’s evidence of rehabilitation.\\nThe more likely interpretation is that Judge Lamberth was\\nmerely observing that Arrington had changed over the years.\\nThe judge’s remarks came immediately after he spoke about\\nsentencing many “young guys” and after he told Arrington,\\n“You’re not that person anymore.” APP 259.” We view the\\njudge’s next statement—particularly in light of its ending with\\n“were you there then”—to mean that Judge Lamberth intended\\n\\n> The judge followed this statement with: “I’m very glad\\nto hear you say that, and I hope that can be where we are today\\nin your life and you will not be set back by the things I’ve said\\nhere today, because I’m sentencing the guy that was before\\nJudge Robertson.” APP 259. This states the obvious—\\nArrington’s resentence would reflect the crimes Arrington was\\nconvicted of committing when he appeared before Judge\\nRobertson.\\n\\f5\\n\\nto sentence Arrington as Judge Robertson would have done if he\\nwere resentencing Arrington. This follows from Judge\\nLamberth’s very next remark, which Arrington neglects to\\nmention: “I’d have to — I have to sentence you with what I have\\ntoday.” APP 259. This contradicts Arrington’s claim that the\\njudge was refusing to consider any developments between the\\nimposition of the original sentence and the resentencing hearing.\\n\\nWe do not suggest that our reading of Judge Lamberth’s\\nremarks leaps from the transcript pages. Oral statements are\\noften not as precise as written statements;’ even legal\\ndocuments—such as opinions and statutes—are sometimes less\\nthan perfectly clear. But here, if defense counsel had an inkling\\nthat Judge Lamberth was refusing to consider the evidence of\\nrehabilitation,’ one would have expected defense counsel to\\nseek clarification. Yet counsel lodged no such objection. There\\nis also a presumption Arrington has not overcome—that the\\nsentencing judge considered evidence of mitigation when\\ndefense counsel interposed no objection and the judge’s ultimate\\nsentence was “reasonable.” United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82,\\n88 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In addition, the record shows that Judge\\nLamberth did not fail to “consider” the rehabilitation evidence.\\nIn this context the antonym of “consider” may be “ignore” or it\\nmay be “overlook.” Judge Lamberth did neither. At the hearing\\n\\n3 Oral statements also have an interpretive dimension\\nwritten statements lack. See United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d\\n845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993).\\n\\n‘ Arrington’s counsel admitted that before her client’s\\nscales fell from his eyes, he was not exactly a model prisoner.\\nHe had been disciplined three times for getting into violent\\naltercations with other inmates and twice for possessing hidden\\nweapons. APP 128-131.\\n\\f6\\n\\nJudge Lamberth congratulated Arrington on his progress. See\\nnote 2 supra. But it became clear as the hearing drew to a close,\\nthat rather than departing downward, Judge Lamberth was going\\nto depart upward. And as we next discuss, he expressed a sound\\nbasis for doing so.\\n\\nDespite Arrington’s claim to the contrary, Judge\\nLamberth sufficiently explained his decision to impose an\\nupward variance. He had good reason to find that Arrington’s\\nconduct was “more harmful or egregious” than the typical\\nconduct of a defendant found guilty of assault with a dangerous\\nweapon causing severe injuries. United States v. Brown, 808\\nF.3d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Nicely,\\n492 F. App’x. 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see United States v.\\nBrown, 892 F.3d, 385, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v.\\nTracks, 106 F.4th 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2024). At the hearing Judge\\nLamberth stated that “the guidelines are really contemplating\\nthat you drug the policeman through the intersection while\\nfleeing from a traffic stop and that caused the debilitating injury”\\nand that “because of the gravity of Officer Daniels’s injury and\\nthe wrongfulness of using the firearm, I will depart and treat the\\ncase the same as if — wasn’t just drug through the intersection,\\nbut also you shot officer Daniels.” APP 257. As the\\ngovernment puts it: “The district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by determining that Arrington’s conduct in this\\ncase—which included both a vehicular assault and an attempt to\\nmurder a police officer by shooting him in the face at close\\nrange—was more harmful and egregious than that of a defendant\\nwho had only committed a vehicular assault that caused similarly\\nserious injuries.” Appellee Br. 32. That rationale is enough to\\njustify the upward variance ordered here. See Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).\\n\\nArrington also claims that Judge Lamberth’s variance\\n\\f7\\n\\nwas improper because the judge partly relied on a reason he did\\nnot adequately explain—namely, that the Guidelines’ calculation\\ncompletely erased the felon-in-possession charge. But this is\\nbeside the point. As suggested above, the judge indicated at the\\nresentencing hearing that Arrington’s shooting of the officer in\\nthe face by itself justified a variance up to the statutory\\nmaximum sentence of 240 months. See note 1 supra; APP 257.\\nThus, any error in the treatment of the felon-in-possession\\nconviction was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Crim.\\nP. 52(a).\\n\\nWe see no need to discuss Arrington’s other arguments.\\nThese have been considered and rejected.\\n\\nAffirmed.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11212490/\", \"author_raw\": \"Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"CHILDS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"GARCIA"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RANDOLPH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"CHILDS\": \", Circuit\", \"GARCIA\": \", Circuit\", \"RANDOLPH\": \", Senior Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745905/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Derrek Arrington\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\nArgued October 21, 2025 Decided December 2, 2025\nNo. 24-3077\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nAPPELLEE\n\nV.\n\nDERREK E. ARRINGTON,\nAPPELLANT\n\nAppeal from the United States District Court\nfor the District of Columbia\n(No. 1:00-cr-00159-1)\n\nLisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender,\nargued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.\nKramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant\nFederal Public Defender, entered an appearance.\n\nTimothy R. Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the\ncause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris\nPirro, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S.\nAttorney.\n\nBefore: CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\n\fOpinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\nRANDOLPH.\n\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A jury convicted\nDerrek Arrington on two counts: (1) assaulting a Park Police\nOfficer with a deadly weapon (a car) when Arrington, trying to\navoid arrest, trapped the officer’s arm in the driver’s side\nwindow and drove away, dragging the officer through an\nintersection; and (2) being a felon in possession of a stolen\nfirearm. We affirmed Arrington’s convictions, for which Judge\nRobertson imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.\nSee United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\n\nFor reasons unnecessary to recount, in 2024 a different\ndistrict judge—Lamberth, J—set aside Arrington’s original\nsentence. By then Arrington had finished serving his time for\nthe assault and gun charges. But he remained in prison because\nhe committed those two offenses while he was on parole for an\narmed robbery conviction in the D.C. Superior Court. That court\nrevoked his parole and required him to serve the remaining 11\nyears’ imprisonment of his armed robbery sentence. Arrington’s\nSuperior Court parole-revocation sentence ran from the end of\nhis federal imprisonment. So Arrington asserts that if Judge\nLamberth resentenced him to less than 240 months, Arrington’s\nrelease date from his parole violation sentence would be earlier.\nWe shall assume he is correct.\n\nThe issues on appeal deal with whether Judge Lamberth\nerred in resentencing Arrington to a 240-month term of\nimprisonment.\n\nArrington’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 140—175\nmonths’ imprisonment. APP 236. Judge Lamberth decided to\n\f3\n\norder an upward variance of 65 months from the top of the\nrange, thus making the resentence equal to the original\nsentence—the maximum sentence permissible. APP 211.\nForemost in the judge’s remarks at the hearing and in his written\nStatement of Reasons was “the moral depravity” of Arrington’s\nattempted murder of the Park Police officer—after dragging the\nofficer down the street in his car, Arrington shot him in the face\nat point-blank range, severing one of the officer’s facial nerves\nand causing permanent facial paralysis and loss of vision.' The\njudge’s Statement of Reasons also mentioned Arrington’s\nconvictions for armed robberies, one of which came after his\noriginal sentencing in this case, and the felon-in-possession\ncharge, which the judge thought was not adequately factored into\nthe overall Guideline calculation.\n\nThe main ground of appeal is that Judge Lamberth failed\nto consider Arrington’s purported rehabilitation while in prison\nbetween the first sentence in this case and the hearing on\nresentencing. Arrington is correct that on resentencing, a\ndefendant’s interim rehabilitation is a predictive consideration\nthat may lend support to a downward departure from the\nSentencing Guidelines range. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States,\n562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011). Judge Lamberth, an experienced\nfederal judge, knew this full well, as our court recognized in\nUnited States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\n\n' Judge Lamberth stated at the hearing: “If I merely hued\nto the high end of the guideline range, it would not provide\nadequate penalty for the heinous act which was coming within\na millimeter of ending the officer’s life by the shot which I find\nthat you did, in fact, shoot him in the face. I think then, that\nthere’s a variance upward in the guidelines to the maximum\nsentence under the statute.” APP 257.\n\f4\n\nArrington’s counsel presumably realized that Judge\nLamberth did not need to be reminded to consider evidence of\nreformation. Even when prompted, defense counsel registered\nno objection to the judge’s treatment of Arrington’s\nrehabilitation claim. We therefore may reverse only if Judge\nLamberth committed a “plain error’ under Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 52(b)—that is, a mistake so obvious that the\njudge should have recognized his blunder even though counsel\nfailed to point it out. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,\n734 (1993).\n\nTo support his argument, Arrington cites the judge’s\nremarks at the hearing: “I’m not sentencing the guy that is\nappearing before me here today. I’m doing what I think would\nhave been the sentence Judge Robertson would have imposed\nwere you there then.” APP 259. Together these statements may\nseem a bit confusing. One interpretation—Arrington’s—is that\nthe judge was ignoring the defense’s evidence of rehabilitation.\nThe more likely interpretation is that Judge Lamberth was\nmerely observing that Arrington had changed over the years.\nThe judge’s remarks came immediately after he spoke about\nsentencing many “young guys” and after he told Arrington,\n“You’re not that person anymore.” APP 259.” We view the\njudge’s next statement—particularly in light of its ending with\n“were you there then”—to mean that Judge Lamberth intended\n\n> The judge followed this statement with: “I’m very glad\nto hear you say that, and I hope that can be where we are today\nin your life and you will not be set back by the things I’ve said\nhere today, because I’m sentencing the guy that was before\nJudge Robertson.” APP 259. This states the obvious—\nArrington’s resentence would reflect the crimes Arrington was\nconvicted of committing when he appeared before Judge\nRobertson.\n\f5\n\nto sentence Arrington as Judge Robertson would have done if he\nwere resentencing Arrington. This follows from Judge\nLamberth’s very next remark, which Arrington neglects to\nmention: “I’d have to — I have to sentence you with what I have\ntoday.” APP 259. This contradicts Arrington’s claim that the\njudge was refusing to consider any developments between the\nimposition of the original sentence and the resentencing hearing.\n\nWe do not suggest that our reading of Judge Lamberth’s\nremarks leaps from the transcript pages. Oral statements are\noften not as precise as written statements;’ even legal\ndocuments—such as opinions and statutes—are sometimes less\nthan perfectly clear. But here, if defense counsel had an inkling\nthat Judge Lamberth was refusing to consider the evidence of\nrehabilitation,’ one would have expected defense counsel to\nseek clarification. Yet counsel lodged no such objection. There\nis also a presumption Arrington has not overcome—that the\nsentencing judge considered evidence of mitigation when\ndefense counsel interposed no objection and the judge’s ultimate\nsentence was “reasonable.” United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82,\n88 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In addition, the record shows that Judge\nLamberth did not fail to “consider” the rehabilitation evidence.\nIn this context the antonym of “consider” may be “ignore” or it\nmay be “overlook.” Judge Lamberth did neither. At the hearing\n\n3 Oral statements also have an interpretive dimension\nwritten statements lack. See United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d\n845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993).\n\n‘ Arrington’s counsel admitted that before her client’s\nscales fell from his eyes, he was not exactly a model prisoner.\nHe had been disciplined three times for getting into violent\naltercations with other inmates and twice for possessing hidden\nweapons. APP 128-131.\n\f6\n\nJudge Lamberth congratulated Arrington on his progress. See\nnote 2 supra. But it became clear as the hearing drew to a close,\nthat rather than departing downward, Judge Lamberth was going\nto depart upward. And as we next discuss, he expressed a sound\nbasis for doing so.\n\nDespite Arrington’s claim to the contrary, Judge\nLamberth sufficiently explained his decision to impose an\nupward variance. He had good reason to find that Arrington’s\nconduct was “more harmful or egregious” than the typical\nconduct of a defendant found guilty of assault with a dangerous\nweapon causing severe injuries. United States v. Brown, 808\nF.3d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Nicely,\n492 F. App’x. 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see United States v.\nBrown, 892 F.3d, 385, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v.\nTracks, 106 F.4th 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2024). At the hearing Judge\nLamberth stated that “the guidelines are really contemplating\nthat you drug the policeman through the intersection while\nfleeing from a traffic stop and that caused the debilitating injury”\nand that “because of the gravity of Officer Daniels’s injury and\nthe wrongfulness of using the firearm, I will depart and treat the\ncase the same as if — wasn’t just drug through the intersection,\nbut also you shot officer Daniels.” APP 257. As the\ngovernment puts it: “The district court did not abuse its\ndiscretion by determining that Arrington’s conduct in this\ncase—which included both a vehicular assault and an attempt to\nmurder a police officer by shooting him in the face at close\nrange—was more harmful and egregious than that of a defendant\nwho had only committed a vehicular assault that caused similarly\nserious injuries.” Appellee Br. 32. That rationale is enough to\njustify the upward variance ordered here. See Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).\n\nArrington also claims that Judge Lamberth’s variance\n\f7\n\nwas improper because the judge partly relied on a reason he did\nnot adequately explain—namely, that the Guidelines’ calculation\ncompletely erased the felon-in-possession charge. But this is\nbeside the point. As suggested above, the judge indicated at the\nresentencing hearing that Arrington’s shooting of the officer in\nthe face by itself justified a variance up to the statutory\nmaximum sentence of 240 months. See note 1 supra; APP 257.\nThus, any error in the treatment of the felon-in-possession\nconviction was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Crim.\nP. 52(a).\n\nWe see no need to discuss Arrington’s other arguments.\nThese have been considered and rejected.\n\nAffirmed.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Derrek Arrington\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-02\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n\\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\nArgued October 21, 2025 Decided December 2, 2025\\nNo. 24-3077\\n\\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\nAPPELLEE\\n\\nV.\\n\\nDERREK E. ARRINGTON,\\nAPPELLANT\\n\\nAppeal from the United States District Court\\nfor the District of Columbia\\n(No. 1:00-cr-00159-1)\\n\\nLisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender,\\nargued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.\\nKramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant\\nFederal Public Defender, entered an appearance.\\n\\nTimothy R. Cahill, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the\\ncause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris\\nPirro, U.S. Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S.\\nAttorney.\\n\\nBefore: CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\\n\\fOpinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\\nRANDOLPH.\\n\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A jury convicted\\nDerrek Arrington on two counts: (1) assaulting a Park Police\\nOfficer with a deadly weapon (a car) when Arrington, trying to\\navoid arrest, trapped the officer’s arm in the driver’s side\\nwindow and drove away, dragging the officer through an\\nintersection; and (2) being a felon in possession of a stolen\\nfirearm. We affirmed Arrington’s convictions, for which Judge\\nRobertson imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment.\\nSee United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2002).\\n\\nFor reasons unnecessary to recount, in 2024 a different\\ndistrict judge—Lamberth, J—set aside Arrington’s original\\nsentence. By then Arrington had finished serving his time for\\nthe assault and gun charges. But he remained in prison because\\nhe committed those two offenses while he was on parole for an\\narmed robbery conviction in the D.C. Superior Court. That court\\nrevoked his parole and required him to serve the remaining 11\\nyears’ imprisonment of his armed robbery sentence. Arrington’s\\nSuperior Court parole-revocation sentence ran from the end of\\nhis federal imprisonment. So Arrington asserts that if Judge\\nLamberth resentenced him to less than 240 months, Arrington’s\\nrelease date from his parole violation sentence would be earlier.\\nWe shall assume he is correct.\\n\\nThe issues on appeal deal with whether Judge Lamberth\\nerred in resentencing Arrington to a 240-month term of\\nimprisonment.\\n\\nArrington’s Sentencing Guidelines range was 140—175\\nmonths’ imprisonment. APP 236. Judge Lamberth decided to\\n\\f3\\n\\norder an upward variance of 65 months from the top of the\\nrange, thus making the resentence equal to the original\\nsentence—the maximum sentence permissible. APP 211.\\nForemost in the judge’s remarks at the hearing and in his written\\nStatement of Reasons was “the moral depravity” of Arrington’s\\nattempted murder of the Park Police officer—after dragging the\\nofficer down the street in his car, Arrington shot him in the face\\nat point-blank range, severing one of the officer’s facial nerves\\nand causing permanent facial paralysis and loss of vision.' The\\njudge’s Statement of Reasons also mentioned Arrington’s\\nconvictions for armed robberies, one of which came after his\\noriginal sentencing in this case, and the felon-in-possession\\ncharge, which the judge thought was not adequately factored into\\nthe overall Guideline calculation.\\n\\nThe main ground of appeal is that Judge Lamberth failed\\nto consider Arrington’s purported rehabilitation while in prison\\nbetween the first sentence in this case and the hearing on\\nresentencing. Arrington is correct that on resentencing, a\\ndefendant’s interim rehabilitation is a predictive consideration\\nthat may lend support to a downward departure from the\\nSentencing Guidelines range. See, e.g., Pepper v. United States,\\n562 U.S. 476, 481 (2011). Judge Lamberth, an experienced\\nfederal judge, knew this full well, as our court recognized in\\nUnited States v. Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, 684-85 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n' Judge Lamberth stated at the hearing: “If I merely hued\\nto the high end of the guideline range, it would not provide\\nadequate penalty for the heinous act which was coming within\\na millimeter of ending the officer’s life by the shot which I find\\nthat you did, in fact, shoot him in the face. I think then, that\\nthere’s a variance upward in the guidelines to the maximum\\nsentence under the statute.” APP 257.\\n\\f4\\n\\nArrington’s counsel presumably realized that Judge\\nLamberth did not need to be reminded to consider evidence of\\nreformation. Even when prompted, defense counsel registered\\nno objection to the judge’s treatment of Arrington’s\\nrehabilitation claim. We therefore may reverse only if Judge\\nLamberth committed a “plain error’ under Federal Rule of\\nCriminal Procedure 52(b)—that is, a mistake so obvious that the\\njudge should have recognized his blunder even though counsel\\nfailed to point it out. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,\\n734 (1993).\\n\\nTo support his argument, Arrington cites the judge’s\\nremarks at the hearing: “I’m not sentencing the guy that is\\nappearing before me here today. I’m doing what I think would\\nhave been the sentence Judge Robertson would have imposed\\nwere you there then.” APP 259. Together these statements may\\nseem a bit confusing. One interpretation—Arrington’s—is that\\nthe judge was ignoring the defense’s evidence of rehabilitation.\\nThe more likely interpretation is that Judge Lamberth was\\nmerely observing that Arrington had changed over the years.\\nThe judge’s remarks came immediately after he spoke about\\nsentencing many “young guys” and after he told Arrington,\\n“You’re not that person anymore.” APP 259.” We view the\\njudge’s next statement—particularly in light of its ending with\\n“were you there then”—to mean that Judge Lamberth intended\\n\\n> The judge followed this statement with: “I’m very glad\\nto hear you say that, and I hope that can be where we are today\\nin your life and you will not be set back by the things I’ve said\\nhere today, because I’m sentencing the guy that was before\\nJudge Robertson.” APP 259. This states the obvious—\\nArrington’s resentence would reflect the crimes Arrington was\\nconvicted of committing when he appeared before Judge\\nRobertson.\\n\\f5\\n\\nto sentence Arrington as Judge Robertson would have done if he\\nwere resentencing Arrington. This follows from Judge\\nLamberth’s very next remark, which Arrington neglects to\\nmention: “I’d have to — I have to sentence you with what I have\\ntoday.” APP 259. This contradicts Arrington’s claim that the\\njudge was refusing to consider any developments between the\\nimposition of the original sentence and the resentencing hearing.\\n\\nWe do not suggest that our reading of Judge Lamberth’s\\nremarks leaps from the transcript pages. Oral statements are\\noften not as precise as written statements;’ even legal\\ndocuments—such as opinions and statutes—are sometimes less\\nthan perfectly clear. But here, if defense counsel had an inkling\\nthat Judge Lamberth was refusing to consider the evidence of\\nrehabilitation,’ one would have expected defense counsel to\\nseek clarification. Yet counsel lodged no such objection. There\\nis also a presumption Arrington has not overcome—that the\\nsentencing judge considered evidence of mitigation when\\ndefense counsel interposed no objection and the judge’s ultimate\\nsentence was “reasonable.” United States v. Pyles, 862 F.3d 82,\\n88 (D.C. Cir. 2017). In addition, the record shows that Judge\\nLamberth did not fail to “consider” the rehabilitation evidence.\\nIn this context the antonym of “consider” may be “ignore” or it\\nmay be “overlook.” Judge Lamberth did neither. At the hearing\\n\\n3 Oral statements also have an interpretive dimension\\nwritten statements lack. See United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d\\n845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1993).\\n\\n‘ Arrington’s counsel admitted that before her client’s\\nscales fell from his eyes, he was not exactly a model prisoner.\\nHe had been disciplined three times for getting into violent\\naltercations with other inmates and twice for possessing hidden\\nweapons. APP 128-131.\\n\\f6\\n\\nJudge Lamberth congratulated Arrington on his progress. See\\nnote 2 supra. But it became clear as the hearing drew to a close,\\nthat rather than departing downward, Judge Lamberth was going\\nto depart upward. And as we next discuss, he expressed a sound\\nbasis for doing so.\\n\\nDespite Arrington’s claim to the contrary, Judge\\nLamberth sufficiently explained his decision to impose an\\nupward variance. He had good reason to find that Arrington’s\\nconduct was “more harmful or egregious” than the typical\\nconduct of a defendant found guilty of assault with a dangerous\\nweapon causing severe injuries. United States v. Brown, 808\\nF.3d 865, 867 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Nicely,\\n492 F. App’x. 119, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see United States v.\\nBrown, 892 F.3d, 385, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United States v.\\nTracks, 106 F.4th 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2024). At the hearing Judge\\nLamberth stated that “the guidelines are really contemplating\\nthat you drug the policeman through the intersection while\\nfleeing from a traffic stop and that caused the debilitating injury”\\nand that “because of the gravity of Officer Daniels’s injury and\\nthe wrongfulness of using the firearm, I will depart and treat the\\ncase the same as if — wasn’t just drug through the intersection,\\nbut also you shot officer Daniels.” APP 257. As the\\ngovernment puts it: “The district court did not abuse its\\ndiscretion by determining that Arrington’s conduct in this\\ncase—which included both a vehicular assault and an attempt to\\nmurder a police officer by shooting him in the face at close\\nrange—was more harmful and egregious than that of a defendant\\nwho had only committed a vehicular assault that caused similarly\\nserious injuries.” Appellee Br. 32. That rationale is enough to\\njustify the upward variance ordered here. See Gall v. United\\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).\\n\\nArrington also claims that Judge Lamberth’s variance\\n\\f7\\n\\nwas improper because the judge partly relied on a reason he did\\nnot adequately explain—namely, that the Guidelines’ calculation\\ncompletely erased the felon-in-possession charge. But this is\\nbeside the point. As suggested above, the judge indicated at the\\nresentencing hearing that Arrington’s shooting of the officer in\\nthe face by itself justified a variance up to the statutory\\nmaximum sentence of 240 months. See note 1 supra; APP 257.\\nThus, any error in the treatment of the felon-in-possession\\nconviction was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Crim.\\nP. 52(a).\\n\\nWe see no need to discuss Arrington’s other arguments.\\nThese have been considered and rejected.\\n\\nAffirmed.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30994,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10747722,"string":"10,747,722"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"DC v. Donald Trump"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-04"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-5418"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"BEFORE: Millett, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the emergency motion for administrative stay and for stay pending\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5418 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-03005-JMC\\n Filed On: December 4, 2025\\nDistrict of Columbia,\\n\\n Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDonald J. Trump, in his official capacity as\\nPresident of the United States, et al.,\\n\\n Appellants\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Millett, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for administrative stay and for stay\\npending appeal, the response thereto, and the reply, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the district court’s November 20, 2025 order be administratively\\nstayed pending further order of this court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\\ngive the court sufficient opportunity to consider the motion for stay pending appeal and\\nshould not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion. See D.C.\\nCircuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2025).\\n\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214307/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"MILLETT"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KATSAS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RAO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10747722/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: DC v. Donald Trump\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-04\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n ____________\nNo. 25-5418 September Term, 2025\n 1:25-cv-03005-JMC\n Filed On: December 4, 2025\nDistrict of Columbia,\n\n Appellee\n\n v.\n\nDonald J. Trump, in his official capacity as\nPresident of the United States, et al.,\n\n Appellants\n\n\n BEFORE: Millett, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for administrative stay and for stay\npending appeal, the response thereto, and the reply, it is\n\n ORDERED that the district court’s November 20, 2025 order be administratively\nstayed pending further order of this court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\ngive the court sufficient opportunity to consider the motion for stay pending appeal and\nshould not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion. See D.C.\nCircuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2025).\n\n\n Per Curiam\n\n\n FOR THE COURT:\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\n\n BY: /s/\n Selena R. Gancasz\n Deputy Clerk\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: DC v. Donald Trump\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-04\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5418 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-03005-JMC\\n Filed On: December 4, 2025\\nDistrict of Columbia,\\n\\n Appellee\\n\\n v.\\n\\nDonald J. Trump, in his official capacity as\\nPresident of the United States, et al.,\\n\\n Appellants\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Millett, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for administrative stay and for stay\\npending appeal, the response thereto, and the reply, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the district court’s November 20, 2025 order be administratively\\nstayed pending further order of this court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\\ngive the court sufficient opportunity to consider the motion for stay pending appeal and\\nshould not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of that motion. See D.C.\\nCircuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2025).\\n\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30995,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10748283,"string":"10,748,283"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Gwynne A. Wilcox v. Donald J. Trump"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-05"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-5057"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and PAN, Circuit Judges.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nArgued May 16, 2025 Decided December 5, 2025\\n\\n No. 25-5037\\n\\n CATHY A. HARRIS, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HER\\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS\\n PROTECTION BOARD,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BESSENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF\\n THE TREASURY, ET AL.,\\n APPELLANTS\\n\\n\\n\\n Consolidated with 25-5055\\n\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:25-cv-00412)\\n\\n\\n\\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Martin Akerman, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nMartin Akerman in support of appellants.\\n\\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\\n\\n Nathaniel A. Zelinsky argued the cause for appellee Cathy\\nA. Harris. With him on the brief were Michael J. Kator,\\nJeremy D. Wright, Kerrie D. Riggs, Linda M. Correia, Neal\\nKumar Katyal, Kristina Alekseyeva, and Ezra P. Louvis.\\n\\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\\n\\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\\n\\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\\nof Congress in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth C. Lockwood and Kathryn M. Ali were on the\\nbrief for amici curiae Former Board Members and General\\nCounsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n 3\\n Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Hawaii, Kaliko’onalani D. Fernandes,\\nSolicitor General, Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Philip J.\\nWeiser, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe State of Colorado, Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of California, William Tong,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Aaron M.\\nFrey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the\\nState of Maine, Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of\\nMassachusetts, Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Minnesota, Matthew J.\\nPlatkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of New York,\\nKwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\\nMaryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Michigan, Aaron D. Ford,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of New Mexico, Jeff Jackson,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof North Carolina, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Charity R. Clark,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Wisconsin, Peter F. Neronha,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Rhode Island, Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Washington, and Brian\\n\\n 4\\nL. Schwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the District of Columbia, were on the brief for amici curiae\\nState of Hawaii, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Thad M. Guyer was on the brief for amici curiae\\nGovernment Accountability Project, et al. in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph Carson, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nJoseph Carson, PE in support of appellee.\\n\\n\\n No. 25-5057\\n\\n GWYNNE A. WILCOX,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\n DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT\\n OF THE UNITED STATES AND MARVIN E. KAPLAN, IN HIS\\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR\\n RELATIONS BOARD,\\n APPELLANTS\\n\\n 5\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:25-cv-00334)\\n\\n\\n\\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\\n\\n Daniel Z. Epstein and R. Trent McCotter were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Separation of Powers Clinic in support of\\nappellants.\\n\\n Michael Pepson was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nAmericans for Prosperity Foundation in support of appellants.\\n\\n Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee, and\\nWhitney Hermandorfer, Director of Strategic Litigation at the\\ntime the brief was filed, were on the brief for amicus curiae\\nState of Tennessee in support of appellants.\\n\\n Michael H. McGinley, Brian A. Kulp, Jordan L. Von\\nBokern, and Steven A. Engel were on the brief for amicus\\ncuriae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of\\nAmerica in support of appellants.\\n\\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\\n\\n 6\\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\\n\\n Kevin F. King, Matthew J. Glover, Eli Nachmany, and\\nBrad J. Grisenti were on the brief for amicus curiae Coalition\\nfor a Democratic Workplace in support of appellants.\\n\\n William J. Olson and Jeremiah L. Morgan were on the\\nbrief for amicus curiae America’s Future, et al. in support of\\nappellants.\\n\\n Deepak Gupta argued the cause for appellee Gwynne A.\\nWilcox. With him on the brief were Jennifer D. Bennett,\\nMatthew W. H. Wessler, Gregory A. Beck, and Alisa C. Philo.\\n\\n Dennis Fan was on the brief for amici curiae Former\\nMembers of the National Labor Relations Board in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\\n\\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\\n\\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\\nof Congress in support of appellee.\\n\\n Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor\\n\\n 7\\nGeneral, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz,\\nSolicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General,\\nKris Mayes, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the State of Arizona, Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado,\\nKathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Delaware, Rob Bonta, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\\nCalifornia, William Tong, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Connecticut, Brian L.\\nSchwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii, Anthony\\nG. Brown, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the State of Maryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,\\nMatthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\\nYork, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Oregon, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine,\\nAndrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,\\nAaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\\nMexico, Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of North Carolina, Peter F. Neronha,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Wisconsin, and Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General,\\n\\n 8\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Washington,\\nwere on the brief for amici curiae State of Minnesota, et al. in\\nsupport of appellee.\\n\\n Matthew Ginsburg, Harold Craig Becker, and Maneesh\\nSharma were on the brief for amicus curiae the American\\nFederation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations\\n(AFL-CIO) in support of appellee.\\n\\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Richard F. Griffin and Faaris Akremi were on the brief for\\namicus curiae Professor Jed H. Shugerman in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and PAN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.\\n\\n Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PAN.\\n\\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge: These appeals present the\\nquestion whether Congress may constitutionally prohibit the\\nPresident from removing members of the National Labor\\nRelations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board without\\ncause. The district courts upheld the constitutionality of\\nstatutory removal protections for members of these boards.\\n\\n We reverse. Under Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,\\n295 U.S. 602 (1935), Congress may restrict the President’s\\nability to remove principal officers who wield only quasi-\\n\\n 9\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers. But under Seila Law LLC\\nv. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197\\n(2020), Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to\\nremove principal officers who wield substantial executive\\npower. As explained below, the NLRB and MSPB wield\\nsubstantial powers that are both executive in nature and\\ndifferent from the powers that Humphrey’s Executor deemed\\nto be merely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. So, Congress\\ncannot restrict the President’s ability to remove NLRB or\\nMSPB members.\\n\\n I\\n\\n The National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems\\nProtection Board are multimember agencies with wide-ranging\\nstatutory responsibilities and with members protected by\\nstatute from presidential removal without cause.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The National Labor Relations Act constitutes the NLRB\\nas an agency of five members appointed by the President with\\nthe advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). The\\nmembers serve five-year terms. Id. The NLRA purports to\\nprohibit the President from removing a member except “for\\nneglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id.\\n\\n Congress empowered the NLRB to prevent any “unfair\\nlabor practice” affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 160(a). The NLRB conducts formal adjudications to resolve\\nunfair-labor-practice complaints presented to it. Id. § 160(b).\\nIf it finds an unfair labor practice, the NLRB must issue a\\ncease-and-desist order. Id. § 160(c). It also may order\\naffirmative relief, including reinstatement and backpay, to\\n“effectuate the policies” of the NLRA. Id. Acting under these\\nremedial authorities, the NLRB has claimed the power to award\\n\\n 10\\ncompensatory and consequential-like damages. See Thryv,\\nInc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10 (Dec. 13, 2022), vacated in\\npart on other grounds, 102 F.4th 727 (5th Cir. 2024). But see\\nNLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2024)\\n(concluding such relief is ultra vires). In some instances, the\\nNLRB may find speech to constitute an unfair labor practice.\\nSee 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); Cadillac of Naperville, Inc. v.\\nNLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Katsas, J.,\\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part). In others, it may\\ncompose and order company speech as a remedy for unfair\\nlabor practices. See HTH Corp. v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 668, 675–\\n78 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n The NLRB may litigate in federal court to prevent unfair\\nlabor practices. Upon the filing of an administrative complaint,\\nit may seek interim injunctive relief in district court. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 160(j). And upon finding an unfair labor practice, the NLRB\\nmay petition an appropriate court of appeals to enforce its\\norder. Id. § 160(e). In conducting this litigation, the NLRB\\nacts through its own counsel, rather than that of the Justice\\nDepartment. Id. § 154(a).\\n\\n Beyond its powers to prevent unfair labor practices, the\\nNLRB has substantial authority over matters involving union\\nelections. Within or across employers, it must determine the\\n“unit appropriate” for collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 159(b). For such units, the NLRB also supervises elections\\nto certify or decertify unions as the employees’ bargaining\\nrepresentatives. See id. § 159(c)–(e).\\n\\n Lastly, the NLRB may “from time to time … make,\\namend, and rescind … such rules and regulations as may be\\n\\n 11\\nnecessary to carry out the provisions of” the NLRA, including\\nthe provisions outlined above. 29 U.S.C. § 156.1\\n\\n B\\n\\n The Civil Service Reform Act constitutes the MSPB as an\\nagency of three members appointed by the President with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 1201. The\\nmembers serve seven-year terms. Id. § 1202(a). The CSRA\\npurports to prohibit the President from removing a member\\nexcept for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in\\noffice.” Id. § 1202(d).\\n\\n The MSPB primarily manages disputes between federal\\nemployees and their employing agencies. Among other things,\\nthe MSPB may adjudicate all matters within its jurisdiction and\\nmay “take final action on any such matter.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(a)(1). It may “order any Federal agency or employee\\nto comply with any” of its orders or decisions, and it may\\n“enforce compliance” with them. Id. § 1204(a)(2). To do so,\\nit may “order that any employee charged with complying with\\nsuch [an] order,” except for Senate-confirmed presidential\\nappointees, “shall not be entitled to receive payment for service\\nas an employee during any period that the order has not been\\ncomplied with.” Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Separate from the NLRB, Congress has created its office of\\nGeneral Counsel. That officer is appointed by the President, with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to a four-year term. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 153(d). Unlike NLRB members, the General Counsel has no\\nstatutory removal protection. He has “final authority” to investigate,\\ncharge, and prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\\nNLRB. Id. He also supervises the NLRB’s regional offices, and the\\nBoard may delegate additional powers to him. Id.\\n\\n 12\\n The MSPB’s jurisdiction covers a wide range of federal\\nemployment disputes. The MSPB often reviews actions\\nalready taken by the employing agency. For example, federal\\nemployees may “appeal” to the MSPB disciplinary actions\\ntaken by an employer to promote “efficiency of the [civil]\\nservice.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), (d). Employees also may seek\\n“corrective action” from the MSPB for any “prohibited\\npersonnel practice.” Id. § 1221(a). Such practices include acts\\nof discrimination made unlawful by four different statutes,\\ngranting unauthorized preferences, coercing political activity,\\nretaliation for various protected activities, improper influence,\\ndeception, and obstruction. Id. § 2302(b). The MSPB also has\\njurisdiction to review employment actions alleged to violate\\nstatutory protections for military servicemembers or veterans.\\nSee id. §§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324.\\n\\n Sometimes, the MSPB resolves disputes in the first\\ninstance. Many such disputes involve claims presented to it by\\nthe Office of the Special Counsel. In these cases, the MSPB\\nmay order corrective action for prohibited personnel practices,\\n5 U.S.C. § 1214, or for violations of other statutes enforced by\\nthe Special Counsel, id. § 1216. The MSPB also may impose\\ndiscipline for any of these violations. Id. § 1215(a)(3). Finally,\\nthe MSPB resolves employment disputes involving\\nAdministrative Law Judges, who cannot be removed,\\nsuspended, or demoted without “good cause” as found by the\\nMSPB. Id. § 7521.\\n\\n In its various adjudications, the MSPB may award a wide\\nrange of interim and final relief. Upon request by the Special\\nCounsel, any MSPB member may “order a stay of any\\npersonnel action” reasonably believed to constitute a\\nprohibited personnel practice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Such\\nstays may last for up to 45 days initially, and the MSPB may\\nextend them for “any period” it considers appropriate. Id.\\n\\n 13\\n§ 1214(b)(1)(B)(i). To remedy unwarranted discipline\\nimposed by an employing agency, the MSPB may order\\naffirmative relief including reinstatement and backpay. See\\nElgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 6 (2012). For prohibited\\npersonnel practices, it may order “corrective action” that\\nincludes reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory damages.\\nId. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, and penalties of\\nup to $1,000, or “any combination” of these sanctions. Id.\\n§ 1215(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n The MSPB has its own litigating authority. Except in the\\nSupreme Court, its attorneys “may appear for the Board, and\\nrepresent the Board, in any civil action brought in connection\\nwith any function carried out by the Board.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(i). When aggrieved employees seek judicial review of\\nits decisions, the MSPB (rather than the employing agency or\\nofficial) is sometimes the respondent. See id. § 7703(a)(2).\\nSpecifically, it is the respondent when the employee challenges\\nan adverse procedural ruling, Spruill v. MSPB, 978 F.2d 679,\\n684 (Fed. Cir. 1992), or when the MSPB adjudicates a dispute\\nin the first instance, Costello v. MSPB, 182 F.3d 1372, 1381\\n(Fed. Cir. 1999).\\n\\n The MSPB has three overlapping grants of rulemaking\\nauthority. It may promulgate “such regulations as may be\\nnecessary for the performance of its functions.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(h). It may promulgate “regulations to carry out the\\npurpose” of conducting administrative appeals. Id. § 7701(k).\\nAnd it may promulgate regulations “for the purpose of section\\n7521,” which governs adverse employment actions against\\nALJs. Id. § 1305. The MSPB also may sua sponte review\\nregulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel\\nManagement. Id. § 1204(f)(1). It may declare such regulations\\n\\n 14\\ninvalid, on their face or as implemented, to the extent they\\npurport to require prohibited personnel practices. Id.\\n§ 1204(f)(2). And it may “require any agency” to “cease\\ncompliance” with such regulations. Id. § 1204(f)(4)(A).\\n\\n II\\n\\n The President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB\\nand Cathy Harris from the MSPB. In defense of those actions,\\nthe government does not contend that Wilcox or Harris\\nengaged in any conduct that would support for-cause removal\\nunder the relevant statutory restrictions. Instead, it argues that\\nthe restrictions are unconstitutional.\\n\\n Wilcox and Harris sued to challenge their removals. The\\ndistrict courts held that the statutory removal protections are\\nconstitutional under Humphrey’s Executor; they declared that\\nWilcox and Harris continue to hold their respective offices; and\\nthey enjoined the government from interfering with the\\nindividuals’ ability to function as board members. Wilcox v.\\nTrump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215 (D.D.C. 2025); Harris v. Bessent,\\n775 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2025). The government appealed\\nand sought interim stays pending appeal. A motions panel of\\nthis Court granted the stays, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037,\\n2025 WL 980278 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2025), but the full Court\\nvacated that decision, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037, 2025\\nWL 1021435 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (en banc) (per curiam).\\n\\n The Supreme Court then stayed the district courts’ orders\\npending the resolution of these appeals and any ensuing\\npetitions for certiorari. Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415\\n(2025) (per curiam). In doing so, the Court found it likely “that\\nboth the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive\\npower,” which it said would make the removal restrictions\\nunconstitutional. Id. at 1415.\\n\\n 15\\n III\\n\\n A\\n\\n Article II of the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power”\\nof the United States “in a President,” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1,\\ncl. 1, and requires him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully\\nexecuted,” id. § 3. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52\\n(1926), the Supreme Court held that the Vesting and Take Care\\nClauses prevent Congress from restricting the President’s\\nability to remove government officers who wield significant\\nexecutive power on his behalf. See id. at 117–18, 163–64. The\\nCourt invalidated a statute requiring the Senate to provide\\nadvice and consent to effectuate the President’s removal of a\\nfirst-class postmaster. See id. at 107, 176. In later cases, the\\nCourt applied Myers to invalidate statutory restrictions on the\\nPresident’s ability to remove various principal officers. See\\nCollins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021) (Director of Federal\\nHousing Finance Agency); Seila Law, 591 U.S. 197 (Director\\nof CFPB); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,\\n561 U.S. 477 (2010) (members of PCAOB). More recently,\\nthe Court noted that because the President’s “exclusive power\\nof removal in executive agencies” is “conclusive and\\npreclusive,” Congress may not restrict it. Trump v. United\\nStates, 603 U.S. 593, 609 (2024) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &\\nTube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 & n.4 (1952) (Jackson,\\nJ., concurring)).\\n\\n A different line of precedent qualifies these cases. In\\nHumphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court upheld the\\nconstitutionality of a statute barring the President from\\nremoving members of the Federal Trade Commission absent\\n“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 41. The Court acknowledged Myers’s holding that\\nCongress cannot restrict the President’s ability to remove\\n\\n 16\\n“purely executive officers.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\\n627–28. But it concluded that Myers does not govern the\\nremoval of an officer “who exercises no part of the executive\\npower vested by the Constitution in the President.” Id. at 628.\\nAnd it characterized the FTC’s powers not as executive, but as\\n“quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.” Id. In Wiener v. United\\nStates, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), the Court applied Humphrey’s\\nExecutor to infer and uphold a cause requirement for removing\\nmembers of the War Claims Commission, a tribunal that\\nadjudicated claims under a statutory scheme for compensating\\ncertain Americans held by the Axis powers during World War\\nII. Id. at 349–50, 355–56. Other precedents have upheld cause\\nrequirements for the removal of certain inferior officers.\\nMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); United States v.\\nPerkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).\\n\\n In Seila Law, the Court read Humphrey’s Executor\\nnarrowly and expressly declined to extend it. According to the\\nCourt, “text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in\\n1789 [regarding removal of executive officers], Myers, and\\nFree Enterprise Fund all establish that the President’s removal\\npower is the rule, not the exception.” 591 U.S. at 228.\\nMoreover, Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison reflect “two\\nexceptions—one for multimember expert agencies that do not\\nwield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers\\nwith limited duties and no policymaking or administrative\\nauthority.” Id. at 218. Furthermore, these exceptions\\n“represent what up to now have been the outermost\\nconstitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions\\non the President’s removal power.” Id. (quoting PHH Corp. v.\\nCFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)\\n(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). As it had done previously, the\\nCourt declined to “extend” Humphrey’s Executor to a “new\\nsituation.” Id. at 220 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at\\n483).\\n\\n 17\\n Seila Law held that the Myers rule—not the Humphrey’s\\nExecutor exception—governs removal of the CFPB Director.\\nTo distinguish Humphrey’s Executor, the Court identified three\\nsignificant executive powers vested in the CFPB. First, the\\nCFPB can “promulgate binding rules” implementing the\\nstatutes that it administers. 591 U.S. at 218. Second, it can\\n“issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in\\nadministrative adjudications.” Id. at 219. Third, it can “seek\\ndaunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf\\nof the United States in federal court—a quintessentially\\nexecutive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.” Id.\\n\\n B\\n\\n These appeals turn on whether Humphrey’s Executor\\napplies to the NLRB and MSPB. At first glance, that question\\nseems to turn on whether these agencies exercise any\\nsignificant executive power within the meaning of the Vesting\\nClause, which would bring this case within the rule of Myers\\nand Seila Law; or whether the agencies exercise only quasi-\\nlegislative and quasi-judicial powers, which Humphrey’s\\nExecutor deemed to fall outside the President’s executive\\npower under Article II. See 295 U.S. at 627–28. But after\\nHumphrey’s Executor was decided, two related developments\\nin separation-of-powers jurisprudence made it all but\\nimpossible to distinguish executive power from quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial power.\\n\\n First, the Supreme Court has broadened its understanding\\nof what powers count as executive. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424\\nU.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Court held that the Federal\\nElection Commission’s “enforcement power, exemplified by\\nits discretionary power to seek judicial relief,” is an executive\\npower entrusted to the President through the Take Care Clause.\\nSee id. at 138. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the\\n\\n 18\\nCourt held that the power to interpret and apply a statute\\nrequiring certain budget cuts is executive. See id. at 733\\n(“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the\\nlegislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the\\nlaw.”). In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991),\\nJustice Scalia explained at length that “there is nothing\\n‘inherently judicial’ about ‘adjudication,’” which Article II\\nagencies perform routinely. Id. at 909 (concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgment); see id. at 909–12. And in City of\\nArlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), the Court explained\\nthat rulemaking and administrative adjudication “take\\n‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—\\nindeed, under our constitutional structure they must be\\nexercises of—the ‘executive Power.’” Id. at 304 n.4 (quoting\\nArticle II Vesting Clause). With enforcement, rulemaking, and\\nadministrative adjudication all classed as executive powers,\\nwhat is left of the assertedly discrete categories of quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers? In sum, “[t]he Court’s\\nconclusion [in Humphrey’s Executor] that the FTC did not\\nexercise executive power has not withstood the test of time.”\\nSeila Law, 591 U.S. at 216 n.2 (citing City of Arlington, 569\\nU.S. at 304 n.4). To the contrary, it is “hard to dispute that the\\npowers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey’s Executor would\\nat the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some\\ndegree.” Id. (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28).\\n\\n Second, the Supreme Court increasingly has stressed that\\nthere are only three kinds of constitutional powers, and two of\\nthem are not delegable. “Our Constitution divided the ‘powers\\nof the new Federal Government into three defined categories,\\nLegislative, Executive, and Judicial.’” Free Enter. Fund, 561\\nU.S. at 483 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).\\nOnly Congress itself may exercise the legislative power. See\\nWhitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)\\n(Article I “permits no delegation”). And only life-tenured\\n\\n 19\\njudges may exercise the “judicial Power of the United States.”\\nStern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011) (quoting U.S.\\nConst. Art. III, § 1); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488\\nU.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A judge may not\\nleave the decision to his law clerk, or to a master.”). So by\\nprocess of elimination, if agencies may receive neither\\nlegislative nor judicial powers, what is left for them other than\\nsome portion of the executive power?\\n\\n These considerations suggest that very little remains of\\nHumphrey’s Executor. Perhaps its most plausible application\\nis to purely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims\\nCommission at issue in Wiener. But under today’s separation-\\nof-powers jurisprudence, even those bodies exercise the\\nPresident’s executive power. See, e.g., United States v.\\nArthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 17 (2021) (Administrative Patent\\nJudges); Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014) (Tax Court judges). Recall that Seila Law limited\\nHumphrey’s Executor to entities that “do not wield substantial\\nexecutive power.” 591 U.S. at 218. So maybe agencies with\\nany “substantial” power—quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, or\\notherwise—fall outside Humphrey’s Executor because that\\npower is and must be executive. See Consumers’ Rsch. v.\\nCPSC, 98 F.4th 646, 650–57 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J.,\\ndissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Maybe\\nHumphrey’s Executor thus governs only agencies with purely\\nadvisory functions—like, say, the United States Commission\\non Civil Rights, see Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028, 2025\\nWL 559669, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (Katsas, J.,\\ndissenting). And maybe the Supreme Court, which is now\\nconsidering whether to overrule Humphrey’s Executor, will\\nsoon hold as much. See Stay Order, Trump v. Slaughter, No.\\n25-332 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025).\\n\\n 20\\n All of that said, we are reluctant to decide these appeals\\nalong those lines. Of course, we must apply Humphrey’s\\nExecutor as best we can, unless and until the Supreme Court\\noverrules it. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American\\nExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Moreover, despite\\nrejecting the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme\\nCourt has twice expressly declined to overrule it. See Seila\\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 228; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483. And\\nSeila Law acknowledged that Humphrey’s Executor had\\nupheld removal restrictions for an agency with powers that\\n“would at the present time be considered executive.” 591 U.S.\\nat 216 n.2 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28). Given\\nthese considerations, maybe Congress still may restrict\\nremoval if the board at issue has only those powers that\\nHumphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-\\njudicial, even if those powers are now recognized as executive.\\n\\n Fortunately, we need not resolve all these tensions. As we\\nexplain below, the NLRB and MSPB exercise significant\\nexecutive powers, which is enough to trigger the general rule\\nof Myers and Seila Law. Moreover, many of those powers\\nexceed ones that Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial, which makes this case fall outside\\nany exception based on that decision.\\n\\n C\\n\\n So what powers did Humphrey’s Executor deem to be\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial? That case involved powers\\nvested in the FTC by the Federal Trade Commission Act as\\noriginally enacted in 1914. Section 5 of that Act prohibited\\n“unfair methods of competition in commerce.” Act of Sept. 26,\\n1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (codified as amended\\nat 15 U.S.C. § 45). It authorized the Commission to adjudicate\\ncomplaints alleging unfair methods of competition, to issue\\n\\n 21\\ncease-and-desist orders, and to seek judicial enforcement of\\nthose orders. Id. Section 6 of the Act authorized the\\nCommission to make and file reports with other governmental\\nentities, including Congress. Id. at 721–22 (codified as\\namended at 15 U.S.C. § 46). Section 7 authorized the\\nCommission to act “as a master in chancery” in pending\\nantitrust actions. Id. at 722 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 47). For\\nour purposes, “what matters is the set of powers the Court\\nconsidered as the basis for its decision” in Humphrey’s\\nExecutor. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219 n.4.\\n\\n 1\\n\\n In distinguishing Myers, the Court deemed only one of the\\nFTC’s powers to be quasi-legislative: making reports for\\nCongress. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628 (“In making\\ninvestigations and reports … for the information of Congress\\nunder section 6, in aid of the legislative power, it acts as a\\nlegislative agency.”). That power is “investigative and\\ninformative”—one that “Congress might delegate to one of its\\nown committees.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.\\n\\n More interesting is a power that Humphrey’s Executor did\\nnot describe as quasi-legislative. Section 6(g) of the FTC Act\\nauthorized the Commission “to make rules and regulations for\\nthe purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.” 38 Stat.\\nat 722. Yet Humphrey’s Executor did not mention that\\nprovision, much less characterize it as conferring on the FTC\\nthe quasi-legislative power to engage in substantive\\nrulemaking. This was hardly surprising because “the agency\\nitself did not assert the power to promulgate substantive rules\\nuntil 1962 and indeed indicated intermittently that it lacked\\nsuch a power.” Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d\\n672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Before Humphrey’s Executor was\\ndecided, the Commission had expressly disclaimed the power\\n\\n 22\\nto promulgate substantive rules governing primary conduct, as\\nopposed to procedural rules governing the conduct of\\nadministrative adjudication under section 5. See id. at 693\\nn.27; Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the\\nFiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922 at 36 (“One of the most\\ncommon mistakes is to suppose that the commission can\\nissue … regulations unconnected with any proceeding before\\nit.”). For this reason, the Supreme Court cited the CFPB’s\\npower “to promulgate binding [substantive] rules” as one\\nimportant power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor—and\\none key reason why Humphrey’s Executor does not apply to\\nthe CFPB. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Humphrey’s Executor conceived of “quasi-judicial”\\npower as assisting the Article III courts or, at most, engaging\\nin a restrained species of administrative adjudication modeled\\non how Article III judges resolve cases or controversies.\\n\\n In distinguishing Myers, the Supreme Court expressly\\ndescribed only one of the FTC’s powers as “quasi-judicial”—\\nits section 7 power to assist the courts. See 295 U.S. at 628.\\nThat provision allowed a federal district court, if it found that\\nequitable remedies were warranted in an antitrust case, to\\n“refer” the case “to the commission, as a master in chancery, to\\nascertain and report an appropriate form of decree.” 38 Stat. at\\n722. In that instance, the Commission would prepare and file\\na report, which the court could “adopt or reject” as it chose. Id.\\nAs Humphrey’s Executor perceived it, “quasi-judicial” power\\nis thus merely the power to “act[] as an agency of the\\njudiciary.” 295 U.S. at 628. Today, we might liken this power\\nto that of a magistrate judge or a special master. See 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 636 (magistrate judges); Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters).\\n\\n 23\\n More generally, the Supreme Court also referenced the\\nFTC’s power to conduct administrative adjudications under\\nsection 5, which it described as “filling in and administering\\nthe details” regarding a “general” statutory prohibition of\\nunfair methods of competition. See 295 U.S. at 628.\\nAccording to the Court, that enterprise emphatically did not\\ninvolve any discretionary policy judgments. Instead, the FTC\\nwas a “nonpartisan” body required to “act with entire\\nimpartiality.” Id. at 624. And it was “charged with the\\nenforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.” Id. In\\nWiener, the Court similarly described administrative\\nadjudication by the War Claims Commission: Claims before it\\n“were to be ‘adjudicated according to law,’ that is, on the merits\\nof each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal\\nconsiderations.” 357 U.S. at 355. These descriptions resemble\\nJustice Scalia’s minimalist account of adjudication in\\nFreytag—agencies or courts “determine facts, apply a rule of\\nlaw to those facts, and thus arrive at a decision.” 501 U.S. at\\n909 (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). These\\ndescriptions also conjure up an enduring image of how judges\\nare supposed to adjudicate, as umpires fairly applying set rules\\nto call balls and strikes.\\n\\n Precedents contemporaneous with Humphrey’s Executor\\nconfirm this restrained conception of FTC administrative\\nadjudication. For one thing, the Supreme Court repeatedly had\\nheld that the meaning of “unfair methods of competition,”\\nalthough open-ended, was “for the courts, not the commission,\\nultimately to determine as [a] matter of law.” FTC v. Gratz,\\n253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); see FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S.\\n568, 579–80 (1923) (following Gratz). Moreover, courts\\ndiscerned the meaning of that phrase not through broad or\\npolicy-laden pronouncements, but by “the gradual process of\\njudicial inclusion and exclusion,” consistent with traditional\\ncommon-law adjudication. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643,\\n\\n 24\\n648 (1931) (cleaned up). Some of these precedents eventually\\nwere disapproved. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,\\n320–21 (1966) (disapproving Gratz). But in 1935, insofar as\\nFTC administrative adjudication was deemed a quasi-judicial\\npower, it was at most the power to resolve disputes like judges.\\n\\n * * * *\\n\\n In sum, Humphrey’s Executor laid down specific\\nconceptions of what counts as “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-\\njudicial” power. The former includes only legislative research\\nfunctions such as investigating, writing reports, and making\\nrecommendations to Congress. The latter includes only the\\npower to serve as a trial master or to act as a judge-like\\nadjudicator without policymaking authority. As Seila Law\\nnoted, neither category encompasses the powers to promulgate\\nsubstantive rules or to impose civil fines. See 591 U.S. at 218–\\n19. And although Humphrey’s Executor did not separately\\nanalyze available remedies, Seila Law stressed that the FTC in\\n1935 could only assist courts or enter cease-and-desist orders,\\nas opposed to awarding damages or affirmative equitable relief.\\nSee id.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n The powers of the NLRB and MSPB substantially exceed\\nthe circumscribed administrative powers that Humphrey’s\\nExecutor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.\\n\\n A\\n\\n Congress has vested the NLRB with several executive\\npowers beyond the ones addressed in Humphrey’s Executor.\\n\\n First, the NLRB possesses “broad rulemaking authority.”\\nAm. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991). Section 6\\n\\n 25\\nof the NLRA empowers the agency to promulgate “such rules\\nand regulations as may be necessary to carry out the\\nprovisions” of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 156. In American\\nHospital Association, the Supreme Court held that this\\nauthority covers not only rules establishing unfair labor\\npractices under section 8, but also “industry-wide rule[s]\\ndelineating … appropriate bargaining units” under section 9.\\n499 U.S. at 611. Invoking that power, the NLRB has\\npromulgated rules governing collective bargaining in the health\\ncare industry. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. As Seila Law made clear,\\nthe power to “promulgate binding rules fleshing out” major\\nfederal statutes exceeds the powers that Humphrey’s Executor\\ndeemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. See 591 U.S.\\nat 218. Needless to say, it is also a quintessential executive\\npower under current constitutional standards.\\n\\n Wilcox objects that the NLRB has not often engaged in\\nsubstantive rulemaking. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1–3; Nat’l Ass’n\\nof Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But that\\nis irrelevant to our inquiry. When evaluating the\\nconstitutionality of removal restrictions, courts consider the\\n“authority” that an agency “possesses,” not the rigor with\\nwhich the power is exercised. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. So,\\n“an agency’s voluntary self-denial” of its rulemaking power\\n“has no bearing” on our constitutional analysis. Am. Trucking\\nAss’ns, 531 U.S. at 473.\\n\\n Second, the NLRB conducts administrative adjudications\\nthat are nothing like the model of adjudication that Humphrey’s\\nExecutor treated as quasi-judicial. Recall that model: A\\n“nonpartisan” body of experts acts “with entire impartiality” to\\nundertake “the enforcement of no policy except the policy of\\nthe law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And courts\\ndecide what the governing statutory standard means, through a\\nneutral process of case-by-case adjudication. See Raladam,\\n\\n 26\\n283 U.S. at 648; Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427. In other words, courts\\nwould decide what constitutes an “unfair method of\\ncompetition” or an “unfair labor practice,” using familiar\\ninterpretive tools such as statutory text, structure, canons,\\nhistory, and precedent. This fairly describes the functioning of\\npurely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims Commission,\\nwhich was charged with nothing more than adjudicating claims\\n“according to law.” 357 U.S. at 355. But it does not fairly\\ndescribe adjudication conducted by agencies with substantive\\nrulemaking power, which the Administrative Procedure Act\\ndefines as including the power to “prescribe law or policy.”\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5). For those agencies, the Supreme\\nCourt has held that “adjudication is a generally permissible\\nmode of law-making and policymaking,” precisely because the\\nagency has been “delegated the power to make law and policy\\nthrough rulemaking.” Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 154\\n(1991); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03\\n(1947) (Chenery II).\\n\\n The NLRB conducts the latter kind of adjudications. It is\\ntasked with “developing and applying national labor policy.”\\nNLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).\\nSo, it may “announc[e] new principles in an adjudicative\\nproceeding.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294\\n(1974); see Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1056\\n(D.C. Cir. 1989) (NLRB adjudication “enunciated a new rule,”\\nwhich “the Board has the authority to do”). The NLRB does\\nthis routinely, see, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.\\n251, 260–67 (1975); NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406\\nU.S. 272, 284–85 (1972), creating a bevy of requirements that\\nare akin to “statutory” rules or “one[s] established by\\nregulation,” Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,\\n804–05 (1945).\\n\\n 27\\n Moreover, policy considerations drive NLRB\\nadjudications. The Supreme Court has contrasted the “narrow\\nconfines of law” for the courts with the “spacious domain of\\npolicy” for the NLRB. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.\\n177, 194 (1941). Likewise, this Court has held that the NLRB\\nmay “explicate why national labor policy requires” a given\\nrule. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Loc. No. 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d\\n802, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The NLRB routinely invokes\\n“policy” considerations not only to create rules by\\nadjudication, but also to overrule them. In re Lamons Gasket\\nCo., 357 NLRB 739, 739 (2011); In re IBM Corp., 341 NLRB\\n1288, 1290 (2004); see Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB,\\n100 F.4th 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2024) (O’Scannlain, J., specially\\nconcurring) (NLRB “frequently changes its mind, seesawing\\nback and forth between statutory interpretations depending on\\nits political composition, leaving workers, employers, and\\nunions in the lurch”). On one recent occasion, the NLRB\\noverruled itself for the fifth time, and this Court, barely\\nmentioning any statutory provisions, upheld the agency’s latest\\nposition as reasonably explained and thus not arbitrary. See\\nHosp. Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB, 94 F.4th 1, 16\\n(D.C. Cir. 2024) (Katsas, J., concurring), GVR, 145 S. Ct. 982\\n(2024). Perhaps the NLRA will be somewhat more\\nconstraining now that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,\\n603 U.S. 369 (2024), has overruled Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.\\nNatural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But\\nit would blink reality to suppose that Loper Bright will\\neliminate the NLRB’s ability to conduct policymaking through\\nadjudication under Chenery II. Whatever the virtues of that\\nmodern species of administrative adjudication, it cannot fairly\\nbe described as approximating how Article III judges decide\\ncases, or as resting on “no policy except the policy of the law.”\\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And it plainly involves the\\nexercise of substantial executive power. See City of Arlington,\\n569 U.S. at 304 n.4.\\n\\n 28\\n Third, the NLRB may award substantially broader\\nremedies than the FTC could in 1935. At that time, the FTC,\\nupon finding an unfair method of competition, could issue only\\na cease-and-desist order. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\\n620–21. Such orders impose only a “negative restriction.”\\nAlberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The NLRB,\\nin contrast, may award various forms of affirmative relief.\\nUpon finding an unfair labor practice, it may issue not only a\\ncease-and-desist order, but also one “requiring” the offending\\nemployer or union “to take such affirmative action including\\nreinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will\\neffectuate the policies of” the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). This\\nmay include the power to award compensatory damages. See\\nThryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10. And it sometimes\\nincludes the power to compel employers to read NLRB-\\ncomposed admissions of liability, see Advancepierre Foods,\\nInc. v. NLRB, 966 F.3d 813, 820–21 (D.C. Cir. 2020), a remedy\\nthat Judge Williams likened to the practices of Joseph Stalin\\nand Mao Zedong, see HTH Corp., 823 F.3d at 677. Whatever\\nthe merits of that comparison, the NLRB’s remedial authority\\nsubstantially exceeds that of the FTC in 1935. This\\nconsideration also further distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219.\\n\\n Fourth, the NLRB has broader litigating authority than the\\nFTC did in 1935. Each agency may petition courts of appeals\\nto enforce final administrative orders. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)\\n(NLRB); 38 Stat. at 719–20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 45) (FTC). But as noted above, NLRB remedial orders may\\nbe much broader than those of the FTC in 1935. Moreover, the\\nNLRB has litigating authority to seek interim relief in district\\ncourts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). In contrast, to obtain any judicial\\nrelief besides enforcement of a final cease-and-desist order, the\\nFTC in 1935 would have needed to ask the Attorney General\\nto seek mandamus on its behalf. See 38 Stat. at 722 (codified\\n\\n 29\\nas amended at 15 U.S.C. § 49); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274\\nU.S. 160, 173–74 (1927); Space Expl. Techs. Corp. v. NLRB,\\n151 F.4th 761, 776 n.76 (5th Cir. 2025). The NLRB’s greater\\nauthority to litigate on behalf of the United States both further\\ndistinguishes Humphrey’s Executor, see Seila Law, 591 U.S. at\\n218–19, and reflects a greater degree of executive power, see\\nBuckley, 424 U.S. at 138–40; In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255,\\n264 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (“civil\\nenforcement decisions brought by the Federal Government are\\npresumptively an exclusive Executive power”).\\n\\n Wilcox objects that NLRB litigation is conducted by its\\nGeneral Counsel, an executive officer removable at-will by the\\nPresident. But while the General Counsel has “final authority”\\nto prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\\nNLRB, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d); see NLRB v. United Food & Com.\\nWorkers Union, Loc. 23, 484 U.S. 112, 118–19 (1987), the\\nNLRA gives the Board itself control over litigation in court, 29\\nU.S.C. § 160(e), (j). The General Counsel conducts that\\nlitigation pursuant to a delegation from the Board under section\\n3(d), which permits the NLRB to assign to the General Counsel\\n“such other duties as the Board may prescribe.” Id. § 153(d).\\nUnder the terms of that delegation, the General Counsel\\nconducts litigation “in full accordance with the directions of the\\nBoard.” Authority and Assigned Responsibilities of General\\nCounsel of National Labor Relations Board § I.B, 20 Fed. Reg.\\n2,175, 2,175 (Apr. 6, 1955).\\n\\n Finally, the NLRB exercises substantial executive power\\nin administering section 9 of the NLRA, which governs the\\ndetermination of appropriate units for collective bargaining and\\nthe conduct of union elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159. Wilcox\\nobjects that elections are supervised primarily by the NLRB’s\\nregional offices, which in turn are supervised by the General\\nCounsel. See id. § 153(d). Yet the NLRA clearly gives the\\n\\n 30\\nBoard itself, not the General Counsel, final authority over\\nsection 9 administration. See id. § 159(b) (“The Board shall\\ndecide in each case … the unit appropriate for the purposes of\\ncollective bargaining ….”); id. § 159(c) (“the Board shall\\ninvestigate” petitions to conduct a union election). Indeed, the\\nBoard’s most prominent substantive rule to date involved not\\nan elaboration of unfair labor practices, but a determination of\\nappropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. See 29\\nC.F.R. § 103.30.\\n\\n Because the NLRB’s rulemaking, adjudicatory, remedial,\\nenforcement, and election-administration powers are not solely\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, the agency falls well outside\\nthe Humphrey’s Executor exception.\\n\\n B\\n\\n The MSPB likewise has more executive powers than ones\\nthat Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or\\nquasi-judicial.\\n\\n Start with rulemaking. The CSRA empowers the MSPB\\nto promulgate regulations “for the performance of its\\nfunctions,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h), and “for the purpose of section\\n7521,” id. § 1305. Section 7521 prohibits the “removal” of\\nALJs without a prior MSPB determination of good cause. Id.\\n§ 7521(a), (b)(1). In Tunik v. MSPB, 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir.\\n2005), the Federal Circuit held these grants of rulemaking\\npower authorize the MSPB to decide, with the force and effect\\nof law, what constitutes a prohibited “removal.” Id. at 1345.\\nIn other words, they permit the MSPB to define by regulation\\nwhat primary conduct section 7521 prohibits, not simply to\\nprescribe rules for the adjudication of disputes under that\\nprovision. To be sure, the MSPB’s rulemaking authority with\\nrespect to section 7521 does not rival the broad rulemaking\\nauthority of the NLRB, and the contours of its other rulemaking\\n\\n 31\\nauthorities are unclear. Nonetheless, the existence of at least\\nsome substantive rulemaking power counts as a distinction of\\nHumphrey’s Executor and as executive power under Article II.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\\n\\n As for adjudication, the MSPB may be less aggressive than\\nthe NLRB in naked appeals to shifting policy preferences, but\\nits adjudicatory powers still exceed what Humphrey’s Executor\\ndeemed to be quasi-judicial. This is true on at least three\\ndifferent dimensions—finality, breadth of jurisdiction, and\\nbreadth of remedial authority.\\n\\n Finality. The power to “unilaterally issue final decisions”\\nis a significant executive power that was not present in\\nHumphrey’s Executor. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. In\\n1935, an FTC cease-and-desist order remained ineffective\\nunless and until the agency persuaded a court of appeals to\\nenforce it. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 22 (1929); Claire\\nFurnace, 274 U.S. at 170. In contrast, the MSPB may “take\\nfinal action on any” matter “within the jurisdiction of the\\nBoard,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1), and also may “order any\\nFederal agency or employee to comply” with any of its orders,\\nid. § 1204(a)(2). Aggrieved employees may obtain judicial\\nreview of final MSPB decisions, but the decisions remain\\neffective unless and until a court of appeals sets them aside.\\nSee id. § 7703.\\n\\n Breadth of jurisdiction. In 1935, the FTC was a\\nspecialized tribunal. At that time, section 5 of the FTC Act was\\nlimited to addressing “unfair methods of competition.” See 38\\nStat. at 719; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (now also addressing\\n“unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). So, the FTC was\\nlargely directed towards antitrust enforcement, as reflected in\\nits role as a “master in chancery” for antitrust cases.\\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628. In contrast, the MSPB is\\n\\n 32\\nmore a jack-of-all-trades. In determining prohibited personnel\\npractices, it must administer portions of Title VII, the Age\\nDiscrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards\\nAct, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Whistleblower Protection\\nAct. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), (8). And those five statutes\\nencompass only two of 14 categories of personnel practices\\nthat the CSRA prohibits and that the MSPB must consider. Id.\\n§ 2302(b). The MSPB also must administer the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and the\\nVeterans Employment Opportunities Act. See id.\\n§§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324. It must\\nadminister the Hatch Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and\\nvarious other statutes within the prosecutorial authority of the\\nSpecial Counsel. 5 U.S.C. § 1216(a). Finally, it must decide\\nwhether employing agencies have meted out appropriate\\ndiscipline. Id. § 7513(d). To do that, the MSPB makes its own\\n“discretionary judgment,” which “is by no means” a mere legal\\nor factual inquiry. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B.\\n313, 325–26 (1981). Instead, it involves application of a non-\\nexclusive, twelve-factor balancing test that considers, among\\nother things, the nature of the offense, the employee’s work and\\ndisciplinary record, the potential for rehabilitation, mitigating\\ncircumstances, and the adequacy of alternative sanctions. See\\nConor v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir.\\n2021) (citing Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332). According to the\\nMSPB, this searching inquiry is “considerably broader” than\\none that courts would undertake. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 327.\\nThus, it cannot plausibly be described as “quasi-judicial.”\\nLikewise, it cannot fairly be characterized as involving “no\\npolicy except the policy of the law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295\\nU.S. at 624.\\n\\n Breadth of remedial authority. When it finds a legal\\nviolation, the MSPB can do far more than simply order the\\noffending agency to cease and desist. For unwarranted\\n\\n 33\\nemployee discipline, the MSPB may order relief “including\\nreinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees.” Elgin, 567 U.S.\\nat 6. For prohibited personnel practices, it may order corrective\\naction that includes reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and\\nconsequential damages, medical and other costs, travel\\nexpenses, attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and interest.\\n5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, suspension,\\nreprimand, civil penalties of up to $1,000, or “any\\ncombination” of these sanctions. Id. § 1215(a)(3)(A). And for\\nviolation of its own orders, the MSPB also may order the salary\\nof an offending official to be withheld. Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\\nAll of this sharply distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor. The\\npower to award “legal and equitable relief in administrative\\nadjudications” is an executive power that was not at issue there.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. Moreover, if the power to\\n“seek daunting monetary penalties” in court is also such a\\npower, see id., then so too is the power to impose such penalties\\nunilaterally.\\n\\n Unlike the FTC in 1935, the MSPB also may award\\ninterim relief in some circumstances—and may do so on a\\nwholesale basis. Upon request by the Special Counsel, any\\nMSPB member may “order a stay of any personnel action” that\\nshe reasonably believes to constitute a prohibited personnel\\npractice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Recently, Harris herself\\ninvoked this authority to reinstate nearly 6,000 laid-off\\nemployees pending further administrative proceedings. Order\\non Stay Request, Special Counsel ex rel. John Doe v. USDA,\\nNo. CB-1208-25-0020-U-1 (MSPB Mar. 5, 2025),\\nhttps://perma.cc/3F45-PKG5. That too far exceeds the FTC’s\\nremedial authority in 1935.\\n\\n 34\\n Harris objects that we should not consider the MSPB’s\\nsalary-withholding power because the statute granting it is\\nunconstitutional. This argument addresses only one of many\\nremedial powers that were not present in Humphrey’s\\nExecutor. In any event, the argument fails on its own terms.\\nHarris contends that withholding a salary requires involvement\\nof the Comptroller General, who is a legislative official. She\\ninvokes Bowsher, which held that Congress could not vest the\\nComptroller General with the executive power to decide what\\nbudget cuts a particular statute required. See 478 U.S. at 733–\\n34. The argument correctly assumes that the power to withhold\\nthe salary of a government official is executive. But the\\nComptroller General does not exercise this power. “[T]he\\nBoard may order” that the offending employee “shall not be\\nentitled to receive payment for service as an employee” during\\nthe period of non-compliance. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(e)(2)(A). The\\nMSPB must “certify” its order to the Comptroller General, who\\nis in no way authorized to review it. Id. So, unlike the statute\\nat issue in Bowsher, the CSRA does not give the Comptroller\\nGeneral any discretion to bind the Executive Branch.\\n\\n Finally, consider litigating authority, another executive\\npower not addressed in Humphrey’s Executor. The MSPB’s\\npower to appear “in any civil action brought in connection with\\nany function carried out by the Board,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(i),\\ncontemplates MSPB control of any district-court litigation\\nbrought by or against the agency. And the MSPB sometimes\\nis the proper respondent when its orders are challenged in a\\ncourt of appeals. See Spruill, 978 F.2d at 684; Costello, 182\\nF.3d at 1381. That too cuts against the MSPB’s position here.\\nPurely adjudicatory agencies—ones designed to be “an\\nindependent adjudicator” with no policymaking authority—are\\ngenerally not proper parties to defend their decisions on review,\\njust as district judges are generally not proper parties to defend\\ntheir decisions on appeal. Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l\\n\\n 35\\nUnion v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see\\nHinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).\\n\\n In sum, the MSPB has at least some substantive\\nrulemaking power; it administers a host of wide-ranging\\nfederal statutes; it awards various kinds of affirmative,\\ncompensatory, and punitive relief; and it litigates in court on its\\nown behalf. Taken together, these powers well exceed the\\npowers deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in\\nHumphrey’s Executor and the powers vested in the War Claims\\nCommission. For these reasons, Congress may not restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove MSPB members.\\n\\n V\\n\\n The constitutional problem in these cases arises from two\\nfeatures of each agency: (1) the agency has been vested with\\nsignificant executive power that cannot be characterized as\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, and (2) Congress has\\nrestricted the President’s ability to remove its members.\\nWilcox and Harris urge us to solve the constitutional problem\\nby stripping away agency powers, rather than by declining to\\nenforce the removal restrictions.\\n\\n We reject that proposal. When the Supreme Court\\nencounters a statute that unconstitutionally insulates an\\nexecutive officer from at-will removal, it has typically\\nresponded by disregarding the removal restriction. See Myers,\\n272 U.S. at 176; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508–10; Seila\\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 232–38. Our Circuit has done likewise.\\nDellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5052, 2025 WL 717383, at *1\\n(D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (per curiam). Following that well-\\nworn path, we hold that the appropriate resolution here is to\\ndisregard the statutory removal restrictions for NLRB and\\n\\n 36\\nMSPB members, not to blue-pencil provisions from among the\\nfull panoply of the executive powers of each agency.2\\n\\n VI\\n\\n We close by flagging three issues not resolved here.\\n\\n First, we do not decide whether Congress may restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove officers with solely adjudicatory\\nfunctions. Our analysis above has distinguished the court-like\\nadjudication of bodies such as the War Claims Commission\\nfrom the Chenery II-like adjudication of agencies vested with\\nboth adjudicatory and policymaking responsibilities. And we\\nhave shown that the powers vested in the NLRB and MSPB\\nsignificantly exceed those vested in the FTC in 1935 and those\\nvested in the War Claims Commission. We express no opinion\\nregarding other agencies that may plausibly be described as\\npurely adjudicatory.\\n\\n Second, despite multiple amicus briefs focused on this\\npoint, we do not address whether Congress may restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove members of the Board of\\nGovernors of the Federal Reserve System. Granting a stay in\\nthis case, the Supreme Court noted that there is a “distinct\\nhistorical tradition” regarding the treatment of congressionally\\nchartered banks, which may bear on Congress’s ability to\\nrestrict the removal of their officials. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at\\n\\n 2\\n The Supreme Court took a different approach in Bowsher.\\nAfter concluding that Congress had unconstitutionally conferred\\nexecutive power on a legislative officer removable only by Congress,\\nthe Court responded by stripping the officer of that power. 478 U.S.\\nat 734–36. But this merely implemented a statutory “fallback”\\nprovision setting forth how the law at issue should operate if one of\\nits provisions was held unconstitutional. See id. at 735. The NLRA\\nand the CSRA contain no such provision.\\n\\n 37\\n1415; see also An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the\\nBank of the United States, ch. 10, § 5, 1 Stat. 191, 193 (1791)\\n(directors of the First Bank of the United States were appointed\\nand removed “by the stockholders”). We have no occasion\\nhere to address the scope or import of that tradition.\\n\\n Third, because we hold that the President permissibly\\nremoved Wilcox and Harris, we do not consider whether\\nwrongfully removed principal officers may obtain declaratory,\\nequitable, or mandatory relief against the President or other\\ngovernment officials.\\n\\n VII\\n\\n For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgments\\nof the district courts.\\n\\n So ordered.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214868/\", \"author_raw\": \"Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS\"}, {\"author\": \"PAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"PAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:\\n\\n The public is well served when some parts of our\\ngovernment are insulated from the fray of politics. That is\\nbecause certain government functions are, or should be,\\nnonpartisan. For example, courts of law and other adjudicators\\nthat apply legal standards to facts must be impartial, and their\\nimpartiality is protected when the decision-makers do not fear\\nlosing their jobs when there is a change in presidential\\nadministrations. And some agencies that employ subject-\\nmatter expertise to address technical regulatory and policy\\nissues, such as the Federal Reserve, are better able to execute\\ntheir duties and to inspire public confidence in their decision-\\nmaking if they are distanced from political considerations.\\n\\n Such “independent” government entities have existed in\\nour country in some form since 1790.1 And 138 years ago,\\nCongress created the first nonpartisan expert independent\\nagency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The\\nSupreme Court confirmed that such agencies are constitutional\\nninety years ago.2 Today, approximately thirty-three\\nindependent agencies apply specialized expertise to make\\nmerit-based decisions on behalf of the American people, in\\ndiverse areas like commerce, public safety, and energy.3 And\\nnumerous courts of law — such as the Tax Court, the Court of\\nAppeals for the Armed Forces, and the Court of Appeals for\\nVeterans Claims — serve as independent adjudicators, even\\nthough they are housed within the Executive Branch.\\n\\n1\\n See Christine Kexel Chabot, Is the Federal Reserve\\nConstitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies,\\n96 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 39–40 (2020) (describing the Sinking Fund\\nCommission of 1790, which had two members who were not\\nremovable by the President).\\n2\\n See Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602\\n(1935).\\n3\\n See infra notes 14–20.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n The key feature that defines a government entity’s\\nindependence from political influence is its freedom from total\\ncontrol by the President. To safeguard that independence,\\nCongress has limited the President’s authority to remove the\\nleaders of agencies that it has determined should be\\napolitical — and it has set such removal protections with the\\napproval of Republican and Democratic Presidents alike.4 As\\nrelevant here, Congress has specifically provided that the\\nPresident may remove the leaders of certain independent\\nagencies only “for cause,” such as the leaders’ inefficiency,\\nmalfeasance, or neglect of duty. For at least ninety years, it has\\nbeen settled law that Congress may impose statutory for-cause\\nremoval protections in the exercise of its authority to organize\\nand structure the Executive Branch.\\n\\n But today, my colleagues make us the first court to strike\\ndown the independence of a traditional multimember expert\\nagency: They hold that the for-cause removal protections that\\nsafeguard the political independence of the National Labor\\nRelations Board (NLRB) and the Merit Systems Protection\\nBoard (MSPB) are unconstitutional. Under my colleagues’\\nreasoning, it appears that no independent agencies may\\nlawfully exist in this country: Their determination that the\\nMSPB cannot be independent — even though it is purely\\nadjudicatory and does not touch upon core constitutional\\nfunctions assigned to the President — suggests that no agencies\\ncan be independent. Although my colleagues attempt to couch\\ntheir analysis in narrow terms, they redefine the type of\\nexecutive power that must be placed under the exclusive\\ncommand of the President, and effectively grant him dominion\\nover approximately thirty-three previously independent\\nagencies.\\n\\n4\\n See infra note 8.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n This case must be viewed in the context of a broader\\nreevaluation of how agency independence fits in our\\nconstitutional system. The Supreme Court upheld the\\nconstitutionality of independent agencies, like the MSPB and\\nthe NLRB, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.\\n602 (1935), and it has repeatedly reaffirmed the essential\\nholding of Humphrey’s. See, e.g., Wiener v. United States, 357\\nU.S. 349, 356 (1958); Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197,\\n218 (2020). But the Court has expressed doubts about the\\nscope of Humphrey’s and is poised to reconsider its ruling in\\nthat case. See Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, slip op. at 1\\n(U.S. Sept. 22, 2025) (granting certiorari before judgment and\\nsetting oral argument for December 2025). The pendency of\\nSlaughter places us in an unusual position: Although the\\nconstitutional arguments before us mirror those raised in\\nSlaughter, the Supreme Court has rebuffed requests to hear the\\ninstant cases in conjunction with Slaughter and has instead left\\nthese cases for us to decide. See Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct.\\n1415, 1416–17 (2025) (declining to address the government’s\\nrequest for certiorari before judgment); Order Den. Cert.\\nBefore J., Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-312 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025);\\nOrder Den. Cert. Before J., Wilcox v. Trump, No. 25-319 (U.S.\\nSept. 22, 2025). We, in turn, expedited the instant appeals, and\\nwe must consider them in the face of conflicting signals from\\nthe Court. See Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1416–17 (staying lower-\\ncourt injunctions favoring Wilcox and Harris based on a\\nfinding that the government is likely to succeed on the merits,\\nbut leaving intact the “narrow exceptions [to at-will removal]\\nrecognized by our precedents”). Regardless of the odd\\nprocedural posture in which we find ourselves, the bottom line\\nis that we are duty-bound to apply Humphrey’s until the\\nSupreme Court overrules it, and Humphrey’s requires us to\\nuphold the independence of the MSPB and the NLRB.\\n\\n 4\\n The government takes the position that agency\\nindependence is unconstitutional because the President must\\nmaintain ironclad control over any government entity that is\\nwithin the Executive Branch. It openly asks the Supreme Court\\nto overrule Humphrey’s, and it asks this court to essentially do\\nthe same.5 The government’s extreme view of executive power\\nsharply departs from precedent and from prior applications of\\nthe “unitary executive theory.” Although the Supreme Court\\nhas adhered to a robust conception of executive power and the\\nunitary executive, it has never held that the Constitution flatly\\nprohibits the existence of independent agencies. If courts\\nimplicitly or explicitly adopt such an extreme interpretation of\\nthe Constitution after at least 138 years of contrary practice,\\nwith the consequence of awarding even more power to a\\nPresident who has pushed the limits of Article II, I fear that it\\nwill erode public confidence in the judiciary. Because\\nindependent agencies have served our nation well for over a\\ncentury — with the blessing of all three branches of\\ngovernment, under both Republican and Democratic leaders —\\nthe government’s new argument that agency independence\\ninflicts “a grave harm to the separation of powers” lacks\\ncredibility. Gov’t Br. 2. That is especially so where the\\ngovernment’s theory purports to promote democratic\\naccountability while asking unelected judges to rewrite the\\nconstitutional order.\\n\\n Neither this case nor Slaughter is about whether the\\nPresident should be the master of all executive power wielded\\nby the federal government. The Supreme Court has already\\n\\n5\\n See Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Slaughter, No. 25-332 (Oct.\\n10, 2025) (“If Humphrey’s Executor is not already a dead letter, this\\nCourt should overrule it . . . .”); Gov’t Br. 21 (“Because Humphrey’s\\nExecutor rests on repudiated reasoning, the decision can be\\nunderstood as precedential only as to the specific question it\\nresolved.”).\\n\\n 5\\nrecognized that the Constitution vests all executive power in\\nthe President; and as a result, he generally is entitled to remove\\nprincipal officers of the Executive Branch, such as agency\\nleaders, in his discretion. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 215; Free\\nEnter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010). The current\\nquestion before the courts is narrower: It is whether the\\nConstitution mandates that there can be no exceptions to that\\ngeneral rule of at-will removal. Here, my colleagues implicitly\\nagree with the government that no such exceptions exist —\\nthey adopt a vanishingly narrow view of the types of agencies\\nthat may remain independent. Meanwhile, the government\\nasks both this court and the Supreme Court to accept its\\nmaximalist view of executive power and to abandon\\nHumphrey’s.\\n\\n Our starting point is the Supreme Court’s recognition of\\nan exception to the President’s at-will removal authority for\\n“multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial\\nexecutive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. To overrule\\nthat precedent so that the President may seize total control over\\nall independent agencies, the government must argue that the\\ncurrent exception is impermissible because the Constitution\\ncompels the President’s complete domination of the Executive\\nBranch. But the government’s position is logically flawed:\\nWhile arguing for total presidential control in sweeping terms,\\nthe government nonetheless concedes that it may be\\nappropriate to carve out exceptions for the Federal Reserve and\\nArticle I courts (which are situated within the Executive\\nBranch).6 In other words, the government argues for no\\n6\\n Reply Br. 13–15 (noting that Federal Reserve officials might\\nnot be subject to at-will removal because of the agency’s history);\\nOral Arg. 32:29–44 (“The common thread between the Article I\\ncourts, the Fed, the Article IV courts is that, as either historical or\\ndoctrinal matter, there is a significant . . . question as to whether that\\n\\n 6\\nexceptions while conceding that exceptions are allowed. If the\\nConstitution permits Congress to impose for-cause removal\\nrestrictions to protect the independence of Federal Reserve\\nofficials and Article I judges, there is no logical way to hold\\nthat the Constitution nevertheless forbids Congress from\\nprotecting the leaders of other government entities that have\\nsimilar needs for independence (i.e., because they also are\\nimpartial adjudicators or have a historical tradition of political\\nindependence).\\n\\n Adoption of the government’s maximalist theory of\\nexecutive power (implicitly or explicitly) threatens to\\nfundamentally change the character of our government. In\\nessence, the government asks the courts to hold that our\\nConstitution requires all actions and decisions made by the\\nExecutive Branch to be political. Thus, instead of relying on\\nsubject-matter expertise to make merits-based decisions for the\\npublic good, previously independent agencies must advance\\nthe political agenda of the President. Taken to its logical end,\\nthe government’s theory will eliminate removal protections for\\nall employees of the Executive Branch and place every hiring\\ndecision and agency action under the political direction of the\\nPresident. But such a radical upending of the constitutional\\norder is not supported by the text or structure of the\\nConstitution and is inconsistent with the intent of the Framers.\\nAnd while the government claims to uphold the separation of\\npowers, its theory instead concentrates excessive power in the\\nPresident and thus paves the way to autocracy.\\n\\n\\n\\ngovernmental entity is wielding traditional executive power.”); Brief\\nfor the Petitioners at 23, Slaughter, No. 25-332 (Oct. 10, 2025) (“No\\none disputes that the President’s illimitable power of removal\\nextends only to executive officers and excludes truly non-executive\\nappointees, such as D.C. Court of Appeals judges.” (cleaned up)).\\n\\n 7\\n The government urges an unprecedented interpretation of\\nthe Constitution that would lead to the full politicization of our\\ngovernment and a massive transfer of power to the President.\\nMy colleagues take an alternative approach in name only.\\nRather than expressly declaring Humphrey’s a dead letter, they\\nredefine Humphrey’s “substantial executive power” exception\\nsuch that it does not allow for any independent agencies. In so\\ndoing, they enable the government to achieve its goals while\\nmaintaining the appearance of judicial restraint. Under either\\napproach, independent agencies as we know them cannot exist\\nin this country. Because that outcome is not required by our\\nConstitution and does harm to our nation, I respectfully dissent.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n A. Legal Background\\n\\n In 1935, the Supreme Court confirmed that Congress has\\nthe power to create independent agencies in a landmark\\nopinion: Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. President\\nFranklin D. Roosevelt claimed that he was entitled to remove\\ncommissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) at will,\\nand his Administration asserted that the statute that allowed\\nonly “for cause” removal of FTC commissioners was “an\\nunconstitutional interference with the executive power of the\\nPresident.” Brief for the United States at 7, 20, Humphrey’s,\\n295 U.S. 602 (No. 667), 1935 WL 32965, at *7, *20. The\\nSupreme Court unanimously rejected that argument. The\\nCourt upheld the FTC just as Congress had created it — as “a\\nbody of experts who shall gain experience by length of service”\\nand “which shall be independent of executive authority, except\\nin its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without the\\nleave or hindrance of any other official or any department of\\nthe government.” Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 625–26. The Court\\nemphasized that the FTC was “neither political nor executive,”\\n\\n 8\\nwas “charged with the enforcement of no policy except the\\npolicy of the law,” and was to be “nonpartisan” and\\n“impartial[].” Id. at 624. Notably, the FTC had five members\\nwith staggered terms, and no more than three of them could be\\nfrom the same political party. Id. at 620. The Court held that\\nCongress had authority that “cannot well be doubted” to create\\n“quasi legislative” or “quasi judicial” agencies, and to require\\nthem “to act in discharge of their duties independently of\\nexecutive control.” Id. at 629. Moreover, freedom from “the\\nsuspicion of partisan direction” depended on for-cause removal\\nprotection, because “one who holds his office only during the\\npleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an\\nattitude of independence against the latter’s will.” Id. at 625,\\n629.7\\n\\n After the Supreme Court’s holding in Humphrey’s,\\nCongress created many more independent agencies in the mold\\nof the FTC — i.e., multimember expert bodies, performing\\nnonpartisan functions with impartiality. And each new\\nagency’s organic statute was signed into law by the then-\\nserving President.8 Furthermore, two decades after\\n\\n7\\n The Court distinguished its previous decision in Myers v. United\\nStates, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). There, the Court invalidated a statutory\\nprovision that required the Senate’s advice and consent for the\\nremoval of postmasters, while making numerous comments about\\nthe scope of executive power. Id. at 163–64. Humphrey’s limited\\nMyers to its holding, which reached only “purely executive officers.”\\nHumphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 627–28, 631–32.\\n8\\n Presidents who have signed legislation creating independent\\nagencies include: Grover Cleveland (Interstate Commerce\\nCommission, see Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-\\n104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383); Calvin Coolidge (National Mediation\\nBoard, see Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, § 4, 44 Stat. 577,\\n579 (1926)), Franklin D. Roosevelt (National Labor Relations Board,\\n\\n 9\\nHumphrey’s, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the legality of\\nindependent Executive Branch agencies in Wiener v. United\\nStates, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), extending for-cause removal\\nprotection to members of the purely adjudicatory nonpartisan\\nWar Claims Commission, even though no express statutory\\nprovision required it. Thus, in the ninety years since\\nHumphrey’s, all three branches of our government have\\naccepted the important role of apolitical independent agencies\\nwithin our constitutional system.\\n\\n Fast forward from 1935 to the year 2020. In Seila Law\\nLLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme\\n\\nsee National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3(a),\\n49 Stat. 449, 451); Harry Truman (War Claims Commission, see War\\nClaims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240; Wiener, 357\\nU.S. at 354–56); Richard Nixon (Consumer Product Safety\\nCommission, see Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573,\\n§ 4(a), 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972)), Gerald Ford (Nuclear Regulatory\\nCommission, see Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.\\n93-438, § 201(e), 88 Stat. 1233, 1243), Jimmy Carter (Merit Systems\\nProtection Board, see Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.\\n95-454, § 1202(d), 92 Stat. 1111, 1122), Ronald Reagan (National\\nIndian Gaming Commission, see Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,\\nPub. L. No. 100-497, § 5(b)(6), 102 Stat. 2467, 2470 (1988)), George\\nH.W. Bush (Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, see\\nClean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,\\n§ 112(r)(6)(B), 104 Stat. 2399, 2565), Bill Clinton (Surface\\nTransportation Board, see ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.\\n104-88, § 701(b)(3), 109 Stat. 803, 932–33), George W. Bush\\n(Department of Defense: Board of Actuaries, see National Defense\\nAuthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,\\n§ 906(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3, 275–76), and Barack Obama (Consumer\\nFinancial Protection Bureau, see Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform\\nand Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(c)(3),\\n124 Stat. 1376, 1964 (2010), independence invalidated by Seila Law,\\n591 U.S. at 230–38).\\n\\n 10\\nCourt confronted a newly created independent agency with a\\nnovel leadership structure: the CFPB. 591 U.S. at 207, 220.\\n“Congress tasked the CFPB with implementing and enforcing\\na large body of financial consumer protection laws . . . .” Id. at\\n206 (cleaned up). The CFPB could issue “binding regulations”\\nand exercise “extensive adjudicatory authority.” Id. at 206–07.\\nIt also possessed “potent enforcement powers,” including “the\\nauthority to conduct investigations, issue subpoenas and civil\\ninvestigative demands, initiate administrative adjudications,\\nand prosecute civil actions in federal court.” Id. at 206 (citing\\n12 U.S.C. §§ 5562, 5564(a), (f)). The Supreme Court observed\\nthat the CFPB was “almost wholly unprecedented” and differed\\nfrom the “traditional” multileader expert agency examined in\\nHumphrey’s in important respects. Id. at 207, 220. In\\nparticular, the CFPB had a single Director who enjoyed a five-\\nyear term, which meant that the for-cause removal protection\\nmight prevent a President with only a four-year term from ever\\nappointing the agency’s leader. Id. at 225. Furthermore, the\\nCFPB had a unique funding arrangement — it was funded by\\nthe Federal Reserve and therefore not subject to the\\nappropriations process controlled by Congress and the\\nPresident. Id. at 207–08. Citing those unusual structural\\nfeatures, the Supreme Court determined that the CFPB\\nconcentrated too much power in one person — the CFPB\\nDirector — who was accountable to no one. Id. at 204–05,\\n224–25. The Court thus struck down the for-cause removal\\nprotection for the Director, holding that it was unconstitutional\\nand violated the separation of powers. It addressed this\\nconstitutional infirmity by making the CFPB Director\\nremovable at the President’s will. Id. at 230–38.\\n\\n In disapproving the unprecedented structure of the CFPB,\\nthe Court noted that although Presidents by default have “at\\nwill” removal authority over principal officers within the\\nExecutive Branch, Humphrey’s established an exception to that\\n\\n 11\\nrule for “multimember expert agencies that do not wield\\nsubstantial executive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. The\\nCourt did not specify what would constitute “substantial\\nexecutive power” under its test. Id. But the Court made clear\\nthat it would “not revisit” Humphrey’s and would leave it “in\\nplace,” even though it declined to “extend” the Humphrey’s\\nexception to a novel, single-director government agency. Id. at\\n215, 220, 228. Thus, the Court expressly left intact its prior\\napproval of “traditional” multileader independent agencies. Id.\\nat 207. Indeed, seven members of the Court endorsed the\\nnotion that Congress could address the “problem” posed by the\\nCFPB’s lack of accountability by “converting the CFPB into a\\nmultimember agency.” Id. at 237 (Roberts, C.J., joined by\\nAlito & Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 298\\n(Kagan, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,\\nconcurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). That\\nholding was consistent with other cases, before and since, that\\nalso addressed the President’s authority to remove agency\\nleaders and left Humphrey’s untouched. See Free Enter. Fund,\\n561 U.S. at 483–84 (striking down two layers of for-cause\\nremoval protection for an official but declining to “reexamine”\\nHumphrey’s); Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 250–51 (2021)\\n(striking down the independence of an agency headed by a\\nsingle person, regardless of whether the executive power it\\nwielded was significant, but recognizing that Seila Law did\\n“not revisit our prior decisions” (cleaned up)).\\n\\n B. Procedural Background\\n\\n The President dismissed MSPB Chair Cathy Harris and\\nNLRB Member Gwynne Wilcox in violation of the for-cause\\nremoval statutes that safeguard the independence of their\\nrespective agencies. The government claims that those for-\\ncause removal statutes are unconstitutional and that the\\nPresident therefore need not abide by them. Specifically, the\\n\\n 12\\ngovernment asserts that Humphrey’s allowed for-cause\\nremoval protections only for agencies that exercise “no part of\\nthe executive power,” and “any exercise of executive power\\nsubjects an agency head to the President’s control.” Gov’t Br.\\n22, 26–27 (emphasis added). According to the government, the\\nMSPB and the NLRB wield “substantial executive power”\\neven if their functions are largely adjudicatory, and an agency’s\\nexercise of any executive power requires it to be placed under\\nthe control of the President. In sum, the government’s position\\nis that the President is entitled to remove as he pleases any and\\nall principal officers of any executive agency — including the\\nMSPB and the NLRB. Otherwise, the theory goes, the\\nseparation of powers will be violated.\\n\\n Two judges of the district court rejected the government’s\\narguments. See Harris v. Bessent (Harris I), 775 F. Supp. 3d\\n164 (D.D.C. 2025) (Contreras, J.); Wilcox v. Trump (Wilcox I),\\n775 F. Supp. 3d 215 (D.D.C. 2025) (Howell, J.). They held\\nthat Humphrey’s and Wiener are controlling Supreme Court\\nprecedents that required them to uphold the for-cause removal\\nprotections for members of the MSPB and the NLRB, which\\nare traditional multimember expert agencies. Judge Contreras\\nand Judge Howell issued permanent injunctions that effectively\\nrestored Harris and Wilcox to their positions and required the\\ngovernment to comply with the applicable for-cause removal\\nstatutes. See Harris I, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 189; Wilcox I, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 240–41. The government appealed.\\n\\n During the pendency of the instant appeals, the\\ngovernment moved to stay the district court’s injunctions, and\\nthis court ultimately denied the government’s request. See\\nHarris v. Bessent (Harris III), Nos. 25-5037, 25-5057, 2025\\nWL 1021435 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (en banc) (per curiam),\\nvacating Harris v. Bessent (Harris II), 2025 WL 980278 (D.C.\\nCir. Mar. 28, 2025) (per curiam). The government then asked\\n\\n 13\\nthe Supreme Court to stay the district court’s injunctions\\npending appeal and to grant a writ of certiorari before\\njudgment. We heard oral argument in these cases — on an\\nexpedited schedule — on May 16. On May 22, the Supreme\\nCourt issued an order staying the district court’s judgments\\npending final disposition of the cases. See Wilcox, 145 S. Ct.\\n1415. In so doing, the Court held that the government would\\nlikely succeed on the merits because “the NLRB and MSPB\\n[likely] exercise considerable executive power.” Id. at 1416.\\nHowever, it expressly left intact the “narrow exceptions [to at-\\nwill removal] recognized by [its] precedents.” Id. (citing Seila\\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 215–18). The Court did not address the\\ngovernment’s request for a writ of certiorari before judgment.\\nSee id. at 1416–17.\\n\\n Parallel to Harris’s and Wilcox’s cases, the government\\nhas been litigating the President’s removal of FTC\\nCommissioner Rebecca Slaughter. After the President\\nremoved Slaughter without cause, the district court relied on\\nHumphrey’s to order Slaughter’s reinstatement. This court\\ndenied the government’s motion for a stay of the district court’s\\norder pending appeal. See Slaughter v. Trump, No. 25-5261,\\n2025 WL 2551247 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2025). The government\\nthen asked the Supreme Court for a stay of the district court’s\\njudgment in Slaughter and petitioned for a writ of certiorari\\nbefore judgment.\\n\\n Before the Supreme Court ruled on the Slaughter\\napplications, Harris and Wilcox filed separate petitions for\\nwrits of certiorari before judgment. Petition for a Writ of\\nCertiorari Before Judgment, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-312\\n(U.S. Sept. 15, 2025); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before\\nJudgment, Wilcox v. Trump, No. 25-319 (U.S. Sept. 15, 2025).\\nThey argued that their cases and Slaughter present similar legal\\nissues and that the Court, should it grant certiorari before\\n\\n 14\\njudgment in Slaughter, should also grant certiorari before\\njudgment in Harris and Wilcox and consolidate the three cases.\\nThe Court granted a stay of the district court’s injunction in\\nSlaughter and granted a writ of certiorari before judgment in\\nthat case. But the Court denied both Harris’s and Wilcox’s\\npetitions for certiorari before judgment, thus leaving the instant\\ncases for this court to decide. The Court now is poised to hear\\noral arguments in Slaughter.\\n\\n Meanwhile, we are called upon to decide (1) whether the\\ngovernment’s constitutional challenge to the for-cause removal\\nprotections afforded to leaders of the MSPB and the NLRB is\\nforeclosed by Humphrey’s and Wiener; and (2) if it is not,\\nwhether the Supreme Court’s precedents and the Constitution\\nrequire us to adopt the expansive view of executive authority\\nurged by the government. The government also argues that the\\ndistrict court lacked authority to effectively reinstate Harris and\\nWilcox to their posts at their respective agencies.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n A. Applying Existing Precedents\\n\\n Just five years after Seila Law was decided, the\\ngovernment comes before us to argue that the MSPB and the\\nNLRB — two traditional multileader expert agencies — are\\nunconstitutional in their current forms. Although Seila Law\\nheld that the President generally has at-will removal authority\\nover all principal officers in the Executive Branch, it\\nrecognized a long-standing exception for “multimember expert\\nagencies that do not wield substantial executive power” — and\\nit expressly left Humphrey’s on the books. See Seila Law, 591\\nU.S. at 204–05, 215–18. The most sensible interpretation of\\nSeila Law’s holding is that an agency with features and\\nfunctions like those approved by the Court in Humphrey’s\\n\\n 15\\npasses muster and, by implication, does not exercise\\n“substantial executive power.” The MSPB and the NLRB meet\\nthat test.\\n\\n The government contends, however, that the MSPB and\\nthe NLRB may not be placed beyond the President’s total\\ncontrol because each wields “executive power.” The\\ngovernment takes the position that all Executive Branch\\nentities wield executive power and that “any exercise of\\nexecutive power subjects an agency head to the President’s\\ncontrol.” Gov’t Br. 26 (emphasis added). According to the\\ngovernment, because the MSPB and the NLRB are within the\\nExecutive Branch, their predominantly adjudicatory functions\\nare exercises of executive power, and they therefore must be\\ncontrolled by the President. That theory departs from the\\nSupreme Court’s holding in Seila Law, which preserved the\\nindependence of multileader expert agencies that do not wield\\n“substantial executive power,” not “any executive power.” In\\nshort, Humphrey’s allows the existence of independent\\nmultimember expert agencies that exercise no greater powers\\nthan did the 1935 FTC; but the government suggests that zero\\nindependent agencies are constitutional. And because the\\ngovernment’s theory leaves no room in any corner of the\\nExecutive Branch for any exceptions to the President’s at-will\\nremoval authority, it eviscerates Humphrey’s. The government\\nthus does not ask us to abide by Humphrey’s, but instead\\neffectively asks us to overrule it, which we are not at liberty to\\ndo.\\n\\n As I see it, the MSPB and the NLRB fall squarely within\\nthe exception to the President’s at-will removal authority that\\nthe Supreme Court acknowledged in Humphrey’s and left “in\\nplace” in Seila Law. Humphrey’s and Wiener control this case\\nbecause the MSPB and the NLRB are multimember expert\\nagencies that (1) exercise no more executive power than did the\\n\\n 16\\n1935 FTC that was approved in Humphrey’s, and (2) are\\npredominantly adjudicatory, like the independent War Claims\\nCommission that was approved in Wiener. They are therefore\\n“multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial\\nexecutive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. Accordingly,\\nfor-cause removal protections for leaders of the MSPB and the\\nNLRB are constitutional.\\n\\n As previously discussed, Humphrey’s upheld the\\nconstitutionality of for-cause removal protections for\\ncommissioners of the 1935 FTC. The “set of powers”\\nexercised by the FTC that were “the basis for [the Humphrey’s]\\ndecision,” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219 n.4, included the\\nauthority to issue and then adjudicate complaints charging\\nunfair competition; to exercise “wide powers of investigation”\\nand “report to Congress with recommendations”; and to\\nrecommend remedies in antitrust suits brought by the Attorney\\nGeneral in federal court, Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 620–21\\n(citing Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 62-203,\\n§§ 5–7, 38 Stat. 717, 719–22 (1914)).\\n\\n The Humphrey’s Court described key features of the FTC\\nthat demonstrated its nonpartisanship and its need for\\nindependence. Notably, the FTC was led by multiple\\ncommissioners serving staggered, seven-year terms and\\nbalanced along partisan lines. See Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at\\n620, 624. Moreover, it was intended to be an “independent”\\n“body of experts” that was “charged with the enforcement of\\nno policy except the policy of the law.” Id. at 624–25. The\\nCourt also observed that the FTC’s functions were “neither\\npolitical nor executive, but predominantly quasi judicial and\\nquasi legislative,” and any executive functions thus were\\nmerely ancillary. Id. at 624, 628 & n.1. The Supreme Court\\nalso addressed adjudicatory functions in Wiener, where the\\nCourt held that the President had no power to “remove a\\n\\n 17\\nmember of an adjudicatory body like the War Claims\\nCommission merely because he wanted his own appointees on\\nsuch a Commission.” 57 U.S. at 356. At bottom, the\\nconstitutionality of removal restrictions “will depend upon the\\ncharacter of the office.” Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 624, 631. As\\nrelevant here, both the MSPB and the NLRB are predominantly\\nadjudicative and share many of the key characteristics of the\\n1935 FTC and the War Claims Commission that justified their\\nindependence.\\n\\n The MSPB functions more like a court than a regulator. It\\nis “predominantly an adjudicatory body,” as the government\\nconcedes. Oral Arg. 12:19–23, Harris II, 2025 WL 980278\\n(No. 25-5037); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1). President\\nJimmy Carter proposed the MSPB as “the adjudicatory arm of\\nthe new personnel system,” with a bipartisan multimember\\nstructure that would “guarantee independent and impartial\\nprotection to employees.” Federal Civil Service Reform\\nMessage to the Congress, 1 Pub. Papers 445 (Mar. 2, 1978).\\nThus, the MSPB’s mission is “to adjudicate federal\\nemployment disputes.” Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480,\\n482 (2024). Specifically, it hears appeals of adverse\\nemployment actions brought by federal workers. See 5 U.S.C.\\n§§ 7701(a), 7512, 7513(d). It also resolves in the first instance\\na handful of other matters, such as cases brought by the Office\\nof Special Counsel for “corrective action” concerning\\n“prohibited personnel practice[s]” by agencies. Id.\\n§ 1214(b)(2)(C); see also id. §§ 1214(b)(4)(B)(i), 1215(a)(1),\\n3592(a)(2), 7521(b).\\n\\n The structure of the MSPB is “patterned on the classic\\nindependent regulatory agency sanctioned” in Humphrey’s.\\nFEC v. NRA Pol. Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir.\\n1993). As in Humphrey’s, the President may remove a member\\nof the MSPB “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or\\n\\n 18\\nmalfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d); Humphrey’s, 295\\nU.S. at 622. And like the 1935 FTC, the three members of the\\nMSPB must be drawn from different political parties, and they\\nserve staggered terms of seven years. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201,\\n1202(a)–(c); Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 620.\\n\\n The MSPB is passive and must wait for appeals and cases\\nto be initiated by federal employees, employer agencies, or the\\nOffice of Special Counsel. Harris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *30\\n(Millett, J., dissenting) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204(a)(1),\\n1214(b)(1)(a); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3). Notably, it is the Office of\\nSpecial Counsel that investigates and prosecutes certain kinds\\nof misconduct by federal agencies and then petitions the MSPB\\nfor corrective action. See 5 U.S.C. § 1212. As a de facto\\nmatter, the Special Counsel now answers to the President.9\\nMoreover, the MSPB does not regulate through rulemaking\\nbecause its rulemaking authority is limited to “such regulations\\nas may be necessary for the performance of its functions.” 5\\nU.S.C. § 1204(h).10\\n9\\n The Special Counsel is appointed by the President with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate. Although a statute confers for-\\ncause removal protection on the Special Counsel, see 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1211, the President deemed that statute unconstitutional and fired\\nthe former Special Counsel, Hampton Dellinger. Although the\\ndistrict court ordered the government to reinstate Dellinger, a special\\npanel of this court stayed the district court’s order pending appeal,\\nDellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5052, 2025 WL 887518 (D.C. Cir. Mar.\\n10, 2025) (per curiam), and Dellinger subsequently dropped his suit.\\nAs a result, the President has de facto authority to appoint a Special\\nCounsel of his own choosing. See Defendants’ Notice of the\\nPresident’s Designation of Acting Special Counsel, Dellinger v.\\nBessent, No. 25-cv-385 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2025), ECF No. 13.\\n10\\n The responsibility of enforcing civil-service regulations and\\nlaws and “aiding the President” in preparing civil-service rules and\\npolicies is assigned to the Office of Personnel Management, a\\nseparate agency. 5 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(7).\\n\\n 19\\n\\n As the district court explained, the MSPB “spends nearly\\nall of its time adjudicating inward-facing personnel matters\\ninvolving federal employees.” Harris I, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 176\\n(cleaned up). The MSPB’s adjudicatory process is “designed\\nto reach consensus based on established MSPB and federal\\ncase law,” as decisions are drafted by career attorneys without\\nMSPB members directing the results in advance. See Brief for\\nFormer Board Members and General Counsel of the MSPB as\\nAmici Curiae Supporting Appellee 8. Like the War Claims\\nCommission in Wiener, the MSPB hears claims that are\\n“‘adjudicated according to law,’ that is, on the merits of each\\nclaim, supported by evidence and governing legal\\nconsiderations”; and it serves as “a body that [is] ‘entirely free\\nfrom the control or coercive influence [of the President], direct\\nor indirect.’” 357 U.S. at 355 (quoting Humphrey’s, 295 U.S.\\nat 629). In short, the MSPB is so clearly adjudicatory and free\\nof quintessential executive responsibilities that if it exercises\\n“substantial executive power,” then every agency does.11\\n\\n11\\n My colleagues’ discussion of the MSPB’s supposedly\\nsubstantial “executive” powers is unconvincing. They suggest that\\nthe MSPB exercises substantial executive power because (1) it issues\\n“final decisions,” (2) it has “jack-of-all-trades” jurisdiction that is\\nless “specialized” than the 1935 FTC, and (3) it has the power to\\naward “legal and equitable relief in administrative adjudications.”\\nMaj. Op. 31–33 (citations omitted). But in Wiener, the Supreme\\nCourt upheld for-cause removal protections for the leaders of the\\nWar Claims Commission, which enjoyed “finality of determination”\\nover a “large number of claimants [with a] diversity in the specific\\ncircumstances giving rise to the[ir] claims,” and which could order\\n“compensat[ion for] internees, prisoners of war, and religious\\norganizations.” 357 U.S. at 350, 354–55. Moreover, my colleagues\\ndo not explain why the features they highlight represent the exercise\\nof “executive” power. In fact, many courts issue final decisions,\\n\\n 20\\n\\n Congress created the NLRB to enforce the National Labor\\nRelations Act of 1935 (NLRA), which encourages collective\\nbargaining and protects the rights of workers. Pub. L. No. 74-\\n198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–\\n169). In designing the NLRB, Congress relied on Humphrey’s:\\nIt enacted the NLRA “just over a month after Humphrey’s\\nExecutor was decided and modeled the statute on the FTC’s\\norganic statute.” Harris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *31 (Millett,\\nJ., dissenting) (citing the two agencies’ organic statutes).\\n\\n The Board of the NLRB closely resembles the\\nHumphrey’s model. It consists of five members, appointed by\\nthe President with the advice and consent of the Senate, who\\nserve staggered five-year terms. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). A\\nmember “may be removed by the President, upon notice and\\nhearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no\\nother cause.” Id. Although no statutory provision requires a\\npartisan balance in the NLRB Board’s membership,\\n“Presidents since Eisenhower have adhered to a ‘tradition’ of\\nappointing no more than three members from their own party.”\\nHarris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *31 (Millett, J., dissenting)\\n(quoting Brian D. Feinstein & Daniel J. Hemel, Partisan\\nBalance with Bite, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 9, 54–55 (2018)).\\n\\n The Board of the NLRB is “predominantly an adjudicatory\\nbody.” Harris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *31 (Millett, J.,\\ndissenting). It decides disputes about unfair labor practices and\\nresolves union-representation questions. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b),\\n(c)(1)(A). The Board’s remedial authority includes issuing\\ncease-and-desist orders and orders to employers or unions to\\n\\n\\nunder many different statutes, and award legal and equitable relief,\\nwhich suggests that those functions should be considered quasi-\\njudicial under Humphrey’s.\\n\\n 21\\ntake “affirmative action,” such as “reinstatement of employees\\nwith or without back pay.” Id. § 160(c). But to enforce its\\norders, the Board must petition a federal court of appeals. Id.\\n§ 160(e); see also Dish Network Corp. v. NLRB, 953 F.3d 370,\\n375 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The NLRB may be the only agency\\nthat needs a court’s imprimatur to render its orders\\nenforceable.”). Judicial review of a Board order is also\\navailable for “[a]ny person aggrieved by a final order of the\\nBoard.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).\\n\\n Importantly, the investigation and prosecution of unfair\\nlabor practices are performed by the General Counsel of the\\nNLRB, who brings cases before the Board for adjudication.\\nThe General Counsel is appointed by the President, with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, and is removable by the\\nPresident at will. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). As a result, all\\ninvestigative and prosecutorial functions — hallmarks of\\nexecutive power — are wielded by an official accountable to\\nthe President. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988)\\n(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental investigation and\\nprosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive\\nfunction.”). Thus, “the character” of the Board is\\n“predominantly” adjudicative. Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 624,\\n631.12\\n\\n12\\n The Board has only “circumscribed” rulemaking authority.\\nHarris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *31 (Millett, J., dissenting). True, it\\nhas “authority . . . to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner\\nprescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act], such rules and\\nregulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the\\nNLRA].” 29 U.S.C. § 156. But in practice, the Board does not\\n“promulgate binding rules,” in contrast to the CFPB. Seila Law, 591\\nU.S. at 218. “From its inception in 1935, the Board has exhibited a\\nnegative attitude toward setting down principles in rulemaking,\\nrather than adjudication.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d\\n\\n 22\\n\\n There is no denying “the intrinsic judicial character of the\\ntask[s]” that are performed by the MSPB and the NLRB: They\\napply law to facts and resolve cases. Wiener, 357 U.S. at 355.\\nThey do not perform any quintessentially executive functions,\\nsuch as investigating and prosecuting cases to execute the law.\\nNor do they touch upon subject areas that are expressly in the\\nPresident’s bailiwick, such as foreign affairs or national\\ndefense. Moreover, the quasi-judicial duties of the MSPB and\\nthe NLRB do not interfere with the President’s exercise of\\nexecutive power or impede the President’s ability to faithfully\\nexecute the laws. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–90 (“The\\nanalysis contained in our removal cases is designed . . . to\\nensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s\\nexercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally\\nappointed duty to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully\\nexecuted’ under Article II.”).\\n\\n Because both the MSPB and the NLRB are predominantly\\nadjudicatory, they wield less executive power than did the 1935\\nFTC, which had “wide powers of investigation” and authority\\nto issue complaints that it then adjudicated. Humphrey’s, 295\\nU.S. at 620–21; see also U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Soc.\\nDemocratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 427–28\\n(1921) (explaining that when an executive official is “making\\n\\n947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up), overruled on other grounds\\nby Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)\\n(en banc). Although the government asserts that “the NLRB . . .\\npromulgates substantive rules of general applicability governing\\nemployer-employee relations,” Gov’t Br. 29, the entire corpus of\\nsubstantive NLRB rules is limited to: (1) a rule concerning collective\\nbargaining units in healthcare facilities, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30; (2) a rule\\naddressing joint-employer status, id. § 103.40; and (3) jurisdictional\\nstandards for colleges and universities, symphony orchestras, and\\ndog- or horse-racing industries, id. §§ 103.1, 103.2, 103.3.\\n\\n 23\\n[a] determination [in which] he must, like a court or a jury,\\nform a judgment whether certain conditions prescribed by\\nCongress exist, on controverted facts or by applying the law[,]\\n. . . [t]he function is a strictly judicial one, although exercised\\nin administering an executive office”). Thus, although the\\nMSPB and the NLRB may exercise some “executive power”\\nbecause they are housed within the Executive Branch, they do\\nnot wield “substantial executive power.” Cf. City of Arlington\\nv. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013) (noting that when\\nagencies “conduct adjudications,” their activities take “judicial\\nforms,” yet “they are exercises of — indeed, under our\\nconstitutional structure they must be exercises of — the\\nexecutive power” (cleaned up) (emphasis in original)).\\n\\n In sum, the MSPB and the NLRB fall safely within\\nHumphrey’s exception to the President’s at-will removal\\nauthority. Both agencies have nonpartisan multimember\\nleadership structures that allow every President to select at least\\nsome of their members. See Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 625–26\\n(noting that the 1935 FTC was “independent of executive\\nauthority, except in its selection” of commissioners). They also\\nconduct apolitical adjudicatory work that requires\\nindependence and expertise; and they receive their funding\\nthrough the normal appropriations process. At bottom, they are\\ntraditional multimember expert agencies that wield less\\nexecutive power than did the 1935 FTC, and they therefore do\\nnot wield “substantial executive power.”\\n\\n If the meaning of “substantial executive power” has\\nchanged since Seila Law was decided, or if it is different from\\nwhat was approved in Humphrey’s, or if there is no longer a\\ntest of “substantial” power at all, the Supreme Court must tell\\nus so. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490\\nU.S. 477, 484 (1989). We should follow the lead of other\\ncourts of appeals and our own en banc court, which have\\n\\n 24\\ndetermined that Humphrey’s remains good law, despite the\\nparts of Seila Law that have been perceived to undermine its\\nreasoning. See Harris III, 2025 WL 1021435, at *1; Meta\\nPlatforms, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24-5054, 2024 WL 1549732, at *2\\n(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2024) (per curiam); Severino v. Biden, 71\\nF.4th 1038, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2023); Leachco, Inc. v. Consumer\\nProd. Safety Comm’n, 103 F.4th 748, 762–63 (10th Cir. 2024);\\nConsumers’ Rsch. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 91 F.4th\\n342, 346 (5th Cir. 2024). Humphrey’s and Wiener require us\\nto affirm the judgments entered by the district court. In the\\nalternative, we should hold these cases in abeyance and await\\nfurther instructions from the Supreme Court in Slaughter.\\n\\n B. Departing from Existing Precedents\\n\\n My colleagues break new ground in determining the type\\nand extent of executive power that must be controlled by the\\nPresident through the tool of at-will removal. Although Seila\\nLaw recognized an exception to the President’s at-will removal\\nauthority for “multimember expert agencies that do not wield\\nsubstantial executive power,” 591 U.S. at 218, my colleagues\\nessentially eliminate that exception by redefining what counts\\nas “substantial executive power.” They apply that term so\\nbroadly that it encompasses the work of even adjudicatory\\nagencies that have little or nothing to do with traditional\\nexecutive functions. While my colleagues’ analysis is steeped\\nin details about the powers of the agencies at issue, and how\\nthose powers compare with the responsibilities of the 1935\\nFTC, the bottom line is this: If the Constitution cannot tolerate\\nthe independence of the purely adjudicatory MSPB, which\\nfunctions as a court in the specialized realm of employment\\nlaw, there is no agency that can escape total presidential\\ncontrol. My colleagues hold, in substance, that the existence\\nof independent agencies is incompatible with our Constitution.\\n\\n 25\\n The government reaches the same end point — the\\nelimination of independent agencies — by taking a different\\nroute. The government urges the more direct approach of\\nreplacing the Supreme Court’s test of “substantial executive\\npower” with a new standard that gives the President total\\ncontrol over agencies that wield “any executive power.” The\\ngovernment claims that all Executive Branch entities wield\\nexecutive power, and any executive power must be supervised\\nby the President through at-will removal, because the\\nConstitution vests all executive power in him. Thus, because\\nindependent agencies are within the Executive Branch, the\\nPresident must have total control over them, and there are no\\nconstitutionally permissible independent agencies.\\n\\n The government’s position is based on a new, maximalist\\nversion of the “unitary executive theory.” Although that theory\\nstands for the proposition that all executive power must be\\nplaced in the hands of the President, no court has ever applied\\nit to abolish all independent agencies. The government claims\\nthat there can be no exceptions to the President’s general at-\\nwill removal authority because at-will removal assures that\\nagencies are accountable to the people: According to the\\ngovernment, voters elected the President and would want him\\nto direct all the affairs of the Executive Branch. Other methods\\nof presidential control — such as the appointment of agency\\nleaders, for-cause removal, and the appropriations\\nprocess — are considered insufficient.\\n\\n Under the government’s maximalist theory, our duly\\nelected representatives in Congress who determined that\\nindependent agencies serve the public interest were powerless\\nto do what they thought was best for the nation. Instead, the\\ngovernment has suddenly realized, the Constitution requires us\\nto eradicate the independence of all Executive Branch\\nagencies. The government takes that position even though the\\n\\n 26\\nFounders approved a commission with members who were not\\nsubject to the President’s at-will removal (the Sinking Fund\\nCommission) in 1790; multimember expert agencies have\\nexisted since the ICC was established in 1877; and independent\\nagencies with certain features — including multimember\\nstructures, bipartisanship, and the task of applying expertise to\\naddress nonpolitical issues — were upheld by the Supreme\\nCourt in Humphrey’s and left intact by Seila Law.\\n\\n Given our long-standing acceptance of some agency\\nindependence in our constitutional scheme, we should view\\nwith suspicion the government’s insistence that an immediate,\\ndrastic change to our government is necessary. Over the 138\\nyears in which expert independent agencies have operated\\nwithin our constitutional system, our nation has not perceptibly\\nexperienced any harms from the asserted lack of sufficient\\npolitical accountability.13 I am concerned that our implicit\\nadoption of the government’s radical view of executive\\nauthority will enable the President to claim and consolidate too\\nmuch power, and that will cause the public to lose faith in the\\nimpartiality of the judiciary. It may be difficult to persuade\\nmembers of the public that the Constitution really requires that\\nall appointments and decisions made within the Executive\\nBranch be political, when that has never been the country’s\\nexperience or understanding.\\n\\n\\n\\n13\\n When the government was asked at oral argument to explain\\nhow our country has been tangibly harmed by the alleged widespread\\nconstitutional problem posed by agency independence, it had no real\\nresponse. Government counsel spoke of “the blurring of the lines of\\naccountability” and “disabl[ing] the will of the people” — but he\\ncould identify no actual detriment to the functioning of our\\ngovernment and its ability to serve the public. Oral Arg. 8:23–24,\\n11:20–21.\\n\\n 27\\n The implicit or explicit adoption of a constitutional theory\\nthat effectively outlaws independent agencies will have\\nprofound effects on the governance of our nation. It threatens\\nto impair the work of approximately thirty-three agencies that\\nCongress has entrusted with important, apolitical missions, like\\npromoting public safety,14 facilitating commerce,15 serving the\\nlegal system,16 helping the disadvantaged,17 protecting\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n14\\n The National Transportation Safety Board (49 U.S.C.\\n§ 1111(c)), the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission\\n(29 U.S.C. § 661(b)), the Consumer Product Safety Commission (15\\nU.S.C. § 2053(a)), the National Advisory Council on the National\\nHealth Service Corps (42 U.S.C. §254j(b)(1)), the Federal Mine\\nSafety and Health Review Commission (30 U.S.C. § 823(b)(1)(B)),\\nthe Institute of Peace (22 U.S.C. § 4605(f)), the Chemical Safety and\\nHazard Investigation Board (42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(6)(B)), and the\\nFederal Aerospace Management Advisory Council (49 U.S.C.\\n§ 106(p)(6)(E)).\\n15\\n The Federal Trade Commission (15 U.S.C. § 41), the Federal\\nMaritime Commission (46 U.S.C. § 46101(b)(5)), the Postal Service\\n(39 U.S.C. § 202(a)(1)), the Postal Regulatory Commission (39\\nU.S.C. § 502(a)), the National Indian Gaming Commission (25\\nU.S.C. § 2704(b)(6)), the Surface Transportation Board (49 U.S.C.\\n§ 1301(b)(3)), the Corporation for Travel Promotion (22 U.S.C.\\n§ 2131(b)(2)(D)), and the Financial Oversight and Management\\nBoard for Puerto Rico (48 U.S.C. § 2121(e)(5)(B)).\\n16\\n The Sentencing Commission (28 U.S.C. § 991(a)), the State\\nJustice Institute (42 U.S.C. § 10703(h)), the Civilian Board of\\nContract Appeals (41 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(3)), and the Foreign Claims\\nSettlement Commission (22 U.S.C. §§ 1622(c), 1622b).\\n17\\n The Commission on Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1975(e)) and the\\nLegal Services Corporation (42 U.S.C. § 2996c(e)).\\n\\n 28\\nworkers,18 harnessing energy or natural resources,19 and\\nserving members of the military and veterans.20 Under the\\ngovernment’s theory, judges who serve on Article I courts —\\nsuch as the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the Armed\\nForces, and the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims — also\\nmay be subject to at-will removal because those courts are\\nsituated within the Executive Branch and therefore exercise\\nsome executive power. See Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929,\\n943 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that “the Tax Court exercises its\\nauthority as part of the Executive Branch”); Edmond v. United\\nStates, 520 U.S. 651, 664 (1997) (recognizing that the Court of\\nAppeals for the Armed Forces is an “Executive Branch\\nentity”); United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 20 (2021)\\n(describing the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as “an\\nExecutive Branch entity”).\\n\\n Although the government currently does not take the\\nposition that Article I judges and Federal Reserve officials are\\nsubject to at-will removal by the President, those arbitrary\\ncarve-outs provide little reassurance — adoption of the\\nmaximalist theory would allow the government to change its\\nmind whenever it becomes politically expedient. The\\n\\n18\\n The National Labor Relations Board (29 U.S.C. §153(a)), the\\nMerit Systems Protection Board (5 U.S.C. § 1202(d)), the National\\nMediation Board (45 U.S.C. § 154), the Federal Labor Relations\\nAuthority (5 U.S.C. § 7104(b)), the Foreign Service Labor Relations\\nBoard (22 U.S.C. § 4106(e)), and the Foreign Service Grievance\\nBoard (22 U.S.C. § 4135(d)).\\n19\\n The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (42 U.S.C. § 5841(e)), the\\nRegional Fishery Management Councils (16 U.S.C. § 1852(b)(6)),\\nand the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (42 U.S.C.\\n§ 7171(b)(1)).\\n20\\n The Department of Defense: Medicare-Eligible Retiree Health\\nCare Board of Actuaries (10 U.S.C. § 1114(a)(2)(A)) and the\\nDepartment of Defense: Board of Actuaries (10 U.S.C. § 183(b)(3)).\\n\\n 29\\ngovernment’s theory also puts at risk inferior officers and\\ncareer civil servants employed by the Executive Branch: If the\\nConstitution entitles the President to exercise at-will removal\\nauthority over all parties who wield any executive power, then\\npreviously approved statutory protections for such employees\\nmay well be unconstitutional. See Brief for the Petitioners at\\n20, Slaughter, No. 25-332 (Oct. 10, 2025) (describing a\\npreviously recognized exception for inferior officers as\\n“dubious”). Thus, we may soon be living in a world in which\\nevery hiring decision and action by any government agency\\nwill be influenced by politics, with little regard for subject-\\nmatter expertise, the public good, and merit-based decision-\\nmaking. Indeed, “[t]he power to remove government officials\\nand replace them with the chief executive’s preferred people\\nprovides a powerful weapon to convert the government from\\nan instrument of law into the instrument of an autocratic chief\\nexecutive” — “[a] President can simply fire conscientious\\npeople and seek to replace them with quislings willing to do his\\nbidding.” David M. Driesen, The Unitary Executive Theory in\\nComparative Context, 72 Hastings L.J. 1, 42 (2020).\\n\\n The impending upheaval is not required by our\\nConstitution, the Supreme Court’s precedents, or the unitary\\nexecutive theory. The Constitution unquestionably empowers\\nCongress to organize and structure the Executive Branch, and\\nthe Constitution’s text and structure indicate that Congress’s\\ncreation of independent agencies is within constitutional\\nbounds. Moreover, the Supreme Court has been careful, thus\\nfar, to preserve the viability of independent multileader expert\\nagencies. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216–18; Humphrey’s, 295\\nU.S. at 632. And that is consistent with the Court’s recognition\\nof a strong unitary executive. Under the Court’s precedents,\\nthe President must be able to remove “purely executive”\\nofficials, Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 631–32; see also Morrison,\\n487 U.S. at 689–90, as well as leaders of single-headed\\n\\n 30\\nagencies exercising executive power, Collins, 594 U.S. at 253–\\n54, and even leaders of multileader agencies that wield\\n“substantial executive power,” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\\nEliminating agency independence altogether goes far beyond\\nwhat the unitary executive theory requires.\\n\\n In sum, both the government’s theory and my colleagues’\\nanalysis have the practical effect of outlawing independent\\nagencies in this country. In my view, the government and my\\ncolleagues misread the Constitution and all the cases that have\\ncome before.\\n\\n 1. The Unitary Executive Theory\\n\\n As the Supreme Court explained in Seila Law, “[u]nder\\nour Constitution, the ‘executive Power’ — all of it — is ‘vested\\nin a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully\\nexecuted.’” 591 U.S. at 203 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1,\\n3). Rather than divide the power of the Executive Branch\\namong multiple actors, the Framers concentrated all its power\\nin a single President who would be “directly accountable to the\\npeople through regular elections.” Id. at 224. To ensure that\\nExecutive Branch officers also answer to the people, such\\nofficers generally “must remain accountable to the President”\\nthrough the President’s power of at-will removal. Id. at 204,\\n213, 224. In addition, for the President to faithfully execute the\\nlaws, he must effectively supervise those who assist him in\\ncarrying out the functions of the Executive Branch, which also\\nnecessitates the general power to remove principal officers who\\nlead Executive Branch agencies. See id. at 214.\\n\\n The underlying premise of the unitary executive theory is\\nthat the President alone is responsible for exercising all\\nexecutive power, and he therefore must have the right to\\ncontrol (and remove) agency leaders who assist him in doing\\n\\n 31\\nthe work of the Executive Branch. That idea is uncontroversial\\nas applied to the many agencies that perform core executive\\nfunctions on the President’s behalf. Core executive functions\\ninclude powers related to the national defense, foreign affairs,\\nand law enforcement. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,\\n750 (1982) (noting that Article II “establishes the President as\\nthe chief constitutional officer of the Executive Branch,\\nentrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost\\ndiscretion and sensitivity,” including “the enforcement of\\nfederal law[,] . . . the conduct of foreign affairs[,] . . . and\\nmanagement of the Executive Branch”). The Constitution\\nplainly requires the President to have unfettered power to\\nremove the leaders of agencies like the Defense Department,\\nthe State Department, and the Justice Department. See\\nMorrison, 487 U.S. at 690 (“Myers was undoubtedly\\ncorrect . . . in its broader suggestion that there are some ‘purely\\nexecutive’ officials who must be removable by the President at\\nwill if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional role.”\\n(quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 132–34 (1926))).\\n\\n But there is a continuum of government functions, and not\\nall such functions must be treated in the same way. Walter\\nDellinger, when he headed the Office of Legal Counsel,\\nidentified a “spectrum” of executive power: “[A]t one end of\\nthe spectrum, restrictions on the President’s power to remove\\nofficers with broad policy responsibilities in areas Congress\\ndoes not or cannot shelter from presidential policy control,”\\nsuch as the Secretary of Defense, “clearly should be deemed\\nunconstitutional.” The Constitutional Separation of Powers\\nBetween the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 169\\n(1996). But “[a]t the other end of the spectrum,” “officers with\\nadjudicatory duties affecting the rights of private\\nindividuals” — such as judges appointed to serve on Article I\\ncourts — should not be subject to at-will removal because “the\\ncontention that the essential role of the executive branch would\\n\\n 32\\nbe imperiled by giving a measure of independence to such\\nofficials is untenable under both precedent and principle.” Id.\\nThe spectrum described by Dellinger recognizes that there is a\\ncorrelation between the amount of executive power that an\\nagency exercises and the amount of presidential oversight that\\nis constitutionally required. The immediate questions here are,\\n“Where do the MSPB and the NLRB fall on that spectrum of\\nexecutive power?” and ultimately, “May Congress\\nconstitutionally create a category of agencies that need not be\\nplaced under the President’s total control because their\\nfunctions do not interfere with or sufficiently implicate the\\nPresident’s exercise of executive power?”\\n\\n Seila Law established just five years ago that the test for\\nconstitutionally permissible independence is whether a\\nmultileader expert agency exercises “substantial executive\\npower.” 591 U.S. at 218; see also Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1416\\n(referencing “considerable executive power”). Because the\\ndegree of necessary presidential supervision is commensurate\\nwith the amount of executive power that an agency wields,\\nmultimember agencies that do not exercise “substantial\\nexecutive power” may enjoy for-cause removal protections\\nbecause the President influences such agencies in less intrusive\\nways that nevertheless preserve “the President’s ability to\\nperform his constitutional duty.” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691;\\nsee also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The\\nFuture of Agency Independence, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 599, 632\\n(2010) (noting that independent agencies “are subject to other,\\nwell-recognized measures of presidential influence that better\\npromote accountability”).\\n\\n For instance, the President influences the MSPB and the\\nNLRB by appointing at least some of their members, see 5\\nU.S.C. § 1201 (MSPB); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (NLRB), and by\\nchoosing their chairpersons, see 5 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (MSPB);\\n\\n 33\\n29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (NLRB); see also Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at\\n625 (noting that the FTC would “be independent of executive\\nauthority, except in its selection”). The President also may\\nensure that agency leadership is competent and ethical by\\nremoving, or threatening to remove, an agency leader for cause.\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (MSPB); 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (NLRB).\\nMoreover, these multileader independent agencies answer to\\nboth Congress and the President through the appropriations\\nprocess, in which the President and Congress together\\ndetermine the agencies’ funding levels. Independent agencies\\nalso are held accountable by Congress’s power to enact laws,\\nsigned by the President, that can affect the agencies’ authority\\nand operations. Finally, the President exercises significant\\ncontrol over the MSPB and the NLRB by overseeing many of\\nthe cases that are brought before them, through his power to\\nappoint and remove the General Counsel of the NLRB and the\\nSpecial Counsel. Thus, the MSPB and the NLRB are\\ncompletely unlike the independent agencies that the Supreme\\nCourt has deemed insufficiently accountable, due to features\\nlike a single-head leadership structure, double layers of\\naccountability, or insulation from the normal appropriations\\nprocess. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484; Seila Law, 591\\nU.S. at 225–26; Collins, 594 U.S. at 228. Instead, numerous\\nchecks on the MSPB and the NLRB ensure that they remain\\naccountable to the President, the Congress, and the American\\npeople, even if the President does not have at-will removal\\nauthority.\\n\\n Congress’s creation of independent multileader expert\\nagencies is consistent with the unitary executive theory.\\nAlthough Article II vests executive power in the President,\\nArticle I commands that Congress “shall have Power To . . .\\nmake all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying\\ninto Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in\\nthe Government of the United States, or in any Department or\\n\\n 34\\nOfficer thereof.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. Thus, “[u]nitary\\nexecutive theorists concede that Congress has broad power\\nunder the Necessary and Proper Clause to structure the\\nexecutive department.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H.\\nRhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,\\nPlural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1165–68 (1992); see\\nalso Michael W. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be\\nKing 146 (2020) (The Take Care Clause and the Commander-\\nin-Chief Clause “place the President at the head of a\\nhierarchical system, the substance of which is entirely within\\ncongressional control.”). Indeed, it is “natural” to conclude\\nthat the Necessary and Proper Clause lets Congress make\\n“judgment calls” about the removal of executive officers “as it\\nenacts particular statutes that structure particular agencies.”\\nCaleb Nelson, Special Feature: Must Administrative Officers\\nServe at the President’s Pleasure?, Democracy Project 2025\\n(Sept. 29, 2025), https://perma.cc/758B-ZCTS. Even the\\nstrongest formulations of the unitary executive theory have\\nrecognized narrow “exceptions” to the general rule that the\\nPresident is entitled to remove principal officers who wield\\nexecutive power. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 204; Wilcox, 145 S.\\nCt. at 1416 (“Because the Constitution vests the executive\\npower in the President, he may remove without cause executive\\nofficers who exercise that power on his behalf, subject to\\nnarrow exceptions recognized by our precedents.” (citations\\nomitted)).\\n\\n The current exception to the general rule of at-will removal\\nfor independent multimember executive agencies is\\nappropriate because such agencies do not threaten the\\nPresident’s leadership of the Executive Branch: They wield\\nlimited executive power, and the President can adequately\\nsupervise them using methods other than at-will removal. In\\nparticular, a strong unitary executive can coexist with an\\nindependent MSPB and NLRB, as created by Congress,\\n\\n 35\\nbecause those agencies: (1) are predominantly adjudicatory and\\ntherefore do not exercise substantial executive power;\\n(2) specialize in resolving labor and employment disputes, and\\ntherefore have nothing to do with the President’s core\\nexecutive responsibilities; and (3) are accountable to the\\nPresident through his selection of agency leadership, the\\nappropriations and legislative processes, and his influence over\\nthe agencies’ dockets of cases. Thus, the President remains\\nstrong and in command of the Executive Branch,\\nnotwithstanding the existence of these independent agencies.\\n\\n In short, the unitary executive is compatible with the\\nindependence of nonpartisan multimember expert agencies that\\nare (1) “neither political nor executive,” (2) “charged with the\\nenforcement of no policy except the policy of the law,” and\\n(3) “independent of executive authority, except in [their]\\nselection.” Humphrey’s, 295 U.S. at 624–26. That\\ncompatibility is especially evident where the agencies in\\nquestion are predominantly adjudicatory and quasi-judicial,\\ntherefore falling near the end of the executive-power spectrum\\noccupied by courts of law. The Supreme Court has allowed\\ntraditional independent agencies to exist for at least ninety\\nyears and has approved their independence while at the same\\ntime recognizing a strong unitary executive. See Free Enter.\\nFund, 561 U.S. at 483 (explaining that Article II “has been\\nunderstood to empower the President to keep [Executive\\nBranch] officers accountable — by removing them from office,\\nif necessary,” but also holding, under Humphrey’s, “that\\nCongress can, under certain circumstances, create independent\\nagencies run by principal officers appointed by the President,\\nwhom the President may not remove at will but only for good\\ncause”); Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 203–04 (noting that “the\\nexecutive power — all of it — is vested in a President,” but\\nalso acknowledging that, under Humphrey’s, “Congress could\\ncreate expert agencies led by a group of principal officers\\n\\n 36\\nremovable by the President only for good cause” (cleaned up)).\\nThus, the unitary executive theory does not require us to\\neliminate all independent multimember expert agencies.\\n\\n 2. The Maximalist Unitary Executive\\n\\n The government urges us to adopt a new, maximalist\\nformulation of the unitary executive theory that entitles the\\nPresident to assert total control over all agencies that wield any\\nexecutive power, without exception — and that control\\nlogically must extend to every agency, court, or entity within\\nthe Executive Branch. The President’s mandatory control must\\nbe effectuated, according to the government, through at-will\\nremoval power over all the leaders of Executive Branch\\nentities, including those that previously have been independent.\\nThe government’s maximalist theory that places “any\\nexecutive power” under absolute presidential control is a sharp\\ndeparture from the Supreme Court’s recognition of an\\nexception “for multimember expert agencies that do not wield\\nsubstantial executive power.” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 216, 218\\n(emphases added); see also Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415\\n(referencing “considerable executive power” (emphasis\\nadded)). Yet the government contends that its new maximalist\\ntheory is not just better than the alternative, but that the\\nConstitution commands our sudden acceptance of it, despite\\n138 years of our nation’s contrary practice and understanding.\\n\\n My colleagues do not explicitly embrace the government’s\\nreasoning, but they de facto agree with the underlying premise\\nof total executive control that leaves no room for political\\nindependence. Their view that even the MSPB — a purely\\nadjudicatory agency that functions as an employment-law court\\n— wields “substantial executive power” unmistakably implies\\nthat no Executive Branch agencies can remain independent.\\n\\n 37\\nMy colleagues thus adopt their own theory of maximalist\\nexecutive authority.\\n\\n In considering the approaches advocated by the\\ngovernment and my colleagues, it is beyond debate that the\\nPresident is entitled to control and to supervise the executive\\npower of the federal government, which “generally” entitles\\nhim to remove principal Executive Branch officials at his\\ndiscretion. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 213; accord Free Enter.\\nFund, 561 U.S. at 513–14. The question before us is whether\\nthe Constitution prohibits any exception to the general rule of\\nat-will removal. And the available evidence indicates that the\\nConstitution does not compel such an interpretation. See Caleb\\nNelson, supra (“[B]oth the text and history of Article II are far\\nmore equivocal than the current [Supreme] Court has been\\nsuggesting.”). To the contrary, we should reject any theory that\\nrequires the abolition of independent agencies because that\\ndrastic action (1) is unsupported by constitutional text,\\nstructure, and original intent; and (2) violates the separation of\\npowers.\\n\\n i. Constitutional Text, Structure, and Original Intent\\n\\n The Constitution does not specifically address the removal\\nof officers in the Executive Branch, other than by providing for\\nimpeachment under certain circumstances. But the Necessary\\nand Proper Clause of Article I empowers Congress “[t]o make\\nall Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into\\nExecution the foregoing Powers [of Congress], and all other\\nPowers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the\\nUnited States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S.\\nConst. art. I, § 8. That broad authority allows Congress to\\ncreate and structure government agencies, and it is “natural” to\\nconclude that Congress can make “judgment calls” about the\\nremoval of officers “as it enacts particular statutes that\\n\\n 38\\nstructure particular agencies.” Caleb Nelson, supra. The right\\nof removal is not inherent to the executive power because that\\npower “entails executing laws . . . , such as statutes enacted by\\nCongress,” and the President is “not in charge of the content of\\nthose laws.” Id. Moreover, “neither the Vesting Clause nor\\nanything else in Article II compels the inference that after\\nofficers have been duly appointed, and after the President has\\nissued the commissions that the Constitution requires, the\\nPresident must be able to terminate the appointments and\\nrescind the commissions at will . . . .” Id. Thus, nothing in the\\nConstitution’s text supports the government’s claim that the\\nPresident’s general removal power must be absolute and cannot\\nbe subject to exceptions.\\n\\n Importantly, the Framers assumed that the President would\\nnot necessarily have the right to remove Executive Branch\\nofficials. In 1790, the First Congress established the Sinking\\nFund Commission to repay the country’s Revolutionary War\\ndebt. The members of the Commission were “the President of\\nthe Senate [i.e., the Vice President], the Chief Justice, the\\nSecretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the\\nAttorney General.” Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 2, 1 Stat.\\n186, 186; see also Chabot, supra note 1, at 39–40. The Vice\\nPresident — who at that time, before the Twelfth Amendment,\\nwas the runner-up from the last presidential election rather than\\nthe President’s running mate — and the Chief Justice were not\\nsubject to removal by the President, thus insulating the\\nCommission from complete presidential control. Chabot,\\nsupra note 1, at 41. Alexander Hamilton proposed the\\nCommission, the First Congress passed legislation that\\nestablished it, and President George Washington signed the law\\n— all of which would be surprising if the Commission’s\\nindependent structure violated the very Constitution that those\\npeople had just forged. See id. at 42–43.\\n\\n 39\\n Nor was the Sinking Fund Commission an anomaly. See\\nChristine Kexel Chabot, Interring the Unitary Executive, 98\\nNotre Dame L. Rev. 129, 133 (2022) (documenting how the\\nFirst Congress “repeatedly enabled independent exercises of\\nsignificant executive power that fell outside of the President’s\\ncomplete control and removal power”). Congress restricted the\\nPresident’s removal authority over the heads of the First (1791)\\nand Second (1816) Banks of the United States, the judges of\\nthe Court of Claims (1855), and the Comptroller of the\\nCurrency (1863). Harris II, 2025 WL 980278, at *37 (Millett,\\nJ., dissenting). Even the government concedes that the “early\\nCongresses . . . provided that the Banks of the United States —\\nlike the Federal Reserve — would have a degree of insulation\\nfrom the President’s control.” Gov’t Reply 15. Indeed, James\\nMadison himself, speaking from the House floor, attested in\\n1789 that “because Congress may establish [executive] offices\\nby law . . . , most certainly it is in the discretion of the\\nLegislature to say upon what terms the office shall be held,\\neither during good behaviour or during pleasure.” 1 Annals of\\nCong. 374–75 (1789).\\n\\n Although it is true that the First Congress voted to give the\\nPresident plenary removal power over the Secretary of Foreign\\nAffairs in 1789, the import of that event is debatable. It is\\nunclear whether the President’s removal authority in that\\ninstance was seen as granted by Congress or required by the\\nConstitution. Compare Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein,\\nThe President and the Administration, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1,\\n25–29 (1994), with Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the\\nDecision of 1789, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1021, 1021 (2006).\\nMoreover, the First Congress’s confirmation that the President\\nhas conclusive authority to remove the Secretary of Foreign\\nAffairs — a purely executive official exercising core Article II\\npowers — does not establish that the President necessarily\\nmust have at-will removal authority over all other agency\\n\\n 40\\nleaders in the Executive Branch, including those who do not\\nwield substantial executive power.\\n\\n In sum, a search for evidence that the Constitution compels\\nus to accept a maximalist interpretation of executive power\\ncomes up short. The government’s theory that “the President\\nmust have full control over each and every exercise of\\n‘executive’ power by the federal government (including an\\nunlimitable ability to remove all or almost all executive officers\\nfor reasons good or bad)” gives the President “more power than\\nany member of the founding generation could have\\nanticipated.” Caleb Nelson, supra.\\n\\n ii. The Separation of Powers\\n\\n The government posits that the Constitution tolerates no\\nexceptions to the President’s at-will removal authority because\\nthe President is answerable to the people, while unelected\\nagency heads are not. See Oral Arg. 4:14–9:24. Thus, the\\nfoundation of the government’s maximalist theory of executive\\npower is political accountability. And the government claims\\nthat a departure from “Article II’s design . . . inflicts a\\nconstitutional harm on the country.” Id. at 4:53–57. But once\\nwe accept that the President generally is entitled to remove\\nExecutive Branch officials who wield executive power, the\\ngovernment’s theory does not effectively explain why there can\\nbe no exceptions to the general rule, especially where\\nprecedents recognize such exceptions. We must bear in mind\\nthat Congress duly enacted the for-cause removal statutes at\\nissue, with the consent of the Presidents who signed the\\nlegislation in question.\\n\\n Congress is “the branch of our Government most\\nresponsive to the popular will.” Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO\\nv. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist,\\n\\n 41\\nJ., concurring in the judgment). A first-term President faces\\nvoters only when he is running for reelection after four years in\\noffice, while a second-term President is not checked by the\\nballot box at all. But every member of the House and one third\\nof Senators go before their constituents every two years. See\\nU.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 3. And while the President may act\\nunilaterally and privately, members of Congress deliberate and\\nvote collectively and transparently. They are also closer to\\ntheir voters: “Elected representatives solicit the views of their\\nconstituents, listen to their complaints and requests, and make\\na great effort to accommodate their concerns.” Biden v.\\nMissouri, 595 U.S. 87, 105 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting).\\nAccordingly, “[a] statute enacted by Congress expresses the\\nwill of the people of the United States in the most solemn\\nform.” United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 222 (1902).\\nRespect for democracy, therefore, requires respect for the\\npolicy decisions of “those popularly chosen to legislate.” Felix\\nFrankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47\\nColum. L Rev. 527, 545 (1947). And because we owe “[d]ue\\nrespect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of\\nGovernment,” we must review acts of Congress with a\\n“presumption of constitutionality.” United States v. Morrison,\\n529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). Unelected judges do not uphold the\\nideals of democracy and political accountability when they\\noverturn laws that were passed by the people’s representatives.\\n\\n To the extent the goals of the President and Congress are\\nin tension here, the President’s power is at its “lowest ebb.”\\nSee Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,\\n637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Where a President defies\\na law duly enacted by Congress, such a “[p]residential claim to\\na power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be\\nscrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium\\nestablished by our constitutional system.” Id. at 638. Indeed,\\nthe example that Justice Jackson used to illustrate the\\n\\n 42\\nPresident’s relative weakness in the face of contrary\\ncongressional intent was Humphrey’s Executor: “President\\nRoosevelt’s effort to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner\\nwas found to be contrary to the policy of Congress and\\nimpinging upon an area of congressional control, and so his\\nremoval power was cut down accordingly.” Id. at 638 n.4. It\\nbears emphasis that Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown,\\nthe Court’s iconic decision on the separation of powers, that\\nstatutory for-cause removal restrictions fall within “an area of\\ncongressional control” — i.e., Congress’s prerogative to\\nstructure the Executive Branch. Id.\\n\\n In the cases before us, “the equilibrium established by our\\nconstitutional system” is indeed at stake. Youngstown, 343\\nU.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). My colleagues’ implicit\\nand substantial adoption of the government’s maximalist view\\nof the unitary executive will allow the President to seize power\\nthat Congress did not intend for him to have, and thus will\\naggrandize the Executive Branch at the expense of the\\nLegislative Branch. The “concentration of [so much] power in\\nthe hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.” Clinton v.\\nCity of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,\\nconcurring). As Justice Brandeis put it, “[t]he doctrine of the\\nseparation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787\\nnot to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of\\narbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by\\nmeans of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of\\nthe governmental powers among three departments, to save the\\npeople from autocracy.” Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J.,\\ndissenting); see also Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128, 169\\n(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (warning against\\n“accelerat[ing] the flight of power from the legislative to the\\nexecutive branch, turning the latter into a vortex of authority\\nthat was constitutionally reserved for the people’s\\nrepresentatives in order to protect their liberties”). In the face\\n\\n 43\\nof an attempted power grab that will transform our country, the\\nrole of the courts is to prevent undue concentration of power,\\nnot guarantee it.\\n\\n III.\\n\\n The government argues that the district court had no\\nauthority to “reinstate” Harris and Wilcox, whether through\\ndeclaratory or injunctive relief. Gov’t Br. 39. I disagree.\\n\\n The district court awarded substantively identical\\ndeclaratory and injunctive relief to Harris and Wilcox.21 On\\nappeal, the government does not contest the district court’s\\nauthority to declare “that the removal[s] w[ere] unlawful.”\\nGov’t Br. 40 n.7. Instead, it argues (1) that the “court’s\\ndeclaration[s] that [Harris and Wilcox] shall continue to\\nremain” members of the MSPB and the NLRB amounted to\\n“full reinstatement” and thus exceeded the district court’s\\nauthority, id., and (2) that the district court lacked equitable\\nauthority to reinstate Harris and Wilcox via injunctions against\\nvarious subordinate executive officials, id. at 38.\\n\\n The Supreme Court will consider similar arguments in\\nSlaughter. See Question Presented, Slaughter, No. 25-332\\n(Sept. 22, 2025) (instructing the parties to brief “[w]hether a\\nfederal court may prevent a person’s removal from public\\noffice, either through relief at equity or at law”). But in the\\nmeantime, our own precedents bind us.\\n\\n We have repeatedly recognized that lower courts enjoy\\nequitable authority to de facto reinstate wrongfully removed\\n\\n21\\n In the alternative, the district court noted that Harris and Wilcox\\nlikely were entitled to mandamus relief, but it ultimately did not grant\\nsuch extraordinary relief.\\n\\n 44\\nofficers. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir.\\n1996) (recognizing the availability of a de facto reinstatement\\nremedy requiring subordinate executive officials to “treat[]\\nSwan as a member of the [agency] Board and allow[] him to\\nexercise the privileges of that office”); Severino v. Biden, 71\\nF.4th 1038, 1042–43 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“We can enjoin\\nsubordinate executive officials to reinstate a wrongly\\nterminated official de facto, even without a formal presidential\\nreappointment.” (cleaned up)); see also Harris II, 2025 WL\\n980278, at *44 (Millett, J., dissenting) (“Swan and Severino . . .\\nheld that an injunction could restore someone to office de\\nfacto.”); cf. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 63 (1974) (“[T]he\\nDistrict Court is not totally without authority to grant interim\\ninjunctive relief to a discharged Government employee . . . .”).\\nConsistent with our precedent, the district court properly\\nawarded declaratory and injunctive relief to Harris and\\nWilcox.22\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n For the reasons discussed, I would affirm the judgments of\\nthe district court. Unlike my colleagues, I would decline the\\ngovernment’s invitation to radically reshape our government.\\nAs Justice Robert H. Jackson so eloquently stated:\\n\\n The actual art of governing under our\\n Constitution does not and cannot conform to\\n judicial definitions of the power of any of its\\n branches based on isolated clauses or even\\n\\n22\\n Further, it is notable that the Supreme Court has recently\\ndeclined to stay several lower-court orders reinstating federal\\nofficials who were removed by the President. See Order, Trump v.\\nCook, No. 25A312 (U.S. Oct. 1, 2025) (member of the Federal\\nReserve Board); Order, Blanche v. Perlmutter, No. 25A478 (U.S.\\nNov. 26, 2025) (Registrar of Copyrights).\\n\\n 45\\n single Articles torn from context. While the\\n Constitution diffuses power the better to\\n secure liberty, it also contemplates that\\n practice will integrate the dispersed powers\\n into a workable government.\\n\\nYoungstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).\\nThroughout our history, the Supreme Court’s precedents and\\nour nation’s practice and tradition have allowed independent\\nmultimember expert agencies to operate successfully within\\nour constitutional system; and as a result, we have reaped the\\nbenefits of a workable government that best serves the interests\\nof the American people. The government now urges an\\nextreme view of Article II’s Vesting Clause, torn from context:\\nIt attempts to reduce the actual art of governing to an\\nuncompromising usurpation of power by the President, all in\\ndefiance of Congress’s authority and without regard for the\\npublic good. My colleagues’ substantial acceptance of the\\ngovernment’s maximalist theory of executive power brings us\\ncloser to autocracy, harms our nation, and violates the\\nseparation of powers. I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11214868/\", \"author_raw\": \"PAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"KATSAS"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WALKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"PAN"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"KATSAS\": \", Circuit\", \"WALKER\": \", Circuit\", \"PAN\": \", Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748283/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Gwynne A. Wilcox v. Donald J. Trump\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued May 16, 2025 Decided December 5, 2025\n\n No. 25-5037\n\n CATHY A. HARRIS, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HER\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS\n PROTECTION BOARD,\n APPELLEE\n\n v.\n\nSCOTT BESSENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF\n THE TREASURY, ET AL.,\n APPELLANTS\n\n\n\n Consolidated with 25-5055\n\n\n Appeals from the United States District Court\n for the District of Columbia\n (No. 1:25-cv-00412)\n\n\n\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\n\n 2\n\n Martin Akerman, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\nMartin Akerman in support of appellants.\n\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\n\n Nathaniel A. Zelinsky argued the cause for appellee Cathy\nA. Harris. With him on the brief were Michael J. Kator,\nJeremy D. Wright, Kerrie D. Riggs, Linda M. Correia, Neal\nKumar Katyal, Kristina Alekseyeva, and Ezra P. Louvis.\n\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\n\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\n\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\n\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\nof Congress in support of appellee.\n\n Elizabeth C. Lockwood and Kathryn M. Ali were on the\nbrief for amici curiae Former Board Members and General\nCounsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board in support of\nappellee.\n\n 3\n Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Hawaii, Kaliko’onalani D. Fernandes,\nSolicitor General, Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, Office\nof the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Philip J.\nWeiser, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\nthe State of Colorado, Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Office of\nthe Attorney General for the State of California, William Tong,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office\nof the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Aaron M.\nFrey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the\nState of Maine, Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General,\nOffice of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of\nMassachusetts, Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of Minnesota, Matthew J.\nPlatkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\nthe State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney General,\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of New York,\nKwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown, Attorney\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\nMaryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of Michigan, Aaron D. Ford,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of New Mexico, Jeff Jackson,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof North Carolina, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of\nthe Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Charity R. Clark,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of Wisconsin, Peter F. Neronha,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Rhode Island, Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, Office\nof the Attorney General for the State of Washington, and Brian\n\n 4\nL. Schwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\nfor the District of Columbia, were on the brief for amici curiae\nState of Hawaii, et al. in support of appellee.\n\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\nappellee.\n\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\n\n Thad M. Guyer was on the brief for amici curiae\nGovernment Accountability Project, et al. in support of\nappellee.\n\n Joseph Carson, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\nJoseph Carson, PE in support of appellee.\n\n\n No. 25-5057\n\n GWYNNE A. WILCOX,\n APPELLEE\n\n v.\n\n DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT\n OF THE UNITED STATES AND MARVIN E. KAPLAN, IN HIS\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR\n RELATIONS BOARD,\n APPELLANTS\n\n 5\n\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Columbia\n (No. 1:25-cv-00334)\n\n\n\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\n\n Daniel Z. Epstein and R. Trent McCotter were on the brief\nfor amicus curiae Separation of Powers Clinic in support of\nappellants.\n\n Michael Pepson was on the brief for amicus curiae\nAmericans for Prosperity Foundation in support of appellants.\n\n Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Office\nof the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee, and\nWhitney Hermandorfer, Director of Strategic Litigation at the\ntime the brief was filed, were on the brief for amicus curiae\nState of Tennessee in support of appellants.\n\n Michael H. McGinley, Brian A. Kulp, Jordan L. Von\nBokern, and Steven A. Engel were on the brief for amicus\ncuriae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of\nAmerica in support of appellants.\n\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\n\n 6\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\n\n Kevin F. King, Matthew J. Glover, Eli Nachmany, and\nBrad J. Grisenti were on the brief for amicus curiae Coalition\nfor a Democratic Workplace in support of appellants.\n\n William J. Olson and Jeremiah L. Morgan were on the\nbrief for amicus curiae America’s Future, et al. in support of\nappellants.\n\n Deepak Gupta argued the cause for appellee Gwynne A.\nWilcox. With him on the brief were Jennifer D. Bennett,\nMatthew W. H. Wessler, Gregory A. Beck, and Alisa C. Philo.\n\n Dennis Fan was on the brief for amici curiae Former\nMembers of the National Labor Relations Board in support of\nappellee.\n\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\n\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\n\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\n\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\nof Congress in support of appellee.\n\n Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor\n\n 7\nGeneral, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz,\nSolicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General,\nKris Mayes, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\nfor the State of Arizona, Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General,\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado,\nKathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Delaware, Rob Bonta, Attorney\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\nCalifornia, William Tong, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the State of Connecticut, Brian L.\nSchwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\nthe District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General,\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii, Anthony\nG. Brown, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\nfor the State of Maryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General,\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,\nMatthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\nYork, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Oregon, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine,\nAndrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Office of the\nAttorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,\nAaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\nMexico, Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\nGeneral for the State of North Carolina, Peter F. Neronha,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Office of\nthe Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul,\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\nof Wisconsin, and Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General,\n\n 8\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Washington,\nwere on the brief for amici curiae State of Minnesota, et al. in\nsupport of appellee.\n\n Matthew Ginsburg, Harold Craig Becker, and Maneesh\nSharma were on the brief for amicus curiae the American\nFederation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations\n(AFL-CIO) in support of appellee.\n\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\nappellee.\n\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\n\n Richard F. Griffin and Faaris Akremi were on the brief for\namicus curiae Professor Jed H. Shugerman in support of\nappellee.\n\n Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and PAN, Circuit Judges.\n\n Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.\n\n Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PAN.\n\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge: These appeals present the\nquestion whether Congress may constitutionally prohibit the\nPresident from removing members of the National Labor\nRelations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board without\ncause. The district courts upheld the constitutionality of\nstatutory removal protections for members of these boards.\n\n We reverse. Under Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,\n295 U.S. 602 (1935), Congress may restrict the President’s\nability to remove principal officers who wield only quasi-\n\n 9\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers. But under Seila Law LLC\nv. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197\n(2020), Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to\nremove principal officers who wield substantial executive\npower. As explained below, the NLRB and MSPB wield\nsubstantial powers that are both executive in nature and\ndifferent from the powers that Humphrey’s Executor deemed\nto be merely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. So, Congress\ncannot restrict the President’s ability to remove NLRB or\nMSPB members.\n\n I\n\n The National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems\nProtection Board are multimember agencies with wide-ranging\nstatutory responsibilities and with members protected by\nstatute from presidential removal without cause.\n\n A\n\n The National Labor Relations Act constitutes the NLRB\nas an agency of five members appointed by the President with\nthe advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). The\nmembers serve five-year terms. Id. The NLRA purports to\nprohibit the President from removing a member except “for\nneglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id.\n\n Congress empowered the NLRB to prevent any “unfair\nlabor practice” affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 160(a). The NLRB conducts formal adjudications to resolve\nunfair-labor-practice complaints presented to it. Id. § 160(b).\nIf it finds an unfair labor practice, the NLRB must issue a\ncease-and-desist order. Id. § 160(c). It also may order\naffirmative relief, including reinstatement and backpay, to\n“effectuate the policies” of the NLRA. Id. Acting under these\nremedial authorities, the NLRB has claimed the power to award\n\n 10\ncompensatory and consequential-like damages. See Thryv,\nInc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10 (Dec. 13, 2022), vacated in\npart on other grounds, 102 F.4th 727 (5th Cir. 2024). But see\nNLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2024)\n(concluding such relief is ultra vires). In some instances, the\nNLRB may find speech to constitute an unfair labor practice.\nSee 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); Cadillac of Naperville, Inc. v.\nNLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Katsas, J.,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part). In others, it may\ncompose and order company speech as a remedy for unfair\nlabor practices. See HTH Corp. v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 668, 675–\n78 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\n\n The NLRB may litigate in federal court to prevent unfair\nlabor practices. Upon the filing of an administrative complaint,\nit may seek interim injunctive relief in district court. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 160(j). And upon finding an unfair labor practice, the NLRB\nmay petition an appropriate court of appeals to enforce its\norder. Id. § 160(e). In conducting this litigation, the NLRB\nacts through its own counsel, rather than that of the Justice\nDepartment. Id. § 154(a).\n\n Beyond its powers to prevent unfair labor practices, the\nNLRB has substantial authority over matters involving union\nelections. Within or across employers, it must determine the\n“unit appropriate” for collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 159(b). For such units, the NLRB also supervises elections\nto certify or decertify unions as the employees’ bargaining\nrepresentatives. See id. § 159(c)–(e).\n\n Lastly, the NLRB may “from time to time … make,\namend, and rescind … such rules and regulations as may be\n\n 11\nnecessary to carry out the provisions of” the NLRA, including\nthe provisions outlined above. 29 U.S.C. § 156.1\n\n B\n\n The Civil Service Reform Act constitutes the MSPB as an\nagency of three members appointed by the President with the\nadvice and consent of the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 1201. The\nmembers serve seven-year terms. Id. § 1202(a). The CSRA\npurports to prohibit the President from removing a member\nexcept for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in\noffice.” Id. § 1202(d).\n\n The MSPB primarily manages disputes between federal\nemployees and their employing agencies. Among other things,\nthe MSPB may adjudicate all matters within its jurisdiction and\nmay “take final action on any such matter.” 5 U.S.C.\n§ 1204(a)(1). It may “order any Federal agency or employee\nto comply with any” of its orders or decisions, and it may\n“enforce compliance” with them. Id. § 1204(a)(2). To do so,\nit may “order that any employee charged with complying with\nsuch [an] order,” except for Senate-confirmed presidential\nappointees, “shall not be entitled to receive payment for service\nas an employee during any period that the order has not been\ncomplied with.” Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\n\n\n\n 1\n Separate from the NLRB, Congress has created its office of\nGeneral Counsel. That officer is appointed by the President, with the\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to a four-year term. 29 U.S.C.\n§ 153(d). Unlike NLRB members, the General Counsel has no\nstatutory removal protection. He has “final authority” to investigate,\ncharge, and prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\nNLRB. Id. He also supervises the NLRB’s regional offices, and the\nBoard may delegate additional powers to him. Id.\n\n 12\n The MSPB’s jurisdiction covers a wide range of federal\nemployment disputes. The MSPB often reviews actions\nalready taken by the employing agency. For example, federal\nemployees may “appeal” to the MSPB disciplinary actions\ntaken by an employer to promote “efficiency of the [civil]\nservice.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), (d). Employees also may seek\n“corrective action” from the MSPB for any “prohibited\npersonnel practice.” Id. § 1221(a). Such practices include acts\nof discrimination made unlawful by four different statutes,\ngranting unauthorized preferences, coercing political activity,\nretaliation for various protected activities, improper influence,\ndeception, and obstruction. Id. § 2302(b). The MSPB also has\njurisdiction to review employment actions alleged to violate\nstatutory protections for military servicemembers or veterans.\nSee id. §§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324.\n\n Sometimes, the MSPB resolves disputes in the first\ninstance. Many such disputes involve claims presented to it by\nthe Office of the Special Counsel. In these cases, the MSPB\nmay order corrective action for prohibited personnel practices,\n5 U.S.C. § 1214, or for violations of other statutes enforced by\nthe Special Counsel, id. § 1216. The MSPB also may impose\ndiscipline for any of these violations. Id. § 1215(a)(3). Finally,\nthe MSPB resolves employment disputes involving\nAdministrative Law Judges, who cannot be removed,\nsuspended, or demoted without “good cause” as found by the\nMSPB. Id. § 7521.\n\n In its various adjudications, the MSPB may award a wide\nrange of interim and final relief. Upon request by the Special\nCounsel, any MSPB member may “order a stay of any\npersonnel action” reasonably believed to constitute a\nprohibited personnel practice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Such\nstays may last for up to 45 days initially, and the MSPB may\nextend them for “any period” it considers appropriate. Id.\n\n 13\n§ 1214(b)(1)(B)(i). To remedy unwarranted discipline\nimposed by an employing agency, the MSPB may order\naffirmative relief including reinstatement and backpay. See\nElgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 6 (2012). For prohibited\npersonnel practices, it may order “corrective action” that\nincludes reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory damages.\nId. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, and penalties of\nup to $1,000, or “any combination” of these sanctions. Id.\n§ 1215(a)(3)(A).\n\n The MSPB has its own litigating authority. Except in the\nSupreme Court, its attorneys “may appear for the Board, and\nrepresent the Board, in any civil action brought in connection\nwith any function carried out by the Board.” 5 U.S.C.\n§ 1204(i). When aggrieved employees seek judicial review of\nits decisions, the MSPB (rather than the employing agency or\nofficial) is sometimes the respondent. See id. § 7703(a)(2).\nSpecifically, it is the respondent when the employee challenges\nan adverse procedural ruling, Spruill v. MSPB, 978 F.2d 679,\n684 (Fed. Cir. 1992), or when the MSPB adjudicates a dispute\nin the first instance, Costello v. MSPB, 182 F.3d 1372, 1381\n(Fed. Cir. 1999).\n\n The MSPB has three overlapping grants of rulemaking\nauthority. It may promulgate “such regulations as may be\nnecessary for the performance of its functions.” 5 U.S.C.\n§ 1204(h). It may promulgate “regulations to carry out the\npurpose” of conducting administrative appeals. Id. § 7701(k).\nAnd it may promulgate regulations “for the purpose of section\n7521,” which governs adverse employment actions against\nALJs. Id. § 1305. The MSPB also may sua sponte review\nregulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel\nManagement. Id. § 1204(f)(1). It may declare such regulations\n\n 14\ninvalid, on their face or as implemented, to the extent they\npurport to require prohibited personnel practices. Id.\n§ 1204(f)(2). And it may “require any agency” to “cease\ncompliance” with such regulations. Id. § 1204(f)(4)(A).\n\n II\n\n The President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB\nand Cathy Harris from the MSPB. In defense of those actions,\nthe government does not contend that Wilcox or Harris\nengaged in any conduct that would support for-cause removal\nunder the relevant statutory restrictions. Instead, it argues that\nthe restrictions are unconstitutional.\n\n Wilcox and Harris sued to challenge their removals. The\ndistrict courts held that the statutory removal protections are\nconstitutional under Humphrey’s Executor; they declared that\nWilcox and Harris continue to hold their respective offices; and\nthey enjoined the government from interfering with the\nindividuals’ ability to function as board members. Wilcox v.\nTrump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215 (D.D.C. 2025); Harris v. Bessent,\n775 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2025). The government appealed\nand sought interim stays pending appeal. A motions panel of\nthis Court granted the stays, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037,\n2025 WL 980278 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2025), but the full Court\nvacated that decision, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037, 2025\nWL 1021435 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (en banc) (per curiam).\n\n The Supreme Court then stayed the district courts’ orders\npending the resolution of these appeals and any ensuing\npetitions for certiorari. Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415\n(2025) (per curiam). In doing so, the Court found it likely “that\nboth the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive\npower,” which it said would make the removal restrictions\nunconstitutional. Id. at 1415.\n\n 15\n III\n\n A\n\n Article II of the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power”\nof the United States “in a President,” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1,\ncl. 1, and requires him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully\nexecuted,” id. § 3. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52\n(1926), the Supreme Court held that the Vesting and Take Care\nClauses prevent Congress from restricting the President’s\nability to remove government officers who wield significant\nexecutive power on his behalf. See id. at 117–18, 163–64. The\nCourt invalidated a statute requiring the Senate to provide\nadvice and consent to effectuate the President’s removal of a\nfirst-class postmaster. See id. at 107, 176. In later cases, the\nCourt applied Myers to invalidate statutory restrictions on the\nPresident’s ability to remove various principal officers. See\nCollins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021) (Director of Federal\nHousing Finance Agency); Seila Law, 591 U.S. 197 (Director\nof CFPB); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,\n561 U.S. 477 (2010) (members of PCAOB). More recently,\nthe Court noted that because the President’s “exclusive power\nof removal in executive agencies” is “conclusive and\npreclusive,” Congress may not restrict it. Trump v. United\nStates, 603 U.S. 593, 609 (2024) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &\nTube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 & n.4 (1952) (Jackson,\nJ., concurring)).\n\n A different line of precedent qualifies these cases. In\nHumphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court upheld the\nconstitutionality of a statute barring the President from\nremoving members of the Federal Trade Commission absent\n“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”\n15 U.S.C. § 41. The Court acknowledged Myers’s holding that\nCongress cannot restrict the President’s ability to remove\n\n 16\n“purely executive officers.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\n627–28. But it concluded that Myers does not govern the\nremoval of an officer “who exercises no part of the executive\npower vested by the Constitution in the President.” Id. at 628.\nAnd it characterized the FTC’s powers not as executive, but as\n“quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.” Id. In Wiener v. United\nStates, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), the Court applied Humphrey’s\nExecutor to infer and uphold a cause requirement for removing\nmembers of the War Claims Commission, a tribunal that\nadjudicated claims under a statutory scheme for compensating\ncertain Americans held by the Axis powers during World War\nII. Id. at 349–50, 355–56. Other precedents have upheld cause\nrequirements for the removal of certain inferior officers.\nMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); United States v.\nPerkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).\n\n In Seila Law, the Court read Humphrey’s Executor\nnarrowly and expressly declined to extend it. According to the\nCourt, “text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in\n1789 [regarding removal of executive officers], Myers, and\nFree Enterprise Fund all establish that the President’s removal\npower is the rule, not the exception.” 591 U.S. at 228.\nMoreover, Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison reflect “two\nexceptions—one for multimember expert agencies that do not\nwield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers\nwith limited duties and no policymaking or administrative\nauthority.” Id. at 218. Furthermore, these exceptions\n“represent what up to now have been the outermost\nconstitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions\non the President’s removal power.” Id. (quoting PHH Corp. v.\nCFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)\n(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). As it had done previously, the\nCourt declined to “extend” Humphrey’s Executor to a “new\nsituation.” Id. at 220 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at\n483).\n\n 17\n Seila Law held that the Myers rule—not the Humphrey’s\nExecutor exception—governs removal of the CFPB Director.\nTo distinguish Humphrey’s Executor, the Court identified three\nsignificant executive powers vested in the CFPB. First, the\nCFPB can “promulgate binding rules” implementing the\nstatutes that it administers. 591 U.S. at 218. Second, it can\n“issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in\nadministrative adjudications.” Id. at 219. Third, it can “seek\ndaunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf\nof the United States in federal court—a quintessentially\nexecutive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.” Id.\n\n B\n\n These appeals turn on whether Humphrey’s Executor\napplies to the NLRB and MSPB. At first glance, that question\nseems to turn on whether these agencies exercise any\nsignificant executive power within the meaning of the Vesting\nClause, which would bring this case within the rule of Myers\nand Seila Law; or whether the agencies exercise only quasi-\nlegislative and quasi-judicial powers, which Humphrey’s\nExecutor deemed to fall outside the President’s executive\npower under Article II. See 295 U.S. at 627–28. But after\nHumphrey’s Executor was decided, two related developments\nin separation-of-powers jurisprudence made it all but\nimpossible to distinguish executive power from quasi-\nlegislative or quasi-judicial power.\n\n First, the Supreme Court has broadened its understanding\nof what powers count as executive. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424\nU.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Court held that the Federal\nElection Commission’s “enforcement power, exemplified by\nits discretionary power to seek judicial relief,” is an executive\npower entrusted to the President through the Take Care Clause.\nSee id. at 138. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the\n\n 18\nCourt held that the power to interpret and apply a statute\nrequiring certain budget cuts is executive. See id. at 733\n(“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the\nlegislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the\nlaw.”). In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991),\nJustice Scalia explained at length that “there is nothing\n‘inherently judicial’ about ‘adjudication,’” which Article II\nagencies perform routinely. Id. at 909 (concurring in part and\nconcurring in the judgment); see id. at 909–12. And in City of\nArlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), the Court explained\nthat rulemaking and administrative adjudication “take\n‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—\nindeed, under our constitutional structure they must be\nexercises of—the ‘executive Power.’” Id. at 304 n.4 (quoting\nArticle II Vesting Clause). With enforcement, rulemaking, and\nadministrative adjudication all classed as executive powers,\nwhat is left of the assertedly discrete categories of quasi-\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers? In sum, “[t]he Court’s\nconclusion [in Humphrey’s Executor] that the FTC did not\nexercise executive power has not withstood the test of time.”\nSeila Law, 591 U.S. at 216 n.2 (citing City of Arlington, 569\nU.S. at 304 n.4). To the contrary, it is “hard to dispute that the\npowers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey’s Executor would\nat the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some\ndegree.” Id. (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28).\n\n Second, the Supreme Court increasingly has stressed that\nthere are only three kinds of constitutional powers, and two of\nthem are not delegable. “Our Constitution divided the ‘powers\nof the new Federal Government into three defined categories,\nLegislative, Executive, and Judicial.’” Free Enter. Fund, 561\nU.S. at 483 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).\nOnly Congress itself may exercise the legislative power. See\nWhitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)\n(Article I “permits no delegation”). And only life-tenured\n\n 19\njudges may exercise the “judicial Power of the United States.”\nStern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011) (quoting U.S.\nConst. Art. III, § 1); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488\nU.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A judge may not\nleave the decision to his law clerk, or to a master.”). So by\nprocess of elimination, if agencies may receive neither\nlegislative nor judicial powers, what is left for them other than\nsome portion of the executive power?\n\n These considerations suggest that very little remains of\nHumphrey’s Executor. Perhaps its most plausible application\nis to purely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims\nCommission at issue in Wiener. But under today’s separation-\nof-powers jurisprudence, even those bodies exercise the\nPresident’s executive power. See, e.g., United States v.\nArthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 17 (2021) (Administrative Patent\nJudges); Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir.\n2014) (Tax Court judges). Recall that Seila Law limited\nHumphrey’s Executor to entities that “do not wield substantial\nexecutive power.” 591 U.S. at 218. So maybe agencies with\nany “substantial” power—quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, or\notherwise—fall outside Humphrey’s Executor because that\npower is and must be executive. See Consumers’ Rsch. v.\nCPSC, 98 F.4th 646, 650–57 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J.,\ndissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Maybe\nHumphrey’s Executor thus governs only agencies with purely\nadvisory functions—like, say, the United States Commission\non Civil Rights, see Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028, 2025\nWL 559669, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (Katsas, J.,\ndissenting). And maybe the Supreme Court, which is now\nconsidering whether to overrule Humphrey’s Executor, will\nsoon hold as much. See Stay Order, Trump v. Slaughter, No.\n25-332 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025).\n\n 20\n All of that said, we are reluctant to decide these appeals\nalong those lines. Of course, we must apply Humphrey’s\nExecutor as best we can, unless and until the Supreme Court\noverrules it. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American\nExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Moreover, despite\nrejecting the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme\nCourt has twice expressly declined to overrule it. See Seila\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 228; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483. And\nSeila Law acknowledged that Humphrey’s Executor had\nupheld removal restrictions for an agency with powers that\n“would at the present time be considered executive.” 591 U.S.\nat 216 n.2 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28). Given\nthese considerations, maybe Congress still may restrict\nremoval if the board at issue has only those powers that\nHumphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-\njudicial, even if those powers are now recognized as executive.\n\n Fortunately, we need not resolve all these tensions. As we\nexplain below, the NLRB and MSPB exercise significant\nexecutive powers, which is enough to trigger the general rule\nof Myers and Seila Law. Moreover, many of those powers\nexceed ones that Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-\nlegislative or quasi-judicial, which makes this case fall outside\nany exception based on that decision.\n\n C\n\n So what powers did Humphrey’s Executor deem to be\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial? That case involved powers\nvested in the FTC by the Federal Trade Commission Act as\noriginally enacted in 1914. Section 5 of that Act prohibited\n“unfair methods of competition in commerce.” Act of Sept. 26,\n1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (codified as amended\nat 15 U.S.C. § 45). It authorized the Commission to adjudicate\ncomplaints alleging unfair methods of competition, to issue\n\n 21\ncease-and-desist orders, and to seek judicial enforcement of\nthose orders. Id. Section 6 of the Act authorized the\nCommission to make and file reports with other governmental\nentities, including Congress. Id. at 721–22 (codified as\namended at 15 U.S.C. § 46). Section 7 authorized the\nCommission to act “as a master in chancery” in pending\nantitrust actions. Id. at 722 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 47). For\nour purposes, “what matters is the set of powers the Court\nconsidered as the basis for its decision” in Humphrey’s\nExecutor. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219 n.4.\n\n 1\n\n In distinguishing Myers, the Court deemed only one of the\nFTC’s powers to be quasi-legislative: making reports for\nCongress. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628 (“In making\ninvestigations and reports … for the information of Congress\nunder section 6, in aid of the legislative power, it acts as a\nlegislative agency.”). That power is “investigative and\ninformative”—one that “Congress might delegate to one of its\nown committees.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.\n\n More interesting is a power that Humphrey’s Executor did\nnot describe as quasi-legislative. Section 6(g) of the FTC Act\nauthorized the Commission “to make rules and regulations for\nthe purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.” 38 Stat.\nat 722. Yet Humphrey’s Executor did not mention that\nprovision, much less characterize it as conferring on the FTC\nthe quasi-legislative power to engage in substantive\nrulemaking. This was hardly surprising because “the agency\nitself did not assert the power to promulgate substantive rules\nuntil 1962 and indeed indicated intermittently that it lacked\nsuch a power.” Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d\n672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Before Humphrey’s Executor was\ndecided, the Commission had expressly disclaimed the power\n\n 22\nto promulgate substantive rules governing primary conduct, as\nopposed to procedural rules governing the conduct of\nadministrative adjudication under section 5. See id. at 693\nn.27; Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the\nFiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922 at 36 (“One of the most\ncommon mistakes is to suppose that the commission can\nissue … regulations unconnected with any proceeding before\nit.”). For this reason, the Supreme Court cited the CFPB’s\npower “to promulgate binding [substantive] rules” as one\nimportant power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor—and\none key reason why Humphrey’s Executor does not apply to\nthe CFPB. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\n\n 2\n\n Humphrey’s Executor conceived of “quasi-judicial”\npower as assisting the Article III courts or, at most, engaging\nin a restrained species of administrative adjudication modeled\non how Article III judges resolve cases or controversies.\n\n In distinguishing Myers, the Supreme Court expressly\ndescribed only one of the FTC’s powers as “quasi-judicial”—\nits section 7 power to assist the courts. See 295 U.S. at 628.\nThat provision allowed a federal district court, if it found that\nequitable remedies were warranted in an antitrust case, to\n“refer” the case “to the commission, as a master in chancery, to\nascertain and report an appropriate form of decree.” 38 Stat. at\n722. In that instance, the Commission would prepare and file\na report, which the court could “adopt or reject” as it chose. Id.\nAs Humphrey’s Executor perceived it, “quasi-judicial” power\nis thus merely the power to “act[] as an agency of the\njudiciary.” 295 U.S. at 628. Today, we might liken this power\nto that of a magistrate judge or a special master. See 28 U.S.C.\n§ 636 (magistrate judges); Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters).\n\n 23\n More generally, the Supreme Court also referenced the\nFTC’s power to conduct administrative adjudications under\nsection 5, which it described as “filling in and administering\nthe details” regarding a “general” statutory prohibition of\nunfair methods of competition. See 295 U.S. at 628.\nAccording to the Court, that enterprise emphatically did not\ninvolve any discretionary policy judgments. Instead, the FTC\nwas a “nonpartisan” body required to “act with entire\nimpartiality.” Id. at 624. And it was “charged with the\nenforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.” Id. In\nWiener, the Court similarly described administrative\nadjudication by the War Claims Commission: Claims before it\n“were to be ‘adjudicated according to law,’ that is, on the merits\nof each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal\nconsiderations.” 357 U.S. at 355. These descriptions resemble\nJustice Scalia’s minimalist account of adjudication in\nFreytag—agencies or courts “determine facts, apply a rule of\nlaw to those facts, and thus arrive at a decision.” 501 U.S. at\n909 (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). These\ndescriptions also conjure up an enduring image of how judges\nare supposed to adjudicate, as umpires fairly applying set rules\nto call balls and strikes.\n\n Precedents contemporaneous with Humphrey’s Executor\nconfirm this restrained conception of FTC administrative\nadjudication. For one thing, the Supreme Court repeatedly had\nheld that the meaning of “unfair methods of competition,”\nalthough open-ended, was “for the courts, not the commission,\nultimately to determine as [a] matter of law.” FTC v. Gratz,\n253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); see FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S.\n568, 579–80 (1923) (following Gratz). Moreover, courts\ndiscerned the meaning of that phrase not through broad or\npolicy-laden pronouncements, but by “the gradual process of\njudicial inclusion and exclusion,” consistent with traditional\ncommon-law adjudication. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643,\n\n 24\n648 (1931) (cleaned up). Some of these precedents eventually\nwere disapproved. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,\n320–21 (1966) (disapproving Gratz). But in 1935, insofar as\nFTC administrative adjudication was deemed a quasi-judicial\npower, it was at most the power to resolve disputes like judges.\n\n * * * *\n\n In sum, Humphrey’s Executor laid down specific\nconceptions of what counts as “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-\njudicial” power. The former includes only legislative research\nfunctions such as investigating, writing reports, and making\nrecommendations to Congress. The latter includes only the\npower to serve as a trial master or to act as a judge-like\nadjudicator without policymaking authority. As Seila Law\nnoted, neither category encompasses the powers to promulgate\nsubstantive rules or to impose civil fines. See 591 U.S. at 218–\n19. And although Humphrey’s Executor did not separately\nanalyze available remedies, Seila Law stressed that the FTC in\n1935 could only assist courts or enter cease-and-desist orders,\nas opposed to awarding damages or affirmative equitable relief.\nSee id.\n\n IV\n\n The powers of the NLRB and MSPB substantially exceed\nthe circumscribed administrative powers that Humphrey’s\nExecutor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.\n\n A\n\n Congress has vested the NLRB with several executive\npowers beyond the ones addressed in Humphrey’s Executor.\n\n First, the NLRB possesses “broad rulemaking authority.”\nAm. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991). Section 6\n\n 25\nof the NLRA empowers the agency to promulgate “such rules\nand regulations as may be necessary to carry out the\nprovisions” of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 156. In American\nHospital Association, the Supreme Court held that this\nauthority covers not only rules establishing unfair labor\npractices under section 8, but also “industry-wide rule[s]\ndelineating … appropriate bargaining units” under section 9.\n499 U.S. at 611. Invoking that power, the NLRB has\npromulgated rules governing collective bargaining in the health\ncare industry. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. As Seila Law made clear,\nthe power to “promulgate binding rules fleshing out” major\nfederal statutes exceeds the powers that Humphrey’s Executor\ndeemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. See 591 U.S.\nat 218. Needless to say, it is also a quintessential executive\npower under current constitutional standards.\n\n Wilcox objects that the NLRB has not often engaged in\nsubstantive rulemaking. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1–3; Nat’l Ass’n\nof Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But that\nis irrelevant to our inquiry. When evaluating the\nconstitutionality of removal restrictions, courts consider the\n“authority” that an agency “possesses,” not the rigor with\nwhich the power is exercised. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. So,\n“an agency’s voluntary self-denial” of its rulemaking power\n“has no bearing” on our constitutional analysis. Am. Trucking\nAss’ns, 531 U.S. at 473.\n\n Second, the NLRB conducts administrative adjudications\nthat are nothing like the model of adjudication that Humphrey’s\nExecutor treated as quasi-judicial. Recall that model: A\n“nonpartisan” body of experts acts “with entire impartiality” to\nundertake “the enforcement of no policy except the policy of\nthe law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And courts\ndecide what the governing statutory standard means, through a\nneutral process of case-by-case adjudication. See Raladam,\n\n 26\n283 U.S. at 648; Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427. In other words, courts\nwould decide what constitutes an “unfair method of\ncompetition” or an “unfair labor practice,” using familiar\ninterpretive tools such as statutory text, structure, canons,\nhistory, and precedent. This fairly describes the functioning of\npurely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims Commission,\nwhich was charged with nothing more than adjudicating claims\n“according to law.” 357 U.S. at 355. But it does not fairly\ndescribe adjudication conducted by agencies with substantive\nrulemaking power, which the Administrative Procedure Act\ndefines as including the power to “prescribe law or policy.”\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5). For those agencies, the Supreme\nCourt has held that “adjudication is a generally permissible\nmode of law-making and policymaking,” precisely because the\nagency has been “delegated the power to make law and policy\nthrough rulemaking.” Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 154\n(1991); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03\n(1947) (Chenery II).\n\n The NLRB conducts the latter kind of adjudications. It is\ntasked with “developing and applying national labor policy.”\nNLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).\nSo, it may “announc[e] new principles in an adjudicative\nproceeding.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294\n(1974); see Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1056\n(D.C. Cir. 1989) (NLRB adjudication “enunciated a new rule,”\nwhich “the Board has the authority to do”). The NLRB does\nthis routinely, see, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.\n251, 260–67 (1975); NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406\nU.S. 272, 284–85 (1972), creating a bevy of requirements that\nare akin to “statutory” rules or “one[s] established by\nregulation,” Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,\n804–05 (1945).\n\n 27\n Moreover, policy considerations drive NLRB\nadjudications. The Supreme Court has contrasted the “narrow\nconfines of law” for the courts with the “spacious domain of\npolicy” for the NLRB. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.\n177, 194 (1941). Likewise, this Court has held that the NLRB\nmay “explicate why national labor policy requires” a given\nrule. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Loc. No. 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d\n802, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The NLRB routinely invokes\n“policy” considerations not only to create rules by\nadjudication, but also to overrule them. In re Lamons Gasket\nCo., 357 NLRB 739, 739 (2011); In re IBM Corp., 341 NLRB\n1288, 1290 (2004); see Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB,\n100 F.4th 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2024) (O’Scannlain, J., specially\nconcurring) (NLRB “frequently changes its mind, seesawing\nback and forth between statutory interpretations depending on\nits political composition, leaving workers, employers, and\nunions in the lurch”). On one recent occasion, the NLRB\noverruled itself for the fifth time, and this Court, barely\nmentioning any statutory provisions, upheld the agency’s latest\nposition as reasonably explained and thus not arbitrary. See\nHosp. Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB, 94 F.4th 1, 16\n(D.C. Cir. 2024) (Katsas, J., concurring), GVR, 145 S. Ct. 982\n(2024). Perhaps the NLRA will be somewhat more\nconstraining now that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,\n603 U.S. 369 (2024), has overruled Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.\nNatural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But\nit would blink reality to suppose that Loper Bright will\neliminate the NLRB’s ability to conduct policymaking through\nadjudication under Chenery II. Whatever the virtues of that\nmodern species of administrative adjudication, it cannot fairly\nbe described as approximating how Article III judges decide\ncases, or as resting on “no policy except the policy of the law.”\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And it plainly involves the\nexercise of substantial executive power. See City of Arlington,\n569 U.S. at 304 n.4.\n\n 28\n Third, the NLRB may award substantially broader\nremedies than the FTC could in 1935. At that time, the FTC,\nupon finding an unfair method of competition, could issue only\na cease-and-desist order. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\n620–21. Such orders impose only a “negative restriction.”\nAlberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The NLRB,\nin contrast, may award various forms of affirmative relief.\nUpon finding an unfair labor practice, it may issue not only a\ncease-and-desist order, but also one “requiring” the offending\nemployer or union “to take such affirmative action including\nreinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will\neffectuate the policies of” the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). This\nmay include the power to award compensatory damages. See\nThryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10. And it sometimes\nincludes the power to compel employers to read NLRB-\ncomposed admissions of liability, see Advancepierre Foods,\nInc. v. NLRB, 966 F.3d 813, 820–21 (D.C. Cir. 2020), a remedy\nthat Judge Williams likened to the practices of Joseph Stalin\nand Mao Zedong, see HTH Corp., 823 F.3d at 677. Whatever\nthe merits of that comparison, the NLRB’s remedial authority\nsubstantially exceeds that of the FTC in 1935. This\nconsideration also further distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor.\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219.\n\n Fourth, the NLRB has broader litigating authority than the\nFTC did in 1935. Each agency may petition courts of appeals\nto enforce final administrative orders. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)\n(NLRB); 38 Stat. at 719–20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.\n§ 45) (FTC). But as noted above, NLRB remedial orders may\nbe much broader than those of the FTC in 1935. Moreover, the\nNLRB has litigating authority to seek interim relief in district\ncourts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). In contrast, to obtain any judicial\nrelief besides enforcement of a final cease-and-desist order, the\nFTC in 1935 would have needed to ask the Attorney General\nto seek mandamus on its behalf. See 38 Stat. at 722 (codified\n\n 29\nas amended at 15 U.S.C. § 49); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274\nU.S. 160, 173–74 (1927); Space Expl. Techs. Corp. v. NLRB,\n151 F.4th 761, 776 n.76 (5th Cir. 2025). The NLRB’s greater\nauthority to litigate on behalf of the United States both further\ndistinguishes Humphrey’s Executor, see Seila Law, 591 U.S. at\n218–19, and reflects a greater degree of executive power, see\nBuckley, 424 U.S. at 138–40; In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255,\n264 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (“civil\nenforcement decisions brought by the Federal Government are\npresumptively an exclusive Executive power”).\n\n Wilcox objects that NLRB litigation is conducted by its\nGeneral Counsel, an executive officer removable at-will by the\nPresident. But while the General Counsel has “final authority”\nto prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\nNLRB, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d); see NLRB v. United Food & Com.\nWorkers Union, Loc. 23, 484 U.S. 112, 118–19 (1987), the\nNLRA gives the Board itself control over litigation in court, 29\nU.S.C. § 160(e), (j). The General Counsel conducts that\nlitigation pursuant to a delegation from the Board under section\n3(d), which permits the NLRB to assign to the General Counsel\n“such other duties as the Board may prescribe.” Id. § 153(d).\nUnder the terms of that delegation, the General Counsel\nconducts litigation “in full accordance with the directions of the\nBoard.” Authority and Assigned Responsibilities of General\nCounsel of National Labor Relations Board § I.B, 20 Fed. Reg.\n2,175, 2,175 (Apr. 6, 1955).\n\n Finally, the NLRB exercises substantial executive power\nin administering section 9 of the NLRA, which governs the\ndetermination of appropriate units for collective bargaining and\nthe conduct of union elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159. Wilcox\nobjects that elections are supervised primarily by the NLRB’s\nregional offices, which in turn are supervised by the General\nCounsel. See id. § 153(d). Yet the NLRA clearly gives the\n\n 30\nBoard itself, not the General Counsel, final authority over\nsection 9 administration. See id. § 159(b) (“The Board shall\ndecide in each case … the unit appropriate for the purposes of\ncollective bargaining ….”); id. § 159(c) (“the Board shall\ninvestigate” petitions to conduct a union election). Indeed, the\nBoard’s most prominent substantive rule to date involved not\nan elaboration of unfair labor practices, but a determination of\nappropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. See 29\nC.F.R. § 103.30.\n\n Because the NLRB’s rulemaking, adjudicatory, remedial,\nenforcement, and election-administration powers are not solely\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, the agency falls well outside\nthe Humphrey’s Executor exception.\n\n B\n\n The MSPB likewise has more executive powers than ones\nthat Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or\nquasi-judicial.\n\n Start with rulemaking. The CSRA empowers the MSPB\nto promulgate regulations “for the performance of its\nfunctions,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h), and “for the purpose of section\n7521,” id. § 1305. Section 7521 prohibits the “removal” of\nALJs without a prior MSPB determination of good cause. Id.\n§ 7521(a), (b)(1). In Tunik v. MSPB, 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir.\n2005), the Federal Circuit held these grants of rulemaking\npower authorize the MSPB to decide, with the force and effect\nof law, what constitutes a prohibited “removal.” Id. at 1345.\nIn other words, they permit the MSPB to define by regulation\nwhat primary conduct section 7521 prohibits, not simply to\nprescribe rules for the adjudication of disputes under that\nprovision. To be sure, the MSPB’s rulemaking authority with\nrespect to section 7521 does not rival the broad rulemaking\nauthority of the NLRB, and the contours of its other rulemaking\n\n 31\nauthorities are unclear. Nonetheless, the existence of at least\nsome substantive rulemaking power counts as a distinction of\nHumphrey’s Executor and as executive power under Article II.\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\n\n As for adjudication, the MSPB may be less aggressive than\nthe NLRB in naked appeals to shifting policy preferences, but\nits adjudicatory powers still exceed what Humphrey’s Executor\ndeemed to be quasi-judicial. This is true on at least three\ndifferent dimensions—finality, breadth of jurisdiction, and\nbreadth of remedial authority.\n\n Finality. The power to “unilaterally issue final decisions”\nis a significant executive power that was not present in\nHumphrey’s Executor. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. In\n1935, an FTC cease-and-desist order remained ineffective\nunless and until the agency persuaded a court of appeals to\nenforce it. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 22 (1929); Claire\nFurnace, 274 U.S. at 170. In contrast, the MSPB may “take\nfinal action on any” matter “within the jurisdiction of the\nBoard,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1), and also may “order any\nFederal agency or employee to comply” with any of its orders,\nid. § 1204(a)(2). Aggrieved employees may obtain judicial\nreview of final MSPB decisions, but the decisions remain\neffective unless and until a court of appeals sets them aside.\nSee id. § 7703.\n\n Breadth of jurisdiction. In 1935, the FTC was a\nspecialized tribunal. At that time, section 5 of the FTC Act was\nlimited to addressing “unfair methods of competition.” See 38\nStat. at 719; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (now also addressing\n“unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). So, the FTC was\nlargely directed towards antitrust enforcement, as reflected in\nits role as a “master in chancery” for antitrust cases.\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628. In contrast, the MSPB is\n\n 32\nmore a jack-of-all-trades. In determining prohibited personnel\npractices, it must administer portions of Title VII, the Age\nDiscrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards\nAct, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Whistleblower Protection\nAct. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), (8). And those five statutes\nencompass only two of 14 categories of personnel practices\nthat the CSRA prohibits and that the MSPB must consider. Id.\n§ 2302(b). The MSPB also must administer the Uniformed\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and the\nVeterans Employment Opportunities Act. See id.\n§§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324. It must\nadminister the Hatch Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and\nvarious other statutes within the prosecutorial authority of the\nSpecial Counsel. 5 U.S.C. § 1216(a). Finally, it must decide\nwhether employing agencies have meted out appropriate\ndiscipline. Id. § 7513(d). To do that, the MSPB makes its own\n“discretionary judgment,” which “is by no means” a mere legal\nor factual inquiry. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B.\n313, 325–26 (1981). Instead, it involves application of a non-\nexclusive, twelve-factor balancing test that considers, among\nother things, the nature of the offense, the employee’s work and\ndisciplinary record, the potential for rehabilitation, mitigating\ncircumstances, and the adequacy of alternative sanctions. See\nConor v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir.\n2021) (citing Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332). According to the\nMSPB, this searching inquiry is “considerably broader” than\none that courts would undertake. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 327.\nThus, it cannot plausibly be described as “quasi-judicial.”\nLikewise, it cannot fairly be characterized as involving “no\npolicy except the policy of the law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295\nU.S. at 624.\n\n Breadth of remedial authority. When it finds a legal\nviolation, the MSPB can do far more than simply order the\noffending agency to cease and desist. For unwarranted\n\n 33\nemployee discipline, the MSPB may order relief “including\nreinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees.” Elgin, 567 U.S.\nat 6. For prohibited personnel practices, it may order corrective\naction that includes reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and\nconsequential damages, medical and other costs, travel\nexpenses, attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and interest.\n5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, suspension,\nreprimand, civil penalties of up to $1,000, or “any\ncombination” of these sanctions. Id. § 1215(a)(3)(A). And for\nviolation of its own orders, the MSPB also may order the salary\nof an offending official to be withheld. Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\nAll of this sharply distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor. The\npower to award “legal and equitable relief in administrative\nadjudications” is an executive power that was not at issue there.\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. Moreover, if the power to\n“seek daunting monetary penalties” in court is also such a\npower, see id., then so too is the power to impose such penalties\nunilaterally.\n\n Unlike the FTC in 1935, the MSPB also may award\ninterim relief in some circumstances—and may do so on a\nwholesale basis. Upon request by the Special Counsel, any\nMSPB member may “order a stay of any personnel action” that\nshe reasonably believes to constitute a prohibited personnel\npractice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Recently, Harris herself\ninvoked this authority to reinstate nearly 6,000 laid-off\nemployees pending further administrative proceedings. Order\non Stay Request, Special Counsel ex rel. John Doe v. USDA,\nNo. CB-1208-25-0020-U-1 (MSPB Mar. 5, 2025),\nhttps://perma.cc/3F45-PKG5. That too far exceeds the FTC’s\nremedial authority in 1935.\n\n 34\n Harris objects that we should not consider the MSPB’s\nsalary-withholding power because the statute granting it is\nunconstitutional. This argument addresses only one of many\nremedial powers that were not present in Humphrey’s\nExecutor. In any event, the argument fails on its own terms.\nHarris contends that withholding a salary requires involvement\nof the Comptroller General, who is a legislative official. She\ninvokes Bowsher, which held that Congress could not vest the\nComptroller General with the executive power to decide what\nbudget cuts a particular statute required. See 478 U.S. at 733–\n34. The argument correctly assumes that the power to withhold\nthe salary of a government official is executive. But the\nComptroller General does not exercise this power. “[T]he\nBoard may order” that the offending employee “shall not be\nentitled to receive payment for service as an employee” during\nthe period of non-compliance. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(e)(2)(A). The\nMSPB must “certify” its order to the Comptroller General, who\nis in no way authorized to review it. Id. So, unlike the statute\nat issue in Bowsher, the CSRA does not give the Comptroller\nGeneral any discretion to bind the Executive Branch.\n\n Finally, consider litigating authority, another executive\npower not addressed in Humphrey’s Executor. The MSPB’s\npower to appear “in any civil action brought in connection with\nany function carried out by the Board,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(i),\ncontemplates MSPB control of any district-court litigation\nbrought by or against the agency. And the MSPB sometimes\nis the proper respondent when its orders are challenged in a\ncourt of appeals. See Spruill, 978 F.2d at 684; Costello, 182\nF.3d at 1381. That too cuts against the MSPB’s position here.\nPurely adjudicatory agencies—ones designed to be “an\nindependent adjudicator” with no policymaking authority—are\ngenerally not proper parties to defend their decisions on review,\njust as district judges are generally not proper parties to defend\ntheir decisions on appeal. Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l\n\n 35\nUnion v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see\nHinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).\n\n In sum, the MSPB has at least some substantive\nrulemaking power; it administers a host of wide-ranging\nfederal statutes; it awards various kinds of affirmative,\ncompensatory, and punitive relief; and it litigates in court on its\nown behalf. Taken together, these powers well exceed the\npowers deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in\nHumphrey’s Executor and the powers vested in the War Claims\nCommission. For these reasons, Congress may not restrict the\nPresident’s ability to remove MSPB members.\n\n V\n\n The constitutional problem in these cases arises from two\nfeatures of each agency: (1) the agency has been vested with\nsignificant executive power that cannot be characterized as\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, and (2) Congress has\nrestricted the President’s ability to remove its members.\nWilcox and Harris urge us to solve the constitutional problem\nby stripping away agency powers, rather than by declining to\nenforce the removal restrictions.\n\n We reject that proposal. When the Supreme Court\nencounters a statute that unconstitutionally insulates an\nexecutive officer from at-will removal, it has typically\nresponded by disregarding the removal restriction. See Myers,\n272 U.S. at 176; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508–10; Seila\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 232–38. Our Circuit has done likewise.\nDellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5052, 2025 WL 717383, at *1\n(D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (per curiam). Following that well-\nworn path, we hold that the appropriate resolution here is to\ndisregard the statutory removal restrictions for NLRB and\n\n 36\nMSPB members, not to blue-pencil provisions from among the\nfull panoply of the executive powers of each agency.2\n\n VI\n\n We close by flagging three issues not resolved here.\n\n First, we do not decide whether Congress may restrict the\nPresident’s ability to remove officers with solely adjudicatory\nfunctions. Our analysis above has distinguished the court-like\nadjudication of bodies such as the War Claims Commission\nfrom the Chenery II-like adjudication of agencies vested with\nboth adjudicatory and policymaking responsibilities. And we\nhave shown that the powers vested in the NLRB and MSPB\nsignificantly exceed those vested in the FTC in 1935 and those\nvested in the War Claims Commission. We express no opinion\nregarding other agencies that may plausibly be described as\npurely adjudicatory.\n\n Second, despite multiple amicus briefs focused on this\npoint, we do not address whether Congress may restrict the\nPresident’s ability to remove members of the Board of\nGovernors of the Federal Reserve System. Granting a stay in\nthis case, the Supreme Court noted that there is a “distinct\nhistorical tradition” regarding the treatment of congressionally\nchartered banks, which may bear on Congress’s ability to\nrestrict the removal of their officials. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at\n\n 2\n The Supreme Court took a different approach in Bowsher.\nAfter concluding that Congress had unconstitutionally conferred\nexecutive power on a legislative officer removable only by Congress,\nthe Court responded by stripping the officer of that power. 478 U.S.\nat 734–36. But this merely implemented a statutory “fallback”\nprovision setting forth how the law at issue should operate if one of\nits provisions was held unconstitutional. See id. at 735. The NLRA\nand the CSRA contain no such provision.\n\n 37\n1415; see also An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the\nBank of the United States, ch. 10, § 5, 1 Stat. 191, 193 (1791)\n(directors of the First Bank of the United States were appointed\nand removed “by the stockholders”). We have no occasion\nhere to address the scope or import of that tradition.\n\n Third, because we hold that the President permissibly\nremoved Wilcox and Harris, we do not consider whether\nwrongfully removed principal officers may obtain declaratory,\nequitable, or mandatory relief against the President or other\ngovernment officials.\n\n VII\n\n For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgments\nof the district courts.\n\n So ordered.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Gwynne A. Wilcox v. Donald J. Trump\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-05\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nArgued May 16, 2025 Decided December 5, 2025\\n\\n No. 25-5037\\n\\n CATHY A. HARRIS, IN HER PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HER\\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBER OF THE MERIT SYSTEMS\\n PROTECTION BOARD,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\nSCOTT BESSENT, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF\\n THE TREASURY, ET AL.,\\n APPELLANTS\\n\\n\\n\\n Consolidated with 25-5055\\n\\n\\n Appeals from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:25-cv-00412)\\n\\n\\n\\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Martin Akerman, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nMartin Akerman in support of appellants.\\n\\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\\n\\n Nathaniel A. Zelinsky argued the cause for appellee Cathy\\nA. Harris. With him on the brief were Michael J. Kator,\\nJeremy D. Wright, Kerrie D. Riggs, Linda M. Correia, Neal\\nKumar Katyal, Kristina Alekseyeva, and Ezra P. Louvis.\\n\\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\\n\\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\\n\\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\\nof Congress in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth C. Lockwood and Kathryn M. Ali were on the\\nbrief for amici curiae Former Board Members and General\\nCounsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n 3\\n Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Hawaii, Kaliko’onalani D. Fernandes,\\nSolicitor General, Kristin K. Mayes, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Arizona, Philip J.\\nWeiser, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe State of Colorado, Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of California, William Tong,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Connecticut, Kathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Delaware, Aaron M.\\nFrey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the\\nState of Maine, Andrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of\\nMassachusetts, Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Minnesota, Matthew J.\\nPlatkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of New York,\\nKwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Illinois, Anthony G. Brown, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\\nMaryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Michigan, Aaron D. Ford,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of New Mexico, Jeff Jackson,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof North Carolina, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of Oregon, Charity R. Clark,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Wisconsin, Peter F. Neronha,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Rhode Island, Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Washington, and Brian\\n\\n 4\\nL. Schwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the District of Columbia, were on the brief for amici curiae\\nState of Hawaii, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Thad M. Guyer was on the brief for amici curiae\\nGovernment Accountability Project, et al. in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph Carson, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nJoseph Carson, PE in support of appellee.\\n\\n\\n No. 25-5057\\n\\n GWYNNE A. WILCOX,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\n DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT\\n OF THE UNITED STATES AND MARVIN E. KAPLAN, IN HIS\\n OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LABOR\\n RELATIONS BOARD,\\n APPELLANTS\\n\\n 5\\n\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:25-cv-00334)\\n\\n\\n\\n Harry Graver, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Eric D.\\nMcArthur, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Mark R.\\nFreeman, Michael S. Raab, Joshua M. Salzman, Laura E.\\nMyron, and Daniel Aguilar, Attorneys.\\n\\n Daniel Z. Epstein and R. Trent McCotter were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Separation of Powers Clinic in support of\\nappellants.\\n\\n Michael Pepson was on the brief for amicus curiae\\nAmericans for Prosperity Foundation in support of appellants.\\n\\n Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, Office\\nof the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee, and\\nWhitney Hermandorfer, Director of Strategic Litigation at the\\ntime the brief was filed, were on the brief for amicus curiae\\nState of Tennessee in support of appellants.\\n\\n Michael H. McGinley, Brian A. Kulp, Jordan L. Von\\nBokern, and Steven A. Engel were on the brief for amicus\\ncuriae the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of\\nAmerica in support of appellants.\\n\\n James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Florida, Jeffrey Paul Desousa, Acting\\nSolicitor General, and Nathan A. Forrester, Chief Deputy\\n\\n 6\\nSolicitor General, were on the brief for amici curiae State of\\nFlorida, et al. in support of appellants.\\n\\n Kevin F. King, Matthew J. Glover, Eli Nachmany, and\\nBrad J. Grisenti were on the brief for amicus curiae Coalition\\nfor a Democratic Workplace in support of appellants.\\n\\n William J. Olson and Jeremiah L. Morgan were on the\\nbrief for amicus curiae America’s Future, et al. in support of\\nappellants.\\n\\n Deepak Gupta argued the cause for appellee Gwynne A.\\nWilcox. With him on the brief were Jennifer D. Bennett,\\nMatthew W. H. Wessler, Gregory A. Beck, and Alisa C. Philo.\\n\\n Dennis Fan was on the brief for amici curiae Former\\nMembers of the National Labor Relations Board in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Steven A. Hirsch was on the brief for amici curiae Law\\nProfessors John C. Coates, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Elizabeth B. Wydra, Brianne J. Gorod, and Brian R.\\nFrazelle were on the brief for amicus curiae Constitutional\\nAccountability Center in support of appellee.\\n\\n Nicolas A. Sansone and Allison M. Zieve were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Public Citizen in support of appellee.\\n\\n Anthony Schoenberg, Alexis Loeb, John Ugai, and Raven\\nQuesenberry were on the brief for amici curiae 253 Members\\nof Congress in support of appellee.\\n\\n Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Minnesota, Liz Kramer, Solicitor\\n\\n 7\\nGeneral, Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Illinois, Jane Elinor Notz,\\nSolicitor General, Alex Hemmer, Deputy Solicitor General,\\nKris Mayes, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the State of Arizona, Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Colorado,\\nKathleen Jennings, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Delaware, Rob Bonta, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of\\nCalifornia, William Tong, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the State of Connecticut, Brian L.\\nSchwalb, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for\\nthe District of Columbia, Anne E. Lopez, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Hawaii, Anthony\\nG. Brown, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General\\nfor the State of Maryland, Dana Nessel, Attorney General,\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Michigan,\\nMatthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of New Jersey, Letitia James, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\\nYork, Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Oregon, Aaron M. Frey, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Maine,\\nAndrea Joy Campbell, Attorney General, Office of the\\nAttorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,\\nAaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of Nevada, Raul Torrez, Attorney\\nGeneral, Office of the Attorney General for the State of New\\nMexico, Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney\\nGeneral for the State of North Carolina, Peter F. Neronha,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Rhode Island, Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Office of\\nthe Attorney General for the State of Vermont, Joshua L. Kaul,\\nAttorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State\\nof Wisconsin, and Nicholas W. Brown, Attorney General,\\n\\n 8\\nOffice of the Attorney General for the State of Washington,\\nwere on the brief for amici curiae State of Minnesota, et al. in\\nsupport of appellee.\\n\\n Matthew Ginsburg, Harold Craig Becker, and Maneesh\\nSharma were on the brief for amicus curiae the American\\nFederation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations\\n(AFL-CIO) in support of appellee.\\n\\n William Pittard and Daniel Csigirinszkij were on the brief\\nfor amicus curiae Professor Peter Conti-Brown in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Joseph M. Sellers was on the brief for amici curiae Patrick\\nJ. Borchers, et al. in support of appellee.\\n\\n Richard F. Griffin and Faaris Akremi were on the brief for\\namicus curiae Professor Jed H. Shugerman in support of\\nappellee.\\n\\n Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and PAN, Circuit Judges.\\n\\n Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS.\\n\\n Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PAN.\\n\\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge: These appeals present the\\nquestion whether Congress may constitutionally prohibit the\\nPresident from removing members of the National Labor\\nRelations Board and Merit Systems Protection Board without\\ncause. The district courts upheld the constitutionality of\\nstatutory removal protections for members of these boards.\\n\\n We reverse. Under Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,\\n295 U.S. 602 (1935), Congress may restrict the President’s\\nability to remove principal officers who wield only quasi-\\n\\n 9\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers. But under Seila Law LLC\\nv. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. 197\\n(2020), Congress may not restrict the President’s ability to\\nremove principal officers who wield substantial executive\\npower. As explained below, the NLRB and MSPB wield\\nsubstantial powers that are both executive in nature and\\ndifferent from the powers that Humphrey’s Executor deemed\\nto be merely quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. So, Congress\\ncannot restrict the President’s ability to remove NLRB or\\nMSPB members.\\n\\n I\\n\\n The National Labor Relations Board and Merit Systems\\nProtection Board are multimember agencies with wide-ranging\\nstatutory responsibilities and with members protected by\\nstatute from presidential removal without cause.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The National Labor Relations Act constitutes the NLRB\\nas an agency of five members appointed by the President with\\nthe advice and consent of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). The\\nmembers serve five-year terms. Id. The NLRA purports to\\nprohibit the President from removing a member except “for\\nneglect of duty or malfeasance in office.” Id.\\n\\n Congress empowered the NLRB to prevent any “unfair\\nlabor practice” affecting interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 160(a). The NLRB conducts formal adjudications to resolve\\nunfair-labor-practice complaints presented to it. Id. § 160(b).\\nIf it finds an unfair labor practice, the NLRB must issue a\\ncease-and-desist order. Id. § 160(c). It also may order\\naffirmative relief, including reinstatement and backpay, to\\n“effectuate the policies” of the NLRA. Id. Acting under these\\nremedial authorities, the NLRB has claimed the power to award\\n\\n 10\\ncompensatory and consequential-like damages. See Thryv,\\nInc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10 (Dec. 13, 2022), vacated in\\npart on other grounds, 102 F.4th 727 (5th Cir. 2024). But see\\nNLRB v. Starbucks Corp., 125 F.4th 78, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2024)\\n(concluding such relief is ultra vires). In some instances, the\\nNLRB may find speech to constitute an unfair labor practice.\\nSee 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1); Cadillac of Naperville, Inc. v.\\nNLRB, 14 F.4th 703, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Katsas, J.,\\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part). In others, it may\\ncompose and order company speech as a remedy for unfair\\nlabor practices. See HTH Corp. v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 668, 675–\\n78 (D.C. Cir. 2016).\\n\\n The NLRB may litigate in federal court to prevent unfair\\nlabor practices. Upon the filing of an administrative complaint,\\nit may seek interim injunctive relief in district court. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 160(j). And upon finding an unfair labor practice, the NLRB\\nmay petition an appropriate court of appeals to enforce its\\norder. Id. § 160(e). In conducting this litigation, the NLRB\\nacts through its own counsel, rather than that of the Justice\\nDepartment. Id. § 154(a).\\n\\n Beyond its powers to prevent unfair labor practices, the\\nNLRB has substantial authority over matters involving union\\nelections. Within or across employers, it must determine the\\n“unit appropriate” for collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 159(b). For such units, the NLRB also supervises elections\\nto certify or decertify unions as the employees’ bargaining\\nrepresentatives. See id. § 159(c)–(e).\\n\\n Lastly, the NLRB may “from time to time … make,\\namend, and rescind … such rules and regulations as may be\\n\\n 11\\nnecessary to carry out the provisions of” the NLRA, including\\nthe provisions outlined above. 29 U.S.C. § 156.1\\n\\n B\\n\\n The Civil Service Reform Act constitutes the MSPB as an\\nagency of three members appointed by the President with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 1201. The\\nmembers serve seven-year terms. Id. § 1202(a). The CSRA\\npurports to prohibit the President from removing a member\\nexcept for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in\\noffice.” Id. § 1202(d).\\n\\n The MSPB primarily manages disputes between federal\\nemployees and their employing agencies. Among other things,\\nthe MSPB may adjudicate all matters within its jurisdiction and\\nmay “take final action on any such matter.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(a)(1). It may “order any Federal agency or employee\\nto comply with any” of its orders or decisions, and it may\\n“enforce compliance” with them. Id. § 1204(a)(2). To do so,\\nit may “order that any employee charged with complying with\\nsuch [an] order,” except for Senate-confirmed presidential\\nappointees, “shall not be entitled to receive payment for service\\nas an employee during any period that the order has not been\\ncomplied with.” Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n Separate from the NLRB, Congress has created its office of\\nGeneral Counsel. That officer is appointed by the President, with the\\nadvice and consent of the Senate, to a four-year term. 29 U.S.C.\\n§ 153(d). Unlike NLRB members, the General Counsel has no\\nstatutory removal protection. He has “final authority” to investigate,\\ncharge, and prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\\nNLRB. Id. He also supervises the NLRB’s regional offices, and the\\nBoard may delegate additional powers to him. Id.\\n\\n 12\\n The MSPB’s jurisdiction covers a wide range of federal\\nemployment disputes. The MSPB often reviews actions\\nalready taken by the employing agency. For example, federal\\nemployees may “appeal” to the MSPB disciplinary actions\\ntaken by an employer to promote “efficiency of the [civil]\\nservice.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a), (d). Employees also may seek\\n“corrective action” from the MSPB for any “prohibited\\npersonnel practice.” Id. § 1221(a). Such practices include acts\\nof discrimination made unlawful by four different statutes,\\ngranting unauthorized preferences, coercing political activity,\\nretaliation for various protected activities, improper influence,\\ndeception, and obstruction. Id. § 2302(b). The MSPB also has\\njurisdiction to review employment actions alleged to violate\\nstatutory protections for military servicemembers or veterans.\\nSee id. §§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324.\\n\\n Sometimes, the MSPB resolves disputes in the first\\ninstance. Many such disputes involve claims presented to it by\\nthe Office of the Special Counsel. In these cases, the MSPB\\nmay order corrective action for prohibited personnel practices,\\n5 U.S.C. § 1214, or for violations of other statutes enforced by\\nthe Special Counsel, id. § 1216. The MSPB also may impose\\ndiscipline for any of these violations. Id. § 1215(a)(3). Finally,\\nthe MSPB resolves employment disputes involving\\nAdministrative Law Judges, who cannot be removed,\\nsuspended, or demoted without “good cause” as found by the\\nMSPB. Id. § 7521.\\n\\n In its various adjudications, the MSPB may award a wide\\nrange of interim and final relief. Upon request by the Special\\nCounsel, any MSPB member may “order a stay of any\\npersonnel action” reasonably believed to constitute a\\nprohibited personnel practice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Such\\nstays may last for up to 45 days initially, and the MSPB may\\nextend them for “any period” it considers appropriate. Id.\\n\\n 13\\n§ 1214(b)(1)(B)(i). To remedy unwarranted discipline\\nimposed by an employing agency, the MSPB may order\\naffirmative relief including reinstatement and backpay. See\\nElgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 6 (2012). For prohibited\\npersonnel practices, it may order “corrective action” that\\nincludes reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory damages.\\nId. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, and penalties of\\nup to $1,000, or “any combination” of these sanctions. Id.\\n§ 1215(a)(3)(A).\\n\\n The MSPB has its own litigating authority. Except in the\\nSupreme Court, its attorneys “may appear for the Board, and\\nrepresent the Board, in any civil action brought in connection\\nwith any function carried out by the Board.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(i). When aggrieved employees seek judicial review of\\nits decisions, the MSPB (rather than the employing agency or\\nofficial) is sometimes the respondent. See id. § 7703(a)(2).\\nSpecifically, it is the respondent when the employee challenges\\nan adverse procedural ruling, Spruill v. MSPB, 978 F.2d 679,\\n684 (Fed. Cir. 1992), or when the MSPB adjudicates a dispute\\nin the first instance, Costello v. MSPB, 182 F.3d 1372, 1381\\n(Fed. Cir. 1999).\\n\\n The MSPB has three overlapping grants of rulemaking\\nauthority. It may promulgate “such regulations as may be\\nnecessary for the performance of its functions.” 5 U.S.C.\\n§ 1204(h). It may promulgate “regulations to carry out the\\npurpose” of conducting administrative appeals. Id. § 7701(k).\\nAnd it may promulgate regulations “for the purpose of section\\n7521,” which governs adverse employment actions against\\nALJs. Id. § 1305. The MSPB also may sua sponte review\\nregulations promulgated by the Office of Personnel\\nManagement. Id. § 1204(f)(1). It may declare such regulations\\n\\n 14\\ninvalid, on their face or as implemented, to the extent they\\npurport to require prohibited personnel practices. Id.\\n§ 1204(f)(2). And it may “require any agency” to “cease\\ncompliance” with such regulations. Id. § 1204(f)(4)(A).\\n\\n II\\n\\n The President removed Gwynne Wilcox from the NLRB\\nand Cathy Harris from the MSPB. In defense of those actions,\\nthe government does not contend that Wilcox or Harris\\nengaged in any conduct that would support for-cause removal\\nunder the relevant statutory restrictions. Instead, it argues that\\nthe restrictions are unconstitutional.\\n\\n Wilcox and Harris sued to challenge their removals. The\\ndistrict courts held that the statutory removal protections are\\nconstitutional under Humphrey’s Executor; they declared that\\nWilcox and Harris continue to hold their respective offices; and\\nthey enjoined the government from interfering with the\\nindividuals’ ability to function as board members. Wilcox v.\\nTrump, 775 F. Supp. 3d 215 (D.D.C. 2025); Harris v. Bessent,\\n775 F. Supp. 3d 164 (D.D.C. 2025). The government appealed\\nand sought interim stays pending appeal. A motions panel of\\nthis Court granted the stays, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037,\\n2025 WL 980278 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 2025), but the full Court\\nvacated that decision, Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037, 2025\\nWL 1021435 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (en banc) (per curiam).\\n\\n The Supreme Court then stayed the district courts’ orders\\npending the resolution of these appeals and any ensuing\\npetitions for certiorari. Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415\\n(2025) (per curiam). In doing so, the Court found it likely “that\\nboth the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive\\npower,” which it said would make the removal restrictions\\nunconstitutional. Id. at 1415.\\n\\n 15\\n III\\n\\n A\\n\\n Article II of the Constitution vests “[t]he executive Power”\\nof the United States “in a President,” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1,\\ncl. 1, and requires him to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully\\nexecuted,” id. § 3. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52\\n(1926), the Supreme Court held that the Vesting and Take Care\\nClauses prevent Congress from restricting the President’s\\nability to remove government officers who wield significant\\nexecutive power on his behalf. See id. at 117–18, 163–64. The\\nCourt invalidated a statute requiring the Senate to provide\\nadvice and consent to effectuate the President’s removal of a\\nfirst-class postmaster. See id. at 107, 176. In later cases, the\\nCourt applied Myers to invalidate statutory restrictions on the\\nPresident’s ability to remove various principal officers. See\\nCollins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220 (2021) (Director of Federal\\nHousing Finance Agency); Seila Law, 591 U.S. 197 (Director\\nof CFPB); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,\\n561 U.S. 477 (2010) (members of PCAOB). More recently,\\nthe Court noted that because the President’s “exclusive power\\nof removal in executive agencies” is “conclusive and\\npreclusive,” Congress may not restrict it. Trump v. United\\nStates, 603 U.S. 593, 609 (2024) (quoting Youngstown Sheet &\\nTube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 & n.4 (1952) (Jackson,\\nJ., concurring)).\\n\\n A different line of precedent qualifies these cases. In\\nHumphrey’s Executor, the Supreme Court upheld the\\nconstitutionality of a statute barring the President from\\nremoving members of the Federal Trade Commission absent\\n“inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”\\n15 U.S.C. § 41. The Court acknowledged Myers’s holding that\\nCongress cannot restrict the President’s ability to remove\\n\\n 16\\n“purely executive officers.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\\n627–28. But it concluded that Myers does not govern the\\nremoval of an officer “who exercises no part of the executive\\npower vested by the Constitution in the President.” Id. at 628.\\nAnd it characterized the FTC’s powers not as executive, but as\\n“quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.” Id. In Wiener v. United\\nStates, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), the Court applied Humphrey’s\\nExecutor to infer and uphold a cause requirement for removing\\nmembers of the War Claims Commission, a tribunal that\\nadjudicated claims under a statutory scheme for compensating\\ncertain Americans held by the Axis powers during World War\\nII. Id. at 349–50, 355–56. Other precedents have upheld cause\\nrequirements for the removal of certain inferior officers.\\nMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); United States v.\\nPerkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886).\\n\\n In Seila Law, the Court read Humphrey’s Executor\\nnarrowly and expressly declined to extend it. According to the\\nCourt, “text, first principles, the First Congress’s decision in\\n1789 [regarding removal of executive officers], Myers, and\\nFree Enterprise Fund all establish that the President’s removal\\npower is the rule, not the exception.” 591 U.S. at 228.\\nMoreover, Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison reflect “two\\nexceptions—one for multimember expert agencies that do not\\nwield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers\\nwith limited duties and no policymaking or administrative\\nauthority.” Id. at 218. Furthermore, these exceptions\\n“represent what up to now have been the outermost\\nconstitutional limits of permissible congressional restrictions\\non the President’s removal power.” Id. (quoting PHH Corp. v.\\nCFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc)\\n(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)). As it had done previously, the\\nCourt declined to “extend” Humphrey’s Executor to a “new\\nsituation.” Id. at 220 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at\\n483).\\n\\n 17\\n Seila Law held that the Myers rule—not the Humphrey’s\\nExecutor exception—governs removal of the CFPB Director.\\nTo distinguish Humphrey’s Executor, the Court identified three\\nsignificant executive powers vested in the CFPB. First, the\\nCFPB can “promulgate binding rules” implementing the\\nstatutes that it administers. 591 U.S. at 218. Second, it can\\n“issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in\\nadministrative adjudications.” Id. at 219. Third, it can “seek\\ndaunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf\\nof the United States in federal court—a quintessentially\\nexecutive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.” Id.\\n\\n B\\n\\n These appeals turn on whether Humphrey’s Executor\\napplies to the NLRB and MSPB. At first glance, that question\\nseems to turn on whether these agencies exercise any\\nsignificant executive power within the meaning of the Vesting\\nClause, which would bring this case within the rule of Myers\\nand Seila Law; or whether the agencies exercise only quasi-\\nlegislative and quasi-judicial powers, which Humphrey’s\\nExecutor deemed to fall outside the President’s executive\\npower under Article II. See 295 U.S. at 627–28. But after\\nHumphrey’s Executor was decided, two related developments\\nin separation-of-powers jurisprudence made it all but\\nimpossible to distinguish executive power from quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial power.\\n\\n First, the Supreme Court has broadened its understanding\\nof what powers count as executive. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424\\nU.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), the Court held that the Federal\\nElection Commission’s “enforcement power, exemplified by\\nits discretionary power to seek judicial relief,” is an executive\\npower entrusted to the President through the Take Care Clause.\\nSee id. at 138. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the\\n\\n 18\\nCourt held that the power to interpret and apply a statute\\nrequiring certain budget cuts is executive. See id. at 733\\n(“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the\\nlegislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the\\nlaw.”). In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991),\\nJustice Scalia explained at length that “there is nothing\\n‘inherently judicial’ about ‘adjudication,’” which Article II\\nagencies perform routinely. Id. at 909 (concurring in part and\\nconcurring in the judgment); see id. at 909–12. And in City of\\nArlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013), the Court explained\\nthat rulemaking and administrative adjudication “take\\n‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—\\nindeed, under our constitutional structure they must be\\nexercises of—the ‘executive Power.’” Id. at 304 n.4 (quoting\\nArticle II Vesting Clause). With enforcement, rulemaking, and\\nadministrative adjudication all classed as executive powers,\\nwhat is left of the assertedly discrete categories of quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial powers? In sum, “[t]he Court’s\\nconclusion [in Humphrey’s Executor] that the FTC did not\\nexercise executive power has not withstood the test of time.”\\nSeila Law, 591 U.S. at 216 n.2 (citing City of Arlington, 569\\nU.S. at 304 n.4). To the contrary, it is “hard to dispute that the\\npowers of the FTC at the time of Humphrey’s Executor would\\nat the present time be considered ‘executive,’ at least to some\\ndegree.” Id. (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28).\\n\\n Second, the Supreme Court increasingly has stressed that\\nthere are only three kinds of constitutional powers, and two of\\nthem are not delegable. “Our Constitution divided the ‘powers\\nof the new Federal Government into three defined categories,\\nLegislative, Executive, and Judicial.’” Free Enter. Fund, 561\\nU.S. at 483 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).\\nOnly Congress itself may exercise the legislative power. See\\nWhitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001)\\n(Article I “permits no delegation”). And only life-tenured\\n\\n 19\\njudges may exercise the “judicial Power of the United States.”\\nStern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011) (quoting U.S.\\nConst. Art. III, § 1); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488\\nU.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A judge may not\\nleave the decision to his law clerk, or to a master.”). So by\\nprocess of elimination, if agencies may receive neither\\nlegislative nor judicial powers, what is left for them other than\\nsome portion of the executive power?\\n\\n These considerations suggest that very little remains of\\nHumphrey’s Executor. Perhaps its most plausible application\\nis to purely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims\\nCommission at issue in Wiener. But under today’s separation-\\nof-powers jurisprudence, even those bodies exercise the\\nPresident’s executive power. See, e.g., United States v.\\nArthrex, Inc., 594 U.S. 1, 17 (2021) (Administrative Patent\\nJudges); Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 932 (D.C. Cir.\\n2014) (Tax Court judges). Recall that Seila Law limited\\nHumphrey’s Executor to entities that “do not wield substantial\\nexecutive power.” 591 U.S. at 218. So maybe agencies with\\nany “substantial” power—quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, or\\notherwise—fall outside Humphrey’s Executor because that\\npower is and must be executive. See Consumers’ Rsch. v.\\nCPSC, 98 F.4th 646, 650–57 (5th Cir. 2024) (Oldham, J.,\\ndissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Maybe\\nHumphrey’s Executor thus governs only agencies with purely\\nadvisory functions—like, say, the United States Commission\\non Civil Rights, see Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028, 2025\\nWL 559669, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (Katsas, J.,\\ndissenting). And maybe the Supreme Court, which is now\\nconsidering whether to overrule Humphrey’s Executor, will\\nsoon hold as much. See Stay Order, Trump v. Slaughter, No.\\n25-332 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2025).\\n\\n 20\\n All of that said, we are reluctant to decide these appeals\\nalong those lines. Of course, we must apply Humphrey’s\\nExecutor as best we can, unless and until the Supreme Court\\noverrules it. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American\\nExpress, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). Moreover, despite\\nrejecting the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor, the Supreme\\nCourt has twice expressly declined to overrule it. See Seila\\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 228; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 483. And\\nSeila Law acknowledged that Humphrey’s Executor had\\nupheld removal restrictions for an agency with powers that\\n“would at the present time be considered executive.” 591 U.S.\\nat 216 n.2 (quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690 n.28). Given\\nthese considerations, maybe Congress still may restrict\\nremoval if the board at issue has only those powers that\\nHumphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-\\njudicial, even if those powers are now recognized as executive.\\n\\n Fortunately, we need not resolve all these tensions. As we\\nexplain below, the NLRB and MSPB exercise significant\\nexecutive powers, which is enough to trigger the general rule\\nof Myers and Seila Law. Moreover, many of those powers\\nexceed ones that Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-\\nlegislative or quasi-judicial, which makes this case fall outside\\nany exception based on that decision.\\n\\n C\\n\\n So what powers did Humphrey’s Executor deem to be\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial? That case involved powers\\nvested in the FTC by the Federal Trade Commission Act as\\noriginally enacted in 1914. Section 5 of that Act prohibited\\n“unfair methods of competition in commerce.” Act of Sept. 26,\\n1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719–20 (codified as amended\\nat 15 U.S.C. § 45). It authorized the Commission to adjudicate\\ncomplaints alleging unfair methods of competition, to issue\\n\\n 21\\ncease-and-desist orders, and to seek judicial enforcement of\\nthose orders. Id. Section 6 of the Act authorized the\\nCommission to make and file reports with other governmental\\nentities, including Congress. Id. at 721–22 (codified as\\namended at 15 U.S.C. § 46). Section 7 authorized the\\nCommission to act “as a master in chancery” in pending\\nantitrust actions. Id. at 722 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 47). For\\nour purposes, “what matters is the set of powers the Court\\nconsidered as the basis for its decision” in Humphrey’s\\nExecutor. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219 n.4.\\n\\n 1\\n\\n In distinguishing Myers, the Court deemed only one of the\\nFTC’s powers to be quasi-legislative: making reports for\\nCongress. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628 (“In making\\ninvestigations and reports … for the information of Congress\\nunder section 6, in aid of the legislative power, it acts as a\\nlegislative agency.”). That power is “investigative and\\ninformative”—one that “Congress might delegate to one of its\\nown committees.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.\\n\\n More interesting is a power that Humphrey’s Executor did\\nnot describe as quasi-legislative. Section 6(g) of the FTC Act\\nauthorized the Commission “to make rules and regulations for\\nthe purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act.” 38 Stat.\\nat 722. Yet Humphrey’s Executor did not mention that\\nprovision, much less characterize it as conferring on the FTC\\nthe quasi-legislative power to engage in substantive\\nrulemaking. This was hardly surprising because “the agency\\nitself did not assert the power to promulgate substantive rules\\nuntil 1962 and indeed indicated intermittently that it lacked\\nsuch a power.” Nat’l Petrol. Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d\\n672, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Before Humphrey’s Executor was\\ndecided, the Commission had expressly disclaimed the power\\n\\n 22\\nto promulgate substantive rules governing primary conduct, as\\nopposed to procedural rules governing the conduct of\\nadministrative adjudication under section 5. See id. at 693\\nn.27; Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission for the\\nFiscal Year Ended June 30, 1922 at 36 (“One of the most\\ncommon mistakes is to suppose that the commission can\\nissue … regulations unconnected with any proceeding before\\nit.”). For this reason, the Supreme Court cited the CFPB’s\\npower “to promulgate binding [substantive] rules” as one\\nimportant power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor—and\\none key reason why Humphrey’s Executor does not apply to\\nthe CFPB. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n Humphrey’s Executor conceived of “quasi-judicial”\\npower as assisting the Article III courts or, at most, engaging\\nin a restrained species of administrative adjudication modeled\\non how Article III judges resolve cases or controversies.\\n\\n In distinguishing Myers, the Supreme Court expressly\\ndescribed only one of the FTC’s powers as “quasi-judicial”—\\nits section 7 power to assist the courts. See 295 U.S. at 628.\\nThat provision allowed a federal district court, if it found that\\nequitable remedies were warranted in an antitrust case, to\\n“refer” the case “to the commission, as a master in chancery, to\\nascertain and report an appropriate form of decree.” 38 Stat. at\\n722. In that instance, the Commission would prepare and file\\na report, which the court could “adopt or reject” as it chose. Id.\\nAs Humphrey’s Executor perceived it, “quasi-judicial” power\\nis thus merely the power to “act[] as an agency of the\\njudiciary.” 295 U.S. at 628. Today, we might liken this power\\nto that of a magistrate judge or a special master. See 28 U.S.C.\\n§ 636 (magistrate judges); Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (special masters).\\n\\n 23\\n More generally, the Supreme Court also referenced the\\nFTC’s power to conduct administrative adjudications under\\nsection 5, which it described as “filling in and administering\\nthe details” regarding a “general” statutory prohibition of\\nunfair methods of competition. See 295 U.S. at 628.\\nAccording to the Court, that enterprise emphatically did not\\ninvolve any discretionary policy judgments. Instead, the FTC\\nwas a “nonpartisan” body required to “act with entire\\nimpartiality.” Id. at 624. And it was “charged with the\\nenforcement of no policy except the policy of the law.” Id. In\\nWiener, the Court similarly described administrative\\nadjudication by the War Claims Commission: Claims before it\\n“were to be ‘adjudicated according to law,’ that is, on the merits\\nof each claim, supported by evidence and governing legal\\nconsiderations.” 357 U.S. at 355. These descriptions resemble\\nJustice Scalia’s minimalist account of adjudication in\\nFreytag—agencies or courts “determine facts, apply a rule of\\nlaw to those facts, and thus arrive at a decision.” 501 U.S. at\\n909 (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). These\\ndescriptions also conjure up an enduring image of how judges\\nare supposed to adjudicate, as umpires fairly applying set rules\\nto call balls and strikes.\\n\\n Precedents contemporaneous with Humphrey’s Executor\\nconfirm this restrained conception of FTC administrative\\nadjudication. For one thing, the Supreme Court repeatedly had\\nheld that the meaning of “unfair methods of competition,”\\nalthough open-ended, was “for the courts, not the commission,\\nultimately to determine as [a] matter of law.” FTC v. Gratz,\\n253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920); see FTC v. Curtis Pub. Co., 260 U.S.\\n568, 579–80 (1923) (following Gratz). Moreover, courts\\ndiscerned the meaning of that phrase not through broad or\\npolicy-laden pronouncements, but by “the gradual process of\\njudicial inclusion and exclusion,” consistent with traditional\\ncommon-law adjudication. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643,\\n\\n 24\\n648 (1931) (cleaned up). Some of these precedents eventually\\nwere disapproved. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316,\\n320–21 (1966) (disapproving Gratz). But in 1935, insofar as\\nFTC administrative adjudication was deemed a quasi-judicial\\npower, it was at most the power to resolve disputes like judges.\\n\\n * * * *\\n\\n In sum, Humphrey’s Executor laid down specific\\nconceptions of what counts as “quasi-legislative” or “quasi-\\njudicial” power. The former includes only legislative research\\nfunctions such as investigating, writing reports, and making\\nrecommendations to Congress. The latter includes only the\\npower to serve as a trial master or to act as a judge-like\\nadjudicator without policymaking authority. As Seila Law\\nnoted, neither category encompasses the powers to promulgate\\nsubstantive rules or to impose civil fines. See 591 U.S. at 218–\\n19. And although Humphrey’s Executor did not separately\\nanalyze available remedies, Seila Law stressed that the FTC in\\n1935 could only assist courts or enter cease-and-desist orders,\\nas opposed to awarding damages or affirmative equitable relief.\\nSee id.\\n\\n IV\\n\\n The powers of the NLRB and MSPB substantially exceed\\nthe circumscribed administrative powers that Humphrey’s\\nExecutor deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial.\\n\\n A\\n\\n Congress has vested the NLRB with several executive\\npowers beyond the ones addressed in Humphrey’s Executor.\\n\\n First, the NLRB possesses “broad rulemaking authority.”\\nAm. Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 613 (1991). Section 6\\n\\n 25\\nof the NLRA empowers the agency to promulgate “such rules\\nand regulations as may be necessary to carry out the\\nprovisions” of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 156. In American\\nHospital Association, the Supreme Court held that this\\nauthority covers not only rules establishing unfair labor\\npractices under section 8, but also “industry-wide rule[s]\\ndelineating … appropriate bargaining units” under section 9.\\n499 U.S. at 611. Invoking that power, the NLRB has\\npromulgated rules governing collective bargaining in the health\\ncare industry. 29 C.F.R. § 103.30. As Seila Law made clear,\\nthe power to “promulgate binding rules fleshing out” major\\nfederal statutes exceeds the powers that Humphrey’s Executor\\ndeemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. See 591 U.S.\\nat 218. Needless to say, it is also a quintessential executive\\npower under current constitutional standards.\\n\\n Wilcox objects that the NLRB has not often engaged in\\nsubstantive rulemaking. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 103.1–3; Nat’l Ass’n\\nof Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But that\\nis irrelevant to our inquiry. When evaluating the\\nconstitutionality of removal restrictions, courts consider the\\n“authority” that an agency “possesses,” not the rigor with\\nwhich the power is exercised. Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218. So,\\n“an agency’s voluntary self-denial” of its rulemaking power\\n“has no bearing” on our constitutional analysis. Am. Trucking\\nAss’ns, 531 U.S. at 473.\\n\\n Second, the NLRB conducts administrative adjudications\\nthat are nothing like the model of adjudication that Humphrey’s\\nExecutor treated as quasi-judicial. Recall that model: A\\n“nonpartisan” body of experts acts “with entire impartiality” to\\nundertake “the enforcement of no policy except the policy of\\nthe law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And courts\\ndecide what the governing statutory standard means, through a\\nneutral process of case-by-case adjudication. See Raladam,\\n\\n 26\\n283 U.S. at 648; Gratz, 253 U.S. at 427. In other words, courts\\nwould decide what constitutes an “unfair method of\\ncompetition” or an “unfair labor practice,” using familiar\\ninterpretive tools such as statutory text, structure, canons,\\nhistory, and precedent. This fairly describes the functioning of\\npurely adjudicatory bodies like the War Claims Commission,\\nwhich was charged with nothing more than adjudicating claims\\n“according to law.” 357 U.S. at 355. But it does not fairly\\ndescribe adjudication conducted by agencies with substantive\\nrulemaking power, which the Administrative Procedure Act\\ndefines as including the power to “prescribe law or policy.”\\nSee 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)–(5). For those agencies, the Supreme\\nCourt has held that “adjudication is a generally permissible\\nmode of law-making and policymaking,” precisely because the\\nagency has been “delegated the power to make law and policy\\nthrough rulemaking.” Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 154\\n(1991); see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03\\n(1947) (Chenery II).\\n\\n The NLRB conducts the latter kind of adjudications. It is\\ntasked with “developing and applying national labor policy.”\\nNLRB v. Curtin Matheson Sci., Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786 (1990).\\nSo, it may “announc[e] new principles in an adjudicative\\nproceeding.” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294\\n(1974); see Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 892 F.2d 1052, 1056\\n(D.C. Cir. 1989) (NLRB adjudication “enunciated a new rule,”\\nwhich “the Board has the authority to do”). The NLRB does\\nthis routinely, see, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.\\n251, 260–67 (1975); NLRB v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406\\nU.S. 272, 284–85 (1972), creating a bevy of requirements that\\nare akin to “statutory” rules or “one[s] established by\\nregulation,” Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793,\\n804–05 (1945).\\n\\n 27\\n Moreover, policy considerations drive NLRB\\nadjudications. The Supreme Court has contrasted the “narrow\\nconfines of law” for the courts with the “spacious domain of\\npolicy” for the NLRB. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.\\n177, 194 (1941). Likewise, this Court has held that the NLRB\\nmay “explicate why national labor policy requires” a given\\nrule. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Loc. No. 455 v. NLRB, 510 F.2d\\n802, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The NLRB routinely invokes\\n“policy” considerations not only to create rules by\\nadjudication, but also to overrule them. In re Lamons Gasket\\nCo., 357 NLRB 739, 739 (2011); In re IBM Corp., 341 NLRB\\n1288, 1290 (2004); see Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB,\\n100 F.4th 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2024) (O’Scannlain, J., specially\\nconcurring) (NLRB “frequently changes its mind, seesawing\\nback and forth between statutory interpretations depending on\\nits political composition, leaving workers, employers, and\\nunions in the lurch”). On one recent occasion, the NLRB\\noverruled itself for the fifth time, and this Court, barely\\nmentioning any statutory provisions, upheld the agency’s latest\\nposition as reasonably explained and thus not arbitrary. See\\nHosp. Menonita de Guayama, Inc. v. NLRB, 94 F.4th 1, 16\\n(D.C. Cir. 2024) (Katsas, J., concurring), GVR, 145 S. Ct. 982\\n(2024). Perhaps the NLRA will be somewhat more\\nconstraining now that Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo,\\n603 U.S. 369 (2024), has overruled Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.\\nNatural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But\\nit would blink reality to suppose that Loper Bright will\\neliminate the NLRB’s ability to conduct policymaking through\\nadjudication under Chenery II. Whatever the virtues of that\\nmodern species of administrative adjudication, it cannot fairly\\nbe described as approximating how Article III judges decide\\ncases, or as resting on “no policy except the policy of the law.”\\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 624. And it plainly involves the\\nexercise of substantial executive power. See City of Arlington,\\n569 U.S. at 304 n.4.\\n\\n 28\\n Third, the NLRB may award substantially broader\\nremedies than the FTC could in 1935. At that time, the FTC,\\nupon finding an unfair method of competition, could issue only\\na cease-and-desist order. See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at\\n620–21. Such orders impose only a “negative restriction.”\\nAlberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The NLRB,\\nin contrast, may award various forms of affirmative relief.\\nUpon finding an unfair labor practice, it may issue not only a\\ncease-and-desist order, but also one “requiring” the offending\\nemployer or union “to take such affirmative action including\\nreinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will\\neffectuate the policies of” the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). This\\nmay include the power to award compensatory damages. See\\nThryv, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 22, at *9–10. And it sometimes\\nincludes the power to compel employers to read NLRB-\\ncomposed admissions of liability, see Advancepierre Foods,\\nInc. v. NLRB, 966 F.3d 813, 820–21 (D.C. Cir. 2020), a remedy\\nthat Judge Williams likened to the practices of Joseph Stalin\\nand Mao Zedong, see HTH Corp., 823 F.3d at 677. Whatever\\nthe merits of that comparison, the NLRB’s remedial authority\\nsubstantially exceeds that of the FTC in 1935. This\\nconsideration also further distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219.\\n\\n Fourth, the NLRB has broader litigating authority than the\\nFTC did in 1935. Each agency may petition courts of appeals\\nto enforce final administrative orders. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)\\n(NLRB); 38 Stat. at 719–20 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.\\n§ 45) (FTC). But as noted above, NLRB remedial orders may\\nbe much broader than those of the FTC in 1935. Moreover, the\\nNLRB has litigating authority to seek interim relief in district\\ncourts. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j). In contrast, to obtain any judicial\\nrelief besides enforcement of a final cease-and-desist order, the\\nFTC in 1935 would have needed to ask the Attorney General\\nto seek mandamus on its behalf. See 38 Stat. at 722 (codified\\n\\n 29\\nas amended at 15 U.S.C. § 49); FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 274\\nU.S. 160, 173–74 (1927); Space Expl. Techs. Corp. v. NLRB,\\n151 F.4th 761, 776 n.76 (5th Cir. 2025). The NLRB’s greater\\nauthority to litigate on behalf of the United States both further\\ndistinguishes Humphrey’s Executor, see Seila Law, 591 U.S. at\\n218–19, and reflects a greater degree of executive power, see\\nBuckley, 424 U.S. at 138–40; In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255,\\n264 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.) (“civil\\nenforcement decisions brought by the Federal Government are\\npresumptively an exclusive Executive power”).\\n\\n Wilcox objects that NLRB litigation is conducted by its\\nGeneral Counsel, an executive officer removable at-will by the\\nPresident. But while the General Counsel has “final authority”\\nto prosecute unfair-labor-practice complaints before the\\nNLRB, 29 U.S.C. § 153(d); see NLRB v. United Food & Com.\\nWorkers Union, Loc. 23, 484 U.S. 112, 118–19 (1987), the\\nNLRA gives the Board itself control over litigation in court, 29\\nU.S.C. § 160(e), (j). The General Counsel conducts that\\nlitigation pursuant to a delegation from the Board under section\\n3(d), which permits the NLRB to assign to the General Counsel\\n“such other duties as the Board may prescribe.” Id. § 153(d).\\nUnder the terms of that delegation, the General Counsel\\nconducts litigation “in full accordance with the directions of the\\nBoard.” Authority and Assigned Responsibilities of General\\nCounsel of National Labor Relations Board § I.B, 20 Fed. Reg.\\n2,175, 2,175 (Apr. 6, 1955).\\n\\n Finally, the NLRB exercises substantial executive power\\nin administering section 9 of the NLRA, which governs the\\ndetermination of appropriate units for collective bargaining and\\nthe conduct of union elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159. Wilcox\\nobjects that elections are supervised primarily by the NLRB’s\\nregional offices, which in turn are supervised by the General\\nCounsel. See id. § 153(d). Yet the NLRA clearly gives the\\n\\n 30\\nBoard itself, not the General Counsel, final authority over\\nsection 9 administration. See id. § 159(b) (“The Board shall\\ndecide in each case … the unit appropriate for the purposes of\\ncollective bargaining ….”); id. § 159(c) (“the Board shall\\ninvestigate” petitions to conduct a union election). Indeed, the\\nBoard’s most prominent substantive rule to date involved not\\nan elaboration of unfair labor practices, but a determination of\\nappropriate bargaining units in the health care industry. See 29\\nC.F.R. § 103.30.\\n\\n Because the NLRB’s rulemaking, adjudicatory, remedial,\\nenforcement, and election-administration powers are not solely\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, the agency falls well outside\\nthe Humphrey’s Executor exception.\\n\\n B\\n\\n The MSPB likewise has more executive powers than ones\\nthat Humphrey’s Executor deemed to be quasi-legislative or\\nquasi-judicial.\\n\\n Start with rulemaking. The CSRA empowers the MSPB\\nto promulgate regulations “for the performance of its\\nfunctions,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h), and “for the purpose of section\\n7521,” id. § 1305. Section 7521 prohibits the “removal” of\\nALJs without a prior MSPB determination of good cause. Id.\\n§ 7521(a), (b)(1). In Tunik v. MSPB, 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir.\\n2005), the Federal Circuit held these grants of rulemaking\\npower authorize the MSPB to decide, with the force and effect\\nof law, what constitutes a prohibited “removal.” Id. at 1345.\\nIn other words, they permit the MSPB to define by regulation\\nwhat primary conduct section 7521 prohibits, not simply to\\nprescribe rules for the adjudication of disputes under that\\nprovision. To be sure, the MSPB’s rulemaking authority with\\nrespect to section 7521 does not rival the broad rulemaking\\nauthority of the NLRB, and the contours of its other rulemaking\\n\\n 31\\nauthorities are unclear. Nonetheless, the existence of at least\\nsome substantive rulemaking power counts as a distinction of\\nHumphrey’s Executor and as executive power under Article II.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 218.\\n\\n As for adjudication, the MSPB may be less aggressive than\\nthe NLRB in naked appeals to shifting policy preferences, but\\nits adjudicatory powers still exceed what Humphrey’s Executor\\ndeemed to be quasi-judicial. This is true on at least three\\ndifferent dimensions—finality, breadth of jurisdiction, and\\nbreadth of remedial authority.\\n\\n Finality. The power to “unilaterally issue final decisions”\\nis a significant executive power that was not present in\\nHumphrey’s Executor. See Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. In\\n1935, an FTC cease-and-desist order remained ineffective\\nunless and until the agency persuaded a court of appeals to\\nenforce it. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 22 (1929); Claire\\nFurnace, 274 U.S. at 170. In contrast, the MSPB may “take\\nfinal action on any” matter “within the jurisdiction of the\\nBoard,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1), and also may “order any\\nFederal agency or employee to comply” with any of its orders,\\nid. § 1204(a)(2). Aggrieved employees may obtain judicial\\nreview of final MSPB decisions, but the decisions remain\\neffective unless and until a court of appeals sets them aside.\\nSee id. § 7703.\\n\\n Breadth of jurisdiction. In 1935, the FTC was a\\nspecialized tribunal. At that time, section 5 of the FTC Act was\\nlimited to addressing “unfair methods of competition.” See 38\\nStat. at 719; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (now also addressing\\n“unfair or deceptive acts or practices”). So, the FTC was\\nlargely directed towards antitrust enforcement, as reflected in\\nits role as a “master in chancery” for antitrust cases.\\nHumphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628. In contrast, the MSPB is\\n\\n 32\\nmore a jack-of-all-trades. In determining prohibited personnel\\npractices, it must administer portions of Title VII, the Age\\nDiscrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards\\nAct, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Whistleblower Protection\\nAct. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1), (8). And those five statutes\\nencompass only two of 14 categories of personnel practices\\nthat the CSRA prohibits and that the MSPB must consider. Id.\\n§ 2302(b). The MSPB also must administer the Uniformed\\nServices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and the\\nVeterans Employment Opportunities Act. See id.\\n§§ 1204(a)(1), 3330a(d)(1); 38 U.S.C. § 4324. It must\\nadminister the Hatch Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and\\nvarious other statutes within the prosecutorial authority of the\\nSpecial Counsel. 5 U.S.C. § 1216(a). Finally, it must decide\\nwhether employing agencies have meted out appropriate\\ndiscipline. Id. § 7513(d). To do that, the MSPB makes its own\\n“discretionary judgment,” which “is by no means” a mere legal\\nor factual inquiry. Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B.\\n313, 325–26 (1981). Instead, it involves application of a non-\\nexclusive, twelve-factor balancing test that considers, among\\nother things, the nature of the offense, the employee’s work and\\ndisciplinary record, the potential for rehabilitation, mitigating\\ncircumstances, and the adequacy of alternative sanctions. See\\nConor v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 8 F.4th 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir.\\n2021) (citing Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332). According to the\\nMSPB, this searching inquiry is “considerably broader” than\\none that courts would undertake. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 327.\\nThus, it cannot plausibly be described as “quasi-judicial.”\\nLikewise, it cannot fairly be characterized as involving “no\\npolicy except the policy of the law.” Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295\\nU.S. at 624.\\n\\n Breadth of remedial authority. When it finds a legal\\nviolation, the MSPB can do far more than simply order the\\noffending agency to cease and desist. For unwarranted\\n\\n 33\\nemployee discipline, the MSPB may order relief “including\\nreinstatement, backpay, and attorney’s fees.” Elgin, 567 U.S.\\nat 6. For prohibited personnel practices, it may order corrective\\naction that includes reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and\\nconsequential damages, medical and other costs, travel\\nexpenses, attorney’s fees, expert witness fees, and interest.\\n5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(g), 1221(g)(1). In cases where it imposes\\ndiscipline, the MSPB may order removal, demotion, debarment\\nfrom federal employment for up to five years, suspension,\\nreprimand, civil penalties of up to $1,000, or “any\\ncombination” of these sanctions. Id. § 1215(a)(3)(A). And for\\nviolation of its own orders, the MSPB also may order the salary\\nof an offending official to be withheld. Id. § 1204(e)(2)(A).\\nAll of this sharply distinguishes Humphrey’s Executor. The\\npower to award “legal and equitable relief in administrative\\nadjudications” is an executive power that was not at issue there.\\nSee Seila Law, 591 U.S. at 219. Moreover, if the power to\\n“seek daunting monetary penalties” in court is also such a\\npower, see id., then so too is the power to impose such penalties\\nunilaterally.\\n\\n Unlike the FTC in 1935, the MSPB also may award\\ninterim relief in some circumstances—and may do so on a\\nwholesale basis. Upon request by the Special Counsel, any\\nMSPB member may “order a stay of any personnel action” that\\nshe reasonably believes to constitute a prohibited personnel\\npractice. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(b)(1)(A). Recently, Harris herself\\ninvoked this authority to reinstate nearly 6,000 laid-off\\nemployees pending further administrative proceedings. Order\\non Stay Request, Special Counsel ex rel. John Doe v. USDA,\\nNo. CB-1208-25-0020-U-1 (MSPB Mar. 5, 2025),\\nhttps://perma.cc/3F45-PKG5. That too far exceeds the FTC’s\\nremedial authority in 1935.\\n\\n 34\\n Harris objects that we should not consider the MSPB’s\\nsalary-withholding power because the statute granting it is\\nunconstitutional. This argument addresses only one of many\\nremedial powers that were not present in Humphrey’s\\nExecutor. In any event, the argument fails on its own terms.\\nHarris contends that withholding a salary requires involvement\\nof the Comptroller General, who is a legislative official. She\\ninvokes Bowsher, which held that Congress could not vest the\\nComptroller General with the executive power to decide what\\nbudget cuts a particular statute required. See 478 U.S. at 733–\\n34. The argument correctly assumes that the power to withhold\\nthe salary of a government official is executive. But the\\nComptroller General does not exercise this power. “[T]he\\nBoard may order” that the offending employee “shall not be\\nentitled to receive payment for service as an employee” during\\nthe period of non-compliance. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(e)(2)(A). The\\nMSPB must “certify” its order to the Comptroller General, who\\nis in no way authorized to review it. Id. So, unlike the statute\\nat issue in Bowsher, the CSRA does not give the Comptroller\\nGeneral any discretion to bind the Executive Branch.\\n\\n Finally, consider litigating authority, another executive\\npower not addressed in Humphrey’s Executor. The MSPB’s\\npower to appear “in any civil action brought in connection with\\nany function carried out by the Board,” 5 U.S.C. § 1204(i),\\ncontemplates MSPB control of any district-court litigation\\nbrought by or against the agency. And the MSPB sometimes\\nis the proper respondent when its orders are challenged in a\\ncourt of appeals. See Spruill, 978 F.2d at 684; Costello, 182\\nF.3d at 1381. That too cuts against the MSPB’s position here.\\nPurely adjudicatory agencies—ones designed to be “an\\nindependent adjudicator” with no policymaking authority—are\\ngenerally not proper parties to defend their decisions on review,\\njust as district judges are generally not proper parties to defend\\ntheir decisions on appeal. Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l\\n\\n 35\\nUnion v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643, 651–52 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see\\nHinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995).\\n\\n In sum, the MSPB has at least some substantive\\nrulemaking power; it administers a host of wide-ranging\\nfederal statutes; it awards various kinds of affirmative,\\ncompensatory, and punitive relief; and it litigates in court on its\\nown behalf. Taken together, these powers well exceed the\\npowers deemed to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial in\\nHumphrey’s Executor and the powers vested in the War Claims\\nCommission. For these reasons, Congress may not restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove MSPB members.\\n\\n V\\n\\n The constitutional problem in these cases arises from two\\nfeatures of each agency: (1) the agency has been vested with\\nsignificant executive power that cannot be characterized as\\nquasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, and (2) Congress has\\nrestricted the President’s ability to remove its members.\\nWilcox and Harris urge us to solve the constitutional problem\\nby stripping away agency powers, rather than by declining to\\nenforce the removal restrictions.\\n\\n We reject that proposal. When the Supreme Court\\nencounters a statute that unconstitutionally insulates an\\nexecutive officer from at-will removal, it has typically\\nresponded by disregarding the removal restriction. See Myers,\\n272 U.S. at 176; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508–10; Seila\\nLaw, 591 U.S. at 232–38. Our Circuit has done likewise.\\nDellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5052, 2025 WL 717383, at *1\\n(D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2025) (per curiam). Following that well-\\nworn path, we hold that the appropriate resolution here is to\\ndisregard the statutory removal restrictions for NLRB and\\n\\n 36\\nMSPB members, not to blue-pencil provisions from among the\\nfull panoply of the executive powers of each agency.2\\n\\n VI\\n\\n We close by flagging three issues not resolved here.\\n\\n First, we do not decide whether Congress may restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove officers with solely adjudicatory\\nfunctions. Our analysis above has distinguished the court-like\\nadjudication of bodies such as the War Claims Commission\\nfrom the Chenery II-like adjudication of agencies vested with\\nboth adjudicatory and policymaking responsibilities. And we\\nhave shown that the powers vested in the NLRB and MSPB\\nsignificantly exceed those vested in the FTC in 1935 and those\\nvested in the War Claims Commission. We express no opinion\\nregarding other agencies that may plausibly be described as\\npurely adjudicatory.\\n\\n Second, despite multiple amicus briefs focused on this\\npoint, we do not address whether Congress may restrict the\\nPresident’s ability to remove members of the Board of\\nGovernors of the Federal Reserve System. Granting a stay in\\nthis case, the Supreme Court noted that there is a “distinct\\nhistorical tradition” regarding the treatment of congressionally\\nchartered banks, which may bear on Congress’s ability to\\nrestrict the removal of their officials. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at\\n\\n 2\\n The Supreme Court took a different approach in Bowsher.\\nAfter concluding that Congress had unconstitutionally conferred\\nexecutive power on a legislative officer removable only by Congress,\\nthe Court responded by stripping the officer of that power. 478 U.S.\\nat 734–36. But this merely implemented a statutory “fallback”\\nprovision setting forth how the law at issue should operate if one of\\nits provisions was held unconstitutional. See id. at 735. The NLRA\\nand the CSRA contain no such provision.\\n\\n 37\\n1415; see also An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the\\nBank of the United States, ch. 10, § 5, 1 Stat. 191, 193 (1791)\\n(directors of the First Bank of the United States were appointed\\nand removed “by the stockholders”). We have no occasion\\nhere to address the scope or import of that tradition.\\n\\n Third, because we hold that the President permissibly\\nremoved Wilcox and Harris, we do not consider whether\\nwrongfully removed principal officers may obtain declaratory,\\nequitable, or mandatory relief against the President or other\\ngovernment officials.\\n\\n VII\\n\\n For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgments\\nof the district courts.\\n\\n So ordered.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30996,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10749905,"string":"10,749,905"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"Nicolas Talbott v. USA"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-09"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-5087"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"BEFORE: Pillard*, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5087 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00240-ACR\\n Filed On: December 9, 2025\\nNicolas Talbott, et al.,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUnited States of America, et al.,\\n\\n Appellants\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Pillard*, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal, the\\nopposition thereto, and the reply; the Rule 28(j) letters, and the responses thereto; and\\nthe letter request to lift the administrative stay, and the response thereto, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the administrative stay entered on March 27, 2025, be dissolved.\\nIt is\\n\\n FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal be granted. A\\nconcurring statement of Circuit Judge Katsas, joined by Circuit Judge Rao, and a\\ndissenting statement of Circuit Judge Pillard are attached.\\n\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\\n\\n\\n* Circuit Judge Pillard would deny the motion for stay pending appeal.\\n\\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge, joined by RAO, Circuit Judge:\\nThe United States military enforces strict medical standards to\\nensure that only physically and mentally fit individuals join its\\nranks. For decades, these requirements barred service by\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, a medical condition\\nassociated with clinically significant distress. This bar was\\npartially relaxed in 2016, revived in 2018, partially relaxed\\nagain in 2021, and revived again in 2025. District courts\\npreliminarily enjoined the 2018 revival as a likely violation of\\nequal-protection principles, but this Court vacated one of those\\ninjunctions, and the Supreme Court stayed two others. This\\ncase presents equal-protection challenges to the 2025 revival.\\n\\n The 2025 policy generally bars individuals with gender\\ndysphoria from serving in the Armed Forces. The Secretary of\\nDefense concluded that this policy would advance important\\nmilitary interests of combat readiness, unit cohesion, and cost\\ncontrol. In doing so, he consulted materials compiled to assess\\nthe 2016 and 2018 policy changes, as well as more recent\\nstudies regarding the impacts of gender dysphoria on those\\nwith the condition and on their military service. The district\\ncourt nonetheless preliminarily enjoined the 2025 policy based\\non its own contrary assessment of the evidence.\\n\\n In our view, the court afforded insufficient deference to the\\nSecretary’s considered judgment. Accordingly, we stay the\\npreliminary injunction pending the government’s appeal.\\n\\n I\\n\\n A\\n\\n To join and remain in the United States military, service\\nmembers must meet strict medical standards. Lengthy\\nDepartment of Defense documents set out the requirements.\\n\\n 2\\nAdd. 1301; see, e.g., Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03, Vol. 1,\\nMedical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\\nEnlistment, or Induction (May 2024), https://perma.cc/J67Q-\\n982F (“DoD Accession Standards”); Dep’t of Def. Instruction\\n6130.03, Vol. 2, Medical Standards for Military Service:\\nRetention (June 2022), https://perma.cc/WFQ3-F229 (“DoD\\nRetention Standards”).\\n\\n Hundreds of medical conditions are “disqualifying” for\\naccession to military service. DoD Accession Standards at 13–\\n54. They run the gamut from poor vision, poor hearing,\\nasthma, and high blood pressure to various abdominal, heart,\\nlung, neurologic, urinary, vascular, and other deficiencies. See\\nid. at 13–50. Many mental-health conditions are also\\ndisqualifying. These include bipolar disorders, eating\\ndisorders, substance-related disorders, obsessive-compulsive\\ndisorder, and depression or anxiety disorders under certain\\nconditions. See id. at 50–52. The military traditionally has\\naligned these disqualifying mental-health conditions with those\\nlisted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\\nDisorders (DSM), a diagnostic and treatment manual published\\nby the American Psychiatric Association. See Doe 2 v.\\nShanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J.,\\nconcurring in the result).\\n\\n These requirements advance many military objectives.\\nAmong other things, they ensure that service members can\\ncomplete required training, serve in harsh or remote\\nenvironments, and perform their duties as safely as possible.\\nDoD Accession Standards at 5. The standards also reduce the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n “Add.” citations refer to the government’s addendum, while\\n“App.” citations refer to the plaintiffs’ appendix.\\n\\n 3\\nrisk that service members will “require excessive time lost\\nfrom duty” for medical reasons. Id. at 4.\\n\\n B\\n\\n This case involves application of these principles to gender\\ndysphoria, a medical condition experienced by certain\\ntransgender individuals. The term “transgender” describes an\\nindividual whose self-perceived gender is incongruent with his\\nor her biological sex. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and\\nStatistical Manual of Mental Disorders 511 (5th ed. Text\\nRevision 2022) (“DSM-5”). A subset of transgender\\nindividuals experience “gender dysphoria,” a psychological\\ncondition stemming from such an incongruence. See id. at\\n512–13. Gender dysphoria “is associated with clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\\nother important areas of functioning.” Id. at 513. Individuals\\nwith gender dysphoria often seek specialized treatment,\\nincluding hormone therapy, surgery, or other substantial\\ninterventions. See id. For example, women with gender\\ndysphoria may take testosterone to induce hair growth, a\\ndeepened voice, and increased muscle mass. They also may\\nundergo surgery to remove their breasts or change the\\nappearance of their genitalia. Men with gender dysphoria may\\nseek comparable hormonal or surgical interventions.\\n\\n Before 2016, the medical standards discussed above\\nbroadly barred transgender individuals from military service.\\nAdd. 125; see Doe 2, 917 F.3d at 696–97 (Wilkins, J.,\\nconcurring). Over the last decade, however, the governing\\nrules have changed repeatedly. One way or another, recent\\nstandards all distinguish between transgender individuals and\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.\\n\\n 4\\n 1\\n\\n In June 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued a\\npolicy permitting military service by transgender individuals\\nnot suffering from gender dysphoria. App. 17 (“Carter\\nPolicy”). For individuals seeking to join the military, a “history\\nof gender dysphoria [was] disqualifying” unless a licensed\\nmedical provider certified that the individual had been “stable\\nwithout clinically significant distress or impairment in social,\\noccupational, or other important areas of functioning for 18\\nmonths.” Id. at 20. Likewise, a “history of medical treatment\\nassociated with gender transition [was] disqualifying” unless a\\nmedical provider certified that the treatment had concluded and\\nthat the individual had been clinically stable for 18 months. Id.\\nFor individuals already serving in the military, the policy\\npermitted “[g]ender transition” despite noting that it “presents\\nunique challenges” for “military mission and readiness needs.”\\nId. at 21.\\n\\n In significant part, the Carter Policy rested on a report by\\nthe RAND Corporation, which recommended that transgender\\nindividuals be permitted to serve in the Armed Forces. App.\\n116 (“RAND Report”). Despite reaching this conclusion, the\\nRAND Report included significant caveats. It flagged as a\\n“critical limitation” the “lack of rigorous epidemiological\\nstudies of the size or health care needs of either the U.S.\\ntransgender population or the transgender population serving\\nin the military.” Id. at 138. Likewise, it acknowledged a lack\\nof data “from which to estimate” how many transgender\\nindividuals have gender dysphoria. Id. at 141. Regardless, the\\nreport found that hormone treatments make an individual\\nundeployable for a year. See id. at 202. But it discounted this\\nconcern based on an assertion that “only a small proportion” of\\ntransgender service members would seek the treatment in any\\ngiven year. Id. at 204.\\n\\n 5\\n After instituting the new policy, Secretary Carter issued a\\n71-page “implementation handbook” addressing “some of the\\nissues” posed for military commanders. U.S. Dep’t of Defense,\\nTransgender Service in the U.S. Military: An Implementation\\nHandbook at 1, 8 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/B9NH-\\n6YVT (“Carter Handbook”). Among other things, the\\nhandbook asked commanders to evaluate whether any\\n“treatment plan” would cause “impacts to the mission\\n(including deployments, operations, training and exercises).”\\nId. at 53. It discussed deployment to any nation that “view[s]\\ntransgender people as culturally unacceptable,” requiring\\ncommanders to consider reassignment and to “[p]roceed with\\ncaution for the safety of the Service member.” Id. at 69. It\\nanticipated “discomfort” from service members not wanting to\\nshare showers, bathrooms, and other living facilities with\\nindividuals of the opposite sex. Id. at 60, 64. And it flagged\\nfairness concerns if a transitioning service member could not\\nmeet the physical standards established for his or her “preferred\\ngender.” Id. at 48–49.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n In August 2017, President Trump ordered reconsideration\\nof the Carter Policy. As the President saw it, Secretary Carter\\nhad “failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that\\nterminating” the prior “longstanding policy and practice would\\nnot hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit\\ncohesion, or tax military resources.” Military Service by\\nTransgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,319, 41,319 (Aug.\\n30, 2017). The President reinstated the previous accession\\npolicy pending further study, and he substantially restricted\\ngovernment funding for “sex-reassignment surgical\\nprocedures.” Id. For individuals already serving in the\\nmilitary, he delayed any changes until Secretary of Defense\\nJames Mattis could implement a new policy. Id. at 41,319–20.\\n\\n 6\\n In February 2018, Secretary Mattis issued a policy titled\\n“Military Service by Transgender Individuals.” Add. 119\\n(“Mattis Policy”). This policy barred from military service\\nindividuals who would require or had undergone “gender\\ntransition.” Id. at 120. Likewise, it barred individuals with a\\nhistory of “gender dysphoria” from joining the military unless\\nthey had been “stable for 36 consecutive months in their\\nbiological sex prior to accession.” Id. Service members\\ndiagnosed with gender dysphoria after joining could continue\\nto serve if they “d[id] not require a change of gender and\\nremain[ed] deployable.” Id. Service members diagnosed with\\ngender dysphoria while the Carter Policy remained in effect\\ncould continue serving “in their preferred gender” and\\nreceiving “medically necessary treatment.” Id. Transgender\\nindividuals without a history of gender dysphoria could join\\nand serve “in their biological sex.” Id. at 121.\\n\\n The Mattis Policy rested on the “professional military\\njudgment” of “senior uniformed and civilian Defense\\nDepartment and U.S. Coast Guard leaders.” Add. 119. It also\\nrested on recommendations set forth in a Defense Department\\nreport reflecting “input from transgender Service members,\\ncommanders of transgender Service members, military medical\\nprofessionals, and civilian medical professionals with\\nexperience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 119–20; see id. at 122–66 (“Mattis Report”).\\nBased on this information, Secretary Mattis concluded that the\\nRAND Report “contained significant shortcomings.” Id. at\\n120. Specifically, it relied on “limited and heavily caveated\\ndata to support its conclusions, glossed over the impacts of\\nhealthcare costs, readiness, and unit cohesion, and erroneously\\nrelied on the selective experiences of foreign militaries with\\ndifferent operational requirements than our own.” Id.\\n\\n 7\\n These actions spurred litigation. Before Secretary Mattis\\nissued his policy, four district courts enjoined portions of\\nPresident Trump’s memorandum. Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F.\\nSupp. 3d 167, 177 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp.\\n3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, No. 17-cv-\\n1297, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017);\\nStockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799, 2017 WL 9732572, at\\n*16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). After Secretary Mattis issued\\nhis policy, we granted the government’s motion to dissolve one\\nof those injunctions. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22\\n(D.C. Cir. 2019). We held that the Mattis Policy “plausibly\\nrelied upon the considered professional judgment of\\nappropriate military officials and appeared to permit some\\ntransgender individuals to serve in the military.” Id. at 25\\n(cleaned up). Soon after our decision, the Supreme Court\\nstayed two of the other injunctions against the presidential\\nmemorandum and interim guidance. Trump v. Karnoski, 586\\nU.S. 1124 (2019); Trump v. Stockman, 586 U.S. 1124 (2019).\\nThe fourth district court then followed suit. See Stone v.\\nTrump, No. 17-cv-2459, 2019 WL 5697228, at *3 (D. Md.\\nMar. 7, 2019). With these stays in place, challenges to the\\npresidential memorandum and the Mattis Policy fizzled out.\\nThe Mattis Policy thus remained in force from January 2019\\nuntil President Biden assumed office in January 2021.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n Upon taking office, President Biden issued an executive\\norder shifting the policy once again. Enabling All Qualified\\nAmericans to Serve Their Country in Uniform, 86 Fed. Reg.\\n7,471 (Jan. 28, 2021). President Biden directed Defense\\nSecretary Lloyd Austin to “immediately prohibit involuntary\\nseparations, discharges, and denials of reenlistment or\\ncontinuation of service on the basis of gender identity.” Id. at\\n7,472. And he directed military officials to “establish[] a\\n\\n 8\\nprocess by which transgender service members may transition\\ngender while serving.” Id.\\n\\n In April 2021, the Department of Defense issued new\\nguidance. App. 49; see also Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03,\\nVol. 1, Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\\nEnlistment, or Induction (Apr. 2021), https://perma.cc/3W6K-\\n2XHW (“2021 DoD Accession Standards”) (collectively\\n“Austin Policy”). The Austin Policy largely restored the Carter\\nPolicy, disqualifying gender-dysphoric individuals from\\nacceding unless they had been “stable without clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\\nother important areas of functioning for 18 months.” 2021\\nDoD Accession Standards at 48. But the Austin Policy\\npermitted “in-service transition,” App. 49, while recognizing\\nthat it poses “unique challenges” to “military mission and\\nreadiness,” id. at 55.\\n\\n 4\\n\\n Upon returning to office, President Trump revoked the\\nBiden executive order. Prioritizing Military Excellence and\\nReadiness, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,757, 8,757 (Feb. 3, 2025). President\\nTrump cited longstanding DoD guidance requiring service\\nmembers to be “free of medical conditions” that may “require\\nexcessive time lost from duty.” Id. (cleaned up). He further\\nemphasized that the Armed Forces “must adhere to high mental\\nand physical health standards” to ensure that they can “deploy,\\nfight, and win, including in austere conditions and without the\\nbenefit of routine medical treatment or special provisions.” Id.\\nAnd he concluded that these high standards are “inconsistent\\nwith the medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.” Id. The President directed\\nDefense Secretary Pete Hegseth to update the military’s\\nmedical standards accordingly. See id. at 8,757–58.\\n\\n 9\\n Secretary Hegseth issued various memoranda\\ndisqualifying from military service individuals with a diagnosis\\nof, history of, or symptoms “consistent with” gender dysphoria.\\nAdd. 99–109, 113–16, 198–202 (collectively “Hegseth\\nPolicy”). For purposes of the policy, symptoms “consistent\\nwith” gender dysphoria means symptoms that “would be\\nsufficient to constitute a diagnosis.” Id. at 200 n.2. In limited\\ncircumstances, the policy allows gender-dysphoric individuals\\nto apply for a waiver to join or remain in the military. Id. at\\n198–99.\\n\\n Several studies and reviews undergird the Hegseth Policy.\\nThese include the Mattis Policy and Report, a 2021 DoD study\\nanalyzing appropriate accession standards for transgender\\nindividuals, a 2025 literature review on the efficacy of\\nhormonal or surgical treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\\nreview of cost data for treating gender-dysphoric service\\nmembers through 2024. Add. 115–16.\\n\\n C\\n\\n Plaintiffs are transgender individuals with gender\\ndysphoria diagnoses. Most of them are active-duty service\\nmembers. They contend that the Hegseth Policy violates equal-\\nprotection principles incorporated into the Fifth Amendment.\\n\\n The district court preliminarily enjoined the Hegseth\\nPolicy. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was\\nappropriate because the policy assertedly discriminates based\\non sex and transgender status. Talbott v. United States, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d 283, 316–22 (D.D.C. 2025). The court further held\\nthat the policy was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny.\\nSee id. at 322–26. Alternatively, the court held that the policy\\nwas motivated by animus toward transgender individuals and\\nthus would fail even rational-basis scrutiny. See id. at 326–29.\\n\\n 10\\nAnd it found that the equitable factors favored the plaintiffs.\\nSee id. at 332–34.\\n\\n The government appealed the preliminary injunction and\\nmoved for a stay. While that motion was pending, the Supreme\\nCourt stayed a preliminary injunction against the Hegseth\\nPolicy entered by the Western District of Washington. United\\nStates v. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (mem.) (May 6, 2025). Soon\\nafter, the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the use of\\nhormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors does not\\ndiscriminate based on sex or transgender status and survives\\nrational-basis review. United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495,\\n510–25 (2025).\\n\\n II\\n\\n The grant of a stay pending appeal depends on whether\\n(1) the appellant has made a strong showing that it will prevail\\non the merits; (2) the appellant will be irreparably harmed\\nabsent a stay; (3) issuance of the stay will substantially harm\\nplaintiffs or others; and (4) the stay is in the public interest.\\nNken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009). Applying these\\nfactors, a stay is warranted.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy likely does not violate equal\\nprotection. We doubt that the policy triggers any form of\\nheightened scrutiny. In Skrmetti, the Supreme Court held that\\na law prohibiting the use of hormones to treat gender dysphoria\\nin minors “classifies on the basis of medical use” and thus does\\nnot discriminate based on either sex or transgender status. See\\n605 U.S. at 510–19. The same reasoning would seem to cover\\nthe Hegseth Policy, which classifies based on the medical\\ncondition of gender dysphoria. Skrmetti also casts significant\\ndoubt on the proposition that a classification based on\\n\\n 11\\ntransgender status would trigger heightened scrutiny. See id.\\nat 517 (“This Court has not previously held that transgender\\nindividuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class.”); id. at 557\\n(Barrett, J., concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause does\\nnot demand heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that classify\\nbased on transgender status.”); id. at 558 (Alito, J., concurring\\nin part and concurring in the judgment) (classification based on\\ntransgender status “does not warrant heightened scrutiny”).\\n\\n Even if the Hegseth Policy contained a classification\\ntriggering some form of heightened scrutiny, decades of\\nprecedent establish that the judiciary must tread carefully when\\nasked to second-guess considered military judgments of the\\npolitical branches. And we must do so even in cases involving\\nsex-based or other quasi-suspect classifications. Moreover, the\\nSupreme Court already has held that the government is likely\\nto succeed on its contention that the Hegseth Policy does not\\nviolate equal protection. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. at 2695. And this\\nCourt, applying settled doctrines of deference to the military,\\nhas strongly suggested that the Mattis Policy did not violate\\nequal protection. See Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25. Given these\\ndecisions, and for reasons summarized below, the Hegseth\\nPolicy is likely constitutional.\\n\\n 1\\n\\n The Constitution vests the “complex, subtle, and\\nprofessional decisions as to the composition, training,\\nequipping, and control of a military force” in the political\\nbranches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). For\\nexample, Article II makes the President the Commander in\\nChief, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, while Article I gives\\nCongress the power to declare war and make rules for the\\nArmed Forces, id. Art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14. So, the President and\\nCongress have primary responsibility for the “delicate task of\\n\\n 12\\nbalancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the\\nmilitary.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996)\\n(cleaned up).\\n\\n Given this allocation of powers, the judicial branch must\\nbe “reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in\\nmilitary and national security affairs.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan,\\n484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.\\n83, 93–94 (1953) (“judges are not given the task of running the\\nArmy”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.\\n579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (courts should give\\nthe President, as Commander-in-Chief, “the widest latitude …\\nto command the instruments of national force”). Indeed, it is\\n“difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in\\nwhich the courts have less competence.” Rostker v. Goldberg,\\n453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10).\\n\\n Our review of constitutional challenges to military rules\\nthus “is far more deferential than constitutional review of\\nsimilar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”\\nGoldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). In the\\nmilitary context, courts consider whether the policy at issue\\nresulted from the professional judgment of military authorities\\nand reasonably furthers legitimate military interests. Id.\\nMoreover, we must respect the military’s judgment on “the\\nrelative importance of a particular military interest.” Id.\\nCourts “must be particularly careful not to substitute our\\njudgment of what is desirable … or our own evaluation of\\nevidence for a reasonable evaluation” by the political branches.\\nGoldberg, 453 U.S. at 68.\\n\\n Consider two leading precedents in this area. In Goldberg,\\nthe Supreme Court rejected an equal-protection challenge to a\\nstatute compelling men but not women to register for the draft.\\n453 U.S. at 59, 83. The Court stressed that Congress had made\\n\\n 13\\na considered judgment that this classification minimized\\n“burdens” and “administrative problems” involving\\n“housing … and physical standards,” while promoting “the\\nimportant goal of military flexibility.” Id. at 81–82. In the\\n“context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future\\nmobilization,” the Court refused to “dismiss such problems as\\ninsignificant.” Id. at 81. In Goldman, the Court similarly\\nrejected a free-exercise challenge to a military regulation\\nrestricting the wearing of yarmulkes. 475 U.S. at 509–10. The\\nCourt declined to apply the heightened scrutiny normally used\\nto assess First Amendment claims. See id. at 506–07. Instead,\\nit took a “far more deferential approach” than it would have if\\nthe restriction had been “designed for civilian society.” Id. at\\n507. Citing Goldberg, the Court confirmed that “judicial\\ndeference is at its apogee” when the political branches make\\n“rules and regulations for [military] governance.” Id. at 508\\n(cleaned up). The Court thus credited the “professional\\njudgment of military authorities” that the restriction advanced\\nlegitimate goals including “obedience, unity, commitment, and\\nesprit de corps.” Id. at 507.\\n\\n Of course, the Constitution binds the government in the\\nrealm of military affairs. See Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67; Parker\\nv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). As we have noted, “the cost\\nof military service has never entailed the complete surrender of\\nall basic rights.” Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 92 (D.C. Cir.\\n2022) (cleaned up). Particularly when Congress has mandated\\nheightened scrutiny, a military policy may be found unlawful\\nwhere, for example, it is riddled with unexplained exemptions\\nfor some but not others. See id. at 98–107 (applying the\\nReligious Freedom Restoration Act). But even then, courts\\nmust afford deference to the executive’s considered judgment\\nthat a military policy furthers legitimate interests. See id. at\\n98–99.\\n\\n 14\\n 2\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy is likely constitutional because it\\nreflects a considered judgment of military leaders and furthers\\nlegitimate military interests.\\n\\n a\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy reflects the considered judgment of\\nthe Secretary of Defense and military leaders in the Defense\\nDepartment. The policy was informed by “existing and prior\\nDoD policy, and prior DoD studies and reviews of service by\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, including a review of\\nmedical literature regarding the medical risks associated with\\n[the] presence and treatment of gender dysphoria.” Add. 115.\\nIn significant part, the Hegseth Policy relied on the Mattis\\nPolicy, which “conclude[d] that there are substantial risks\\nassociated with allowing accession and retention of individuals\\nwith a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria.” Id. (Hegseth\\nPolicy) (quoting id. at 120 (Mattis Policy)). In turn, the Mattis\\nPolicy “was informed by an extensive inquiry conducted by a\\npanel of experts” who considered the views of many\\nstakeholders, including transgender service members and their\\ncommanders. Id. at 115 (Hegseth Policy); see id. at 119 (Mattis\\nPolicy). And we previously concluded that, because the Mattis\\nPolicy relied on the considered judgment of military officials,\\nthe government had “substantial arguments” that it complied\\nwith equal-protection principles. Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also relied on more recent materials,\\nincluding a 2021 study addressing appropriate accession\\nstandards for transgender individuals, a 2025 literature review\\non the efficacy of treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\\nreview of cost data for treating gender dysphoria. Add. 115–\\n16. The 2021 study suggested that up to 40 percent of\\nindividuals with a gender dysphoria diagnosis would be\\n\\n 15\\n“deemed non-deployable due to mental health reasons at some\\ntime during the 24 months following initial diagnosis.”\\nTalbott, No. 25-cv-240, Dkt. No. 86-1, at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 17,\\n2025) (“AMSARA Study”). The 2025 literature review\\nindicated that transgender individuals are far more likely than\\nothers “to receive a psychiatric diagnosis” of mood disorders,\\nanxiety disorders, or psychotic disorders, with a suicide attempt\\nrate 13 times higher than that for non-transgender individuals.\\nAdd. 189. The literature review also found that the “strength\\nof the evidence” supporting the efficacy of hormonal or\\nsurgical treatments for gender dysphoria is “low to moderate.”\\nId. at 189–93. And the cost data indicated that, between 2015\\nand 2024, DoD spent over $52 million providing treatment for\\ngender dysphoria to active-duty service members. Id. at 116.\\n\\n b\\n\\n The government identifies several legitimate military\\ninterests that the Hegseth Policy advances.\\n\\n Chief among them is military readiness. On its face, the\\npolicy applies only to individuals with gender dysphoria, a\\nmedical condition that involves “clinically significant distress\\nor impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas\\nof functioning.” DSM-5 at 513. Secretary Hegseth had before\\nhim evidence that treatments for gender dysphoria would limit\\ndeployability and may not be effective. AMSARA Study at 15;\\nAdd. 189–93. His predecessors unanimously agreed that these\\nconcerns are serious ones: The Carter and Austin Policies\\nbarred accession by individuals with a history of gender\\ndysphoria unless they had been “stable without clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment” for 18 months, App. 20;\\n2021 DoD Accession Standards at 48, while the Mattis Policy\\ndrew the line at 36 months, Add. 120. The Mattis Report noted\\nthat individuals “receiving hormone therapy and surgery”\\n\\n 16\\ncould not deploy to “austere environments where their\\nhealthcare needs cannot be met,” which showed that “the\\ninclusion of individuals with gender dysphoria in the force will\\nhave a negative impact on readiness.” Id. at 156. The Carter\\nimplementation handbook also anticipated “impacts to the\\nmission (including deployment, operations, training, exercise\\nschedules, and critical skills availability)” from both treatment\\nrequirements and international cultural constraints. See, e.g.,\\nCarter Handbook at 14, 29, 48, 69. Even the RAND Report,\\ndespite recommending that individuals with gender dysphoria\\nbe allowed to serve, recognized that hormone treatments could\\nrender them unable to deploy for a year. App. 202.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also rests on concerns about unit\\ncohesion and good order. The military’s interest in “fostering\\ncohesion and unity among its members” is “surely” a\\n“compelling” one. Singh, 56 F.4th at 99. And even when\\napplying strict scrutiny, we must “indulge the widest latitude\\nin considering” interests based on an asserted need for unit\\ncohesion. Id. (cleaned up).\\n\\n One such interest involves the privacy of service members\\nwho, as the Mattis Report explained, must “live in extremely\\nclose proximity to one another when sleeping, undressing,\\nshowering, and using the bathroom.” Add. 159. To protect\\nprivacy, Congress has required the military to provide separate\\nhousing for male and female service recruits. See, e.g., 10\\nU.S.C. §§ 7419 (Army), 8431 (Navy), 9419 (Air Force). Even\\nbeyond statutory requirements, the military “has long\\nmaintained separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities\\nfor men and women.” Add. 159. Distinctions like these—\\nkeyed to biological differences between the sexes—are\\nunquestionably constitutional. As Justice Ginsburg explained\\nfor the Supreme Court, it is not only permissible, but indeed\\n“necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the\\n\\n 17\\nother sex in living arrangements.” United States v. Virginia,\\n518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996). And as Judge Williams later\\nelaborated, in explaining why the Mattis Policy likely did not\\nviolate equal protection, “there is no constitutional right for,\\nsay, biological males who identify as female to live, sleep,\\nshower, and train with biological females.” Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\\n707–08 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). The Mattis\\nReport and Carter implementation handbook both\\nacknowledge that allowing gender-dysphoric individuals to\\nserve consistent with their perceived gender identity, as\\nopposed to their biological sex, would impinge on these\\nprivacy interests in intimate, communal living spaces. Add.\\n159 (Mattis Report); Carter Handbook at 60 (issues with “open\\nbay shower configuration”); id. at 63–65 (sleeping areas).\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also implicates the military’s sex-\\nbased standards for physical fitness. As the Mattis Report\\nexplained, “to allow biological males who identify as female to\\nbe held to female standards” would raise concerns of unfairness\\nand discrimination. Add. 158. Among other things, such\\nindividuals would gain competitive advantages over other\\nmales held to the male strength and fitness standards. See id.\\nLikewise, females required to compete against such individuals\\nwould be disadvantaged. See id. “Even more importantly, in\\nphysically violent training and competition, such as boxing and\\ncombatives, pitting biological females against biological males\\nwho identify as female, and vice versa, could present a serious\\nsafety risk as well.” Id. We cannot lightly dismiss these\\nconcerns.\\n\\n Finally, the Hegseth Policy cited cost issues, noting that\\nthe military had spent more than $52 million on treating service\\nmembers with gender dysphoria between 2015 and 2024. Add.\\n116. The Mattis Report likewise cited cost concerns. It noted\\nthat after the Carter Policy was implemented, medical costs for\\n\\n 18\\nservice members with gender dysphoria increased nearly three\\ntimes as much as did costs for service members who did not\\nhave gender dysphoria. Id. at 163. Moreover, it noted that\\nunits sometimes had to use “operations and maintenance funds\\nto pay for” the “specialized medical care” needed by gender-\\ndysphoric service members. Id.\\n\\n c\\n\\n The district court held that the Hegseth Policy does not\\nadvance these interests. In our view, it gave no sound reason\\nfor overriding the Secretary’s considered judgment.\\n\\n The court dismissed the Mattis Policy and Report as\\n“outdated.” Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 325. The court\\nconcluded that in 2018, when Secretary Mattis issued his\\nreport, “medical literature concerning the study and treatment\\nof gender dysphoria” was “in a state of flux.” Id. at 303\\n(cleaned up). But, the court continued, “medical studies now\\noverwhelmingly conclude that gender dysphoria is highly\\ntreatable.” Id. at 304. In support, the court cited a declaration\\nfrom one doctor who simply stated, in one sentence and\\nwithout citations, that “gender dysphoria is ‘highly treatable.’”\\nId. (citing Decl. of George Brown at 4, Dkt. No. 72-77).\\n\\n We are wary of such a sweeping conclusion. For one\\nthing, the Mattis Report reflects a thorough assessment of\\nevidence available as of 2018, not much time has passed since\\nthen, and we are skeptical that the constitutionality of a military\\npolicy ebbs and flows as new medical studies emerge every few\\nyears. For another, the Hegseth Policy did consider more\\nrecent studies, which provide further support for its restrictions.\\nTo reiterate, the policy rests in part on a 2021 DoD study\\nsuggesting that up to 40 percent of individuals being treated for\\ngender dysphoria may become non-deployable at some point\\nover a two-year period, AMSARA Study at 15, and a 2025\\n\\n 19\\nliterature review finding that transgender individuals are more\\nlikely than others to suffer various mental-health issues, Add.\\n188, and that the “strength of the evidence” supporting\\nhormonal or surgical treatment for gender dysphoria is “low to\\nmoderate,” id. at 189–93. Moreover, at least with respect to\\nadolescents, evidence regarding treatment efficacy may be\\neven less settled today than it was a few years ago. See\\nSkrmetti, 605 U.S. at 524 (“Recent developments only\\nunderscore the need for legislative flexibility in this area.”); id.\\nat 532–40 (Thomas, J., concurring); Br. of Alabama as Amicus\\nCuriae at 28–32, Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (Oct. 15, 2024). Given\\nall this, the military was not constitutionally required to credit\\nplaintiffs’ side of a fraught medical divide. Finally, the\\nHegseth Policy advances some interests that do not turn on\\nmedical questions at all. For example, the military continues\\nto observe sex-based distinctions for sleeping areas and\\nphysical competitions. And the privacy and safety interests\\nadvanced by these standards do not turn on whether gender\\ndysphoria is more treatable today than it was seven years ago.\\n\\n The district court also conducted a searching review of the\\npost-2018 studies relied on by DoD. Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d\\nat 301–08, 322–25. We find many of its criticisms\\nunpersuasive. For example, as to the 2021 study, the court\\nconcluded that a 40 percent non-deployability rate was “not\\ninformative” without knowing the comparable rate for non-\\ntransgender individuals. Id. at 304. But with accession\\nstandards that screen out everything from asthma to high blood\\npressure, it strains credulity to suppose that military-wide\\naverages for non-deployability would be anywhere near two\\nout of five. Next, the district court downplayed the 2025\\nliterature review because it addressed all gender-dysphoric\\nindividuals, rather than only those serving in the military. Id.\\nat 305. But that broader focus surely understates the challenges\\nfaced by gender-dysphoric individuals in the military, where\\n\\n 20\\nlife is often more stressful and demanding than it is for\\ncivilians. The court further downplayed evidence of greater\\nmental-health issues faced by transgender individuals as\\nreflecting “external factors.” Id. Maybe so, but that says little\\nabout the cost to the military from taking on individuals who\\nhave a medical diagnosis associated with significant mental\\ndistress. To be sure, the district court fairly noted that the 2021\\nstudy and the 2025 literature review contain some evidence\\ncutting in favor of permitting service by individuals with\\ngender dysphoria. Id. at 303–06. But the RAND Report that\\ninformed the Carter Policy likewise contained cross-cutting\\nconclusions. Again, the military is entitled to substantial\\ndeference in setting risk tolerances and evaluating conflicting\\nevidence bearing on matters like force composition. See, e.g.,\\nTrump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 707–08 (2018); Goldman, 475\\nU.S. at 507; Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70–72; Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\\n728 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). Here, the evidence\\nsupporting the Hegseth Policy was more than sufficient to\\nsupport the choices made.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n The district court also held that the Hegseth Policy is\\nrooted in animus against transgender individuals and therefore\\nwould fail even rational-basis scrutiny. Talbott, 775 F. Supp.\\n3d at 326–29. The court invoked a line of cases invalidating\\nstatutes that disadvantaged unpopular groups. See, e.g., Romer\\nv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne\\nLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S.\\n528 (1973). In our view, the district court overread these\\nprecedents.\\n\\n These decisions reflect ordinary rational-basis principles;\\nthey are not an independent basis for striking down statutes or\\nrules. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.\\n\\n 21\\nGarrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court rejected a\\ncontention that “decisionmaking reflecting negative\\nattitudes … necessarily runs afoul of” equal protection. Id. at\\n367 (cleaned up) (discussing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448).\\nInstead, the Court explained, cases like Cleburne condemn\\nnegative attitudes “unsubstantiated” by anything that would\\nindicate a legitimate government interest. See id. (emphasis\\nomitted). So, “read in context,” the animus precedents “simply\\nstate the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of the\\nCourt’s equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject\\nto rational-basis scrutiny does not violate the Fourteenth\\nAmendment when it rationally furthers the purpose identified\\nby the [government].” Id. (cleaned up).\\n\\n The Supreme Court confirmed this point in Trump v.\\nHawaii. There, it explained that the “common thread” uniting\\nits animus decisions has been the lack of “any purpose other\\nthan a ‘bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.’” 585\\nU.S. at 705 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534) (cleaned up).\\nPut differently, the key question is whether it is “impossible to\\n‘discern a relationship to legitimate state interests’” such that\\nthe policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Id. at 706\\n(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635). If any legitimate state\\ninterest exists, “we must accept that independent justification”\\nand thus reject an equal-protection challenge resting on\\nasserted animus. Id. Because the Hegseth Policy advances\\nlegitimate military interests, the animus cases do not help the\\nplaintiffs here.\\n\\n The district court looked beyond the Hegseth Policy itself\\nto derive animus from various statements made by the\\nPresident or other officials. The Supreme Court rejected such\\nan approach in Trump v. Hawaii, which upheld a presidential\\nproclamation imposing restrictions on travel to the United\\nStates from six predominantly Muslim countries. 585 U.S. at\\n\\n 22\\n676; see also id. at 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The\\nplaintiffs in that case highlighted several of President Trump’s\\nsocial media posts which, in the dissenting justices’ view,\\n“express[ed] animus toward Islam.” Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J.,\\ndissenting); see also id. at 728 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the\\nCourt discounted the “significance of those statements in\\nreviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,\\naddressing a matter within the core of executive\\nresponsibility.” Id. at 702 (majority opinion). The task, as the\\nCourt viewed it, was to “consider not only the statements of a\\nparticular President, but also the authority of the Presidency\\nitself.” Id. With that principle in mind, the Court looked to the\\nproclamation’s text, which was “expressly premised on\\nlegitimate purposes.” Id. at 706. Given that conclusion, the\\nstatements of government officials about the proclamation\\nwere not dispositive. So too here. Our review must focus on\\nthe text and sources informing the Hegseth Policy, not extrinsic\\nstatements made about it.\\n\\n B\\n\\n The remaining stay factors also favor the government. For\\none thing, the Supreme Court’s stay order in Shilling indicates\\nthat the government would suffer an irreparable injury if the\\nHegseth Policy were enjoined pending appellate review of\\npreliminary injunctions. See Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695; Nken,\\n556 U.S. at 425–26. This is hardly surprising. Injunctions that\\n“improperly intrude” on the Executive Branch often inflict\\nirreparable injury, Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 859\\n(2025) (cleaned up), especially where the injunction interferes\\nwith the government’s “compelling need to provide for the\\nNation’s security,” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,\\n582 U.S. 571, 583 (2017) (per curiam). We can imagine few if\\nany government interests more compelling than a strong and\\nready military. And while the district court concluded that\\n\\n 23\\nallowing gender-dysphoric individuals to serve in the military\\nwould advance the cause of military strength and readiness, the\\nConstitution assigns that assessment to the political branches,\\nas cases like Goldberg and Goldman make clear.\\n\\n On the other side of the balance, we acknowledge that the\\nplaintiffs have significant interests at stake—particularly those\\nwho have already acceded. But “[t]he possibility that adequate\\ncompensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a\\nlater date … weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable\\nharm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454\\nF.3d 290, 297–98 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). In particular,\\nloss of a valued government position “does not usually\\nconstitute irreparable injury,” especially if the terminated\\nindividual or officer may obtain backpay or reinstatement if he\\nor she ultimately prevails on the merits. Sampson v. Murray,\\n415 U.S. 61, 90–91 (1974). Courts applying these principles\\nhave held that even less-than-honorable military discharges do\\nnot constitute irreparable injuries warranting interim relief\\nwhile challenges to the discharge remain ongoing. See\\nHartikka v. United States, 754 F.2d 1516, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985);\\nGuerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 273–74 (4th Cir. 1991). And\\nhere, any service members separated under the Hegseth Policy\\nwill be honorably discharged. Add. 101.\\n\\n Finally, the public interest does not warrant a stay. With\\nthe government likely to prevail on the merits, and with the\\nbalance of harm among the parties favoring the government,\\nwe can discern no other consideration here that would tip the\\nscale in the opposite direction.\\n\\n 24\\n III\\n\\n For these reasons, we grant the stay pending appeal.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The district court independently erred in universally enjoining\\nthe Hegseth Policy rather than merely providing as-applied relief to\\nthe plaintiffs. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 839–47. Given our conclusion\\nthat the government should be able to enforce the policy while its\\nappeal is pending, we need not address further questions about the\\nappropriate scope of any injunctive relief.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11216490/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}, {\"author\": \"PILLARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"PILLARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Transgender members\\nof the military have answered the call to serve this nation on\\nthe same terms as any other servicemember. For nearly a\\ndecade, they have met the same standards, risen to the same\\nchallenges, and defended our country with the same honor as\\ntheir peers. They have passed intensive physical and mental\\nhealth screening, completed demanding training programs, and\\nmet the rigors of their assigned duties. The achievements of\\nthe individual plaintiffs in this case include “more than 80\\ncommendations” during a collective total of “over 130 years of\\nmilitary service.” See Talbott v. United States, 775 F. Supp. 3d\\n283, 291 (D.D.C. 2025). In the district court, high-ranking\\nofficials from the Army, Navy, and Air Force offered\\nunrebutted testimony uniformly supporting the finding that\\ntransgender servicemembers “have had either no detrimental\\neffect or have had a positive” effect on military readiness. Id.\\nat 310. Defendants offered no evidence to the contrary.\\n\\n This suit arises because the government has now decided\\nto force every transgender servicemember out of the military\\nthrough a policy based on nothing more than negative attitudes\\nabout transgender identity. The majority and I agree that we\\nowe the greatest deference to the political branches’ expert\\njudgments on military policy. Maj. 11-12. The Constitution\\nvests control of the military in the political branches. Id. We\\nmust respect “the executive’s considered judgment that a\\nmilitary policy furthers legitimate interests.” Id. at 13. The\\ndistrict court, in accord with that deferential standard of review,\\nTalbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 311-12, offered the government\\nevery opportunity to provide evidence of considered judgment\\nsupporting the Hegseth Policy, id. at 309. The government\\ndeclined to do so. Id.\\n\\n Underscoring that its actions are heedless of military need,\\nthe government cannot even say how many servicemembers its\\npolicy will exclude—but evidence suggests the number is in\\nthe thousands. Id. at 307; see generally Add. 129 n.10 (citing\\n\\n 2\\na 2016 survey estimating that 8,980 active-duty\\nservicemembers, approximately 1% of the service, identified\\nas transgender). Prior defense secretaries in Republican and\\nDemocratic administrations adopted varying policies regarding\\ntransgender people’s accession. But none categorically barred\\ncurrent servicemembers who are transgender from remaining\\nin their roles so long as they continue to meet military\\nstandards.\\n\\n There may well be valid reasons to reexamine and alter\\nmilitary service policies set by previous administrations. But\\non this record, one cannot tell. Defendants provide no evidence\\nthat they based their new policy on any assessment of costs,\\nbenefits, or any other factor legitimately bearing on military\\nnecessity. Indeed, there is “no evidence that [President Trump\\nor Secretary Hegseth] consulted with uniformed military\\nleaders” before imposing their unprecedented ban on\\ntransgender servicemembers. Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 292.\\nThe outcome was determined by animus from the start.\\n\\n In Executive Order 14183, President Trump declared as\\n“the policy of the United States” that “adoption of a gender\\nidentity inconsistent with an individual’s sex conflicts with a\\nsoldier’s commitment to an honorable, truthful, and disciplined\\nlifestyle, even in one’s personal life.” Prioritizing Military\\nExcellence and Readiness, 90 Fed. Reg. 8757, 8757 (Feb. 3,\\n2025). He asserted that openly identifying as transgender is\\n“not consistent with the humility and selflessness required of a\\nservice member.” Id. Having thereby tagged all transgender\\nservicemembers as shameful, dishonest laggards too arrogant\\nor selfish to serve, he ordered Secretary Hegseth to implement\\npolicies within sixty days to carry out the Executive Order. Id.\\nat 8757-58.\\n\\n 3\\n Secretary Hegseth responded by adopting the policy at\\nissue here. Under the Hegseth Policy, all servicemembers who\\n“exhibit symptoms consistent with[] gender dysphoria” or\\n“have a history of” receiving gender-affirming care are\\nsummarily “disqualified from military service.” Add. 106.\\nThe policy purports to allow “consider[ation] for a waiver on a\\ncase-by-case basis, provided there is a compelling Government\\ninterest in retaining the servicemember that directly supports\\nwarfighting capabilities,” id., but the waiver is illusory. It is\\nunavailable to anyone who has ever “attempted to transition to\\nany sex other than their [birth] sex” and requires a commitment\\nto “adhere to . . . the standards associated with the Service\\nmember’s [birth] sex.” Id. The so-called waiver thus excludes\\nany transgender person who has ever attempted to serve or\\nsucceeded in serving—or just living—consistently with their\\ngender identity, or who intends to do so.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy casts itself as concerned with the\\n“medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on individuals\\nwith gender dysphoria.” Id. at 101. But the Policy is not a\\nmedical standard. It is a categorical exclusion of transgender\\npeople from military service—with “transgender” broadly\\ndefined. It covers not only those with diagnosed gender\\ndysphoria, but also those with “a history of” gender dysphoria,\\nor “symptoms consistent with” gender dysphoria. Id. As the\\ndistrict court found, it is a ban on transgender troops writ large.\\nTalbott, 775 F.3d at 301-02; see infra Part I.A. What is more,\\nthe Hegseth Policy explicitly bars the military branches from\\nusing the military’s own Disability Evaluation System to\\ndetermine on a case-by-case basis whether a transgender\\nperson has a disabling medical condition burdensome to the\\nmilitary or inconsistent with continued service. Add. 106. The\\ngovernment cannot identify any other medical condition that\\nautomatically triggers administrative separation instead of an\\nindividualized medical evaluation regarding continued fitness\\n\\n 4\\nto serve. Oral Arg. 27:30-28:30. Why do health concerns\\nstemming from present, past, or suspected gender dysphoria\\nrequire a process different from what the military uses for every\\nother medical condition affecting servicemembers? The\\ngovernment has no answer.\\n\\n The record of the military’s prior experience with\\nindividualized medical evaluations under Secretaries Carter,\\nMattis, and Austin undercuts the Hegseth Policy: It reveals that\\nincumbent transgender servicemembers have earned their\\nplaces in the military and that they can serve without health-\\nrelated disqualification, Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 308-09, and\\noften without any period of non-deployability, Wagner Decl.\\n¶ 14 (App. 332). Secretaries Carter, Mattis, and Austin\\nunderstood that the military has strong reasons to continue to\\nbenefit from incumbent servicemembers’ valuable training and\\nexperience, in which the government has made significant\\ninvestments, rather than arbitrarily removing them from their\\nposts. And they recognized that transgender servicemembers\\nhave significant reliance interests in their military positions.\\nSee, e.g., Add. 128 (Mattis Policy).\\n\\n In implementing the Hegseth Policy to exclude even\\ncurrent servicemembers, defendants double down on\\ndemeaning their own. The Air Force has released a\\nmemorandum requiring transgender servicemembers to either\\nshow up to their separation hearings wearing the uniform and\\nmeeting the grooming standards of their birth sex—not the\\nuniform they have worn while serving—or else forego the right\\nto participate in their hearings. Memorandum from Brian\\nScarlett, Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Air Force for\\nManpower, Pers., and Servs., to All Major Commands, Direct\\nReporting Units, Field Operating Agencies, & Commanders 4\\n(Aug. 14, 2024) [hereinafter Air Force Memorandum]. For\\ntransgender servicemembers who want to participate in their\\n\\n 5\\nown separation hearings, that might mean buying a new\\nuniform, shaving their mustaches or shearing their long hair to\\nadhere to different sex-based standards, and dressing in\\nclothing not meant for their medically transitioned bodies. It is\\nhard to see any purpose of those requirements other than\\nhumiliating the departing transgender servicemembers and\\ndeterring them from exercising their hearing rights. The threat\\nthat any transgender servicemember who does not separate\\nvoluntarily could face recoupment of past bonuses is added\\nspite. Add. 107.\\n\\n Based on its review of the uncontested facts of record, the\\ndistrict court preliminarily enjoined the Hegseth Policy.\\nApplying existing, binding law to the uncontested record\\nbefore us, I must agree with that judgment. I cannot credit the\\ngovernment’s bare assertions over the district court’s findings\\non the factual record, none of which the government challenges\\nfor clear error. The government has not satisfied the\\ndemanding standard to stay the district court’s preliminary\\ninjunction.\\n\\n I write with full respect for the signal we have already\\nreceived from the Supreme Court regarding the Hegseth\\nPolicy. Acting on its emergency docket without statement or\\nopinion, the Supreme Court has stayed a separate preliminary\\ninjunction against the Hegseth Policy issued by the U.S.\\nDistrict Court for the Western District of Washington. See\\nUnited States v. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (2025) (mem). I am\\nmindful of the Supreme Court’s guidance that its “interim\\norders . . . inform how [we] should exercise [our] equitable\\ndiscretion in like cases,” Trump v. Boyle, 145 S. Ct. 2653, 2654\\n(2025), as well as its instruction that the Court’s “unexplicated\\ndecisions” are “not to be read as a renunciation . . . of doctrines\\npreviously announced” in its binding decisions, Ramos v.\\nLouisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 104-05 (2020) (internal quotation\\n\\n 6\\nmarks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court’s order in\\nShilling may well reflect its conclusion that district judges lack\\nauthority to grant universal relief. Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606\\nU.S. 831, 856 (2025).1 And this case, like Shilling, arrives in a\\npreliminary posture, presenting the kind of important, fast-\\nmoving issue on which the lower federal courts can contribute\\nto “the airing of competing views” that may “aid[] [the\\nSupreme] Court’s own decisionmaking process” at the merits\\nstage. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 589 U.S. 1173,\\n1176 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in grant of stay); see also\\nArizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,\\ndissenting) (“[D]iverse opinions from[] state and federal\\nappellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring\\nfinal pronouncement by this Court.”). As do my colleagues in\\nthe majority, I thus find it worthwhile to briefly explain my\\nviews on whether the district court’s preliminary injunction\\nshould be stayed pending resolution of the appeal on its merits.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Entering a stay pending appeal is an “extraordinary”\\nremedy. Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. FEC (CREW),\\n904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam). In most\\ncircumstances, parties must vindicate their positions through\\nthe ordinary process of litigation. To stay relief that a district\\ncourt entered for an opposing party, the applicant must (1)\\nmake a “strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on the\\nmerits;” (2) demonstrate that it will be “irreparably injured”\\nbefore the appeal concludes; (3) show that issuing a stay will\\nnot “substantially injure the other parties interested in the\\n\\n1\\n As this case proceeds, the district court may need to reassess the\\nscope of its injunction in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening\\ndecision in CASA. See Doe v. Trump, 142 F.4th 109, 112 (1st Cir.\\n2025).\\n\\n 7\\nproceeding;” and (4) establish that “the public interest” favors\\na stay. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). We review\\nthe district court’s decision to grant the preliminary injunction\\n“for abuse of discretion, its legal conclusions de novo, and [its]\\nfactual findings for clear error.” Media Matters for Am. v.\\nPaxton, 138 F.4th 563, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025).\\n\\n Even with the benefit of the “great deference” we owe “to\\nthe professional judgment of military authorities,” Winter v.\\nNatural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24\\n(2008), defendants have failed to make the necessary “strong\\nshowing” that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their\\nclaim, Nken, 556 U.S. at 426. Because the Hegseth Policy is\\nopenly fueled by animus towards transgender people and\\ndefendants have not shown that it is based on military\\nconsiderations, it fails even the most deferential form of equal\\nprotection review.\\n A.\\n “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of\\nthe laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a\\nbare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot\\nconstitute a legitimate governmental interest.” U.S. Dep’t of\\nAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). Accordingly,\\neven reviewed with “the highest deference” that we owe the\\npolitical branches “in ordering military affairs,” Loving v.\\nUnited States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); see Dep’t of Navy v.\\nEgan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (collecting cases), a law or\\nother official action that is driven solely by animus towards a\\ndisfavored group cannot survive. Animus fails as a\\njustification for differential treatment even of groups\\nunprotected by any heightened constitutional scrutiny. The\\nSupreme Court has applied rationality review to strike down as\\nanimus-based a statutory provision rooted in negative attitudes\\nabout “‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’” that disqualified\\n\\n 8\\nunmarried cohabitants from receiving food stamps, Moreno,\\n413 U.S. at 534 (citing 116 Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970)\\n(statement of Sen. Holland)), the amendment of Colorado’s\\nconstitution to prohibit the state from acting to protect gay\\npeople from discrimination, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,\\n632-33 (1996), and a zoning ordinance rooted in fears of the\\nmentally disabled, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,\\n473 U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985). Even as the Court in Cleburne\\ndeclined to apply heightened scrutiny to official action\\ntargeting “the mentally retarded,” it invalidated the denial of a\\npermit for a group home because the denial was “rooted in\\nconsiderations that the Constitution will not tolerate”—\\nnamely, “irrational prejudice.” Id. at 446, 450.\\n\\n Animus need not be explicit on the face of a policy, as it is\\nhere, but may be evidenced by “contemporary statements by\\nmembers of the decisionmaking body.” Village of Arlington\\nHeights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977).\\nIn Cleburne, for example, the Court relied on the district\\ncourt’s findings that the Cleburne City Council passed the\\ndiscriminatory zoning ordinance primarily based on the\\n“negative attitude of . . . property owners . . . ” and “the fears\\nof elderly residents,” 473 U.S. at 448—attitudes and fears\\naccepted by the “five city officials most involved in the\\ndecisionmaking process,” Br. for Resp’ts at 34, City of\\nCleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (No.\\n84-468). “[C]ircumstantial” factors may provide evidence of\\ndecisionmakers’ animus, including “sudden[]” changes in\\npolicy (especially unexplained reversals), “[d]epartures from\\nthe normal procedural sequence,” failure to address “the factors\\nusually considered important,” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at\\n266-68, and creating a policy whose “sheer breadth” is\\n“discontinuous with the reasons offered” for it, Romer, 517\\nU.S. at 632. The Defense of Marriage Act, for example, failed\\nrationality review in part because its “unusual deviation from\\n\\n 9\\nthe usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state\\ndefinitions of marriage” provided “strong evidence of a law\\nhaving the purpose and effect of disapproval” of same-sex\\ncouples. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013).\\n\\n Executive Order 14183, which triggered the Hegseth\\nPolicy, is openly hostile to transgender people. The Order\\ndenigrates anyone with “a gender identity inconsistent with\\n[that] individual’s sex,” (i.e., anyone who is transgender) as\\ncategorically unable to fulfill “a soldier’s commitment to an\\nhonorable, truthful, and disciplined lifestyle”—a commitment\\nrequired “even in one’s personal life.” Prioritizing Military\\nExcellence and Readiness, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8757. The Order\\nasserts that transgender identity is itself a “falsehood . . . not\\nconsistent with the humility and selflessness required of a\\nservice member.” Id. In other words, Executive Order 14183\\nvilifies transgender people as dishonorable, dishonest, and\\nundisciplined. It treats their transgender identity as a defect\\nthat categorically cancels out their every individual strength,\\nability, and virtue. The military’s new official policy brands\\nall transgender people, without regard to individual merit, as\\nunworthy to serve in our armed forces solely because they are\\ntransgender.\\n\\n Neither the government nor the majority disputes that\\nExecutive Order 14183 expresses animus towards transgender\\npeople. See Mot. for Stay 24-25; Maj. 20-22. They focus only\\non the Hegseth Policy. But that changes nothing. The Hegseth\\nPolicy springs from the Executive Order and espouses the same\\ndenigration and vitriol. Contextual factors—the statements of\\ntriumphant policymakers, the hasty and unsupported reversal\\nof apparently successful policies backed by careful study, and\\nthe categorical sweep of the new policy—all confirm that the\\nHegseth Policy, like the Executive Order, is driven by animus.\\n\\n 10\\n Start with the substance of the Hegseth Policy. Secretary\\nHegseth’s memoranda repeat the disparaging claim that people\\n“expressing a false ‘gender identity’ divergent from an\\nindividual’s [birth] sex cannot satisfy the rigorous standards\\nnecessary for military service.” App. 325 (quoting Executive\\nOrder 14183); App. 639-40. Additional implementing\\ndocuments list military virtues, including “honesty, humility,\\nuniformity, and integrity,” and then flatly declare that anyone\\nwho has “symptoms consistent with[] gender dysphoria”\\ncategorically lacks such virtues. See, e.g., Add. 101; Add. 114.\\nAs the district court concluded, the Hegseth Policy’s “language\\nis unabashedly demeaning [and] its policy stigmatizes\\ntransgender persons as inherently unfit.” Talbott, 775 F. Supp.\\n3d at 326.\\n\\n Next, consider some of the many statements from official\\ngovernment sources describing the Hegseth Policy as a total\\nban on transgender service and celebrating the wholesale\\nexclusion of transgender individuals. For instance:\\n\\n • “Transgender service members are disqualified\\n from service without an exemption.”\\n @DODResponse, X.com (Feb. 27, 2025) (emphasis\\n added), https://perma.cc/S4CE-EPFX.\\n\\n • “Your agenda is illegals, trans & DEI — all of which\\n are no longer allowed @ DoD.” @PeteHegseth,\\n X.com (Apr. 20, 2025) (emphasis added),\\n https://perma.cc/WX2M-R4K9.\\n\\n • “No more dudes in dresses, we’re done with that\\n shit.” Pete Hegseth, Sec’y Defense, U.S. Dep’t of\\n Defense, Keynote Address at Special Operations\\n Forces Week 2025 (May 6, 2025),\\n https://perma.cc/T75U-93FR.\\n\\n 11\\n\\n\\n • “After a SCOTUS victory for @POTUS, TRANS is\\n out at the DOD.” @PeteHegseth, X.com (May 8,\\n 2025) (emphasis added), https://perma.cc/ZUV2-\\n 6QNJ.\\n\\n Add to defendants’ overt derision their unusually “rushed\\nand haphazard manner” of issuing the Hegseth Policy. Talbott,\\n775 F. Supp. 3d at 302. Previous defense secretaries devoted\\nmonths of study, with the help of experts, to understanding the\\nfacts and circumstances relevant to transgender service. Id.\\nSecretary Hegseth promulgated his policy in just one month.\\nId. That was remarkable because, by the time Secretary\\nHegseth took office, the military was poised to shift from the\\nprognostication on which past administrations had to rely to\\ndraw on the military’s own substantial and growing experience\\nwith transgender servicemembers.\\n\\n Before our court, defendants rely almost exclusively on the\\n2018 Mattis Report and the Policy that Report recommended.\\nMot. for Stay 13, 23-24. But when Secretary Mattis acted, the\\nmilitary had negligible experience with openly transgender\\nservicemembers. Of necessity he based his policy on “risks”\\nand predictions about what “could” happen gleaned from\\nbroader studies not focused on the military. Add. 120. Even\\nthen, the Mattis Policy made no move to purge transgender\\npeople already serving; it disallowed only new accessions.\\nAdd. 120-21. Secretary Hegseth, in contrast, had a wealth of\\nrelevant evidence available to him that Secretary Mattis had\\nlacked: the military services’ own experience during the\\nintervening years with the thousands of transgender persons\\namong their ranks. Secretary Hegseth deliberately failed to\\naccount for that highly probative experience—or even explain\\nwhy he eschewed it. Ignoring realities that might undercut his\\nchosen course, Secretary Hegseth rested his policy on\\n\\n 12\\ncategorical disdain. That head-in-the-sand approach yielded a\\npolicy driven by animus, not military need.\\n\\n The majority reverts to three pieces of evidence that\\ndefendants had featured in district court: a 2021 review\\nconducted by the Department’s Psychological Health Center of\\nExcellence and the Accession Medical Standards Analysis and\\nResearch Activity; a 2025 medical literature review conducted\\nby the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health\\nAffairs; and a review of cost data on treatment of active-duty\\nservicemembers currently experiencing gender dysphoria.\\nMaj. 14-15. But the district court found, as to the first two\\nsources, that each “contradicts, rather than supports, the\\nconclusions” the Department drew from it. Talbott, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 305-06. And as to the cost data, the district court\\nexplained that the Department could not substantiate its\\nassertion of the disproportionate cost of treating\\nservicemembers with gender dysphoria without any baseline\\nfor comparison with costs of other types of covered medical\\ncare, or any analysis of the costs associated with discharging\\nall transgender servicemembers. Id. at 306. The government\\ndoes not challenge the district court’s findings of fact as clearly\\nerroneous, and we are bound to respect them.\\n\\n Finally, consider the draconian scope of the Hegseth\\nPolicy. It imposes a complete ban on military service by\\ntransgender individuals. See id. at 301-02. And, unlike every\\npolicy since 2016, it does not just affect the standards for\\nprospective recruits but drives out current, active-duty soldiers.\\nIt does so in vivid contrast to the Mattis Policy, which\\nrecognized that the military generally applies “less stringent\\nstandards to retention than to accession in order to preserve the\\nDepartment’s substantial investment in trained personnel” and\\nto honor the reliance interests of incumbent transgender\\nservicemembers. Add. 127-28; see id. 164 (“[R]etention\\n\\n 13\\nstandards focus squarely on whether the Service member,\\ndespite his or her condition, can continue to do the job.”).\\nAccordingly, servicemembers who had been diagnosed with\\ngender dysphoria yet permitted under the Carter Policy to serve\\nopenly could remain in the service under the Mattis Policy,\\ncontinue to receive benefits including medical treatment, and\\nserve consistently with their gender identity. Add. 120. That\\n“reliance exemption” was critical to our court’s understanding\\nthat the Mattis Policy did not operate as a blanket ban on\\ntransgender servicemembers. See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F.\\nApp’x 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d\\n694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Wilkins, J., concurring); id. at 722\\n(Williams, J., concurring). In contrast, the Hegseth Policy not\\nonly prevents transgender persons from acceding to the\\nmilitary but also summarily ousts all those already in it. Both\\ngroups are disqualified from service without exception.\\nThousands of talented and patriotic individuals who met\\nrigorous accession standards and have been serving military\\nneed are being pointlessly expelled.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also subjects transgender\\nservicemembers to a gratuitously harsh administrative\\nseparation process. Normally, when a current servicemember\\nis diagnosed with a medical condition that the military\\nconsiders potentially disabling, the Department of Defense\\nrefers the servicemember to its Disability Evaluation System\\nfor an individualized assessment of the servicemember’s\\ncontinued ability to serve and suitability for deployment. Soper\\nDecl. ¶ 13 (App. 446). The Department uses the results of that\\nindividualized assessment to determine whether the\\nservicemember can continue in the military. But the Hegseth\\nPolicy specifically bars referrals to the Disability Evaluation\\nSystem based on gender dysphoria. Instead, it requires\\ntransgender servicemembers to undergo administrative\\nseparation, a process typically reserved for misconduct or\\n\\n 14\\nfailure to meet standards. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 16 (App. 446).\\nAdministrative separation proceedings can cause immediate\\nand severe career harm: Servicemembers in those proceedings\\nare automatically designated non-deployable and cannot be\\npromoted. Id. at ¶ 14.\\n\\n There is no other medical condition that automatically\\ntriggers administrative separation from the military rather than\\nindividualized medical evaluation followed by determination\\nof an appropriate response. Oral Arg. 27:30-28:30.\\nDefendants offer no explanation why they devised a new,\\ncategorical approach just for gender dysphoria when existing\\nmedical screening procedures serve for all other medical\\nconditions. As the district court found, this sui generis\\ntreatment of gender dysphoria underscores that the Hegseth\\nPolicy’s asserted grounding in “the military’s rigorous physical\\nand mental fitness requirements” is pretextual. Talbott, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 328. Such rigorous fitness “standards are already\\nin place, and each active-duty Plaintiff already meets them.”\\nId. If servicemembers become unfit or if their participation\\nposes unusual risks to others, the military’s preexisting\\nprocedures enable it to assess and remove them.\\n\\n The district court also found that the government plans to\\nimplement the Policy by assigning servicemembers to the task\\nof “rummag[ing] through private medical records” to identify\\nthose “who have a current diagnosis or history of, or exhibit\\nsymptoms consistent with, gender dysphoria.” Talbott v.\\nUnited States, 775 F. Supp. 3d 445, 449-50 (D.D.C. 2025)\\n(emphasis added). No previous policy has devised such a\\ncostly and intrusive implementation scheme. No other medical\\ncondition involves servicemembers scrutinizing their peers’\\nmedical records to root out vaguely defined disfavored\\nsymptoms—in the name of unit cohesion, no less. The Hegseth\\n\\n 15\\nPolicy is not designed to further military objectives. It is\\ndesigned to stigmatize and drive out an unwanted group.\\n B.\\n\\n In advocating for a stay, the government does not dispute\\nthe animus pervading the Executive Order but shrugs it off as\\nlegally beside the point. Animus matters to the constitutional\\nanalysis, say defendants, only where a policy “lack[s] any\\npurpose other than a ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically\\nunpopular group.’” Mot. for Stay 25 (quoting Trump v.\\nHawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 705 (2018) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S.\\nat 534)). The majority agrees, concluding that “[i]f any\\nlegitimate [governmental] interest exists” alongside the\\nanimus, “‘we must accept that independent justification.’”\\nMaj. 21 (quoting Trump, 585 U.S. at 706). We need not\\naddress whether the presence of animus is fatal to a policy with\\na genuinely independent justification because here, the\\ngovernment fails to offer any plausible, distinct rationale for its\\npolicy.\\n\\n Trump v. Hawaii exemplifies the requisite inquiry. There,\\nchallengers asserted that a Presidential Proclamation barring\\nthe entry to the United States of nationals from certain\\ncountries was invalid because it was fueled by anti-Muslim\\nanimus. Trump, 585 U.S. at 699. In crediting the government\\nwith an independent and legitimate national security\\njustification, the Court emphasized that the revised\\nProclamation before it “reflect[ed] the results of a worldwide\\nreview process undertaken by multiple Cabinet officials and\\ntheir agencies,” limited the ban to “countries that were\\npreviously designated by Congress or prior administrations as\\nposing national security risks,” and provided for meaningful\\nexceptions and waivers in keeping with the limited national\\nsecurity rationale. Trump, 585 U.S. at 706-710.\\n\\n 16\\n But the Court has refused to so credit alternate\\nexplanations for policies driven by animus where, as here,\\nthose explanations lack indicia of truth and independence. In\\nMoreno, for example, the government claimed the challenged\\npolicy was designed to prevent welfare fraud; the Court\\ndisbelieved that explanation because other statutory provisions\\ndealt with “those very same abuses.” 413 U.S. at 535-37. In\\nCleburne, the government claimed its policy forbidding a\\ngroup home for the developmentally disabled was justified by\\nthe possibility that local “students might harass” the disabled\\nresidents, that its siting in a floodplain might endanger them,\\nthat the city might face legal liability, and that the group home\\nwould create residential crowding. 473 U.S. at 449-50. There,\\ntoo, the Court rejected the alternate explanations because the\\ntargeted group presented no “different or special hazard” from\\ngroups that remained unregulated. Id. at 449. And in Romer,\\nthe Court deemed several explanations pretextual because the\\nchallenged policy’s “sheer breadth” in depriving the targeted\\ngroup of every potential legal protection from discrimination\\n“across the board” was notably “discontinuous with the reasons\\noffered for it.” 517 U.S. at 632-33.\\n\\n The Supreme Court’s instruction to credit only actual\\njustifications “independent” of animus aligns with broader\\nprinciples of equal protection analysis. Trump, 585 U.S. at\\n706. Screening out animus is a chief concern of constitutional\\nscrutiny. The Court reviews suspect classifications such as\\nrace and sex more skeptically because they “are so seldom\\nrelevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that\\nlaws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect\\nprejudice and antipathy.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. In other\\nwords, the Court treats a suspect category as presumptively\\nbased in animus (and therefore unconstitutional) unless the\\nlaw’s “suitabl[e] tailor[ing]” toward some legitimate and\\nsufficiently weighty purpose shows otherwise. Id. Even under\\n\\n 17\\nthe most deferential rational basis review, the government must\\ndo more than supply possible alternate explanations for a\\npolicy motivated by animus. It must show that such reasons\\nbetter explain the policy than the “prejudice and antipathy”\\nalready identified. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. To hold\\notherwise would too readily allow official actors to mask\\nforbidden, irrational animus with pretext.\\n\\n The government variously asserts that the Hegseth Policy\\nis justified because transgender servicemembers harm military\\nreadiness, disrupt unit cohesion, or impose excess medical\\ncosts. Mot. for Stay 14-18. But none of those alternate\\nrationales accounts for the focus, conclusory process, or harsh\\nscope of the Hegseth Policy. Animus does. The government\\nhas failed to show that the Hegseth Policy was designed to\\npromote its stated interests rather than the inverse: that those\\ninterests were retrofitted to justify the animus-driven policy\\nrequired by Executive Order 14183.\\n\\n Consider the two potentially strongest justifications for the\\nPolicy: improving military readiness and maintaining unit\\ncohesion. The majority notes that previous defense secretaries\\nhad “concerns” about transgender persons’ health issues,\\nstressing the predictions of the Mattis Report and the\\n“anticipated” impacts of the Carter Policy. Maj. 15-16\\n(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the majority\\ndraws on the Mattis Report’s discussion of potential unit\\ncohesion issues stemming from gender-based privacy and\\nphysical fitness standards. Id. at 16-17. But the predictions\\nand hypotheticals of past defense secretaries were developed\\nnearly a decade ago, without the benefit of experience. As the\\ndistrict court observed, the Mattis Report was explicit that its\\n“findings were limited by uncertainty” because “[t]ransgender\\npersons had not served openly previously.” Talbott, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d at 303 (internal quotation marks omitted).\\n\\n 18\\n\\n In adopting the Hegseth Policy, defendants failed to\\nconsider whether the “woefully stale” predictions of the Mattis\\nReport have borne out. Id. at 324. The government is silent as\\nto whether, in the intervening seven years, any of the\\nchallenges predicted by the Mattis Policy—or others it did not\\nforesee—have arisen and, if so, how the military has addressed\\nthem. And the government fails to identify any way in which\\npolicies in place on the eve of the Hegseth Policy failed to meet\\nlegitimate military needs. Defendants provide no evidence that\\nPresident Trump or Secretary Hegseth “consulted with\\nuniformed military leaders” at all before imposing their\\nunprecedented ban on transgender servicemembers. Id. at 292.\\n\\n Contrast defendants’ suppositions with the district court’s\\nfindings of fact, based on undisputed record evidence that\\nincludes the observations of multiple high-ranking officials\\nwho implemented the Austin Policy. Former service\\nsecretaries and other leaders of the Department of Defense\\nattested that they had never encountered a disciplinary case,\\nreadiness issue, or weakening of unit cohesion stemming from\\na servicemember’s transgender status. Id. at 309-10. What is\\nmore, the former Secretary of the Navy observed that “allowing\\ntransgender individuals to serve strengthens unit cohesion by\\nfostering honesty and mutual trust” and that “excluding\\ntransgender individuals from military service is destabilizing to\\ngood order and discipline.” Id. at 308. The district court\\ncredited those officials’ uncontested avowals that “transgender\\nservice . . . has not negatively impacted readiness.” Id. at 309.\\nAs one official responsible for personnel and readiness\\nexplained, “policies that allow transgender service members to\\nbe evaluated based on skill and merit . . . do not jeopardize the\\nmilitary’s mission of protecting the United States, but\\nstrengthen it.” Id. at 309.\\n\\n 19\\n In accord with those attestations, the record substantiates\\nthat plaintiffs’ service has made our country safer. To name\\njust a few, Captain Gordon Herrero kept American soldiers in\\nthe Republic of Korea supplied with necessities during\\nmultinational military exercises and was recently selected to\\neducate future officers as an instructor at the United States\\nMilitary Academy at West Point. Herrero Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, ECF\\nNo. 72-25. Major Erica Vandal earned a Bronze Star for her\\nmeritorious service as a Battery Commander in Afghanistan.\\nVandal Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, ECF No. 72-20. Ensign Dany Danridge\\nrepaired and maintained Navy aircraft and equipment to\\nsupport the military campaign against ISIL. Danridge Decl.\\n¶¶ 11-12, ECF No. 72-28. Commander Michelle Bloomrose,\\nas Commanding Officer of the Naval Justice School, trained\\nhundreds of enlisted and civilian professionals to deliver\\nmilitary legal services. Bloomrose Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 72-54.\\nEach has served our country for between nine and nineteen\\nyears, each continues to meet the military’s demanding\\nstandards, and each wishes to continue serving. These\\nservicemembers’ records, unmet by any contrary showing,\\nsupport the district court’s conclusion that the service of openly\\ntransgender people “has resulted in a stronger, not a weaker\\nmilitary.” Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 308.\\n\\n The government raises no challenge to the district court’s\\nfindings of fact. Despite being afforded the opportunity to\\ncross-examine those officials and submit its own evidence, the\\ngovernment repeatedly declined to do so (with one immaterial\\nexception).2 The government instead simply ignores the record\\n\\n2\\n The government filed one declaration by Timothy Dill, Assistant\\nSecretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, in response\\nto the declaration of Gilbert Cisneros, the former Under Secretary of\\nDefense for Personnel and Readiness. Id. at 309. Mr. Dill\\nchallenged whether a person in Mr. Cisneros’s role would have had\\nfirsthand knowledge of individualized servicemember complaints.\\n\\n 20\\nand the district court’s findings about the military’s experience\\nsince the Mattis Policy, and the majority does the same. But in\\nthe absence of any showing of clear error we are bound to\\nrespect those findings. As the case comes before us, the facts\\nconclusively demonstrate that the government’s stated\\njustifications for the Hegseth Policy are unsupported and\\npretextual.\\n\\n The gratuitously demeaning nature of the administrative\\nseparation process that the military has adopted for transgender\\nservicemembers underscores the point. No special concern for\\ndeployability, unit cohesion, training safety, or medical costs\\nsupports the use against this group of a separation process\\ndesigned for cases of misconduct or failure to meet standards.\\nAnd none of the government’s justifications could support the\\nadditional, degrading step of requiring transgender\\nservicemembers to either attend their separation hearings\\ndressed up according to the military standards for their birth\\nsex or else waive the right to participate. See Air Force\\nMemorandum 4.\\n C.\\n Because this policy fails rational basis review, it is\\nunnecessary to explore the deferential version of heightened\\nscrutiny for “the military context” that the majority assumes to\\nbe the most demanding standard that might apply here. Maj.\\n12. The majority’s test, however, notably overreads limited\\nlines of precedent to downplay the role of overt bias or animus.\\nAnd in any event, it fails to justify upholding the Hegseth\\nPolicy.\\n\\nId. at 310. But the district court credited Mr. Cisneros’s testimony\\nover Mr. Dill’s, reasoning that Mr. Cisneros’s sworn account of his\\nfirsthand experiences was more authoritative than someone else’s\\nsuppositions about his experiences, id., and the government does not\\nchallenge that determination as clearly erroneous.\\n\\n 21\\n\\n The majority asserts that, “[i]n the military context,”\\ncourts need only “consider whether the policy . . . resulted from\\nthe professional judgment of military authorities and\\nreasonably furthers legitimate military interests.” Maj. 12.\\nNeither of the cases it cites supports such a conclusion. Rostker\\nv. Goldberg rejected an invitation to craft a distinct version of\\nintermediate scrutiny of sex-based classifications for military\\nissues, 453 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1981), and in any event concerned\\nCongress’s constitutional authority over military affairs, id. at\\n64-65. The Rostker Court nonetheless scrutinized Congress’s\\ndecision-making to determine whether the contested statute\\nwas “the ‘accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking\\nabout females.’” Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430\\nU.S. 313, 320 (1977)). Goldman v. Weinberger continued a\\nlong line of decisions denying accommodation of certain\\naspects of religious free exercise in the military. See 475 U.S.\\n503, 507, 509-10 (1986). To be sure, “the complex, subtle, and\\nprofessional decisions as to the composition and training of\\nmilitary forces are matters of expert military judgment” on\\nwhich we “tread with great care,” but no special rule of\\ndeference shelters military policies from claims of\\nunconstitutional bias or animus. See Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th\\n88, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and\\nalterations omitted).\\n\\n Even under the majority’s standard, the Hegseth Policy\\nfalls short: It did not result from the professional judgment of\\nmilitary authorities. We owe deference to the “considered\\nprofessional judgment” of “appropriate military officials.”\\nGoldman, 475 U.S. at 509. But where defendants made no\\nattempt to collect or analyze the most relevant information\\navailable to the military or bring military expertise to bear on\\nthe issue before the court, there is no “considered professional\\njudgment” to which we might defer. In Rostker, the Court\\n\\n 22\\nupheld a policy that was the product of extensive “hearings,\\nfloor debate, and . . . committee” discussions which “adduced\\nextensive testimony and evidence concerning the issue.” 453\\nU.S. at 72. And in Goldman, the Court evaluated “AFR 35-10,\\na 190-page document” developed by the Air Force which\\n“describe[d] in minute detail” what its servicemembers could\\nwear and the limited “individualized options” allowed. 475\\nU.S. at 508. Those efforts helped demonstrate that the policies\\nin question were the result of “considered professional\\njudgment,” id., and “reasonable evaluation,” Rostker, 453 U.S.\\nat 68, warranting deference from the courts. There is no record\\nof informed and expert decision making in support of the\\nHegseth Policy’s abrupt upending of prior policies that were\\nbased on careful study.\\n\\n The Department of Defense may forego consideration,\\nstudy, or analysis of military experience or needs as it develops\\nand implements its personnel policies. But if it makes that\\nchoice, it cannot then demand in litigation that courts\\nevaluating the constitutionality of those policies defer to the\\nDepartment’s unreasoned—even arbitrary or malign—\\nconclusions. And it certainly cannot do so when it has failed\\nto challenge as clearly erroneous the district court’s findings of\\nfact—findings based on attestations of military officials who\\nimplemented the Austin Policy—that allowing open service by\\nqualified transgender individuals has had a positive effect on\\nmilitary readiness and unit cohesion. See Talbott, 775 F. Supp.\\n3d at 309. Ignoring the overt animus fueling the Hegseth\\nPolicy by assuming the Policy is supported by valid military\\ninterests that the government did not even bother to\\nsubstantiate in court would stretch “military deference” beyond\\nany rational meaning. As the Supreme Court noted in Rostker,\\n“deference does not mean abdication.” 453 U.S. at 70.\\n\\n * * *\\n\\n 23\\n Neither the government nor the majority contests the\\nexistence of animus pervading Executive Order 14183. Mot.\\nfor Stay 24-25; Maj. 20-22. The Hegseth Policy carried that\\nanimus forward in the draconian ban it imposed, which it then\\nsought to justify based on stale predictions that had supported\\na significantly more modest policy years earlier. None of the\\ngovernment’s alternate justifications can disguise the real\\nimpetus behind the Hegseth Policy: to purge transgender\\nservicemembers from the military because the President\\nvilifies transgender people and wishes to drive them out. The\\ngovernment cannot make a strong showing of likelihood of\\nsuccess on the merits when the Hegseth Policy fails even\\nrational basis review.\\n II.\\n\\n The government must meet a “high standard” to show that\\nit faces irreparable injury. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches\\nv. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Staying a\\ndistrict court’s grant of preliminary relief “based only on a\\npossibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our\\ncharacterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy\\nthat may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the\\nplaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.\\nInstead, the government must show that the impending injury\\nis “actual and not theoretical,” and “of such imminence that\\nthere is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent\\nirreparable harm.” Id. (quoting Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758\\nF.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). Failure to\\ndemonstrate irreparable harm is, by itself, “fatal” to a request\\nfor a stay. See KalshiEx LLC v. CFTC, 119 F.4th 58, 64 (D.C.\\nCir. 2024).\\n\\n The majority seeks to justify its stay based on the\\ngovernment’s compelling interest in a “strong and ready\\nmilitary.” Maj. 22. But the record in this case is devoid of\\n\\n 24\\nevidence that the preliminary injunction allowing continued\\nservice by fully qualified, healthy, and ready transgender\\ntroops will irreparably harm that interest. The majority simply\\nasserts that in matters of military readiness “the Constitution\\nassigns that assessment to the political branches.” Maj. 23.\\nIndeed, we give “great deference” to the military’s judgments.\\nWinter, 555 U.S. at 24. But the military must provide\\nsomething more than the bare assertions in its briefing to be\\n“weighed against the [other] interests that are legitimately\\nbefore this [c]ourt.” See Winter, 555 U.S. at 25.\\n\\n The government does not here assert that, pending\\nexpedited decision of the appeal, the preliminary injunction is\\nlikely to undermine military readiness and lethality. Rather, it\\nrelies on a generic claim that the Department of Defense suffers\\nirreparably when it cannot immediately carry out a policy it\\nthinks is valid. The majority refrained from embracing that\\nclaim. No wonder: That reasoning applies to every injunction\\nagainst the executive branch, so to treat it as irreparable harm\\nwould effectively disable courts from preliminarily enjoining\\nany unconstitutional executive action. “That cannot be so.”\\nDoe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 2020). Even\\nin Maryland v. King, the Chief Justice’s in-chambers stay order\\non which the government relies, the applicants demonstrated\\n“ongoing and concrete harm.” 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012)\\n(Roberts, C.J., in chambers). Assertions of a generalized\\ninterest in the immediate effectiveness of an executive policy\\nthat a court deems likely unconstitutional cannot constitute\\nirreparable harm. To hold that it does would negate the\\nirreparable harm factor whenever the government seeks a stay.\\n\\n Defendants have identified no irreparable harms that\\nmanifested under the many years of the Austin Policy. And the\\ndistrict court found that the Mattis Report’s predictions were\\ndisproven by the real-world experiences of commanding\\n\\n 25\\nservicemembers under that policy. Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at\\n323-25. The military has robust policies in place to remove\\nservicemembers who pose a threat to military readiness and\\nlethality, and transgender servicemembers are governed by\\nthose just like everyone else. They are subject to the military’s\\nregular disciplinary procedures. And if they have medical\\nconditions affecting their ability to serve, the military can make\\nindividualized assessments through the Disability Evaluation\\nSystem and remove any transgender servicemember as to\\nwhom the assessment confirms a service impediment. The\\ngovernment’s request for a stay therefore fails for lack of\\nirreparable harm.\\n III.\\n The majority contends that a stay pending appeal will not\\ncause “irreparable injuries” to plaintiffs because if they\\nultimately prevail they may obtain backpay or reinstatement.\\nMaj. 23. “But in this procedural posture, it is not the plaintiffs’\\nburden to prove irreparable injury; it is the government’s.”\\nJ.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682, at *12 (D.C.\\nCir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring). Instead, “[w]e\\nmust consider whether a stay will ‘substantially injure’ the\\nplaintiffs.” Id. (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). If a stay is\\ngranted, plaintiffs who are currently in the process of joining\\nthe military will be prevented from doing so, despite having\\ntrained to qualify and given up housing, other jobs, and\\neducational opportunities in reliance on enlistment contracts.\\nAnd the incumbent active-duty plaintiffs who are being\\nseparated from the service are already suffering the loss of a\\n“job, income, pension, health and life insurance, and all the\\nother benefits attendant” with military service, which by itself\\nconstitutes substantial and irreparable harm. McVeigh v.\\nCohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D.D.C. 1998); see Elzie v.\\nAspin, 841 F. Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1993); see also Cy Neff,\\nUS To Begin Immediate Removal of Up to 1,000 Trans Military\\n\\n 26\\nMembers, GUARDIAN (May 8, 2025), https://perma.cc/Q83G-\\nXNNB. Plaintiffs are currently losing the opportunity to accept\\nSenate-confirmed promotions, losing the ability to accrue time\\ntowards retirement, losing access to medically necessary\\nhealthcare, losing the opportunity to provide benefits for their\\nchildren, and, in many cases, losing the only career they have\\never known—for which many of them undertook years of\\nspecialized training. The Hegseth Policy stigmatizes plaintiffs\\nand “subject[s]” them “to the indignity of being unable to serve\\nfor reasons that, on this record, bear no relationship to their\\nability to perform.” Singh, 56 F.4th at 110 (internal quotation\\nmarks and alterations omitted). Under our precedent, that is\\n“irreversible and irreparable harm.” Id. Undoubtably, the\\nlikelihood of “substantial[] injur[y]” to the plaintiffs weighs\\nheavily in favor of denying the stay. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.\\n IV.\\n Finally, denying a stay serves the public interest. In Doe\\n1, we held that allowing a ban on the accession of transgender\\npeople to the military to take effect was contrary to the public\\ninterest because it would “directly impair and injure the\\nongoing educational and professional plans of transgender\\nindividuals and would deprive the military of skilled and\\ntalented service members.” 2017 WL 6553389, at *3. That\\nreasoning has even greater force in this case. Allowing the\\nHegseth Policy to take effect would lead not only to the end of\\nnew accessions, but to the blanket removal of thousands of\\nadmittedly qualified and talented servicemembers fully able to\\ncontinue meeting the military’s demanding standards.\\nRemoving those individuals based only on their transgender\\nstatus is especially detrimental at a time when the services are\\n“facing a reduced pool of American[s] who meet military\\nphysical and health standards” and must “build[] and grow[]\\n[their] own skilled specialists and leaders organically,” a\\nprocess that “typically requires years or decades.” Wagner\\n\\n 27\\nDecl. ¶ 41 (App. 12-13). The public interest suffers from the\\narbitrary and demoralizing depletion of our armed forces.\\n\\n * * *\\n Every factor in this case weighs against granting a stay\\npending appeal. Defendants have failed to introduce evidence\\nthat the Hegseth Policy serves any purpose other than the\\nindulgence of animus. They have not demonstrated that the\\nmilitary is likely to suffer any harm, let alone irreparable harm,\\nif the preliminary injunction remains in place while this case is\\nlitigated. On the other side of the ledger, plaintiffs and the\\npublic are already suffering substantial and irreparable harm as\\nthe military has begun to carry out the Hegseth Policy. All of\\nthat is enough to deny defendants’ request for a stay. But denial\\nis even more urgent here to prevent grave disruption to the\\nstatus quo that preceded the Hegseth Policy: what the record\\nshows to be nearly a decade of successful service in our armed\\nforces by transgender servicemembers. The majority’s\\ndecision makes it all but inevitable that thousands of qualified\\nservicemembers will lose careers they have built over decades,\\ndrawn up short by a policy that would repay their commitment\\nand service to our nation with detriment and derision. The\\nmajority grants this stay in the face of all evidence to the\\ncontrary. We should not accord deference to the military when\\nthe Department itself carelessly relied on no more than blatant\\nanimus.\\n\\n I respectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11216490/\", \"author_raw\": \"PILLARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"PILLARD"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"KATSAS"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RAO"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749905/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: Nicolas Talbott v. USA\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-09\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n ____________\nNo. 25-5087 September Term, 2025\n 1:25-cv-00240-ACR\n Filed On: December 9, 2025\nNicolas Talbott, et al.,\n\n Appellees\n\n v.\n\nUnited States of America, et al.,\n\n Appellants\n\n\n BEFORE: Pillard*, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal, the\nopposition thereto, and the reply; the Rule 28(j) letters, and the responses thereto; and\nthe letter request to lift the administrative stay, and the response thereto, it is\n\n ORDERED that the administrative stay entered on March 27, 2025, be dissolved.\nIt is\n\n FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal be granted. A\nconcurring statement of Circuit Judge Katsas, joined by Circuit Judge Rao, and a\ndissenting statement of Circuit Judge Pillard are attached.\n\n\n Per Curiam\n\n\n FOR THE COURT:\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\n\n BY: /s/\n Selena R. Gancasz\n Deputy Clerk\n\n\n* Circuit Judge Pillard would deny the motion for stay pending appeal.\n\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge, joined by RAO, Circuit Judge:\nThe United States military enforces strict medical standards to\nensure that only physically and mentally fit individuals join its\nranks. For decades, these requirements barred service by\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, a medical condition\nassociated with clinically significant distress. This bar was\npartially relaxed in 2016, revived in 2018, partially relaxed\nagain in 2021, and revived again in 2025. District courts\npreliminarily enjoined the 2018 revival as a likely violation of\nequal-protection principles, but this Court vacated one of those\ninjunctions, and the Supreme Court stayed two others. This\ncase presents equal-protection challenges to the 2025 revival.\n\n The 2025 policy generally bars individuals with gender\ndysphoria from serving in the Armed Forces. The Secretary of\nDefense concluded that this policy would advance important\nmilitary interests of combat readiness, unit cohesion, and cost\ncontrol. In doing so, he consulted materials compiled to assess\nthe 2016 and 2018 policy changes, as well as more recent\nstudies regarding the impacts of gender dysphoria on those\nwith the condition and on their military service. The district\ncourt nonetheless preliminarily enjoined the 2025 policy based\non its own contrary assessment of the evidence.\n\n In our view, the court afforded insufficient deference to the\nSecretary’s considered judgment. Accordingly, we stay the\npreliminary injunction pending the government’s appeal.\n\n I\n\n A\n\n To join and remain in the United States military, service\nmembers must meet strict medical standards. Lengthy\nDepartment of Defense documents set out the requirements.\n\n 2\nAdd. 1301; see, e.g., Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03, Vol. 1,\nMedical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\nEnlistment, or Induction (May 2024), https://perma.cc/J67Q-\n982F (“DoD Accession Standards”); Dep’t of Def. Instruction\n6130.03, Vol. 2, Medical Standards for Military Service:\nRetention (June 2022), https://perma.cc/WFQ3-F229 (“DoD\nRetention Standards”).\n\n Hundreds of medical conditions are “disqualifying” for\naccession to military service. DoD Accession Standards at 13–\n54. They run the gamut from poor vision, poor hearing,\nasthma, and high blood pressure to various abdominal, heart,\nlung, neurologic, urinary, vascular, and other deficiencies. See\nid. at 13–50. Many mental-health conditions are also\ndisqualifying. These include bipolar disorders, eating\ndisorders, substance-related disorders, obsessive-compulsive\ndisorder, and depression or anxiety disorders under certain\nconditions. See id. at 50–52. The military traditionally has\naligned these disqualifying mental-health conditions with those\nlisted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\nDisorders (DSM), a diagnostic and treatment manual published\nby the American Psychiatric Association. See Doe 2 v.\nShanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J.,\nconcurring in the result).\n\n These requirements advance many military objectives.\nAmong other things, they ensure that service members can\ncomplete required training, serve in harsh or remote\nenvironments, and perform their duties as safely as possible.\nDoD Accession Standards at 5. The standards also reduce the\n\n\n\n 1\n “Add.” citations refer to the government’s addendum, while\n“App.” citations refer to the plaintiffs’ appendix.\n\n 3\nrisk that service members will “require excessive time lost\nfrom duty” for medical reasons. Id. at 4.\n\n B\n\n This case involves application of these principles to gender\ndysphoria, a medical condition experienced by certain\ntransgender individuals. The term “transgender” describes an\nindividual whose self-perceived gender is incongruent with his\nor her biological sex. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and\nStatistical Manual of Mental Disorders 511 (5th ed. Text\nRevision 2022) (“DSM-5”). A subset of transgender\nindividuals experience “gender dysphoria,” a psychological\ncondition stemming from such an incongruence. See id. at\n512–13. Gender dysphoria “is associated with clinically\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\nother important areas of functioning.” Id. at 513. Individuals\nwith gender dysphoria often seek specialized treatment,\nincluding hormone therapy, surgery, or other substantial\ninterventions. See id. For example, women with gender\ndysphoria may take testosterone to induce hair growth, a\ndeepened voice, and increased muscle mass. They also may\nundergo surgery to remove their breasts or change the\nappearance of their genitalia. Men with gender dysphoria may\nseek comparable hormonal or surgical interventions.\n\n Before 2016, the medical standards discussed above\nbroadly barred transgender individuals from military service.\nAdd. 125; see Doe 2, 917 F.3d at 696–97 (Wilkins, J.,\nconcurring). Over the last decade, however, the governing\nrules have changed repeatedly. One way or another, recent\nstandards all distinguish between transgender individuals and\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.\n\n 4\n 1\n\n In June 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued a\npolicy permitting military service by transgender individuals\nnot suffering from gender dysphoria. App. 17 (“Carter\nPolicy”). For individuals seeking to join the military, a “history\nof gender dysphoria [was] disqualifying” unless a licensed\nmedical provider certified that the individual had been “stable\nwithout clinically significant distress or impairment in social,\noccupational, or other important areas of functioning for 18\nmonths.” Id. at 20. Likewise, a “history of medical treatment\nassociated with gender transition [was] disqualifying” unless a\nmedical provider certified that the treatment had concluded and\nthat the individual had been clinically stable for 18 months. Id.\nFor individuals already serving in the military, the policy\npermitted “[g]ender transition” despite noting that it “presents\nunique challenges” for “military mission and readiness needs.”\nId. at 21.\n\n In significant part, the Carter Policy rested on a report by\nthe RAND Corporation, which recommended that transgender\nindividuals be permitted to serve in the Armed Forces. App.\n116 (“RAND Report”). Despite reaching this conclusion, the\nRAND Report included significant caveats. It flagged as a\n“critical limitation” the “lack of rigorous epidemiological\nstudies of the size or health care needs of either the U.S.\ntransgender population or the transgender population serving\nin the military.” Id. at 138. Likewise, it acknowledged a lack\nof data “from which to estimate” how many transgender\nindividuals have gender dysphoria. Id. at 141. Regardless, the\nreport found that hormone treatments make an individual\nundeployable for a year. See id. at 202. But it discounted this\nconcern based on an assertion that “only a small proportion” of\ntransgender service members would seek the treatment in any\ngiven year. Id. at 204.\n\n 5\n After instituting the new policy, Secretary Carter issued a\n71-page “implementation handbook” addressing “some of the\nissues” posed for military commanders. U.S. Dep’t of Defense,\nTransgender Service in the U.S. Military: An Implementation\nHandbook at 1, 8 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/B9NH-\n6YVT (“Carter Handbook”). Among other things, the\nhandbook asked commanders to evaluate whether any\n“treatment plan” would cause “impacts to the mission\n(including deployments, operations, training and exercises).”\nId. at 53. It discussed deployment to any nation that “view[s]\ntransgender people as culturally unacceptable,” requiring\ncommanders to consider reassignment and to “[p]roceed with\ncaution for the safety of the Service member.” Id. at 69. It\nanticipated “discomfort” from service members not wanting to\nshare showers, bathrooms, and other living facilities with\nindividuals of the opposite sex. Id. at 60, 64. And it flagged\nfairness concerns if a transitioning service member could not\nmeet the physical standards established for his or her “preferred\ngender.” Id. at 48–49.\n\n 2\n\n In August 2017, President Trump ordered reconsideration\nof the Carter Policy. As the President saw it, Secretary Carter\nhad “failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that\nterminating” the prior “longstanding policy and practice would\nnot hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit\ncohesion, or tax military resources.” Military Service by\nTransgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,319, 41,319 (Aug.\n30, 2017). The President reinstated the previous accession\npolicy pending further study, and he substantially restricted\ngovernment funding for “sex-reassignment surgical\nprocedures.” Id. For individuals already serving in the\nmilitary, he delayed any changes until Secretary of Defense\nJames Mattis could implement a new policy. Id. at 41,319–20.\n\n 6\n In February 2018, Secretary Mattis issued a policy titled\n“Military Service by Transgender Individuals.” Add. 119\n(“Mattis Policy”). This policy barred from military service\nindividuals who would require or had undergone “gender\ntransition.” Id. at 120. Likewise, it barred individuals with a\nhistory of “gender dysphoria” from joining the military unless\nthey had been “stable for 36 consecutive months in their\nbiological sex prior to accession.” Id. Service members\ndiagnosed with gender dysphoria after joining could continue\nto serve if they “d[id] not require a change of gender and\nremain[ed] deployable.” Id. Service members diagnosed with\ngender dysphoria while the Carter Policy remained in effect\ncould continue serving “in their preferred gender” and\nreceiving “medically necessary treatment.” Id. Transgender\nindividuals without a history of gender dysphoria could join\nand serve “in their biological sex.” Id. at 121.\n\n The Mattis Policy rested on the “professional military\njudgment” of “senior uniformed and civilian Defense\nDepartment and U.S. Coast Guard leaders.” Add. 119. It also\nrested on recommendations set forth in a Defense Department\nreport reflecting “input from transgender Service members,\ncommanders of transgender Service members, military medical\nprofessionals, and civilian medical professionals with\nexperience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender\ndysphoria.” Id. at 119–20; see id. at 122–66 (“Mattis Report”).\nBased on this information, Secretary Mattis concluded that the\nRAND Report “contained significant shortcomings.” Id. at\n120. Specifically, it relied on “limited and heavily caveated\ndata to support its conclusions, glossed over the impacts of\nhealthcare costs, readiness, and unit cohesion, and erroneously\nrelied on the selective experiences of foreign militaries with\ndifferent operational requirements than our own.” Id.\n\n 7\n These actions spurred litigation. Before Secretary Mattis\nissued his policy, four district courts enjoined portions of\nPresident Trump’s memorandum. Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F.\nSupp. 3d 167, 177 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp.\n3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, No. 17-cv-\n1297, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017);\nStockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799, 2017 WL 9732572, at\n*16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). After Secretary Mattis issued\nhis policy, we granted the government’s motion to dissolve one\nof those injunctions. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22\n(D.C. Cir. 2019). We held that the Mattis Policy “plausibly\nrelied upon the considered professional judgment of\nappropriate military officials and appeared to permit some\ntransgender individuals to serve in the military.” Id. at 25\n(cleaned up). Soon after our decision, the Supreme Court\nstayed two of the other injunctions against the presidential\nmemorandum and interim guidance. Trump v. Karnoski, 586\nU.S. 1124 (2019); Trump v. Stockman, 586 U.S. 1124 (2019).\nThe fourth district court then followed suit. See Stone v.\nTrump, No. 17-cv-2459, 2019 WL 5697228, at *3 (D. Md.\nMar. 7, 2019). With these stays in place, challenges to the\npresidential memorandum and the Mattis Policy fizzled out.\nThe Mattis Policy thus remained in force from January 2019\nuntil President Biden assumed office in January 2021.\n\n 3\n\n Upon taking office, President Biden issued an executive\norder shifting the policy once again. Enabling All Qualified\nAmericans to Serve Their Country in Uniform, 86 Fed. Reg.\n7,471 (Jan. 28, 2021). President Biden directed Defense\nSecretary Lloyd Austin to “immediately prohibit involuntary\nseparations, discharges, and denials of reenlistment or\ncontinuation of service on the basis of gender identity.” Id. at\n7,472. And he directed military officials to “establish[] a\n\n 8\nprocess by which transgender service members may transition\ngender while serving.” Id.\n\n In April 2021, the Department of Defense issued new\nguidance. App. 49; see also Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03,\nVol. 1, Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\nEnlistment, or Induction (Apr. 2021), https://perma.cc/3W6K-\n2XHW (“2021 DoD Accession Standards”) (collectively\n“Austin Policy”). The Austin Policy largely restored the Carter\nPolicy, disqualifying gender-dysphoric individuals from\nacceding unless they had been “stable without clinically\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\nother important areas of functioning for 18 months.” 2021\nDoD Accession Standards at 48. But the Austin Policy\npermitted “in-service transition,” App. 49, while recognizing\nthat it poses “unique challenges” to “military mission and\nreadiness,” id. at 55.\n\n 4\n\n Upon returning to office, President Trump revoked the\nBiden executive order. Prioritizing Military Excellence and\nReadiness, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,757, 8,757 (Feb. 3, 2025). President\nTrump cited longstanding DoD guidance requiring service\nmembers to be “free of medical conditions” that may “require\nexcessive time lost from duty.” Id. (cleaned up). He further\nemphasized that the Armed Forces “must adhere to high mental\nand physical health standards” to ensure that they can “deploy,\nfight, and win, including in austere conditions and without the\nbenefit of routine medical treatment or special provisions.” Id.\nAnd he concluded that these high standards are “inconsistent\nwith the medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.” Id. The President directed\nDefense Secretary Pete Hegseth to update the military’s\nmedical standards accordingly. See id. at 8,757–58.\n\n 9\n Secretary Hegseth issued various memoranda\ndisqualifying from military service individuals with a diagnosis\nof, history of, or symptoms “consistent with” gender dysphoria.\nAdd. 99–109, 113–16, 198–202 (collectively “Hegseth\nPolicy”). For purposes of the policy, symptoms “consistent\nwith” gender dysphoria means symptoms that “would be\nsufficient to constitute a diagnosis.” Id. at 200 n.2. In limited\ncircumstances, the policy allows gender-dysphoric individuals\nto apply for a waiver to join or remain in the military. Id. at\n198–99.\n\n Several studies and reviews undergird the Hegseth Policy.\nThese include the Mattis Policy and Report, a 2021 DoD study\nanalyzing appropriate accession standards for transgender\nindividuals, a 2025 literature review on the efficacy of\nhormonal or surgical treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\nreview of cost data for treating gender-dysphoric service\nmembers through 2024. Add. 115–16.\n\n C\n\n Plaintiffs are transgender individuals with gender\ndysphoria diagnoses. Most of them are active-duty service\nmembers. They contend that the Hegseth Policy violates equal-\nprotection principles incorporated into the Fifth Amendment.\n\n The district court preliminarily enjoined the Hegseth\nPolicy. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was\nappropriate because the policy assertedly discriminates based\non sex and transgender status. Talbott v. United States, 775 F.\nSupp. 3d 283, 316–22 (D.D.C. 2025). The court further held\nthat the policy was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny.\nSee id. at 322–26. Alternatively, the court held that the policy\nwas motivated by animus toward transgender individuals and\nthus would fail even rational-basis scrutiny. See id. at 326–29.\n\n 10\nAnd it found that the equitable factors favored the plaintiffs.\nSee id. at 332–34.\n\n The government appealed the preliminary injunction and\nmoved for a stay. While that motion was pending, the Supreme\nCourt stayed a preliminary injunction against the Hegseth\nPolicy entered by the Western District of Washington. United\nStates v. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (mem.) (May 6, 2025). Soon\nafter, the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the use of\nhormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors does not\ndiscriminate based on sex or transgender status and survives\nrational-basis review. United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495,\n510–25 (2025).\n\n II\n\n The grant of a stay pending appeal depends on whether\n(1) the appellant has made a strong showing that it will prevail\non the merits; (2) the appellant will be irreparably harmed\nabsent a stay; (3) issuance of the stay will substantially harm\nplaintiffs or others; and (4) the stay is in the public interest.\nNken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009). Applying these\nfactors, a stay is warranted.\n\n A\n\n The Hegseth Policy likely does not violate equal\nprotection. We doubt that the policy triggers any form of\nheightened scrutiny. In Skrmetti, the Supreme Court held that\na law prohibiting the use of hormones to treat gender dysphoria\nin minors “classifies on the basis of medical use” and thus does\nnot discriminate based on either sex or transgender status. See\n605 U.S. at 510–19. The same reasoning would seem to cover\nthe Hegseth Policy, which classifies based on the medical\ncondition of gender dysphoria. Skrmetti also casts significant\ndoubt on the proposition that a classification based on\n\n 11\ntransgender status would trigger heightened scrutiny. See id.\nat 517 (“This Court has not previously held that transgender\nindividuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class.”); id. at 557\n(Barrett, J., concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause does\nnot demand heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that classify\nbased on transgender status.”); id. at 558 (Alito, J., concurring\nin part and concurring in the judgment) (classification based on\ntransgender status “does not warrant heightened scrutiny”).\n\n Even if the Hegseth Policy contained a classification\ntriggering some form of heightened scrutiny, decades of\nprecedent establish that the judiciary must tread carefully when\nasked to second-guess considered military judgments of the\npolitical branches. And we must do so even in cases involving\nsex-based or other quasi-suspect classifications. Moreover, the\nSupreme Court already has held that the government is likely\nto succeed on its contention that the Hegseth Policy does not\nviolate equal protection. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. at 2695. And this\nCourt, applying settled doctrines of deference to the military,\nhas strongly suggested that the Mattis Policy did not violate\nequal protection. See Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25. Given these\ndecisions, and for reasons summarized below, the Hegseth\nPolicy is likely constitutional.\n\n 1\n\n The Constitution vests the “complex, subtle, and\nprofessional decisions as to the composition, training,\nequipping, and control of a military force” in the political\nbranches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). For\nexample, Article II makes the President the Commander in\nChief, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, while Article I gives\nCongress the power to declare war and make rules for the\nArmed Forces, id. Art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14. So, the President and\nCongress have primary responsibility for the “delicate task of\n\n 12\nbalancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the\nmilitary.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996)\n(cleaned up).\n\n Given this allocation of powers, the judicial branch must\nbe “reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in\nmilitary and national security affairs.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan,\n484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.\n83, 93–94 (1953) (“judges are not given the task of running the\nArmy”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.\n579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (courts should give\nthe President, as Commander-in-Chief, “the widest latitude …\nto command the instruments of national force”). Indeed, it is\n“difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in\nwhich the courts have less competence.” Rostker v. Goldberg,\n453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10).\n\n Our review of constitutional challenges to military rules\nthus “is far more deferential than constitutional review of\nsimilar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”\nGoldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). In the\nmilitary context, courts consider whether the policy at issue\nresulted from the professional judgment of military authorities\nand reasonably furthers legitimate military interests. Id.\nMoreover, we must respect the military’s judgment on “the\nrelative importance of a particular military interest.” Id.\nCourts “must be particularly careful not to substitute our\njudgment of what is desirable … or our own evaluation of\nevidence for a reasonable evaluation” by the political branches.\nGoldberg, 453 U.S. at 68.\n\n Consider two leading precedents in this area. In Goldberg,\nthe Supreme Court rejected an equal-protection challenge to a\nstatute compelling men but not women to register for the draft.\n453 U.S. at 59, 83. The Court stressed that Congress had made\n\n 13\na considered judgment that this classification minimized\n“burdens” and “administrative problems” involving\n“housing … and physical standards,” while promoting “the\nimportant goal of military flexibility.” Id. at 81–82. In the\n“context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future\nmobilization,” the Court refused to “dismiss such problems as\ninsignificant.” Id. at 81. In Goldman, the Court similarly\nrejected a free-exercise challenge to a military regulation\nrestricting the wearing of yarmulkes. 475 U.S. at 509–10. The\nCourt declined to apply the heightened scrutiny normally used\nto assess First Amendment claims. See id. at 506–07. Instead,\nit took a “far more deferential approach” than it would have if\nthe restriction had been “designed for civilian society.” Id. at\n507. Citing Goldberg, the Court confirmed that “judicial\ndeference is at its apogee” when the political branches make\n“rules and regulations for [military] governance.” Id. at 508\n(cleaned up). The Court thus credited the “professional\njudgment of military authorities” that the restriction advanced\nlegitimate goals including “obedience, unity, commitment, and\nesprit de corps.” Id. at 507.\n\n Of course, the Constitution binds the government in the\nrealm of military affairs. See Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67; Parker\nv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). As we have noted, “the cost\nof military service has never entailed the complete surrender of\nall basic rights.” Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 92 (D.C. Cir.\n2022) (cleaned up). Particularly when Congress has mandated\nheightened scrutiny, a military policy may be found unlawful\nwhere, for example, it is riddled with unexplained exemptions\nfor some but not others. See id. at 98–107 (applying the\nReligious Freedom Restoration Act). But even then, courts\nmust afford deference to the executive’s considered judgment\nthat a military policy furthers legitimate interests. See id. at\n98–99.\n\n 14\n 2\n\n The Hegseth Policy is likely constitutional because it\nreflects a considered judgment of military leaders and furthers\nlegitimate military interests.\n\n a\n\n The Hegseth Policy reflects the considered judgment of\nthe Secretary of Defense and military leaders in the Defense\nDepartment. The policy was informed by “existing and prior\nDoD policy, and prior DoD studies and reviews of service by\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, including a review of\nmedical literature regarding the medical risks associated with\n[the] presence and treatment of gender dysphoria.” Add. 115.\nIn significant part, the Hegseth Policy relied on the Mattis\nPolicy, which “conclude[d] that there are substantial risks\nassociated with allowing accession and retention of individuals\nwith a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria.” Id. (Hegseth\nPolicy) (quoting id. at 120 (Mattis Policy)). In turn, the Mattis\nPolicy “was informed by an extensive inquiry conducted by a\npanel of experts” who considered the views of many\nstakeholders, including transgender service members and their\ncommanders. Id. at 115 (Hegseth Policy); see id. at 119 (Mattis\nPolicy). And we previously concluded that, because the Mattis\nPolicy relied on the considered judgment of military officials,\nthe government had “substantial arguments” that it complied\nwith equal-protection principles. Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25.\n\n The Hegseth Policy also relied on more recent materials,\nincluding a 2021 study addressing appropriate accession\nstandards for transgender individuals, a 2025 literature review\non the efficacy of treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\nreview of cost data for treating gender dysphoria. Add. 115–\n16. The 2021 study suggested that up to 40 percent of\nindividuals with a gender dysphoria diagnosis would be\n\n 15\n“deemed non-deployable due to mental health reasons at some\ntime during the 24 months following initial diagnosis.”\nTalbott, No. 25-cv-240, Dkt. No. 86-1, at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 17,\n2025) (“AMSARA Study”). The 2025 literature review\nindicated that transgender individuals are far more likely than\nothers “to receive a psychiatric diagnosis” of mood disorders,\nanxiety disorders, or psychotic disorders, with a suicide attempt\nrate 13 times higher than that for non-transgender individuals.\nAdd. 189. The literature review also found that the “strength\nof the evidence” supporting the efficacy of hormonal or\nsurgical treatments for gender dysphoria is “low to moderate.”\nId. at 189–93. And the cost data indicated that, between 2015\nand 2024, DoD spent over $52 million providing treatment for\ngender dysphoria to active-duty service members. Id. at 116.\n\n b\n\n The government identifies several legitimate military\ninterests that the Hegseth Policy advances.\n\n Chief among them is military readiness. On its face, the\npolicy applies only to individuals with gender dysphoria, a\nmedical condition that involves “clinically significant distress\nor impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas\nof functioning.” DSM-5 at 513. Secretary Hegseth had before\nhim evidence that treatments for gender dysphoria would limit\ndeployability and may not be effective. AMSARA Study at 15;\nAdd. 189–93. His predecessors unanimously agreed that these\nconcerns are serious ones: The Carter and Austin Policies\nbarred accession by individuals with a history of gender\ndysphoria unless they had been “stable without clinically\nsignificant distress or impairment” for 18 months, App. 20;\n2021 DoD Accession Standards at 48, while the Mattis Policy\ndrew the line at 36 months, Add. 120. The Mattis Report noted\nthat individuals “receiving hormone therapy and surgery”\n\n 16\ncould not deploy to “austere environments where their\nhealthcare needs cannot be met,” which showed that “the\ninclusion of individuals with gender dysphoria in the force will\nhave a negative impact on readiness.” Id. at 156. The Carter\nimplementation handbook also anticipated “impacts to the\nmission (including deployment, operations, training, exercise\nschedules, and critical skills availability)” from both treatment\nrequirements and international cultural constraints. See, e.g.,\nCarter Handbook at 14, 29, 48, 69. Even the RAND Report,\ndespite recommending that individuals with gender dysphoria\nbe allowed to serve, recognized that hormone treatments could\nrender them unable to deploy for a year. App. 202.\n\n The Hegseth Policy also rests on concerns about unit\ncohesion and good order. The military’s interest in “fostering\ncohesion and unity among its members” is “surely” a\n“compelling” one. Singh, 56 F.4th at 99. And even when\napplying strict scrutiny, we must “indulge the widest latitude\nin considering” interests based on an asserted need for unit\ncohesion. Id. (cleaned up).\n\n One such interest involves the privacy of service members\nwho, as the Mattis Report explained, must “live in extremely\nclose proximity to one another when sleeping, undressing,\nshowering, and using the bathroom.” Add. 159. To protect\nprivacy, Congress has required the military to provide separate\nhousing for male and female service recruits. See, e.g., 10\nU.S.C. §§ 7419 (Army), 8431 (Navy), 9419 (Air Force). Even\nbeyond statutory requirements, the military “has long\nmaintained separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities\nfor men and women.” Add. 159. Distinctions like these—\nkeyed to biological differences between the sexes—are\nunquestionably constitutional. As Justice Ginsburg explained\nfor the Supreme Court, it is not only permissible, but indeed\n“necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the\n\n 17\nother sex in living arrangements.” United States v. Virginia,\n518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996). And as Judge Williams later\nelaborated, in explaining why the Mattis Policy likely did not\nviolate equal protection, “there is no constitutional right for,\nsay, biological males who identify as female to live, sleep,\nshower, and train with biological females.” Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\n707–08 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). The Mattis\nReport and Carter implementation handbook both\nacknowledge that allowing gender-dysphoric individuals to\nserve consistent with their perceived gender identity, as\nopposed to their biological sex, would impinge on these\nprivacy interests in intimate, communal living spaces. Add.\n159 (Mattis Report); Carter Handbook at 60 (issues with “open\nbay shower configuration”); id. at 63–65 (sleeping areas).\n\n The Hegseth Policy also implicates the military’s sex-\nbased standards for physical fitness. As the Mattis Report\nexplained, “to allow biological males who identify as female to\nbe held to female standards” would raise concerns of unfairness\nand discrimination. Add. 158. Among other things, such\nindividuals would gain competitive advantages over other\nmales held to the male strength and fitness standards. See id.\nLikewise, females required to compete against such individuals\nwould be disadvantaged. See id. “Even more importantly, in\nphysically violent training and competition, such as boxing and\ncombatives, pitting biological females against biological males\nwho identify as female, and vice versa, could present a serious\nsafety risk as well.” Id. We cannot lightly dismiss these\nconcerns.\n\n Finally, the Hegseth Policy cited cost issues, noting that\nthe military had spent more than $52 million on treating service\nmembers with gender dysphoria between 2015 and 2024. Add.\n116. The Mattis Report likewise cited cost concerns. It noted\nthat after the Carter Policy was implemented, medical costs for\n\n 18\nservice members with gender dysphoria increased nearly three\ntimes as much as did costs for service members who did not\nhave gender dysphoria. Id. at 163. Moreover, it noted that\nunits sometimes had to use “operations and maintenance funds\nto pay for” the “specialized medical care” needed by gender-\ndysphoric service members. Id.\n\n c\n\n The district court held that the Hegseth Policy does not\nadvance these interests. In our view, it gave no sound reason\nfor overriding the Secretary’s considered judgment.\n\n The court dismissed the Mattis Policy and Report as\n“outdated.” Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 325. The court\nconcluded that in 2018, when Secretary Mattis issued his\nreport, “medical literature concerning the study and treatment\nof gender dysphoria” was “in a state of flux.” Id. at 303\n(cleaned up). But, the court continued, “medical studies now\noverwhelmingly conclude that gender dysphoria is highly\ntreatable.” Id. at 304. In support, the court cited a declaration\nfrom one doctor who simply stated, in one sentence and\nwithout citations, that “gender dysphoria is ‘highly treatable.’”\nId. (citing Decl. of George Brown at 4, Dkt. No. 72-77).\n\n We are wary of such a sweeping conclusion. For one\nthing, the Mattis Report reflects a thorough assessment of\nevidence available as of 2018, not much time has passed since\nthen, and we are skeptical that the constitutionality of a military\npolicy ebbs and flows as new medical studies emerge every few\nyears. For another, the Hegseth Policy did consider more\nrecent studies, which provide further support for its restrictions.\nTo reiterate, the policy rests in part on a 2021 DoD study\nsuggesting that up to 40 percent of individuals being treated for\ngender dysphoria may become non-deployable at some point\nover a two-year period, AMSARA Study at 15, and a 2025\n\n 19\nliterature review finding that transgender individuals are more\nlikely than others to suffer various mental-health issues, Add.\n188, and that the “strength of the evidence” supporting\nhormonal or surgical treatment for gender dysphoria is “low to\nmoderate,” id. at 189–93. Moreover, at least with respect to\nadolescents, evidence regarding treatment efficacy may be\neven less settled today than it was a few years ago. See\nSkrmetti, 605 U.S. at 524 (“Recent developments only\nunderscore the need for legislative flexibility in this area.”); id.\nat 532–40 (Thomas, J., concurring); Br. of Alabama as Amicus\nCuriae at 28–32, Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (Oct. 15, 2024). Given\nall this, the military was not constitutionally required to credit\nplaintiffs’ side of a fraught medical divide. Finally, the\nHegseth Policy advances some interests that do not turn on\nmedical questions at all. For example, the military continues\nto observe sex-based distinctions for sleeping areas and\nphysical competitions. And the privacy and safety interests\nadvanced by these standards do not turn on whether gender\ndysphoria is more treatable today than it was seven years ago.\n\n The district court also conducted a searching review of the\npost-2018 studies relied on by DoD. Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d\nat 301–08, 322–25. We find many of its criticisms\nunpersuasive. For example, as to the 2021 study, the court\nconcluded that a 40 percent non-deployability rate was “not\ninformative” without knowing the comparable rate for non-\ntransgender individuals. Id. at 304. But with accession\nstandards that screen out everything from asthma to high blood\npressure, it strains credulity to suppose that military-wide\naverages for non-deployability would be anywhere near two\nout of five. Next, the district court downplayed the 2025\nliterature review because it addressed all gender-dysphoric\nindividuals, rather than only those serving in the military. Id.\nat 305. But that broader focus surely understates the challenges\nfaced by gender-dysphoric individuals in the military, where\n\n 20\nlife is often more stressful and demanding than it is for\ncivilians. The court further downplayed evidence of greater\nmental-health issues faced by transgender individuals as\nreflecting “external factors.” Id. Maybe so, but that says little\nabout the cost to the military from taking on individuals who\nhave a medical diagnosis associated with significant mental\ndistress. To be sure, the district court fairly noted that the 2021\nstudy and the 2025 literature review contain some evidence\ncutting in favor of permitting service by individuals with\ngender dysphoria. Id. at 303–06. But the RAND Report that\ninformed the Carter Policy likewise contained cross-cutting\nconclusions. Again, the military is entitled to substantial\ndeference in setting risk tolerances and evaluating conflicting\nevidence bearing on matters like force composition. See, e.g.,\nTrump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 707–08 (2018); Goldman, 475\nU.S. at 507; Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70–72; Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\n728 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). Here, the evidence\nsupporting the Hegseth Policy was more than sufficient to\nsupport the choices made.\n\n 3\n\n The district court also held that the Hegseth Policy is\nrooted in animus against transgender individuals and therefore\nwould fail even rational-basis scrutiny. Talbott, 775 F. Supp.\n3d at 326–29. The court invoked a line of cases invalidating\nstatutes that disadvantaged unpopular groups. See, e.g., Romer\nv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne\nLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S.\n528 (1973). In our view, the district court overread these\nprecedents.\n\n These decisions reflect ordinary rational-basis principles;\nthey are not an independent basis for striking down statutes or\nrules. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.\n\n 21\nGarrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court rejected a\ncontention that “decisionmaking reflecting negative\nattitudes … necessarily runs afoul of” equal protection. Id. at\n367 (cleaned up) (discussing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448).\nInstead, the Court explained, cases like Cleburne condemn\nnegative attitudes “unsubstantiated” by anything that would\nindicate a legitimate government interest. See id. (emphasis\nomitted). So, “read in context,” the animus precedents “simply\nstate the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of the\nCourt’s equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject\nto rational-basis scrutiny does not violate the Fourteenth\nAmendment when it rationally furthers the purpose identified\nby the [government].” Id. (cleaned up).\n\n The Supreme Court confirmed this point in Trump v.\nHawaii. There, it explained that the “common thread” uniting\nits animus decisions has been the lack of “any purpose other\nthan a ‘bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.’” 585\nU.S. at 705 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534) (cleaned up).\nPut differently, the key question is whether it is “impossible to\n‘discern a relationship to legitimate state interests’” such that\nthe policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Id. at 706\n(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635). If any legitimate state\ninterest exists, “we must accept that independent justification”\nand thus reject an equal-protection challenge resting on\nasserted animus. Id. Because the Hegseth Policy advances\nlegitimate military interests, the animus cases do not help the\nplaintiffs here.\n\n The district court looked beyond the Hegseth Policy itself\nto derive animus from various statements made by the\nPresident or other officials. The Supreme Court rejected such\nan approach in Trump v. Hawaii, which upheld a presidential\nproclamation imposing restrictions on travel to the United\nStates from six predominantly Muslim countries. 585 U.S. at\n\n 22\n676; see also id. at 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The\nplaintiffs in that case highlighted several of President Trump’s\nsocial media posts which, in the dissenting justices’ view,\n“express[ed] animus toward Islam.” Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J.,\ndissenting); see also id. at 728 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the\nCourt discounted the “significance of those statements in\nreviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,\naddressing a matter within the core of executive\nresponsibility.” Id. at 702 (majority opinion). The task, as the\nCourt viewed it, was to “consider not only the statements of a\nparticular President, but also the authority of the Presidency\nitself.” Id. With that principle in mind, the Court looked to the\nproclamation’s text, which was “expressly premised on\nlegitimate purposes.” Id. at 706. Given that conclusion, the\nstatements of government officials about the proclamation\nwere not dispositive. So too here. Our review must focus on\nthe text and sources informing the Hegseth Policy, not extrinsic\nstatements made about it.\n\n B\n\n The remaining stay factors also favor the government. For\none thing, the Supreme Court’s stay order in Shilling indicates\nthat the government would suffer an irreparable injury if the\nHegseth Policy were enjoined pending appellate review of\npreliminary injunctions. See Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695; Nken,\n556 U.S. at 425–26. This is hardly surprising. Injunctions that\n“improperly intrude” on the Executive Branch often inflict\nirreparable injury, Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 859\n(2025) (cleaned up), especially where the injunction interferes\nwith the government’s “compelling need to provide for the\nNation’s security,” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,\n582 U.S. 571, 583 (2017) (per curiam). We can imagine few if\nany government interests more compelling than a strong and\nready military. And while the district court concluded that\n\n 23\nallowing gender-dysphoric individuals to serve in the military\nwould advance the cause of military strength and readiness, the\nConstitution assigns that assessment to the political branches,\nas cases like Goldberg and Goldman make clear.\n\n On the other side of the balance, we acknowledge that the\nplaintiffs have significant interests at stake—particularly those\nwho have already acceded. But “[t]he possibility that adequate\ncompensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a\nlater date … weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable\nharm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454\nF.3d 290, 297–98 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). In particular,\nloss of a valued government position “does not usually\nconstitute irreparable injury,” especially if the terminated\nindividual or officer may obtain backpay or reinstatement if he\nor she ultimately prevails on the merits. Sampson v. Murray,\n415 U.S. 61, 90–91 (1974). Courts applying these principles\nhave held that even less-than-honorable military discharges do\nnot constitute irreparable injuries warranting interim relief\nwhile challenges to the discharge remain ongoing. See\nHartikka v. United States, 754 F.2d 1516, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985);\nGuerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 273–74 (4th Cir. 1991). And\nhere, any service members separated under the Hegseth Policy\nwill be honorably discharged. Add. 101.\n\n Finally, the public interest does not warrant a stay. With\nthe government likely to prevail on the merits, and with the\nbalance of harm among the parties favoring the government,\nwe can discern no other consideration here that would tip the\nscale in the opposite direction.\n\n 24\n III\n\n For these reasons, we grant the stay pending appeal.2\n\n\n\n\n 2\n The district court independently erred in universally enjoining\nthe Hegseth Policy rather than merely providing as-applied relief to\nthe plaintiffs. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 839–47. Given our conclusion\nthat the government should be able to enforce the policy while its\nappeal is pending, we need not address further questions about the\nappropriate scope of any injunctive relief.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: Nicolas Talbott v. USA\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-09\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5087 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00240-ACR\\n Filed On: December 9, 2025\\nNicolas Talbott, et al.,\\n\\n Appellees\\n\\n v.\\n\\nUnited States of America, et al.,\\n\\n Appellants\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Pillard*, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal, the\\nopposition thereto, and the reply; the Rule 28(j) letters, and the responses thereto; and\\nthe letter request to lift the administrative stay, and the response thereto, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the administrative stay entered on March 27, 2025, be dissolved.\\nIt is\\n\\n FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal be granted. A\\nconcurring statement of Circuit Judge Katsas, joined by Circuit Judge Rao, and a\\ndissenting statement of Circuit Judge Pillard are attached.\\n\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\\n\\n\\n* Circuit Judge Pillard would deny the motion for stay pending appeal.\\n\\n KATSAS, Circuit Judge, joined by RAO, Circuit Judge:\\nThe United States military enforces strict medical standards to\\nensure that only physically and mentally fit individuals join its\\nranks. For decades, these requirements barred service by\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, a medical condition\\nassociated with clinically significant distress. This bar was\\npartially relaxed in 2016, revived in 2018, partially relaxed\\nagain in 2021, and revived again in 2025. District courts\\npreliminarily enjoined the 2018 revival as a likely violation of\\nequal-protection principles, but this Court vacated one of those\\ninjunctions, and the Supreme Court stayed two others. This\\ncase presents equal-protection challenges to the 2025 revival.\\n\\n The 2025 policy generally bars individuals with gender\\ndysphoria from serving in the Armed Forces. The Secretary of\\nDefense concluded that this policy would advance important\\nmilitary interests of combat readiness, unit cohesion, and cost\\ncontrol. In doing so, he consulted materials compiled to assess\\nthe 2016 and 2018 policy changes, as well as more recent\\nstudies regarding the impacts of gender dysphoria on those\\nwith the condition and on their military service. The district\\ncourt nonetheless preliminarily enjoined the 2025 policy based\\non its own contrary assessment of the evidence.\\n\\n In our view, the court afforded insufficient deference to the\\nSecretary’s considered judgment. Accordingly, we stay the\\npreliminary injunction pending the government’s appeal.\\n\\n I\\n\\n A\\n\\n To join and remain in the United States military, service\\nmembers must meet strict medical standards. Lengthy\\nDepartment of Defense documents set out the requirements.\\n\\n 2\\nAdd. 1301; see, e.g., Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03, Vol. 1,\\nMedical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\\nEnlistment, or Induction (May 2024), https://perma.cc/J67Q-\\n982F (“DoD Accession Standards”); Dep’t of Def. Instruction\\n6130.03, Vol. 2, Medical Standards for Military Service:\\nRetention (June 2022), https://perma.cc/WFQ3-F229 (“DoD\\nRetention Standards”).\\n\\n Hundreds of medical conditions are “disqualifying” for\\naccession to military service. DoD Accession Standards at 13–\\n54. They run the gamut from poor vision, poor hearing,\\nasthma, and high blood pressure to various abdominal, heart,\\nlung, neurologic, urinary, vascular, and other deficiencies. See\\nid. at 13–50. Many mental-health conditions are also\\ndisqualifying. These include bipolar disorders, eating\\ndisorders, substance-related disorders, obsessive-compulsive\\ndisorder, and depression or anxiety disorders under certain\\nconditions. See id. at 50–52. The military traditionally has\\naligned these disqualifying mental-health conditions with those\\nlisted in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental\\nDisorders (DSM), a diagnostic and treatment manual published\\nby the American Psychiatric Association. See Doe 2 v.\\nShanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 709 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J.,\\nconcurring in the result).\\n\\n These requirements advance many military objectives.\\nAmong other things, they ensure that service members can\\ncomplete required training, serve in harsh or remote\\nenvironments, and perform their duties as safely as possible.\\nDoD Accession Standards at 5. The standards also reduce the\\n\\n\\n\\n 1\\n “Add.” citations refer to the government’s addendum, while\\n“App.” citations refer to the plaintiffs’ appendix.\\n\\n 3\\nrisk that service members will “require excessive time lost\\nfrom duty” for medical reasons. Id. at 4.\\n\\n B\\n\\n This case involves application of these principles to gender\\ndysphoria, a medical condition experienced by certain\\ntransgender individuals. The term “transgender” describes an\\nindividual whose self-perceived gender is incongruent with his\\nor her biological sex. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and\\nStatistical Manual of Mental Disorders 511 (5th ed. Text\\nRevision 2022) (“DSM-5”). A subset of transgender\\nindividuals experience “gender dysphoria,” a psychological\\ncondition stemming from such an incongruence. See id. at\\n512–13. Gender dysphoria “is associated with clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\\nother important areas of functioning.” Id. at 513. Individuals\\nwith gender dysphoria often seek specialized treatment,\\nincluding hormone therapy, surgery, or other substantial\\ninterventions. See id. For example, women with gender\\ndysphoria may take testosterone to induce hair growth, a\\ndeepened voice, and increased muscle mass. They also may\\nundergo surgery to remove their breasts or change the\\nappearance of their genitalia. Men with gender dysphoria may\\nseek comparable hormonal or surgical interventions.\\n\\n Before 2016, the medical standards discussed above\\nbroadly barred transgender individuals from military service.\\nAdd. 125; see Doe 2, 917 F.3d at 696–97 (Wilkins, J.,\\nconcurring). Over the last decade, however, the governing\\nrules have changed repeatedly. One way or another, recent\\nstandards all distinguish between transgender individuals and\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.\\n\\n 4\\n 1\\n\\n In June 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter issued a\\npolicy permitting military service by transgender individuals\\nnot suffering from gender dysphoria. App. 17 (“Carter\\nPolicy”). For individuals seeking to join the military, a “history\\nof gender dysphoria [was] disqualifying” unless a licensed\\nmedical provider certified that the individual had been “stable\\nwithout clinically significant distress or impairment in social,\\noccupational, or other important areas of functioning for 18\\nmonths.” Id. at 20. Likewise, a “history of medical treatment\\nassociated with gender transition [was] disqualifying” unless a\\nmedical provider certified that the treatment had concluded and\\nthat the individual had been clinically stable for 18 months. Id.\\nFor individuals already serving in the military, the policy\\npermitted “[g]ender transition” despite noting that it “presents\\nunique challenges” for “military mission and readiness needs.”\\nId. at 21.\\n\\n In significant part, the Carter Policy rested on a report by\\nthe RAND Corporation, which recommended that transgender\\nindividuals be permitted to serve in the Armed Forces. App.\\n116 (“RAND Report”). Despite reaching this conclusion, the\\nRAND Report included significant caveats. It flagged as a\\n“critical limitation” the “lack of rigorous epidemiological\\nstudies of the size or health care needs of either the U.S.\\ntransgender population or the transgender population serving\\nin the military.” Id. at 138. Likewise, it acknowledged a lack\\nof data “from which to estimate” how many transgender\\nindividuals have gender dysphoria. Id. at 141. Regardless, the\\nreport found that hormone treatments make an individual\\nundeployable for a year. See id. at 202. But it discounted this\\nconcern based on an assertion that “only a small proportion” of\\ntransgender service members would seek the treatment in any\\ngiven year. Id. at 204.\\n\\n 5\\n After instituting the new policy, Secretary Carter issued a\\n71-page “implementation handbook” addressing “some of the\\nissues” posed for military commanders. U.S. Dep’t of Defense,\\nTransgender Service in the U.S. Military: An Implementation\\nHandbook at 1, 8 (Sept. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/B9NH-\\n6YVT (“Carter Handbook”). Among other things, the\\nhandbook asked commanders to evaluate whether any\\n“treatment plan” would cause “impacts to the mission\\n(including deployments, operations, training and exercises).”\\nId. at 53. It discussed deployment to any nation that “view[s]\\ntransgender people as culturally unacceptable,” requiring\\ncommanders to consider reassignment and to “[p]roceed with\\ncaution for the safety of the Service member.” Id. at 69. It\\nanticipated “discomfort” from service members not wanting to\\nshare showers, bathrooms, and other living facilities with\\nindividuals of the opposite sex. Id. at 60, 64. And it flagged\\nfairness concerns if a transitioning service member could not\\nmeet the physical standards established for his or her “preferred\\ngender.” Id. at 48–49.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n In August 2017, President Trump ordered reconsideration\\nof the Carter Policy. As the President saw it, Secretary Carter\\nhad “failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that\\nterminating” the prior “longstanding policy and practice would\\nnot hinder military effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit\\ncohesion, or tax military resources.” Military Service by\\nTransgender Individuals, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,319, 41,319 (Aug.\\n30, 2017). The President reinstated the previous accession\\npolicy pending further study, and he substantially restricted\\ngovernment funding for “sex-reassignment surgical\\nprocedures.” Id. For individuals already serving in the\\nmilitary, he delayed any changes until Secretary of Defense\\nJames Mattis could implement a new policy. Id. at 41,319–20.\\n\\n 6\\n In February 2018, Secretary Mattis issued a policy titled\\n“Military Service by Transgender Individuals.” Add. 119\\n(“Mattis Policy”). This policy barred from military service\\nindividuals who would require or had undergone “gender\\ntransition.” Id. at 120. Likewise, it barred individuals with a\\nhistory of “gender dysphoria” from joining the military unless\\nthey had been “stable for 36 consecutive months in their\\nbiological sex prior to accession.” Id. Service members\\ndiagnosed with gender dysphoria after joining could continue\\nto serve if they “d[id] not require a change of gender and\\nremain[ed] deployable.” Id. Service members diagnosed with\\ngender dysphoria while the Carter Policy remained in effect\\ncould continue serving “in their preferred gender” and\\nreceiving “medically necessary treatment.” Id. Transgender\\nindividuals without a history of gender dysphoria could join\\nand serve “in their biological sex.” Id. at 121.\\n\\n The Mattis Policy rested on the “professional military\\njudgment” of “senior uniformed and civilian Defense\\nDepartment and U.S. Coast Guard leaders.” Add. 119. It also\\nrested on recommendations set forth in a Defense Department\\nreport reflecting “input from transgender Service members,\\ncommanders of transgender Service members, military medical\\nprofessionals, and civilian medical professionals with\\nexperience in the care and treatment of individuals with gender\\ndysphoria.” Id. at 119–20; see id. at 122–66 (“Mattis Report”).\\nBased on this information, Secretary Mattis concluded that the\\nRAND Report “contained significant shortcomings.” Id. at\\n120. Specifically, it relied on “limited and heavily caveated\\ndata to support its conclusions, glossed over the impacts of\\nhealthcare costs, readiness, and unit cohesion, and erroneously\\nrelied on the selective experiences of foreign militaries with\\ndifferent operational requirements than our own.” Id.\\n\\n 7\\n These actions spurred litigation. Before Secretary Mattis\\nissued his policy, four district courts enjoined portions of\\nPresident Trump’s memorandum. Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F.\\nSupp. 3d 167, 177 (D.D.C. 2017); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp.\\n3d 747, 769 (D. Md. 2017); Karnoski v. Trump, No. 17-cv-\\n1297, 2017 WL 6311305, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2017);\\nStockman v. Trump, No. 17-cv-1799, 2017 WL 9732572, at\\n*16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017). After Secretary Mattis issued\\nhis policy, we granted the government’s motion to dissolve one\\nof those injunctions. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 22\\n(D.C. Cir. 2019). We held that the Mattis Policy “plausibly\\nrelied upon the considered professional judgment of\\nappropriate military officials and appeared to permit some\\ntransgender individuals to serve in the military.” Id. at 25\\n(cleaned up). Soon after our decision, the Supreme Court\\nstayed two of the other injunctions against the presidential\\nmemorandum and interim guidance. Trump v. Karnoski, 586\\nU.S. 1124 (2019); Trump v. Stockman, 586 U.S. 1124 (2019).\\nThe fourth district court then followed suit. See Stone v.\\nTrump, No. 17-cv-2459, 2019 WL 5697228, at *3 (D. Md.\\nMar. 7, 2019). With these stays in place, challenges to the\\npresidential memorandum and the Mattis Policy fizzled out.\\nThe Mattis Policy thus remained in force from January 2019\\nuntil President Biden assumed office in January 2021.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n Upon taking office, President Biden issued an executive\\norder shifting the policy once again. Enabling All Qualified\\nAmericans to Serve Their Country in Uniform, 86 Fed. Reg.\\n7,471 (Jan. 28, 2021). President Biden directed Defense\\nSecretary Lloyd Austin to “immediately prohibit involuntary\\nseparations, discharges, and denials of reenlistment or\\ncontinuation of service on the basis of gender identity.” Id. at\\n7,472. And he directed military officials to “establish[] a\\n\\n 8\\nprocess by which transgender service members may transition\\ngender while serving.” Id.\\n\\n In April 2021, the Department of Defense issued new\\nguidance. App. 49; see also Dep’t of Def. Instruction 6130.03,\\nVol. 1, Medical Standards for Military Service: Appointment,\\nEnlistment, or Induction (Apr. 2021), https://perma.cc/3W6K-\\n2XHW (“2021 DoD Accession Standards”) (collectively\\n“Austin Policy”). The Austin Policy largely restored the Carter\\nPolicy, disqualifying gender-dysphoric individuals from\\nacceding unless they had been “stable without clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or\\nother important areas of functioning for 18 months.” 2021\\nDoD Accession Standards at 48. But the Austin Policy\\npermitted “in-service transition,” App. 49, while recognizing\\nthat it poses “unique challenges” to “military mission and\\nreadiness,” id. at 55.\\n\\n 4\\n\\n Upon returning to office, President Trump revoked the\\nBiden executive order. Prioritizing Military Excellence and\\nReadiness, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,757, 8,757 (Feb. 3, 2025). President\\nTrump cited longstanding DoD guidance requiring service\\nmembers to be “free of medical conditions” that may “require\\nexcessive time lost from duty.” Id. (cleaned up). He further\\nemphasized that the Armed Forces “must adhere to high mental\\nand physical health standards” to ensure that they can “deploy,\\nfight, and win, including in austere conditions and without the\\nbenefit of routine medical treatment or special provisions.” Id.\\nAnd he concluded that these high standards are “inconsistent\\nwith the medical, surgical, and mental health constraints on\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria.” Id. The President directed\\nDefense Secretary Pete Hegseth to update the military’s\\nmedical standards accordingly. See id. at 8,757–58.\\n\\n 9\\n Secretary Hegseth issued various memoranda\\ndisqualifying from military service individuals with a diagnosis\\nof, history of, or symptoms “consistent with” gender dysphoria.\\nAdd. 99–109, 113–16, 198–202 (collectively “Hegseth\\nPolicy”). For purposes of the policy, symptoms “consistent\\nwith” gender dysphoria means symptoms that “would be\\nsufficient to constitute a diagnosis.” Id. at 200 n.2. In limited\\ncircumstances, the policy allows gender-dysphoric individuals\\nto apply for a waiver to join or remain in the military. Id. at\\n198–99.\\n\\n Several studies and reviews undergird the Hegseth Policy.\\nThese include the Mattis Policy and Report, a 2021 DoD study\\nanalyzing appropriate accession standards for transgender\\nindividuals, a 2025 literature review on the efficacy of\\nhormonal or surgical treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\\nreview of cost data for treating gender-dysphoric service\\nmembers through 2024. Add. 115–16.\\n\\n C\\n\\n Plaintiffs are transgender individuals with gender\\ndysphoria diagnoses. Most of them are active-duty service\\nmembers. They contend that the Hegseth Policy violates equal-\\nprotection principles incorporated into the Fifth Amendment.\\n\\n The district court preliminarily enjoined the Hegseth\\nPolicy. The court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was\\nappropriate because the policy assertedly discriminates based\\non sex and transgender status. Talbott v. United States, 775 F.\\nSupp. 3d 283, 316–22 (D.D.C. 2025). The court further held\\nthat the policy was unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny.\\nSee id. at 322–26. Alternatively, the court held that the policy\\nwas motivated by animus toward transgender individuals and\\nthus would fail even rational-basis scrutiny. See id. at 326–29.\\n\\n 10\\nAnd it found that the equitable factors favored the plaintiffs.\\nSee id. at 332–34.\\n\\n The government appealed the preliminary injunction and\\nmoved for a stay. While that motion was pending, the Supreme\\nCourt stayed a preliminary injunction against the Hegseth\\nPolicy entered by the Western District of Washington. United\\nStates v. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (mem.) (May 6, 2025). Soon\\nafter, the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the use of\\nhormones to treat gender dysphoria in minors does not\\ndiscriminate based on sex or transgender status and survives\\nrational-basis review. United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495,\\n510–25 (2025).\\n\\n II\\n\\n The grant of a stay pending appeal depends on whether\\n(1) the appellant has made a strong showing that it will prevail\\non the merits; (2) the appellant will be irreparably harmed\\nabsent a stay; (3) issuance of the stay will substantially harm\\nplaintiffs or others; and (4) the stay is in the public interest.\\nNken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26 (2009). Applying these\\nfactors, a stay is warranted.\\n\\n A\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy likely does not violate equal\\nprotection. We doubt that the policy triggers any form of\\nheightened scrutiny. In Skrmetti, the Supreme Court held that\\na law prohibiting the use of hormones to treat gender dysphoria\\nin minors “classifies on the basis of medical use” and thus does\\nnot discriminate based on either sex or transgender status. See\\n605 U.S. at 510–19. The same reasoning would seem to cover\\nthe Hegseth Policy, which classifies based on the medical\\ncondition of gender dysphoria. Skrmetti also casts significant\\ndoubt on the proposition that a classification based on\\n\\n 11\\ntransgender status would trigger heightened scrutiny. See id.\\nat 517 (“This Court has not previously held that transgender\\nindividuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class.”); id. at 557\\n(Barrett, J., concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause does\\nnot demand heightened judicial scrutiny of laws that classify\\nbased on transgender status.”); id. at 558 (Alito, J., concurring\\nin part and concurring in the judgment) (classification based on\\ntransgender status “does not warrant heightened scrutiny”).\\n\\n Even if the Hegseth Policy contained a classification\\ntriggering some form of heightened scrutiny, decades of\\nprecedent establish that the judiciary must tread carefully when\\nasked to second-guess considered military judgments of the\\npolitical branches. And we must do so even in cases involving\\nsex-based or other quasi-suspect classifications. Moreover, the\\nSupreme Court already has held that the government is likely\\nto succeed on its contention that the Hegseth Policy does not\\nviolate equal protection. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. at 2695. And this\\nCourt, applying settled doctrines of deference to the military,\\nhas strongly suggested that the Mattis Policy did not violate\\nequal protection. See Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25. Given these\\ndecisions, and for reasons summarized below, the Hegseth\\nPolicy is likely constitutional.\\n\\n 1\\n\\n The Constitution vests the “complex, subtle, and\\nprofessional decisions as to the composition, training,\\nequipping, and control of a military force” in the political\\nbranches. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). For\\nexample, Article II makes the President the Commander in\\nChief, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, while Article I gives\\nCongress the power to declare war and make rules for the\\nArmed Forces, id. Art. I, § 8, cls. 11, 14. So, the President and\\nCongress have primary responsibility for the “delicate task of\\n\\n 12\\nbalancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the\\nmilitary.” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996)\\n(cleaned up).\\n\\n Given this allocation of powers, the judicial branch must\\nbe “reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in\\nmilitary and national security affairs.” Dep’t of Navy v. Egan,\\n484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S.\\n83, 93–94 (1953) (“judges are not given the task of running the\\nArmy”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.\\n579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (courts should give\\nthe President, as Commander-in-Chief, “the widest latitude …\\nto command the instruments of national force”). Indeed, it is\\n“difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in\\nwhich the courts have less competence.” Rostker v. Goldberg,\\n453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) (quoting Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 10).\\n\\n Our review of constitutional challenges to military rules\\nthus “is far more deferential than constitutional review of\\nsimilar laws or regulations designed for civilian society.”\\nGoldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). In the\\nmilitary context, courts consider whether the policy at issue\\nresulted from the professional judgment of military authorities\\nand reasonably furthers legitimate military interests. Id.\\nMoreover, we must respect the military’s judgment on “the\\nrelative importance of a particular military interest.” Id.\\nCourts “must be particularly careful not to substitute our\\njudgment of what is desirable … or our own evaluation of\\nevidence for a reasonable evaluation” by the political branches.\\nGoldberg, 453 U.S. at 68.\\n\\n Consider two leading precedents in this area. In Goldberg,\\nthe Supreme Court rejected an equal-protection challenge to a\\nstatute compelling men but not women to register for the draft.\\n453 U.S. at 59, 83. The Court stressed that Congress had made\\n\\n 13\\na considered judgment that this classification minimized\\n“burdens” and “administrative problems” involving\\n“housing … and physical standards,” while promoting “the\\nimportant goal of military flexibility.” Id. at 81–82. In the\\n“context of military preparedness and the exigencies of a future\\nmobilization,” the Court refused to “dismiss such problems as\\ninsignificant.” Id. at 81. In Goldman, the Court similarly\\nrejected a free-exercise challenge to a military regulation\\nrestricting the wearing of yarmulkes. 475 U.S. at 509–10. The\\nCourt declined to apply the heightened scrutiny normally used\\nto assess First Amendment claims. See id. at 506–07. Instead,\\nit took a “far more deferential approach” than it would have if\\nthe restriction had been “designed for civilian society.” Id. at\\n507. Citing Goldberg, the Court confirmed that “judicial\\ndeference is at its apogee” when the political branches make\\n“rules and regulations for [military] governance.” Id. at 508\\n(cleaned up). The Court thus credited the “professional\\njudgment of military authorities” that the restriction advanced\\nlegitimate goals including “obedience, unity, commitment, and\\nesprit de corps.” Id. at 507.\\n\\n Of course, the Constitution binds the government in the\\nrealm of military affairs. See Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 67; Parker\\nv. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). As we have noted, “the cost\\nof military service has never entailed the complete surrender of\\nall basic rights.” Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 92 (D.C. Cir.\\n2022) (cleaned up). Particularly when Congress has mandated\\nheightened scrutiny, a military policy may be found unlawful\\nwhere, for example, it is riddled with unexplained exemptions\\nfor some but not others. See id. at 98–107 (applying the\\nReligious Freedom Restoration Act). But even then, courts\\nmust afford deference to the executive’s considered judgment\\nthat a military policy furthers legitimate interests. See id. at\\n98–99.\\n\\n 14\\n 2\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy is likely constitutional because it\\nreflects a considered judgment of military leaders and furthers\\nlegitimate military interests.\\n\\n a\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy reflects the considered judgment of\\nthe Secretary of Defense and military leaders in the Defense\\nDepartment. The policy was informed by “existing and prior\\nDoD policy, and prior DoD studies and reviews of service by\\nindividuals with gender dysphoria, including a review of\\nmedical literature regarding the medical risks associated with\\n[the] presence and treatment of gender dysphoria.” Add. 115.\\nIn significant part, the Hegseth Policy relied on the Mattis\\nPolicy, which “conclude[d] that there are substantial risks\\nassociated with allowing accession and retention of individuals\\nwith a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria.” Id. (Hegseth\\nPolicy) (quoting id. at 120 (Mattis Policy)). In turn, the Mattis\\nPolicy “was informed by an extensive inquiry conducted by a\\npanel of experts” who considered the views of many\\nstakeholders, including transgender service members and their\\ncommanders. Id. at 115 (Hegseth Policy); see id. at 119 (Mattis\\nPolicy). And we previously concluded that, because the Mattis\\nPolicy relied on the considered judgment of military officials,\\nthe government had “substantial arguments” that it complied\\nwith equal-protection principles. Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 25.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also relied on more recent materials,\\nincluding a 2021 study addressing appropriate accession\\nstandards for transgender individuals, a 2025 literature review\\non the efficacy of treatments for gender dysphoria, and a\\nreview of cost data for treating gender dysphoria. Add. 115–\\n16. The 2021 study suggested that up to 40 percent of\\nindividuals with a gender dysphoria diagnosis would be\\n\\n 15\\n“deemed non-deployable due to mental health reasons at some\\ntime during the 24 months following initial diagnosis.”\\nTalbott, No. 25-cv-240, Dkt. No. 86-1, at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 17,\\n2025) (“AMSARA Study”). The 2025 literature review\\nindicated that transgender individuals are far more likely than\\nothers “to receive a psychiatric diagnosis” of mood disorders,\\nanxiety disorders, or psychotic disorders, with a suicide attempt\\nrate 13 times higher than that for non-transgender individuals.\\nAdd. 189. The literature review also found that the “strength\\nof the evidence” supporting the efficacy of hormonal or\\nsurgical treatments for gender dysphoria is “low to moderate.”\\nId. at 189–93. And the cost data indicated that, between 2015\\nand 2024, DoD spent over $52 million providing treatment for\\ngender dysphoria to active-duty service members. Id. at 116.\\n\\n b\\n\\n The government identifies several legitimate military\\ninterests that the Hegseth Policy advances.\\n\\n Chief among them is military readiness. On its face, the\\npolicy applies only to individuals with gender dysphoria, a\\nmedical condition that involves “clinically significant distress\\nor impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas\\nof functioning.” DSM-5 at 513. Secretary Hegseth had before\\nhim evidence that treatments for gender dysphoria would limit\\ndeployability and may not be effective. AMSARA Study at 15;\\nAdd. 189–93. His predecessors unanimously agreed that these\\nconcerns are serious ones: The Carter and Austin Policies\\nbarred accession by individuals with a history of gender\\ndysphoria unless they had been “stable without clinically\\nsignificant distress or impairment” for 18 months, App. 20;\\n2021 DoD Accession Standards at 48, while the Mattis Policy\\ndrew the line at 36 months, Add. 120. The Mattis Report noted\\nthat individuals “receiving hormone therapy and surgery”\\n\\n 16\\ncould not deploy to “austere environments where their\\nhealthcare needs cannot be met,” which showed that “the\\ninclusion of individuals with gender dysphoria in the force will\\nhave a negative impact on readiness.” Id. at 156. The Carter\\nimplementation handbook also anticipated “impacts to the\\nmission (including deployment, operations, training, exercise\\nschedules, and critical skills availability)” from both treatment\\nrequirements and international cultural constraints. See, e.g.,\\nCarter Handbook at 14, 29, 48, 69. Even the RAND Report,\\ndespite recommending that individuals with gender dysphoria\\nbe allowed to serve, recognized that hormone treatments could\\nrender them unable to deploy for a year. App. 202.\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also rests on concerns about unit\\ncohesion and good order. The military’s interest in “fostering\\ncohesion and unity among its members” is “surely” a\\n“compelling” one. Singh, 56 F.4th at 99. And even when\\napplying strict scrutiny, we must “indulge the widest latitude\\nin considering” interests based on an asserted need for unit\\ncohesion. Id. (cleaned up).\\n\\n One such interest involves the privacy of service members\\nwho, as the Mattis Report explained, must “live in extremely\\nclose proximity to one another when sleeping, undressing,\\nshowering, and using the bathroom.” Add. 159. To protect\\nprivacy, Congress has required the military to provide separate\\nhousing for male and female service recruits. See, e.g., 10\\nU.S.C. §§ 7419 (Army), 8431 (Navy), 9419 (Air Force). Even\\nbeyond statutory requirements, the military “has long\\nmaintained separate berthing, bathroom, and shower facilities\\nfor men and women.” Add. 159. Distinctions like these—\\nkeyed to biological differences between the sexes—are\\nunquestionably constitutional. As Justice Ginsburg explained\\nfor the Supreme Court, it is not only permissible, but indeed\\n“necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from the\\n\\n 17\\nother sex in living arrangements.” United States v. Virginia,\\n518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 (1996). And as Judge Williams later\\nelaborated, in explaining why the Mattis Policy likely did not\\nviolate equal protection, “there is no constitutional right for,\\nsay, biological males who identify as female to live, sleep,\\nshower, and train with biological females.” Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\\n707–08 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). The Mattis\\nReport and Carter implementation handbook both\\nacknowledge that allowing gender-dysphoric individuals to\\nserve consistent with their perceived gender identity, as\\nopposed to their biological sex, would impinge on these\\nprivacy interests in intimate, communal living spaces. Add.\\n159 (Mattis Report); Carter Handbook at 60 (issues with “open\\nbay shower configuration”); id. at 63–65 (sleeping areas).\\n\\n The Hegseth Policy also implicates the military’s sex-\\nbased standards for physical fitness. As the Mattis Report\\nexplained, “to allow biological males who identify as female to\\nbe held to female standards” would raise concerns of unfairness\\nand discrimination. Add. 158. Among other things, such\\nindividuals would gain competitive advantages over other\\nmales held to the male strength and fitness standards. See id.\\nLikewise, females required to compete against such individuals\\nwould be disadvantaged. See id. “Even more importantly, in\\nphysically violent training and competition, such as boxing and\\ncombatives, pitting biological females against biological males\\nwho identify as female, and vice versa, could present a serious\\nsafety risk as well.” Id. We cannot lightly dismiss these\\nconcerns.\\n\\n Finally, the Hegseth Policy cited cost issues, noting that\\nthe military had spent more than $52 million on treating service\\nmembers with gender dysphoria between 2015 and 2024. Add.\\n116. The Mattis Report likewise cited cost concerns. It noted\\nthat after the Carter Policy was implemented, medical costs for\\n\\n 18\\nservice members with gender dysphoria increased nearly three\\ntimes as much as did costs for service members who did not\\nhave gender dysphoria. Id. at 163. Moreover, it noted that\\nunits sometimes had to use “operations and maintenance funds\\nto pay for” the “specialized medical care” needed by gender-\\ndysphoric service members. Id.\\n\\n c\\n\\n The district court held that the Hegseth Policy does not\\nadvance these interests. In our view, it gave no sound reason\\nfor overriding the Secretary’s considered judgment.\\n\\n The court dismissed the Mattis Policy and Report as\\n“outdated.” Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d at 325. The court\\nconcluded that in 2018, when Secretary Mattis issued his\\nreport, “medical literature concerning the study and treatment\\nof gender dysphoria” was “in a state of flux.” Id. at 303\\n(cleaned up). But, the court continued, “medical studies now\\noverwhelmingly conclude that gender dysphoria is highly\\ntreatable.” Id. at 304. In support, the court cited a declaration\\nfrom one doctor who simply stated, in one sentence and\\nwithout citations, that “gender dysphoria is ‘highly treatable.’”\\nId. (citing Decl. of George Brown at 4, Dkt. No. 72-77).\\n\\n We are wary of such a sweeping conclusion. For one\\nthing, the Mattis Report reflects a thorough assessment of\\nevidence available as of 2018, not much time has passed since\\nthen, and we are skeptical that the constitutionality of a military\\npolicy ebbs and flows as new medical studies emerge every few\\nyears. For another, the Hegseth Policy did consider more\\nrecent studies, which provide further support for its restrictions.\\nTo reiterate, the policy rests in part on a 2021 DoD study\\nsuggesting that up to 40 percent of individuals being treated for\\ngender dysphoria may become non-deployable at some point\\nover a two-year period, AMSARA Study at 15, and a 2025\\n\\n 19\\nliterature review finding that transgender individuals are more\\nlikely than others to suffer various mental-health issues, Add.\\n188, and that the “strength of the evidence” supporting\\nhormonal or surgical treatment for gender dysphoria is “low to\\nmoderate,” id. at 189–93. Moreover, at least with respect to\\nadolescents, evidence regarding treatment efficacy may be\\neven less settled today than it was a few years ago. See\\nSkrmetti, 605 U.S. at 524 (“Recent developments only\\nunderscore the need for legislative flexibility in this area.”); id.\\nat 532–40 (Thomas, J., concurring); Br. of Alabama as Amicus\\nCuriae at 28–32, Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495 (Oct. 15, 2024). Given\\nall this, the military was not constitutionally required to credit\\nplaintiffs’ side of a fraught medical divide. Finally, the\\nHegseth Policy advances some interests that do not turn on\\nmedical questions at all. For example, the military continues\\nto observe sex-based distinctions for sleeping areas and\\nphysical competitions. And the privacy and safety interests\\nadvanced by these standards do not turn on whether gender\\ndysphoria is more treatable today than it was seven years ago.\\n\\n The district court also conducted a searching review of the\\npost-2018 studies relied on by DoD. Talbott, 775 F. Supp. 3d\\nat 301–08, 322–25. We find many of its criticisms\\nunpersuasive. For example, as to the 2021 study, the court\\nconcluded that a 40 percent non-deployability rate was “not\\ninformative” without knowing the comparable rate for non-\\ntransgender individuals. Id. at 304. But with accession\\nstandards that screen out everything from asthma to high blood\\npressure, it strains credulity to suppose that military-wide\\naverages for non-deployability would be anywhere near two\\nout of five. Next, the district court downplayed the 2025\\nliterature review because it addressed all gender-dysphoric\\nindividuals, rather than only those serving in the military. Id.\\nat 305. But that broader focus surely understates the challenges\\nfaced by gender-dysphoric individuals in the military, where\\n\\n 20\\nlife is often more stressful and demanding than it is for\\ncivilians. The court further downplayed evidence of greater\\nmental-health issues faced by transgender individuals as\\nreflecting “external factors.” Id. Maybe so, but that says little\\nabout the cost to the military from taking on individuals who\\nhave a medical diagnosis associated with significant mental\\ndistress. To be sure, the district court fairly noted that the 2021\\nstudy and the 2025 literature review contain some evidence\\ncutting in favor of permitting service by individuals with\\ngender dysphoria. Id. at 303–06. But the RAND Report that\\ninformed the Carter Policy likewise contained cross-cutting\\nconclusions. Again, the military is entitled to substantial\\ndeference in setting risk tolerances and evaluating conflicting\\nevidence bearing on matters like force composition. See, e.g.,\\nTrump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 707–08 (2018); Goldman, 475\\nU.S. at 507; Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 70–72; Doe 2, 917 F.3d at\\n728 (Williams, J., concurring in the result). Here, the evidence\\nsupporting the Hegseth Policy was more than sufficient to\\nsupport the choices made.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n The district court also held that the Hegseth Policy is\\nrooted in animus against transgender individuals and therefore\\nwould fail even rational-basis scrutiny. Talbott, 775 F. Supp.\\n3d at 326–29. The court invoked a line of cases invalidating\\nstatutes that disadvantaged unpopular groups. See, e.g., Romer\\nv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne\\nLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S.\\n528 (1973). In our view, the district court overread these\\nprecedents.\\n\\n These decisions reflect ordinary rational-basis principles;\\nthey are not an independent basis for striking down statutes or\\nrules. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.\\n\\n 21\\nGarrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court rejected a\\ncontention that “decisionmaking reflecting negative\\nattitudes … necessarily runs afoul of” equal protection. Id. at\\n367 (cleaned up) (discussing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448).\\nInstead, the Court explained, cases like Cleburne condemn\\nnegative attitudes “unsubstantiated” by anything that would\\nindicate a legitimate government interest. See id. (emphasis\\nomitted). So, “read in context,” the animus precedents “simply\\nstate the unremarkable and widely acknowledged tenet of the\\nCourt’s equal protection jurisprudence that state action subject\\nto rational-basis scrutiny does not violate the Fourteenth\\nAmendment when it rationally furthers the purpose identified\\nby the [government].” Id. (cleaned up).\\n\\n The Supreme Court confirmed this point in Trump v.\\nHawaii. There, it explained that the “common thread” uniting\\nits animus decisions has been the lack of “any purpose other\\nthan a ‘bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group.’” 585\\nU.S. at 705 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534) (cleaned up).\\nPut differently, the key question is whether it is “impossible to\\n‘discern a relationship to legitimate state interests’” such that\\nthe policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.” Id. at 706\\n(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 635). If any legitimate state\\ninterest exists, “we must accept that independent justification”\\nand thus reject an equal-protection challenge resting on\\nasserted animus. Id. Because the Hegseth Policy advances\\nlegitimate military interests, the animus cases do not help the\\nplaintiffs here.\\n\\n The district court looked beyond the Hegseth Policy itself\\nto derive animus from various statements made by the\\nPresident or other officials. The Supreme Court rejected such\\nan approach in Trump v. Hawaii, which upheld a presidential\\nproclamation imposing restrictions on travel to the United\\nStates from six predominantly Muslim countries. 585 U.S. at\\n\\n 22\\n676; see also id. at 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The\\nplaintiffs in that case highlighted several of President Trump’s\\nsocial media posts which, in the dissenting justices’ view,\\n“express[ed] animus toward Islam.” Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J.,\\ndissenting); see also id. at 728 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the\\nCourt discounted the “significance of those statements in\\nreviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,\\naddressing a matter within the core of executive\\nresponsibility.” Id. at 702 (majority opinion). The task, as the\\nCourt viewed it, was to “consider not only the statements of a\\nparticular President, but also the authority of the Presidency\\nitself.” Id. With that principle in mind, the Court looked to the\\nproclamation’s text, which was “expressly premised on\\nlegitimate purposes.” Id. at 706. Given that conclusion, the\\nstatements of government officials about the proclamation\\nwere not dispositive. So too here. Our review must focus on\\nthe text and sources informing the Hegseth Policy, not extrinsic\\nstatements made about it.\\n\\n B\\n\\n The remaining stay factors also favor the government. For\\none thing, the Supreme Court’s stay order in Shilling indicates\\nthat the government would suffer an irreparable injury if the\\nHegseth Policy were enjoined pending appellate review of\\npreliminary injunctions. See Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695; Nken,\\n556 U.S. at 425–26. This is hardly surprising. Injunctions that\\n“improperly intrude” on the Executive Branch often inflict\\nirreparable injury, Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 859\\n(2025) (cleaned up), especially where the injunction interferes\\nwith the government’s “compelling need to provide for the\\nNation’s security,” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,\\n582 U.S. 571, 583 (2017) (per curiam). We can imagine few if\\nany government interests more compelling than a strong and\\nready military. And while the district court concluded that\\n\\n 23\\nallowing gender-dysphoric individuals to serve in the military\\nwould advance the cause of military strength and readiness, the\\nConstitution assigns that assessment to the political branches,\\nas cases like Goldberg and Goldman make clear.\\n\\n On the other side of the balance, we acknowledge that the\\nplaintiffs have significant interests at stake—particularly those\\nwho have already acceded. But “[t]he possibility that adequate\\ncompensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a\\nlater date … weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable\\nharm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454\\nF.3d 290, 297–98 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). In particular,\\nloss of a valued government position “does not usually\\nconstitute irreparable injury,” especially if the terminated\\nindividual or officer may obtain backpay or reinstatement if he\\nor she ultimately prevails on the merits. Sampson v. Murray,\\n415 U.S. 61, 90–91 (1974). Courts applying these principles\\nhave held that even less-than-honorable military discharges do\\nnot constitute irreparable injuries warranting interim relief\\nwhile challenges to the discharge remain ongoing. See\\nHartikka v. United States, 754 F.2d 1516, 1518 (9th Cir. 1985);\\nGuerra v. Scruggs, 942 F.2d 270, 273–74 (4th Cir. 1991). And\\nhere, any service members separated under the Hegseth Policy\\nwill be honorably discharged. Add. 101.\\n\\n Finally, the public interest does not warrant a stay. With\\nthe government likely to prevail on the merits, and with the\\nbalance of harm among the parties favoring the government,\\nwe can discern no other consideration here that would tip the\\nscale in the opposite direction.\\n\\n 24\\n III\\n\\n For these reasons, we grant the stay pending appeal.2\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 2\\n The district court independently erred in universally enjoining\\nthe Hegseth Policy rather than merely providing as-applied relief to\\nthe plaintiffs. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 839–47. Given our conclusion\\nthat the government should be able to enforce the policy while its\\nappeal is pending, we need not address further questions about the\\nappropriate scope of any injunctive relief.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30997,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10754578,"string":"10,754,578"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"United States v. Jeffrey Williamson"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"24-3014"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nArgued September 4, 2025 Decided December 12, 2025\\n\\n No. 24-3014\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\n JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,\\n APPELLANT\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:20-cr-00195-1)\\n\\n\\n A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause\\nand filed the briefs for appellant.\\n\\n Allaya Lloyd, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was William\\nGullotta, Trial Attorney.\\n\\n Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\\nRANDOLPH.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n\\n Dissenting opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge\\nRAO.\\n\\n RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal\\nfrom an Order of the district court issued on February 5, 2024.\\nThe full text of the Order, signed by District Judge Walton, is\\nset forth in an Addendum to this opinion.\\n\\n The appellant, Jeffrey Henry Williamson, is a prisoner\\nat the Federal Correctional Complex in Butner, North\\nCarolina. While nearing the end of his eight-year sentence for\\nthreatening to murder an agent of the Federal Bureau of\\nInvestigation, Williamson mailed a series of letters threatening\\nnot only the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted him but\\nalso the prosecutor’s family and an FBI agent.\\n\\n In his letters, Williamson recounted dreams of\\nmurdering the prosecutor and his family, and asked “How\\ndoes that make you feel? There will be justice/you made a\\nterrible mistake.” App. 3. As to the FBI agent, Williamson\\nwrote: “the following BOP staff gang stalking + harassment as\\nwell as Butner FCI #1 has caused me nightmares of shooting\\nFBI agent [X] in his head with a 300 mag sniper rifle at 300\\nyards like a deer”. App. 3.\\n\\n A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted\\nWilliamson in September 2020 for those threats, and Judge\\nWalton denied Williamson’s motion to be released pending\\nhis trial. App. 227. He has not yet been tried on those charges.\\n\\n During pretrial proceedings, Williamson finished\\nserving his eight-year sentence for his earlier offenses. The\\npretrial detention order has continued his confinement at FCI\\nButner. The validity of that order is not a subject in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n The history leading to the Order on appeal—Judge\\nWalton’s Order of February 2024—is as follows.\\n\\n In June 2021, after several pretrial proceedings\\nconducted via teleconferences, with Williamson representing\\nhimself, Judge Walton expressed reluctance to schedule a trial\\n“without some input from [a] mental health expert who\\n[could] assist [him] in assessing whether there [was] a viable\\nissue regarding [Williamson’s] mens rea in this case.”1 App.\\n141.\\n\\n Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b), 4242(a), and\\n4247(b), Judge Walton ordered the Medical Center at Butner\\nto conduct a psychological examination of Williamson to\\ndetermine whether he was competent to stand trial, whether\\nhis beliefs in FBI “gang-stalking” were delusional, whether he\\nhad the capacity to appreciate that threatening people violated\\nthe law, and whether he had the capacity to conform his\\nconduct to the law. App. 158–60.\\n\\n A forensic psychologist at Butner, Dr. Ross, reported\\nthat Williamson suffered from a “delusional disorder,\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In opposing Williamson’s release from pretrial\\ndetention, the government informed Judge Walton of the\\nfollowing history. In 2008, Williamson sent emails to FBI\\nheadquarters stating that he would kill FBI agents if they did not\\nstop harassing him. App. 162. The same year he called and left\\nvoicemails at FBI Headquarters threatening to kill federal\\nofficials in Washington, D.C., and Houston, Texas. Id. For\\nthese actions he was imprisoned for forty-two months. App.\\n163. One week after he was let out on supervised release, he\\npointed a fake gun at a real estate agent in Texas and threatened\\nto kill her, for which he was sentenced to nine months in state\\nprison and another twenty-four in federal prison. App. 163–64.\\nIt was after his release from those sentences that he committed\\nthe crimes that earned him the eight-year sentence he was\\nserving at FCI Butner.\\n\\n 4\\n\\npersecutory type, multiple episodes, currently in acute\\nepisode.”2 Although Williamson’s condition did not impair\\nhis ability to represent himself or to understand the illegality\\nof his conduct, Dr. Ross concluded that Williamson was\\nunable to conform his conduct to the law. App. 270.\\n\\n Representing himself at a later pretrial hearing\\nWilliamson insisted that he did not suffer from a mental\\nillness and stated that he did not intend to raise an insanity\\ndefense. App. 237–38. He asked Judge Walton to let him stay\\nat FCI Butner because he was seeking a new examination to\\nprove he was not mentally ill and because he feared that files\\nhe had accumulated while representing himself would not be\\navailable to him if he were transferred to the District of\\nColumbia to await trial. App. 240.\\n\\n In December 2021, the government moved to dismiss\\nthe 2020 Indictment against Williamson without prejudice in\\nlight of his mental condition and the prospect of a valid\\ninsanity defense. App. 279. The government also asked\\nJudge Walton to provide that Williamson should “be\\nevaluated for dangerousness and for a decision by the Director\\nof the facility whether to file a dangerousness certification\\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) . . ..” App. 283.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,\\nDIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS\\n(5th ed. Text Revision 2022): “In persecutory type the central\\ntheme of the delusion involves the individual’s belief of being\\nconspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned,\\nmaliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of\\nlong-term goals. Small slights may be exaggerated and become\\nthe focus of a delusional system. The affected individual may\\nengage in repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction by legal or\\nlegislative action. Individuals with persecutory delusions are\\noften resentful and angry and may resort to violence against\\nthose they believe are hurting them.”\\n\\n 5\\n\\n\\n After still more proceedings unnecessary to recount,\\nJudge Walton orally granted the government’s motion on\\nJanuary 30, 2024. App. 416. On February 5, 2024, he issued\\na written Order dismissing the charges against Williamson,\\nstaying the dismissal, and requiring Williamson to remain at\\nFCI Butner for “a reasonable period not to exceed 45 days, to\\nbe examined to determine whether the director of FCI Butner\\nshould file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” App.\\n425.\\n\\n Judge Walton stayed his Order pending this appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Since 1949, § 4246 has authorized the detention of\\nmentally ill, dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the\\nprisoners would otherwise be released. United States v.\\nComstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129, 140 (2010). Under the current\\nversion of the statute,3 if the director of the facility where the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The version of § 4246 in effect from 1949 to 1984 (then\\n18 U.S.C. § 4247) required civil commitment proceedings to be\\nheld “[w]henever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall\\ncertify that a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire has been\\nexamined by the board of examiners referred to in [18 U.S.C. §\\n4241], and that in the judgment of the Director and the board of\\nexaminers the prisoner is insane or mentally incompetent, and\\nthat if released he will probably endanger the safety of the\\nofficers, the property, or other interests of the United States. . .\\n.” Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88. A separate statute\\nenacted the previous year, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, established a Board\\nof Examiners, consisting of two medical officers appointed by\\nthe warden and Attorney General and one mental health expert\\nappointed by the Surgeon General, at every federal penal and\\ncorrectional institution. Act of June 25, 1948. 62 Stat. 855.\\nThese boards examined prisoners alleged to be insane; the\\nboards then reported their findings to the Attorney General. Id.\\n\\n 6\\n\\ninmate is hospitalized4 determines that he “is presently\\nsuffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which\\nhis release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to\\nanother person or serious damage to property of another, and\\nthat suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the\\nperson are not available” then the director shall file a\\ncertificate in the district court nearest to the facility. The\\nfiling of the certificate “shall stay the release of the person\\npending completion of procedures contained in this section.”\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The filing also begins civil commitment\\nproceedings, including a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§\\n4246(b) & (d), 4247(d).\\n\\n Section 4246 applies to three categories of prisoners:\\n(1) those whose sentences are about to expire, (2) those who\\nwere committed to the custody of the Attorney General under\\n18 U.S.C. § 4241(b), and (3) those “against whom all criminal\\ncharges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the\\nmental condition of the person.” Judge Walton’s Order placed\\n\\n\\n 4\\n In general the statute applies to “a person [who] is\\nhospitalized.” The Butner Federal Correctional Complex\\nconsists of four facilities: three “Correctional Institutions,” and\\none “Medical Center.” Presumably carrying out Judge Walton’s\\nOrder would involve transferring Williamson to the Medical\\nCenter, a hospital and one of the few facilities in the United\\nStates capable of making § 4246 judgments. See United States\\nv. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2025); see also United\\nStates v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009)\\n(“because the Bureau of Prisons operates only five Federal\\nMedical Centers, defendants in 89 of the 94 judicial districts are\\noften sent to institutions outside of the district for\\nhospitalization.”) Judge Walton knew this. His June 2021 order\\nrequired Williamson’s psychiatric analysis to “be performed at\\na federal medical center or another facility at FCI Butner that is\\nsuitable for the psychiatric or psychological examination.” App.\\n158. Williamson has not mounted any argument dealing with\\nthis aspect of § 4246(a).\\n\\n 7\\n\\nWilliamson in the third “dismissed charges” category of §\\n4246(a), and thus made him eligible for a dangerousness\\ndetermination by the facility director at Butner.\\n\\n We interpret “all criminal charges have been\\ndismissed” in § 4246(a) not to mean that the prisoner must\\nhave been released from custody. That interpretation would\\nbe senseless. It would mean that a prisoner must be released\\nbefore he may be evaluated to determine whether he should be\\nreleased. It would also contradict § 4246(a)’s directive that\\nthe issuance of a dangerousness certificate stays the prisoner’s\\nrelease—which necessarily contemplates the prisoner’s\\nremaining in custody while the director considers the danger\\nof releasing him. Williamson does not argue otherwise.\\n\\n Appellate counsel for Williamson nevertheless\\ncontends that the Order exceeded the district court’s authority.\\nAs he now sees it, the Order required the facility director to\\nsubject his client to a § 4246(b) examination even though no\\nexamination can occur until after the director issues a\\ndangerousness certificate.5 The government counters that\\nJudge Walton’s Order merely ensured that the facility director\\nat Butner would have the opportunity to decide whether to\\nissue that certificate.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n We say “as he now sees it” because Williamson’s\\n“stand-by”counsel, at the hearing preceding this Order, agreed\\nwith Judge Walton’s disposition. Counsel told the court: “Well,\\nI think you can do what the government just said, which is to\\ndismiss the charge – the government has a motion pending to\\ndismiss the charge. I think you can do that, and I think you can\\nstay the order for some minimal period of time to allow the\\ngovernment to file the 4246 certificate down in Butner, which is\\nexactly what happened in Godinez-Ortiz [563 F. 3d 1022, 1026\\n(9th Cir. 2009)].” App. 411.\\n\\n 8\\n\\n This is a “quarrel in a straw.”6 The contested portion of\\nJudge Walton’s Order required only that the facility director\\nperform the duty § 4246(a) assigned to him—namely,\\ndetermine whether releasing Williamson would pose a danger\\nto the public. The effect of the Order would have been the\\nsame if, instead, it read: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that\\nMr. Director shall do what 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) requires of\\nhim with respect to inmate J.H. Williamson, No. ____, now\\nthat the court has ordered dismissal of the charges against this\\ninmate for reasons solely related to his mental condition.”7\\n\\n Judge Walton’s Order, although perhaps unnecessary,\\nis appropriate. Any facility director, to comply with §\\n4246(a), must issue a certificate if he finds that the prisoner\\nwould pose a danger if released. But what if the director\\ndetermines that the prisoner would not pose a danger?\\nNothing in § 4246(a) requires the director to publish—let\\nalone explain—that outcome. Thus, if no certificate issues\\nthere might be some doubt whether the director even exercised\\nthe judgment demanded of him. An order such as the one\\nJudge Walton wisely issued made sure that the director\\nperformed his duty under § 4246(a).\\n\\n There is nothing to Williamson’s related argument that\\nJudge Walton’s Order is invalid because it required a\\n“psychiatric examination,” which—the argument goes—can\\nonly be ordered after a certificate is filed and only by the court\\nclosest to the facility.\\n\\n Judge Walton’s Order did not prescribe a “psychiatric\\nexamination”—under § 4246(b) or otherwise. The operative\\n\\n\\n 6\\n WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 4, sc. 4, l. 53–56.\\n 7\\n The early versions of this statute made the director’s\\nduty more explicit, requiring the director have the inmate\\nexamined by a resident Board of Examiners before they could\\nissue a certificate. Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88.\\n\\n 9\\n\\nparagraph of the Order describes the director’s decision-\\nmaking responsibility as “conduct[ing] the evaluation”8 or\\n“examin[ing]” Williamson to decide whether to issue a\\ncertificate. To accomplish this the director necessarily must\\nexercise judgment. It is of no moment whether a court calls\\nthis exercise an “assessment,”9 or an “evaluation,”10 or an\\n“examination,”11 or a “determination.”12\\n\\n Williamson also contends that there was no need for\\nthe court to order any new evaluation or examination of him.\\nHe puts it this way: “Mr. Williamson had been at Butner for\\nyears, serving his prior sentence and in pretrial custody in the\\npresent case, and, thus, the director had ample opportunity and\\ninformation upon which to ‘assess’ whether to issue a\\ncertificate.” Reply Brief, at 6. The assumption is that records\\nfrom Williamson’s many years at Butner provide sufficient\\nmaterial to satisfy the director’s obligation under §4246(a).\\nBut §4246(a) is concerned with the present and what it\\npredicts about the future. The director must determine whether\\nthe prisoner is “presently suffering from a mental disease” and\\nwould be a danger to the public if released. It follows that the\\ndirector must evaluate Williamson’s current condition—that\\n\\n\\n 8\\n Quoting United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022,\\n1032 (9th Cir. 2009).\\n 9\\n As the Eighth Circuit did in United States v. Payen, 144\\nF.4th 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2025).\\n 10\\n As the Fifth Circuit did in Sealed Appellee v. Sealed\\nAppellant, 83 F.4th 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2023).\\n 11\\n As the district court did in United States v. Guzman-\\nMontesino, No. CR 24-106(GMM), 2025 WL 2374770, at *3\\n(D.P.R. Aug. 14, 2025).\\n 12\\n As the Supreme Court did in Greenwood v. United\\nStates, 350 U.S. 366, 370 (1956).\\n\\n 10\\n\\nis, his condition when his release is imminent.\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit adopted this interpretation when\\nreviewing an order similar to the Order now before us. There\\ntoo the district court’s order indicated that the facility director\\nat Butner would make a preliminary dangerousness\\ndetermination. See United States v. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 190\\n(4th Cir. 2025). The government had requested an order\\n“referring [Berry] to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation for\\ncivil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” Motion to\\nRefer Defendant for a Civil Commitment Determination,\\nUnited States v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D.\\nMich. 2019). The district court granted the request stating that\\n“it is appropriate that Berry be evaluated for civil\\ncommitment.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and to\\nRefer Defendant For a Civil Commitment Evaluation, United\\nStates v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D. Mich.\\n2019). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order, reasoning that\\n“it would make little sense to interpret the statute [§ 4246] to\\nrequire the release of dangerous, mentally incompetent\\nindividuals the moment their charges are dismissed without\\naffording the government a reasonable opportunity to seek\\ncertification under § 4246.” Berry, 142 F. 3d at 192.\\n\\n The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in upholding\\na district court order identical to Judge Walton’s.13 The court\\n\\n\\n 13\\n The court of appeals in Godinez-Ortiz ruled that the\\ndistrict court “correctly recognized that a dangerousness\\nevaluation conducted pursuant to § 4246 would determine\\nwhether [the defendant] might pose a danger to the public if\\nreleased from the facility. The court granted the government’s\\nmotion, dismissing the charges without prejudice, but staying its\\norder of dismissal pending appeal and the determination\\n\\n 11\\n\\nreasoned that “[i]n authorizing the director to file a\\ndangerousness certification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates\\nthe temporary commitment of that person so that the director\\ncan conduct the evaluation necessary to make the certification\\ndecision.” Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\\n\\n This brings us to Williamson’s remaining argument.\\nAs we understand it, he contends that because § 4246 does not\\nexpressly authorize a district court to order a director to\\nconduct a preliminary dangerousness evaluation Judge Walton\\nhad no authority to issue an order requiring or even allowing\\nthe director to make that judgment. E.g. Appellant Brief at 19,\\n23, and Reply Brief at 12–13.\\n\\n It is a well-established principle that district courts\\nhave inherent powers, including the power to stay\\nproceedings, which they can wield to respond to specific\\nproblems when doing so does not contradict any express rule\\nor statute. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016);\\nDegen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996); Chambers\\nv. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46, (1991); Link v. Wabash\\nR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962); United States v.\\nHudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). The Order here is a\\nreasonable response to the specific problem of making the\\n“dismissed-charges” category in § 4246(a) administratively\\nworkable and does not contradict the statute. See Berry, 142\\nF. 4th at 192; see also Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\\n\\n\\nregarding dangerousness. Additionally, the court ordered that\\n[the defendant] be returned to FMC-Butner for a period of 45\\ndays to give the facility an opportunity to determine whether to\\nfile a dangerousness certificate pursuant to § 4246.” 563 F.3d at\\n1026.\\n\\n 12\\n\\n\\n We close with this response to the dissent.\\n\\n To support its theory that we lack appellate\\njurisdiction, the dissent relies on the same reasons we have\\njust given for rejecting the defendant’s appeal on the merits.\\nThe outcome of our decision is the same as the dissent’s\\npreferred “jurisdictional” disposition: Judge Walton’s Order,\\nstayed during the pendency of this appeal, will go into effect.\\nThe question naturally arises: should our opinion be placed\\n“on the merits” or instead, as the dissent prefers, should it be\\nlabeled a “jurisdictional” determination? Bell v. Hood, 327\\nU.S. 678, 682 (1946), gives the answer: the decision should be\\non the merits.\\n\\n The Order dismisses the indictment against\\nWilliamson. Williamson objects only to one aspect of the\\nOrder: the requirement that a facility director at Butner make a\\ndangerousness determination. According to Williamson, this\\nillegally required his confinement to a hospital for a maximum\\nof 45 days14 to be subjected to a psychiatric evaluation. Under\\ncircuit law, an order committing a defendant to a prison\\nhospital “to undergo an involuntary psychiatric examination”\\nis immediately appealable. United States v. Weissberger, 951\\nF.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Accord United States v.\\nGodinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.\\nBerry, 142 F.4th 184 (4th Cir. 2025). Our decision that the\\nOrder did not do what Williamson claims is a decision on the\\nmerits, not a ruling that we lack jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood,\\nsupra; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 89 (1998).\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n See note 4 supra and the Order.\\n\\n 13\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ADDENDUM\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n In accordance with the oral rulings issued by the Court at\\nthe status hearing held on January 30, 2024, via teleconference,\\nit is hereby\\n\\n ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for an\\nEvaluation Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, to Dismiss the\\nIndictment without Prejudice, and to Stay the Order of Dismissal\\nPending a Dangerousness Certification, ECF No. 113, is\\nGRANTED. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the defendant shall remain at FCI\\nButner for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed forty-five\\ndays, to be examined to determine whether the director of FCI\\nButner should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See\\nUnited States v. Godinez Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.\\n2009) (“In authorizing the director to file a dangerousness\\ncertification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates the temporary\\ncommitment of that person so that the director can conduct the\\nevaluation necessary to make the certification decision.”); see id.\\n(“The duration of such commitment[] is controlled by 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n 14\\n\\n§ 4247(b).”). It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the Court will dismiss the Indictment\\nwithout prejudice “solely for reasons related to the mental\\ncondition of the [defendant.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). However,\\nsuch dismissal is STAYED pending the completion of the\\nevaluation of the defendant and the determination by the director\\nof FCI Butner regarding whether to file a dangerousness\\ncertificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See Godinez-Ortiz, 563\\nF.3d at 1026 (affirming the district\\ncourt’s order which “granted the motion [to dismiss],\\ndismiss[ed] the charges without prejudice, [and] stay[ed] [the]\\norder of dismissal pending . . . the determination regarding\\ndangerousness”); see, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, No.\\n12-cr-184 (DBH), 2014 WL 3378662, at *2 (D. Me. July 9,\\n2014) (granting “the government’s motion to dismiss without\\nprejudice and its motion for an order directing the United States\\nBureau of Prisons, through FMC Butner, to conduct a\\ndangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246\\\" and staying\\nthe order of dismissal “pending the completion of the\\ndangerousness evaluation” in accordance with the procedure\\napproved by the Ninth Circuit in Godinez-Ortiz); United States\\nv. Hardy, No. 09-cr-130 (DBH), 2011 WL 997288, at *1 (D. Me.\\nMar. 18, 2011) (citing Godinez-Ortiz in granting the\\ngovernment’s motion for a dangerousness evaluation, to dismiss\\nwithout prejudice, and stay the order of dismissal).1 It is further\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Court acknowledges that, if the director of FCI\\nButner files a certificate of dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 4246, the certificate must be “transmit[ted] . . . to the clerk of\\nthe court for the district in which the [defendant] is confined[,]”\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), and, thus, any dangerousness proceedings\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 4246 would procced [sic] in that district rather\\nthan in this Court, see United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-191\\n\\n 15\\n\\n ORDERED that the time from January 30, 2024, until\\nthe date on which the director of FCI Butner makes the\\ndetermination regarding whether to file a certificate pursuant to\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246, is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, to\\nallow time for the defendant to be examined for the purposes of\\nthis determination. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that, upon the filing of a notice of appeal\\nchallenging this Order, which the defendant represents he\\nintends to file, the proceedings before this Court will be\\nSTAYED pending a ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit.\\nIt is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the Court\\nwithin seven days of the resolution of his forthcoming appeal\\nthat will challenge this Order. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the execution of this Order shall be\\nSTAYED for five days to allow the defendant to file a notice of\\nappeal. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forthwith\\nmail a copy of this Order to the defendant s address on record.\\n\\n SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2024.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n(JMF), 1999 WL 1062139, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1999) (stating\\nthat “[t]he only natural reading of [18 U.S.C. § 4246(a)] is that\\nthe court of confinement, where the certificate was filed, has\\njurisdiction to determine dangerousness” and that “exclusive\\njurisdiction to commit the defendant under 18 U.S.C.[] § 4246\\nlies in the court where he is presently confined”).\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11221163/\", \"author_raw\": \"Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.\"}, {\"author\": \"RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting\", \"type\": \"dissent\", \"text\": \"RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting: It is highly unusual for this\\ncourt to review an interlocutory order in a criminal case. We\\nmay hear such appeals only if the order conclusively\\ndetermines rights “too important to be denied review” and\\nmeets the strict requirements of the collateral order doctrine.\\nCohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546\\n(1949). Jeffrey Williamson was already committed to pre-trial\\ndetention. The order under review merely provides up to 45\\ndays for the director of the facility detaining Williamson to\\ndetermine whether to initiate civil commitment proceedings, a\\ntask assigned to the director by statute. The order does not\\nresolve the type of important question amenable to\\ninterlocutory review. This court therefore lacks jurisdiction,\\nand the appeal should be dismissed.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n Jeffrey Williamson was indicted for mailing letters\\nthreatening an FBI agent and a federal prosecutor while serving\\na sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in\\nButner, North Carolina. In June 2021, when his sentence\\nexpired, Williamson was committed to pretrial detention. After\\na court-ordered psychiatric examination concluded that he met\\nthe standard for insanity, the government moved to dismiss his\\nindictment without prejudice “solely for reasons related to [his]\\nmental condition.” J.A. 268.\\n\\n The government also asked the district court to stay the\\ndismissal order and commit Williamson to FCI Butner for 45\\ndays so he could be evaluated for dangerousness under 18\\nU.S.C. § 4246. That provision authorizes civil commitment of\\nindividuals whose release poses a danger to the public. As\\napplicable here, it applies to persons “in the custody of the\\nBureau of Prisons” whose charges “have been dismissed solely\\nfor reasons related to the[ir] mental condition.” 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 4246(a). If the director of the facility where the person is held\\ndetermines he meets the statute’s standard for dangerousness,\\n\\n 2\\nthe director must file a so-called dangerousness certificate. Id.\\nThis certificate stays the person’s release pending civil\\ncommitment proceedings provided for in the statute. Id.\\n\\n The district court granted the government’s motion. The\\norder required that he “remain at FCI Butner” for up to 45 days\\n“to be examined to determine whether the director” should file\\na dangerousness certificate. But the order did not expressly\\ncommit Williamson under section 4246. The order also stated\\nthat the court will dismiss the indictment once the director\\ndetermines whether to file a certificate. The court stayed its\\norder pending this appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n The district court’s limited order is not a final judgment,\\nnor does it satisfy the strict requirements of the collateral order\\ndoctrine. Because the order does not decide the type of\\nimportant issue subject to interlocutory review, we lack\\njurisdiction to review it.\\n\\n A.\\n\\n Appellate jurisdiction is generally limited by statute to\\n“final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “In\\ncriminal cases, this prohibits appellate review until after\\nconviction and imposition of sentence.” Midland Asphalt Corp.\\nv. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). Williamson has not\\nbeen convicted, and his indictment has not yet been dismissed,\\nso the order under review is not a final judgment. Accordingly,\\nwe have jurisdiction only if the order fits within the “‘small\\nclass’ of collateral rulings that … are appropriately deemed\\n‘final.’” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106\\n(2009) (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545–46). An order qualifies\\nfor interlocutory review if it: (1) “conclusively determines the\\ndisputed question”; (2) “resolves an important issue\\n\\n 3\\ncompletely separate from the merits of the action”; and (3) “is\\neffectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Sell\\nv. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (cleaned up).\\n\\n The Supreme Court has stressed the need to apply this\\nstandard stringently and explained that the second and third\\nprongs embody a “judgment about the value of the interests” at\\nstake. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (cleaned up); see Will v.\\nHallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–52 (2006). Only if deferring\\nreview “imperil[s] a substantial public interest or some\\nparticular value of a high order” does the collateral order\\ninvolve “important questions” that are “effectively\\nunreviewable” after final judgment. Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107\\n(cleaned up). The standard is designed to respect the statutory\\nlimits of section 1291 and to prevent “piecemeal” appeals from\\n“undermin[ing] efficient judicial administration.” Id. at 106.\\n\\n In criminal cases, the Court applies the collateral order\\ndoctrine “with the utmost strictness.” Flanagan v. United\\nStates, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984). “[T]he delays and disruptions\\nattendant upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to\\nthe effective and fair administration of the criminal law.” Di\\nBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). Interlocutory\\nappeals undermine the defendant’s and society’s “strong\\ninterest in the speedy resolution” of criminal cases. Flanagan,\\n465 U.S. at 264; see U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme\\nCourt has recognized only four issues that justify immediate\\nappellate review of a criminal order: the denial of a motion to\\nreduce bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); the denial of\\na motion asserting Double Jeopardy, Abney v. United States,\\n431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); the denial of a motion asserting\\nSpeech and Debate immunity, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S.\\n500, 507–08 (1979); and the authorization of involuntary\\nmedication, Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. The Court has resisted\\nextending interlocutory review beyond matters that are\\n\\n 4\\nsubstantially similar to these four types. See Flanagan, 465\\nU.S. at 267; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857\\n(1978). This circuit has similarly adhered to a “restrictive\\napproach” and declined to extend the doctrine “[b]eyond the\\npenumbras of Abney … and Helstoski.” United States v.\\nBrizendine, 659 F.2d 215, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also\\nUnited States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 747–49\\n(2016).\\n\\n B.\\n\\n The district court’s order does not meet the requirements\\nfor an immediately appealable collateral order.\\n\\n As the majority explains, the brief order here does not\\ndecide an important question. It simply permits the director at\\nFCI Butner to evaluate Williamson and determine whether to\\nfile a dangerousness certificate. See Majority Op. 7–9. The\\ndistrict court held that it will dismiss the charges against\\nWilliamson for reasons of mental defect, so he was subject to\\na dangerousness evaluation under section 4246(a). The order\\nappropriately provides time for the facility director to\\nundertake the evaluation and to determine whether Williamson\\nwould pose a danger if released.\\n\\n Williamson argues the order is immediately appealable\\nbecause it commits him to a new term of custody and subjects\\nhim to an involuntary psychiatric examination. But properly\\nunderstood, this order does neither. It simply leaves\\nWilliamson in pretrial detention, which was previously\\nauthorized in the June 2021 order, an order not challenged\\nhere.1 The order under review also does not mandate a\\n\\n1\\n Williamson already appealed the June 2021 pretrial detention order\\nwithout success. See Per Curiam Judgment, No. 21-3042 (D.C. Cir.\\nMar. 25, 2022). Had Williamson filed a new motion for the district\\n\\n 5\\npsychiatric examination; it simply permits the section 4246(a)\\nevaluation for dangerousness.\\n\\n As such, the order has little consequence and cannot\\nsatisfy the stringent requirements of the collateral order\\ndoctrine. Specifically, the order fails the second and third\\nprongs because it does not resolve an “important question[]”\\nthat is “effectively unreviewable” after final judgment.\\nMohawk, 558 U.S. at 106–07 (cleaned up). As explained above,\\nthe second and third prongs apply only to those orders that\\ndecide important issues such that deferring review “imperil[s]\\na substantial public interest or some particular value of a high\\norder.” Id. at 107 (cleaned up). The order here only indicates\\nthat Williamson, who is already detained, should be evaluated\\nfor dangerousness under section 4246(a). This dangerousness\\nevaluation is the process by which the director determines\\nwhether to file a certificate of dangerousness now that\\nWilliamson’s charges will be dismissed for reasons of mental\\ndefect. The order merely confirms how the (stayed) dismissal\\ninteracts with section 4246(a) to permit the dangerousness\\nevaluation and provides the director with up to 45 days to\\nperform that evaluation. The order thus “does not cause or\\ncompound [Williamson’s] deprivation.” MacDonald, 435 U.S.\\nat 861.\\n\\n The order does not decide the sort of important question\\nrecognized as warranting immediate review. For instance, the\\norder does not commit Williamson to involuntary\\nhospitalization. Cf. United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392,\\n396–97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that commitment orders\\n\\n\\ncourt to revoke its pretrial detention order, he would be statutorily\\nentitled to appeal an order denying it. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c); In re\\nStone, 940 F.3d 1332, 1338–39 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But this appeal\\ninvolves no such order.\\n\\n 6\\nunder section 4241 are immediately appealable). The order\\nplainly involves no claimed immunity from trial. See United\\nStates v. Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 767–69 (D.C. Cir. 1999)\\n(dismissing interlocutory appeal in part because “[n]othing\\nCisneros argues amounts to a right not to be tried”). Nor does\\nthe order mandate a severe infringement of Williamson’s\\nliberty similar to an order requiring involuntary psychiatric\\nmedication. Cf. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176–77. The district court’s\\norder cannot be analogized to any of the issues important\\nenough for interlocutory review. Asserting jurisdiction over\\nthis appeal would therefore require recognizing a new category\\nof collateral orders, a consequence that the majority neither\\nacknowledges nor explains.\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in a similar appeal\\ninvolving section 4246 further highlights why review under the\\ncollateral order doctrine is unavailable here. See United States\\nv. Carrington, 91 F.4th 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2024). There, the\\ncourt dismissed an appeal of an order that, among other things,\\nstated the defendant was “subject to” section 4246. Id. at 264.\\nThe defendant had been in custody under section 4241, which\\nexpressly provides that upon the expiration of such custody the\\nindividual “is subject to the provisions of section 4246.” Id. at\\n257–58, 262–63; 8 U.S.C. § 4241(d). The order at issue merely\\nconfirmed what the statute already provided. Consequently, it\\n“decided nothing” and was “not an appealable collateral\\norder.” Id. at 270. The order under review here, which merely\\nrecognizes that Williamson is subject to a dangerousness\\nevaluation under section 4246, is similarly not appropriate for\\ninterlocutory review.\\n\\n My colleagues’ assertion that the proper interpretation of\\nthe district court’s order is a merits issue, not a jurisdictional\\n\\n 7\\none,2 turns the collateral order doctrine on its head. Section\\n1291 requires us to determine whether there is a “final\\ndecision.” That assessment is not a merits question, but a\\nprerequisite to jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s standard for\\nwhether a collateral order is appealable as a “final decision”\\nrequires us to determine whether the order “conclusively\\ndetermines the disputed question” and “resolves an important\\nissue.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (cleaned up). Interpreting the\\ndistrict court’s order is thus a necessary step before deciding\\nwhether we have jurisdiction. See Summers v. U.S. Dep’t of\\nJust., 925 F.2d 450, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding collateral\\norder doctrine inapplicable to district court’s stay in a FOIA\\ncase after interpreting the stay as “subject to revision” given it\\nrequired “periodic status reports” from the defendant);\\nCarrington, 91 F.4th at 266–70 (holding collateral order\\ndoctrine inapplicable to district court’s order that the defendant\\nwas “subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246” after\\nrejecting the argument that the order “conclusively resolved the\\nquestion of the applicability of” section 4246); cf. Robinson-\\n2\\n For this proposition, the majority relies on Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.\\n678 (1946), which held that a nonfrivolous argument that a claim\\narises under federal law will be sufficient for jurisdiction under 28\\nU.S.C. § 1331. But the Supreme Court has recognized that the\\n“nonfrivolous argument” standard does not apply universally and\\nthat it “has interpreted other jurisdictional statutes differently.”\\nBolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l\\nDrilling Co., 581 U.S. 170, 183–84 (2017). For example, when\\nassessing diversity jurisdiction courts must determine whether “in\\nfact” the parties are diverse, “not simply whether they are arguably\\nso.” Id. at 184. Similarly, for appellate jurisdiction under section\\n1291, the Court has never suggested that a nonfrivolous argument is\\nenough. Rather, courts must consider whether there is in fact a “final\\ndecision.” See, e.g., Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 798, 800–02\\n(affirming dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under section 1291\\nbecause order was not a final judgment and did not qualify under the\\ncollateral order doctrine).\\n\\n 8\\nReeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 571 F.3d 1333, 1338 (D.C.\\nCir. 2009) (dismissing for lack of appellate jurisdiction after\\nrejecting appellant’s “misread[ing]” of the district court’s order\\nas a final judgment). Because the district court’s order,\\nproperly understood, does not qualify under the collateral order\\ndoctrine, we must dismiss Williamson’s appeal for lack of\\njurisdiction.\\n\\n ***\\n\\n The majority affirms the district court’s order in part\\nbecause Williamson’s appeal is merely a “quarrel in a straw.”\\nMajority Op. 7. That observation, however, is precisely why\\nthe order is not immediately appealable. Because this court\\nlacks jurisdiction, Williamson’s appeal should be dismissed. I\\nrespectfully dissent.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11221163/\", \"author_raw\": \"RAO, Circuit Judge, dissenting\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RAO"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WALKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"RANDOLPH"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"RAO\": \", Circuit\", \"WALKER\": \", Circuit\", \"RANDOLPH\": \", Senior Circuit\"}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":2,"string":"2"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754578/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: United States v. Jeffrey Williamson\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued September 4, 2025 Decided December 12, 2025\n\n No. 24-3014\n\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n APPELLEE\n\n v.\n\n JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,\n APPELLANT\n\n\n Appeal from the United States District Court\n for the District of Columbia\n (No. 1:20-cr-00195-1)\n\n\n A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause\nand filed the briefs for appellant.\n\n Allaya Lloyd, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\nargued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was William\nGullotta, Trial Attorney.\n\n Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\n\n Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\nRANDOLPH.\n\n 2\n\n\n Dissenting opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge\nRAO.\n\n RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal\nfrom an Order of the district court issued on February 5, 2024.\nThe full text of the Order, signed by District Judge Walton, is\nset forth in an Addendum to this opinion.\n\n The appellant, Jeffrey Henry Williamson, is a prisoner\nat the Federal Correctional Complex in Butner, North\nCarolina. While nearing the end of his eight-year sentence for\nthreatening to murder an agent of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation, Williamson mailed a series of letters threatening\nnot only the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted him but\nalso the prosecutor’s family and an FBI agent.\n\n In his letters, Williamson recounted dreams of\nmurdering the prosecutor and his family, and asked “How\ndoes that make you feel? There will be justice/you made a\nterrible mistake.” App. 3. As to the FBI agent, Williamson\nwrote: “the following BOP staff gang stalking + harassment as\nwell as Butner FCI #1 has caused me nightmares of shooting\nFBI agent [X] in his head with a 300 mag sniper rifle at 300\nyards like a deer”. App. 3.\n\n A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted\nWilliamson in September 2020 for those threats, and Judge\nWalton denied Williamson’s motion to be released pending\nhis trial. App. 227. He has not yet been tried on those charges.\n\n During pretrial proceedings, Williamson finished\nserving his eight-year sentence for his earlier offenses. The\npretrial detention order has continued his confinement at FCI\nButner. The validity of that order is not a subject in this\nappeal.\n\n I.\n\n 3\n\n The history leading to the Order on appeal—Judge\nWalton’s Order of February 2024—is as follows.\n\n In June 2021, after several pretrial proceedings\nconducted via teleconferences, with Williamson representing\nhimself, Judge Walton expressed reluctance to schedule a trial\n“without some input from [a] mental health expert who\n[could] assist [him] in assessing whether there [was] a viable\nissue regarding [Williamson’s] mens rea in this case.”1 App.\n141.\n\n Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b), 4242(a), and\n4247(b), Judge Walton ordered the Medical Center at Butner\nto conduct a psychological examination of Williamson to\ndetermine whether he was competent to stand trial, whether\nhis beliefs in FBI “gang-stalking” were delusional, whether he\nhad the capacity to appreciate that threatening people violated\nthe law, and whether he had the capacity to conform his\nconduct to the law. App. 158–60.\n\n A forensic psychologist at Butner, Dr. Ross, reported\nthat Williamson suffered from a “delusional disorder,\n\n\n 1\n In opposing Williamson’s release from pretrial\ndetention, the government informed Judge Walton of the\nfollowing history. In 2008, Williamson sent emails to FBI\nheadquarters stating that he would kill FBI agents if they did not\nstop harassing him. App. 162. The same year he called and left\nvoicemails at FBI Headquarters threatening to kill federal\nofficials in Washington, D.C., and Houston, Texas. Id. For\nthese actions he was imprisoned for forty-two months. App.\n163. One week after he was let out on supervised release, he\npointed a fake gun at a real estate agent in Texas and threatened\nto kill her, for which he was sentenced to nine months in state\nprison and another twenty-four in federal prison. App. 163–64.\nIt was after his release from those sentences that he committed\nthe crimes that earned him the eight-year sentence he was\nserving at FCI Butner.\n\n 4\n\npersecutory type, multiple episodes, currently in acute\nepisode.”2 Although Williamson’s condition did not impair\nhis ability to represent himself or to understand the illegality\nof his conduct, Dr. Ross concluded that Williamson was\nunable to conform his conduct to the law. App. 270.\n\n Representing himself at a later pretrial hearing\nWilliamson insisted that he did not suffer from a mental\nillness and stated that he did not intend to raise an insanity\ndefense. App. 237–38. He asked Judge Walton to let him stay\nat FCI Butner because he was seeking a new examination to\nprove he was not mentally ill and because he feared that files\nhe had accumulated while representing himself would not be\navailable to him if he were transferred to the District of\nColumbia to await trial. App. 240.\n\n In December 2021, the government moved to dismiss\nthe 2020 Indictment against Williamson without prejudice in\nlight of his mental condition and the prospect of a valid\ninsanity defense. App. 279. The government also asked\nJudge Walton to provide that Williamson should “be\nevaluated for dangerousness and for a decision by the Director\nof the facility whether to file a dangerousness certification\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) . . ..” App. 283.\n\n\n 2\n See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,\nDIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS\n(5th ed. Text Revision 2022): “In persecutory type the central\ntheme of the delusion involves the individual’s belief of being\nconspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned,\nmaliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of\nlong-term goals. Small slights may be exaggerated and become\nthe focus of a delusional system. The affected individual may\nengage in repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction by legal or\nlegislative action. Individuals with persecutory delusions are\noften resentful and angry and may resort to violence against\nthose they believe are hurting them.”\n\n 5\n\n\n After still more proceedings unnecessary to recount,\nJudge Walton orally granted the government’s motion on\nJanuary 30, 2024. App. 416. On February 5, 2024, he issued\na written Order dismissing the charges against Williamson,\nstaying the dismissal, and requiring Williamson to remain at\nFCI Butner for “a reasonable period not to exceed 45 days, to\nbe examined to determine whether the director of FCI Butner\nshould file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” App.\n425.\n\n Judge Walton stayed his Order pending this appeal.\n\n II.\n\n Since 1949, § 4246 has authorized the detention of\nmentally ill, dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the\nprisoners would otherwise be released. United States v.\nComstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129, 140 (2010). Under the current\nversion of the statute,3 if the director of the facility where the\n\n\n 3\n The version of § 4246 in effect from 1949 to 1984 (then\n18 U.S.C. § 4247) required civil commitment proceedings to be\nheld “[w]henever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall\ncertify that a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire has been\nexamined by the board of examiners referred to in [18 U.S.C. §\n4241], and that in the judgment of the Director and the board of\nexaminers the prisoner is insane or mentally incompetent, and\nthat if released he will probably endanger the safety of the\nofficers, the property, or other interests of the United States. . .\n.” Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88. A separate statute\nenacted the previous year, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, established a Board\nof Examiners, consisting of two medical officers appointed by\nthe warden and Attorney General and one mental health expert\nappointed by the Surgeon General, at every federal penal and\ncorrectional institution. Act of June 25, 1948. 62 Stat. 855.\nThese boards examined prisoners alleged to be insane; the\nboards then reported their findings to the Attorney General. Id.\n\n 6\n\ninmate is hospitalized4 determines that he “is presently\nsuffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which\nhis release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to\nanother person or serious damage to property of another, and\nthat suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the\nperson are not available” then the director shall file a\ncertificate in the district court nearest to the facility. The\nfiling of the certificate “shall stay the release of the person\npending completion of procedures contained in this section.”\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The filing also begins civil commitment\nproceedings, including a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§\n4246(b) & (d), 4247(d).\n\n Section 4246 applies to three categories of prisoners:\n(1) those whose sentences are about to expire, (2) those who\nwere committed to the custody of the Attorney General under\n18 U.S.C. § 4241(b), and (3) those “against whom all criminal\ncharges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the\nmental condition of the person.” Judge Walton’s Order placed\n\n\n 4\n In general the statute applies to “a person [who] is\nhospitalized.” The Butner Federal Correctional Complex\nconsists of four facilities: three “Correctional Institutions,” and\none “Medical Center.” Presumably carrying out Judge Walton’s\nOrder would involve transferring Williamson to the Medical\nCenter, a hospital and one of the few facilities in the United\nStates capable of making § 4246 judgments. See United States\nv. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2025); see also United\nStates v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009)\n(“because the Bureau of Prisons operates only five Federal\nMedical Centers, defendants in 89 of the 94 judicial districts are\noften sent to institutions outside of the district for\nhospitalization.”) Judge Walton knew this. His June 2021 order\nrequired Williamson’s psychiatric analysis to “be performed at\na federal medical center or another facility at FCI Butner that is\nsuitable for the psychiatric or psychological examination.” App.\n158. Williamson has not mounted any argument dealing with\nthis aspect of § 4246(a).\n\n 7\n\nWilliamson in the third “dismissed charges” category of §\n4246(a), and thus made him eligible for a dangerousness\ndetermination by the facility director at Butner.\n\n We interpret “all criminal charges have been\ndismissed” in § 4246(a) not to mean that the prisoner must\nhave been released from custody. That interpretation would\nbe senseless. It would mean that a prisoner must be released\nbefore he may be evaluated to determine whether he should be\nreleased. It would also contradict § 4246(a)’s directive that\nthe issuance of a dangerousness certificate stays the prisoner’s\nrelease—which necessarily contemplates the prisoner’s\nremaining in custody while the director considers the danger\nof releasing him. Williamson does not argue otherwise.\n\n Appellate counsel for Williamson nevertheless\ncontends that the Order exceeded the district court’s authority.\nAs he now sees it, the Order required the facility director to\nsubject his client to a § 4246(b) examination even though no\nexamination can occur until after the director issues a\ndangerousness certificate.5 The government counters that\nJudge Walton’s Order merely ensured that the facility director\nat Butner would have the opportunity to decide whether to\nissue that certificate.\n\n\n\n\n 5\n We say “as he now sees it” because Williamson’s\n“stand-by”counsel, at the hearing preceding this Order, agreed\nwith Judge Walton’s disposition. Counsel told the court: “Well,\nI think you can do what the government just said, which is to\ndismiss the charge – the government has a motion pending to\ndismiss the charge. I think you can do that, and I think you can\nstay the order for some minimal period of time to allow the\ngovernment to file the 4246 certificate down in Butner, which is\nexactly what happened in Godinez-Ortiz [563 F. 3d 1022, 1026\n(9th Cir. 2009)].” App. 411.\n\n 8\n\n This is a “quarrel in a straw.”6 The contested portion of\nJudge Walton’s Order required only that the facility director\nperform the duty § 4246(a) assigned to him—namely,\ndetermine whether releasing Williamson would pose a danger\nto the public. The effect of the Order would have been the\nsame if, instead, it read: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that\nMr. Director shall do what 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) requires of\nhim with respect to inmate J.H. Williamson, No. ____, now\nthat the court has ordered dismissal of the charges against this\ninmate for reasons solely related to his mental condition.”7\n\n Judge Walton’s Order, although perhaps unnecessary,\nis appropriate. Any facility director, to comply with §\n4246(a), must issue a certificate if he finds that the prisoner\nwould pose a danger if released. But what if the director\ndetermines that the prisoner would not pose a danger?\nNothing in § 4246(a) requires the director to publish—let\nalone explain—that outcome. Thus, if no certificate issues\nthere might be some doubt whether the director even exercised\nthe judgment demanded of him. An order such as the one\nJudge Walton wisely issued made sure that the director\nperformed his duty under § 4246(a).\n\n There is nothing to Williamson’s related argument that\nJudge Walton’s Order is invalid because it required a\n“psychiatric examination,” which—the argument goes—can\nonly be ordered after a certificate is filed and only by the court\nclosest to the facility.\n\n Judge Walton’s Order did not prescribe a “psychiatric\nexamination”—under § 4246(b) or otherwise. The operative\n\n\n 6\n WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 4, sc. 4, l. 53–56.\n 7\n The early versions of this statute made the director’s\nduty more explicit, requiring the director have the inmate\nexamined by a resident Board of Examiners before they could\nissue a certificate. Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88.\n\n 9\n\nparagraph of the Order describes the director’s decision-\nmaking responsibility as “conduct[ing] the evaluation”8 or\n“examin[ing]” Williamson to decide whether to issue a\ncertificate. To accomplish this the director necessarily must\nexercise judgment. It is of no moment whether a court calls\nthis exercise an “assessment,”9 or an “evaluation,”10 or an\n“examination,”11 or a “determination.”12\n\n Williamson also contends that there was no need for\nthe court to order any new evaluation or examination of him.\nHe puts it this way: “Mr. Williamson had been at Butner for\nyears, serving his prior sentence and in pretrial custody in the\npresent case, and, thus, the director had ample opportunity and\ninformation upon which to ‘assess’ whether to issue a\ncertificate.” Reply Brief, at 6. The assumption is that records\nfrom Williamson’s many years at Butner provide sufficient\nmaterial to satisfy the director’s obligation under §4246(a).\nBut §4246(a) is concerned with the present and what it\npredicts about the future. The director must determine whether\nthe prisoner is “presently suffering from a mental disease” and\nwould be a danger to the public if released. It follows that the\ndirector must evaluate Williamson’s current condition—that\n\n\n 8\n Quoting United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022,\n1032 (9th Cir. 2009).\n 9\n As the Eighth Circuit did in United States v. Payen, 144\nF.4th 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2025).\n 10\n As the Fifth Circuit did in Sealed Appellee v. Sealed\nAppellant, 83 F.4th 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2023).\n 11\n As the district court did in United States v. Guzman-\nMontesino, No. CR 24-106(GMM), 2025 WL 2374770, at *3\n(D.P.R. Aug. 14, 2025).\n 12\n As the Supreme Court did in Greenwood v. United\nStates, 350 U.S. 366, 370 (1956).\n\n 10\n\nis, his condition when his release is imminent.\n\n The Fourth Circuit adopted this interpretation when\nreviewing an order similar to the Order now before us. There\ntoo the district court’s order indicated that the facility director\nat Butner would make a preliminary dangerousness\ndetermination. See United States v. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 190\n(4th Cir. 2025). The government had requested an order\n“referring [Berry] to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation for\ncivil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” Motion to\nRefer Defendant for a Civil Commitment Determination,\nUnited States v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D.\nMich. 2019). The district court granted the request stating that\n“it is appropriate that Berry be evaluated for civil\ncommitment.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and to\nRefer Defendant For a Civil Commitment Evaluation, United\nStates v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D. Mich.\n2019). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order, reasoning that\n“it would make little sense to interpret the statute [§ 4246] to\nrequire the release of dangerous, mentally incompetent\nindividuals the moment their charges are dismissed without\naffording the government a reasonable opportunity to seek\ncertification under § 4246.” Berry, 142 F. 3d at 192.\n\n The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in upholding\na district court order identical to Judge Walton’s.13 The court\n\n\n 13\n The court of appeals in Godinez-Ortiz ruled that the\ndistrict court “correctly recognized that a dangerousness\nevaluation conducted pursuant to § 4246 would determine\nwhether [the defendant] might pose a danger to the public if\nreleased from the facility. The court granted the government’s\nmotion, dismissing the charges without prejudice, but staying its\norder of dismissal pending appeal and the determination\n\n 11\n\nreasoned that “[i]n authorizing the director to file a\ndangerousness certification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates\nthe temporary commitment of that person so that the director\ncan conduct the evaluation necessary to make the certification\ndecision.” Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\n\n This brings us to Williamson’s remaining argument.\nAs we understand it, he contends that because § 4246 does not\nexpressly authorize a district court to order a director to\nconduct a preliminary dangerousness evaluation Judge Walton\nhad no authority to issue an order requiring or even allowing\nthe director to make that judgment. E.g. Appellant Brief at 19,\n23, and Reply Brief at 12–13.\n\n It is a well-established principle that district courts\nhave inherent powers, including the power to stay\nproceedings, which they can wield to respond to specific\nproblems when doing so does not contradict any express rule\nor statute. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016);\nDegen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996); Chambers\nv. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46, (1991); Link v. Wabash\nR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962); United States v.\nHudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). The Order here is a\nreasonable response to the specific problem of making the\n“dismissed-charges” category in § 4246(a) administratively\nworkable and does not contradict the statute. See Berry, 142\nF. 4th at 192; see also Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\n\n\nregarding dangerousness. Additionally, the court ordered that\n[the defendant] be returned to FMC-Butner for a period of 45\ndays to give the facility an opportunity to determine whether to\nfile a dangerousness certificate pursuant to § 4246.” 563 F.3d at\n1026.\n\n 12\n\n\n We close with this response to the dissent.\n\n To support its theory that we lack appellate\njurisdiction, the dissent relies on the same reasons we have\njust given for rejecting the defendant’s appeal on the merits.\nThe outcome of our decision is the same as the dissent’s\npreferred “jurisdictional” disposition: Judge Walton’s Order,\nstayed during the pendency of this appeal, will go into effect.\nThe question naturally arises: should our opinion be placed\n“on the merits” or instead, as the dissent prefers, should it be\nlabeled a “jurisdictional” determination? Bell v. Hood, 327\nU.S. 678, 682 (1946), gives the answer: the decision should be\non the merits.\n\n The Order dismisses the indictment against\nWilliamson. Williamson objects only to one aspect of the\nOrder: the requirement that a facility director at Butner make a\ndangerousness determination. According to Williamson, this\nillegally required his confinement to a hospital for a maximum\nof 45 days14 to be subjected to a psychiatric evaluation. Under\ncircuit law, an order committing a defendant to a prison\nhospital “to undergo an involuntary psychiatric examination”\nis immediately appealable. United States v. Weissberger, 951\nF.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Accord United States v.\nGodinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.\nBerry, 142 F.4th 184 (4th Cir. 2025). Our decision that the\nOrder did not do what Williamson claims is a decision on the\nmerits, not a ruling that we lack jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood,\nsupra; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523\nU.S. 83, 89 (1998).\n\n\n\n 14\n See note 4 supra and the Order.\n\n 13\n\n Affirmed.\n\n\n\n\n ADDENDUM\n\n ORDER\n\n In accordance with the oral rulings issued by the Court at\nthe status hearing held on January 30, 2024, via teleconference,\nit is hereby\n\n ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for an\nEvaluation Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, to Dismiss the\nIndictment without Prejudice, and to Stay the Order of Dismissal\nPending a Dangerousness Certification, ECF No. 113, is\nGRANTED. It is further\n\n ORDERED that the defendant shall remain at FCI\nButner for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed forty-five\ndays, to be examined to determine whether the director of FCI\nButner should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See\nUnited States v. Godinez Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.\n2009) (“In authorizing the director to file a dangerousness\ncertification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates the temporary\ncommitment of that person so that the director can conduct the\nevaluation necessary to make the certification decision.”); see id.\n(“The duration of such commitment[] is controlled by 18 U.S.C.\n\n 14\n\n§ 4247(b).”). It is further\n\n ORDERED that the Court will dismiss the Indictment\nwithout prejudice “solely for reasons related to the mental\ncondition of the [defendant.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). However,\nsuch dismissal is STAYED pending the completion of the\nevaluation of the defendant and the determination by the director\nof FCI Butner regarding whether to file a dangerousness\ncertificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See Godinez-Ortiz, 563\nF.3d at 1026 (affirming the district\ncourt’s order which “granted the motion [to dismiss],\ndismiss[ed] the charges without prejudice, [and] stay[ed] [the]\norder of dismissal pending . . . the determination regarding\ndangerousness”); see, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, No.\n12-cr-184 (DBH), 2014 WL 3378662, at *2 (D. Me. July 9,\n2014) (granting “the government’s motion to dismiss without\nprejudice and its motion for an order directing the United States\nBureau of Prisons, through FMC Butner, to conduct a\ndangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246\" and staying\nthe order of dismissal “pending the completion of the\ndangerousness evaluation” in accordance with the procedure\napproved by the Ninth Circuit in Godinez-Ortiz); United States\nv. Hardy, No. 09-cr-130 (DBH), 2011 WL 997288, at *1 (D. Me.\nMar. 18, 2011) (citing Godinez-Ortiz in granting the\ngovernment’s motion for a dangerousness evaluation, to dismiss\nwithout prejudice, and stay the order of dismissal).1 It is further\n\n\n 1\n The Court acknowledges that, if the director of FCI\nButner files a certificate of dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\n§ 4246, the certificate must be “transmit[ted] . . . to the clerk of\nthe court for the district in which the [defendant] is confined[,]”\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), and, thus, any dangerousness proceedings\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 4246 would procced [sic] in that district rather\nthan in this Court, see United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-191\n\n 15\n\n ORDERED that the time from January 30, 2024, until\nthe date on which the director of FCI Butner makes the\ndetermination regarding whether to file a certificate pursuant to\n18 U.S.C. § 4246, is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, to\nallow time for the defendant to be examined for the purposes of\nthis determination. It is further\n\n ORDERED that, upon the filing of a notice of appeal\nchallenging this Order, which the defendant represents he\nintends to file, the proceedings before this Court will be\nSTAYED pending a ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit.\nIt is further\n\n ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the Court\nwithin seven days of the resolution of his forthcoming appeal\nthat will challenge this Order. It is further\n\n ORDERED that the execution of this Order shall be\nSTAYED for five days to allow the defendant to file a notice of\nappeal. It is further\n\n ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forthwith\nmail a copy of this Order to the defendant s address on record.\n\n SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2024.\n\n\n\n\n(JMF), 1999 WL 1062139, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1999) (stating\nthat “[t]he only natural reading of [18 U.S.C. § 4246(a)] is that\nthe court of confinement, where the certificate was filed, has\njurisdiction to determine dangerousness” and that “exclusive\njurisdiction to commit the defendant under 18 U.S.C.[] § 4246\nlies in the court where he is presently confined”).\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: United States v. Jeffrey Williamson\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: Yes\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n\\n\\n\\nArgued September 4, 2025 Decided December 12, 2025\\n\\n No. 24-3014\\n\\n UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\\n APPELLEE\\n\\n v.\\n\\n JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON,\\n APPELLANT\\n\\n\\n Appeal from the United States District Court\\n for the District of Columbia\\n (No. 1:20-cr-00195-1)\\n\\n\\n A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause\\nand filed the briefs for appellant.\\n\\n Allaya Lloyd, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,\\nargued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief was William\\nGullotta, Trial Attorney.\\n\\n Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and\\nRANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.\\n\\n Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge\\nRANDOLPH.\\n\\n 2\\n\\n\\n Dissenting opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge\\nRAO.\\n\\n RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: This is an appeal\\nfrom an Order of the district court issued on February 5, 2024.\\nThe full text of the Order, signed by District Judge Walton, is\\nset forth in an Addendum to this opinion.\\n\\n The appellant, Jeffrey Henry Williamson, is a prisoner\\nat the Federal Correctional Complex in Butner, North\\nCarolina. While nearing the end of his eight-year sentence for\\nthreatening to murder an agent of the Federal Bureau of\\nInvestigation, Williamson mailed a series of letters threatening\\nnot only the Assistant U.S. Attorney who prosecuted him but\\nalso the prosecutor’s family and an FBI agent.\\n\\n In his letters, Williamson recounted dreams of\\nmurdering the prosecutor and his family, and asked “How\\ndoes that make you feel? There will be justice/you made a\\nterrible mistake.” App. 3. As to the FBI agent, Williamson\\nwrote: “the following BOP staff gang stalking + harassment as\\nwell as Butner FCI #1 has caused me nightmares of shooting\\nFBI agent [X] in his head with a 300 mag sniper rifle at 300\\nyards like a deer”. App. 3.\\n\\n A grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted\\nWilliamson in September 2020 for those threats, and Judge\\nWalton denied Williamson’s motion to be released pending\\nhis trial. App. 227. He has not yet been tried on those charges.\\n\\n During pretrial proceedings, Williamson finished\\nserving his eight-year sentence for his earlier offenses. The\\npretrial detention order has continued his confinement at FCI\\nButner. The validity of that order is not a subject in this\\nappeal.\\n\\n I.\\n\\n 3\\n\\n The history leading to the Order on appeal—Judge\\nWalton’s Order of February 2024—is as follows.\\n\\n In June 2021, after several pretrial proceedings\\nconducted via teleconferences, with Williamson representing\\nhimself, Judge Walton expressed reluctance to schedule a trial\\n“without some input from [a] mental health expert who\\n[could] assist [him] in assessing whether there [was] a viable\\nissue regarding [Williamson’s] mens rea in this case.”1 App.\\n141.\\n\\n Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(b), 4242(a), and\\n4247(b), Judge Walton ordered the Medical Center at Butner\\nto conduct a psychological examination of Williamson to\\ndetermine whether he was competent to stand trial, whether\\nhis beliefs in FBI “gang-stalking” were delusional, whether he\\nhad the capacity to appreciate that threatening people violated\\nthe law, and whether he had the capacity to conform his\\nconduct to the law. App. 158–60.\\n\\n A forensic psychologist at Butner, Dr. Ross, reported\\nthat Williamson suffered from a “delusional disorder,\\n\\n\\n 1\\n In opposing Williamson’s release from pretrial\\ndetention, the government informed Judge Walton of the\\nfollowing history. In 2008, Williamson sent emails to FBI\\nheadquarters stating that he would kill FBI agents if they did not\\nstop harassing him. App. 162. The same year he called and left\\nvoicemails at FBI Headquarters threatening to kill federal\\nofficials in Washington, D.C., and Houston, Texas. Id. For\\nthese actions he was imprisoned for forty-two months. App.\\n163. One week after he was let out on supervised release, he\\npointed a fake gun at a real estate agent in Texas and threatened\\nto kill her, for which he was sentenced to nine months in state\\nprison and another twenty-four in federal prison. App. 163–64.\\nIt was after his release from those sentences that he committed\\nthe crimes that earned him the eight-year sentence he was\\nserving at FCI Butner.\\n\\n 4\\n\\npersecutory type, multiple episodes, currently in acute\\nepisode.”2 Although Williamson’s condition did not impair\\nhis ability to represent himself or to understand the illegality\\nof his conduct, Dr. Ross concluded that Williamson was\\nunable to conform his conduct to the law. App. 270.\\n\\n Representing himself at a later pretrial hearing\\nWilliamson insisted that he did not suffer from a mental\\nillness and stated that he did not intend to raise an insanity\\ndefense. App. 237–38. He asked Judge Walton to let him stay\\nat FCI Butner because he was seeking a new examination to\\nprove he was not mentally ill and because he feared that files\\nhe had accumulated while representing himself would not be\\navailable to him if he were transferred to the District of\\nColumbia to await trial. App. 240.\\n\\n In December 2021, the government moved to dismiss\\nthe 2020 Indictment against Williamson without prejudice in\\nlight of his mental condition and the prospect of a valid\\ninsanity defense. App. 279. The government also asked\\nJudge Walton to provide that Williamson should “be\\nevaluated for dangerousness and for a decision by the Director\\nof the facility whether to file a dangerousness certification\\npursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) . . ..” App. 283.\\n\\n\\n 2\\n See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,\\nDIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS\\n(5th ed. Text Revision 2022): “In persecutory type the central\\ntheme of the delusion involves the individual’s belief of being\\nconspired against, cheated, spied on, followed, poisoned,\\nmaliciously maligned, harassed, or obstructed in the pursuit of\\nlong-term goals. Small slights may be exaggerated and become\\nthe focus of a delusional system. The affected individual may\\nengage in repeated attempts to obtain satisfaction by legal or\\nlegislative action. Individuals with persecutory delusions are\\noften resentful and angry and may resort to violence against\\nthose they believe are hurting them.”\\n\\n 5\\n\\n\\n After still more proceedings unnecessary to recount,\\nJudge Walton orally granted the government’s motion on\\nJanuary 30, 2024. App. 416. On February 5, 2024, he issued\\na written Order dismissing the charges against Williamson,\\nstaying the dismissal, and requiring Williamson to remain at\\nFCI Butner for “a reasonable period not to exceed 45 days, to\\nbe examined to determine whether the director of FCI Butner\\nshould file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” App.\\n425.\\n\\n Judge Walton stayed his Order pending this appeal.\\n\\n II.\\n\\n Since 1949, § 4246 has authorized the detention of\\nmentally ill, dangerous federal prisoners beyond the date the\\nprisoners would otherwise be released. United States v.\\nComstock, 560 U.S. 126, 129, 140 (2010). Under the current\\nversion of the statute,3 if the director of the facility where the\\n\\n\\n 3\\n The version of § 4246 in effect from 1949 to 1984 (then\\n18 U.S.C. § 4247) required civil commitment proceedings to be\\nheld “[w]henever the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall\\ncertify that a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire has been\\nexamined by the board of examiners referred to in [18 U.S.C. §\\n4241], and that in the judgment of the Director and the board of\\nexaminers the prisoner is insane or mentally incompetent, and\\nthat if released he will probably endanger the safety of the\\nofficers, the property, or other interests of the United States. . .\\n.” Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88. A separate statute\\nenacted the previous year, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, established a Board\\nof Examiners, consisting of two medical officers appointed by\\nthe warden and Attorney General and one mental health expert\\nappointed by the Surgeon General, at every federal penal and\\ncorrectional institution. Act of June 25, 1948. 62 Stat. 855.\\nThese boards examined prisoners alleged to be insane; the\\nboards then reported their findings to the Attorney General. Id.\\n\\n 6\\n\\ninmate is hospitalized4 determines that he “is presently\\nsuffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which\\nhis release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to\\nanother person or serious damage to property of another, and\\nthat suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the\\nperson are not available” then the director shall file a\\ncertificate in the district court nearest to the facility. The\\nfiling of the certificate “shall stay the release of the person\\npending completion of procedures contained in this section.”\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The filing also begins civil commitment\\nproceedings, including a hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§\\n4246(b) & (d), 4247(d).\\n\\n Section 4246 applies to three categories of prisoners:\\n(1) those whose sentences are about to expire, (2) those who\\nwere committed to the custody of the Attorney General under\\n18 U.S.C. § 4241(b), and (3) those “against whom all criminal\\ncharges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the\\nmental condition of the person.” Judge Walton’s Order placed\\n\\n\\n 4\\n In general the statute applies to “a person [who] is\\nhospitalized.” The Butner Federal Correctional Complex\\nconsists of four facilities: three “Correctional Institutions,” and\\none “Medical Center.” Presumably carrying out Judge Walton’s\\nOrder would involve transferring Williamson to the Medical\\nCenter, a hospital and one of the few facilities in the United\\nStates capable of making § 4246 judgments. See United States\\nv. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 189 (4th Cir. 2025); see also United\\nStates v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009)\\n(“because the Bureau of Prisons operates only five Federal\\nMedical Centers, defendants in 89 of the 94 judicial districts are\\noften sent to institutions outside of the district for\\nhospitalization.”) Judge Walton knew this. His June 2021 order\\nrequired Williamson’s psychiatric analysis to “be performed at\\na federal medical center or another facility at FCI Butner that is\\nsuitable for the psychiatric or psychological examination.” App.\\n158. Williamson has not mounted any argument dealing with\\nthis aspect of § 4246(a).\\n\\n 7\\n\\nWilliamson in the third “dismissed charges” category of §\\n4246(a), and thus made him eligible for a dangerousness\\ndetermination by the facility director at Butner.\\n\\n We interpret “all criminal charges have been\\ndismissed” in § 4246(a) not to mean that the prisoner must\\nhave been released from custody. That interpretation would\\nbe senseless. It would mean that a prisoner must be released\\nbefore he may be evaluated to determine whether he should be\\nreleased. It would also contradict § 4246(a)’s directive that\\nthe issuance of a dangerousness certificate stays the prisoner’s\\nrelease—which necessarily contemplates the prisoner’s\\nremaining in custody while the director considers the danger\\nof releasing him. Williamson does not argue otherwise.\\n\\n Appellate counsel for Williamson nevertheless\\ncontends that the Order exceeded the district court’s authority.\\nAs he now sees it, the Order required the facility director to\\nsubject his client to a § 4246(b) examination even though no\\nexamination can occur until after the director issues a\\ndangerousness certificate.5 The government counters that\\nJudge Walton’s Order merely ensured that the facility director\\nat Butner would have the opportunity to decide whether to\\nissue that certificate.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n 5\\n We say “as he now sees it” because Williamson’s\\n“stand-by”counsel, at the hearing preceding this Order, agreed\\nwith Judge Walton’s disposition. Counsel told the court: “Well,\\nI think you can do what the government just said, which is to\\ndismiss the charge – the government has a motion pending to\\ndismiss the charge. I think you can do that, and I think you can\\nstay the order for some minimal period of time to allow the\\ngovernment to file the 4246 certificate down in Butner, which is\\nexactly what happened in Godinez-Ortiz [563 F. 3d 1022, 1026\\n(9th Cir. 2009)].” App. 411.\\n\\n 8\\n\\n This is a “quarrel in a straw.”6 The contested portion of\\nJudge Walton’s Order required only that the facility director\\nperform the duty § 4246(a) assigned to him—namely,\\ndetermine whether releasing Williamson would pose a danger\\nto the public. The effect of the Order would have been the\\nsame if, instead, it read: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that\\nMr. Director shall do what 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) requires of\\nhim with respect to inmate J.H. Williamson, No. ____, now\\nthat the court has ordered dismissal of the charges against this\\ninmate for reasons solely related to his mental condition.”7\\n\\n Judge Walton’s Order, although perhaps unnecessary,\\nis appropriate. Any facility director, to comply with §\\n4246(a), must issue a certificate if he finds that the prisoner\\nwould pose a danger if released. But what if the director\\ndetermines that the prisoner would not pose a danger?\\nNothing in § 4246(a) requires the director to publish—let\\nalone explain—that outcome. Thus, if no certificate issues\\nthere might be some doubt whether the director even exercised\\nthe judgment demanded of him. An order such as the one\\nJudge Walton wisely issued made sure that the director\\nperformed his duty under § 4246(a).\\n\\n There is nothing to Williamson’s related argument that\\nJudge Walton’s Order is invalid because it required a\\n“psychiatric examination,” which—the argument goes—can\\nonly be ordered after a certificate is filed and only by the court\\nclosest to the facility.\\n\\n Judge Walton’s Order did not prescribe a “psychiatric\\nexamination”—under § 4246(b) or otherwise. The operative\\n\\n\\n 6\\n WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 4, sc. 4, l. 53–56.\\n 7\\n The early versions of this statute made the director’s\\nduty more explicit, requiring the director have the inmate\\nexamined by a resident Board of Examiners before they could\\nissue a certificate. Act of Sept. 7, 1949. 63 Stat. 687–88.\\n\\n 9\\n\\nparagraph of the Order describes the director’s decision-\\nmaking responsibility as “conduct[ing] the evaluation”8 or\\n“examin[ing]” Williamson to decide whether to issue a\\ncertificate. To accomplish this the director necessarily must\\nexercise judgment. It is of no moment whether a court calls\\nthis exercise an “assessment,”9 or an “evaluation,”10 or an\\n“examination,”11 or a “determination.”12\\n\\n Williamson also contends that there was no need for\\nthe court to order any new evaluation or examination of him.\\nHe puts it this way: “Mr. Williamson had been at Butner for\\nyears, serving his prior sentence and in pretrial custody in the\\npresent case, and, thus, the director had ample opportunity and\\ninformation upon which to ‘assess’ whether to issue a\\ncertificate.” Reply Brief, at 6. The assumption is that records\\nfrom Williamson’s many years at Butner provide sufficient\\nmaterial to satisfy the director’s obligation under §4246(a).\\nBut §4246(a) is concerned with the present and what it\\npredicts about the future. The director must determine whether\\nthe prisoner is “presently suffering from a mental disease” and\\nwould be a danger to the public if released. It follows that the\\ndirector must evaluate Williamson’s current condition—that\\n\\n\\n 8\\n Quoting United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022,\\n1032 (9th Cir. 2009).\\n 9\\n As the Eighth Circuit did in United States v. Payen, 144\\nF.4th 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2025).\\n 10\\n As the Fifth Circuit did in Sealed Appellee v. Sealed\\nAppellant, 83 F.4th 399, 402 (5th Cir. 2023).\\n 11\\n As the district court did in United States v. Guzman-\\nMontesino, No. CR 24-106(GMM), 2025 WL 2374770, at *3\\n(D.P.R. Aug. 14, 2025).\\n 12\\n As the Supreme Court did in Greenwood v. United\\nStates, 350 U.S. 366, 370 (1956).\\n\\n 10\\n\\nis, his condition when his release is imminent.\\n\\n The Fourth Circuit adopted this interpretation when\\nreviewing an order similar to the Order now before us. There\\ntoo the district court’s order indicated that the facility director\\nat Butner would make a preliminary dangerousness\\ndetermination. See United States v. Berry, 142 F. 4th 184, 190\\n(4th Cir. 2025). The government had requested an order\\n“referring [Berry] to the Bureau of Prisons for evaluation for\\ncivil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246.” Motion to\\nRefer Defendant for a Civil Commitment Determination,\\nUnited States v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D.\\nMich. 2019). The district court granted the request stating that\\n“it is appropriate that Berry be evaluated for civil\\ncommitment.” Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and to\\nRefer Defendant For a Civil Commitment Evaluation, United\\nStates v. Berry, 2:15-cr-20743-DML-MKM (S.D. Mich.\\n2019). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order, reasoning that\\n“it would make little sense to interpret the statute [§ 4246] to\\nrequire the release of dangerous, mentally incompetent\\nindividuals the moment their charges are dismissed without\\naffording the government a reasonable opportunity to seek\\ncertification under § 4246.” Berry, 142 F. 3d at 192.\\n\\n The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in upholding\\na district court order identical to Judge Walton’s.13 The court\\n\\n\\n 13\\n The court of appeals in Godinez-Ortiz ruled that the\\ndistrict court “correctly recognized that a dangerousness\\nevaluation conducted pursuant to § 4246 would determine\\nwhether [the defendant] might pose a danger to the public if\\nreleased from the facility. The court granted the government’s\\nmotion, dismissing the charges without prejudice, but staying its\\norder of dismissal pending appeal and the determination\\n\\n 11\\n\\nreasoned that “[i]n authorizing the director to file a\\ndangerousness certification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates\\nthe temporary commitment of that person so that the director\\ncan conduct the evaluation necessary to make the certification\\ndecision.” Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\\n\\n This brings us to Williamson’s remaining argument.\\nAs we understand it, he contends that because § 4246 does not\\nexpressly authorize a district court to order a director to\\nconduct a preliminary dangerousness evaluation Judge Walton\\nhad no authority to issue an order requiring or even allowing\\nthe director to make that judgment. E.g. Appellant Brief at 19,\\n23, and Reply Brief at 12–13.\\n\\n It is a well-established principle that district courts\\nhave inherent powers, including the power to stay\\nproceedings, which they can wield to respond to specific\\nproblems when doing so does not contradict any express rule\\nor statute. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016);\\nDegen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996); Chambers\\nv. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46, (1991); Link v. Wabash\\nR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631 (1962); United States v.\\nHudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812)). The Order here is a\\nreasonable response to the specific problem of making the\\n“dismissed-charges” category in § 4246(a) administratively\\nworkable and does not contradict the statute. See Berry, 142\\nF. 4th at 192; see also Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d at 1032.\\n\\n\\nregarding dangerousness. Additionally, the court ordered that\\n[the defendant] be returned to FMC-Butner for a period of 45\\ndays to give the facility an opportunity to determine whether to\\nfile a dangerousness certificate pursuant to § 4246.” 563 F.3d at\\n1026.\\n\\n 12\\n\\n\\n We close with this response to the dissent.\\n\\n To support its theory that we lack appellate\\njurisdiction, the dissent relies on the same reasons we have\\njust given for rejecting the defendant’s appeal on the merits.\\nThe outcome of our decision is the same as the dissent’s\\npreferred “jurisdictional” disposition: Judge Walton’s Order,\\nstayed during the pendency of this appeal, will go into effect.\\nThe question naturally arises: should our opinion be placed\\n“on the merits” or instead, as the dissent prefers, should it be\\nlabeled a “jurisdictional” determination? Bell v. Hood, 327\\nU.S. 678, 682 (1946), gives the answer: the decision should be\\non the merits.\\n\\n The Order dismisses the indictment against\\nWilliamson. Williamson objects only to one aspect of the\\nOrder: the requirement that a facility director at Butner make a\\ndangerousness determination. According to Williamson, this\\nillegally required his confinement to a hospital for a maximum\\nof 45 days14 to be subjected to a psychiatric evaluation. Under\\ncircuit law, an order committing a defendant to a prison\\nhospital “to undergo an involuntary psychiatric examination”\\nis immediately appealable. United States v. Weissberger, 951\\nF.2d 392, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Accord United States v.\\nGodinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.\\nBerry, 142 F.4th 184 (4th Cir. 2025). Our decision that the\\nOrder did not do what Williamson claims is a decision on the\\nmerits, not a ruling that we lack jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood,\\nsupra; Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523\\nU.S. 83, 89 (1998).\\n\\n\\n\\n 14\\n See note 4 supra and the Order.\\n\\n 13\\n\\n Affirmed.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n ADDENDUM\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n In accordance with the oral rulings issued by the Court at\\nthe status hearing held on January 30, 2024, via teleconference,\\nit is hereby\\n\\n ORDERED that the Government’s Motion for an\\nEvaluation Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, to Dismiss the\\nIndictment without Prejudice, and to Stay the Order of Dismissal\\nPending a Dangerousness Certification, ECF No. 113, is\\nGRANTED. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the defendant shall remain at FCI\\nButner for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed forty-five\\ndays, to be examined to determine whether the director of FCI\\nButner should file a certificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See\\nUnited States v. Godinez Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir.\\n2009) (“In authorizing the director to file a dangerousness\\ncertification, § 4246 necessarily contemplates the temporary\\ncommitment of that person so that the director can conduct the\\nevaluation necessary to make the certification decision.”); see id.\\n(“The duration of such commitment[] is controlled by 18 U.S.C.\\n\\n 14\\n\\n§ 4247(b).”). It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the Court will dismiss the Indictment\\nwithout prejudice “solely for reasons related to the mental\\ncondition of the [defendant.]” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). However,\\nsuch dismissal is STAYED pending the completion of the\\nevaluation of the defendant and the determination by the director\\nof FCI Butner regarding whether to file a dangerousness\\ncertificate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See Godinez-Ortiz, 563\\nF.3d at 1026 (affirming the district\\ncourt’s order which “granted the motion [to dismiss],\\ndismiss[ed] the charges without prejudice, [and] stay[ed] [the]\\norder of dismissal pending . . . the determination regarding\\ndangerousness”); see, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, No.\\n12-cr-184 (DBH), 2014 WL 3378662, at *2 (D. Me. July 9,\\n2014) (granting “the government’s motion to dismiss without\\nprejudice and its motion for an order directing the United States\\nBureau of Prisons, through FMC Butner, to conduct a\\ndangerousness evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4246\\\" and staying\\nthe order of dismissal “pending the completion of the\\ndangerousness evaluation” in accordance with the procedure\\napproved by the Ninth Circuit in Godinez-Ortiz); United States\\nv. Hardy, No. 09-cr-130 (DBH), 2011 WL 997288, at *1 (D. Me.\\nMar. 18, 2011) (citing Godinez-Ortiz in granting the\\ngovernment’s motion for a dangerousness evaluation, to dismiss\\nwithout prejudice, and stay the order of dismissal).1 It is further\\n\\n\\n 1\\n The Court acknowledges that, if the director of FCI\\nButner files a certificate of dangerousness pursuant to 18 U.S.C.\\n§ 4246, the certificate must be “transmit[ted] . . . to the clerk of\\nthe court for the district in which the [defendant] is confined[,]”\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246(a), and, thus, any dangerousness proceedings\\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 4246 would procced [sic] in that district rather\\nthan in this Court, see United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-191\\n\\n 15\\n\\n ORDERED that the time from January 30, 2024, until\\nthe date on which the director of FCI Butner makes the\\ndetermination regarding whether to file a certificate pursuant to\\n18 U.S.C. § 4246, is excluded under the Speedy Trial Act, to\\nallow time for the defendant to be examined for the purposes of\\nthis determination. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that, upon the filing of a notice of appeal\\nchallenging this Order, which the defendant represents he\\nintends to file, the proceedings before this Court will be\\nSTAYED pending a ruling by the District of Columbia Circuit.\\nIt is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the Court\\nwithin seven days of the resolution of his forthcoming appeal\\nthat will challenge this Order. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the execution of this Order shall be\\nSTAYED for five days to allow the defendant to file a notice of\\nappeal. It is further\\n\\n ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forthwith\\nmail a copy of this Order to the defendant s address on record.\\n\\n SO ORDERED this 5th day of February, 2024.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n(JMF), 1999 WL 1062139, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1999) (stating\\nthat “[t]he only natural reading of [18 U.S.C. § 4246(a)] is that\\nthe court of confinement, where the certificate was filed, has\\njurisdiction to determine dangerousness” and that “exclusive\\njurisdiction to commit the defendant under 18 U.S.C.[] § 4246\\nlies in the court where he is presently confined”).\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30998,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10754785,"string":"10,754,785"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"In re: Donald Trump"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-12"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-5452"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion for a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus and for an administrative stay, and the opposition to the motion for a stay; and the notice of district court orders, it is ORDERED that the district court’s December 8, 2025 order be administratively stayed pending further order of the court.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\\n Filed On: December 12, 2025\\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\\n\\n Petitioners\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus and for an\\nadministrative stay, and the opposition to the motion for a stay; and the notice of district\\ncourt orders, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the district court’s December 8, 2025 order be administratively\\nstayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\\nallow the court time to render a decision on the mandamus petition and the stay motion.\\nThe administrative stay should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of\\nthat petition or motion. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures\\n33 (2025).\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n* Circuit Judge Childs would deny the motion for an administrative stay.\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11221370/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RAO"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WALKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CHILDS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754785/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In re: Donald Trump\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n ____________\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\n Filed On: December 12, 2025\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\n\n Petitioners\n\n\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus and for an\nadministrative stay, and the opposition to the motion for a stay; and the notice of district\ncourt orders, it is\n\n ORDERED that the district court’s December 8, 2025 order be administratively\nstayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\nallow the court time to render a decision on the mandamus petition and the stay motion.\nThe administrative stay should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of\nthat petition or motion. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures\n33 (2025).\n\n Per Curiam\n\n\n FOR THE COURT:\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\n\n BY: /s/\n Selena R. Gancasz\n Deputy Clerk\n\n\n\n\n* Circuit Judge Childs would deny the motion for an administrative stay.\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In re: Donald Trump\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-12\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\\n Filed On: December 12, 2025\\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\\n\\n Petitioners\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus and for an\\nadministrative stay, and the opposition to the motion for a stay; and the notice of district\\ncourt orders, it is\\n\\n ORDERED that the district court’s December 8, 2025 order be administratively\\nstayed pending further order of the court. The purpose of this administrative stay is to\\nallow the court time to render a decision on the mandamus petition and the stay motion.\\nThe administrative stay should not be construed in any way as a ruling on the merits of\\nthat petition or motion. See D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures\\n33 (2025).\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n* Circuit Judge Childs would deny the motion for an administrative stay.\\n[END_CASE]\",\n \"role\": \"user\"\n }\n]","isConversational":true}}},{"rowIdx":30999,"cells":{"id":{"kind":"number","value":10758394,"string":"10,758,394"},"name":{"kind":"string","value":""},"name_abbreviation":{"kind":"string","value":"In re: Donald Trump"},"decision_date":{"kind":"string","value":"2025-12-15"},"docket_number":{"kind":"string","value":"25-5452"},"court":{"kind":"string","value":"U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit"},"casebody":{"kind":"string","value":"{\"judges\": \"BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion for a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus, and the opposition thereto; and the notice of district court orders, it is ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that respondents file a response to the petition for a writ of mandamus, not to exceed 8,800 words, by December 29, 2025.\", \"parties\": \"\", \"opinions\": [{\"author\": \"PER CURIAM\", \"type\": \"010combined\", \"text\": \"United States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\\n Filed On: December 15, 2025\\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\\n\\n Petitioners\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus, and the opposition\\nthereto; and the notice of district court orders, it is\\n\\n ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that respondents file a response to the\\npetition for a writ of mandamus, not to exceed 8,800 words, by December 29, 2025.\\nSee Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)(1), (b)(1); D.C. Cir. Rule 21(a), (b). Petitioners shall file a\\nreply, not to exceed 4,900 words, by January 5, 2026. While not otherwise limited, the\\nparties are directed to address the following issue:\\n\\n Federal law recognizes that criminal contempt may be direct or indirect.\\n See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 797-99\\n (1987). A court may initiate criminal proceedings for indirect contempt\\n through notice and a referral for prosecution. See Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n 42(a)(1)-(2). In seeking information about decisions made outside the\\n presence of the court and referencing the possibility of a referral for\\n prosecution, the district court appears to contemplate indirect contempt\\n proceedings. See ECF No. 196 at 1. On what legal basis may a district\\n court (1) investigate possible grounds for indirect contempt and (2) delay\\n a referral for prosecution until it finds probable cause that indirect\\n contempt occurred?\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. Gancasz\\n Deputy Clerk\", \"resource_uri\": \"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11224979/\", \"author_raw\": \"PER CURIAM\"}]}"},"judge1":{"kind":"string","value":"RAO"},"judge2":{"kind":"string","value":"WALKER"},"judge3":{"kind":"string","value":"CHILDS"},"exactly_three_caps":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"extra_judges":{"kind":"string","value":""},"judge_designations":{"kind":"string","value":"{}"},"opinions_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"majority_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"other_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"primary_citation":{"kind":"string","value":""},"reporter":{"kind":"string","value":""},"volume":{"kind":"null"},"resource_url":{"kind":"string","value":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758394/"},"precedential_status":{"kind":"string","value":"Published"},"010combined_count":{"kind":"number","value":1,"string":"1"},"020lead_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"030concurrence_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"035concurrenceinpart_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"040dissent_count":{"kind":"number","value":0,"string":"0"},"year":{"kind":"number","value":2025,"string":"2,025"},"month":{"kind":"number","value":12,"string":"12"},"messages":{"kind":"list like","value":[{"content":"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\n\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\nobject that encodes the following variables:\n\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\n- Disposition of Case\n- Winning Party\n- Issue Area\n- Legal Provisions\n- Decision Direction\n- Lower Court Direction\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\n\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \"the Court\"** and assuming\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\n\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\n\n==================================================\n1. INPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou will receive input in two sections:\n\n[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\">\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\nOpinion type: <e.g. \"majority\", \"per curiam\", \"on-the-merits\", \"rehearing\", \"en banc\", etc.>\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\n\n[CASE_TEXT]\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\n[END_CASE]\n\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\n\n==================================================\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\n==================================================\n\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\n\n- \"petitioner\"\n- \"respondent\"\n- \"case_disposition\"\n- \"winning_party\"\n- \"issue_area\"\n- \"legal_provisions\"\n- \"decision_direction\"\n- \"lower_court_direction\"\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\"\n- \"method\"\n- \"who_appealed\"\n- \"dissent_basis\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\n- \"concurrence_type\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"concurrence_basis\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\n- \"justification\"\n\nSchema:\n\n- \"petitioner\": {\n \"name\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\n \"description\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"respondent\": {\n \"name\": string,\n \"description\": string, // e.g. \"United States as appellee\", \"private employer\", \"federal agency\"\n \"category\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\n \"category_label\": string // label for the category code\n }\n\n- \"case_disposition\": {\n \"code\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"winning_party\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"issue_area\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\n \"label\": string // short description of the main issue area\n }\n\n- \"issue_area_alt\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"legal_provisions\": [\n {\n \"area_code\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\n \"area_label\": string,\n \"provision_text\": string // e.g. \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\", \"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\"\n },\n ...\n ]\n\n- \"decision_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"lower_court_direction\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\n \"label\": string // \"no\" or \"yes\"\n }\n\n- \"method\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"who_appealed\": {\n \"code\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"dissent_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_type\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"code\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\n \"label\": string\n }\n\n- \"concurrence_basis\": { // ONLY include if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\" in metadata\n \"procedural\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n \"merits\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\n }\n\n- \"justification\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\n\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\n\n==================================================\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\n==================================================\n\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\n\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\n- The \"name\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\n- The \"description\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \"federal prisoner challenging sentence\",\n \"state official in civil-rights suit\", \"private corporation defendant\", \"federal agency\").\n\nFor each party, also assign a \"category\" code using this 7-category typology:\n\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\n\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\n\n\n3.2 Disposition of Case\n\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\n\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\n2 = reversed\n3 = reversed and remanded\n4 = vacated and remanded\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\n7 = vacated\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\n0 = no disposition\n\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\n or original authority (the word \"remand\" must appear in the opinion text).\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\"no disposition\").\n\n\n3.3 Winning Party\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\n\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\n- A \"favorable disposition\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\n regardless of the case disposition.\n\n\n3.4 Issue Area\n\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\n\n1 = Criminal Procedure\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\n\n2 = Civil Rights\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\n\n3 = First Amendment\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\n\n4 = Due Process\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\n\n5 = Privacy\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\n\n6 = Attorneys\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\n\n7 = Unions\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\n\n8 = Economic Activity\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\n\n9 = Judicial Power\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\n\n10 = Federalism\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\n\n11 = Interstate Relations\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\n\n12 = Federal Taxation\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\n\n13 = Miscellaneous\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\n\n14 = Private Action\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\n\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\n\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\n\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\n\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\n\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \"issue_area_alt\" with your\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\nset \"issue_area_alt\" to the same code and label as \"issue_area\".\n\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\n\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\n\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\n\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\n\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\n use 8.\n\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\n allegation.\n\n\n3.5 Legal Provisions\n\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \"legal_provisions\".\n\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\n\n1 = Constitution (original text)\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\n\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\n\n3 = Federal Statute\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\n\n4 = Court Rules\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\n (prejudicial evidence).\n\n5 = Other\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\n the categories above.\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\n of laches, implied contracts.\n\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\n\n8 = State or local law or regulation\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\n than federal law.\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\n\n9 = No Legal Provision\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\n citing specific legal authority.\n\nFor each entry:\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \"Constitution\", \"Federal Statute\").\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\",\n \"42 U.S.C. § 1983\", \"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\", \"state tort law\").\n\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\n\nDistinguishing area codes:\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\n\n\n3.6 Decision Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\nCRITICAL: The codes \"conservative\" and \"liberal\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\n\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\n\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\n | with one of the patterns above |\n\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\nprinciples — use the table.\n\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\n\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\n\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\n\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\n says \"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\n\n\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\n\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\n row for code 1 says \"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\"\n\n\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\n\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\n\n Coding:\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\n lookup table row for code 8 says \"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\"\n\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \"pro-business\" outcome (e.g., it\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\n\n\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\n\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\n\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\n\n\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = conservative\n2 = liberal\n3 = unspecifiable\n\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\n\nUse this rule of thumb:\n\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \"affirmed\"\n or 8 \"petition denied or appeal dismissed\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \"reversed\",\n 3 \"reversed and remanded\", 4 \"vacated and remanded\", or 7 \"vacated\"), then the lower court's direction is the\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\n\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\n- \"SAME\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\n- \"OPPOSITE\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\n\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\n\nCodes:\n\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\n\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\n\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\nchallenged provision, code 0.\n\n\n3.9 Method\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\n\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\nstatements like \"before the court en banc,\" \"on rehearing,\" \"upon reconsideration,\" or\n\"per curiam.\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\n\n\n3.10 Who Appealed\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\n\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\nhistory. The \"original plaintiff\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \"original\ndefendant\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\n\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\n\n\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\" or \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\",\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\n\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\n\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\n\n\"dissent_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\n - \"merits\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\n\n\"concurrence_basis\" (include ONLY if \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\"):\n - \"procedural\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\n - \"merits\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\n\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\n(the longest or most substantive).\n\nIf the metadata says \"Has dissenting opinion: No\", OMIT \"dissent_basis\" entirely from your output.\nIf the metadata says \"Has concurring opinion: No\", OMIT \"concurrence_type\" and \"concurrence_basis\" entirely from your output.\n\n\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\n\nIf the case metadata states \"Has concurring opinion: Yes\", classify the concurrence as one of\nthe following types:\n\nCodes:\n\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\n\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\n like \"concurring in the result,\" \"concurring in the judgment,\" \"concurring in the result\n only,\" or \"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\n majority's analysis.\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\n\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\n the majority opinion or only the result.\n\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\nboth outcome and reasoning.\n\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\n\n\n==================================================\n4. GENERAL RULES\n==================================================\n\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \"unspecifiable\" or \"no disposition\" code\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\n directions in Section 3.6.\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\n- Include \"dissent_basis\", \"concurrence_type\", and \"concurrence_basis\" ONLY when the metadata\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\n\n\n==================================================\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\n==================================================\n\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\n","role":"system"},{"content":"[CASE_METADATA]\nCase name: In re: Donald Trump\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\nOpinion type: majority\nHas dissenting opinion: No\nHas concurring opinion: No\nAdditional notes: \n\n[CASE_TEXT]\nUnited States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n ____________\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\n Filed On: December 15, 2025\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\n\n Petitioners\n\n\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs, Circuit Judges\n\n ORDER\n\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus, and the opposition\nthereto; and the notice of district court orders, it is\n\n ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that respondents file a response to the\npetition for a writ of mandamus, not to exceed 8,800 words, by December 29, 2025.\nSee Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)(1), (b)(1); D.C. Cir. Rule 21(a), (b). Petitioners shall file a\nreply, not to exceed 4,900 words, by January 5, 2026. While not otherwise limited, the\nparties are directed to address the following issue:\n\n Federal law recognizes that criminal contempt may be direct or indirect.\n See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 797-99\n (1987). A court may initiate criminal proceedings for indirect contempt\n through notice and a referral for prosecution. See Fed. R. Crim. P.\n 42(a)(1)-(2). In seeking information about decisions made outside the\n presence of the court and referencing the possibility of a referral for\n prosecution, the district court appears to contemplate indirect contempt\n proceedings. See ECF No. 196 at 1. On what legal basis may a district\n court (1) investigate possible grounds for indirect contempt and (2) delay\n a referral for prosecution until it finds probable cause that indirect\n contempt occurred?\n\n Per Curiam\n\n\n FOR THE COURT:\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\n\n BY: /s/\n Selena R. Gancasz\n Deputy Clerk\n[END_CASE]","role":"user"}],"string":"[\n {\n \"content\": \"You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the codebook below.\\n\\nYour task: Given metadata and text for a single federal appellate case, output a single JSON\\nobject that encodes the following variables:\\n\\n- Petitioner (name, description, and general category)\\n- Respondent (name, description, and general category)\\n- Disposition of Case\\n- Winning Party\\n- Issue Area\\n- Legal Provisions\\n- Decision Direction\\n- Lower Court Direction\\n- Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n- Method (panel, en banc, or rehearing)\\n- Who Appealed (original plaintiff vs. defendant)\\n- Dissent Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if dissent exists)\\n- Concurrence Type (regular vs. special/result-only — only if concurrence exists)\\n- Concurrence Basis (procedural vs. merits — only if concurrence exists)\\n\\nYou are working with U.S. Courts of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. Apply the SCDB coding\\nrules as closely as possible, treating the **Court of Appeals as \\\"the Court\\\"** and assuming\\nthat the **lower court is, e.g., a federal district court** whose decision is being reviewed.\\n\\nTo encode these variables, start by determining the petitioner and respondent, following the\\ninstructions in Section 3.1. Then, find the disposition of the case and code it according\\nto Section 3.2. Knowing the disposition will guide your next step: determining if the petitioner\\nwas the winning party, following the directions in Section 3.3. Next, use the overall opinion content\\nto code the issue area as described in Section 3.4. This step will also inform the legal provisions\\ncoding as laid out in Section 3.5. With the winning party, disposition, and issue area fixed,\\ncarefully and precisely follow the directions in Section 3.6 to assign a decision direction for the opinion.\\nBased on that decision direction and the disposition, you can assign a lower court direction as well,\\nfollowing Section 3.7. Finally, justify your decisions in the manner described below.\\n\\n==================================================\\n1. INPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou will receive input in two sections:\\n\\n[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: <case name as in the caption>\\nCourt: <name of the Court of Appeals, e.g. \\\"United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit\\\">\\nDate decided: <YYYY-MM-DD or best approximation>\\nOpinion type: <e.g. \\\"majority\\\", \\\"per curiam\\\", \\\"on-the-merits\\\", \\\"rehearing\\\", \\\"en banc\\\", etc.>\\nHas dissenting opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate dissent>\\nHas concurring opinion: <Yes or No, based on whether the input data contains a separate concurrence>\\nAdditional notes: <any other metadata or summary, if provided>\\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\n<full or excerpted opinion text here>\\n[END_CASE]\\n\\nUse both metadata and text to code the variables. If metadata and text conflict, prefer the\\nsubstantive discussion in the opinion.\\n\\n==================================================\\n2. OUTPUT FORMAT\\n==================================================\\n\\nYou must output ONLY a single JSON object with exactly these keys:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\"\\n- \\\"respondent\\\"\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\"\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\"\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\"\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\"\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\"\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\"\\n- \\\"method\\\"\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\"\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\" (only if the case has a dissenting opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (only if the case has a concurring opinion)\\n- \\\"justification\\\"\\n\\nSchema:\\n\\n- \\\"petitioner\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string, // short party name from caption; usually the appellant\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // role and identity, e.g. \\\"federal criminal defendant appealing conviction\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"respondent\\\": {\\n \\\"name\\\": string,\\n \\\"description\\\": string, // e.g. \\\"United States as appellee\\\", \\\"private employer\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\"\\n \\\"category\\\": integer, // 1–7 general litigant type (see Section 3.1)\\n \\\"category_label\\\": string // label for the category code\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"case_disposition\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // must be one of the codes below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"winning_party\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0, 1, or 2 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14 from the list below\\n \\\"label\\\": string // short description of the main issue area\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"issue_area_alt\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–14; your best non-Misc alternative if issue_area.code == 13, else same as issue_area.code\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"legal_provisions\\\": [\\n {\\n \\\"area_code\\\": integer, // 1–9 (law area codes below)\\n \\\"area_label\\\": string,\\n \\\"provision_text\\\": string // e.g. \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\", \\\"18 U.S.C. § 924(c)\\\"\\n },\\n ...\\n ]\\n\\n- \\\"decision_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"lower_court_direction\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1, 2, or 3 as defined below\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"declaration_of_unconstitutionality\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 0 or 1 (see Section 3.8)\\n \\\"label\\\": string // \\\"no\\\" or \\\"yes\\\"\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"method\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.9)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"who_appealed\\\": {\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–4 (see Section 3.10)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"dissent_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_type\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"code\\\": integer, // 1–3 (see Section 3.12)\\n \\\"label\\\": string\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"concurrence_basis\\\": { // ONLY include if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\" in metadata\\n \\\"procedural\\\": integer, // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n \\\"merits\\\": integer // 0–3 (see Section 3.11)\\n }\\n\\n- \\\"justification\\\": string // 2–4 sentences summarizing why you chose these codes.\\n // You MUST explicitly say: (a) who won and why, (b) what issue_area.code is,\\n // (c) how that combination implied the decision_direction.code you chose, and\\n // (d) why the lower_court_direction is the same as or opposite to decision_direction.\\n\\nYour entire response must be exactly one JSON object in this schema and nothing else.\\n\\n==================================================\\n3. VARIABLE INTERPRETATION\\n==================================================\\n\\n3.1 Petitioner and Respondent\\n\\n- Use the case caption, opinion type, and text to determine who is appealing.\\n- Petitioner = the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals (typically the appellant).\\n- Respondent = the party opposing the appeal (typically the appellee).\\n- The \\\"name\\\" should be a reasonably short label from the caption.\\n- The \\\"description\\\" should describe their role and identity (e.g., \\\"federal prisoner challenging sentence\\\",\\n \\\"state official in civil-rights suit\\\", \\\"private corporation defendant\\\", \\\"federal agency\\\").\\n\\nFor each party, also assign a \\\"category\\\" code using this 7-category typology:\\n\\n1 = private business or corporation (including partnerships, sole proprietorships)\\n2 = nonprofit organization, interest group, or union (as an institutional party)\\n3 = federal government (including U.S. as party, federal agencies like DOJ, IRS, EPA, SEC, NLRB, etc.)\\n4 = sub-state government (city, county, municipality, school district, local official)\\n5 = state government (state, governor, state agency, state official in official capacity)\\n6 = tribal government or Indian nation\\n7 = natural person (individual, including pro se litigants and individual officials sued personally)\\n\\nChoose the category based on who the party IS, not what kind of case it is. When a government\\nofficial is sued in their official capacity, code them as the relevant government level (3, 4, or 5).\\nWhen sued in their personal/individual capacity, code them as 7 (natural person).\\n\\n\\n3.2 Disposition of Case\\n\\nCodes (Songer-style numbering):\\n\\n1 = affirmed (includes modified and affirmed)\\n2 = reversed\\n3 = reversed and remanded\\n4 = vacated and remanded\\n5 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part\\n6 = affirmed in part, reversed (or vacated) in part, and remanded\\n7 = vacated\\n8 = petition denied or appeal dismissed\\n9 = stay, petition, or motion granted\\n10 = certification to or from a lower court\\n11 = affirmed, vacated, and remanded (without reversal)\\n0 = no disposition\\n\\n- Use the text and opinion type (majority, rehearing, etc.) to identify what the Court of Appeals actually did.\\n- Only choose options 3, 4, or 6 if the opinion contains explicit instructions to remand the matter to the lower court\\n or original authority (the word \\\"remand\\\" must appear in the opinion text).\\n- For rehearing petitions, be explicit about whether the petition is granted (9), denied (8), or leads to modification\\n or vacatur (7) of the prior judgment.\\n- If the Court takes no substantive action on the merits (e.g., purely procedural opinion), use 0 (\\\"no disposition\\\").\\n\\n\\n3.3 Winning Party\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = no favorable disposition for petitioning party apparent\\n1 = petitioning party received a favorable disposition\\n2 = favorable disposition for petitioning party unclear\\n\\n- Treat the **petitioner** as the party seeking relief in the Court of Appeals.\\n- A \\\"favorable disposition\\\" is one that materially improves the petitioner's position relative to the lower court judgment\\n (e.g., reversal, vacatur, remand requiring relief, sentence reduction).\\n- For mixed outcomes (e.g., affirmed in part and reversed in part), assess whether, on balance, the petitioner is better off.\\n If clearly better off, use 1; if clearly not better off, use 0; if ambiguous, use 2.\\n- Note that an outcome favoring the petitioning party may be either an affirmation (if the lower court had ruled in favor of the petitioner)\\n OR a reversal (if the lower court had ruled against the petitioner). You should focus on whether the petitioner is better off,\\n regardless of the case disposition.\\n\\n\\n3.4 Issue Area\\n\\nChoose exactly one code and label from this list, based on the main legal/policy issue in the appeal:\\n\\n1 = Criminal Procedure\\n (e.g., search and seizure, arrest, interrogation, right to counsel, trial and sentencing rules, habeas)\\n\\n2 = Civil Rights\\n (e.g., equal protection, discrimination based on race or other protected traits, voting rights, school desegregation)\\n\\n3 = First Amendment\\n (e.g., freedom of speech, press, association, religion, and related expression claims)\\n\\n4 = Due Process\\n (e.g., non-criminal procedural fairness, property or liberty deprivations, economic regulation challenges framed as due process)\\n\\n5 = Privacy\\n (e.g., contraception, abortion, family relationships, intimate or sexual privacy, personal autonomy)\\n\\n6 = Attorneys\\n (e.g., attorney's fees, sanctions, bar admission and discipline, representation issues)\\n\\n7 = Unions\\n (e.g., labor relations, union membership and internal affairs, collective bargaining, union security)\\n\\n8 = Economic Activity\\n (e.g., antitrust, securities, regulation of business, commercial law, bankruptcy, financial regulation)\\n\\n9 = Judicial Power\\n (e.g., jurisdiction, standing, mootness, justiciability, sovereign immunity, standards of review, appellate procedure)\\n\\n10 = Federalism\\n (e.g., conflicts between federal and state authority, preemption, Tenth Amendment issues, state sovereign immunity vs federal power)\\n\\n11 = Interstate Relations\\n (e.g., disputes between states, boundary and water disputes, interstate compacts and obligations)\\n\\n12 = Federal Taxation\\n (e.g., federal income, corporate, estate, excise, and other federal tax issues)\\n\\n13 = Miscellaneous\\n (cases that genuinely do not fit any other issue area — see IMPORTANT note below)\\n\\n14 = Private Action\\n (e.g., private law disputes in property, contracts, torts, wills, estates, and similar matters)\\n\\nPick the **single best** issue area based on what the Court of Appeals treats as the central question.\\nIf multiple areas appear, choose the one most emphasized in the reasoning.\\n\\nIMPORTANT — AVOID MISCELLANEOUS (13):\\n\\nCode 13 should be used ONLY as a genuine last resort when NO other category applies even\\napproximately. Before choosing 13, reconsider the following common mappings:\\n\\n - Medical malpractice, products liability, personal injury, breach of contract,\\n admiralty, property disputes → 14 (Private Action)\\n - Workers' compensation (LHWCA, FELA, Longshore Act) → 7 (Unions) or 14 (Private Action)\\n - Bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, business regulation → 8 (Economic Activity)\\n - Social Security, disability, welfare benefits → 2 (Civil Rights)\\n - Attorneys' fees, bar discipline → 6 (Attorneys)\\n - Federal preemption of state law → 10 (Federalism)\\n - Procedural rehearing or jurisdictional questions → 9 (Judicial Power)\\n - Separation of powers, legislative veto → 13 (Miscellaneous) — this is a genuine use\\n\\nIf you DO choose issue_area.code = 13, you MUST also fill in \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" with your\\nbest-guess alternative code (the closest non-Misc category). If issue_area.code is not 13,\\nset \\\"issue_area_alt\\\" to the same code and label as \\\"issue_area\\\".\\n\\nISSUE AREA TIEBREAKING RULES:\\n\\nWhen a case implicates more than one issue area, apply these rules to select the primary one:\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Civil Rights (2): If the court's holding concerns criminal\\n conviction, sentencing, or procedure itself (e.g., suppression of evidence, habeas review of\\n a conviction), use 1 even if discrimination or civil-rights statutes are mentioned. Use 2\\n only when the holding primarily addresses whether discriminatory treatment occurred or whether\\n a civil-rights statute was violated.\\n\\n- Criminal Procedure (1) vs. Due Process (4): If the party is a criminal defendant raising\\n due-process claims about trial procedure, sentencing, or conditions of confinement, use 1.\\n Use 4 only when the due-process claim arises in a non-criminal context (e.g., government\\n termination of benefits, property seizure in a civil case).\\n\\n- Judicial Power (9) vs. any other area: Many cases discuss jurisdiction, standing, or\\n justiciability before reaching the merits. Use 9 ONLY when the court's holding is\\n primarily about whether it has the power to hear the case — i.e., the court resolves a\\n jurisdictional or justiciability question and that resolution IS the outcome. If the court\\n establishes jurisdiction and then rules on the merits, use the substantive merits area instead.\\n\\n- Economic Activity (8) vs. Federalism (10): If the holding is about whether a federal\\n statute preempts state regulation, use 10. If the holding is about the substance of a\\n federal regulatory scheme (e.g., upholding or striking down an EPA rule on the merits),\\n use 8.\\n\\n- Civil Rights (2) vs. Due Process (4): If the claim involves alleged discrimination under\\n equal protection or a civil-rights statute, use 2. Use 4 only when the claim is about\\n procedural fairness or property/liberty deprivation without an underlying discrimination\\n allegation.\\n\\n\\n3.5 Legal Provisions\\n\\nFor each major legal provision the Court of Appeals applies or interprets, add an entry to \\\"legal_provisions\\\".\\n\\nLaw Area codes (SCDB varLawArea):\\n\\n1 = Constitution (original text)\\n An Article or Section of the original Constitution (not an Amendment).\\n Examples: Article I (congressional power), Article II (executive power),\\n Article III (judicial power), Supremacy Clause, Commerce Clause, Full Faith\\n and Credit Clause, Contracts Clause.\\n\\n2 = Constitutional Amendment\\n Any Amendment to the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights.\\n Examples: First Amendment (speech, religion), Fourth Amendment (search and\\n seizure), Fifth Amendment (due process, takings, self-incrimination), Sixth\\n Amendment (right to counsel, jury trial), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual\\n punishment), Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection, due process).\\n\\n3 = Federal Statute\\n A statute enacted by Congress, cited by title and section of the U.S. Code or\\n by its popular name. This is the most common category.\\n Examples: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question\\n jurisdiction), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Sherman Act § 1 (antitrust),\\n 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (firearms), ERISA, CERCLA, ADA, FOIA, Sentencing Guidelines.\\n\\n4 = Court Rules\\n Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, or Appellate\\n Procedure, as well as local circuit rules.\\n Examples: Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim), Fed. R. Civ. P.\\n 56 (summary judgment), Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (plea agreements), Fed. R. Evid. 403\\n (prejudicial evidence).\\n\\n5 = Other\\n Common law doctrines, equitable principles, or other legal authorities not fitting\\n the categories above.\\n Examples: common law fraud, maritime law (general), equitable estoppel, doctrine\\n of laches, implied contracts.\\n\\n6 = Infrequently litigated statutes\\n Federal statutes that appear rarely in appellate litigation and are not well-known\\n by popular name. Use this when the statute is obscure or highly specialized.\\n Examples: Railway Labor Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Suits in Admiralty Act,\\n obscure provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.\\n\\n8 = State or local law or regulation\\n A state statute, state constitutional provision, local ordinance, or state/local\\n regulation. Use this when the court applies or interprets state or local law rather\\n than federal law.\\n Examples: state tort law, state contract law, state criminal statute, local zoning\\n ordinance, state environmental regulation.\\n\\n9 = No Legal Provision\\n The opinion does not meaningfully rely on any identifiable legal provision. Very\\n rare — use only when the court's analysis is purely factual or procedural without\\n citing specific legal authority.\\n\\nFor each entry:\\n- `area_code`: choose the single best area for the provision.\\n- `area_label`: the corresponding label (e.g., \\\"Constitution\\\", \\\"Federal Statute\\\").\\n- `provision_text`: identify the specific provision (e.g., \\\"Fourth Amendment, search and seizure\\\",\\n \\\"42 U.S.C. § 1983\\\", \\\"Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)\\\", \\\"state tort law\\\").\\n\\nInclude the one to three provisions central to the court's analysis. If the opinion does not meaningfully\\nrely on any legal provision (very rare), use a single entry with area_code 9 and a brief explanation.\\n\\nDistinguishing area codes:\\n- If the court interprets the CONSTITUTION ITSELF (e.g., Commerce Clause), use 1.\\n- If the court interprets a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (e.g., Fourth Amendment), use 2.\\n- If the court interprets a FEDERAL STATUTE (the most common scenario), use 3.\\n- If the dispute is about a PROCEDURAL RULE (e.g., Rule 12(b)(6) motion), use 4.\\n- Use 8 for STATE LAW even if the case is in federal court on diversity jurisdiction.\\n- Use 5 for common law doctrines that are not codified in any statute or rule.\\n- Use 6 only for genuinely obscure federal statutes that would not be recognized by name.\\n\\n\\n3.6 Decision Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\n>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>\\nCRITICAL: The codes \\\"conservative\\\" and \\\"liberal\\\" are MECHANICAL LABELS defined by the SCDB\\ncodebook. They are NOT your own assessment of political ideology. You MUST apply them exactly\\nas the lookup table below specifies, even when the result seems counterintuitive. For example,\\na decision favoring a taxpayer over the IRS is ALWAYS coded conservative (1) in a Federal\\nTaxation case, regardless of the policy context. A decision upholding a government regulation\\nis ALWAYS coded liberal (2) in an Economic Activity case, even if the regulation benefits\\nbusiness. Do NOT let your general understanding of politics override these rules.\\n<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<\\n\\nDIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE — apply mechanically based on issue_area.code and who benefits:\\n\\nissue_area.code | benefiting side | direction\\n----------------|------------------------------------------------------------|----------\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | accused / convicted person / criminal defendant | 2 (liberal)\\n1 (Crim. Pro.) | prosecution / law enforcement / government | 1 (conservative)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | civil rights or civil liberties claimant | 2 (liberal)\\n2 (Civ. Rts.) | government defendant / party opposing civil rights claim | 1 (conservative)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | person asserting First Amendment protections | 2 (liberal)\\n3 (1st Amend.) | government restricting speech, press, religion, etc. | 1 (conservative)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | individual challenging deprivation of liberty or property | 2 (liberal)\\n4 (Due Proc.) | government upholding deprivation | 1 (conservative)\\n5 (Privacy) | person asserting privacy / autonomy / reproductive choice | 2 (liberal)\\n5 (Privacy) | government restricting privacy or autonomy | 1 (conservative)\\n7 (Unions) | union / workers / collective bargaining interests | 2 (liberal)\\n7 (Unions) | employer / management / anti-union interests | 1 (conservative)\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | workers, consumers, injured parties, environment, govt | 2 (liberal)\\n | regulation, or small entities against large business |\\n8 (Econ. Act.) | employers, large business, property owners, deregulation | 1 (conservative)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | broader court access / standing / review | 2 (liberal)\\n9 (Jud. Power) | narrower court access / standing / review | 1 (conservative)\\n10 (Federalism) | federal authority over state authority | 2 (liberal)\\n10 (Federalism) | state sovereignty over federal power | 1 (conservative)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | United States / IRS / federal taxing authority | 2 (liberal)\\n12 (Fed. Tax.) | taxpayer | 1 (conservative)\\n11,14 | use 3 (unspecifiable) unless decision clearly aligns | 3 (unspecifiable)\\n | with one of the patterns above |\\n\\nPROCEDURE: You MUST FIRST determine who won the case (winning_party), THEN identify the\\nissue_area, and LAST look up the decision_direction from the table above by matching the\\nissue_area.code with the side that benefited. Do NOT reason about direction from first\\nprinciples — use the table.\\n\\nIf, after applying the table, you cannot determine which side benefited, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n\\n3.6.1 Worked Examples\\n\\nThe following three examples demonstrate correct mechanical application of the direction\\nlookup table, including cases where the SCDB coding may seem counterintuitive:\\n\\nEXAMPLE A — Federal Taxation (issue_area.code = 12)\\n\\n Facts: A taxpayer appeals an IRS assessment to the Court of Appeals. The court reverses the\\n Tax Court, holding that the taxpayer's deductions were proper and the assessment was incorrect.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 12 (Federal Taxation)\\n winning_party.code = 1 (petitioner/taxpayer received favorable disposition)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← taxpayer won; lookup table row for code 12\\n says \\\"taxpayer → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even though the taxpayer prevailed against the government, the SCDB mechanically\\n codes this as conservative (1) because the taxpayer benefited.\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE B — Criminal Procedure (issue_area.code = 1)\\n\\n Facts: A criminal defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that evidence was obtained\\n through an unlawful search. The Court of Appeals affirms, holding the search was lawful.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 1 (Criminal Procedure)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner)\\n decision_direction = 1 (conservative) ← prosecution/government benefited; lookup table\\n row for code 1 says \\\"prosecution → 1 (conservative)\\\"\\n\\n\\nEXAMPLE C — Economic Activity (issue_area.code = 8)\\n\\n Facts: A chemical company challenges an EPA water-quality regulation. The Court of Appeals\\n affirms, upholding the regulation as within the agency's statutory authority.\\n\\n Coding:\\n issue_area.code = 8 (Economic Activity)\\n winning_party.code = 0 (no favorable disposition for petitioner/company)\\n decision_direction = 2 (liberal) ← government regulation upheld against business;\\n lookup table row for code 8 says \\\"govt regulation → 2 (liberal)\\\"\\n\\n NOTE: Even if one might view upholding a regulation as a \\\"pro-business\\\" outcome (e.g., it\\n creates regulatory certainty), the SCDB mechanically codes government regulation prevailing\\n over a business challenge as liberal (2).\\n\\n\\n3.6.2 Internal Consistency Check\\n\\nBefore you output the JSON, you MUST run the following consistency check:\\n\\n1. Identify issue_area.code.\\n2. Identify which side won in the case (petitioner vs respondent) and what kind of party they are.\\n3. Look up the corresponding row in the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE above.\\n4. Verify that your decision_direction.code matches the table entry.\\n5. If it does not match, CORRECT decision_direction.code to match the table.\\n\\n\\n3.7 Lower Court Direction\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = conservative\\n2 = liberal\\n3 = unspecifiable\\n\\nUse the same DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE as for Decision Direction (see Section 3.6), but applied to\\nthe **lower court's outcome**. You MUST determine the lower court's direction by comparing the lower\\ncourt's judgment and the appellate court's disposition.\\n\\nUse this rule of thumb:\\n\\n1. First, identify the appellate disposition (case_disposition.code).\\n2. Next, identify the decision_direction.code for the Court of Appeals.\\n3. Last, infer who benefited in the lower court and assign lower_court_direction as follows:\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **leaves the lower court judgment in place** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 1 \\\"affirmed\\\"\\n or 8 \\\"petition denied or appeal dismissed\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- If the Court of Appeals clearly **undoes the lower court judgment** (e.g., case_disposition.code = 2 \\\"reversed\\\",\\n 3 \\\"reversed and remanded\\\", 4 \\\"vacated and remanded\\\", or 7 \\\"vacated\\\"), then the lower court's direction is the\\n OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n\\n- For mixed outcomes (case_disposition.code = 5 or 6), compare who won more in the lower court vs on appeal:\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is better off after the appeal than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the OPPOSITE of decision_direction.code.\\n * If, on balance, the petitioner is worse off or no better off than under the lower court judgment, then\\n the lower court's direction should usually be the SAME as decision_direction.code.\\n * If you cannot determine who benefited more from the lower court judgment even approximately, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\n- For stays, motions, certifications, or purely procedural dispositions (codes 9, 10, 0), infer who benefited in\\n the lower court if possible; if not, use 3 (unspecifiable).\\n\\nWhen you set lower_court_direction, remember:\\n- \\\"SAME\\\" means lower_court_direction.code = decision_direction.code.\\n- \\\"OPPOSITE\\\" means: if decision_direction.code = 1 (conservative), then lower_court_direction.code = 2 (liberal);\\n if decision_direction.code = 2 (liberal), then lower_court_direction.code = 1 (conservative).\\n\\n3.8 Declaration of Unconstitutionality\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n0 = the court did NOT strike down any statute, regulation, or government action as unconstitutional\\n1 = the court DID declare a statute, regulation, or government action unconstitutional\\n\\nCode 1 if the court holds that a law, regulation, executive action, or government practice violates\\nthe Constitution (whether facial or as-applied). This includes striking down acts of Congress, federal\\nregulations, state statutes, state constitutional provisions, and local ordinances.\\n\\nDo NOT code 1 merely because the court discusses constitutional issues. The court must actually\\nhold that something is unconstitutional. If the court upholds the constitutionality of the\\nchallenged provision, code 0.\\n\\n\\n3.9 Method\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = standard panel decision (typically 3 judges, first hearing)\\n2 = panel rehearing (same panel reconsidering its prior decision)\\n3 = en banc (full court or en banc panel rehearing a case)\\n4 = per curiam (unsigned opinion — may overlap with codes 1 or 3)\\n\\nUse the opinion text, metadata, and case caption to determine the method. Look for explicit\\nstatements like \\\"before the court en banc,\\\" \\\"on rehearing,\\\" \\\"upon reconsideration,\\\" or\\n\\\"per curiam.\\\" If the metadata indicates more than 3 judges participated, this strongly\\nsuggests en banc (code 3). If none of these indicators are present, use 1 (standard panel).\\n\\n\\n3.10 Who Appealed\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = original plaintiff (or the equivalent, e.g. the Title VII complainant, habeas petitioner)\\n2 = original defendant (or the equivalent, e.g. the employer in a Title VII suit)\\n3 = federal government on behalf of the original plaintiff\\n4 = federal government on behalf of the original defendant\\n\\nDetermine who initiated the appeal by examining the case caption, opinion text, and procedural\\nhistory. The \\\"original plaintiff\\\" is the party who filed suit in the lower court; the \\\"original\\ndefendant\\\" is the party who was sued. In criminal cases, the original plaintiff is typically the\\ngovernment (prosecution) and the original defendant is the accused.\\n\\nIf the opinion describes a cross-appeal, code based on who filed the PRIMARY appeal (the one\\nthe court addresses as the main appeal). If you cannot determine who appealed, use 1 as default\\nfor criminal defendants (who are most commonly appellants) or your best judgment from the caption\\nordering (appellant is typically listed first).\\n\\n\\n3.11 Dissent/Concurrence Basis (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\" or \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\",\\ncode whether that separate opinion addresses procedural issues, merits issues, or both.\\n\\nFor each dimension (procedural / merits), use one of these codes:\\n\\n0 = the dissent/concurrence exists but does NOT address this type of issue\\n1 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and DISAGREES with the majority's resolution\\n2 = addresses the SAME issue as the majority and AGREES with the majority's resolution\\n3 = addresses an issue NOT discussed by the majority opinion\\n\\n\\\"dissent_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has dissenting opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the dissent address procedural questions (jurisdiction, standing,\\n standard of review, procedural default, timeliness, etc.)?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the dissent address the substantive legal merits (statutory interpretation,\\n constitutional analysis, factual sufficiency, etc.)?\\n\\n\\\"concurrence_basis\\\" (include ONLY if \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\"):\\n - \\\"procedural\\\": Does the concurrence address procedural questions?\\n - \\\"merits\\\": Does the concurrence address the substantive legal merits?\\n\\nIf multiple dissenting or concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY one\\n(the longest or most substantive).\\n\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has dissenting opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"dissent_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\nIf the metadata says \\\"Has concurring opinion: No\\\", OMIT \\\"concurrence_type\\\" and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" entirely from your output.\\n\\n\\n3.12 Concurrence Type (Conditional)\\n\\nIf the case metadata states \\\"Has concurring opinion: Yes\\\", classify the concurrence as one of\\nthe following types:\\n\\nCodes:\\n\\n1 = regular concurrence — the concurring judge JOINED the majority opinion AND wrote or joined\\n a separate concurrence to add additional reasoning, emphasize a point, or note a limitation.\\n The key indicator: the judge agrees with BOTH the outcome AND the reasoning of the majority.\\n\\n2 = special concurrence / concurrence in result only — the concurring judge agrees with the\\n OUTCOME (disposition) but does NOT join the majority opinion's reasoning. Look for language\\n like \\\"concurring in the result,\\\" \\\"concurring in the judgment,\\\" \\\"concurring in the result\\n only,\\\" or \\\"I concur in the judgment but write separately because I disagree with the\\n majority's analysis.\\\" The key indicator: the judge explicitly declines to join the majority\\n opinion or distances themselves from the majority's reasoning.\\n\\n3 = cannot determine — the opinion text does not make clear whether the concurring judge joined\\n the majority opinion or only the result.\\n\\nThis distinction matters because special concurrences (code 2) signal reasoning disagreement\\nwithin a nominally unanimous disposition. A case where all judges agree on the outcome but one\\nwrites a special concurrence is qualitatively different from one where all judges agree on\\nboth outcome and reasoning.\\n\\nIf multiple concurring opinions exist, code based on the PRIMARY concurrence (the longest or\\nmost substantive). If one is a regular concurrence and another is a special concurrence,\\ncode based on the special concurrence (code 2), as it is more analytically informative.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n4. GENERAL RULES\\n==================================================\\n\\n- Use metadata (case name, court, date, opinion type) to:\\n - distinguish main merits opinions from rehearing or procedural opinions,\\n - interpret how the appellate disposition relates to the prior judgment,\\n - infer whether the case is criminal, civil rights, tax, etc.\\n- If some information is missing, use the appropriate \\\"unspecifiable\\\" or \\\"no disposition\\\" code\\n (e.g., 3 for direction, 11 for case_disposition); do not invent facts.\\n- Carefully follow the steps laid out in the introduction in order. In particular,\\n decide who won the case (winning_party). Then, decide what the issue_area is.\\n Only choose decision_direction once you have completed those steps, and follow the exact\\n directions in Section 3.6.\\n- In the justification, explicitly state who won, why (according to the disposition), and\\n how that winner and the issue_area code together implied the direction code you chose.\\n Reference the DIRECTION LOOKUP TABLE row you applied.\\n- ALWAYS choose exactly one code for each coded variable where required.\\n- NEVER output any keys other than the ones defined in the schema above.\\n- Include \\\"dissent_basis\\\", \\\"concurrence_type\\\", and \\\"concurrence_basis\\\" ONLY when the metadata\\n indicates the corresponding opinion type exists. Omit them entirely otherwise.\\n- NEVER output any numeric codes outside the permitted lists above.\\n\\n\\n==================================================\\n5. FINAL REQUIREMENT\\n==================================================\\n\\nAfter reading [CASE_METADATA] and [CASE_TEXT], respond ONLY with the JSON object in the schema\\nabove. Do not include any extra commentary, markdown, or explanation outside the JSON.\\n\",\n \"role\": \"system\"\n },\n {\n \"content\": \"[CASE_METADATA]\\nCase name: In re: Donald Trump\\nCourt: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit\\nDate decided: 2025-12-15\\nOpinion type: majority\\nHas dissenting opinion: No\\nHas concurring opinion: No\\nAdditional notes: \\n\\n[CASE_TEXT]\\nUnited States Court of Appeals\\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\\n ____________\\nNo. 25-5452 September Term, 2025\\n 1:25-cv-00766-JEB\\n Filed On: December 15, 2025\\nIn re: Donald J. Trump, et al.,\\n\\n Petitioners\\n\\n\\n BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs, Circuit Judges\\n\\n ORDER\\n\\n Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion\\nfor a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus, and the opposition\\nthereto; and the notice of district court orders, it is\\n\\n ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that respondents file a response to the\\npetition for a writ of mandamus, not to exceed 8,800 words, by December 29, 2025.\\nSee Fed. R. App. P. 21(a)(1), (b)(1); D.C. Cir. Rule 21(a), (b). Petitioners shall file a\\nreply, not to exceed 4,900 words, by January 5, 2026. While not otherwise limited, the\\nparties are directed to address the following issue:\\n\\n Federal law recognizes that criminal contempt may be direct or indirect.\\n See Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 797-99\\n (1987). A court may initiate criminal proceedings for indirect contempt\\n through notice and a referral for prosecution. See Fed. R. Crim. P.\\n 42(a)(1)-(2). In seeking information about decisions made outside the\\n presence of the court and referencing the possibility of a referral for\\n prosecution, the district court appears to contemplate indirect contempt\\n proceedings. See ECF No. 196 at 1. On what legal basis may a district\\n court (1) investigate possible grounds for indirect contempt and (2) delay\\n a referral for prosecution until it finds probable cause that indirect\\n contempt occurred?\\n\\n Per Curiam\\n\\n\\n FOR THE COURT:\\n Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk\\n\\n BY: /s/\\n Selena R. 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id int64 | name string | name_abbreviation string | decision_date string | docket_number string | court string | casebody string | judge1 string | judge2 string | judge3 string | exactly_three_caps int64 | extra_judges string | judge_designations string | opinions_count int64 | majority_count int64 | dissent_count int64 | concurrence_count int64 | other_count int64 | primary_citation string | reporter string | volume null | resource_url string | precedential_status string | 010combined_count int64 | 020lead_count int64 | 030concurrence_count int64 | 035concurrenceinpart_count int64 | 040dissent_count int64 | year int64 | month int64 | messages list |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
10,761,029 | United States v. Yuri Chachanko | 2025-12-18 | 24-2440 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "STRAS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | BENTON | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {"BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit", "STRAS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761029/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,762,965 | Lynne Panting v. United States | 2025-12-22 | 24-3426 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before BENTON, GRASZ, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | BENTON | GRASZ | STRAS | 1 | {"BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit", "STRAS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762965/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,925 | reVamped LLC v. City of Pipestone | 2025-12-23 | 25-1076 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BENTON, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | COLLOTON | LOKEN | BENTON | 1 | {"COLLOTON": ", Chief", "LOKEN": ", Circuit", "BENTON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763925/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,926 | United States v. Coreena Velasco | 2025-12-23 | 25-2078 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | LOKEN | KELLY | ERICKSON | 1 | {"LOKEN": ", Circuit", "KELLY": ", Circuit", "ERICKSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763926/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,591 | United States v. Jonathan Wright | 2025-12-30 | 24-2057 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before SMITH, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | SMITH | GRUENDER | SHEPHERD | 1 | {"SMITH": ", Circuit", "GRUENDER": ", Circuit", "SHEPHERD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766591/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,593 | Brooke Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School District | 2025-12-30 | 23-1374, 23-1880 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, LOKEN, SMITH, GRUENDER, BENTON, SHEPHERD, KELLY, ERICKSON, GRASZ, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges, En Banc.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, with whom GRUENDER, BENTON, STRAS, and", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeal... | COLLOTON | LOKEN | SMITH | 2 | GRUENDER; BENTON; SHEPHERD; KELLY; ERICKSON; GRASZ; STRAS; KOBES | {"COLLOTON": ", Chief", "LOKEN": ", Circuit", "SMITH": ", Circuit", "GRUENDER": ", Circuit", "BENTON": ", Circuit", "SHEPHERD": ", Circuit", "KELLY": ", Circuit", "ERICKSON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit", "STRAS": ", Circuit", "KOBES": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766593/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
10,767,327 | Breayonna Aaron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation | 2025-12-31 | 24-2654, 24-2693 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | {"judges": "Before BENTON, GRASZ, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRASZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n For the Eighth Circuit\n ___________________________\n\n ... | BENTON | GRASZ | KOBES | 1 | {"BENTON": ", Circuit", "GRASZ": ", Circuit", "KOBES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10767327/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,225 | Singh v. Bondi | 2025-12-01 | 24-815 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Sandra S. Ikuta, Ryan D. Nelson, and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nBALJIT SINGH, ... | SANDRA S IKUTA | RYAN D NELSON | LAWRENCE VANDYKE | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745225/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,279 | Rhode v. Bonta | 2025-12-01 | 24-542 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURGUIA, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 1 2025\n MOLL... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745279/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
10,745,917 | Antonio Doyle v. Terry Royal | 2025-12-02 | 20-99013 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: William A. Fletcher, Eric D. Miller, and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MILLER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nANTONIO LAVON DOYLE, N... | WILLIAM A FLETCHER | ERIC D MILLER | KENNETH K LEE | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745917/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,746,641 | San Luis Obispo Coastkeeper v. County of San Luis Obispo | 2025-12-03 | 24-7807 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Danielle J. Forrest, and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nSAN LUIS OBISPO ... | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | DANIELLE J FORREST | LAWRENCE VANDYKE | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746641/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,746,687 | Li v. Arcsoft, Inc. | 2025-12-03 | 24-2964 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judge, and Raner C. Collins, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Circuit Judge, and Raner C. Collins, District Judge. *", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR... | MARY H MURGUIA | DANIELLE J FORREST | RANER C COLLINS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746687/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,747,827 | State of Washington v. United States Department of Education | 2025-12-04 | 25-7157 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Richard C. Tallman, Jay S. Bybee, and Gabriel P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 4 2025\n ... | RICHARD C TALLMAN | JAY S BYBEE | GABRIEL P SANCHEZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10747827/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,748,295 | International Partners for Ethical Care Inc v. Ferguson | 2025-12-05 | 24-3661 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "VanDyke, joined by Judge Bumatay, stated that", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nINTERNATIONAL P... | SIDNEY R THOMAS | MILAN D SMITH JR | DANIEL A BRESS | 1 | {} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748295/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,749,402 | State of Oregon v. Trump | 2025-12-08 | 25-6268 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before Approving Military Plan: ‘Am I Watching Things on Television That Are Different from What's Happening?", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURGUIA, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ... | APPROVING MILITARY PLAN | TELEVISION | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749402/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||
10,750,643 | United States v. Kittson | 2025-12-10 | 23-4132 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Mary M. Schroeder, John B. Owens, and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "OWENS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No.... | MARY M SCHROEDER | JOHN B OWENS | LAWRENCE VANDYKE | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10750643/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,753,349 | Human Rights Defense Center, Inc. v. Uttecht | 2025-12-11 | 24-2552 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Jay S. Bybee and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges, and Xavier Rodriguez, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FORREST, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nHUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE ... | JAY S BYBEE | DANIELLE J FORREST | XAVIER RODRIGUEZ | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10753349/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,753,351 | Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc. | 2025-12-11 | 25-2935 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: SIDNEY R. THOMAS and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges, and MICHAEL J. MCSHANE, Chief District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nEPIC... | SIDNEY R THOMAS | MILAN D SMITH JR | MICHAEL J MCSHANE | 1 | {"SIDNEY R THOMAS": "MILAN D SMITH, JR , Circuit", "MILAN D SMITH JR": "MILAN D SMITH, JR , Circuit", "MICHAEL J MCSHANE": ", Chief District"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10753351/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,322 | International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board | 2025-12-16 | 23-632 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURGUIA, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 16 2025\n MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK\n ... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759322/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
10,759,958 | United States v. Avalos | 2025-12-17 | 23-3944 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Richard R. Clifton and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3944\n ... | RICHARD R CLIFTON | KENNETH K LEE | RICHARD R CLIFTON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759958/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,744 | United States v. Patrick | 2025-12-19 | 24-2638 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Ronald M. Gould, Richard C. Tallman, and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ... | RONALD M GOULD | RICHARD C TALLMAN | MORGAN B CHRISTEN | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761744/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,745 | United States v. Justus | 2025-12-19 | 24-1641 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges, and Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATE... | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | DANIEL A BRESS | RICHARD D BENNETT | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761745/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,782 | Weldeyohannes v. State of Washington | 2025-12-19 | 24-3821 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GOULD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nMUSSIE E. WELDEYOHANNES, No. ... | WILLIAM A FLETCHER | RONALD M GOULD | ANA DE ALBA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761782/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,783 | Reges v. Cauce | 2025-12-19 | 24-3518 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRESS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nSTUART REGES, ... | SIDNEY R THOMAS | MILAN D SMITH JR | DANIEL A BRESS | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761783/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,039 | Vip Mortgage Incorporated v. Gates | 2025-12-22 | 24-7624 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Richard C. Tallman, Bridget S. Bade, and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LEE, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nVIP MORTGAGE No. ... | RICHARD C TALLMAN | BRIDGET S BADE | KENNETH K LEE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763039/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,040 | United States v. Rodriguez | 2025-12-22 | 24-593 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Roopali H. Desai, and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DESAI, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ... | CONSUELO M CALLAHAN | ROOPALI H DESAI | ANA DE ALBA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763040/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,041 | Ruiz v. Bondi | 2025-12-22 | 23-1095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nCHRISTIAN RUIZ, ... | CONSUELO M CALLAHAN | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | JENNIFER SUNG | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763041/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,137 | United States v. Holmes | 2025-12-22 | 23-1167 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Ryan D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 2... | MARY M SCHROEDER | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | RYAN D NELSON | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763137/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,764,095 | Industrial Park Center LLC v. Great Northern Insurance Company | 2025-12-23 | 24-4788 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Susan P. Graber, Richard C. Tallman, and Bridget S. Bade, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "United States Circuit Judge, Presiding", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nINDUSTRIAL PARK CENTER ... | SUSAN P GRABER | RICHARD C TALLMAN | BRIDGET S BADE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764095/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,764,153 | Thakur v. Trump | 2025-12-23 | 25-4249 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Richard A. Paez, Morgan B. Christen, and Roopali H. Desai, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC ... | RICHARD A PAEZ | MORGAN B CHRISTEN | ROOPALI H DESAI | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764153/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,764,198 | Powers v. McDonough | 2025-12-23 | 24-6338 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Consuelo M. Callahan, Roopali H. Desai, and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "DE ALBA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nJEFFREY POWERS; DEAVIN No. 24-6... | CONSUELO M CALLAHAN | ROOPALI H DESAI | ANA DE ALBA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764198/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,012 | amazon.com Services, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board | 2025-12-29 | 25-886 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Danielle J. Forrest, and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FORREST, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nAMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC; ... | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | DANIELLE J FORREST | LAWRENCE VANDYKE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766012/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,013 | Wilkins v. United States | 2025-12-29 | 25-37 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: MILAN D. SMITH, JR., JACQUELINE H. NGUYEN, and HOLLY A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nLARRY STEVEN WILKINS; WILL ... | MILAN D SMITH JR | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | HOLLY A THOMAS | 1 | {"MILAN D SMITH JR": ", Circuit", "JACQUELINE H NGUYEN": ", Circuit", "HOLLY A THOMAS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766013/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,014 | Milliken v. Bank of America, N.A. | 2025-12-29 | 24-4498 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Morgan B. Christen, Daniel A. Bress, and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRESS, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nAUSTIN MILLIKEN, ... | MORGAN B CHRISTEN | DANIEL A BRESS | LAWRENCE VANDYKE | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766014/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,015 | Khatibi v. Hawkins | 2025-12-29 | 24-3108 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: A. Wallace Tashima, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Salvador Mendoza, Jr., Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "the petition for rehearing en banc and Judge Tashima so", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT... | A WALLACE TASHIMA | JACQUELINE H NGUYEN | SALVADOR MENDOZA JR | 1 | {} | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766015/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,016 | Insinkerator, LLC v. Joneca Company, LLC | 2025-12-29 | 25-286 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Stephen A. Higginson, and Jennifer Sung, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nINSINKERATOR, LLC, a Delaware ... | MARSHA S BERZON | STEPHEN A HIGGINSON | JENNIFER SUNG | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766016/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,017 | Employees at the Clark County Government Center and or on Its Property v. Monsanto Company | 2025-12-29 | 25-6625 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MILLER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nEMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK No. 25-6625\nCOUNTY GOVE... | KIM MCLANE WARDLAW | ERIC D MILLER | KIM MCLANE WARDLAW | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766017/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,046 | Thompson v. Central Valley School District No 365 | 2025-12-29 | 24-5263 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould, and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GOULD, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nRANDEY THOMPSON, No... | WILLIAM A FLETCHER | RONALD M GOULD | ANA DE ALBA | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766046/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,095 | State of Oregon v. Trump | 2025-12-29 | 25-7194 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURGUIA, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION FILED\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 29 2025\n M... | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766095/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
10,766,639 | Employees at the Clark County Government Center and or on Its Property v. Monsanto Company | 2025-12-29 | 25-6625 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit | {"judges": "Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Eric D. Miller, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MILLER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "FOR PUBLICATION\n\n UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT\n\nEMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK No. 25-6625\nCOUNTY GOVE... | KIM MCLANE WARDLAW | ERIC D MILLER | KIM MCLANE WARDLAW | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766639/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,749,804 | United States v. Rainford | 2025-12-09 | 24-7022 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before TYMKOVICH, CARSON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-7022 Document: 69 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 1\n ... | TYMKOVICH | CARSON | FEDERICO | 1 | {"TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "CARSON": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749804/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,754,605 | United States v. McHenry | 2025-12-12 | 24-7048 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before McHUGH, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EID, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-7048 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 1\n ... | MCHUGH | EID | FEDERICO | 1 | {"McHUGH": ", Circuit", "EID": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754605/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,135 | Plump v. Government Employees Insurance Company | 2025-12-16 | 24-3091 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURPHY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-3091 Document: 48 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HOLMES | MURPHY | MCHUGH | 1 | {"HOLMES": ", Chief", "MURPHY": ", Circuit", "McHUGH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759135/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,253 | United States v. Munoz | 2025-12-16 | 24-1418 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "McHUGH, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-1418 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HARTZ | TYMKOVICH | MCHUGH | 1 | {"HARTZ": ", Circuit", "TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "McHUGH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759253/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,254 | United States v. Kirby | 2025-12-16 | 24-7070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-7070 Document: 67-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1\n FILED\n ... | MATHESON | PHILLIPS | ROSSMAN | 1 | {"MATHESON": ", Circuit", "PHILLIPS": ", Circuit", "ROSSMAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759254/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,255 | United States v. Duque-Ramirez | 2025-12-16 | 24-6257 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before MORITZ, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-6257 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1\n ... | MORITZ | KELLY | ROSSMAN | 1 | {"MORITZ": ", Circuit", "KELLY": ", Circuit", "ROSSMAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759255/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,347 | United States v. Holt | 2025-12-16 | 24-7044 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MORITZ and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MORITZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-7044 Document: 62-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HOLMES | MORITZ | ROSSMAN | 1 | {"HOLMES": ", Chief", "MORITZ": ", Circuit", "ROSSMAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759347/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,762,968 | Standard Insurances v. IRS | 2025-12-22 | 24-4094 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-4094 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HARTZ | TYMKOVICH | FEDERICO | 1 | {"HARTZ": ", Circuit", "TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762968/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,762,969 | Berberich v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company | 2025-12-22 | 24-3154 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "HARTZ, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-3154 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HARTZ | TYMKOVICH | FEDERICO | 1 | {"HARTZ": ", Circuit", "TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762969/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,077 | Ortega v. Lujan Grisham | 2025-12-22 | 24-2121 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, BACHARACH, PHILLIPS, McHUGH, MORITZ, EID, CARSON, ROSSMAN, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-2121 Document: 117 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Pag... | HOLMES | HARTZ | TYMKOVICH | 2 | MATHESON; BACHARACH; PHILLIPS; MCHUGH; MORITZ; EID; CARSON; ROSSMAN; FEDERICO | {"HOLMES": ", Chief", "HARTZ": ", Circuit", "TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "MATHESON": ", Circuit", "BACHARACH": ", Circuit", "PHILLIPS": ", Circuit", "McHUGH": ", Circuit", "MORITZ": ", Circuit", "EID": ", Circuit", "CARSON": ", Circuit", "ROSSMAN": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763077/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
10,764,062 | Lancaster v. Cartmell | 2025-12-23 | 25-6000 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 25-6000 Document: 49 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1\n ... | TYMKOVICH | PHILLIPS | MCHUGH | 1 | {"TYMKOVICH": ", Circuit", "PHILLIPS": ", Circuit", "McHUGH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764062/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,764,814 | United States v. Cole | 2025-12-24 | 24-7077 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, EBEL, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EBEL, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-7077 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/24/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HOLMES | EBEL | CARSON | 1 | {"HOLMES": ", Chief", "EBEL": ", Circuit", "CARSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10764814/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,595 | United States v. Raban | 2025-12-30 | 24-1359 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before PHILLIPS, EBEL, and EID, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-1359 Document: 75-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\n ... | PHILLIPS | EBEL | EID | 1 | {"PHILLIPS": ", Circuit", "EBEL": ", Circuit", "EID": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766595/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,661 | United States v. State of Kansas Department of Health & Environment | 2025-12-30 | 24-3041 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "MURPHY, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-3041 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/30/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HOLMES | MURPHY | MCHUGH | 1 | {"HOLMES": ", Chief", "MURPHY": ", Circuit", "McHUGH": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766661/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,766,736 | Rio Grande Foundation v. Oliver | 2025-12-30 | 24-2070 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "", "resource_uri": "https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/opinions/11233321/"}]} | 0 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10766736/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||||||
10,767,248 | United States v. Poterbin | 2025-12-31 | 23-3128 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HARTZ, EBEL, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "EBEL, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 23-3128 Document: 115-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HARTZ | EBEL | ROSSMAN | 1 | {"HARTZ": ", Circuit", "EBEL": ", Circuit", "ROSSMAN": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10767248/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,767,599 | North Brevard County Hospital District v. C.R. Bard | 2025-12-31 | 24-4039 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit | {"judges": "Before HARTZ, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "FEDERICO, Circuit Judge.", "type": "010combined", "text": "Appellate Case: 24-4039 Document: 90-1 Date Filed: 12/31/2025 Page: 1\n ... | HARTZ | EID | FEDERICO | 1 | {"HARTZ": ", Circuit", "EID": ", Circuit", "FEDERICO": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10767599/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,291 | Tiffany Wingo v. Major Branson Harris | 2025-12-01 | 24-10933 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRASHER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10933 Document: 54-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\... | ROSENBAUM | GRANT | BRASHER | 1 | {"ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "BRASHER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745291/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,332 | United States v. John Wayne Thomas | 2025-12-01 | 24-11427 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-11427 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 11\n\n\n\n\n FOR PU... | WILLIAM PRYOR | LAGOA | KIDD | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745332/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,333 | In re: Georgia Senate Bill 202 | 2025-12-01 | 23-13095 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-13095 Document: 188-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATI... | JORDAN | NEWSOM | CORRIGAN | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "CORRIGAN": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745333/ | Published | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,334 | HM Florida-ORL, LLC v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Business | 2025-12-01 | 23-12160 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before William Pryor, Chief Judge, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, Brasher, Abudu, and Kidd, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-12160 Document: 105-1 Date Filed: 12/01/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\nIn the\n\n... | WILLIAM PRYOR | JORDAN | ROSENBAUM | 2 | JILL PRYOR; NEWSOM; BRANCH; GRANT; LUCK; LAGOA; BRASHER; ABUDU; KIDD | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745334/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | |||
10,745,962 | Francisco Lagos Marmol v. Kalonymus Development Partners, LLC | 2025-12-02 | 23-13678 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before LUCK, LAGOA, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "LAGOA, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-13678 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n ... | LUCK | LAGOA | ABUDU | 1 | {"LUCK": ", Circuit", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "ABUDU": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745962/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,746,149 | United States v. Ronald Anthony Beasley, II | 2025-12-02 | 24-10506 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10506 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | BRANCH | ABUDU | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "BRANCH": ", Cir cuit", "ABUDU": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746149/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,746,150 | United States v. Karen Altagracia Perez | 2025-12-02 | 23-12336 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-12336 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/02/2025 Page: 1 of 14\n\n\n\n\n FOR... | WILLIAM PRYOR | BRANCH | ABUDU | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "BRANCH": ", Cir cuit", "ABUDU": ", Cir cuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746150/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,746,612 | Cecil Dante Buckner v. United States | 2025-12-03 | 24-10001 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10001 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 12/03/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n FOR ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | BRANCH | ABUDU | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "BRANCH": ", Cir cuit", "ABUDU": ", Cir cuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10746612/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,747,663 | Florida Preborn Rescue, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, Florida | 2025-12-04 | 23-13501 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-13501 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/04/2025 Page: 1 of 38\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | NEWSOM | GRANT | ABUDU | 1 | {"NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "ABUDU": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10747663/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,748,218 | Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree | 2025-12-05 | 25-10604 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ABUDU, TJOFLAT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 25-10604 Document: 23-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 24\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION... | ABUDU | TJOFLAT | ANDERSON | 1 | {"ABUDU": ", Circuit", "TJOFLAT": ", Circuit", "ANDERSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748218/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,748,282 | Shane Villarino v. Pacesetter Personnel Service, Inc. | 2025-12-05 | 23-10645 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRANT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-10645 Document: 69-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 20\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | NEWSOM | GRANT | ABUDU | 1 | {"NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "ABUDU": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748282/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,748,433 | Florida Agency for Health Care Administration v. Administrator for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services | 2025-12-05 | 24-10875 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,* District Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10875 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/05/2025 Page: 1 of 45\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBL... | JORDAN | NEWSOM | CORRIGAN | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "CORRIGAN": ", District"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748433/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
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"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,749,215 | Fairfield Southern Company v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs | 2025-12-08 | 24-10651 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRASHER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10651 Document: 61-1 Date Filed: 12/08/2025 Page: 1 of 19\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n... | ROSENBAUM | GRANT | BRASHER | 1 | {"ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "BRASHER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749215/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,749,767 | Kimberley Diane Settle v. David Collier | 2025-12-09 | 24-12436 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ABUDU, Cir- cuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, CHIEF JUDGE", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-12436 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 12/09/2025 Page: 1 of 26\n\n\n\n\n ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | BRANCH | ABUDU | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "BRANCH": ", Cir cuit", "ABUDU": ", Cir cuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749767/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,754,576 | United States v. Victor Cremades | 2025-12-12 | 24-10284 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10284 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/12/2025 Page: 1 of 15\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\... | ROSENBAUM | LAGOA | ED CARNES | 1 | {"ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "ED CARNES": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754576/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,757,325 | Frank A. Walls v. Secretary, Department of Corrections | 2025-12-13 | 25-14302 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 25-14302 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2025 Page: 1 of 9\n\n\n\n\n ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | ROSENBAUM | JILL PRYOR | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "JILL PRYOR": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10757325/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,758,268 | Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. Attorney General, State of Alabama | 2025-12-15 | 24-13111 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-13111 Document: 94-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | ROSENBAUM | GRANT | BRASHER | 1 | {"ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "BRASHER": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758268/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,758,304 | Stacey Humphreys v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections | 2025-12-15 | 25-14325 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 25-14325 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | ROSENBAUM | NEWSOM | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit"} | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758304/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,758,392 | Eboni Williams v. Gerald Shapiro | 2025-12-15 | 24-11192 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and HONEYWELL, Dis- trict Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "JORDAN, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-11192 Document: 76-1 Date Filed: 12/15/2025 Page: 1 of 18\n\n\n\n\n FOR P... | JORDAN | NEWSOM | HONEYWELL | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "HONEYWELL": ", Dis trict"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758392/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,759,426 | Creative Choice Homes XXXI, LLC v. Mg Affordable Master, Llc | 2025-12-16 | 23-10198 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "ABUDU, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-10197 Document: 52-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 42\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n... | ROSENBAUM | NEWSOM | ABUDU | 1 | {"ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "ABUDU": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10759426/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,760,279 | National Small Business United v. U.S. Department of the Treasury | 2025-12-16 | 24-10736 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "BRASHER, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10736 Document: 122-1 Date Filed: 12/16/2025 Page: 1 of 21\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | NEWSOM | BRASHER | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "BRASHER": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10760279/ | Published | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,760,278 | United States v. Sharon Keegan | 2025-12-17 | 22-13019 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "GRANT, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 22-13019 Document: 60-1 Date Filed: 12/17/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | NEWSOM | GRANT | ABUDU | 1 | {"NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "ABUDU": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10760278/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,036 | Racheal Gantt v. Deputy Everett | 2025-12-18 | 24-12167 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-12167 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 12/18/2025 Page: 1 of 13\n\n\n\n\n FOR ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | LAGOA | KIDD | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761036/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,761,881 | United States v. Hassan Jones | 2025-12-19 | 24-10938 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and CORRIGAN,∗ Dis- trict Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-10938 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2025 Page: 1 of 23\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICA... | JORDAN | NEWSOM | CORRIGAN | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "CORRIGAN": ", Dis trict"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10761881/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,762,941 | Elena Mukhina v. Walmart, Inc. | 2025-12-22 | 24-11586 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-11586 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 12\n\n\n\n\n FOR PU... | WILLIAM PRYOR | LAGOA | KIDD | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762941/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,762,986 | James Malvezzi v. State of Florida | 2025-12-22 | 24-13051 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-12600 Document: 53-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | JILL PRYOR | LUCK | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "JILL PRYOR": ", Circuit", "LUCK": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10762986/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,079 | United States v. Tyrell Bouie | 2025-12-22 | 24-12347 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-12347 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 5\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | ROSENBAUM | GRANT | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "ROSENBAUM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763079/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,080 | United States v. Benjamin Graddy | 2025-12-22 | 25-10191 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 25-10164 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | NEWSOM | BRASHER | ANDERSON | 1 | {"NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "BRASHER": ", Circuit", "ANDERSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763080/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,138 | United States v. Juan Ortiz-Valle | 2025-12-22 | 23-12388 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, KIDD, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-12388 Document: 56-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | KIDD | ANDERSON | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit", "ANDERSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763138/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,139 | United States v. Jonathan Grenon | 2025-12-22 | 23-13478 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, LUCK, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 23-13478 Document: 118-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 30\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | LUCK | KIDD | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "LUCK": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763139/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,140 | United States v. Gito St Fort | 2025-12-22 | 25-10369 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, KIDD, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 25-10369 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | KIDD | MARCUS | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit", "MARCUS": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763140/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,170 | Aileen Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs | 2025-12-22 | 22-12354 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 22-12354 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 49\n\n\n\n\n FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | LAGOA | TJOFLAT | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "TJOFLAT": ", Circuit"} | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763170/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,171 | Zurich American Insurance Company v. Jerry Walker | 2025-12-22 | 24-12085 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-12085 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 8\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | NEWSOM | GRANT | TJOFLAT | 1 | {"NEWSOM": ", Circuit", "GRANT": ", Circuit", "TJOFLAT": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763171/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,172 | United States v. Josue Garriga, III | 2025-12-22 | 24-13988 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-13988 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 2\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | BRANCH | KIDD | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "BRANCH": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763172/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,232 | United States v. Marco Duncan | 2025-12-22 | 24-13715 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before JORDAN, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-13085 Document: 58-1 Date Filed: 12/22/2025 Page: 1 of 6\n\n\n\n\n NOT FOR PUBLICATION\n\n\n ... | JORDAN | KIDD | WILSON | 1 | {"JORDAN": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit", "WILSON": ", Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763232/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,763,814 | United States v. Erika Day | 2025-12-23 | 24-13312 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | {"judges": "Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and LAGOA and KIDD, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge", "type": "010combined", "text": "USCA11 Case: 24-13312 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 12/23/2025 Page: 1 of 10\n\n\n\n\n FOR ... | WILLIAM PRYOR | LAGOA | KIDD | 1 | {"WILLIAM PRYOR": ", Chief", "LAGOA": ", Circuit", "KIDD": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10763814/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,745,905 | United States v. Derrek Arrington | 2025-12-02 | 24-3077 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Before: CHILDS and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n\nFOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\nArgued October 21... | CHILDS | GARCIA | RANDOLPH | 1 | {"CHILDS": ", Circuit", "GARCIA": ", Circuit", "RANDOLPH": ", Senior Circuit"} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10745905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,747,722 | DC v. Donald Trump | 2025-12-04 | 25-5418 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: Millett, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the emergency motion for administrative stay and for stay pending", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRIC... | MILLETT | KATSAS | RAO | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10747722/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,748,283 | Gwynne A. Wilcox v. Donald J. Trump | 2025-12-05 | 25-5057 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Before: KATSAS, WALKER, and PAN, Circuit Judges.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued May 16, 2025 Decided Decem... | KATSAS | WALKER | PAN | 1 | {"KATSAS": ", Circuit", "WALKER": ", Circuit", "PAN": ", Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10748283/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,749,905 | Nicolas Talbott v. USA | 2025-12-09 | 25-5087 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: Pillard*, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "PER CURIAM", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n ... | PILLARD | KATSAS | RAO | 1 | {} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10749905/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,754,578 | United States v. Jeffrey Williamson | 2025-12-12 | 24-3014 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "Before: RAO and WALKER, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.", "parties": "", "opinions": [{"author": "Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.", "type": "010combined", "text": "United States Court of Appeals\n FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT\n\n\n\nArgued Se... | RAO | WALKER | RANDOLPH | 1 | {"RAO": ", Circuit", "WALKER": ", Circuit", "RANDOLPH": ", Senior Circuit"} | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754578/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,754,785 | In re: Donald Trump | 2025-12-12 | 25-5452 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion for a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus and for an administrative stay, and the opposition to the motion for a stay; and the notice of district ... | RAO | WALKER | CHILDS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10754785/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... | ||||
10,758,394 | In re: Donald Trump | 2025-12-15 | 25-5452 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | {"judges": "BEFORE: Rao, Walker, and Childs, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of mandamus; the emergency motion for a stay pending resolution of the petition for a writ of mandamus, and the opposition thereto; and the notice of district court orders, it is ORDERED, on the court’s own m... | RAO | WALKER | CHILDS | 1 | {} | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | null | https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/clusters/10758394/ | Published | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2,025 | 12 | [
{
"content": "You are an expert legal coding assistant trained to classify U.S. federal Courts of Appeals\ncases using an adaptation of the Supreme Court Database (SCDB_2023_01) codebook. You follow the coding procedure\nin the codebook step by step and use the precise definitions of terms presented in the code... |
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